SooperKanoon Citation | sooperkanoon.com/640942 |
Subject | Election |
Court | Supreme Court of India |
Decided On | Sep-29-1989 |
Case Number | Civil Appeal Nos. 484 and 485 of 1987 |
Judge | K.N. Saikia,; M.H. Kania and; S. Ranganathan, JJ. |
Reported in | AIR1990SC1889; JT1989(4)SC186; 1989(2)SCALE891; 1989Supp(2)SCC504 |
Acts | Representation of the People Act, 1951 - Sections 1, 3(1)(A), 123 and 123(1)(A) |
Appellant | B. Rajagopala Rao and anr. |
Respondent | Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors. |
Cases Referred | H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh |
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$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp' $dataForView = array( 'title_for_layout' => 'B Rajagopala Rao and anr Vs Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors - Citation 640942 - Court Judgment | ', 'desc' => array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '640942', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/50684/representation-of-the-people-act-1951-complete-act">Representation of the People Act, 1951</a> - Sections 1, 3(1)(A), 123 and 123(1)(A)', 'appealno' => 'Civil Appeal Nos. 484 and 485 of 1987', 'appellant' => 'B. Rajagopala Rao and anr.', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'B. Rajagopala Rao and anr. Vs. Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors.', 'casenote' => 'Election - corrupt practices - Sections 123 and 123 (1) (A) of Representation of the People Act, 1951 - whether advertisements by public department and speeches made by respondent No. 1 to sell dhoti and sarees at discount rates amount to corrupt practices - offer was available for mass and for limited duration - such offer was bound to have financial repercussions and it is quite possible that duration of offer limited to enable Government to study financial repercussions rather than from any improper motive - offer not amounted to corrupt practices. - [ D.A. Desai,; O. Chinnappa Reddy and; R.S. Sarkaria, JJ.] The Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 empowers the Union of India in the public interest to take under its control the industries specified in the First Schedule to the Act. Item 23 of the First Schedule relates to textiles of various categories. Section 15 authorises the Central Government to make or cause to be made a full and complete investigation into the circumstances of the case if the Central Government is of the opinion that (a) in respect of any scheduled industry or industrial undertaking or undertakings (i) there has been, or is likely to be, a substantial fall in the volume of production for which, having regard to the economic conditions prevailing, there is no justification; or (ii) there has been, or is likely to be, a marked deterioration in the quality of any article... which could have been or can be avoided; or (iii) there has been or is likely to be a rise in the price of any article..... for which there is no justification; or (iv) it is necessary to take any such action for the purpose of conserving any resources of national importance; or (b) any industrial undertaking is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest. After the investigation is made under section 15, section 16(1) empowers the Central Government if action is desirable, to issue appropriate directions, and section 16(2) provides for the issue of interim directions by the Central Government pending investigation under section 15. Chapter III-A consisting of Sections 18A, 18-AA, 18-B, 18-C, 18-D, 18-E and 18-F deal with "direct management or control of Industrial Undertakings by Central Government in certain cases". Sec. 18-A empowers the Central Government by notified order, to authorise any person or body of persons to take over the management of the whole or any part of an industrial undertaking or to exercise in respect of the whole, or any part of the undertaking such functions of control as may be specified in the order, if the Central Government is of opinion that: (a) an industrial undertaking to which directions have been issued in pursuance of section 16 has failed to comply with such directions, or (b) an industrial undertaking in respect of which an investigation has been made under section 15 is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest. Section 18AA(5) stipulates that the provisions of Sections 18-B to 18 E shall be applicable to the industrial undertaking in respect of which an order has been made under section 18-AA even as they apply to an industrial undertaking taken over under Section 18-A. Section 18-F empowers the Central Government to cancel the order made under section 18-A if it appears that the purpose of the order has been fulfilled or it is not necessary that the order should remain in force. The appellant M/s. Swadeshi Cotton Mills was taken over by the Government of India by a notification dated April 13, 1978 in exercise of the powers conferred on it under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 18AA of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 on the ground that the company had by creation of encumbrances on the assets of its industrial undertakings, brought about a situation which had affected and is likely to further affect the production of articles manufactured or produced by it and that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation. The Government authorised the National Textile Corporation Limited to take over the management, subject to the conditions that the authorised person shall comply with all the directions issued from time to time by the Central Government and that the authorised person shall hold office for a period of five years. The appellant Mills challenged the aforesaid order in a writ petition in the High Court. The case was heard by a Full Bench of five Judges to consider the question whether in construing section 18AA of the Industries Development and Regulation Act, 1951, compliance with the principle of audi alteram partem is to be implied and whether hearing is to be given to the parties who would be affected by the order to be passed prior to the passing of the order or whether hearing can be given after the order is passed and whether the order passed under the said Section is vitiated by not giving of such hearing and whether such vice can be cured. The Bench by a majority answered the three questions as follows:- (a) Section 18AA(1)(a)(b) excludes the giving of prior hearing to the party who would be affected by order thereunder. (b) Section 18-F expressly provides for a post- decisional hearing to the owner of the industrial undertaking, the management of which is taken over under section 18AA to have the order made under section 18AA cancelled on any relevant ground. (c) As the taking over of management under section 18A is not vitiated by the failure to grant prior hearing the question of any such vice being cured by a grant of a subsequent hearing does not arise. The minority, however, held that in compliance with the principles of natural justice, prior hearing to the owner of the undertaking was required to be given before the passing of an order under section 18AA, that the second question did not arise as the denial of a prior hearing would not cure the vice by the grant of subsequent hearing, but it would be open to the Court to moderate the relief in such a way that the order is kept alive to the extent necessary until the making of the fresh order to subserve public interest and to make appropriate directions. After the decision on the reference the case was reheard on merits by a Full Bench of three Judges and the writ petition was allowed in part. The challenge to the validity of the order being rejected but insofar as the impugned order seeking to take over the corporate entity of the company, the corporate entity of the subsidiary and its assets, the petition was allowed and the respondents, the Union of India and the authorised person were directed to release from its control and custody and/or deliver possession of any assets or property of the company which were not referable to the industrial undertakings. Appeals to this Court were filed on behalf of the Company as well as by the Union of India and the National Textile Corporation. Two propositions were propounded on behalf of the company that: (a) Whether it was necessary to observe the rules of natural justice before issuing a notified order under section 18AA(1)(a) and further whether section 18-F impliedly excludes rules of natural justice relating to prior hearing; and it was contended (1) the mere use of the word 'immediate' in sub-clause (a) of section 18AA does not show a legislative intent to exclude the application of audi alteram partem rule altogether. (2) The word 'immediate' in clause (a) has been used in contra distinction to 'investigate'. It only means that under section 18AA action can be taken without prior investigation under section 15. The use of the word 'immediate' in section 18AA(1)(a) only dispenses with investigation under section 15 and not with the principle of audi alteram partem altogether and this is indicated by the marginal note of section 18A and para 3 of the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Amendment Bill which inserted section 18AA in 1971. (3) The word 'immediate' occurs only in clause (a) and not in clause (b) of section 18AA(1). It would be odd if intention to exclude this principle of natural justice is spelt out in one clause of the sub-section when the other clause does not exclude it. (4) Section 18-F does not exclude a pre-decisional hearing. The so-called post-decisional hearing contemplated by section 18-F cannot be and is not intended to be a substitute for a pre-decisional hearing. (5) Section 18F incorporates only a facet, albeit qualified, of section 21 of the General Clauses Act. The language of the Section implicity prohibits an enquiry into circumstances that led to the passing of the order of take-over and under it the aggrieved person is not entitled to show that on merits the order was void ab initio. (6) 'Immediacy' does not exclude a duty to act fairly because even an emergent situation can co-exist with the canons of natural justice. The only effect of urgency on the application of the principle of fair hearing would be that the width, form and duration of the hearing would be tailored to the situation and reduced to the reasonable minimum so that it does not delay and defeat the purpose of the contemplated action. (7) Where the civil consequences of the administrative action are grave and its effect is highly prejudicial to the rights and interests of the person affected and there is nothing in the language and scheme of the statute which unequivocally excludes a fair pre-decisional hearing and the post-decisional hearing provided therein is not a real remedial hearing equitable to a full right of appeal the Court should be loath to infer a legislative intent to exclude even a minimal fair hearing at the pre-decisional stage merely on ground of urgency. (8) The Central Government appointed four Government Officials including one from the office of the Textile Commissioner to study the affairs of the Company and to make recommendation. This Official Group submitted its report on February 16, 1978. The evidence on the basis of which the impugned order was passed was not disclosed to the appellant company till May 1978, only after it had filed the writ petition in the High Court. If there was anything adverse to the appellants in the survey report there was time enough about six weeks between the submission of the Survey Report and the passing of the impugned order for giving a short, reasonable opportunity to the appellants to explain the adverse findings against them. If there was immediacy situational modifications could be made to meet the requirement of fairness, by reducing the period of notice; that even the manner and form of such notice could be simplified to eliminate delay, that telephonic notice or short opportunity for furnishing their explanation to the Company might have satisfied the requirements of natural justice. Such an opportunity of hearing could have been given after the passing of a conditional tentative order and before its enforcement under section 18AA. For the interregnum suitable interim action such as freezing the assets of the Company or restraining the Company from creating further encumbrances, could be taken under section 16. On behalf of the Union of India and the Authorised Officer it was contended that (1) the presumption in favour of audi alteram partem rule stands impliedly displaced by the language scheme, setting and the purpose of the provision in section 18AA. (2) Section 18AA on its plain terms deals with situations where immediate preventive action is required. The paramount concern is to avoid serious problems which may be caused by fall in production. The purpose of an order under section 18AA is not to condemn the owner but to protect the scheduled industry. The issue under section 18AA is not solely between the Government and the management of the industrial undertaking. The object of taking action under this Section is to protect other outside interests of the community at large and the workers. (3) The rule of natural justice to give a hearing has been incorporated in section 18-F which gives an opportunity of a post-decisional hearing to the owner of the undertaking who if he feels aggrieved can on his application be heard, to show that even the original order under section 18AA was passed on invalid grounds and should be cancelled or rescinded. (4) On a true construction of section 18AA read with section 18-F the requirements of natural justice and fair play can be read into the statute only insofar as conformance to such canons can reasonably and realistically be required of it by the provision for a remedial hearing at a subsequent stage. (5) Under section 18-F the Central Government exercises curial functions and that Section confers on the aggrieved owner a right to apply to the Government to cancel the order of take-over. This section casts an obligation on the Central Government to deal with and dispose of an application filed thereunder with reasonable expedition. Allowing the appeal by the Company,<br />HELD: (Sarkaria & Desai, JJ. per Chinnappa Reddy, J. dissenting.) In the facts and circumstances of the instant case, there has been a noncompliance with the implied requirement of the audi alteram partem rule of natural justice at the pre-decisional stage. The impugned order could be struck down as invalid on that score alone. But in view of the commitment / concession that a hearing would be afforded to the Company, the case is remitted to the Central Government to give a full, fair and effective hearing. [587G-H, 588C] The phrase 'natural justice' is not capable of a static and precise definition. It cannot be imprisoned in the straight-jacket of a cast-iron formula. Rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. Hence not possible to make an exhaustive catalogue of such rules. Two fundamental maxims of natural justice have now become deeply and indelibly ingrained in the common consciousness of mankind as pre-eminently necessary to ensure that the law is applied impartially objectively and fairly. These twin principles are (i) audi alteram partem and (ii) nemo judex in re sua. Audi alteram partem is a highly effective rule devised by the Courts to ensure that a statutory authority arrives at a just decision and it is calculated to act as a healthy check on the abuse or misuse of power. Its reach should not be narrowed and its applicability circumscribed.[554C-G] The rules of natural justice can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. If a statutory provision either specifically or by inevitable implication excludes the application of the rules of natural justice then the Court cannot ignore the mandate of the Legislature. Whether or not the application of the principles of natural justice in a given case has been excluded in the exercise of statutory power depends upon the language and basic scheme of the provision conferring the power, the nature of the power the purpose for which it is conferred and the effect of that power. [556A-B] The maxim audi alteram partem has many facets. Two of them are (a) notice of the case to be met, and (b) opportunity to explain. The rule cannot be sacrificed at the altar of administrative convenience or celerity; for, convenience and justice are often not on speaking terms. Difficulties, however, arise when the statute conferring the power does not expressly exclude this rule but its exclusion is sought by implication due to the presence of certain factors such as urgency where the obligation to give notice and opportunity to be heard would obstruct the taking of prompt action of a preventive or remedial nature. Audi alteram partem rule may be disregarded in an emergent situation where immediate action brooks no delay to prevent some imminent danger or injury or hazard to paramount public interests. Section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure empowers the magistrates specified therein to make an exparte conditional order in emergent cases for removal of dangerous public nuisances. Action under section 17 Land Acquisition Act furnishes another such instance. Similarly action on grounds of public safety public health may justify disregard of the rule of prior hearing. [556C-H] Cases where owing to the compulsion of the fact situation or the necessity of taking speedy action no pre- decisional hearing is given but the action, is followed soon by a full post-decisional hearing to the person affected do not in reality constitute an exception to the audi alteram partem rule. To call such cases as exception is a misnomer because they do not exclude fair play in action but adapt it to the urgency of the situation by balancing the competing claims of hurry and hearing. [560H-561A] The general principle as distinguished from an absolute rule of uniform application seems to be that where a statute does not in terms exclude this rule of prior hearing but contemplates a post-decisional hearing amounting to a full review of the original order on merits then such a statute would be construed as excluding the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage. [561G] If the statute conferring the power is silent with regard to the giving of pre-decisional hearing to the person affected and the administrative decision taken by the authority involves civil consequences of a grave nature and no full review or appeal on merits against that decision is provided courts will be extremely reluctant to construe such a statute as excluding the duty of affording even a minimal hearing shorn of all its formal trappings and dilatory features at the pre-decisional stage, unless viewed pragmatically it would paralyse the administrative process or frustrate the need for utmost promptitude. [561H] 7(i). A comparison of the provisions of Section 18A(1)(b) and Section 18AA(1)(c), bring out two main points of distinction: First, action under Section 18A(1)(b) can be taken only after an investigation had been made under Section 15; while under Section 18AA(1)(a) or (b) action can be taken without such investigation. The language, scheme and setting of Section 18AA read in the light of the Objects and Reasons for enacting this provision make this position clear beyond doubt. Second, before taking action under Section 18A(1)(b), the Central Government has to form an opinion on the basis of the investigation conducted under section 15, in regard to the existence of the objective fact, namely: that the industrial undertaking is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest; while under section 18A(1)(a) the Government has to satisfy itself that the persons incharge of the undertaking have brought about a situation likely to cause fall in production, by committing any of the three kinds of acts specified in that provision. This shows that the preliminary objective fact attributable to the persons in charge of the management or affairs of the undertaking, on the basis of which action may be taken under section 18(A)(1)(b), is of far wider amplitude than the circumstance, the existence of which is a sine qua non for taking action under section 18AA(1). The phrase "highly detrimental to the scheduled industry or public interest" in section 18-A is capable of being construed to cover a large variety of acts or things which may be considered wrong with the manner of running the industry by the management. In contrast with it, action under section 18AA(1)(a) can be taken only if the Central Government is satisfied with regard to the existence of the twin conditions specifically mentioned therein, on the basis of evidence in its possession. [569D-H] An analysis of section 18AA(1)(a), indicates that as a necessary preliminary to the exercise of the power thereunder, the Central Government must be satisfied "from documentary or other evidence in its possession" in regard to the co-existence of two circumstances: (i) that the persons in charge of the industrial undertaking have by committing any of these acts, namely, reckless investments, or creation of incumbrances on the assets of industrial undertaking, or by diversion of funds, brought about a situation which is likely to affect the production of the article manufactured or produced in the industrial undertaking, and (ii) that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation.[570B-D] It cannot be laid down as a general proposition that whenever a statute confers a power on an administrative authority and makes the exercise of that power conditional on the formation of an opinion by that authority in regard to the existence of an immediacy, its opinion in regard to that preliminary fact is not open to judicial scrutiny at all. While it may be conceded that an element of subjectivity is always involved in the formation of such an opinion, the existence of the circumstances from which the inference constituting the opinion, as the sine qua non for action, are to be drawn, must be demonstrable, and the existence of such "circumstances", if questioned, must be proved at least prima facie. [571 E-G] From a plain reading of section 18AA, it is clear that it does not expressly in unmistakable and unequivocal terms exclude the application of the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage. [574B] In the instant case, so far as Kanpur Unit is concerned, it was lying closed for more than three months before the passing of the impugned order. There was no 'immediacy' in relation to that unit, which could absolve the Government from the obligation of complying fully with audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional or pre- takeover stage. [583A] Keshav Mills Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, [1973] 3 S.C.R. 22; Kamla Prasad Khetan v. Union of India,[1957] S.C.R. 1052; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 621; Sukhdev Singh & Ors. v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh, [1975] 3 S.C.R. 619; A. K. Kraipak v. Union of India, [1970] 1 S.C.R. 457; Ridge v. Baldwin, [1964] A.C. 40; 196; Heatley v. Tasmanian Racing & Gaming Commission, 14 Australian Law Reports 519; Nawabkhan Abbaskhan v. State of Gujarat, [1974] 3 S.C.R. 427; State of Orissa v. Dr. Bina Pani Dei, [1962] 2 S.C.R. 625; Ambalal M. Shah v. Hathi Singh Manufacturing Co. Ltd. [1962] 3 S.C.R. 171; and S. L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan & Ors., [1981] 1 S.C.R. 746, referred to. (Per Chinnappa Reddy, J. dissenting) The principles of natural justice are not attracted to the situations contemplated by section 18AA of Industries (Development and Regulation) Act. Natural justice like Ultra Vires and Public Policy is a branch of the public law and is a formidable weapon which can be wielded to secure justice to the citizen. While it may be used to protect certain fundamental liberties, civil and political rights, it may be used as indeed it is used more often than not, to protect vested interests and to obstruct the path of progressive change. The time has come to make an appropriate distinction between natural justice in its application to fundamental liberties, civil and political rights and natural justice in its application to vested interests. [590A-B] Our constitution as befits the Constitution of a Socialist Secular Democratic Republic, recognises the paramountcy of the public weal over the private interest. Natural justice, ultra vires, public policy, or any other rule of interpretation must, therefore, conform, grow and be tailored to serve the public interest and respond to the demands of an evolving society. [590C] The principles of natural justice have taken deep root in the judicial conscience of our people. They are now considered so fundamental as to be implicit in every decision making function, judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative. Where authority functions under a statute and the statute provides for the observance of the principles of natural justice in a particular manner, natural justice will have to be observed in that manner and in no other. Where the statute is silent about the observance of the principles of natural justice, such statutory silence is taken to imply compliance with the principles of natural justice. Where the conflict is between the public interest and the private interest the presumption must necessarily be weak and may, therefore, be readily displaced. The presumption is also weak, where what are involved are mere property rights. In cases of urgency, particularly where the public interest is involved, preemptive action may be a strategic necessity. Even in cases of preemptive action, if the statute so provides or if the Courts so deem fit in appropriate cases, a postponed hearing may be substituted for natural justice. [590A-C; 591F-G] 3(ii). Where natural justice is implied, the extent of the implication and the nature of the hearing must vary with the statute, the subject and the situation. [592B] The absence of the expression 'immediate action' in section 18AA(1)(b) does not make any difference. Section 18AA(1)(a) refers to a situation where immediate preventive action may avert a disaster, whereas section 18AA contemplates a situation where the disaster has occurred and action is necessary to restore normalcy. Restoration of production where production has stopped in a key industry or industrial undertaking is as important and urgent in the public interest as prevention of a situation where production may be affected. Immediate action is, therefore, as necessary in the situation contemplated by section 18AA(1)(b) as in the situation contemplated by section 18AA(1)(a). [596 F-G] The marginal note refers to the power to take over without investigation but there is no sufficient reason to suppose that the word immediate is used only to contra- distinguish it from the investigation contemplated by section 15 of the Act, though of course a consequence of immediate action under section 18AA may be to dispense with the enquiry under section 15. In fact, facts which come to light during the course of an investigation under section 15 may form the basis of action under section 18AA(1)(a). Where in the course of an investigation under section 15 it is discovered that the management have, by reckless investments or creation of encumbrances on the assets of the industrial undertaking or by diversion of funds brought about a situation which is likely to affect the production of the articles manufactured or produced in the industrial undertaking, if the Government is satisfied that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation, there is no reason why the Central Government may not straightaway take action under section 18AA(1)(a) without waiting for completion of investigation under section 15. [597A-B] Where there is a provision in the statute itself for revocation of the order by the very authority making the decision, it appears to be unnecessary to insist upon a pre- decisional observance of natural justice. [598A] The likelihood of production being jeopardized or the stoppage of production in a key industrial undertaking is a matter of grave concern affecting the public interest. Parliament has taken so serious a view of the matter that it has authorised the Central Government to take over the management of the industrial undertaking if immediate action may prevent jeopardy to production or restore production where it has already stopped. The necessity for immediate action by the Central Government contemplated by Parliament is definitely indicative of the exclusion of natural justice. It is not as if the owner of the industrial undertaking is left with no remedy. He may move the Central Government under section 18-F to cancel the order made under section 18AA. [598C-D] Neither section 18-F of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act nor section 21 of the General Clauses Act by itself excludes natural justice. The exclusion of natural justice where such exclusion is not express has to be implied by reference to the subject, the statute and the statutory situation. Where an express provision in the statute itself provides for a post decisional hearing the other provisions of the Statute will have to be read in the light of such provision and the provision for post- decisional hearing may then clinch the issue where pre- decisional natural justice appears to be excluded on the other terms of the statute. That a post-decisional hearing may also be had by the terms of section 21 of the General Clauses Act may not necessarily help in the interpretation of the provisions of the statute concerned. [599 A-C] Ridge v. Baldwin, 1964 A.C. p. 40; Annie G. Phillip v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 75 L.E.d. 1289; John H. Fahey v. Paul Mallonee, 91 L.E.d. 2030; Margarita Fuentes v. Robert L. Shevin, Attorney General of Florida, 32 L.E.d. 2d 556 and Lawrence Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 40 L.E.d. 2d 406, referred to. - Rama Rao, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh as well as the President of the Telugu Desam Party as well as respondent No. 3. The advertisements very shortly stated, refer to the auspicious gifts made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to the poor people on the eve of New Year and Sankranti. In the said advertisements, it is stated that the said Government which was formed by the Telugu Desam Party was giving to the poor people whose income was below Rs. and the said advertisements referred to a new scheme of selling sarees and dhoties at half prices to the poor people in the State of Andhra Pradesh having Green-cards. Moreover, the offer in the advertisements for the sale of dhoties and sarees at discount rates was in the nature of a benefit offered to poor persons in that State. When a Government announces the measures which are intended for the benefit of any of the classes for whose the Government can normally be expected to work like the poor or the economical backward classes, it is only in rare circumstances that such a promise can be said to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) even though such a promise might be made on the eve of elections. 8. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => '', 'counseldef' => '', 'court' => 'Supreme Court of India', 'court_type' => 'SC', 'decidedon' => '1989-09-29', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' K.N. Saikia,; M.H. Kania and; S. Ranganathan, JJ.', 'judgement' => '</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Kania, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. These two appeals arise out of the judgments in two Election Petitions in the Andhra Pradesh High Court questioning the election of respondent No. 1 as a Member of Parliament from Srikakulam No. Parliamentary Constituency in the 8th General Election to the House of the People. The points raised in these appeals are common and so are the relevant facts; and, hence, they are being disposed of by this common judgment. We propose to take note of only the few facts which are necessary for the appreciation of the controversy before us.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The polling date for the said election along with other parliamentary elections in the State of Andhra Pradesh was December 27, 1984 but in Srikakulam No. 1 Parliamentary Constituency the polling was countermanded and the date of polling was later fixed on January 28, 1985. In both the Election Petitions the election of respondent No. 1 was questioned mainly on the ground that Shri N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh as well as the President of the Telugu Desam Party as well as respondent No. 1 gave certain speeches and certain advertisements were got published by Shri N.T. Rama Rao through the Publicity Department of the Government of Andhra Pradesh in the newspapers containing certain statements which are alleged to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A) of the <a href="/act/50684/representation-of-the-people-act-1951-complete-act">Representation of the People Act, 1951</a> (hereinafter referred to as 'the said Act'). The main question canvassed before us is whether the statements contained in these aforesaid advertisements amount to a corrupt practice under Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act. Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act runs as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">123. Corrupt practices</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The following shall be deemed to be corrupt practises for the purposes of this Act :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) 'Bribery', that is to say.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(A) any gift, offer or promise by a candidate or his agent or by any other person with the consent of a candidate or his election agent of any gratification, to any person whomsover, with the object, directly or indirectly of inducing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) x x x</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) an elector to vote or refrain from voting at an election, or as a reward to.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) a person for having so stood or not stood, or for having withdrawn or not having withdrawn his candidature; or</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) an elector for having voted or refrained from voting.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The advertisements very shortly stated, refer to the auspicious gifts made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to the poor people on the eve of New Year and Sankranti. In the said advertisements, it is stated that the said Government which was formed by the Telugu Desam Party was giving to the poor people whose income was below Rs. 6,000 per year, a kilo of rice at Rs. 2 per Kg. and the said advertisements referred to a new scheme of selling sarees and dhoties at half prices to the poor people in the State of Andhra Pradesh having Green-cards. Green-cards were directed to be issued to all the persons whose annual income was below Rs. 6,000. The supply of the rice at subsidised rates as aforesaid was also to be made to the Green-card holders only. The scheme to sell sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was to be operative from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. In considering the question whether the said advertisement and the said speeches amount to a corrupt practice, we are of the view that the provisions of Section 123 of the said Act which deal with corrupt practices have to be interpreted, keeping in mind that dictates of commonsense require that they never could have been intended to treat normal election promises made in election manifestoes or usual election speeches by members of various political parties aspiring to power and by different candidates aspiring to get elected to legislative bodies concerned as corrupt practices. We are of the view that these advertisements and speeches amount to nothing more than statements extolling the achievements of the Government of the State of Andhra Pradesh under the Telugu Desam Party headed by N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister, and contain normal election promises and these statements do not amount to corrupt practices falling within the scope of Sub-clause (b) of Clause (A) of Sub-section (1) of Section 123 of the said Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. It was urged by Mr. Rao, learned Counsel for the appellants that in the impugned judgments, the High Court has incorrectly taken the view that in order to amount to bribery within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A), the transaction must amount to a bargain by the candidate with a view to get votes. It was pointed out by him that the said view has been taken in the impugned judgments, relying upon the decision of a Bench comprising to learned Judges of this Court in Ghasi Ram v. Dal Singh and Ors. :1983 SCR 102 . We have gone through to the relevant portion of that judgment (at page 109 and 110 of the said report). A careful perusal of the said judgment shows that what has been really held in that case is that if the promises given or made amount to a bargain entered into by a candidate for a vote or votes, that would amount to a corrupt practice; but it has not been held there that unless the act alleged amounts to such a bargain, it could not amount to a corrupt practice. In our view, that judgment does not lay down that in order to amount to a corrupt practice, the transaction must amount to a bargain for getting a vote. It was pointed out by Mr. Rao, however, that such a view seems to have been taken in two other decisions rendered by two Benches, each comprising two learned Judges of this Court in Bhanu Kumar Shastri v. Mohan Lal Sukhadia and Ors. : [1971]3SCR522 and Harjit Singh Mann v. S Umrao Singh and Ors. : [1980]2SCR501 . and these judgments need to be overruled. We do not propose to go into the correctness or otherwise of this view because, even on the footing that in order to amount to a corrupt practice under the aforesaid provision the alleged acts need not constitute a bargain, the the acts established in the present case, in our opinion, do not amount to a corrupt practice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Our attention was drawn by Mr. Rao to the fact that in this case the said advertisements and the speeches had to be viewed in the context of the fact that the advertisements were issued and the speeches were made after respondent No. 1 filed his nomination papers on January 4, 1985, for the election and before the election was held in the aforesaid constituency. It was further pointed out that the offer made for the sale of sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was limited to the period from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985. It cannot be denied that these factors are relevant factOrs. We cannot, however, lose sight of the fact that this offer was made not only in this constituency but throughout the State where the elections to the House of the People were scheduled to be held, and were, in fact, held on December 27, 1984. It was only in case of this constituency that the election to be held on the scheduled date was countermanded and later held on January 28, 1985. We cannot lose sight of the fact that, as far as the said speeches and the said advertisements, which were issued by the Publicity Department of the State, are concerned, they deal in the main with the achievements of the Government of Andhra Pradesh which, of course, was being run by Ministers belonging to Telugu Desam Party to which respondent No. 1 also belonged. Moreover, the offer in the advertisements for the sale of dhoties and sarees at discount rates was in the nature of a benefit offered to poor persons in that State. When a Government announces the measures which are intended for the benefit of any of the classes for whose the Government can normally be expected to work like the poor or the economical backward classes, it is only in rare circumstances that such a promise can be said to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) even though such a promise might be made on the eve of elections. Keeping this in mind, in our opinion, although the offer to sell dhoties and sarees at discount rates was of a limited duration as aforestated, it cannot be regarded as a corrupt practice. Such an offer was bound to have financial repercussions and it is quite possible the duration of the offer was limited to enable the Government to study the financial repercussions rather than from any improper motive. We find support for this view from the decision of this Court in H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh : [1969]3SCR813 . In that case an Ordinance was passed by the Government of Madhya Pradesh as a result of which a large number of agriculturists, namely, those holdings of plots of land of less than 7.5 acres area or paying land revenue not exceeding Rs. 5/- were exempted from the payment of the land revenue. It was held that such a concession does not amount to a gift, offer or promise of any gratification within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) of the said Act nor does the announcement of the declaration made at a meeting shortly before the election or the issue of a pamphlet containing that declaration at that time carry the matter any further. It was held that neither Shri D.P. Misra who was the Chief Minister nor Shri S.K. Dixit who acted as his agent were guilty of any corrupt practice within the meaning of the aforesaid provision.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. It was next contended by Mr. Rao, although very faintly, that the High Court was in error as it had not decided all other issues which were raised in the election petition. In this regard we cannot lose sight of the fact that the term of the present Lok Sabha is likely to be over within a few months and fresh elections are likely to be held and it would, therefore, be an exercise in futility to remand the matter to the High Court for deciding the remaining issues.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'AIR1990SC1889; JT1989(4)SC186; 1989(2)SCALE891; 1989Supp(2)SCC504', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors.', 'sub' => 'Election', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ), 'casename_url' => 'b-rajagopala-rao-vs-appayya-hanumanthu', 'args' => array( (int) 0 => '640942', (int) 1 => 'b-rajagopala-rao-vs-appayya-hanumanthu' ) ) $title_for_layout = 'B Rajagopala Rao and anr Vs Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors - Citation 640942 - Court Judgment | ' $desc = array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '640942', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/50684/representation-of-the-people-act-1951-complete-act">Representation of the People Act, 1951</a> - Sections 1, 3(1)(A), 123 and 123(1)(A)', 'appealno' => 'Civil Appeal Nos. 484 and 485 of 1987', 'appellant' => 'B. Rajagopala Rao and anr.', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'B. Rajagopala Rao and anr. Vs. Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors.', 'casenote' => 'Election - corrupt practices - Sections 123 and 123 (1) (A) of Representation of the People Act, 1951 - whether advertisements by public department and speeches made by respondent No. 1 to sell dhoti and sarees at discount rates amount to corrupt practices - offer was available for mass and for limited duration - such offer was bound to have financial repercussions and it is quite possible that duration of offer limited to enable Government to study financial repercussions rather than from any improper motive - offer not amounted to corrupt practices. - [ D.A. Desai,; O. Chinnappa Reddy and; R.S. Sarkaria, JJ.] The Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 empowers the Union of India in the public interest to take under its control the industries specified in the First Schedule to the Act. Item 23 of the First Schedule relates to textiles of various categories. Section 15 authorises the Central Government to make or cause to be made a full and complete investigation into the circumstances of the case if the Central Government is of the opinion that (a) in respect of any scheduled industry or industrial undertaking or undertakings (i) there has been, or is likely to be, a substantial fall in the volume of production for which, having regard to the economic conditions prevailing, there is no justification; or (ii) there has been, or is likely to be, a marked deterioration in the quality of any article... which could have been or can be avoided; or (iii) there has been or is likely to be a rise in the price of any article..... for which there is no justification; or (iv) it is necessary to take any such action for the purpose of conserving any resources of national importance; or (b) any industrial undertaking is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest. After the investigation is made under section 15, section 16(1) empowers the Central Government if action is desirable, to issue appropriate directions, and section 16(2) provides for the issue of interim directions by the Central Government pending investigation under section 15. Chapter III-A consisting of Sections 18A, 18-AA, 18-B, 18-C, 18-D, 18-E and 18-F deal with "direct management or control of Industrial Undertakings by Central Government in certain cases". Sec. 18-A empowers the Central Government by notified order, to authorise any person or body of persons to take over the management of the whole or any part of an industrial undertaking or to exercise in respect of the whole, or any part of the undertaking such functions of control as may be specified in the order, if the Central Government is of opinion that: (a) an industrial undertaking to which directions have been issued in pursuance of section 16 has failed to comply with such directions, or (b) an industrial undertaking in respect of which an investigation has been made under section 15 is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest. Section 18AA(5) stipulates that the provisions of Sections 18-B to 18 E shall be applicable to the industrial undertaking in respect of which an order has been made under section 18-AA even as they apply to an industrial undertaking taken over under Section 18-A. Section 18-F empowers the Central Government to cancel the order made under section 18-A if it appears that the purpose of the order has been fulfilled or it is not necessary that the order should remain in force. The appellant M/s. Swadeshi Cotton Mills was taken over by the Government of India by a notification dated April 13, 1978 in exercise of the powers conferred on it under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 18AA of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 on the ground that the company had by creation of encumbrances on the assets of its industrial undertakings, brought about a situation which had affected and is likely to further affect the production of articles manufactured or produced by it and that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation. The Government authorised the National Textile Corporation Limited to take over the management, subject to the conditions that the authorised person shall comply with all the directions issued from time to time by the Central Government and that the authorised person shall hold office for a period of five years. The appellant Mills challenged the aforesaid order in a writ petition in the High Court. The case was heard by a Full Bench of five Judges to consider the question whether in construing section 18AA of the Industries Development and Regulation Act, 1951, compliance with the principle of audi alteram partem is to be implied and whether hearing is to be given to the parties who would be affected by the order to be passed prior to the passing of the order or whether hearing can be given after the order is passed and whether the order passed under the said Section is vitiated by not giving of such hearing and whether such vice can be cured. The Bench by a majority answered the three questions as follows:- (a) Section 18AA(1)(a)(b) excludes the giving of prior hearing to the party who would be affected by order thereunder. (b) Section 18-F expressly provides for a post- decisional hearing to the owner of the industrial undertaking, the management of which is taken over under section 18AA to have the order made under section 18AA cancelled on any relevant ground. (c) As the taking over of management under section 18A is not vitiated by the failure to grant prior hearing the question of any such vice being cured by a grant of a subsequent hearing does not arise. The minority, however, held that in compliance with the principles of natural justice, prior hearing to the owner of the undertaking was required to be given before the passing of an order under section 18AA, that the second question did not arise as the denial of a prior hearing would not cure the vice by the grant of subsequent hearing, but it would be open to the Court to moderate the relief in such a way that the order is kept alive to the extent necessary until the making of the fresh order to subserve public interest and to make appropriate directions. After the decision on the reference the case was reheard on merits by a Full Bench of three Judges and the writ petition was allowed in part. The challenge to the validity of the order being rejected but insofar as the impugned order seeking to take over the corporate entity of the company, the corporate entity of the subsidiary and its assets, the petition was allowed and the respondents, the Union of India and the authorised person were directed to release from its control and custody and/or deliver possession of any assets or property of the company which were not referable to the industrial undertakings. Appeals to this Court were filed on behalf of the Company as well as by the Union of India and the National Textile Corporation. Two propositions were propounded on behalf of the company that: (a) Whether it was necessary to observe the rules of natural justice before issuing a notified order under section 18AA(1)(a) and further whether section 18-F impliedly excludes rules of natural justice relating to prior hearing; and it was contended (1) the mere use of the word 'immediate' in sub-clause (a) of section 18AA does not show a legislative intent to exclude the application of audi alteram partem rule altogether. (2) The word 'immediate' in clause (a) has been used in contra distinction to 'investigate'. It only means that under section 18AA action can be taken without prior investigation under section 15. The use of the word 'immediate' in section 18AA(1)(a) only dispenses with investigation under section 15 and not with the principle of audi alteram partem altogether and this is indicated by the marginal note of section 18A and para 3 of the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Amendment Bill which inserted section 18AA in 1971. (3) The word 'immediate' occurs only in clause (a) and not in clause (b) of section 18AA(1). It would be odd if intention to exclude this principle of natural justice is spelt out in one clause of the sub-section when the other clause does not exclude it. (4) Section 18-F does not exclude a pre-decisional hearing. The so-called post-decisional hearing contemplated by section 18-F cannot be and is not intended to be a substitute for a pre-decisional hearing. (5) Section 18F incorporates only a facet, albeit qualified, of section 21 of the General Clauses Act. The language of the Section implicity prohibits an enquiry into circumstances that led to the passing of the order of take-over and under it the aggrieved person is not entitled to show that on merits the order was void ab initio. (6) 'Immediacy' does not exclude a duty to act fairly because even an emergent situation can co-exist with the canons of natural justice. The only effect of urgency on the application of the principle of fair hearing would be that the width, form and duration of the hearing would be tailored to the situation and reduced to the reasonable minimum so that it does not delay and defeat the purpose of the contemplated action. (7) Where the civil consequences of the administrative action are grave and its effect is highly prejudicial to the rights and interests of the person affected and there is nothing in the language and scheme of the statute which unequivocally excludes a fair pre-decisional hearing and the post-decisional hearing provided therein is not a real remedial hearing equitable to a full right of appeal the Court should be loath to infer a legislative intent to exclude even a minimal fair hearing at the pre-decisional stage merely on ground of urgency. (8) The Central Government appointed four Government Officials including one from the office of the Textile Commissioner to study the affairs of the Company and to make recommendation. This Official Group submitted its report on February 16, 1978. The evidence on the basis of which the impugned order was passed was not disclosed to the appellant company till May 1978, only after it had filed the writ petition in the High Court. If there was anything adverse to the appellants in the survey report there was time enough about six weeks between the submission of the Survey Report and the passing of the impugned order for giving a short, reasonable opportunity to the appellants to explain the adverse findings against them. If there was immediacy situational modifications could be made to meet the requirement of fairness, by reducing the period of notice; that even the manner and form of such notice could be simplified to eliminate delay, that telephonic notice or short opportunity for furnishing their explanation to the Company might have satisfied the requirements of natural justice. Such an opportunity of hearing could have been given after the passing of a conditional tentative order and before its enforcement under section 18AA. For the interregnum suitable interim action such as freezing the assets of the Company or restraining the Company from creating further encumbrances, could be taken under section 16. On behalf of the Union of India and the Authorised Officer it was contended that (1) the presumption in favour of audi alteram partem rule stands impliedly displaced by the language scheme, setting and the purpose of the provision in section 18AA. (2) Section 18AA on its plain terms deals with situations where immediate preventive action is required. The paramount concern is to avoid serious problems which may be caused by fall in production. The purpose of an order under section 18AA is not to condemn the owner but to protect the scheduled industry. The issue under section 18AA is not solely between the Government and the management of the industrial undertaking. The object of taking action under this Section is to protect other outside interests of the community at large and the workers. (3) The rule of natural justice to give a hearing has been incorporated in section 18-F which gives an opportunity of a post-decisional hearing to the owner of the undertaking who if he feels aggrieved can on his application be heard, to show that even the original order under section 18AA was passed on invalid grounds and should be cancelled or rescinded. (4) On a true construction of section 18AA read with section 18-F the requirements of natural justice and fair play can be read into the statute only insofar as conformance to such canons can reasonably and realistically be required of it by the provision for a remedial hearing at a subsequent stage. (5) Under section 18-F the Central Government exercises curial functions and that Section confers on the aggrieved owner a right to apply to the Government to cancel the order of take-over. This section casts an obligation on the Central Government to deal with and dispose of an application filed thereunder with reasonable expedition. Allowing the appeal by the Company,<br/>HELD: (Sarkaria & Desai, JJ. per Chinnappa Reddy, J. dissenting.) In the facts and circumstances of the instant case, there has been a noncompliance with the implied requirement of the audi alteram partem rule of natural justice at the pre-decisional stage. The impugned order could be struck down as invalid on that score alone. But in view of the commitment / concession that a hearing would be afforded to the Company, the case is remitted to the Central Government to give a full, fair and effective hearing. [587G-H, 588C] The phrase 'natural justice' is not capable of a static and precise definition. It cannot be imprisoned in the straight-jacket of a cast-iron formula. Rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. Hence not possible to make an exhaustive catalogue of such rules. Two fundamental maxims of natural justice have now become deeply and indelibly ingrained in the common consciousness of mankind as pre-eminently necessary to ensure that the law is applied impartially objectively and fairly. These twin principles are (i) audi alteram partem and (ii) nemo judex in re sua. Audi alteram partem is a highly effective rule devised by the Courts to ensure that a statutory authority arrives at a just decision and it is calculated to act as a healthy check on the abuse or misuse of power. Its reach should not be narrowed and its applicability circumscribed.[554C-G] The rules of natural justice can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. If a statutory provision either specifically or by inevitable implication excludes the application of the rules of natural justice then the Court cannot ignore the mandate of the Legislature. Whether or not the application of the principles of natural justice in a given case has been excluded in the exercise of statutory power depends upon the language and basic scheme of the provision conferring the power, the nature of the power the purpose for which it is conferred and the effect of that power. [556A-B] The maxim audi alteram partem has many facets. Two of them are (a) notice of the case to be met, and (b) opportunity to explain. The rule cannot be sacrificed at the altar of administrative convenience or celerity; for, convenience and justice are often not on speaking terms. Difficulties, however, arise when the statute conferring the power does not expressly exclude this rule but its exclusion is sought by implication due to the presence of certain factors such as urgency where the obligation to give notice and opportunity to be heard would obstruct the taking of prompt action of a preventive or remedial nature. Audi alteram partem rule may be disregarded in an emergent situation where immediate action brooks no delay to prevent some imminent danger or injury or hazard to paramount public interests. Section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure empowers the magistrates specified therein to make an exparte conditional order in emergent cases for removal of dangerous public nuisances. Action under section 17 Land Acquisition Act furnishes another such instance. Similarly action on grounds of public safety public health may justify disregard of the rule of prior hearing. [556C-H] Cases where owing to the compulsion of the fact situation or the necessity of taking speedy action no pre- decisional hearing is given but the action, is followed soon by a full post-decisional hearing to the person affected do not in reality constitute an exception to the audi alteram partem rule. To call such cases as exception is a misnomer because they do not exclude fair play in action but adapt it to the urgency of the situation by balancing the competing claims of hurry and hearing. [560H-561A] The general principle as distinguished from an absolute rule of uniform application seems to be that where a statute does not in terms exclude this rule of prior hearing but contemplates a post-decisional hearing amounting to a full review of the original order on merits then such a statute would be construed as excluding the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage. [561G] If the statute conferring the power is silent with regard to the giving of pre-decisional hearing to the person affected and the administrative decision taken by the authority involves civil consequences of a grave nature and no full review or appeal on merits against that decision is provided courts will be extremely reluctant to construe such a statute as excluding the duty of affording even a minimal hearing shorn of all its formal trappings and dilatory features at the pre-decisional stage, unless viewed pragmatically it would paralyse the administrative process or frustrate the need for utmost promptitude. [561H] 7(i). A comparison of the provisions of Section 18A(1)(b) and Section 18AA(1)(c), bring out two main points of distinction: First, action under Section 18A(1)(b) can be taken only after an investigation had been made under Section 15; while under Section 18AA(1)(a) or (b) action can be taken without such investigation. The language, scheme and setting of Section 18AA read in the light of the Objects and Reasons for enacting this provision make this position clear beyond doubt. Second, before taking action under Section 18A(1)(b), the Central Government has to form an opinion on the basis of the investigation conducted under section 15, in regard to the existence of the objective fact, namely: that the industrial undertaking is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest; while under section 18A(1)(a) the Government has to satisfy itself that the persons incharge of the undertaking have brought about a situation likely to cause fall in production, by committing any of the three kinds of acts specified in that provision. This shows that the preliminary objective fact attributable to the persons in charge of the management or affairs of the undertaking, on the basis of which action may be taken under section 18(A)(1)(b), is of far wider amplitude than the circumstance, the existence of which is a sine qua non for taking action under section 18AA(1). The phrase "highly detrimental to the scheduled industry or public interest" in section 18-A is capable of being construed to cover a large variety of acts or things which may be considered wrong with the manner of running the industry by the management. In contrast with it, action under section 18AA(1)(a) can be taken only if the Central Government is satisfied with regard to the existence of the twin conditions specifically mentioned therein, on the basis of evidence in its possession. [569D-H] An analysis of section 18AA(1)(a), indicates that as a necessary preliminary to the exercise of the power thereunder, the Central Government must be satisfied "from documentary or other evidence in its possession" in regard to the co-existence of two circumstances: (i) that the persons in charge of the industrial undertaking have by committing any of these acts, namely, reckless investments, or creation of incumbrances on the assets of industrial undertaking, or by diversion of funds, brought about a situation which is likely to affect the production of the article manufactured or produced in the industrial undertaking, and (ii) that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation.[570B-D] It cannot be laid down as a general proposition that whenever a statute confers a power on an administrative authority and makes the exercise of that power conditional on the formation of an opinion by that authority in regard to the existence of an immediacy, its opinion in regard to that preliminary fact is not open to judicial scrutiny at all. While it may be conceded that an element of subjectivity is always involved in the formation of such an opinion, the existence of the circumstances from which the inference constituting the opinion, as the sine qua non for action, are to be drawn, must be demonstrable, and the existence of such "circumstances", if questioned, must be proved at least prima facie. [571 E-G] From a plain reading of section 18AA, it is clear that it does not expressly in unmistakable and unequivocal terms exclude the application of the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage. [574B] In the instant case, so far as Kanpur Unit is concerned, it was lying closed for more than three months before the passing of the impugned order. There was no 'immediacy' in relation to that unit, which could absolve the Government from the obligation of complying fully with audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional or pre- takeover stage. [583A] Keshav Mills Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, [1973] 3 S.C.R. 22; Kamla Prasad Khetan v. Union of India,[1957] S.C.R. 1052; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 621; Sukhdev Singh & Ors. v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh, [1975] 3 S.C.R. 619; A. K. Kraipak v. Union of India, [1970] 1 S.C.R. 457; Ridge v. Baldwin, [1964] A.C. 40; 196; Heatley v. Tasmanian Racing & Gaming Commission, 14 Australian Law Reports 519; Nawabkhan Abbaskhan v. State of Gujarat, [1974] 3 S.C.R. 427; State of Orissa v. Dr. Bina Pani Dei, [1962] 2 S.C.R. 625; Ambalal M. Shah v. Hathi Singh Manufacturing Co. Ltd. [1962] 3 S.C.R. 171; and S. L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan & Ors., [1981] 1 S.C.R. 746, referred to. (Per Chinnappa Reddy, J. dissenting) The principles of natural justice are not attracted to the situations contemplated by section 18AA of Industries (Development and Regulation) Act. Natural justice like Ultra Vires and Public Policy is a branch of the public law and is a formidable weapon which can be wielded to secure justice to the citizen. While it may be used to protect certain fundamental liberties, civil and political rights, it may be used as indeed it is used more often than not, to protect vested interests and to obstruct the path of progressive change. The time has come to make an appropriate distinction between natural justice in its application to fundamental liberties, civil and political rights and natural justice in its application to vested interests. [590A-B] Our constitution as befits the Constitution of a Socialist Secular Democratic Republic, recognises the paramountcy of the public weal over the private interest. Natural justice, ultra vires, public policy, or any other rule of interpretation must, therefore, conform, grow and be tailored to serve the public interest and respond to the demands of an evolving society. [590C] The principles of natural justice have taken deep root in the judicial conscience of our people. They are now considered so fundamental as to be implicit in every decision making function, judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative. Where authority functions under a statute and the statute provides for the observance of the principles of natural justice in a particular manner, natural justice will have to be observed in that manner and in no other. Where the statute is silent about the observance of the principles of natural justice, such statutory silence is taken to imply compliance with the principles of natural justice. Where the conflict is between the public interest and the private interest the presumption must necessarily be weak and may, therefore, be readily displaced. The presumption is also weak, where what are involved are mere property rights. In cases of urgency, particularly where the public interest is involved, preemptive action may be a strategic necessity. Even in cases of preemptive action, if the statute so provides or if the Courts so deem fit in appropriate cases, a postponed hearing may be substituted for natural justice. [590A-C; 591F-G] 3(ii). Where natural justice is implied, the extent of the implication and the nature of the hearing must vary with the statute, the subject and the situation. [592B] The absence of the expression 'immediate action' in section 18AA(1)(b) does not make any difference. Section 18AA(1)(a) refers to a situation where immediate preventive action may avert a disaster, whereas section 18AA contemplates a situation where the disaster has occurred and action is necessary to restore normalcy. Restoration of production where production has stopped in a key industry or industrial undertaking is as important and urgent in the public interest as prevention of a situation where production may be affected. Immediate action is, therefore, as necessary in the situation contemplated by section 18AA(1)(b) as in the situation contemplated by section 18AA(1)(a). [596 F-G] The marginal note refers to the power to take over without investigation but there is no sufficient reason to suppose that the word immediate is used only to contra- distinguish it from the investigation contemplated by section 15 of the Act, though of course a consequence of immediate action under section 18AA may be to dispense with the enquiry under section 15. In fact, facts which come to light during the course of an investigation under section 15 may form the basis of action under section 18AA(1)(a). Where in the course of an investigation under section 15 it is discovered that the management have, by reckless investments or creation of encumbrances on the assets of the industrial undertaking or by diversion of funds brought about a situation which is likely to affect the production of the articles manufactured or produced in the industrial undertaking, if the Government is satisfied that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation, there is no reason why the Central Government may not straightaway take action under section 18AA(1)(a) without waiting for completion of investigation under section 15. [597A-B] Where there is a provision in the statute itself for revocation of the order by the very authority making the decision, it appears to be unnecessary to insist upon a pre- decisional observance of natural justice. [598A] The likelihood of production being jeopardized or the stoppage of production in a key industrial undertaking is a matter of grave concern affecting the public interest. Parliament has taken so serious a view of the matter that it has authorised the Central Government to take over the management of the industrial undertaking if immediate action may prevent jeopardy to production or restore production where it has already stopped. The necessity for immediate action by the Central Government contemplated by Parliament is definitely indicative of the exclusion of natural justice. It is not as if the owner of the industrial undertaking is left with no remedy. He may move the Central Government under section 18-F to cancel the order made under section 18AA. [598C-D] Neither section 18-F of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act nor section 21 of the General Clauses Act by itself excludes natural justice. The exclusion of natural justice where such exclusion is not express has to be implied by reference to the subject, the statute and the statutory situation. Where an express provision in the statute itself provides for a post decisional hearing the other provisions of the Statute will have to be read in the light of such provision and the provision for post- decisional hearing may then clinch the issue where pre- decisional natural justice appears to be excluded on the other terms of the statute. That a post-decisional hearing may also be had by the terms of section 21 of the General Clauses Act may not necessarily help in the interpretation of the provisions of the statute concerned. [599 A-C] Ridge v. Baldwin, 1964 A.C. p. 40; Annie G. Phillip v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 75 L.E.d. 1289; John H. Fahey v. Paul Mallonee, 91 L.E.d. 2030; Margarita Fuentes v. Robert L. Shevin, Attorney General of Florida, 32 L.E.d. 2d 556 and Lawrence Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 40 L.E.d. 2d 406, referred to. - Rama Rao, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh as well as the President of the Telugu Desam Party as well as respondent No. 3. The advertisements very shortly stated, refer to the auspicious gifts made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to the poor people on the eve of New Year and Sankranti. In the said advertisements, it is stated that the said Government which was formed by the Telugu Desam Party was giving to the poor people whose income was below Rs. and the said advertisements referred to a new scheme of selling sarees and dhoties at half prices to the poor people in the State of Andhra Pradesh having Green-cards. Moreover, the offer in the advertisements for the sale of dhoties and sarees at discount rates was in the nature of a benefit offered to poor persons in that State. When a Government announces the measures which are intended for the benefit of any of the classes for whose the Government can normally be expected to work like the poor or the economical backward classes, it is only in rare circumstances that such a promise can be said to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) even though such a promise might be made on the eve of elections. 8. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => '', 'counseldef' => '', 'court' => 'Supreme Court of India', 'court_type' => 'SC', 'decidedon' => '1989-09-29', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' K.N. Saikia,; M.H. Kania and; S. Ranganathan, JJ.', 'judgement' => '</p><p>Kania, J.</p><p>1. These two appeals arise out of the judgments in two Election Petitions in the Andhra Pradesh High Court questioning the election of respondent No. 1 as a Member of Parliament from Srikakulam No. Parliamentary Constituency in the 8th General Election to the House of the People. The points raised in these appeals are common and so are the relevant facts; and, hence, they are being disposed of by this common judgment. We propose to take note of only the few facts which are necessary for the appreciation of the controversy before us.</p><p>2. The polling date for the said election along with other parliamentary elections in the State of Andhra Pradesh was December 27, 1984 but in Srikakulam No. 1 Parliamentary Constituency the polling was countermanded and the date of polling was later fixed on January 28, 1985. In both the Election Petitions the election of respondent No. 1 was questioned mainly on the ground that Shri N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh as well as the President of the Telugu Desam Party as well as respondent No. 1 gave certain speeches and certain advertisements were got published by Shri N.T. Rama Rao through the Publicity Department of the Government of Andhra Pradesh in the newspapers containing certain statements which are alleged to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A) of the <a>Representation of the People Act, 1951</a> (hereinafter referred to as 'the said Act'). The main question canvassed before us is whether the statements contained in these aforesaid advertisements amount to a corrupt practice under Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act. Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act runs as follows :</p><p>123. Corrupt practices</p><p>The following shall be deemed to be corrupt practises for the purposes of this Act :</p><p>(1) 'Bribery', that is to say.</p><p>(A) any gift, offer or promise by a candidate or his agent or by any other person with the consent of a candidate or his election agent of any gratification, to any person whomsover, with the object, directly or indirectly of inducing.</p><p>(a) x x x</p><p>(b) an elector to vote or refrain from voting at an election, or as a reward to.</p><p>(i) a person for having so stood or not stood, or for having withdrawn or not having withdrawn his candidature; or</p><p>(ii) an elector for having voted or refrained from voting.</p><p>3. The advertisements very shortly stated, refer to the auspicious gifts made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to the poor people on the eve of New Year and Sankranti. In the said advertisements, it is stated that the said Government which was formed by the Telugu Desam Party was giving to the poor people whose income was below Rs. 6,000 per year, a kilo of rice at Rs. 2 per Kg. and the said advertisements referred to a new scheme of selling sarees and dhoties at half prices to the poor people in the State of Andhra Pradesh having Green-cards. Green-cards were directed to be issued to all the persons whose annual income was below Rs. 6,000. The supply of the rice at subsidised rates as aforesaid was also to be made to the Green-card holders only. The scheme to sell sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was to be operative from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985.</p><p>4. In considering the question whether the said advertisement and the said speeches amount to a corrupt practice, we are of the view that the provisions of Section 123 of the said Act which deal with corrupt practices have to be interpreted, keeping in mind that dictates of commonsense require that they never could have been intended to treat normal election promises made in election manifestoes or usual election speeches by members of various political parties aspiring to power and by different candidates aspiring to get elected to legislative bodies concerned as corrupt practices. We are of the view that these advertisements and speeches amount to nothing more than statements extolling the achievements of the Government of the State of Andhra Pradesh under the Telugu Desam Party headed by N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister, and contain normal election promises and these statements do not amount to corrupt practices falling within the scope of Sub-clause (b) of Clause (A) of Sub-section (1) of Section 123 of the said Act.</p><p>5. It was urged by Mr. Rao, learned Counsel for the appellants that in the impugned judgments, the High Court has incorrectly taken the view that in order to amount to bribery within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A), the transaction must amount to a bargain by the candidate with a view to get votes. It was pointed out by him that the said view has been taken in the impugned judgments, relying upon the decision of a Bench comprising to learned Judges of this Court in Ghasi Ram v. Dal Singh and Ors. :1983 SCR 102 . We have gone through to the relevant portion of that judgment (at page 109 and 110 of the said report). A careful perusal of the said judgment shows that what has been really held in that case is that if the promises given or made amount to a bargain entered into by a candidate for a vote or votes, that would amount to a corrupt practice; but it has not been held there that unless the act alleged amounts to such a bargain, it could not amount to a corrupt practice. In our view, that judgment does not lay down that in order to amount to a corrupt practice, the transaction must amount to a bargain for getting a vote. It was pointed out by Mr. Rao, however, that such a view seems to have been taken in two other decisions rendered by two Benches, each comprising two learned Judges of this Court in Bhanu Kumar Shastri v. Mohan Lal Sukhadia and Ors. : [1971]3SCR522 and Harjit Singh Mann v. S Umrao Singh and Ors. : [1980]2SCR501 . and these judgments need to be overruled. We do not propose to go into the correctness or otherwise of this view because, even on the footing that in order to amount to a corrupt practice under the aforesaid provision the alleged acts need not constitute a bargain, the the acts established in the present case, in our opinion, do not amount to a corrupt practice.</p><p>6. Our attention was drawn by Mr. Rao to the fact that in this case the said advertisements and the speeches had to be viewed in the context of the fact that the advertisements were issued and the speeches were made after respondent No. 1 filed his nomination papers on January 4, 1985, for the election and before the election was held in the aforesaid constituency. It was further pointed out that the offer made for the sale of sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was limited to the period from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985. It cannot be denied that these factors are relevant factOrs. We cannot, however, lose sight of the fact that this offer was made not only in this constituency but throughout the State where the elections to the House of the People were scheduled to be held, and were, in fact, held on December 27, 1984. It was only in case of this constituency that the election to be held on the scheduled date was countermanded and later held on January 28, 1985. We cannot lose sight of the fact that, as far as the said speeches and the said advertisements, which were issued by the Publicity Department of the State, are concerned, they deal in the main with the achievements of the Government of Andhra Pradesh which, of course, was being run by Ministers belonging to Telugu Desam Party to which respondent No. 1 also belonged. Moreover, the offer in the advertisements for the sale of dhoties and sarees at discount rates was in the nature of a benefit offered to poor persons in that State. When a Government announces the measures which are intended for the benefit of any of the classes for whose the Government can normally be expected to work like the poor or the economical backward classes, it is only in rare circumstances that such a promise can be said to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) even though such a promise might be made on the eve of elections. Keeping this in mind, in our opinion, although the offer to sell dhoties and sarees at discount rates was of a limited duration as aforestated, it cannot be regarded as a corrupt practice. Such an offer was bound to have financial repercussions and it is quite possible the duration of the offer was limited to enable the Government to study the financial repercussions rather than from any improper motive. We find support for this view from the decision of this Court in H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh : [1969]3SCR813 . In that case an Ordinance was passed by the Government of Madhya Pradesh as a result of which a large number of agriculturists, namely, those holdings of plots of land of less than 7.5 acres area or paying land revenue not exceeding Rs. 5/- were exempted from the payment of the land revenue. It was held that such a concession does not amount to a gift, offer or promise of any gratification within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) of the said Act nor does the announcement of the declaration made at a meeting shortly before the election or the issue of a pamphlet containing that declaration at that time carry the matter any further. It was held that neither Shri D.P. Misra who was the Chief Minister nor Shri S.K. Dixit who acted as his agent were guilty of any corrupt practice within the meaning of the aforesaid provision.</p><p>7. It was next contended by Mr. Rao, although very faintly, that the High Court was in error as it had not decided all other issues which were raised in the election petition. In this regard we cannot lose sight of the fact that the term of the present Lok Sabha is likely to be over within a few months and fresh elections are likely to be held and it would, therefore, be an exercise in futility to remand the matter to the High Court for deciding the remaining issues.</p><p>8. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.<p></p><p>', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'AIR1990SC1889; JT1989(4)SC186; 1989(2)SCALE891; 1989Supp(2)SCC504', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors.', 'sub' => 'Election', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ) $casename_url = 'b-rajagopala-rao-vs-appayya-hanumanthu' $args = array( (int) 0 => '640942', (int) 1 => 'b-rajagopala-rao-vs-appayya-hanumanthu' ) $url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/640942/b-rajagopala-rao-vs-appayya-hanumanthu' $ctype = '' $caseref = 'H.V. Kamath v. Ch. 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Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 120]election - corrupt practices - sections 123 and 123 (1) (a) of representation of the people act, 1951 - whether advertisements by public department and speeches made by respondent no. 1 to sell dhoti and sarees at discount rates amount to corrupt practices - offer was available for mass and for limited duration - such offer was bound to have financial repercussions and it is quite possible that duration of offer limited to enable government to study financial repercussions rather than from any improper motive - offer not amounted to corrupt practices. - [ d.a. desai,; o. chinnappa reddy and; r.s. sarkaria, jj.] the industries (development and regulation) act, 1951 empowers the union of india in the public interest to take under its control the industries specified in the first.....Code Contextecho "<div class='table-bordered'><b>Excerpt:</b><br/>";
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$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp' $dataForView = array( 'title_for_layout' => 'B Rajagopala Rao and anr Vs Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors - Citation 640942 - Court Judgment | ', 'desc' => array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '640942', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/50684/representation-of-the-people-act-1951-complete-act">Representation of the People Act, 1951</a> - Sections 1, 3(1)(A), 123 and 123(1)(A)', 'appealno' => 'Civil Appeal Nos. 484 and 485 of 1987', 'appellant' => 'B. Rajagopala Rao and anr.', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'B. Rajagopala Rao and anr. Vs. Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors.', 'casenote' => 'Election - corrupt practices - Sections 123 and 123 (1) (A) of Representation of the People Act, 1951 - whether advertisements by public department and speeches made by respondent No. 1 to sell dhoti and sarees at discount rates amount to corrupt practices - offer was available for mass and for limited duration - such offer was bound to have financial repercussions and it is quite possible that duration of offer limited to enable Government to study financial repercussions rather than from any improper motive - offer not amounted to corrupt practices. - [ D.A. Desai,; O. Chinnappa Reddy and; R.S. Sarkaria, JJ.] The Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 empowers the Union of India in the public interest to take under its control the industries specified in the First Schedule to the Act. Item 23 of the First Schedule relates to textiles of various categories. Section 15 authorises the Central Government to make or cause to be made a full and complete investigation into the circumstances of the case if the Central Government is of the opinion that (a) in respect of any scheduled industry or industrial undertaking or undertakings (i) there has been, or is likely to be, a substantial fall in the volume of production for which, having regard to the economic conditions prevailing, there is no justification; or (ii) there has been, or is likely to be, a marked deterioration in the quality of any article... which could have been or can be avoided; or (iii) there has been or is likely to be a rise in the price of any article..... for which there is no justification; or (iv) it is necessary to take any such action for the purpose of conserving any resources of national importance; or (b) any industrial undertaking is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest. After the investigation is made under section 15, section 16(1) empowers the Central Government if action is desirable, to issue appropriate directions, and section 16(2) provides for the issue of interim directions by the Central Government pending investigation under section 15. Chapter III-A consisting of Sections 18A, 18-AA, 18-B, 18-C, 18-D, 18-E and 18-F deal with "direct management or control of Industrial Undertakings by Central Government in certain cases". Sec. 18-A empowers the Central Government by notified order, to authorise any person or body of persons to take over the management of the whole or any part of an industrial undertaking or to exercise in respect of the whole, or any part of the undertaking such functions of control as may be specified in the order, if the Central Government is of opinion that: (a) an industrial undertaking to which directions have been issued in pursuance of section 16 has failed to comply with such directions, or (b) an industrial undertaking in respect of which an investigation has been made under section 15 is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest. Section 18AA(5) stipulates that the provisions of Sections 18-B to 18 E shall be applicable to the industrial undertaking in respect of which an order has been made under section 18-AA even as they apply to an industrial undertaking taken over under Section 18-A. Section 18-F empowers the Central Government to cancel the order made under section 18-A if it appears that the purpose of the order has been fulfilled or it is not necessary that the order should remain in force. The appellant M/s. Swadeshi Cotton Mills was taken over by the Government of India by a notification dated April 13, 1978 in exercise of the powers conferred on it under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 18AA of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 on the ground that the company had by creation of encumbrances on the assets of its industrial undertakings, brought about a situation which had affected and is likely to further affect the production of articles manufactured or produced by it and that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation. The Government authorised the National Textile Corporation Limited to take over the management, subject to the conditions that the authorised person shall comply with all the directions issued from time to time by the Central Government and that the authorised person shall hold office for a period of five years. The appellant Mills challenged the aforesaid order in a writ petition in the High Court. The case was heard by a Full Bench of five Judges to consider the question whether in construing section 18AA of the Industries Development and Regulation Act, 1951, compliance with the principle of audi alteram partem is to be implied and whether hearing is to be given to the parties who would be affected by the order to be passed prior to the passing of the order or whether hearing can be given after the order is passed and whether the order passed under the said Section is vitiated by not giving of such hearing and whether such vice can be cured. The Bench by a majority answered the three questions as follows:- (a) Section 18AA(1)(a)(b) excludes the giving of prior hearing to the party who would be affected by order thereunder. (b) Section 18-F expressly provides for a post- decisional hearing to the owner of the industrial undertaking, the management of which is taken over under section 18AA to have the order made under section 18AA cancelled on any relevant ground. (c) As the taking over of management under section 18A is not vitiated by the failure to grant prior hearing the question of any such vice being cured by a grant of a subsequent hearing does not arise. The minority, however, held that in compliance with the principles of natural justice, prior hearing to the owner of the undertaking was required to be given before the passing of an order under section 18AA, that the second question did not arise as the denial of a prior hearing would not cure the vice by the grant of subsequent hearing, but it would be open to the Court to moderate the relief in such a way that the order is kept alive to the extent necessary until the making of the fresh order to subserve public interest and to make appropriate directions. After the decision on the reference the case was reheard on merits by a Full Bench of three Judges and the writ petition was allowed in part. The challenge to the validity of the order being rejected but insofar as the impugned order seeking to take over the corporate entity of the company, the corporate entity of the subsidiary and its assets, the petition was allowed and the respondents, the Union of India and the authorised person were directed to release from its control and custody and/or deliver possession of any assets or property of the company which were not referable to the industrial undertakings. Appeals to this Court were filed on behalf of the Company as well as by the Union of India and the National Textile Corporation. Two propositions were propounded on behalf of the company that: (a) Whether it was necessary to observe the rules of natural justice before issuing a notified order under section 18AA(1)(a) and further whether section 18-F impliedly excludes rules of natural justice relating to prior hearing; and it was contended (1) the mere use of the word 'immediate' in sub-clause (a) of section 18AA does not show a legislative intent to exclude the application of audi alteram partem rule altogether. (2) The word 'immediate' in clause (a) has been used in contra distinction to 'investigate'. It only means that under section 18AA action can be taken without prior investigation under section 15. The use of the word 'immediate' in section 18AA(1)(a) only dispenses with investigation under section 15 and not with the principle of audi alteram partem altogether and this is indicated by the marginal note of section 18A and para 3 of the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Amendment Bill which inserted section 18AA in 1971. (3) The word 'immediate' occurs only in clause (a) and not in clause (b) of section 18AA(1). It would be odd if intention to exclude this principle of natural justice is spelt out in one clause of the sub-section when the other clause does not exclude it. (4) Section 18-F does not exclude a pre-decisional hearing. The so-called post-decisional hearing contemplated by section 18-F cannot be and is not intended to be a substitute for a pre-decisional hearing. (5) Section 18F incorporates only a facet, albeit qualified, of section 21 of the General Clauses Act. The language of the Section implicity prohibits an enquiry into circumstances that led to the passing of the order of take-over and under it the aggrieved person is not entitled to show that on merits the order was void ab initio. (6) 'Immediacy' does not exclude a duty to act fairly because even an emergent situation can co-exist with the canons of natural justice. The only effect of urgency on the application of the principle of fair hearing would be that the width, form and duration of the hearing would be tailored to the situation and reduced to the reasonable minimum so that it does not delay and defeat the purpose of the contemplated action. (7) Where the civil consequences of the administrative action are grave and its effect is highly prejudicial to the rights and interests of the person affected and there is nothing in the language and scheme of the statute which unequivocally excludes a fair pre-decisional hearing and the post-decisional hearing provided therein is not a real remedial hearing equitable to a full right of appeal the Court should be loath to infer a legislative intent to exclude even a minimal fair hearing at the pre-decisional stage merely on ground of urgency. (8) The Central Government appointed four Government Officials including one from the office of the Textile Commissioner to study the affairs of the Company and to make recommendation. This Official Group submitted its report on February 16, 1978. The evidence on the basis of which the impugned order was passed was not disclosed to the appellant company till May 1978, only after it had filed the writ petition in the High Court. If there was anything adverse to the appellants in the survey report there was time enough about six weeks between the submission of the Survey Report and the passing of the impugned order for giving a short, reasonable opportunity to the appellants to explain the adverse findings against them. If there was immediacy situational modifications could be made to meet the requirement of fairness, by reducing the period of notice; that even the manner and form of such notice could be simplified to eliminate delay, that telephonic notice or short opportunity for furnishing their explanation to the Company might have satisfied the requirements of natural justice. Such an opportunity of hearing could have been given after the passing of a conditional tentative order and before its enforcement under section 18AA. For the interregnum suitable interim action such as freezing the assets of the Company or restraining the Company from creating further encumbrances, could be taken under section 16. On behalf of the Union of India and the Authorised Officer it was contended that (1) the presumption in favour of audi alteram partem rule stands impliedly displaced by the language scheme, setting and the purpose of the provision in section 18AA. (2) Section 18AA on its plain terms deals with situations where immediate preventive action is required. The paramount concern is to avoid serious problems which may be caused by fall in production. The purpose of an order under section 18AA is not to condemn the owner but to protect the scheduled industry. The issue under section 18AA is not solely between the Government and the management of the industrial undertaking. The object of taking action under this Section is to protect other outside interests of the community at large and the workers. (3) The rule of natural justice to give a hearing has been incorporated in section 18-F which gives an opportunity of a post-decisional hearing to the owner of the undertaking who if he feels aggrieved can on his application be heard, to show that even the original order under section 18AA was passed on invalid grounds and should be cancelled or rescinded. (4) On a true construction of section 18AA read with section 18-F the requirements of natural justice and fair play can be read into the statute only insofar as conformance to such canons can reasonably and realistically be required of it by the provision for a remedial hearing at a subsequent stage. (5) Under section 18-F the Central Government exercises curial functions and that Section confers on the aggrieved owner a right to apply to the Government to cancel the order of take-over. This section casts an obligation on the Central Government to deal with and dispose of an application filed thereunder with reasonable expedition. Allowing the appeal by the Company,<br />HELD: (Sarkaria & Desai, JJ. per Chinnappa Reddy, J. dissenting.) In the facts and circumstances of the instant case, there has been a noncompliance with the implied requirement of the audi alteram partem rule of natural justice at the pre-decisional stage. The impugned order could be struck down as invalid on that score alone. But in view of the commitment / concession that a hearing would be afforded to the Company, the case is remitted to the Central Government to give a full, fair and effective hearing. [587G-H, 588C] The phrase 'natural justice' is not capable of a static and precise definition. It cannot be imprisoned in the straight-jacket of a cast-iron formula. Rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. Hence not possible to make an exhaustive catalogue of such rules. Two fundamental maxims of natural justice have now become deeply and indelibly ingrained in the common consciousness of mankind as pre-eminently necessary to ensure that the law is applied impartially objectively and fairly. These twin principles are (i) audi alteram partem and (ii) nemo judex in re sua. Audi alteram partem is a highly effective rule devised by the Courts to ensure that a statutory authority arrives at a just decision and it is calculated to act as a healthy check on the abuse or misuse of power. Its reach should not be narrowed and its applicability circumscribed.[554C-G] The rules of natural justice can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. If a statutory provision either specifically or by inevitable implication excludes the application of the rules of natural justice then the Court cannot ignore the mandate of the Legislature. Whether or not the application of the principles of natural justice in a given case has been excluded in the exercise of statutory power depends upon the language and basic scheme of the provision conferring the power, the nature of the power the purpose for which it is conferred and the effect of that power. [556A-B] The maxim audi alteram partem has many facets. Two of them are (a) notice of the case to be met, and (b) opportunity to explain. The rule cannot be sacrificed at the altar of administrative convenience or celerity; for, convenience and justice are often not on speaking terms. Difficulties, however, arise when the statute conferring the power does not expressly exclude this rule but its exclusion is sought by implication due to the presence of certain factors such as urgency where the obligation to give notice and opportunity to be heard would obstruct the taking of prompt action of a preventive or remedial nature. Audi alteram partem rule may be disregarded in an emergent situation where immediate action brooks no delay to prevent some imminent danger or injury or hazard to paramount public interests. Section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure empowers the magistrates specified therein to make an exparte conditional order in emergent cases for removal of dangerous public nuisances. Action under section 17 Land Acquisition Act furnishes another such instance. Similarly action on grounds of public safety public health may justify disregard of the rule of prior hearing. [556C-H] Cases where owing to the compulsion of the fact situation or the necessity of taking speedy action no pre- decisional hearing is given but the action, is followed soon by a full post-decisional hearing to the person affected do not in reality constitute an exception to the audi alteram partem rule. To call such cases as exception is a misnomer because they do not exclude fair play in action but adapt it to the urgency of the situation by balancing the competing claims of hurry and hearing. [560H-561A] The general principle as distinguished from an absolute rule of uniform application seems to be that where a statute does not in terms exclude this rule of prior hearing but contemplates a post-decisional hearing amounting to a full review of the original order on merits then such a statute would be construed as excluding the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage. [561G] If the statute conferring the power is silent with regard to the giving of pre-decisional hearing to the person affected and the administrative decision taken by the authority involves civil consequences of a grave nature and no full review or appeal on merits against that decision is provided courts will be extremely reluctant to construe such a statute as excluding the duty of affording even a minimal hearing shorn of all its formal trappings and dilatory features at the pre-decisional stage, unless viewed pragmatically it would paralyse the administrative process or frustrate the need for utmost promptitude. [561H] 7(i). A comparison of the provisions of Section 18A(1)(b) and Section 18AA(1)(c), bring out two main points of distinction: First, action under Section 18A(1)(b) can be taken only after an investigation had been made under Section 15; while under Section 18AA(1)(a) or (b) action can be taken without such investigation. The language, scheme and setting of Section 18AA read in the light of the Objects and Reasons for enacting this provision make this position clear beyond doubt. Second, before taking action under Section 18A(1)(b), the Central Government has to form an opinion on the basis of the investigation conducted under section 15, in regard to the existence of the objective fact, namely: that the industrial undertaking is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest; while under section 18A(1)(a) the Government has to satisfy itself that the persons incharge of the undertaking have brought about a situation likely to cause fall in production, by committing any of the three kinds of acts specified in that provision. This shows that the preliminary objective fact attributable to the persons in charge of the management or affairs of the undertaking, on the basis of which action may be taken under section 18(A)(1)(b), is of far wider amplitude than the circumstance, the existence of which is a sine qua non for taking action under section 18AA(1). The phrase "highly detrimental to the scheduled industry or public interest" in section 18-A is capable of being construed to cover a large variety of acts or things which may be considered wrong with the manner of running the industry by the management. In contrast with it, action under section 18AA(1)(a) can be taken only if the Central Government is satisfied with regard to the existence of the twin conditions specifically mentioned therein, on the basis of evidence in its possession. [569D-H] An analysis of section 18AA(1)(a), indicates that as a necessary preliminary to the exercise of the power thereunder, the Central Government must be satisfied "from documentary or other evidence in its possession" in regard to the co-existence of two circumstances: (i) that the persons in charge of the industrial undertaking have by committing any of these acts, namely, reckless investments, or creation of incumbrances on the assets of industrial undertaking, or by diversion of funds, brought about a situation which is likely to affect the production of the article manufactured or produced in the industrial undertaking, and (ii) that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation.[570B-D] It cannot be laid down as a general proposition that whenever a statute confers a power on an administrative authority and makes the exercise of that power conditional on the formation of an opinion by that authority in regard to the existence of an immediacy, its opinion in regard to that preliminary fact is not open to judicial scrutiny at all. While it may be conceded that an element of subjectivity is always involved in the formation of such an opinion, the existence of the circumstances from which the inference constituting the opinion, as the sine qua non for action, are to be drawn, must be demonstrable, and the existence of such "circumstances", if questioned, must be proved at least prima facie. [571 E-G] From a plain reading of section 18AA, it is clear that it does not expressly in unmistakable and unequivocal terms exclude the application of the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage. [574B] In the instant case, so far as Kanpur Unit is concerned, it was lying closed for more than three months before the passing of the impugned order. There was no 'immediacy' in relation to that unit, which could absolve the Government from the obligation of complying fully with audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional or pre- takeover stage. [583A] Keshav Mills Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, [1973] 3 S.C.R. 22; Kamla Prasad Khetan v. Union of India,[1957] S.C.R. 1052; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 621; Sukhdev Singh & Ors. v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh, [1975] 3 S.C.R. 619; A. K. Kraipak v. Union of India, [1970] 1 S.C.R. 457; Ridge v. Baldwin, [1964] A.C. 40; 196; Heatley v. Tasmanian Racing & Gaming Commission, 14 Australian Law Reports 519; Nawabkhan Abbaskhan v. State of Gujarat, [1974] 3 S.C.R. 427; State of Orissa v. Dr. Bina Pani Dei, [1962] 2 S.C.R. 625; Ambalal M. Shah v. Hathi Singh Manufacturing Co. Ltd. [1962] 3 S.C.R. 171; and S. L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan & Ors., [1981] 1 S.C.R. 746, referred to. (Per Chinnappa Reddy, J. dissenting) The principles of natural justice are not attracted to the situations contemplated by section 18AA of Industries (Development and Regulation) Act. Natural justice like Ultra Vires and Public Policy is a branch of the public law and is a formidable weapon which can be wielded to secure justice to the citizen. While it may be used to protect certain fundamental liberties, civil and political rights, it may be used as indeed it is used more often than not, to protect vested interests and to obstruct the path of progressive change. The time has come to make an appropriate distinction between natural justice in its application to fundamental liberties, civil and political rights and natural justice in its application to vested interests. [590A-B] Our constitution as befits the Constitution of a Socialist Secular Democratic Republic, recognises the paramountcy of the public weal over the private interest. Natural justice, ultra vires, public policy, or any other rule of interpretation must, therefore, conform, grow and be tailored to serve the public interest and respond to the demands of an evolving society. [590C] The principles of natural justice have taken deep root in the judicial conscience of our people. They are now considered so fundamental as to be implicit in every decision making function, judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative. Where authority functions under a statute and the statute provides for the observance of the principles of natural justice in a particular manner, natural justice will have to be observed in that manner and in no other. Where the statute is silent about the observance of the principles of natural justice, such statutory silence is taken to imply compliance with the principles of natural justice. Where the conflict is between the public interest and the private interest the presumption must necessarily be weak and may, therefore, be readily displaced. The presumption is also weak, where what are involved are mere property rights. In cases of urgency, particularly where the public interest is involved, preemptive action may be a strategic necessity. Even in cases of preemptive action, if the statute so provides or if the Courts so deem fit in appropriate cases, a postponed hearing may be substituted for natural justice. [590A-C; 591F-G] 3(ii). Where natural justice is implied, the extent of the implication and the nature of the hearing must vary with the statute, the subject and the situation. [592B] The absence of the expression 'immediate action' in section 18AA(1)(b) does not make any difference. Section 18AA(1)(a) refers to a situation where immediate preventive action may avert a disaster, whereas section 18AA contemplates a situation where the disaster has occurred and action is necessary to restore normalcy. Restoration of production where production has stopped in a key industry or industrial undertaking is as important and urgent in the public interest as prevention of a situation where production may be affected. Immediate action is, therefore, as necessary in the situation contemplated by section 18AA(1)(b) as in the situation contemplated by section 18AA(1)(a). [596 F-G] The marginal note refers to the power to take over without investigation but there is no sufficient reason to suppose that the word immediate is used only to contra- distinguish it from the investigation contemplated by section 15 of the Act, though of course a consequence of immediate action under section 18AA may be to dispense with the enquiry under section 15. In fact, facts which come to light during the course of an investigation under section 15 may form the basis of action under section 18AA(1)(a). Where in the course of an investigation under section 15 it is discovered that the management have, by reckless investments or creation of encumbrances on the assets of the industrial undertaking or by diversion of funds brought about a situation which is likely to affect the production of the articles manufactured or produced in the industrial undertaking, if the Government is satisfied that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation, there is no reason why the Central Government may not straightaway take action under section 18AA(1)(a) without waiting for completion of investigation under section 15. [597A-B] Where there is a provision in the statute itself for revocation of the order by the very authority making the decision, it appears to be unnecessary to insist upon a pre- decisional observance of natural justice. [598A] The likelihood of production being jeopardized or the stoppage of production in a key industrial undertaking is a matter of grave concern affecting the public interest. Parliament has taken so serious a view of the matter that it has authorised the Central Government to take over the management of the industrial undertaking if immediate action may prevent jeopardy to production or restore production where it has already stopped. The necessity for immediate action by the Central Government contemplated by Parliament is definitely indicative of the exclusion of natural justice. It is not as if the owner of the industrial undertaking is left with no remedy. He may move the Central Government under section 18-F to cancel the order made under section 18AA. [598C-D] Neither section 18-F of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act nor section 21 of the General Clauses Act by itself excludes natural justice. The exclusion of natural justice where such exclusion is not express has to be implied by reference to the subject, the statute and the statutory situation. Where an express provision in the statute itself provides for a post decisional hearing the other provisions of the Statute will have to be read in the light of such provision and the provision for post- decisional hearing may then clinch the issue where pre- decisional natural justice appears to be excluded on the other terms of the statute. That a post-decisional hearing may also be had by the terms of section 21 of the General Clauses Act may not necessarily help in the interpretation of the provisions of the statute concerned. [599 A-C] Ridge v. Baldwin, 1964 A.C. p. 40; Annie G. Phillip v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 75 L.E.d. 1289; John H. Fahey v. Paul Mallonee, 91 L.E.d. 2030; Margarita Fuentes v. Robert L. Shevin, Attorney General of Florida, 32 L.E.d. 2d 556 and Lawrence Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 40 L.E.d. 2d 406, referred to. - Rama Rao, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh as well as the President of the Telugu Desam Party as well as respondent No. 3. The advertisements very shortly stated, refer to the auspicious gifts made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to the poor people on the eve of New Year and Sankranti. In the said advertisements, it is stated that the said Government which was formed by the Telugu Desam Party was giving to the poor people whose income was below Rs. and the said advertisements referred to a new scheme of selling sarees and dhoties at half prices to the poor people in the State of Andhra Pradesh having Green-cards. Moreover, the offer in the advertisements for the sale of dhoties and sarees at discount rates was in the nature of a benefit offered to poor persons in that State. When a Government announces the measures which are intended for the benefit of any of the classes for whose the Government can normally be expected to work like the poor or the economical backward classes, it is only in rare circumstances that such a promise can be said to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) even though such a promise might be made on the eve of elections. 8. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => '', 'counseldef' => '', 'court' => 'Supreme Court of India', 'court_type' => 'SC', 'decidedon' => '1989-09-29', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' K.N. Saikia,; M.H. Kania and; S. Ranganathan, JJ.', 'judgement' => '</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Kania, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. These two appeals arise out of the judgments in two Election Petitions in the Andhra Pradesh High Court questioning the election of respondent No. 1 as a Member of Parliament from Srikakulam No. Parliamentary Constituency in the 8th General Election to the House of the People. The points raised in these appeals are common and so are the relevant facts; and, hence, they are being disposed of by this common judgment. We propose to take note of only the few facts which are necessary for the appreciation of the controversy before us.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The polling date for the said election along with other parliamentary elections in the State of Andhra Pradesh was December 27, 1984 but in Srikakulam No. 1 Parliamentary Constituency the polling was countermanded and the date of polling was later fixed on January 28, 1985. In both the Election Petitions the election of respondent No. 1 was questioned mainly on the ground that Shri N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh as well as the President of the Telugu Desam Party as well as respondent No. 1 gave certain speeches and certain advertisements were got published by Shri N.T. Rama Rao through the Publicity Department of the Government of Andhra Pradesh in the newspapers containing certain statements which are alleged to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A) of the <a href="/act/50684/representation-of-the-people-act-1951-complete-act">Representation of the People Act, 1951</a> (hereinafter referred to as 'the said Act'). The main question canvassed before us is whether the statements contained in these aforesaid advertisements amount to a corrupt practice under Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act. Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act runs as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">123. Corrupt practices</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The following shall be deemed to be corrupt practises for the purposes of this Act :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) 'Bribery', that is to say.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(A) any gift, offer or promise by a candidate or his agent or by any other person with the consent of a candidate or his election agent of any gratification, to any person whomsover, with the object, directly or indirectly of inducing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) x x x</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) an elector to vote or refrain from voting at an election, or as a reward to.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) a person for having so stood or not stood, or for having withdrawn or not having withdrawn his candidature; or</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) an elector for having voted or refrained from voting.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The advertisements very shortly stated, refer to the auspicious gifts made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to the poor people on the eve of New Year and Sankranti. In the said advertisements, it is stated that the said Government which was formed by the Telugu Desam Party was giving to the poor people whose income was below Rs. 6,000 per year, a kilo of rice at Rs. 2 per Kg. and the said advertisements referred to a new scheme of selling sarees and dhoties at half prices to the poor people in the State of Andhra Pradesh having Green-cards. Green-cards were directed to be issued to all the persons whose annual income was below Rs. 6,000. The supply of the rice at subsidised rates as aforesaid was also to be made to the Green-card holders only. The scheme to sell sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was to be operative from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. In considering the question whether the said advertisement and the said speeches amount to a corrupt practice, we are of the view that the provisions of Section 123 of the said Act which deal with corrupt practices have to be interpreted, keeping in mind that dictates of commonsense require that they never could have been intended to treat normal election promises made in election manifestoes or usual election speeches by members of various political parties aspiring to power and by different candidates aspiring to get elected to legislative bodies concerned as corrupt practices. We are of the view that these advertisements and speeches amount to nothing more than statements extolling the achievements of the Government of the State of Andhra Pradesh under the Telugu Desam Party headed by N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister, and contain normal election promises and these statements do not amount to corrupt practices falling within the scope of Sub-clause (b) of Clause (A) of Sub-section (1) of Section 123 of the said Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. It was urged by Mr. Rao, learned Counsel for the appellants that in the impugned judgments, the High Court has incorrectly taken the view that in order to amount to bribery within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A), the transaction must amount to a bargain by the candidate with a view to get votes. It was pointed out by him that the said view has been taken in the impugned judgments, relying upon the decision of a Bench comprising to learned Judges of this Court in Ghasi Ram v. Dal Singh and Ors. :1983 SCR 102 . We have gone through to the relevant portion of that judgment (at page 109 and 110 of the said report). A careful perusal of the said judgment shows that what has been really held in that case is that if the promises given or made amount to a bargain entered into by a candidate for a vote or votes, that would amount to a corrupt practice; but it has not been held there that unless the act alleged amounts to such a bargain, it could not amount to a corrupt practice. In our view, that judgment does not lay down that in order to amount to a corrupt practice, the transaction must amount to a bargain for getting a vote. It was pointed out by Mr. Rao, however, that such a view seems to have been taken in two other decisions rendered by two Benches, each comprising two learned Judges of this Court in Bhanu Kumar Shastri v. Mohan Lal Sukhadia and Ors. : [1971]3SCR522 and Harjit Singh Mann v. S Umrao Singh and Ors. : [1980]2SCR501 . and these judgments need to be overruled. We do not propose to go into the correctness or otherwise of this view because, even on the footing that in order to amount to a corrupt practice under the aforesaid provision the alleged acts need not constitute a bargain, the the acts established in the present case, in our opinion, do not amount to a corrupt practice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Our attention was drawn by Mr. Rao to the fact that in this case the said advertisements and the speeches had to be viewed in the context of the fact that the advertisements were issued and the speeches were made after respondent No. 1 filed his nomination papers on January 4, 1985, for the election and before the election was held in the aforesaid constituency. It was further pointed out that the offer made for the sale of sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was limited to the period from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985. It cannot be denied that these factors are relevant factOrs. We cannot, however, lose sight of the fact that this offer was made not only in this constituency but throughout the State where the elections to the House of the People were scheduled to be held, and were, in fact, held on December 27, 1984. It was only in case of this constituency that the election to be held on the scheduled date was countermanded and later held on January 28, 1985. We cannot lose sight of the fact that, as far as the said speeches and the said advertisements, which were issued by the Publicity Department of the State, are concerned, they deal in the main with the achievements of the Government of Andhra Pradesh which, of course, was being run by Ministers belonging to Telugu Desam Party to which respondent No. 1 also belonged. Moreover, the offer in the advertisements for the sale of dhoties and sarees at discount rates was in the nature of a benefit offered to poor persons in that State. When a Government announces the measures which are intended for the benefit of any of the classes for whose the Government can normally be expected to work like the poor or the economical backward classes, it is only in rare circumstances that such a promise can be said to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) even though such a promise might be made on the eve of elections. Keeping this in mind, in our opinion, although the offer to sell dhoties and sarees at discount rates was of a limited duration as aforestated, it cannot be regarded as a corrupt practice. Such an offer was bound to have financial repercussions and it is quite possible the duration of the offer was limited to enable the Government to study the financial repercussions rather than from any improper motive. We find support for this view from the decision of this Court in H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh : [1969]3SCR813 . In that case an Ordinance was passed by the Government of Madhya Pradesh as a result of which a large number of agriculturists, namely, those holdings of plots of land of less than 7.5 acres area or paying land revenue not exceeding Rs. 5/- were exempted from the payment of the land revenue. It was held that such a concession does not amount to a gift, offer or promise of any gratification within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) of the said Act nor does the announcement of the declaration made at a meeting shortly before the election or the issue of a pamphlet containing that declaration at that time carry the matter any further. It was held that neither Shri D.P. Misra who was the Chief Minister nor Shri S.K. Dixit who acted as his agent were guilty of any corrupt practice within the meaning of the aforesaid provision.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. It was next contended by Mr. Rao, although very faintly, that the High Court was in error as it had not decided all other issues which were raised in the election petition. In this regard we cannot lose sight of the fact that the term of the present Lok Sabha is likely to be over within a few months and fresh elections are likely to be held and it would, therefore, be an exercise in futility to remand the matter to the High Court for deciding the remaining issues.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'AIR1990SC1889; JT1989(4)SC186; 1989(2)SCALE891; 1989Supp(2)SCC504', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors.', 'sub' => 'Election', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ), 'casename_url' => 'b-rajagopala-rao-vs-appayya-hanumanthu', 'args' => array( (int) 0 => '640942', (int) 1 => 'b-rajagopala-rao-vs-appayya-hanumanthu' ) ) $title_for_layout = 'B Rajagopala Rao and anr Vs Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors - Citation 640942 - Court Judgment | ' $desc = array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '640942', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/50684/representation-of-the-people-act-1951-complete-act">Representation of the People Act, 1951</a> - Sections 1, 3(1)(A), 123 and 123(1)(A)', 'appealno' => 'Civil Appeal Nos. 484 and 485 of 1987', 'appellant' => 'B. Rajagopala Rao and anr.', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'B. Rajagopala Rao and anr. Vs. Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors.', 'casenote' => 'Election - corrupt practices - Sections 123 and 123 (1) (A) of Representation of the People Act, 1951 - whether advertisements by public department and speeches made by respondent No. 1 to sell dhoti and sarees at discount rates amount to corrupt practices - offer was available for mass and for limited duration - such offer was bound to have financial repercussions and it is quite possible that duration of offer limited to enable Government to study financial repercussions rather than from any improper motive - offer not amounted to corrupt practices. - [ D.A. Desai,; O. Chinnappa Reddy and; R.S. Sarkaria, JJ.] The Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 empowers the Union of India in the public interest to take under its control the industries specified in the First Schedule to the Act. Item 23 of the First Schedule relates to textiles of various categories. Section 15 authorises the Central Government to make or cause to be made a full and complete investigation into the circumstances of the case if the Central Government is of the opinion that (a) in respect of any scheduled industry or industrial undertaking or undertakings (i) there has been, or is likely to be, a substantial fall in the volume of production for which, having regard to the economic conditions prevailing, there is no justification; or (ii) there has been, or is likely to be, a marked deterioration in the quality of any article... which could have been or can be avoided; or (iii) there has been or is likely to be a rise in the price of any article..... for which there is no justification; or (iv) it is necessary to take any such action for the purpose of conserving any resources of national importance; or (b) any industrial undertaking is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest. After the investigation is made under section 15, section 16(1) empowers the Central Government if action is desirable, to issue appropriate directions, and section 16(2) provides for the issue of interim directions by the Central Government pending investigation under section 15. Chapter III-A consisting of Sections 18A, 18-AA, 18-B, 18-C, 18-D, 18-E and 18-F deal with "direct management or control of Industrial Undertakings by Central Government in certain cases". Sec. 18-A empowers the Central Government by notified order, to authorise any person or body of persons to take over the management of the whole or any part of an industrial undertaking or to exercise in respect of the whole, or any part of the undertaking such functions of control as may be specified in the order, if the Central Government is of opinion that: (a) an industrial undertaking to which directions have been issued in pursuance of section 16 has failed to comply with such directions, or (b) an industrial undertaking in respect of which an investigation has been made under section 15 is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest. Section 18AA(5) stipulates that the provisions of Sections 18-B to 18 E shall be applicable to the industrial undertaking in respect of which an order has been made under section 18-AA even as they apply to an industrial undertaking taken over under Section 18-A. Section 18-F empowers the Central Government to cancel the order made under section 18-A if it appears that the purpose of the order has been fulfilled or it is not necessary that the order should remain in force. The appellant M/s. Swadeshi Cotton Mills was taken over by the Government of India by a notification dated April 13, 1978 in exercise of the powers conferred on it under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 18AA of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 on the ground that the company had by creation of encumbrances on the assets of its industrial undertakings, brought about a situation which had affected and is likely to further affect the production of articles manufactured or produced by it and that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation. The Government authorised the National Textile Corporation Limited to take over the management, subject to the conditions that the authorised person shall comply with all the directions issued from time to time by the Central Government and that the authorised person shall hold office for a period of five years. The appellant Mills challenged the aforesaid order in a writ petition in the High Court. The case was heard by a Full Bench of five Judges to consider the question whether in construing section 18AA of the Industries Development and Regulation Act, 1951, compliance with the principle of audi alteram partem is to be implied and whether hearing is to be given to the parties who would be affected by the order to be passed prior to the passing of the order or whether hearing can be given after the order is passed and whether the order passed under the said Section is vitiated by not giving of such hearing and whether such vice can be cured. The Bench by a majority answered the three questions as follows:- (a) Section 18AA(1)(a)(b) excludes the giving of prior hearing to the party who would be affected by order thereunder. (b) Section 18-F expressly provides for a post- decisional hearing to the owner of the industrial undertaking, the management of which is taken over under section 18AA to have the order made under section 18AA cancelled on any relevant ground. (c) As the taking over of management under section 18A is not vitiated by the failure to grant prior hearing the question of any such vice being cured by a grant of a subsequent hearing does not arise. The minority, however, held that in compliance with the principles of natural justice, prior hearing to the owner of the undertaking was required to be given before the passing of an order under section 18AA, that the second question did not arise as the denial of a prior hearing would not cure the vice by the grant of subsequent hearing, but it would be open to the Court to moderate the relief in such a way that the order is kept alive to the extent necessary until the making of the fresh order to subserve public interest and to make appropriate directions. After the decision on the reference the case was reheard on merits by a Full Bench of three Judges and the writ petition was allowed in part. The challenge to the validity of the order being rejected but insofar as the impugned order seeking to take over the corporate entity of the company, the corporate entity of the subsidiary and its assets, the petition was allowed and the respondents, the Union of India and the authorised person were directed to release from its control and custody and/or deliver possession of any assets or property of the company which were not referable to the industrial undertakings. Appeals to this Court were filed on behalf of the Company as well as by the Union of India and the National Textile Corporation. Two propositions were propounded on behalf of the company that: (a) Whether it was necessary to observe the rules of natural justice before issuing a notified order under section 18AA(1)(a) and further whether section 18-F impliedly excludes rules of natural justice relating to prior hearing; and it was contended (1) the mere use of the word 'immediate' in sub-clause (a) of section 18AA does not show a legislative intent to exclude the application of audi alteram partem rule altogether. (2) The word 'immediate' in clause (a) has been used in contra distinction to 'investigate'. It only means that under section 18AA action can be taken without prior investigation under section 15. The use of the word 'immediate' in section 18AA(1)(a) only dispenses with investigation under section 15 and not with the principle of audi alteram partem altogether and this is indicated by the marginal note of section 18A and para 3 of the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Amendment Bill which inserted section 18AA in 1971. (3) The word 'immediate' occurs only in clause (a) and not in clause (b) of section 18AA(1). It would be odd if intention to exclude this principle of natural justice is spelt out in one clause of the sub-section when the other clause does not exclude it. (4) Section 18-F does not exclude a pre-decisional hearing. The so-called post-decisional hearing contemplated by section 18-F cannot be and is not intended to be a substitute for a pre-decisional hearing. (5) Section 18F incorporates only a facet, albeit qualified, of section 21 of the General Clauses Act. The language of the Section implicity prohibits an enquiry into circumstances that led to the passing of the order of take-over and under it the aggrieved person is not entitled to show that on merits the order was void ab initio. (6) 'Immediacy' does not exclude a duty to act fairly because even an emergent situation can co-exist with the canons of natural justice. The only effect of urgency on the application of the principle of fair hearing would be that the width, form and duration of the hearing would be tailored to the situation and reduced to the reasonable minimum so that it does not delay and defeat the purpose of the contemplated action. (7) Where the civil consequences of the administrative action are grave and its effect is highly prejudicial to the rights and interests of the person affected and there is nothing in the language and scheme of the statute which unequivocally excludes a fair pre-decisional hearing and the post-decisional hearing provided therein is not a real remedial hearing equitable to a full right of appeal the Court should be loath to infer a legislative intent to exclude even a minimal fair hearing at the pre-decisional stage merely on ground of urgency. (8) The Central Government appointed four Government Officials including one from the office of the Textile Commissioner to study the affairs of the Company and to make recommendation. This Official Group submitted its report on February 16, 1978. The evidence on the basis of which the impugned order was passed was not disclosed to the appellant company till May 1978, only after it had filed the writ petition in the High Court. If there was anything adverse to the appellants in the survey report there was time enough about six weeks between the submission of the Survey Report and the passing of the impugned order for giving a short, reasonable opportunity to the appellants to explain the adverse findings against them. If there was immediacy situational modifications could be made to meet the requirement of fairness, by reducing the period of notice; that even the manner and form of such notice could be simplified to eliminate delay, that telephonic notice or short opportunity for furnishing their explanation to the Company might have satisfied the requirements of natural justice. Such an opportunity of hearing could have been given after the passing of a conditional tentative order and before its enforcement under section 18AA. For the interregnum suitable interim action such as freezing the assets of the Company or restraining the Company from creating further encumbrances, could be taken under section 16. On behalf of the Union of India and the Authorised Officer it was contended that (1) the presumption in favour of audi alteram partem rule stands impliedly displaced by the language scheme, setting and the purpose of the provision in section 18AA. (2) Section 18AA on its plain terms deals with situations where immediate preventive action is required. The paramount concern is to avoid serious problems which may be caused by fall in production. The purpose of an order under section 18AA is not to condemn the owner but to protect the scheduled industry. The issue under section 18AA is not solely between the Government and the management of the industrial undertaking. The object of taking action under this Section is to protect other outside interests of the community at large and the workers. (3) The rule of natural justice to give a hearing has been incorporated in section 18-F which gives an opportunity of a post-decisional hearing to the owner of the undertaking who if he feels aggrieved can on his application be heard, to show that even the original order under section 18AA was passed on invalid grounds and should be cancelled or rescinded. (4) On a true construction of section 18AA read with section 18-F the requirements of natural justice and fair play can be read into the statute only insofar as conformance to such canons can reasonably and realistically be required of it by the provision for a remedial hearing at a subsequent stage. (5) Under section 18-F the Central Government exercises curial functions and that Section confers on the aggrieved owner a right to apply to the Government to cancel the order of take-over. This section casts an obligation on the Central Government to deal with and dispose of an application filed thereunder with reasonable expedition. Allowing the appeal by the Company,<br/>HELD: (Sarkaria & Desai, JJ. per Chinnappa Reddy, J. dissenting.) In the facts and circumstances of the instant case, there has been a noncompliance with the implied requirement of the audi alteram partem rule of natural justice at the pre-decisional stage. The impugned order could be struck down as invalid on that score alone. But in view of the commitment / concession that a hearing would be afforded to the Company, the case is remitted to the Central Government to give a full, fair and effective hearing. [587G-H, 588C] The phrase 'natural justice' is not capable of a static and precise definition. It cannot be imprisoned in the straight-jacket of a cast-iron formula. Rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. Hence not possible to make an exhaustive catalogue of such rules. Two fundamental maxims of natural justice have now become deeply and indelibly ingrained in the common consciousness of mankind as pre-eminently necessary to ensure that the law is applied impartially objectively and fairly. These twin principles are (i) audi alteram partem and (ii) nemo judex in re sua. Audi alteram partem is a highly effective rule devised by the Courts to ensure that a statutory authority arrives at a just decision and it is calculated to act as a healthy check on the abuse or misuse of power. Its reach should not be narrowed and its applicability circumscribed.[554C-G] The rules of natural justice can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. If a statutory provision either specifically or by inevitable implication excludes the application of the rules of natural justice then the Court cannot ignore the mandate of the Legislature. Whether or not the application of the principles of natural justice in a given case has been excluded in the exercise of statutory power depends upon the language and basic scheme of the provision conferring the power, the nature of the power the purpose for which it is conferred and the effect of that power. [556A-B] The maxim audi alteram partem has many facets. Two of them are (a) notice of the case to be met, and (b) opportunity to explain. The rule cannot be sacrificed at the altar of administrative convenience or celerity; for, convenience and justice are often not on speaking terms. Difficulties, however, arise when the statute conferring the power does not expressly exclude this rule but its exclusion is sought by implication due to the presence of certain factors such as urgency where the obligation to give notice and opportunity to be heard would obstruct the taking of prompt action of a preventive or remedial nature. Audi alteram partem rule may be disregarded in an emergent situation where immediate action brooks no delay to prevent some imminent danger or injury or hazard to paramount public interests. Section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure empowers the magistrates specified therein to make an exparte conditional order in emergent cases for removal of dangerous public nuisances. Action under section 17 Land Acquisition Act furnishes another such instance. Similarly action on grounds of public safety public health may justify disregard of the rule of prior hearing. [556C-H] Cases where owing to the compulsion of the fact situation or the necessity of taking speedy action no pre- decisional hearing is given but the action, is followed soon by a full post-decisional hearing to the person affected do not in reality constitute an exception to the audi alteram partem rule. To call such cases as exception is a misnomer because they do not exclude fair play in action but adapt it to the urgency of the situation by balancing the competing claims of hurry and hearing. [560H-561A] The general principle as distinguished from an absolute rule of uniform application seems to be that where a statute does not in terms exclude this rule of prior hearing but contemplates a post-decisional hearing amounting to a full review of the original order on merits then such a statute would be construed as excluding the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage. [561G] If the statute conferring the power is silent with regard to the giving of pre-decisional hearing to the person affected and the administrative decision taken by the authority involves civil consequences of a grave nature and no full review or appeal on merits against that decision is provided courts will be extremely reluctant to construe such a statute as excluding the duty of affording even a minimal hearing shorn of all its formal trappings and dilatory features at the pre-decisional stage, unless viewed pragmatically it would paralyse the administrative process or frustrate the need for utmost promptitude. [561H] 7(i). A comparison of the provisions of Section 18A(1)(b) and Section 18AA(1)(c), bring out two main points of distinction: First, action under Section 18A(1)(b) can be taken only after an investigation had been made under Section 15; while under Section 18AA(1)(a) or (b) action can be taken without such investigation. The language, scheme and setting of Section 18AA read in the light of the Objects and Reasons for enacting this provision make this position clear beyond doubt. Second, before taking action under Section 18A(1)(b), the Central Government has to form an opinion on the basis of the investigation conducted under section 15, in regard to the existence of the objective fact, namely: that the industrial undertaking is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest; while under section 18A(1)(a) the Government has to satisfy itself that the persons incharge of the undertaking have brought about a situation likely to cause fall in production, by committing any of the three kinds of acts specified in that provision. This shows that the preliminary objective fact attributable to the persons in charge of the management or affairs of the undertaking, on the basis of which action may be taken under section 18(A)(1)(b), is of far wider amplitude than the circumstance, the existence of which is a sine qua non for taking action under section 18AA(1). The phrase "highly detrimental to the scheduled industry or public interest" in section 18-A is capable of being construed to cover a large variety of acts or things which may be considered wrong with the manner of running the industry by the management. In contrast with it, action under section 18AA(1)(a) can be taken only if the Central Government is satisfied with regard to the existence of the twin conditions specifically mentioned therein, on the basis of evidence in its possession. [569D-H] An analysis of section 18AA(1)(a), indicates that as a necessary preliminary to the exercise of the power thereunder, the Central Government must be satisfied "from documentary or other evidence in its possession" in regard to the co-existence of two circumstances: (i) that the persons in charge of the industrial undertaking have by committing any of these acts, namely, reckless investments, or creation of incumbrances on the assets of industrial undertaking, or by diversion of funds, brought about a situation which is likely to affect the production of the article manufactured or produced in the industrial undertaking, and (ii) that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation.[570B-D] It cannot be laid down as a general proposition that whenever a statute confers a power on an administrative authority and makes the exercise of that power conditional on the formation of an opinion by that authority in regard to the existence of an immediacy, its opinion in regard to that preliminary fact is not open to judicial scrutiny at all. While it may be conceded that an element of subjectivity is always involved in the formation of such an opinion, the existence of the circumstances from which the inference constituting the opinion, as the sine qua non for action, are to be drawn, must be demonstrable, and the existence of such "circumstances", if questioned, must be proved at least prima facie. [571 E-G] From a plain reading of section 18AA, it is clear that it does not expressly in unmistakable and unequivocal terms exclude the application of the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage. [574B] In the instant case, so far as Kanpur Unit is concerned, it was lying closed for more than three months before the passing of the impugned order. There was no 'immediacy' in relation to that unit, which could absolve the Government from the obligation of complying fully with audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional or pre- takeover stage. [583A] Keshav Mills Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, [1973] 3 S.C.R. 22; Kamla Prasad Khetan v. Union of India,[1957] S.C.R. 1052; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 621; Sukhdev Singh & Ors. v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh, [1975] 3 S.C.R. 619; A. K. Kraipak v. Union of India, [1970] 1 S.C.R. 457; Ridge v. Baldwin, [1964] A.C. 40; 196; Heatley v. Tasmanian Racing & Gaming Commission, 14 Australian Law Reports 519; Nawabkhan Abbaskhan v. State of Gujarat, [1974] 3 S.C.R. 427; State of Orissa v. Dr. Bina Pani Dei, [1962] 2 S.C.R. 625; Ambalal M. Shah v. Hathi Singh Manufacturing Co. Ltd. [1962] 3 S.C.R. 171; and S. L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan & Ors., [1981] 1 S.C.R. 746, referred to. (Per Chinnappa Reddy, J. dissenting) The principles of natural justice are not attracted to the situations contemplated by section 18AA of Industries (Development and Regulation) Act. Natural justice like Ultra Vires and Public Policy is a branch of the public law and is a formidable weapon which can be wielded to secure justice to the citizen. While it may be used to protect certain fundamental liberties, civil and political rights, it may be used as indeed it is used more often than not, to protect vested interests and to obstruct the path of progressive change. The time has come to make an appropriate distinction between natural justice in its application to fundamental liberties, civil and political rights and natural justice in its application to vested interests. [590A-B] Our constitution as befits the Constitution of a Socialist Secular Democratic Republic, recognises the paramountcy of the public weal over the private interest. Natural justice, ultra vires, public policy, or any other rule of interpretation must, therefore, conform, grow and be tailored to serve the public interest and respond to the demands of an evolving society. [590C] The principles of natural justice have taken deep root in the judicial conscience of our people. They are now considered so fundamental as to be implicit in every decision making function, judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative. Where authority functions under a statute and the statute provides for the observance of the principles of natural justice in a particular manner, natural justice will have to be observed in that manner and in no other. Where the statute is silent about the observance of the principles of natural justice, such statutory silence is taken to imply compliance with the principles of natural justice. Where the conflict is between the public interest and the private interest the presumption must necessarily be weak and may, therefore, be readily displaced. The presumption is also weak, where what are involved are mere property rights. In cases of urgency, particularly where the public interest is involved, preemptive action may be a strategic necessity. Even in cases of preemptive action, if the statute so provides or if the Courts so deem fit in appropriate cases, a postponed hearing may be substituted for natural justice. [590A-C; 591F-G] 3(ii). Where natural justice is implied, the extent of the implication and the nature of the hearing must vary with the statute, the subject and the situation. [592B] The absence of the expression 'immediate action' in section 18AA(1)(b) does not make any difference. Section 18AA(1)(a) refers to a situation where immediate preventive action may avert a disaster, whereas section 18AA contemplates a situation where the disaster has occurred and action is necessary to restore normalcy. Restoration of production where production has stopped in a key industry or industrial undertaking is as important and urgent in the public interest as prevention of a situation where production may be affected. Immediate action is, therefore, as necessary in the situation contemplated by section 18AA(1)(b) as in the situation contemplated by section 18AA(1)(a). [596 F-G] The marginal note refers to the power to take over without investigation but there is no sufficient reason to suppose that the word immediate is used only to contra- distinguish it from the investigation contemplated by section 15 of the Act, though of course a consequence of immediate action under section 18AA may be to dispense with the enquiry under section 15. In fact, facts which come to light during the course of an investigation under section 15 may form the basis of action under section 18AA(1)(a). Where in the course of an investigation under section 15 it is discovered that the management have, by reckless investments or creation of encumbrances on the assets of the industrial undertaking or by diversion of funds brought about a situation which is likely to affect the production of the articles manufactured or produced in the industrial undertaking, if the Government is satisfied that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation, there is no reason why the Central Government may not straightaway take action under section 18AA(1)(a) without waiting for completion of investigation under section 15. [597A-B] Where there is a provision in the statute itself for revocation of the order by the very authority making the decision, it appears to be unnecessary to insist upon a pre- decisional observance of natural justice. [598A] The likelihood of production being jeopardized or the stoppage of production in a key industrial undertaking is a matter of grave concern affecting the public interest. Parliament has taken so serious a view of the matter that it has authorised the Central Government to take over the management of the industrial undertaking if immediate action may prevent jeopardy to production or restore production where it has already stopped. The necessity for immediate action by the Central Government contemplated by Parliament is definitely indicative of the exclusion of natural justice. It is not as if the owner of the industrial undertaking is left with no remedy. He may move the Central Government under section 18-F to cancel the order made under section 18AA. [598C-D] Neither section 18-F of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act nor section 21 of the General Clauses Act by itself excludes natural justice. The exclusion of natural justice where such exclusion is not express has to be implied by reference to the subject, the statute and the statutory situation. Where an express provision in the statute itself provides for a post decisional hearing the other provisions of the Statute will have to be read in the light of such provision and the provision for post- decisional hearing may then clinch the issue where pre- decisional natural justice appears to be excluded on the other terms of the statute. That a post-decisional hearing may also be had by the terms of section 21 of the General Clauses Act may not necessarily help in the interpretation of the provisions of the statute concerned. [599 A-C] Ridge v. Baldwin, 1964 A.C. p. 40; Annie G. Phillip v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 75 L.E.d. 1289; John H. Fahey v. Paul Mallonee, 91 L.E.d. 2030; Margarita Fuentes v. Robert L. Shevin, Attorney General of Florida, 32 L.E.d. 2d 556 and Lawrence Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 40 L.E.d. 2d 406, referred to. - Rama Rao, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh as well as the President of the Telugu Desam Party as well as respondent No. 3. The advertisements very shortly stated, refer to the auspicious gifts made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to the poor people on the eve of New Year and Sankranti. In the said advertisements, it is stated that the said Government which was formed by the Telugu Desam Party was giving to the poor people whose income was below Rs. and the said advertisements referred to a new scheme of selling sarees and dhoties at half prices to the poor people in the State of Andhra Pradesh having Green-cards. Moreover, the offer in the advertisements for the sale of dhoties and sarees at discount rates was in the nature of a benefit offered to poor persons in that State. When a Government announces the measures which are intended for the benefit of any of the classes for whose the Government can normally be expected to work like the poor or the economical backward classes, it is only in rare circumstances that such a promise can be said to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) even though such a promise might be made on the eve of elections. 8. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => '', 'counseldef' => '', 'court' => 'Supreme Court of India', 'court_type' => 'SC', 'decidedon' => '1989-09-29', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' K.N. Saikia,; M.H. Kania and; S. Ranganathan, JJ.', 'judgement' => '</p><p>Kania, J.</p><p>1. These two appeals arise out of the judgments in two Election Petitions in the Andhra Pradesh High Court questioning the election of respondent No. 1 as a Member of Parliament from Srikakulam No. Parliamentary Constituency in the 8th General Election to the House of the People. The points raised in these appeals are common and so are the relevant facts; and, hence, they are being disposed of by this common judgment. We propose to take note of only the few facts which are necessary for the appreciation of the controversy before us.</p><p>2. The polling date for the said election along with other parliamentary elections in the State of Andhra Pradesh was December 27, 1984 but in Srikakulam No. 1 Parliamentary Constituency the polling was countermanded and the date of polling was later fixed on January 28, 1985. In both the Election Petitions the election of respondent No. 1 was questioned mainly on the ground that Shri N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh as well as the President of the Telugu Desam Party as well as respondent No. 1 gave certain speeches and certain advertisements were got published by Shri N.T. Rama Rao through the Publicity Department of the Government of Andhra Pradesh in the newspapers containing certain statements which are alleged to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A) of the <a>Representation of the People Act, 1951</a> (hereinafter referred to as 'the said Act'). The main question canvassed before us is whether the statements contained in these aforesaid advertisements amount to a corrupt practice under Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act. Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act runs as follows :</p><p>123. Corrupt practices</p><p>The following shall be deemed to be corrupt practises for the purposes of this Act :</p><p>(1) 'Bribery', that is to say.</p><p>(A) any gift, offer or promise by a candidate or his agent or by any other person with the consent of a candidate or his election agent of any gratification, to any person whomsover, with the object, directly or indirectly of inducing.</p><p>(a) x x x</p><p>(b) an elector to vote or refrain from voting at an election, or as a reward to.</p><p>(i) a person for having so stood or not stood, or for having withdrawn or not having withdrawn his candidature; or</p><p>(ii) an elector for having voted or refrained from voting.</p><p>3. The advertisements very shortly stated, refer to the auspicious gifts made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to the poor people on the eve of New Year and Sankranti. In the said advertisements, it is stated that the said Government which was formed by the Telugu Desam Party was giving to the poor people whose income was below Rs. 6,000 per year, a kilo of rice at Rs. 2 per Kg. and the said advertisements referred to a new scheme of selling sarees and dhoties at half prices to the poor people in the State of Andhra Pradesh having Green-cards. Green-cards were directed to be issued to all the persons whose annual income was below Rs. 6,000. The supply of the rice at subsidised rates as aforesaid was also to be made to the Green-card holders only. The scheme to sell sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was to be operative from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985.</p><p>4. In considering the question whether the said advertisement and the said speeches amount to a corrupt practice, we are of the view that the provisions of Section 123 of the said Act which deal with corrupt practices have to be interpreted, keeping in mind that dictates of commonsense require that they never could have been intended to treat normal election promises made in election manifestoes or usual election speeches by members of various political parties aspiring to power and by different candidates aspiring to get elected to legislative bodies concerned as corrupt practices. We are of the view that these advertisements and speeches amount to nothing more than statements extolling the achievements of the Government of the State of Andhra Pradesh under the Telugu Desam Party headed by N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister, and contain normal election promises and these statements do not amount to corrupt practices falling within the scope of Sub-clause (b) of Clause (A) of Sub-section (1) of Section 123 of the said Act.</p><p>5. It was urged by Mr. Rao, learned Counsel for the appellants that in the impugned judgments, the High Court has incorrectly taken the view that in order to amount to bribery within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A), the transaction must amount to a bargain by the candidate with a view to get votes. It was pointed out by him that the said view has been taken in the impugned judgments, relying upon the decision of a Bench comprising to learned Judges of this Court in Ghasi Ram v. Dal Singh and Ors. :1983 SCR 102 . We have gone through to the relevant portion of that judgment (at page 109 and 110 of the said report). A careful perusal of the said judgment shows that what has been really held in that case is that if the promises given or made amount to a bargain entered into by a candidate for a vote or votes, that would amount to a corrupt practice; but it has not been held there that unless the act alleged amounts to such a bargain, it could not amount to a corrupt practice. In our view, that judgment does not lay down that in order to amount to a corrupt practice, the transaction must amount to a bargain for getting a vote. It was pointed out by Mr. Rao, however, that such a view seems to have been taken in two other decisions rendered by two Benches, each comprising two learned Judges of this Court in Bhanu Kumar Shastri v. Mohan Lal Sukhadia and Ors. : [1971]3SCR522 and Harjit Singh Mann v. S Umrao Singh and Ors. : [1980]2SCR501 . and these judgments need to be overruled. We do not propose to go into the correctness or otherwise of this view because, even on the footing that in order to amount to a corrupt practice under the aforesaid provision the alleged acts need not constitute a bargain, the the acts established in the present case, in our opinion, do not amount to a corrupt practice.</p><p>6. Our attention was drawn by Mr. Rao to the fact that in this case the said advertisements and the speeches had to be viewed in the context of the fact that the advertisements were issued and the speeches were made after respondent No. 1 filed his nomination papers on January 4, 1985, for the election and before the election was held in the aforesaid constituency. It was further pointed out that the offer made for the sale of sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was limited to the period from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985. It cannot be denied that these factors are relevant factOrs. We cannot, however, lose sight of the fact that this offer was made not only in this constituency but throughout the State where the elections to the House of the People were scheduled to be held, and were, in fact, held on December 27, 1984. It was only in case of this constituency that the election to be held on the scheduled date was countermanded and later held on January 28, 1985. We cannot lose sight of the fact that, as far as the said speeches and the said advertisements, which were issued by the Publicity Department of the State, are concerned, they deal in the main with the achievements of the Government of Andhra Pradesh which, of course, was being run by Ministers belonging to Telugu Desam Party to which respondent No. 1 also belonged. Moreover, the offer in the advertisements for the sale of dhoties and sarees at discount rates was in the nature of a benefit offered to poor persons in that State. When a Government announces the measures which are intended for the benefit of any of the classes for whose the Government can normally be expected to work like the poor or the economical backward classes, it is only in rare circumstances that such a promise can be said to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) even though such a promise might be made on the eve of elections. Keeping this in mind, in our opinion, although the offer to sell dhoties and sarees at discount rates was of a limited duration as aforestated, it cannot be regarded as a corrupt practice. Such an offer was bound to have financial repercussions and it is quite possible the duration of the offer was limited to enable the Government to study the financial repercussions rather than from any improper motive. We find support for this view from the decision of this Court in H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh : [1969]3SCR813 . In that case an Ordinance was passed by the Government of Madhya Pradesh as a result of which a large number of agriculturists, namely, those holdings of plots of land of less than 7.5 acres area or paying land revenue not exceeding Rs. 5/- were exempted from the payment of the land revenue. It was held that such a concession does not amount to a gift, offer or promise of any gratification within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) of the said Act nor does the announcement of the declaration made at a meeting shortly before the election or the issue of a pamphlet containing that declaration at that time carry the matter any further. It was held that neither Shri D.P. Misra who was the Chief Minister nor Shri S.K. Dixit who acted as his agent were guilty of any corrupt practice within the meaning of the aforesaid provision.</p><p>7. It was next contended by Mr. Rao, although very faintly, that the High Court was in error as it had not decided all other issues which were raised in the election petition. In this regard we cannot lose sight of the fact that the term of the present Lok Sabha is likely to be over within a few months and fresh elections are likely to be held and it would, therefore, be an exercise in futility to remand the matter to the High Court for deciding the remaining issues.</p><p>8. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed. 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$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp' $dataForView = array( 'title_for_layout' => 'B Rajagopala Rao and anr Vs Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors - Citation 640942 - Court Judgment | ', 'desc' => array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '640942', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/50684/representation-of-the-people-act-1951-complete-act">Representation of the People Act, 1951</a> - Sections 1, 3(1)(A), 123 and 123(1)(A)', 'appealno' => 'Civil Appeal Nos. 484 and 485 of 1987', 'appellant' => 'B. Rajagopala Rao and anr.', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'B. Rajagopala Rao and anr. Vs. Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors.', 'casenote' => 'Election - corrupt practices - Sections 123 and 123 (1) (A) of Representation of the People Act, 1951 - whether advertisements by public department and speeches made by respondent No. 1 to sell dhoti and sarees at discount rates amount to corrupt practices - offer was available for mass and for limited duration - such offer was bound to have financial repercussions and it is quite possible that duration of offer limited to enable Government to study financial repercussions rather than from any improper motive - offer not amounted to corrupt practices. - [ D.A. Desai,; O. Chinnappa Reddy and; R.S. Sarkaria, JJ.] The Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 empowers the Union of India in the public interest to take under its control the industries specified in the First Schedule to the Act. Item 23 of the First Schedule relates to textiles of various categories. Section 15 authorises the Central Government to make or cause to be made a full and complete investigation into the circumstances of the case if the Central Government is of the opinion that (a) in respect of any scheduled industry or industrial undertaking or undertakings (i) there has been, or is likely to be, a substantial fall in the volume of production for which, having regard to the economic conditions prevailing, there is no justification; or (ii) there has been, or is likely to be, a marked deterioration in the quality of any article... which could have been or can be avoided; or (iii) there has been or is likely to be a rise in the price of any article..... for which there is no justification; or (iv) it is necessary to take any such action for the purpose of conserving any resources of national importance; or (b) any industrial undertaking is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest. After the investigation is made under section 15, section 16(1) empowers the Central Government if action is desirable, to issue appropriate directions, and section 16(2) provides for the issue of interim directions by the Central Government pending investigation under section 15. Chapter III-A consisting of Sections 18A, 18-AA, 18-B, 18-C, 18-D, 18-E and 18-F deal with "direct management or control of Industrial Undertakings by Central Government in certain cases". Sec. 18-A empowers the Central Government by notified order, to authorise any person or body of persons to take over the management of the whole or any part of an industrial undertaking or to exercise in respect of the whole, or any part of the undertaking such functions of control as may be specified in the order, if the Central Government is of opinion that: (a) an industrial undertaking to which directions have been issued in pursuance of section 16 has failed to comply with such directions, or (b) an industrial undertaking in respect of which an investigation has been made under section 15 is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest. Section 18AA(5) stipulates that the provisions of Sections 18-B to 18 E shall be applicable to the industrial undertaking in respect of which an order has been made under section 18-AA even as they apply to an industrial undertaking taken over under Section 18-A. Section 18-F empowers the Central Government to cancel the order made under section 18-A if it appears that the purpose of the order has been fulfilled or it is not necessary that the order should remain in force. The appellant M/s. Swadeshi Cotton Mills was taken over by the Government of India by a notification dated April 13, 1978 in exercise of the powers conferred on it under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 18AA of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 on the ground that the company had by creation of encumbrances on the assets of its industrial undertakings, brought about a situation which had affected and is likely to further affect the production of articles manufactured or produced by it and that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation. The Government authorised the National Textile Corporation Limited to take over the management, subject to the conditions that the authorised person shall comply with all the directions issued from time to time by the Central Government and that the authorised person shall hold office for a period of five years. The appellant Mills challenged the aforesaid order in a writ petition in the High Court. The case was heard by a Full Bench of five Judges to consider the question whether in construing section 18AA of the Industries Development and Regulation Act, 1951, compliance with the principle of audi alteram partem is to be implied and whether hearing is to be given to the parties who would be affected by the order to be passed prior to the passing of the order or whether hearing can be given after the order is passed and whether the order passed under the said Section is vitiated by not giving of such hearing and whether such vice can be cured. The Bench by a majority answered the three questions as follows:- (a) Section 18AA(1)(a)(b) excludes the giving of prior hearing to the party who would be affected by order thereunder. (b) Section 18-F expressly provides for a post- decisional hearing to the owner of the industrial undertaking, the management of which is taken over under section 18AA to have the order made under section 18AA cancelled on any relevant ground. (c) As the taking over of management under section 18A is not vitiated by the failure to grant prior hearing the question of any such vice being cured by a grant of a subsequent hearing does not arise. The minority, however, held that in compliance with the principles of natural justice, prior hearing to the owner of the undertaking was required to be given before the passing of an order under section 18AA, that the second question did not arise as the denial of a prior hearing would not cure the vice by the grant of subsequent hearing, but it would be open to the Court to moderate the relief in such a way that the order is kept alive to the extent necessary until the making of the fresh order to subserve public interest and to make appropriate directions. After the decision on the reference the case was reheard on merits by a Full Bench of three Judges and the writ petition was allowed in part. The challenge to the validity of the order being rejected but insofar as the impugned order seeking to take over the corporate entity of the company, the corporate entity of the subsidiary and its assets, the petition was allowed and the respondents, the Union of India and the authorised person were directed to release from its control and custody and/or deliver possession of any assets or property of the company which were not referable to the industrial undertakings. Appeals to this Court were filed on behalf of the Company as well as by the Union of India and the National Textile Corporation. Two propositions were propounded on behalf of the company that: (a) Whether it was necessary to observe the rules of natural justice before issuing a notified order under section 18AA(1)(a) and further whether section 18-F impliedly excludes rules of natural justice relating to prior hearing; and it was contended (1) the mere use of the word 'immediate' in sub-clause (a) of section 18AA does not show a legislative intent to exclude the application of audi alteram partem rule altogether. (2) The word 'immediate' in clause (a) has been used in contra distinction to 'investigate'. It only means that under section 18AA action can be taken without prior investigation under section 15. The use of the word 'immediate' in section 18AA(1)(a) only dispenses with investigation under section 15 and not with the principle of audi alteram partem altogether and this is indicated by the marginal note of section 18A and para 3 of the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Amendment Bill which inserted section 18AA in 1971. (3) The word 'immediate' occurs only in clause (a) and not in clause (b) of section 18AA(1). It would be odd if intention to exclude this principle of natural justice is spelt out in one clause of the sub-section when the other clause does not exclude it. (4) Section 18-F does not exclude a pre-decisional hearing. The so-called post-decisional hearing contemplated by section 18-F cannot be and is not intended to be a substitute for a pre-decisional hearing. (5) Section 18F incorporates only a facet, albeit qualified, of section 21 of the General Clauses Act. The language of the Section implicity prohibits an enquiry into circumstances that led to the passing of the order of take-over and under it the aggrieved person is not entitled to show that on merits the order was void ab initio. (6) 'Immediacy' does not exclude a duty to act fairly because even an emergent situation can co-exist with the canons of natural justice. The only effect of urgency on the application of the principle of fair hearing would be that the width, form and duration of the hearing would be tailored to the situation and reduced to the reasonable minimum so that it does not delay and defeat the purpose of the contemplated action. (7) Where the civil consequences of the administrative action are grave and its effect is highly prejudicial to the rights and interests of the person affected and there is nothing in the language and scheme of the statute which unequivocally excludes a fair pre-decisional hearing and the post-decisional hearing provided therein is not a real remedial hearing equitable to a full right of appeal the Court should be loath to infer a legislative intent to exclude even a minimal fair hearing at the pre-decisional stage merely on ground of urgency. (8) The Central Government appointed four Government Officials including one from the office of the Textile Commissioner to study the affairs of the Company and to make recommendation. This Official Group submitted its report on February 16, 1978. The evidence on the basis of which the impugned order was passed was not disclosed to the appellant company till May 1978, only after it had filed the writ petition in the High Court. If there was anything adverse to the appellants in the survey report there was time enough about six weeks between the submission of the Survey Report and the passing of the impugned order for giving a short, reasonable opportunity to the appellants to explain the adverse findings against them. If there was immediacy situational modifications could be made to meet the requirement of fairness, by reducing the period of notice; that even the manner and form of such notice could be simplified to eliminate delay, that telephonic notice or short opportunity for furnishing their explanation to the Company might have satisfied the requirements of natural justice. Such an opportunity of hearing could have been given after the passing of a conditional tentative order and before its enforcement under section 18AA. For the interregnum suitable interim action such as freezing the assets of the Company or restraining the Company from creating further encumbrances, could be taken under section 16. On behalf of the Union of India and the Authorised Officer it was contended that (1) the presumption in favour of audi alteram partem rule stands impliedly displaced by the language scheme, setting and the purpose of the provision in section 18AA. (2) Section 18AA on its plain terms deals with situations where immediate preventive action is required. The paramount concern is to avoid serious problems which may be caused by fall in production. The purpose of an order under section 18AA is not to condemn the owner but to protect the scheduled industry. The issue under section 18AA is not solely between the Government and the management of the industrial undertaking. The object of taking action under this Section is to protect other outside interests of the community at large and the workers. (3) The rule of natural justice to give a hearing has been incorporated in section 18-F which gives an opportunity of a post-decisional hearing to the owner of the undertaking who if he feels aggrieved can on his application be heard, to show that even the original order under section 18AA was passed on invalid grounds and should be cancelled or rescinded. (4) On a true construction of section 18AA read with section 18-F the requirements of natural justice and fair play can be read into the statute only insofar as conformance to such canons can reasonably and realistically be required of it by the provision for a remedial hearing at a subsequent stage. (5) Under section 18-F the Central Government exercises curial functions and that Section confers on the aggrieved owner a right to apply to the Government to cancel the order of take-over. This section casts an obligation on the Central Government to deal with and dispose of an application filed thereunder with reasonable expedition. Allowing the appeal by the Company,<br />HELD: (Sarkaria & Desai, JJ. per Chinnappa Reddy, J. dissenting.) In the facts and circumstances of the instant case, there has been a noncompliance with the implied requirement of the audi alteram partem rule of natural justice at the pre-decisional stage. The impugned order could be struck down as invalid on that score alone. But in view of the commitment / concession that a hearing would be afforded to the Company, the case is remitted to the Central Government to give a full, fair and effective hearing. [587G-H, 588C] The phrase 'natural justice' is not capable of a static and precise definition. It cannot be imprisoned in the straight-jacket of a cast-iron formula. Rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. Hence not possible to make an exhaustive catalogue of such rules. Two fundamental maxims of natural justice have now become deeply and indelibly ingrained in the common consciousness of mankind as pre-eminently necessary to ensure that the law is applied impartially objectively and fairly. These twin principles are (i) audi alteram partem and (ii) nemo judex in re sua. Audi alteram partem is a highly effective rule devised by the Courts to ensure that a statutory authority arrives at a just decision and it is calculated to act as a healthy check on the abuse or misuse of power. Its reach should not be narrowed and its applicability circumscribed.[554C-G] The rules of natural justice can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. If a statutory provision either specifically or by inevitable implication excludes the application of the rules of natural justice then the Court cannot ignore the mandate of the Legislature. Whether or not the application of the principles of natural justice in a given case has been excluded in the exercise of statutory power depends upon the language and basic scheme of the provision conferring the power, the nature of the power the purpose for which it is conferred and the effect of that power. [556A-B] The maxim audi alteram partem has many facets. Two of them are (a) notice of the case to be met, and (b) opportunity to explain. The rule cannot be sacrificed at the altar of administrative convenience or celerity; for, convenience and justice are often not on speaking terms. Difficulties, however, arise when the statute conferring the power does not expressly exclude this rule but its exclusion is sought by implication due to the presence of certain factors such as urgency where the obligation to give notice and opportunity to be heard would obstruct the taking of prompt action of a preventive or remedial nature. Audi alteram partem rule may be disregarded in an emergent situation where immediate action brooks no delay to prevent some imminent danger or injury or hazard to paramount public interests. Section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure empowers the magistrates specified therein to make an exparte conditional order in emergent cases for removal of dangerous public nuisances. Action under section 17 Land Acquisition Act furnishes another such instance. Similarly action on grounds of public safety public health may justify disregard of the rule of prior hearing. [556C-H] Cases where owing to the compulsion of the fact situation or the necessity of taking speedy action no pre- decisional hearing is given but the action, is followed soon by a full post-decisional hearing to the person affected do not in reality constitute an exception to the audi alteram partem rule. To call such cases as exception is a misnomer because they do not exclude fair play in action but adapt it to the urgency of the situation by balancing the competing claims of hurry and hearing. [560H-561A] The general principle as distinguished from an absolute rule of uniform application seems to be that where a statute does not in terms exclude this rule of prior hearing but contemplates a post-decisional hearing amounting to a full review of the original order on merits then such a statute would be construed as excluding the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage. [561G] If the statute conferring the power is silent with regard to the giving of pre-decisional hearing to the person affected and the administrative decision taken by the authority involves civil consequences of a grave nature and no full review or appeal on merits against that decision is provided courts will be extremely reluctant to construe such a statute as excluding the duty of affording even a minimal hearing shorn of all its formal trappings and dilatory features at the pre-decisional stage, unless viewed pragmatically it would paralyse the administrative process or frustrate the need for utmost promptitude. [561H] 7(i). A comparison of the provisions of Section 18A(1)(b) and Section 18AA(1)(c), bring out two main points of distinction: First, action under Section 18A(1)(b) can be taken only after an investigation had been made under Section 15; while under Section 18AA(1)(a) or (b) action can be taken without such investigation. The language, scheme and setting of Section 18AA read in the light of the Objects and Reasons for enacting this provision make this position clear beyond doubt. Second, before taking action under Section 18A(1)(b), the Central Government has to form an opinion on the basis of the investigation conducted under section 15, in regard to the existence of the objective fact, namely: that the industrial undertaking is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest; while under section 18A(1)(a) the Government has to satisfy itself that the persons incharge of the undertaking have brought about a situation likely to cause fall in production, by committing any of the three kinds of acts specified in that provision. This shows that the preliminary objective fact attributable to the persons in charge of the management or affairs of the undertaking, on the basis of which action may be taken under section 18(A)(1)(b), is of far wider amplitude than the circumstance, the existence of which is a sine qua non for taking action under section 18AA(1). The phrase "highly detrimental to the scheduled industry or public interest" in section 18-A is capable of being construed to cover a large variety of acts or things which may be considered wrong with the manner of running the industry by the management. In contrast with it, action under section 18AA(1)(a) can be taken only if the Central Government is satisfied with regard to the existence of the twin conditions specifically mentioned therein, on the basis of evidence in its possession. [569D-H] An analysis of section 18AA(1)(a), indicates that as a necessary preliminary to the exercise of the power thereunder, the Central Government must be satisfied "from documentary or other evidence in its possession" in regard to the co-existence of two circumstances: (i) that the persons in charge of the industrial undertaking have by committing any of these acts, namely, reckless investments, or creation of incumbrances on the assets of industrial undertaking, or by diversion of funds, brought about a situation which is likely to affect the production of the article manufactured or produced in the industrial undertaking, and (ii) that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation.[570B-D] It cannot be laid down as a general proposition that whenever a statute confers a power on an administrative authority and makes the exercise of that power conditional on the formation of an opinion by that authority in regard to the existence of an immediacy, its opinion in regard to that preliminary fact is not open to judicial scrutiny at all. While it may be conceded that an element of subjectivity is always involved in the formation of such an opinion, the existence of the circumstances from which the inference constituting the opinion, as the sine qua non for action, are to be drawn, must be demonstrable, and the existence of such "circumstances", if questioned, must be proved at least prima facie. [571 E-G] From a plain reading of section 18AA, it is clear that it does not expressly in unmistakable and unequivocal terms exclude the application of the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage. [574B] In the instant case, so far as Kanpur Unit is concerned, it was lying closed for more than three months before the passing of the impugned order. There was no 'immediacy' in relation to that unit, which could absolve the Government from the obligation of complying fully with audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional or pre- takeover stage. [583A] Keshav Mills Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, [1973] 3 S.C.R. 22; Kamla Prasad Khetan v. Union of India,[1957] S.C.R. 1052; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 621; Sukhdev Singh & Ors. v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh, [1975] 3 S.C.R. 619; A. K. Kraipak v. Union of India, [1970] 1 S.C.R. 457; Ridge v. Baldwin, [1964] A.C. 40; 196; Heatley v. Tasmanian Racing & Gaming Commission, 14 Australian Law Reports 519; Nawabkhan Abbaskhan v. State of Gujarat, [1974] 3 S.C.R. 427; State of Orissa v. Dr. Bina Pani Dei, [1962] 2 S.C.R. 625; Ambalal M. Shah v. Hathi Singh Manufacturing Co. Ltd. [1962] 3 S.C.R. 171; and S. L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan & Ors., [1981] 1 S.C.R. 746, referred to. (Per Chinnappa Reddy, J. dissenting) The principles of natural justice are not attracted to the situations contemplated by section 18AA of Industries (Development and Regulation) Act. Natural justice like Ultra Vires and Public Policy is a branch of the public law and is a formidable weapon which can be wielded to secure justice to the citizen. While it may be used to protect certain fundamental liberties, civil and political rights, it may be used as indeed it is used more often than not, to protect vested interests and to obstruct the path of progressive change. The time has come to make an appropriate distinction between natural justice in its application to fundamental liberties, civil and political rights and natural justice in its application to vested interests. [590A-B] Our constitution as befits the Constitution of a Socialist Secular Democratic Republic, recognises the paramountcy of the public weal over the private interest. Natural justice, ultra vires, public policy, or any other rule of interpretation must, therefore, conform, grow and be tailored to serve the public interest and respond to the demands of an evolving society. [590C] The principles of natural justice have taken deep root in the judicial conscience of our people. They are now considered so fundamental as to be implicit in every decision making function, judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative. Where authority functions under a statute and the statute provides for the observance of the principles of natural justice in a particular manner, natural justice will have to be observed in that manner and in no other. Where the statute is silent about the observance of the principles of natural justice, such statutory silence is taken to imply compliance with the principles of natural justice. Where the conflict is between the public interest and the private interest the presumption must necessarily be weak and may, therefore, be readily displaced. The presumption is also weak, where what are involved are mere property rights. In cases of urgency, particularly where the public interest is involved, preemptive action may be a strategic necessity. Even in cases of preemptive action, if the statute so provides or if the Courts so deem fit in appropriate cases, a postponed hearing may be substituted for natural justice. [590A-C; 591F-G] 3(ii). Where natural justice is implied, the extent of the implication and the nature of the hearing must vary with the statute, the subject and the situation. [592B] The absence of the expression 'immediate action' in section 18AA(1)(b) does not make any difference. Section 18AA(1)(a) refers to a situation where immediate preventive action may avert a disaster, whereas section 18AA contemplates a situation where the disaster has occurred and action is necessary to restore normalcy. Restoration of production where production has stopped in a key industry or industrial undertaking is as important and urgent in the public interest as prevention of a situation where production may be affected. Immediate action is, therefore, as necessary in the situation contemplated by section 18AA(1)(b) as in the situation contemplated by section 18AA(1)(a). [596 F-G] The marginal note refers to the power to take over without investigation but there is no sufficient reason to suppose that the word immediate is used only to contra- distinguish it from the investigation contemplated by section 15 of the Act, though of course a consequence of immediate action under section 18AA may be to dispense with the enquiry under section 15. In fact, facts which come to light during the course of an investigation under section 15 may form the basis of action under section 18AA(1)(a). Where in the course of an investigation under section 15 it is discovered that the management have, by reckless investments or creation of encumbrances on the assets of the industrial undertaking or by diversion of funds brought about a situation which is likely to affect the production of the articles manufactured or produced in the industrial undertaking, if the Government is satisfied that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation, there is no reason why the Central Government may not straightaway take action under section 18AA(1)(a) without waiting for completion of investigation under section 15. [597A-B] Where there is a provision in the statute itself for revocation of the order by the very authority making the decision, it appears to be unnecessary to insist upon a pre- decisional observance of natural justice. [598A] The likelihood of production being jeopardized or the stoppage of production in a key industrial undertaking is a matter of grave concern affecting the public interest. Parliament has taken so serious a view of the matter that it has authorised the Central Government to take over the management of the industrial undertaking if immediate action may prevent jeopardy to production or restore production where it has already stopped. The necessity for immediate action by the Central Government contemplated by Parliament is definitely indicative of the exclusion of natural justice. It is not as if the owner of the industrial undertaking is left with no remedy. He may move the Central Government under section 18-F to cancel the order made under section 18AA. [598C-D] Neither section 18-F of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act nor section 21 of the General Clauses Act by itself excludes natural justice. The exclusion of natural justice where such exclusion is not express has to be implied by reference to the subject, the statute and the statutory situation. Where an express provision in the statute itself provides for a post decisional hearing the other provisions of the Statute will have to be read in the light of such provision and the provision for post- decisional hearing may then clinch the issue where pre- decisional natural justice appears to be excluded on the other terms of the statute. That a post-decisional hearing may also be had by the terms of section 21 of the General Clauses Act may not necessarily help in the interpretation of the provisions of the statute concerned. [599 A-C] Ridge v. Baldwin, 1964 A.C. p. 40; Annie G. Phillip v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 75 L.E.d. 1289; John H. Fahey v. Paul Mallonee, 91 L.E.d. 2030; Margarita Fuentes v. Robert L. Shevin, Attorney General of Florida, 32 L.E.d. 2d 556 and Lawrence Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 40 L.E.d. 2d 406, referred to. - Rama Rao, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh as well as the President of the Telugu Desam Party as well as respondent No. 3. The advertisements very shortly stated, refer to the auspicious gifts made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to the poor people on the eve of New Year and Sankranti. In the said advertisements, it is stated that the said Government which was formed by the Telugu Desam Party was giving to the poor people whose income was below Rs. and the said advertisements referred to a new scheme of selling sarees and dhoties at half prices to the poor people in the State of Andhra Pradesh having Green-cards. Moreover, the offer in the advertisements for the sale of dhoties and sarees at discount rates was in the nature of a benefit offered to poor persons in that State. When a Government announces the measures which are intended for the benefit of any of the classes for whose the Government can normally be expected to work like the poor or the economical backward classes, it is only in rare circumstances that such a promise can be said to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) even though such a promise might be made on the eve of elections. 8. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => '', 'counseldef' => '', 'court' => 'Supreme Court of India', 'court_type' => 'SC', 'decidedon' => '1989-09-29', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' K.N. Saikia,; M.H. Kania and; S. Ranganathan, JJ.', 'judgement' => '</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Kania, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. These two appeals arise out of the judgments in two Election Petitions in the Andhra Pradesh High Court questioning the election of respondent No. 1 as a Member of Parliament from Srikakulam No. Parliamentary Constituency in the 8th General Election to the House of the People. The points raised in these appeals are common and so are the relevant facts; and, hence, they are being disposed of by this common judgment. We propose to take note of only the few facts which are necessary for the appreciation of the controversy before us.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The polling date for the said election along with other parliamentary elections in the State of Andhra Pradesh was December 27, 1984 but in Srikakulam No. 1 Parliamentary Constituency the polling was countermanded and the date of polling was later fixed on January 28, 1985. In both the Election Petitions the election of respondent No. 1 was questioned mainly on the ground that Shri N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh as well as the President of the Telugu Desam Party as well as respondent No. 1 gave certain speeches and certain advertisements were got published by Shri N.T. Rama Rao through the Publicity Department of the Government of Andhra Pradesh in the newspapers containing certain statements which are alleged to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A) of the <a href="/act/50684/representation-of-the-people-act-1951-complete-act">Representation of the People Act, 1951</a> (hereinafter referred to as 'the said Act'). The main question canvassed before us is whether the statements contained in these aforesaid advertisements amount to a corrupt practice under Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act. Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act runs as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">123. Corrupt practices</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The following shall be deemed to be corrupt practises for the purposes of this Act :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) 'Bribery', that is to say.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(A) any gift, offer or promise by a candidate or his agent or by any other person with the consent of a candidate or his election agent of any gratification, to any person whomsover, with the object, directly or indirectly of inducing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) x x x</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) an elector to vote or refrain from voting at an election, or as a reward to.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) a person for having so stood or not stood, or for having withdrawn or not having withdrawn his candidature; or</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) an elector for having voted or refrained from voting.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The advertisements very shortly stated, refer to the auspicious gifts made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to the poor people on the eve of New Year and Sankranti. In the said advertisements, it is stated that the said Government which was formed by the Telugu Desam Party was giving to the poor people whose income was below Rs. 6,000 per year, a kilo of rice at Rs. 2 per Kg. and the said advertisements referred to a new scheme of selling sarees and dhoties at half prices to the poor people in the State of Andhra Pradesh having Green-cards. Green-cards were directed to be issued to all the persons whose annual income was below Rs. 6,000. The supply of the rice at subsidised rates as aforesaid was also to be made to the Green-card holders only. The scheme to sell sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was to be operative from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. In considering the question whether the said advertisement and the said speeches amount to a corrupt practice, we are of the view that the provisions of Section 123 of the said Act which deal with corrupt practices have to be interpreted, keeping in mind that dictates of commonsense require that they never could have been intended to treat normal election promises made in election manifestoes or usual election speeches by members of various political parties aspiring to power and by different candidates aspiring to get elected to legislative bodies concerned as corrupt practices. We are of the view that these advertisements and speeches amount to nothing more than statements extolling the achievements of the Government of the State of Andhra Pradesh under the Telugu Desam Party headed by N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister, and contain normal election promises and these statements do not amount to corrupt practices falling within the scope of Sub-clause (b) of Clause (A) of Sub-section (1) of Section 123 of the said Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. It was urged by Mr. Rao, learned Counsel for the appellants that in the impugned judgments, the High Court has incorrectly taken the view that in order to amount to bribery within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A), the transaction must amount to a bargain by the candidate with a view to get votes. It was pointed out by him that the said view has been taken in the impugned judgments, relying upon the decision of a Bench comprising to learned Judges of this Court in Ghasi Ram v. Dal Singh and Ors. :1983 SCR 102 . We have gone through to the relevant portion of that judgment (at page 109 and 110 of the said report). A careful perusal of the said judgment shows that what has been really held in that case is that if the promises given or made amount to a bargain entered into by a candidate for a vote or votes, that would amount to a corrupt practice; but it has not been held there that unless the act alleged amounts to such a bargain, it could not amount to a corrupt practice. In our view, that judgment does not lay down that in order to amount to a corrupt practice, the transaction must amount to a bargain for getting a vote. It was pointed out by Mr. Rao, however, that such a view seems to have been taken in two other decisions rendered by two Benches, each comprising two learned Judges of this Court in Bhanu Kumar Shastri v. Mohan Lal Sukhadia and Ors. : [1971]3SCR522 and Harjit Singh Mann v. S Umrao Singh and Ors. : [1980]2SCR501 . and these judgments need to be overruled. We do not propose to go into the correctness or otherwise of this view because, even on the footing that in order to amount to a corrupt practice under the aforesaid provision the alleged acts need not constitute a bargain, the the acts established in the present case, in our opinion, do not amount to a corrupt practice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Our attention was drawn by Mr. Rao to the fact that in this case the said advertisements and the speeches had to be viewed in the context of the fact that the advertisements were issued and the speeches were made after respondent No. 1 filed his nomination papers on January 4, 1985, for the election and before the election was held in the aforesaid constituency. It was further pointed out that the offer made for the sale of sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was limited to the period from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985. It cannot be denied that these factors are relevant factOrs. We cannot, however, lose sight of the fact that this offer was made not only in this constituency but throughout the State where the elections to the House of the People were scheduled to be held, and were, in fact, held on December 27, 1984. It was only in case of this constituency that the election to be held on the scheduled date was countermanded and later held on January 28, 1985. We cannot lose sight of the fact that, as far as the said speeches and the said advertisements, which were issued by the Publicity Department of the State, are concerned, they deal in the main with the achievements of the Government of Andhra Pradesh which, of course, was being run by Ministers belonging to Telugu Desam Party to which respondent No. 1 also belonged. Moreover, the offer in the advertisements for the sale of dhoties and sarees at discount rates was in the nature of a benefit offered to poor persons in that State. When a Government announces the measures which are intended for the benefit of any of the classes for whose the Government can normally be expected to work like the poor or the economical backward classes, it is only in rare circumstances that such a promise can be said to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) even though such a promise might be made on the eve of elections. Keeping this in mind, in our opinion, although the offer to sell dhoties and sarees at discount rates was of a limited duration as aforestated, it cannot be regarded as a corrupt practice. Such an offer was bound to have financial repercussions and it is quite possible the duration of the offer was limited to enable the Government to study the financial repercussions rather than from any improper motive. We find support for this view from the decision of this Court in H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh : [1969]3SCR813 . In that case an Ordinance was passed by the Government of Madhya Pradesh as a result of which a large number of agriculturists, namely, those holdings of plots of land of less than 7.5 acres area or paying land revenue not exceeding Rs. 5/- were exempted from the payment of the land revenue. It was held that such a concession does not amount to a gift, offer or promise of any gratification within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) of the said Act nor does the announcement of the declaration made at a meeting shortly before the election or the issue of a pamphlet containing that declaration at that time carry the matter any further. It was held that neither Shri D.P. Misra who was the Chief Minister nor Shri S.K. Dixit who acted as his agent were guilty of any corrupt practice within the meaning of the aforesaid provision.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. It was next contended by Mr. Rao, although very faintly, that the High Court was in error as it had not decided all other issues which were raised in the election petition. In this regard we cannot lose sight of the fact that the term of the present Lok Sabha is likely to be over within a few months and fresh elections are likely to be held and it would, therefore, be an exercise in futility to remand the matter to the High Court for deciding the remaining issues.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'AIR1990SC1889; JT1989(4)SC186; 1989(2)SCALE891; 1989Supp(2)SCC504', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors.', 'sub' => 'Election', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ), 'casename_url' => 'b-rajagopala-rao-vs-appayya-hanumanthu', 'args' => array( (int) 0 => '640942', (int) 1 => 'b-rajagopala-rao-vs-appayya-hanumanthu' ) ) $title_for_layout = 'B Rajagopala Rao and anr Vs Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors - Citation 640942 - Court Judgment | ' $desc = array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '640942', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/50684/representation-of-the-people-act-1951-complete-act">Representation of the People Act, 1951</a> - Sections 1, 3(1)(A), 123 and 123(1)(A)', 'appealno' => 'Civil Appeal Nos. 484 and 485 of 1987', 'appellant' => 'B. Rajagopala Rao and anr.', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'B. Rajagopala Rao and anr. Vs. Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors.', 'casenote' => 'Election - corrupt practices - Sections 123 and 123 (1) (A) of Representation of the People Act, 1951 - whether advertisements by public department and speeches made by respondent No. 1 to sell dhoti and sarees at discount rates amount to corrupt practices - offer was available for mass and for limited duration - such offer was bound to have financial repercussions and it is quite possible that duration of offer limited to enable Government to study financial repercussions rather than from any improper motive - offer not amounted to corrupt practices. - [ D.A. Desai,; O. Chinnappa Reddy and; R.S. Sarkaria, JJ.] The Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 empowers the Union of India in the public interest to take under its control the industries specified in the First Schedule to the Act. Item 23 of the First Schedule relates to textiles of various categories. Section 15 authorises the Central Government to make or cause to be made a full and complete investigation into the circumstances of the case if the Central Government is of the opinion that (a) in respect of any scheduled industry or industrial undertaking or undertakings (i) there has been, or is likely to be, a substantial fall in the volume of production for which, having regard to the economic conditions prevailing, there is no justification; or (ii) there has been, or is likely to be, a marked deterioration in the quality of any article... which could have been or can be avoided; or (iii) there has been or is likely to be a rise in the price of any article..... for which there is no justification; or (iv) it is necessary to take any such action for the purpose of conserving any resources of national importance; or (b) any industrial undertaking is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest. After the investigation is made under section 15, section 16(1) empowers the Central Government if action is desirable, to issue appropriate directions, and section 16(2) provides for the issue of interim directions by the Central Government pending investigation under section 15. Chapter III-A consisting of Sections 18A, 18-AA, 18-B, 18-C, 18-D, 18-E and 18-F deal with "direct management or control of Industrial Undertakings by Central Government in certain cases". Sec. 18-A empowers the Central Government by notified order, to authorise any person or body of persons to take over the management of the whole or any part of an industrial undertaking or to exercise in respect of the whole, or any part of the undertaking such functions of control as may be specified in the order, if the Central Government is of opinion that: (a) an industrial undertaking to which directions have been issued in pursuance of section 16 has failed to comply with such directions, or (b) an industrial undertaking in respect of which an investigation has been made under section 15 is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest. Section 18AA(5) stipulates that the provisions of Sections 18-B to 18 E shall be applicable to the industrial undertaking in respect of which an order has been made under section 18-AA even as they apply to an industrial undertaking taken over under Section 18-A. Section 18-F empowers the Central Government to cancel the order made under section 18-A if it appears that the purpose of the order has been fulfilled or it is not necessary that the order should remain in force. The appellant M/s. Swadeshi Cotton Mills was taken over by the Government of India by a notification dated April 13, 1978 in exercise of the powers conferred on it under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 18AA of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 on the ground that the company had by creation of encumbrances on the assets of its industrial undertakings, brought about a situation which had affected and is likely to further affect the production of articles manufactured or produced by it and that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation. The Government authorised the National Textile Corporation Limited to take over the management, subject to the conditions that the authorised person shall comply with all the directions issued from time to time by the Central Government and that the authorised person shall hold office for a period of five years. The appellant Mills challenged the aforesaid order in a writ petition in the High Court. The case was heard by a Full Bench of five Judges to consider the question whether in construing section 18AA of the Industries Development and Regulation Act, 1951, compliance with the principle of audi alteram partem is to be implied and whether hearing is to be given to the parties who would be affected by the order to be passed prior to the passing of the order or whether hearing can be given after the order is passed and whether the order passed under the said Section is vitiated by not giving of such hearing and whether such vice can be cured. The Bench by a majority answered the three questions as follows:- (a) Section 18AA(1)(a)(b) excludes the giving of prior hearing to the party who would be affected by order thereunder. (b) Section 18-F expressly provides for a post- decisional hearing to the owner of the industrial undertaking, the management of which is taken over under section 18AA to have the order made under section 18AA cancelled on any relevant ground. (c) As the taking over of management under section 18A is not vitiated by the failure to grant prior hearing the question of any such vice being cured by a grant of a subsequent hearing does not arise. The minority, however, held that in compliance with the principles of natural justice, prior hearing to the owner of the undertaking was required to be given before the passing of an order under section 18AA, that the second question did not arise as the denial of a prior hearing would not cure the vice by the grant of subsequent hearing, but it would be open to the Court to moderate the relief in such a way that the order is kept alive to the extent necessary until the making of the fresh order to subserve public interest and to make appropriate directions. After the decision on the reference the case was reheard on merits by a Full Bench of three Judges and the writ petition was allowed in part. The challenge to the validity of the order being rejected but insofar as the impugned order seeking to take over the corporate entity of the company, the corporate entity of the subsidiary and its assets, the petition was allowed and the respondents, the Union of India and the authorised person were directed to release from its control and custody and/or deliver possession of any assets or property of the company which were not referable to the industrial undertakings. Appeals to this Court were filed on behalf of the Company as well as by the Union of India and the National Textile Corporation. Two propositions were propounded on behalf of the company that: (a) Whether it was necessary to observe the rules of natural justice before issuing a notified order under section 18AA(1)(a) and further whether section 18-F impliedly excludes rules of natural justice relating to prior hearing; and it was contended (1) the mere use of the word 'immediate' in sub-clause (a) of section 18AA does not show a legislative intent to exclude the application of audi alteram partem rule altogether. (2) The word 'immediate' in clause (a) has been used in contra distinction to 'investigate'. It only means that under section 18AA action can be taken without prior investigation under section 15. The use of the word 'immediate' in section 18AA(1)(a) only dispenses with investigation under section 15 and not with the principle of audi alteram partem altogether and this is indicated by the marginal note of section 18A and para 3 of the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Amendment Bill which inserted section 18AA in 1971. (3) The word 'immediate' occurs only in clause (a) and not in clause (b) of section 18AA(1). It would be odd if intention to exclude this principle of natural justice is spelt out in one clause of the sub-section when the other clause does not exclude it. (4) Section 18-F does not exclude a pre-decisional hearing. The so-called post-decisional hearing contemplated by section 18-F cannot be and is not intended to be a substitute for a pre-decisional hearing. (5) Section 18F incorporates only a facet, albeit qualified, of section 21 of the General Clauses Act. The language of the Section implicity prohibits an enquiry into circumstances that led to the passing of the order of take-over and under it the aggrieved person is not entitled to show that on merits the order was void ab initio. (6) 'Immediacy' does not exclude a duty to act fairly because even an emergent situation can co-exist with the canons of natural justice. The only effect of urgency on the application of the principle of fair hearing would be that the width, form and duration of the hearing would be tailored to the situation and reduced to the reasonable minimum so that it does not delay and defeat the purpose of the contemplated action. (7) Where the civil consequences of the administrative action are grave and its effect is highly prejudicial to the rights and interests of the person affected and there is nothing in the language and scheme of the statute which unequivocally excludes a fair pre-decisional hearing and the post-decisional hearing provided therein is not a real remedial hearing equitable to a full right of appeal the Court should be loath to infer a legislative intent to exclude even a minimal fair hearing at the pre-decisional stage merely on ground of urgency. (8) The Central Government appointed four Government Officials including one from the office of the Textile Commissioner to study the affairs of the Company and to make recommendation. This Official Group submitted its report on February 16, 1978. The evidence on the basis of which the impugned order was passed was not disclosed to the appellant company till May 1978, only after it had filed the writ petition in the High Court. If there was anything adverse to the appellants in the survey report there was time enough about six weeks between the submission of the Survey Report and the passing of the impugned order for giving a short, reasonable opportunity to the appellants to explain the adverse findings against them. If there was immediacy situational modifications could be made to meet the requirement of fairness, by reducing the period of notice; that even the manner and form of such notice could be simplified to eliminate delay, that telephonic notice or short opportunity for furnishing their explanation to the Company might have satisfied the requirements of natural justice. Such an opportunity of hearing could have been given after the passing of a conditional tentative order and before its enforcement under section 18AA. For the interregnum suitable interim action such as freezing the assets of the Company or restraining the Company from creating further encumbrances, could be taken under section 16. On behalf of the Union of India and the Authorised Officer it was contended that (1) the presumption in favour of audi alteram partem rule stands impliedly displaced by the language scheme, setting and the purpose of the provision in section 18AA. (2) Section 18AA on its plain terms deals with situations where immediate preventive action is required. The paramount concern is to avoid serious problems which may be caused by fall in production. The purpose of an order under section 18AA is not to condemn the owner but to protect the scheduled industry. The issue under section 18AA is not solely between the Government and the management of the industrial undertaking. The object of taking action under this Section is to protect other outside interests of the community at large and the workers. (3) The rule of natural justice to give a hearing has been incorporated in section 18-F which gives an opportunity of a post-decisional hearing to the owner of the undertaking who if he feels aggrieved can on his application be heard, to show that even the original order under section 18AA was passed on invalid grounds and should be cancelled or rescinded. (4) On a true construction of section 18AA read with section 18-F the requirements of natural justice and fair play can be read into the statute only insofar as conformance to such canons can reasonably and realistically be required of it by the provision for a remedial hearing at a subsequent stage. (5) Under section 18-F the Central Government exercises curial functions and that Section confers on the aggrieved owner a right to apply to the Government to cancel the order of take-over. This section casts an obligation on the Central Government to deal with and dispose of an application filed thereunder with reasonable expedition. Allowing the appeal by the Company,<br/>HELD: (Sarkaria & Desai, JJ. per Chinnappa Reddy, J. dissenting.) In the facts and circumstances of the instant case, there has been a noncompliance with the implied requirement of the audi alteram partem rule of natural justice at the pre-decisional stage. The impugned order could be struck down as invalid on that score alone. But in view of the commitment / concession that a hearing would be afforded to the Company, the case is remitted to the Central Government to give a full, fair and effective hearing. [587G-H, 588C] The phrase 'natural justice' is not capable of a static and precise definition. It cannot be imprisoned in the straight-jacket of a cast-iron formula. Rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. Hence not possible to make an exhaustive catalogue of such rules. Two fundamental maxims of natural justice have now become deeply and indelibly ingrained in the common consciousness of mankind as pre-eminently necessary to ensure that the law is applied impartially objectively and fairly. These twin principles are (i) audi alteram partem and (ii) nemo judex in re sua. Audi alteram partem is a highly effective rule devised by the Courts to ensure that a statutory authority arrives at a just decision and it is calculated to act as a healthy check on the abuse or misuse of power. Its reach should not be narrowed and its applicability circumscribed.[554C-G] The rules of natural justice can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. If a statutory provision either specifically or by inevitable implication excludes the application of the rules of natural justice then the Court cannot ignore the mandate of the Legislature. Whether or not the application of the principles of natural justice in a given case has been excluded in the exercise of statutory power depends upon the language and basic scheme of the provision conferring the power, the nature of the power the purpose for which it is conferred and the effect of that power. [556A-B] The maxim audi alteram partem has many facets. Two of them are (a) notice of the case to be met, and (b) opportunity to explain. The rule cannot be sacrificed at the altar of administrative convenience or celerity; for, convenience and justice are often not on speaking terms. Difficulties, however, arise when the statute conferring the power does not expressly exclude this rule but its exclusion is sought by implication due to the presence of certain factors such as urgency where the obligation to give notice and opportunity to be heard would obstruct the taking of prompt action of a preventive or remedial nature. Audi alteram partem rule may be disregarded in an emergent situation where immediate action brooks no delay to prevent some imminent danger or injury or hazard to paramount public interests. Section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure empowers the magistrates specified therein to make an exparte conditional order in emergent cases for removal of dangerous public nuisances. Action under section 17 Land Acquisition Act furnishes another such instance. Similarly action on grounds of public safety public health may justify disregard of the rule of prior hearing. [556C-H] Cases where owing to the compulsion of the fact situation or the necessity of taking speedy action no pre- decisional hearing is given but the action, is followed soon by a full post-decisional hearing to the person affected do not in reality constitute an exception to the audi alteram partem rule. To call such cases as exception is a misnomer because they do not exclude fair play in action but adapt it to the urgency of the situation by balancing the competing claims of hurry and hearing. [560H-561A] The general principle as distinguished from an absolute rule of uniform application seems to be that where a statute does not in terms exclude this rule of prior hearing but contemplates a post-decisional hearing amounting to a full review of the original order on merits then such a statute would be construed as excluding the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage. [561G] If the statute conferring the power is silent with regard to the giving of pre-decisional hearing to the person affected and the administrative decision taken by the authority involves civil consequences of a grave nature and no full review or appeal on merits against that decision is provided courts will be extremely reluctant to construe such a statute as excluding the duty of affording even a minimal hearing shorn of all its formal trappings and dilatory features at the pre-decisional stage, unless viewed pragmatically it would paralyse the administrative process or frustrate the need for utmost promptitude. [561H] 7(i). A comparison of the provisions of Section 18A(1)(b) and Section 18AA(1)(c), bring out two main points of distinction: First, action under Section 18A(1)(b) can be taken only after an investigation had been made under Section 15; while under Section 18AA(1)(a) or (b) action can be taken without such investigation. The language, scheme and setting of Section 18AA read in the light of the Objects and Reasons for enacting this provision make this position clear beyond doubt. Second, before taking action under Section 18A(1)(b), the Central Government has to form an opinion on the basis of the investigation conducted under section 15, in regard to the existence of the objective fact, namely: that the industrial undertaking is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest; while under section 18A(1)(a) the Government has to satisfy itself that the persons incharge of the undertaking have brought about a situation likely to cause fall in production, by committing any of the three kinds of acts specified in that provision. This shows that the preliminary objective fact attributable to the persons in charge of the management or affairs of the undertaking, on the basis of which action may be taken under section 18(A)(1)(b), is of far wider amplitude than the circumstance, the existence of which is a sine qua non for taking action under section 18AA(1). The phrase "highly detrimental to the scheduled industry or public interest" in section 18-A is capable of being construed to cover a large variety of acts or things which may be considered wrong with the manner of running the industry by the management. In contrast with it, action under section 18AA(1)(a) can be taken only if the Central Government is satisfied with regard to the existence of the twin conditions specifically mentioned therein, on the basis of evidence in its possession. [569D-H] An analysis of section 18AA(1)(a), indicates that as a necessary preliminary to the exercise of the power thereunder, the Central Government must be satisfied "from documentary or other evidence in its possession" in regard to the co-existence of two circumstances: (i) that the persons in charge of the industrial undertaking have by committing any of these acts, namely, reckless investments, or creation of incumbrances on the assets of industrial undertaking, or by diversion of funds, brought about a situation which is likely to affect the production of the article manufactured or produced in the industrial undertaking, and (ii) that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation.[570B-D] It cannot be laid down as a general proposition that whenever a statute confers a power on an administrative authority and makes the exercise of that power conditional on the formation of an opinion by that authority in regard to the existence of an immediacy, its opinion in regard to that preliminary fact is not open to judicial scrutiny at all. While it may be conceded that an element of subjectivity is always involved in the formation of such an opinion, the existence of the circumstances from which the inference constituting the opinion, as the sine qua non for action, are to be drawn, must be demonstrable, and the existence of such "circumstances", if questioned, must be proved at least prima facie. [571 E-G] From a plain reading of section 18AA, it is clear that it does not expressly in unmistakable and unequivocal terms exclude the application of the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage. [574B] In the instant case, so far as Kanpur Unit is concerned, it was lying closed for more than three months before the passing of the impugned order. There was no 'immediacy' in relation to that unit, which could absolve the Government from the obligation of complying fully with audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional or pre- takeover stage. [583A] Keshav Mills Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, [1973] 3 S.C.R. 22; Kamla Prasad Khetan v. Union of India,[1957] S.C.R. 1052; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 621; Sukhdev Singh & Ors. v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh, [1975] 3 S.C.R. 619; A. K. Kraipak v. Union of India, [1970] 1 S.C.R. 457; Ridge v. Baldwin, [1964] A.C. 40; 196; Heatley v. Tasmanian Racing & Gaming Commission, 14 Australian Law Reports 519; Nawabkhan Abbaskhan v. State of Gujarat, [1974] 3 S.C.R. 427; State of Orissa v. Dr. Bina Pani Dei, [1962] 2 S.C.R. 625; Ambalal M. Shah v. Hathi Singh Manufacturing Co. Ltd. [1962] 3 S.C.R. 171; and S. L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan & Ors., [1981] 1 S.C.R. 746, referred to. (Per Chinnappa Reddy, J. dissenting) The principles of natural justice are not attracted to the situations contemplated by section 18AA of Industries (Development and Regulation) Act. Natural justice like Ultra Vires and Public Policy is a branch of the public law and is a formidable weapon which can be wielded to secure justice to the citizen. While it may be used to protect certain fundamental liberties, civil and political rights, it may be used as indeed it is used more often than not, to protect vested interests and to obstruct the path of progressive change. The time has come to make an appropriate distinction between natural justice in its application to fundamental liberties, civil and political rights and natural justice in its application to vested interests. [590A-B] Our constitution as befits the Constitution of a Socialist Secular Democratic Republic, recognises the paramountcy of the public weal over the private interest. Natural justice, ultra vires, public policy, or any other rule of interpretation must, therefore, conform, grow and be tailored to serve the public interest and respond to the demands of an evolving society. [590C] The principles of natural justice have taken deep root in the judicial conscience of our people. They are now considered so fundamental as to be implicit in every decision making function, judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative. Where authority functions under a statute and the statute provides for the observance of the principles of natural justice in a particular manner, natural justice will have to be observed in that manner and in no other. Where the statute is silent about the observance of the principles of natural justice, such statutory silence is taken to imply compliance with the principles of natural justice. Where the conflict is between the public interest and the private interest the presumption must necessarily be weak and may, therefore, be readily displaced. The presumption is also weak, where what are involved are mere property rights. In cases of urgency, particularly where the public interest is involved, preemptive action may be a strategic necessity. Even in cases of preemptive action, if the statute so provides or if the Courts so deem fit in appropriate cases, a postponed hearing may be substituted for natural justice. [590A-C; 591F-G] 3(ii). Where natural justice is implied, the extent of the implication and the nature of the hearing must vary with the statute, the subject and the situation. [592B] The absence of the expression 'immediate action' in section 18AA(1)(b) does not make any difference. Section 18AA(1)(a) refers to a situation where immediate preventive action may avert a disaster, whereas section 18AA contemplates a situation where the disaster has occurred and action is necessary to restore normalcy. Restoration of production where production has stopped in a key industry or industrial undertaking is as important and urgent in the public interest as prevention of a situation where production may be affected. Immediate action is, therefore, as necessary in the situation contemplated by section 18AA(1)(b) as in the situation contemplated by section 18AA(1)(a). [596 F-G] The marginal note refers to the power to take over without investigation but there is no sufficient reason to suppose that the word immediate is used only to contra- distinguish it from the investigation contemplated by section 15 of the Act, though of course a consequence of immediate action under section 18AA may be to dispense with the enquiry under section 15. In fact, facts which come to light during the course of an investigation under section 15 may form the basis of action under section 18AA(1)(a). Where in the course of an investigation under section 15 it is discovered that the management have, by reckless investments or creation of encumbrances on the assets of the industrial undertaking or by diversion of funds brought about a situation which is likely to affect the production of the articles manufactured or produced in the industrial undertaking, if the Government is satisfied that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation, there is no reason why the Central Government may not straightaway take action under section 18AA(1)(a) without waiting for completion of investigation under section 15. [597A-B] Where there is a provision in the statute itself for revocation of the order by the very authority making the decision, it appears to be unnecessary to insist upon a pre- decisional observance of natural justice. [598A] The likelihood of production being jeopardized or the stoppage of production in a key industrial undertaking is a matter of grave concern affecting the public interest. Parliament has taken so serious a view of the matter that it has authorised the Central Government to take over the management of the industrial undertaking if immediate action may prevent jeopardy to production or restore production where it has already stopped. The necessity for immediate action by the Central Government contemplated by Parliament is definitely indicative of the exclusion of natural justice. It is not as if the owner of the industrial undertaking is left with no remedy. He may move the Central Government under section 18-F to cancel the order made under section 18AA. [598C-D] Neither section 18-F of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act nor section 21 of the General Clauses Act by itself excludes natural justice. The exclusion of natural justice where such exclusion is not express has to be implied by reference to the subject, the statute and the statutory situation. Where an express provision in the statute itself provides for a post decisional hearing the other provisions of the Statute will have to be read in the light of such provision and the provision for post- decisional hearing may then clinch the issue where pre- decisional natural justice appears to be excluded on the other terms of the statute. That a post-decisional hearing may also be had by the terms of section 21 of the General Clauses Act may not necessarily help in the interpretation of the provisions of the statute concerned. [599 A-C] Ridge v. Baldwin, 1964 A.C. p. 40; Annie G. Phillip v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 75 L.E.d. 1289; John H. Fahey v. Paul Mallonee, 91 L.E.d. 2030; Margarita Fuentes v. Robert L. Shevin, Attorney General of Florida, 32 L.E.d. 2d 556 and Lawrence Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 40 L.E.d. 2d 406, referred to. - Rama Rao, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh as well as the President of the Telugu Desam Party as well as respondent No. 3. The advertisements very shortly stated, refer to the auspicious gifts made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to the poor people on the eve of New Year and Sankranti. In the said advertisements, it is stated that the said Government which was formed by the Telugu Desam Party was giving to the poor people whose income was below Rs. and the said advertisements referred to a new scheme of selling sarees and dhoties at half prices to the poor people in the State of Andhra Pradesh having Green-cards. Moreover, the offer in the advertisements for the sale of dhoties and sarees at discount rates was in the nature of a benefit offered to poor persons in that State. When a Government announces the measures which are intended for the benefit of any of the classes for whose the Government can normally be expected to work like the poor or the economical backward classes, it is only in rare circumstances that such a promise can be said to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) even though such a promise might be made on the eve of elections. 8. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => '', 'counseldef' => '', 'court' => 'Supreme Court of India', 'court_type' => 'SC', 'decidedon' => '1989-09-29', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' K.N. Saikia,; M.H. Kania and; S. Ranganathan, JJ.', 'judgement' => '</p><p>Kania, J.</p><p>1. These two appeals arise out of the judgments in two Election Petitions in the Andhra Pradesh High Court questioning the election of respondent No. 1 as a Member of Parliament from Srikakulam No. Parliamentary Constituency in the 8th General Election to the House of the People. The points raised in these appeals are common and so are the relevant facts; and, hence, they are being disposed of by this common judgment. We propose to take note of only the few facts which are necessary for the appreciation of the controversy before us.</p><p>2. The polling date for the said election along with other parliamentary elections in the State of Andhra Pradesh was December 27, 1984 but in Srikakulam No. 1 Parliamentary Constituency the polling was countermanded and the date of polling was later fixed on January 28, 1985. In both the Election Petitions the election of respondent No. 1 was questioned mainly on the ground that Shri N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh as well as the President of the Telugu Desam Party as well as respondent No. 1 gave certain speeches and certain advertisements were got published by Shri N.T. Rama Rao through the Publicity Department of the Government of Andhra Pradesh in the newspapers containing certain statements which are alleged to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A) of the <a>Representation of the People Act, 1951</a> (hereinafter referred to as 'the said Act'). The main question canvassed before us is whether the statements contained in these aforesaid advertisements amount to a corrupt practice under Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act. Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act runs as follows :</p><p>123. Corrupt practices</p><p>The following shall be deemed to be corrupt practises for the purposes of this Act :</p><p>(1) 'Bribery', that is to say.</p><p>(A) any gift, offer or promise by a candidate or his agent or by any other person with the consent of a candidate or his election agent of any gratification, to any person whomsover, with the object, directly or indirectly of inducing.</p><p>(a) x x x</p><p>(b) an elector to vote or refrain from voting at an election, or as a reward to.</p><p>(i) a person for having so stood or not stood, or for having withdrawn or not having withdrawn his candidature; or</p><p>(ii) an elector for having voted or refrained from voting.</p><p>3. The advertisements very shortly stated, refer to the auspicious gifts made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to the poor people on the eve of New Year and Sankranti. In the said advertisements, it is stated that the said Government which was formed by the Telugu Desam Party was giving to the poor people whose income was below Rs. 6,000 per year, a kilo of rice at Rs. 2 per Kg. and the said advertisements referred to a new scheme of selling sarees and dhoties at half prices to the poor people in the State of Andhra Pradesh having Green-cards. Green-cards were directed to be issued to all the persons whose annual income was below Rs. 6,000. The supply of the rice at subsidised rates as aforesaid was also to be made to the Green-card holders only. The scheme to sell sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was to be operative from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985.</p><p>4. In considering the question whether the said advertisement and the said speeches amount to a corrupt practice, we are of the view that the provisions of Section 123 of the said Act which deal with corrupt practices have to be interpreted, keeping in mind that dictates of commonsense require that they never could have been intended to treat normal election promises made in election manifestoes or usual election speeches by members of various political parties aspiring to power and by different candidates aspiring to get elected to legislative bodies concerned as corrupt practices. We are of the view that these advertisements and speeches amount to nothing more than statements extolling the achievements of the Government of the State of Andhra Pradesh under the Telugu Desam Party headed by N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister, and contain normal election promises and these statements do not amount to corrupt practices falling within the scope of Sub-clause (b) of Clause (A) of Sub-section (1) of Section 123 of the said Act.</p><p>5. It was urged by Mr. Rao, learned Counsel for the appellants that in the impugned judgments, the High Court has incorrectly taken the view that in order to amount to bribery within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A), the transaction must amount to a bargain by the candidate with a view to get votes. It was pointed out by him that the said view has been taken in the impugned judgments, relying upon the decision of a Bench comprising to learned Judges of this Court in Ghasi Ram v. Dal Singh and Ors. :1983 SCR 102 . We have gone through to the relevant portion of that judgment (at page 109 and 110 of the said report). A careful perusal of the said judgment shows that what has been really held in that case is that if the promises given or made amount to a bargain entered into by a candidate for a vote or votes, that would amount to a corrupt practice; but it has not been held there that unless the act alleged amounts to such a bargain, it could not amount to a corrupt practice. In our view, that judgment does not lay down that in order to amount to a corrupt practice, the transaction must amount to a bargain for getting a vote. It was pointed out by Mr. Rao, however, that such a view seems to have been taken in two other decisions rendered by two Benches, each comprising two learned Judges of this Court in Bhanu Kumar Shastri v. Mohan Lal Sukhadia and Ors. : [1971]3SCR522 and Harjit Singh Mann v. S Umrao Singh and Ors. : [1980]2SCR501 . and these judgments need to be overruled. We do not propose to go into the correctness or otherwise of this view because, even on the footing that in order to amount to a corrupt practice under the aforesaid provision the alleged acts need not constitute a bargain, the the acts established in the present case, in our opinion, do not amount to a corrupt practice.</p><p>6. Our attention was drawn by Mr. Rao to the fact that in this case the said advertisements and the speeches had to be viewed in the context of the fact that the advertisements were issued and the speeches were made after respondent No. 1 filed his nomination papers on January 4, 1985, for the election and before the election was held in the aforesaid constituency. It was further pointed out that the offer made for the sale of sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was limited to the period from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985. It cannot be denied that these factors are relevant factOrs. We cannot, however, lose sight of the fact that this offer was made not only in this constituency but throughout the State where the elections to the House of the People were scheduled to be held, and were, in fact, held on December 27, 1984. It was only in case of this constituency that the election to be held on the scheduled date was countermanded and later held on January 28, 1985. We cannot lose sight of the fact that, as far as the said speeches and the said advertisements, which were issued by the Publicity Department of the State, are concerned, they deal in the main with the achievements of the Government of Andhra Pradesh which, of course, was being run by Ministers belonging to Telugu Desam Party to which respondent No. 1 also belonged. Moreover, the offer in the advertisements for the sale of dhoties and sarees at discount rates was in the nature of a benefit offered to poor persons in that State. When a Government announces the measures which are intended for the benefit of any of the classes for whose the Government can normally be expected to work like the poor or the economical backward classes, it is only in rare circumstances that such a promise can be said to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) even though such a promise might be made on the eve of elections. Keeping this in mind, in our opinion, although the offer to sell dhoties and sarees at discount rates was of a limited duration as aforestated, it cannot be regarded as a corrupt practice. Such an offer was bound to have financial repercussions and it is quite possible the duration of the offer was limited to enable the Government to study the financial repercussions rather than from any improper motive. We find support for this view from the decision of this Court in H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh : [1969]3SCR813 . In that case an Ordinance was passed by the Government of Madhya Pradesh as a result of which a large number of agriculturists, namely, those holdings of plots of land of less than 7.5 acres area or paying land revenue not exceeding Rs. 5/- were exempted from the payment of the land revenue. It was held that such a concession does not amount to a gift, offer or promise of any gratification within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) of the said Act nor does the announcement of the declaration made at a meeting shortly before the election or the issue of a pamphlet containing that declaration at that time carry the matter any further. It was held that neither Shri D.P. Misra who was the Chief Minister nor Shri S.K. Dixit who acted as his agent were guilty of any corrupt practice within the meaning of the aforesaid provision.</p><p>7. It was next contended by Mr. Rao, although very faintly, that the High Court was in error as it had not decided all other issues which were raised in the election petition. In this regard we cannot lose sight of the fact that the term of the present Lok Sabha is likely to be over within a few months and fresh elections are likely to be held and it would, therefore, be an exercise in futility to remand the matter to the High Court for deciding the remaining issues.</p><p>8. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed. 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Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 123]kania, j.1. these two appeals arise out of the judgments in two election petitions in the andhra pradesh high court questioning the election of respondent no. 1 as a member of parliament from srikakulam no. parliamentary constituency in the 8th general election to the house of the people. the points raised in these appeals are common and so are the relevant facts; and, hence, they are being disposed of by this common judgment. we propose to take note of only the few facts which are necessary for the appreciation of the controversy before us.2. the polling date for the said election along with other parliamentary elections in the state of andhra pradesh was december 27, 1984 but in srikakulam no. 1 parliamentary constituency the polling was countermanded and the date of polling was later.....Code Context}
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$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp' $dataForView = array( 'title_for_layout' => 'B Rajagopala Rao and anr Vs Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors - Citation 640942 - Court Judgment | ', 'desc' => array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '640942', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/50684/representation-of-the-people-act-1951-complete-act">Representation of the People Act, 1951</a> - Sections 1, 3(1)(A), 123 and 123(1)(A)', 'appealno' => 'Civil Appeal Nos. 484 and 485 of 1987', 'appellant' => 'B. Rajagopala Rao and anr.', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'B. Rajagopala Rao and anr. Vs. Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors.', 'casenote' => 'Election - corrupt practices - Sections 123 and 123 (1) (A) of Representation of the People Act, 1951 - whether advertisements by public department and speeches made by respondent No. 1 to sell dhoti and sarees at discount rates amount to corrupt practices - offer was available for mass and for limited duration - such offer was bound to have financial repercussions and it is quite possible that duration of offer limited to enable Government to study financial repercussions rather than from any improper motive - offer not amounted to corrupt practices. - [ D.A. Desai,; O. Chinnappa Reddy and; R.S. Sarkaria, JJ.] The Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 empowers the Union of India in the public interest to take under its control the industries specified in the First Schedule to the Act. Item 23 of the First Schedule relates to textiles of various categories. Section 15 authorises the Central Government to make or cause to be made a full and complete investigation into the circumstances of the case if the Central Government is of the opinion that (a) in respect of any scheduled industry or industrial undertaking or undertakings (i) there has been, or is likely to be, a substantial fall in the volume of production for which, having regard to the economic conditions prevailing, there is no justification; or (ii) there has been, or is likely to be, a marked deterioration in the quality of any article... which could have been or can be avoided; or (iii) there has been or is likely to be a rise in the price of any article..... for which there is no justification; or (iv) it is necessary to take any such action for the purpose of conserving any resources of national importance; or (b) any industrial undertaking is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest. After the investigation is made under section 15, section 16(1) empowers the Central Government if action is desirable, to issue appropriate directions, and section 16(2) provides for the issue of interim directions by the Central Government pending investigation under section 15. Chapter III-A consisting of Sections 18A, 18-AA, 18-B, 18-C, 18-D, 18-E and 18-F deal with "direct management or control of Industrial Undertakings by Central Government in certain cases". Sec. 18-A empowers the Central Government by notified order, to authorise any person or body of persons to take over the management of the whole or any part of an industrial undertaking or to exercise in respect of the whole, or any part of the undertaking such functions of control as may be specified in the order, if the Central Government is of opinion that: (a) an industrial undertaking to which directions have been issued in pursuance of section 16 has failed to comply with such directions, or (b) an industrial undertaking in respect of which an investigation has been made under section 15 is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest. Section 18AA(5) stipulates that the provisions of Sections 18-B to 18 E shall be applicable to the industrial undertaking in respect of which an order has been made under section 18-AA even as they apply to an industrial undertaking taken over under Section 18-A. Section 18-F empowers the Central Government to cancel the order made under section 18-A if it appears that the purpose of the order has been fulfilled or it is not necessary that the order should remain in force. The appellant M/s. Swadeshi Cotton Mills was taken over by the Government of India by a notification dated April 13, 1978 in exercise of the powers conferred on it under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 18AA of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 on the ground that the company had by creation of encumbrances on the assets of its industrial undertakings, brought about a situation which had affected and is likely to further affect the production of articles manufactured or produced by it and that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation. The Government authorised the National Textile Corporation Limited to take over the management, subject to the conditions that the authorised person shall comply with all the directions issued from time to time by the Central Government and that the authorised person shall hold office for a period of five years. The appellant Mills challenged the aforesaid order in a writ petition in the High Court. The case was heard by a Full Bench of five Judges to consider the question whether in construing section 18AA of the Industries Development and Regulation Act, 1951, compliance with the principle of audi alteram partem is to be implied and whether hearing is to be given to the parties who would be affected by the order to be passed prior to the passing of the order or whether hearing can be given after the order is passed and whether the order passed under the said Section is vitiated by not giving of such hearing and whether such vice can be cured. The Bench by a majority answered the three questions as follows:- (a) Section 18AA(1)(a)(b) excludes the giving of prior hearing to the party who would be affected by order thereunder. (b) Section 18-F expressly provides for a post- decisional hearing to the owner of the industrial undertaking, the management of which is taken over under section 18AA to have the order made under section 18AA cancelled on any relevant ground. (c) As the taking over of management under section 18A is not vitiated by the failure to grant prior hearing the question of any such vice being cured by a grant of a subsequent hearing does not arise. The minority, however, held that in compliance with the principles of natural justice, prior hearing to the owner of the undertaking was required to be given before the passing of an order under section 18AA, that the second question did not arise as the denial of a prior hearing would not cure the vice by the grant of subsequent hearing, but it would be open to the Court to moderate the relief in such a way that the order is kept alive to the extent necessary until the making of the fresh order to subserve public interest and to make appropriate directions. After the decision on the reference the case was reheard on merits by a Full Bench of three Judges and the writ petition was allowed in part. The challenge to the validity of the order being rejected but insofar as the impugned order seeking to take over the corporate entity of the company, the corporate entity of the subsidiary and its assets, the petition was allowed and the respondents, the Union of India and the authorised person were directed to release from its control and custody and/or deliver possession of any assets or property of the company which were not referable to the industrial undertakings. Appeals to this Court were filed on behalf of the Company as well as by the Union of India and the National Textile Corporation. Two propositions were propounded on behalf of the company that: (a) Whether it was necessary to observe the rules of natural justice before issuing a notified order under section 18AA(1)(a) and further whether section 18-F impliedly excludes rules of natural justice relating to prior hearing; and it was contended (1) the mere use of the word 'immediate' in sub-clause (a) of section 18AA does not show a legislative intent to exclude the application of audi alteram partem rule altogether. (2) The word 'immediate' in clause (a) has been used in contra distinction to 'investigate'. It only means that under section 18AA action can be taken without prior investigation under section 15. The use of the word 'immediate' in section 18AA(1)(a) only dispenses with investigation under section 15 and not with the principle of audi alteram partem altogether and this is indicated by the marginal note of section 18A and para 3 of the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Amendment Bill which inserted section 18AA in 1971. (3) The word 'immediate' occurs only in clause (a) and not in clause (b) of section 18AA(1). It would be odd if intention to exclude this principle of natural justice is spelt out in one clause of the sub-section when the other clause does not exclude it. (4) Section 18-F does not exclude a pre-decisional hearing. The so-called post-decisional hearing contemplated by section 18-F cannot be and is not intended to be a substitute for a pre-decisional hearing. (5) Section 18F incorporates only a facet, albeit qualified, of section 21 of the General Clauses Act. The language of the Section implicity prohibits an enquiry into circumstances that led to the passing of the order of take-over and under it the aggrieved person is not entitled to show that on merits the order was void ab initio. (6) 'Immediacy' does not exclude a duty to act fairly because even an emergent situation can co-exist with the canons of natural justice. The only effect of urgency on the application of the principle of fair hearing would be that the width, form and duration of the hearing would be tailored to the situation and reduced to the reasonable minimum so that it does not delay and defeat the purpose of the contemplated action. (7) Where the civil consequences of the administrative action are grave and its effect is highly prejudicial to the rights and interests of the person affected and there is nothing in the language and scheme of the statute which unequivocally excludes a fair pre-decisional hearing and the post-decisional hearing provided therein is not a real remedial hearing equitable to a full right of appeal the Court should be loath to infer a legislative intent to exclude even a minimal fair hearing at the pre-decisional stage merely on ground of urgency. (8) The Central Government appointed four Government Officials including one from the office of the Textile Commissioner to study the affairs of the Company and to make recommendation. This Official Group submitted its report on February 16, 1978. The evidence on the basis of which the impugned order was passed was not disclosed to the appellant company till May 1978, only after it had filed the writ petition in the High Court. If there was anything adverse to the appellants in the survey report there was time enough about six weeks between the submission of the Survey Report and the passing of the impugned order for giving a short, reasonable opportunity to the appellants to explain the adverse findings against them. If there was immediacy situational modifications could be made to meet the requirement of fairness, by reducing the period of notice; that even the manner and form of such notice could be simplified to eliminate delay, that telephonic notice or short opportunity for furnishing their explanation to the Company might have satisfied the requirements of natural justice. Such an opportunity of hearing could have been given after the passing of a conditional tentative order and before its enforcement under section 18AA. For the interregnum suitable interim action such as freezing the assets of the Company or restraining the Company from creating further encumbrances, could be taken under section 16. On behalf of the Union of India and the Authorised Officer it was contended that (1) the presumption in favour of audi alteram partem rule stands impliedly displaced by the language scheme, setting and the purpose of the provision in section 18AA. (2) Section 18AA on its plain terms deals with situations where immediate preventive action is required. The paramount concern is to avoid serious problems which may be caused by fall in production. The purpose of an order under section 18AA is not to condemn the owner but to protect the scheduled industry. The issue under section 18AA is not solely between the Government and the management of the industrial undertaking. The object of taking action under this Section is to protect other outside interests of the community at large and the workers. (3) The rule of natural justice to give a hearing has been incorporated in section 18-F which gives an opportunity of a post-decisional hearing to the owner of the undertaking who if he feels aggrieved can on his application be heard, to show that even the original order under section 18AA was passed on invalid grounds and should be cancelled or rescinded. (4) On a true construction of section 18AA read with section 18-F the requirements of natural justice and fair play can be read into the statute only insofar as conformance to such canons can reasonably and realistically be required of it by the provision for a remedial hearing at a subsequent stage. (5) Under section 18-F the Central Government exercises curial functions and that Section confers on the aggrieved owner a right to apply to the Government to cancel the order of take-over. This section casts an obligation on the Central Government to deal with and dispose of an application filed thereunder with reasonable expedition. Allowing the appeal by the Company,<br />HELD: (Sarkaria & Desai, JJ. per Chinnappa Reddy, J. dissenting.) In the facts and circumstances of the instant case, there has been a noncompliance with the implied requirement of the audi alteram partem rule of natural justice at the pre-decisional stage. The impugned order could be struck down as invalid on that score alone. But in view of the commitment / concession that a hearing would be afforded to the Company, the case is remitted to the Central Government to give a full, fair and effective hearing. [587G-H, 588C] The phrase 'natural justice' is not capable of a static and precise definition. It cannot be imprisoned in the straight-jacket of a cast-iron formula. Rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. Hence not possible to make an exhaustive catalogue of such rules. Two fundamental maxims of natural justice have now become deeply and indelibly ingrained in the common consciousness of mankind as pre-eminently necessary to ensure that the law is applied impartially objectively and fairly. These twin principles are (i) audi alteram partem and (ii) nemo judex in re sua. Audi alteram partem is a highly effective rule devised by the Courts to ensure that a statutory authority arrives at a just decision and it is calculated to act as a healthy check on the abuse or misuse of power. Its reach should not be narrowed and its applicability circumscribed.[554C-G] The rules of natural justice can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. If a statutory provision either specifically or by inevitable implication excludes the application of the rules of natural justice then the Court cannot ignore the mandate of the Legislature. Whether or not the application of the principles of natural justice in a given case has been excluded in the exercise of statutory power depends upon the language and basic scheme of the provision conferring the power, the nature of the power the purpose for which it is conferred and the effect of that power. [556A-B] The maxim audi alteram partem has many facets. Two of them are (a) notice of the case to be met, and (b) opportunity to explain. The rule cannot be sacrificed at the altar of administrative convenience or celerity; for, convenience and justice are often not on speaking terms. Difficulties, however, arise when the statute conferring the power does not expressly exclude this rule but its exclusion is sought by implication due to the presence of certain factors such as urgency where the obligation to give notice and opportunity to be heard would obstruct the taking of prompt action of a preventive or remedial nature. Audi alteram partem rule may be disregarded in an emergent situation where immediate action brooks no delay to prevent some imminent danger or injury or hazard to paramount public interests. Section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure empowers the magistrates specified therein to make an exparte conditional order in emergent cases for removal of dangerous public nuisances. Action under section 17 Land Acquisition Act furnishes another such instance. Similarly action on grounds of public safety public health may justify disregard of the rule of prior hearing. [556C-H] Cases where owing to the compulsion of the fact situation or the necessity of taking speedy action no pre- decisional hearing is given but the action, is followed soon by a full post-decisional hearing to the person affected do not in reality constitute an exception to the audi alteram partem rule. To call such cases as exception is a misnomer because they do not exclude fair play in action but adapt it to the urgency of the situation by balancing the competing claims of hurry and hearing. [560H-561A] The general principle as distinguished from an absolute rule of uniform application seems to be that where a statute does not in terms exclude this rule of prior hearing but contemplates a post-decisional hearing amounting to a full review of the original order on merits then such a statute would be construed as excluding the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage. [561G] If the statute conferring the power is silent with regard to the giving of pre-decisional hearing to the person affected and the administrative decision taken by the authority involves civil consequences of a grave nature and no full review or appeal on merits against that decision is provided courts will be extremely reluctant to construe such a statute as excluding the duty of affording even a minimal hearing shorn of all its formal trappings and dilatory features at the pre-decisional stage, unless viewed pragmatically it would paralyse the administrative process or frustrate the need for utmost promptitude. [561H] 7(i). A comparison of the provisions of Section 18A(1)(b) and Section 18AA(1)(c), bring out two main points of distinction: First, action under Section 18A(1)(b) can be taken only after an investigation had been made under Section 15; while under Section 18AA(1)(a) or (b) action can be taken without such investigation. The language, scheme and setting of Section 18AA read in the light of the Objects and Reasons for enacting this provision make this position clear beyond doubt. Second, before taking action under Section 18A(1)(b), the Central Government has to form an opinion on the basis of the investigation conducted under section 15, in regard to the existence of the objective fact, namely: that the industrial undertaking is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest; while under section 18A(1)(a) the Government has to satisfy itself that the persons incharge of the undertaking have brought about a situation likely to cause fall in production, by committing any of the three kinds of acts specified in that provision. This shows that the preliminary objective fact attributable to the persons in charge of the management or affairs of the undertaking, on the basis of which action may be taken under section 18(A)(1)(b), is of far wider amplitude than the circumstance, the existence of which is a sine qua non for taking action under section 18AA(1). The phrase "highly detrimental to the scheduled industry or public interest" in section 18-A is capable of being construed to cover a large variety of acts or things which may be considered wrong with the manner of running the industry by the management. In contrast with it, action under section 18AA(1)(a) can be taken only if the Central Government is satisfied with regard to the existence of the twin conditions specifically mentioned therein, on the basis of evidence in its possession. [569D-H] An analysis of section 18AA(1)(a), indicates that as a necessary preliminary to the exercise of the power thereunder, the Central Government must be satisfied "from documentary or other evidence in its possession" in regard to the co-existence of two circumstances: (i) that the persons in charge of the industrial undertaking have by committing any of these acts, namely, reckless investments, or creation of incumbrances on the assets of industrial undertaking, or by diversion of funds, brought about a situation which is likely to affect the production of the article manufactured or produced in the industrial undertaking, and (ii) that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation.[570B-D] It cannot be laid down as a general proposition that whenever a statute confers a power on an administrative authority and makes the exercise of that power conditional on the formation of an opinion by that authority in regard to the existence of an immediacy, its opinion in regard to that preliminary fact is not open to judicial scrutiny at all. While it may be conceded that an element of subjectivity is always involved in the formation of such an opinion, the existence of the circumstances from which the inference constituting the opinion, as the sine qua non for action, are to be drawn, must be demonstrable, and the existence of such "circumstances", if questioned, must be proved at least prima facie. [571 E-G] From a plain reading of section 18AA, it is clear that it does not expressly in unmistakable and unequivocal terms exclude the application of the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage. [574B] In the instant case, so far as Kanpur Unit is concerned, it was lying closed for more than three months before the passing of the impugned order. There was no 'immediacy' in relation to that unit, which could absolve the Government from the obligation of complying fully with audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional or pre- takeover stage. [583A] Keshav Mills Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, [1973] 3 S.C.R. 22; Kamla Prasad Khetan v. Union of India,[1957] S.C.R. 1052; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 621; Sukhdev Singh & Ors. v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh, [1975] 3 S.C.R. 619; A. K. Kraipak v. Union of India, [1970] 1 S.C.R. 457; Ridge v. Baldwin, [1964] A.C. 40; 196; Heatley v. Tasmanian Racing & Gaming Commission, 14 Australian Law Reports 519; Nawabkhan Abbaskhan v. State of Gujarat, [1974] 3 S.C.R. 427; State of Orissa v. Dr. Bina Pani Dei, [1962] 2 S.C.R. 625; Ambalal M. Shah v. Hathi Singh Manufacturing Co. Ltd. [1962] 3 S.C.R. 171; and S. L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan & Ors., [1981] 1 S.C.R. 746, referred to. (Per Chinnappa Reddy, J. dissenting) The principles of natural justice are not attracted to the situations contemplated by section 18AA of Industries (Development and Regulation) Act. Natural justice like Ultra Vires and Public Policy is a branch of the public law and is a formidable weapon which can be wielded to secure justice to the citizen. While it may be used to protect certain fundamental liberties, civil and political rights, it may be used as indeed it is used more often than not, to protect vested interests and to obstruct the path of progressive change. The time has come to make an appropriate distinction between natural justice in its application to fundamental liberties, civil and political rights and natural justice in its application to vested interests. [590A-B] Our constitution as befits the Constitution of a Socialist Secular Democratic Republic, recognises the paramountcy of the public weal over the private interest. Natural justice, ultra vires, public policy, or any other rule of interpretation must, therefore, conform, grow and be tailored to serve the public interest and respond to the demands of an evolving society. [590C] The principles of natural justice have taken deep root in the judicial conscience of our people. They are now considered so fundamental as to be implicit in every decision making function, judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative. Where authority functions under a statute and the statute provides for the observance of the principles of natural justice in a particular manner, natural justice will have to be observed in that manner and in no other. Where the statute is silent about the observance of the principles of natural justice, such statutory silence is taken to imply compliance with the principles of natural justice. Where the conflict is between the public interest and the private interest the presumption must necessarily be weak and may, therefore, be readily displaced. The presumption is also weak, where what are involved are mere property rights. In cases of urgency, particularly where the public interest is involved, preemptive action may be a strategic necessity. Even in cases of preemptive action, if the statute so provides or if the Courts so deem fit in appropriate cases, a postponed hearing may be substituted for natural justice. [590A-C; 591F-G] 3(ii). Where natural justice is implied, the extent of the implication and the nature of the hearing must vary with the statute, the subject and the situation. [592B] The absence of the expression 'immediate action' in section 18AA(1)(b) does not make any difference. Section 18AA(1)(a) refers to a situation where immediate preventive action may avert a disaster, whereas section 18AA contemplates a situation where the disaster has occurred and action is necessary to restore normalcy. Restoration of production where production has stopped in a key industry or industrial undertaking is as important and urgent in the public interest as prevention of a situation where production may be affected. Immediate action is, therefore, as necessary in the situation contemplated by section 18AA(1)(b) as in the situation contemplated by section 18AA(1)(a). [596 F-G] The marginal note refers to the power to take over without investigation but there is no sufficient reason to suppose that the word immediate is used only to contra- distinguish it from the investigation contemplated by section 15 of the Act, though of course a consequence of immediate action under section 18AA may be to dispense with the enquiry under section 15. In fact, facts which come to light during the course of an investigation under section 15 may form the basis of action under section 18AA(1)(a). Where in the course of an investigation under section 15 it is discovered that the management have, by reckless investments or creation of encumbrances on the assets of the industrial undertaking or by diversion of funds brought about a situation which is likely to affect the production of the articles manufactured or produced in the industrial undertaking, if the Government is satisfied that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation, there is no reason why the Central Government may not straightaway take action under section 18AA(1)(a) without waiting for completion of investigation under section 15. [597A-B] Where there is a provision in the statute itself for revocation of the order by the very authority making the decision, it appears to be unnecessary to insist upon a pre- decisional observance of natural justice. [598A] The likelihood of production being jeopardized or the stoppage of production in a key industrial undertaking is a matter of grave concern affecting the public interest. Parliament has taken so serious a view of the matter that it has authorised the Central Government to take over the management of the industrial undertaking if immediate action may prevent jeopardy to production or restore production where it has already stopped. The necessity for immediate action by the Central Government contemplated by Parliament is definitely indicative of the exclusion of natural justice. It is not as if the owner of the industrial undertaking is left with no remedy. He may move the Central Government under section 18-F to cancel the order made under section 18AA. [598C-D] Neither section 18-F of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act nor section 21 of the General Clauses Act by itself excludes natural justice. The exclusion of natural justice where such exclusion is not express has to be implied by reference to the subject, the statute and the statutory situation. Where an express provision in the statute itself provides for a post decisional hearing the other provisions of the Statute will have to be read in the light of such provision and the provision for post- decisional hearing may then clinch the issue where pre- decisional natural justice appears to be excluded on the other terms of the statute. That a post-decisional hearing may also be had by the terms of section 21 of the General Clauses Act may not necessarily help in the interpretation of the provisions of the statute concerned. [599 A-C] Ridge v. Baldwin, 1964 A.C. p. 40; Annie G. Phillip v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 75 L.E.d. 1289; John H. Fahey v. Paul Mallonee, 91 L.E.d. 2030; Margarita Fuentes v. Robert L. Shevin, Attorney General of Florida, 32 L.E.d. 2d 556 and Lawrence Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 40 L.E.d. 2d 406, referred to. - Rama Rao, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh as well as the President of the Telugu Desam Party as well as respondent No. 3. The advertisements very shortly stated, refer to the auspicious gifts made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to the poor people on the eve of New Year and Sankranti. In the said advertisements, it is stated that the said Government which was formed by the Telugu Desam Party was giving to the poor people whose income was below Rs. and the said advertisements referred to a new scheme of selling sarees and dhoties at half prices to the poor people in the State of Andhra Pradesh having Green-cards. Moreover, the offer in the advertisements for the sale of dhoties and sarees at discount rates was in the nature of a benefit offered to poor persons in that State. When a Government announces the measures which are intended for the benefit of any of the classes for whose the Government can normally be expected to work like the poor or the economical backward classes, it is only in rare circumstances that such a promise can be said to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) even though such a promise might be made on the eve of elections. 8. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => '', 'counseldef' => '', 'court' => 'Supreme Court of India', 'court_type' => 'SC', 'decidedon' => '1989-09-29', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' K.N. Saikia,; M.H. Kania and; S. Ranganathan, JJ.', 'judgement' => '</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Kania, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. These two appeals arise out of the judgments in two Election Petitions in the Andhra Pradesh High Court questioning the election of respondent No. 1 as a Member of Parliament from Srikakulam No. Parliamentary Constituency in the 8th General Election to the House of the People. The points raised in these appeals are common and so are the relevant facts; and, hence, they are being disposed of by this common judgment. We propose to take note of only the few facts which are necessary for the appreciation of the controversy before us.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The polling date for the said election along with other parliamentary elections in the State of Andhra Pradesh was December 27, 1984 but in Srikakulam No. 1 Parliamentary Constituency the polling was countermanded and the date of polling was later fixed on January 28, 1985. In both the Election Petitions the election of respondent No. 1 was questioned mainly on the ground that Shri N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh as well as the President of the Telugu Desam Party as well as respondent No. 1 gave certain speeches and certain advertisements were got published by Shri N.T. Rama Rao through the Publicity Department of the Government of Andhra Pradesh in the newspapers containing certain statements which are alleged to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A) of the <a href="/act/50684/representation-of-the-people-act-1951-complete-act">Representation of the People Act, 1951</a> (hereinafter referred to as 'the said Act'). The main question canvassed before us is whether the statements contained in these aforesaid advertisements amount to a corrupt practice under Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act. Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act runs as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">123. Corrupt practices</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The following shall be deemed to be corrupt practises for the purposes of this Act :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) 'Bribery', that is to say.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(A) any gift, offer or promise by a candidate or his agent or by any other person with the consent of a candidate or his election agent of any gratification, to any person whomsover, with the object, directly or indirectly of inducing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) x x x</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) an elector to vote or refrain from voting at an election, or as a reward to.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) a person for having so stood or not stood, or for having withdrawn or not having withdrawn his candidature; or</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) an elector for having voted or refrained from voting.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The advertisements very shortly stated, refer to the auspicious gifts made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to the poor people on the eve of New Year and Sankranti. In the said advertisements, it is stated that the said Government which was formed by the Telugu Desam Party was giving to the poor people whose income was below Rs. 6,000 per year, a kilo of rice at Rs. 2 per Kg. and the said advertisements referred to a new scheme of selling sarees and dhoties at half prices to the poor people in the State of Andhra Pradesh having Green-cards. Green-cards were directed to be issued to all the persons whose annual income was below Rs. 6,000. The supply of the rice at subsidised rates as aforesaid was also to be made to the Green-card holders only. The scheme to sell sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was to be operative from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. In considering the question whether the said advertisement and the said speeches amount to a corrupt practice, we are of the view that the provisions of Section 123 of the said Act which deal with corrupt practices have to be interpreted, keeping in mind that dictates of commonsense require that they never could have been intended to treat normal election promises made in election manifestoes or usual election speeches by members of various political parties aspiring to power and by different candidates aspiring to get elected to legislative bodies concerned as corrupt practices. We are of the view that these advertisements and speeches amount to nothing more than statements extolling the achievements of the Government of the State of Andhra Pradesh under the Telugu Desam Party headed by N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister, and contain normal election promises and these statements do not amount to corrupt practices falling within the scope of Sub-clause (b) of Clause (A) of Sub-section (1) of Section 123 of the said Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. It was urged by Mr. Rao, learned Counsel for the appellants that in the impugned judgments, the High Court has incorrectly taken the view that in order to amount to bribery within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A), the transaction must amount to a bargain by the candidate with a view to get votes. It was pointed out by him that the said view has been taken in the impugned judgments, relying upon the decision of a Bench comprising to learned Judges of this Court in Ghasi Ram v. Dal Singh and Ors. :1983 SCR 102 . We have gone through to the relevant portion of that judgment (at page 109 and 110 of the said report). A careful perusal of the said judgment shows that what has been really held in that case is that if the promises given or made amount to a bargain entered into by a candidate for a vote or votes, that would amount to a corrupt practice; but it has not been held there that unless the act alleged amounts to such a bargain, it could not amount to a corrupt practice. In our view, that judgment does not lay down that in order to amount to a corrupt practice, the transaction must amount to a bargain for getting a vote. It was pointed out by Mr. Rao, however, that such a view seems to have been taken in two other decisions rendered by two Benches, each comprising two learned Judges of this Court in Bhanu Kumar Shastri v. Mohan Lal Sukhadia and Ors. : [1971]3SCR522 and Harjit Singh Mann v. S Umrao Singh and Ors. : [1980]2SCR501 . and these judgments need to be overruled. We do not propose to go into the correctness or otherwise of this view because, even on the footing that in order to amount to a corrupt practice under the aforesaid provision the alleged acts need not constitute a bargain, the the acts established in the present case, in our opinion, do not amount to a corrupt practice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Our attention was drawn by Mr. Rao to the fact that in this case the said advertisements and the speeches had to be viewed in the context of the fact that the advertisements were issued and the speeches were made after respondent No. 1 filed his nomination papers on January 4, 1985, for the election and before the election was held in the aforesaid constituency. It was further pointed out that the offer made for the sale of sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was limited to the period from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985. It cannot be denied that these factors are relevant factOrs. We cannot, however, lose sight of the fact that this offer was made not only in this constituency but throughout the State where the elections to the House of the People were scheduled to be held, and were, in fact, held on December 27, 1984. It was only in case of this constituency that the election to be held on the scheduled date was countermanded and later held on January 28, 1985. We cannot lose sight of the fact that, as far as the said speeches and the said advertisements, which were issued by the Publicity Department of the State, are concerned, they deal in the main with the achievements of the Government of Andhra Pradesh which, of course, was being run by Ministers belonging to Telugu Desam Party to which respondent No. 1 also belonged. Moreover, the offer in the advertisements for the sale of dhoties and sarees at discount rates was in the nature of a benefit offered to poor persons in that State. When a Government announces the measures which are intended for the benefit of any of the classes for whose the Government can normally be expected to work like the poor or the economical backward classes, it is only in rare circumstances that such a promise can be said to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) even though such a promise might be made on the eve of elections. Keeping this in mind, in our opinion, although the offer to sell dhoties and sarees at discount rates was of a limited duration as aforestated, it cannot be regarded as a corrupt practice. Such an offer was bound to have financial repercussions and it is quite possible the duration of the offer was limited to enable the Government to study the financial repercussions rather than from any improper motive. We find support for this view from the decision of this Court in H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh : [1969]3SCR813 . In that case an Ordinance was passed by the Government of Madhya Pradesh as a result of which a large number of agriculturists, namely, those holdings of plots of land of less than 7.5 acres area or paying land revenue not exceeding Rs. 5/- were exempted from the payment of the land revenue. It was held that such a concession does not amount to a gift, offer or promise of any gratification within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) of the said Act nor does the announcement of the declaration made at a meeting shortly before the election or the issue of a pamphlet containing that declaration at that time carry the matter any further. It was held that neither Shri D.P. Misra who was the Chief Minister nor Shri S.K. Dixit who acted as his agent were guilty of any corrupt practice within the meaning of the aforesaid provision.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. It was next contended by Mr. Rao, although very faintly, that the High Court was in error as it had not decided all other issues which were raised in the election petition. In this regard we cannot lose sight of the fact that the term of the present Lok Sabha is likely to be over within a few months and fresh elections are likely to be held and it would, therefore, be an exercise in futility to remand the matter to the High Court for deciding the remaining issues.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'AIR1990SC1889; JT1989(4)SC186; 1989(2)SCALE891; 1989Supp(2)SCC504', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors.', 'sub' => 'Election', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ), 'casename_url' => 'b-rajagopala-rao-vs-appayya-hanumanthu', 'args' => array( (int) 0 => '640942', (int) 1 => 'b-rajagopala-rao-vs-appayya-hanumanthu' ) ) $title_for_layout = 'B Rajagopala Rao and anr Vs Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors - Citation 640942 - Court Judgment | ' $desc = array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '640942', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/50684/representation-of-the-people-act-1951-complete-act">Representation of the People Act, 1951</a> - Sections 1, 3(1)(A), 123 and 123(1)(A)', 'appealno' => 'Civil Appeal Nos. 484 and 485 of 1987', 'appellant' => 'B. Rajagopala Rao and anr.', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'B. Rajagopala Rao and anr. Vs. Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors.', 'casenote' => 'Election - corrupt practices - Sections 123 and 123 (1) (A) of Representation of the People Act, 1951 - whether advertisements by public department and speeches made by respondent No. 1 to sell dhoti and sarees at discount rates amount to corrupt practices - offer was available for mass and for limited duration - such offer was bound to have financial repercussions and it is quite possible that duration of offer limited to enable Government to study financial repercussions rather than from any improper motive - offer not amounted to corrupt practices. - [ D.A. Desai,; O. Chinnappa Reddy and; R.S. Sarkaria, JJ.] The Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 empowers the Union of India in the public interest to take under its control the industries specified in the First Schedule to the Act. Item 23 of the First Schedule relates to textiles of various categories. Section 15 authorises the Central Government to make or cause to be made a full and complete investigation into the circumstances of the case if the Central Government is of the opinion that (a) in respect of any scheduled industry or industrial undertaking or undertakings (i) there has been, or is likely to be, a substantial fall in the volume of production for which, having regard to the economic conditions prevailing, there is no justification; or (ii) there has been, or is likely to be, a marked deterioration in the quality of any article... which could have been or can be avoided; or (iii) there has been or is likely to be a rise in the price of any article..... for which there is no justification; or (iv) it is necessary to take any such action for the purpose of conserving any resources of national importance; or (b) any industrial undertaking is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest. After the investigation is made under section 15, section 16(1) empowers the Central Government if action is desirable, to issue appropriate directions, and section 16(2) provides for the issue of interim directions by the Central Government pending investigation under section 15. Chapter III-A consisting of Sections 18A, 18-AA, 18-B, 18-C, 18-D, 18-E and 18-F deal with "direct management or control of Industrial Undertakings by Central Government in certain cases". Sec. 18-A empowers the Central Government by notified order, to authorise any person or body of persons to take over the management of the whole or any part of an industrial undertaking or to exercise in respect of the whole, or any part of the undertaking such functions of control as may be specified in the order, if the Central Government is of opinion that: (a) an industrial undertaking to which directions have been issued in pursuance of section 16 has failed to comply with such directions, or (b) an industrial undertaking in respect of which an investigation has been made under section 15 is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest. Section 18AA(5) stipulates that the provisions of Sections 18-B to 18 E shall be applicable to the industrial undertaking in respect of which an order has been made under section 18-AA even as they apply to an industrial undertaking taken over under Section 18-A. Section 18-F empowers the Central Government to cancel the order made under section 18-A if it appears that the purpose of the order has been fulfilled or it is not necessary that the order should remain in force. The appellant M/s. Swadeshi Cotton Mills was taken over by the Government of India by a notification dated April 13, 1978 in exercise of the powers conferred on it under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 18AA of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 on the ground that the company had by creation of encumbrances on the assets of its industrial undertakings, brought about a situation which had affected and is likely to further affect the production of articles manufactured or produced by it and that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation. The Government authorised the National Textile Corporation Limited to take over the management, subject to the conditions that the authorised person shall comply with all the directions issued from time to time by the Central Government and that the authorised person shall hold office for a period of five years. The appellant Mills challenged the aforesaid order in a writ petition in the High Court. The case was heard by a Full Bench of five Judges to consider the question whether in construing section 18AA of the Industries Development and Regulation Act, 1951, compliance with the principle of audi alteram partem is to be implied and whether hearing is to be given to the parties who would be affected by the order to be passed prior to the passing of the order or whether hearing can be given after the order is passed and whether the order passed under the said Section is vitiated by not giving of such hearing and whether such vice can be cured. The Bench by a majority answered the three questions as follows:- (a) Section 18AA(1)(a)(b) excludes the giving of prior hearing to the party who would be affected by order thereunder. (b) Section 18-F expressly provides for a post- decisional hearing to the owner of the industrial undertaking, the management of which is taken over under section 18AA to have the order made under section 18AA cancelled on any relevant ground. (c) As the taking over of management under section 18A is not vitiated by the failure to grant prior hearing the question of any such vice being cured by a grant of a subsequent hearing does not arise. The minority, however, held that in compliance with the principles of natural justice, prior hearing to the owner of the undertaking was required to be given before the passing of an order under section 18AA, that the second question did not arise as the denial of a prior hearing would not cure the vice by the grant of subsequent hearing, but it would be open to the Court to moderate the relief in such a way that the order is kept alive to the extent necessary until the making of the fresh order to subserve public interest and to make appropriate directions. After the decision on the reference the case was reheard on merits by a Full Bench of three Judges and the writ petition was allowed in part. The challenge to the validity of the order being rejected but insofar as the impugned order seeking to take over the corporate entity of the company, the corporate entity of the subsidiary and its assets, the petition was allowed and the respondents, the Union of India and the authorised person were directed to release from its control and custody and/or deliver possession of any assets or property of the company which were not referable to the industrial undertakings. Appeals to this Court were filed on behalf of the Company as well as by the Union of India and the National Textile Corporation. Two propositions were propounded on behalf of the company that: (a) Whether it was necessary to observe the rules of natural justice before issuing a notified order under section 18AA(1)(a) and further whether section 18-F impliedly excludes rules of natural justice relating to prior hearing; and it was contended (1) the mere use of the word 'immediate' in sub-clause (a) of section 18AA does not show a legislative intent to exclude the application of audi alteram partem rule altogether. (2) The word 'immediate' in clause (a) has been used in contra distinction to 'investigate'. It only means that under section 18AA action can be taken without prior investigation under section 15. The use of the word 'immediate' in section 18AA(1)(a) only dispenses with investigation under section 15 and not with the principle of audi alteram partem altogether and this is indicated by the marginal note of section 18A and para 3 of the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Amendment Bill which inserted section 18AA in 1971. (3) The word 'immediate' occurs only in clause (a) and not in clause (b) of section 18AA(1). It would be odd if intention to exclude this principle of natural justice is spelt out in one clause of the sub-section when the other clause does not exclude it. (4) Section 18-F does not exclude a pre-decisional hearing. The so-called post-decisional hearing contemplated by section 18-F cannot be and is not intended to be a substitute for a pre-decisional hearing. (5) Section 18F incorporates only a facet, albeit qualified, of section 21 of the General Clauses Act. The language of the Section implicity prohibits an enquiry into circumstances that led to the passing of the order of take-over and under it the aggrieved person is not entitled to show that on merits the order was void ab initio. (6) 'Immediacy' does not exclude a duty to act fairly because even an emergent situation can co-exist with the canons of natural justice. The only effect of urgency on the application of the principle of fair hearing would be that the width, form and duration of the hearing would be tailored to the situation and reduced to the reasonable minimum so that it does not delay and defeat the purpose of the contemplated action. (7) Where the civil consequences of the administrative action are grave and its effect is highly prejudicial to the rights and interests of the person affected and there is nothing in the language and scheme of the statute which unequivocally excludes a fair pre-decisional hearing and the post-decisional hearing provided therein is not a real remedial hearing equitable to a full right of appeal the Court should be loath to infer a legislative intent to exclude even a minimal fair hearing at the pre-decisional stage merely on ground of urgency. (8) The Central Government appointed four Government Officials including one from the office of the Textile Commissioner to study the affairs of the Company and to make recommendation. This Official Group submitted its report on February 16, 1978. The evidence on the basis of which the impugned order was passed was not disclosed to the appellant company till May 1978, only after it had filed the writ petition in the High Court. If there was anything adverse to the appellants in the survey report there was time enough about six weeks between the submission of the Survey Report and the passing of the impugned order for giving a short, reasonable opportunity to the appellants to explain the adverse findings against them. If there was immediacy situational modifications could be made to meet the requirement of fairness, by reducing the period of notice; that even the manner and form of such notice could be simplified to eliminate delay, that telephonic notice or short opportunity for furnishing their explanation to the Company might have satisfied the requirements of natural justice. Such an opportunity of hearing could have been given after the passing of a conditional tentative order and before its enforcement under section 18AA. For the interregnum suitable interim action such as freezing the assets of the Company or restraining the Company from creating further encumbrances, could be taken under section 16. On behalf of the Union of India and the Authorised Officer it was contended that (1) the presumption in favour of audi alteram partem rule stands impliedly displaced by the language scheme, setting and the purpose of the provision in section 18AA. (2) Section 18AA on its plain terms deals with situations where immediate preventive action is required. The paramount concern is to avoid serious problems which may be caused by fall in production. The purpose of an order under section 18AA is not to condemn the owner but to protect the scheduled industry. The issue under section 18AA is not solely between the Government and the management of the industrial undertaking. The object of taking action under this Section is to protect other outside interests of the community at large and the workers. (3) The rule of natural justice to give a hearing has been incorporated in section 18-F which gives an opportunity of a post-decisional hearing to the owner of the undertaking who if he feels aggrieved can on his application be heard, to show that even the original order under section 18AA was passed on invalid grounds and should be cancelled or rescinded. (4) On a true construction of section 18AA read with section 18-F the requirements of natural justice and fair play can be read into the statute only insofar as conformance to such canons can reasonably and realistically be required of it by the provision for a remedial hearing at a subsequent stage. (5) Under section 18-F the Central Government exercises curial functions and that Section confers on the aggrieved owner a right to apply to the Government to cancel the order of take-over. This section casts an obligation on the Central Government to deal with and dispose of an application filed thereunder with reasonable expedition. Allowing the appeal by the Company,<br/>HELD: (Sarkaria & Desai, JJ. per Chinnappa Reddy, J. dissenting.) In the facts and circumstances of the instant case, there has been a noncompliance with the implied requirement of the audi alteram partem rule of natural justice at the pre-decisional stage. The impugned order could be struck down as invalid on that score alone. But in view of the commitment / concession that a hearing would be afforded to the Company, the case is remitted to the Central Government to give a full, fair and effective hearing. [587G-H, 588C] The phrase 'natural justice' is not capable of a static and precise definition. It cannot be imprisoned in the straight-jacket of a cast-iron formula. Rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. Hence not possible to make an exhaustive catalogue of such rules. Two fundamental maxims of natural justice have now become deeply and indelibly ingrained in the common consciousness of mankind as pre-eminently necessary to ensure that the law is applied impartially objectively and fairly. These twin principles are (i) audi alteram partem and (ii) nemo judex in re sua. Audi alteram partem is a highly effective rule devised by the Courts to ensure that a statutory authority arrives at a just decision and it is calculated to act as a healthy check on the abuse or misuse of power. Its reach should not be narrowed and its applicability circumscribed.[554C-G] The rules of natural justice can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. If a statutory provision either specifically or by inevitable implication excludes the application of the rules of natural justice then the Court cannot ignore the mandate of the Legislature. Whether or not the application of the principles of natural justice in a given case has been excluded in the exercise of statutory power depends upon the language and basic scheme of the provision conferring the power, the nature of the power the purpose for which it is conferred and the effect of that power. [556A-B] The maxim audi alteram partem has many facets. Two of them are (a) notice of the case to be met, and (b) opportunity to explain. The rule cannot be sacrificed at the altar of administrative convenience or celerity; for, convenience and justice are often not on speaking terms. Difficulties, however, arise when the statute conferring the power does not expressly exclude this rule but its exclusion is sought by implication due to the presence of certain factors such as urgency where the obligation to give notice and opportunity to be heard would obstruct the taking of prompt action of a preventive or remedial nature. Audi alteram partem rule may be disregarded in an emergent situation where immediate action brooks no delay to prevent some imminent danger or injury or hazard to paramount public interests. Section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure empowers the magistrates specified therein to make an exparte conditional order in emergent cases for removal of dangerous public nuisances. Action under section 17 Land Acquisition Act furnishes another such instance. Similarly action on grounds of public safety public health may justify disregard of the rule of prior hearing. [556C-H] Cases where owing to the compulsion of the fact situation or the necessity of taking speedy action no pre- decisional hearing is given but the action, is followed soon by a full post-decisional hearing to the person affected do not in reality constitute an exception to the audi alteram partem rule. To call such cases as exception is a misnomer because they do not exclude fair play in action but adapt it to the urgency of the situation by balancing the competing claims of hurry and hearing. [560H-561A] The general principle as distinguished from an absolute rule of uniform application seems to be that where a statute does not in terms exclude this rule of prior hearing but contemplates a post-decisional hearing amounting to a full review of the original order on merits then such a statute would be construed as excluding the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage. [561G] If the statute conferring the power is silent with regard to the giving of pre-decisional hearing to the person affected and the administrative decision taken by the authority involves civil consequences of a grave nature and no full review or appeal on merits against that decision is provided courts will be extremely reluctant to construe such a statute as excluding the duty of affording even a minimal hearing shorn of all its formal trappings and dilatory features at the pre-decisional stage, unless viewed pragmatically it would paralyse the administrative process or frustrate the need for utmost promptitude. [561H] 7(i). A comparison of the provisions of Section 18A(1)(b) and Section 18AA(1)(c), bring out two main points of distinction: First, action under Section 18A(1)(b) can be taken only after an investigation had been made under Section 15; while under Section 18AA(1)(a) or (b) action can be taken without such investigation. The language, scheme and setting of Section 18AA read in the light of the Objects and Reasons for enacting this provision make this position clear beyond doubt. Second, before taking action under Section 18A(1)(b), the Central Government has to form an opinion on the basis of the investigation conducted under section 15, in regard to the existence of the objective fact, namely: that the industrial undertaking is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest; while under section 18A(1)(a) the Government has to satisfy itself that the persons incharge of the undertaking have brought about a situation likely to cause fall in production, by committing any of the three kinds of acts specified in that provision. This shows that the preliminary objective fact attributable to the persons in charge of the management or affairs of the undertaking, on the basis of which action may be taken under section 18(A)(1)(b), is of far wider amplitude than the circumstance, the existence of which is a sine qua non for taking action under section 18AA(1). The phrase "highly detrimental to the scheduled industry or public interest" in section 18-A is capable of being construed to cover a large variety of acts or things which may be considered wrong with the manner of running the industry by the management. In contrast with it, action under section 18AA(1)(a) can be taken only if the Central Government is satisfied with regard to the existence of the twin conditions specifically mentioned therein, on the basis of evidence in its possession. [569D-H] An analysis of section 18AA(1)(a), indicates that as a necessary preliminary to the exercise of the power thereunder, the Central Government must be satisfied "from documentary or other evidence in its possession" in regard to the co-existence of two circumstances: (i) that the persons in charge of the industrial undertaking have by committing any of these acts, namely, reckless investments, or creation of incumbrances on the assets of industrial undertaking, or by diversion of funds, brought about a situation which is likely to affect the production of the article manufactured or produced in the industrial undertaking, and (ii) that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation.[570B-D] It cannot be laid down as a general proposition that whenever a statute confers a power on an administrative authority and makes the exercise of that power conditional on the formation of an opinion by that authority in regard to the existence of an immediacy, its opinion in regard to that preliminary fact is not open to judicial scrutiny at all. While it may be conceded that an element of subjectivity is always involved in the formation of such an opinion, the existence of the circumstances from which the inference constituting the opinion, as the sine qua non for action, are to be drawn, must be demonstrable, and the existence of such "circumstances", if questioned, must be proved at least prima facie. [571 E-G] From a plain reading of section 18AA, it is clear that it does not expressly in unmistakable and unequivocal terms exclude the application of the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage. [574B] In the instant case, so far as Kanpur Unit is concerned, it was lying closed for more than three months before the passing of the impugned order. There was no 'immediacy' in relation to that unit, which could absolve the Government from the obligation of complying fully with audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional or pre- takeover stage. [583A] Keshav Mills Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, [1973] 3 S.C.R. 22; Kamla Prasad Khetan v. Union of India,[1957] S.C.R. 1052; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 621; Sukhdev Singh & Ors. v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh, [1975] 3 S.C.R. 619; A. K. Kraipak v. Union of India, [1970] 1 S.C.R. 457; Ridge v. Baldwin, [1964] A.C. 40; 196; Heatley v. Tasmanian Racing & Gaming Commission, 14 Australian Law Reports 519; Nawabkhan Abbaskhan v. State of Gujarat, [1974] 3 S.C.R. 427; State of Orissa v. Dr. Bina Pani Dei, [1962] 2 S.C.R. 625; Ambalal M. Shah v. Hathi Singh Manufacturing Co. Ltd. [1962] 3 S.C.R. 171; and S. L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan & Ors., [1981] 1 S.C.R. 746, referred to. (Per Chinnappa Reddy, J. dissenting) The principles of natural justice are not attracted to the situations contemplated by section 18AA of Industries (Development and Regulation) Act. Natural justice like Ultra Vires and Public Policy is a branch of the public law and is a formidable weapon which can be wielded to secure justice to the citizen. While it may be used to protect certain fundamental liberties, civil and political rights, it may be used as indeed it is used more often than not, to protect vested interests and to obstruct the path of progressive change. The time has come to make an appropriate distinction between natural justice in its application to fundamental liberties, civil and political rights and natural justice in its application to vested interests. [590A-B] Our constitution as befits the Constitution of a Socialist Secular Democratic Republic, recognises the paramountcy of the public weal over the private interest. Natural justice, ultra vires, public policy, or any other rule of interpretation must, therefore, conform, grow and be tailored to serve the public interest and respond to the demands of an evolving society. [590C] The principles of natural justice have taken deep root in the judicial conscience of our people. They are now considered so fundamental as to be implicit in every decision making function, judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative. Where authority functions under a statute and the statute provides for the observance of the principles of natural justice in a particular manner, natural justice will have to be observed in that manner and in no other. Where the statute is silent about the observance of the principles of natural justice, such statutory silence is taken to imply compliance with the principles of natural justice. Where the conflict is between the public interest and the private interest the presumption must necessarily be weak and may, therefore, be readily displaced. The presumption is also weak, where what are involved are mere property rights. In cases of urgency, particularly where the public interest is involved, preemptive action may be a strategic necessity. Even in cases of preemptive action, if the statute so provides or if the Courts so deem fit in appropriate cases, a postponed hearing may be substituted for natural justice. [590A-C; 591F-G] 3(ii). Where natural justice is implied, the extent of the implication and the nature of the hearing must vary with the statute, the subject and the situation. [592B] The absence of the expression 'immediate action' in section 18AA(1)(b) does not make any difference. Section 18AA(1)(a) refers to a situation where immediate preventive action may avert a disaster, whereas section 18AA contemplates a situation where the disaster has occurred and action is necessary to restore normalcy. Restoration of production where production has stopped in a key industry or industrial undertaking is as important and urgent in the public interest as prevention of a situation where production may be affected. Immediate action is, therefore, as necessary in the situation contemplated by section 18AA(1)(b) as in the situation contemplated by section 18AA(1)(a). [596 F-G] The marginal note refers to the power to take over without investigation but there is no sufficient reason to suppose that the word immediate is used only to contra- distinguish it from the investigation contemplated by section 15 of the Act, though of course a consequence of immediate action under section 18AA may be to dispense with the enquiry under section 15. In fact, facts which come to light during the course of an investigation under section 15 may form the basis of action under section 18AA(1)(a). Where in the course of an investigation under section 15 it is discovered that the management have, by reckless investments or creation of encumbrances on the assets of the industrial undertaking or by diversion of funds brought about a situation which is likely to affect the production of the articles manufactured or produced in the industrial undertaking, if the Government is satisfied that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation, there is no reason why the Central Government may not straightaway take action under section 18AA(1)(a) without waiting for completion of investigation under section 15. [597A-B] Where there is a provision in the statute itself for revocation of the order by the very authority making the decision, it appears to be unnecessary to insist upon a pre- decisional observance of natural justice. [598A] The likelihood of production being jeopardized or the stoppage of production in a key industrial undertaking is a matter of grave concern affecting the public interest. Parliament has taken so serious a view of the matter that it has authorised the Central Government to take over the management of the industrial undertaking if immediate action may prevent jeopardy to production or restore production where it has already stopped. The necessity for immediate action by the Central Government contemplated by Parliament is definitely indicative of the exclusion of natural justice. It is not as if the owner of the industrial undertaking is left with no remedy. He may move the Central Government under section 18-F to cancel the order made under section 18AA. [598C-D] Neither section 18-F of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act nor section 21 of the General Clauses Act by itself excludes natural justice. The exclusion of natural justice where such exclusion is not express has to be implied by reference to the subject, the statute and the statutory situation. Where an express provision in the statute itself provides for a post decisional hearing the other provisions of the Statute will have to be read in the light of such provision and the provision for post- decisional hearing may then clinch the issue where pre- decisional natural justice appears to be excluded on the other terms of the statute. That a post-decisional hearing may also be had by the terms of section 21 of the General Clauses Act may not necessarily help in the interpretation of the provisions of the statute concerned. [599 A-C] Ridge v. Baldwin, 1964 A.C. p. 40; Annie G. Phillip v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 75 L.E.d. 1289; John H. Fahey v. Paul Mallonee, 91 L.E.d. 2030; Margarita Fuentes v. Robert L. Shevin, Attorney General of Florida, 32 L.E.d. 2d 556 and Lawrence Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 40 L.E.d. 2d 406, referred to. - Rama Rao, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh as well as the President of the Telugu Desam Party as well as respondent No. 3. The advertisements very shortly stated, refer to the auspicious gifts made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to the poor people on the eve of New Year and Sankranti. In the said advertisements, it is stated that the said Government which was formed by the Telugu Desam Party was giving to the poor people whose income was below Rs. and the said advertisements referred to a new scheme of selling sarees and dhoties at half prices to the poor people in the State of Andhra Pradesh having Green-cards. Moreover, the offer in the advertisements for the sale of dhoties and sarees at discount rates was in the nature of a benefit offered to poor persons in that State. When a Government announces the measures which are intended for the benefit of any of the classes for whose the Government can normally be expected to work like the poor or the economical backward classes, it is only in rare circumstances that such a promise can be said to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) even though such a promise might be made on the eve of elections. 8. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => '', 'counseldef' => '', 'court' => 'Supreme Court of India', 'court_type' => 'SC', 'decidedon' => '1989-09-29', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' K.N. Saikia,; M.H. Kania and; S. Ranganathan, JJ.', 'judgement' => '</p><p>Kania, J.</p><p>1. These two appeals arise out of the judgments in two Election Petitions in the Andhra Pradesh High Court questioning the election of respondent No. 1 as a Member of Parliament from Srikakulam No. Parliamentary Constituency in the 8th General Election to the House of the People. The points raised in these appeals are common and so are the relevant facts; and, hence, they are being disposed of by this common judgment. We propose to take note of only the few facts which are necessary for the appreciation of the controversy before us.</p><p>2. The polling date for the said election along with other parliamentary elections in the State of Andhra Pradesh was December 27, 1984 but in Srikakulam No. 1 Parliamentary Constituency the polling was countermanded and the date of polling was later fixed on January 28, 1985. In both the Election Petitions the election of respondent No. 1 was questioned mainly on the ground that Shri N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh as well as the President of the Telugu Desam Party as well as respondent No. 1 gave certain speeches and certain advertisements were got published by Shri N.T. Rama Rao through the Publicity Department of the Government of Andhra Pradesh in the newspapers containing certain statements which are alleged to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A) of the <a>Representation of the People Act, 1951</a> (hereinafter referred to as 'the said Act'). The main question canvassed before us is whether the statements contained in these aforesaid advertisements amount to a corrupt practice under Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act. Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act runs as follows :</p><p>123. Corrupt practices</p><p>The following shall be deemed to be corrupt practises for the purposes of this Act :</p><p>(1) 'Bribery', that is to say.</p><p>(A) any gift, offer or promise by a candidate or his agent or by any other person with the consent of a candidate or his election agent of any gratification, to any person whomsover, with the object, directly or indirectly of inducing.</p><p>(a) x x x</p><p>(b) an elector to vote or refrain from voting at an election, or as a reward to.</p><p>(i) a person for having so stood or not stood, or for having withdrawn or not having withdrawn his candidature; or</p><p>(ii) an elector for having voted or refrained from voting.</p><p>3. The advertisements very shortly stated, refer to the auspicious gifts made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to the poor people on the eve of New Year and Sankranti. In the said advertisements, it is stated that the said Government which was formed by the Telugu Desam Party was giving to the poor people whose income was below Rs. 6,000 per year, a kilo of rice at Rs. 2 per Kg. and the said advertisements referred to a new scheme of selling sarees and dhoties at half prices to the poor people in the State of Andhra Pradesh having Green-cards. Green-cards were directed to be issued to all the persons whose annual income was below Rs. 6,000. The supply of the rice at subsidised rates as aforesaid was also to be made to the Green-card holders only. The scheme to sell sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was to be operative from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985.</p><p>4. In considering the question whether the said advertisement and the said speeches amount to a corrupt practice, we are of the view that the provisions of Section 123 of the said Act which deal with corrupt practices have to be interpreted, keeping in mind that dictates of commonsense require that they never could have been intended to treat normal election promises made in election manifestoes or usual election speeches by members of various political parties aspiring to power and by different candidates aspiring to get elected to legislative bodies concerned as corrupt practices. We are of the view that these advertisements and speeches amount to nothing more than statements extolling the achievements of the Government of the State of Andhra Pradesh under the Telugu Desam Party headed by N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister, and contain normal election promises and these statements do not amount to corrupt practices falling within the scope of Sub-clause (b) of Clause (A) of Sub-section (1) of Section 123 of the said Act.</p><p>5. It was urged by Mr. Rao, learned Counsel for the appellants that in the impugned judgments, the High Court has incorrectly taken the view that in order to amount to bribery within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A), the transaction must amount to a bargain by the candidate with a view to get votes. It was pointed out by him that the said view has been taken in the impugned judgments, relying upon the decision of a Bench comprising to learned Judges of this Court in Ghasi Ram v. Dal Singh and Ors. :1983 SCR 102 . We have gone through to the relevant portion of that judgment (at page 109 and 110 of the said report). A careful perusal of the said judgment shows that what has been really held in that case is that if the promises given or made amount to a bargain entered into by a candidate for a vote or votes, that would amount to a corrupt practice; but it has not been held there that unless the act alleged amounts to such a bargain, it could not amount to a corrupt practice. In our view, that judgment does not lay down that in order to amount to a corrupt practice, the transaction must amount to a bargain for getting a vote. It was pointed out by Mr. Rao, however, that such a view seems to have been taken in two other decisions rendered by two Benches, each comprising two learned Judges of this Court in Bhanu Kumar Shastri v. Mohan Lal Sukhadia and Ors. : [1971]3SCR522 and Harjit Singh Mann v. S Umrao Singh and Ors. : [1980]2SCR501 . and these judgments need to be overruled. We do not propose to go into the correctness or otherwise of this view because, even on the footing that in order to amount to a corrupt practice under the aforesaid provision the alleged acts need not constitute a bargain, the the acts established in the present case, in our opinion, do not amount to a corrupt practice.</p><p>6. Our attention was drawn by Mr. Rao to the fact that in this case the said advertisements and the speeches had to be viewed in the context of the fact that the advertisements were issued and the speeches were made after respondent No. 1 filed his nomination papers on January 4, 1985, for the election and before the election was held in the aforesaid constituency. It was further pointed out that the offer made for the sale of sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was limited to the period from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985. It cannot be denied that these factors are relevant factOrs. We cannot, however, lose sight of the fact that this offer was made not only in this constituency but throughout the State where the elections to the House of the People were scheduled to be held, and were, in fact, held on December 27, 1984. It was only in case of this constituency that the election to be held on the scheduled date was countermanded and later held on January 28, 1985. We cannot lose sight of the fact that, as far as the said speeches and the said advertisements, which were issued by the Publicity Department of the State, are concerned, they deal in the main with the achievements of the Government of Andhra Pradesh which, of course, was being run by Ministers belonging to Telugu Desam Party to which respondent No. 1 also belonged. Moreover, the offer in the advertisements for the sale of dhoties and sarees at discount rates was in the nature of a benefit offered to poor persons in that State. When a Government announces the measures which are intended for the benefit of any of the classes for whose the Government can normally be expected to work like the poor or the economical backward classes, it is only in rare circumstances that such a promise can be said to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) even though such a promise might be made on the eve of elections. Keeping this in mind, in our opinion, although the offer to sell dhoties and sarees at discount rates was of a limited duration as aforestated, it cannot be regarded as a corrupt practice. Such an offer was bound to have financial repercussions and it is quite possible the duration of the offer was limited to enable the Government to study the financial repercussions rather than from any improper motive. We find support for this view from the decision of this Court in H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh : [1969]3SCR813 . In that case an Ordinance was passed by the Government of Madhya Pradesh as a result of which a large number of agriculturists, namely, those holdings of plots of land of less than 7.5 acres area or paying land revenue not exceeding Rs. 5/- were exempted from the payment of the land revenue. It was held that such a concession does not amount to a gift, offer or promise of any gratification within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) of the said Act nor does the announcement of the declaration made at a meeting shortly before the election or the issue of a pamphlet containing that declaration at that time carry the matter any further. It was held that neither Shri D.P. Misra who was the Chief Minister nor Shri S.K. Dixit who acted as his agent were guilty of any corrupt practice within the meaning of the aforesaid provision.</p><p>7. It was next contended by Mr. Rao, although very faintly, that the High Court was in error as it had not decided all other issues which were raised in the election petition. In this regard we cannot lose sight of the fact that the term of the present Lok Sabha is likely to be over within a few months and fresh elections are likely to be held and it would, therefore, be an exercise in futility to remand the matter to the High Court for deciding the remaining issues.</p><p>8. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.<p></p><p>', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'AIR1990SC1889; JT1989(4)SC186; 1989(2)SCALE891; 1989Supp(2)SCC504', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors.', 'sub' => 'Election', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ) $casename_url = 'b-rajagopala-rao-vs-appayya-hanumanthu' $args = array( (int) 0 => '640942', (int) 1 => 'b-rajagopala-rao-vs-appayya-hanumanthu' ) $url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/640942/b-rajagopala-rao-vs-appayya-hanumanthu' $ctype = '' $caseref = 'H.V. Kamath v. Ch. 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$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp' $dataForView = array( 'title_for_layout' => 'B Rajagopala Rao and anr Vs Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors - Citation 640942 - Court Judgment | ', 'desc' => array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '640942', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/50684/representation-of-the-people-act-1951-complete-act">Representation of the People Act, 1951</a> - Sections 1, 3(1)(A), 123 and 123(1)(A)', 'appealno' => 'Civil Appeal Nos. 484 and 485 of 1987', 'appellant' => 'B. Rajagopala Rao and anr.', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'B. Rajagopala Rao and anr. Vs. Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors.', 'casenote' => 'Election - corrupt practices - Sections 123 and 123 (1) (A) of Representation of the People Act, 1951 - whether advertisements by public department and speeches made by respondent No. 1 to sell dhoti and sarees at discount rates amount to corrupt practices - offer was available for mass and for limited duration - such offer was bound to have financial repercussions and it is quite possible that duration of offer limited to enable Government to study financial repercussions rather than from any improper motive - offer not amounted to corrupt practices. - [ D.A. Desai,; O. Chinnappa Reddy and; R.S. Sarkaria, JJ.] The Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 empowers the Union of India in the public interest to take under its control the industries specified in the First Schedule to the Act. Item 23 of the First Schedule relates to textiles of various categories. Section 15 authorises the Central Government to make or cause to be made a full and complete investigation into the circumstances of the case if the Central Government is of the opinion that (a) in respect of any scheduled industry or industrial undertaking or undertakings (i) there has been, or is likely to be, a substantial fall in the volume of production for which, having regard to the economic conditions prevailing, there is no justification; or (ii) there has been, or is likely to be, a marked deterioration in the quality of any article... which could have been or can be avoided; or (iii) there has been or is likely to be a rise in the price of any article..... for which there is no justification; or (iv) it is necessary to take any such action for the purpose of conserving any resources of national importance; or (b) any industrial undertaking is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest. After the investigation is made under section 15, section 16(1) empowers the Central Government if action is desirable, to issue appropriate directions, and section 16(2) provides for the issue of interim directions by the Central Government pending investigation under section 15. Chapter III-A consisting of Sections 18A, 18-AA, 18-B, 18-C, 18-D, 18-E and 18-F deal with "direct management or control of Industrial Undertakings by Central Government in certain cases". Sec. 18-A empowers the Central Government by notified order, to authorise any person or body of persons to take over the management of the whole or any part of an industrial undertaking or to exercise in respect of the whole, or any part of the undertaking such functions of control as may be specified in the order, if the Central Government is of opinion that: (a) an industrial undertaking to which directions have been issued in pursuance of section 16 has failed to comply with such directions, or (b) an industrial undertaking in respect of which an investigation has been made under section 15 is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest. Section 18AA(5) stipulates that the provisions of Sections 18-B to 18 E shall be applicable to the industrial undertaking in respect of which an order has been made under section 18-AA even as they apply to an industrial undertaking taken over under Section 18-A. Section 18-F empowers the Central Government to cancel the order made under section 18-A if it appears that the purpose of the order has been fulfilled or it is not necessary that the order should remain in force. The appellant M/s. Swadeshi Cotton Mills was taken over by the Government of India by a notification dated April 13, 1978 in exercise of the powers conferred on it under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 18AA of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 on the ground that the company had by creation of encumbrances on the assets of its industrial undertakings, brought about a situation which had affected and is likely to further affect the production of articles manufactured or produced by it and that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation. The Government authorised the National Textile Corporation Limited to take over the management, subject to the conditions that the authorised person shall comply with all the directions issued from time to time by the Central Government and that the authorised person shall hold office for a period of five years. The appellant Mills challenged the aforesaid order in a writ petition in the High Court. The case was heard by a Full Bench of five Judges to consider the question whether in construing section 18AA of the Industries Development and Regulation Act, 1951, compliance with the principle of audi alteram partem is to be implied and whether hearing is to be given to the parties who would be affected by the order to be passed prior to the passing of the order or whether hearing can be given after the order is passed and whether the order passed under the said Section is vitiated by not giving of such hearing and whether such vice can be cured. The Bench by a majority answered the three questions as follows:- (a) Section 18AA(1)(a)(b) excludes the giving of prior hearing to the party who would be affected by order thereunder. (b) Section 18-F expressly provides for a post- decisional hearing to the owner of the industrial undertaking, the management of which is taken over under section 18AA to have the order made under section 18AA cancelled on any relevant ground. (c) As the taking over of management under section 18A is not vitiated by the failure to grant prior hearing the question of any such vice being cured by a grant of a subsequent hearing does not arise. The minority, however, held that in compliance with the principles of natural justice, prior hearing to the owner of the undertaking was required to be given before the passing of an order under section 18AA, that the second question did not arise as the denial of a prior hearing would not cure the vice by the grant of subsequent hearing, but it would be open to the Court to moderate the relief in such a way that the order is kept alive to the extent necessary until the making of the fresh order to subserve public interest and to make appropriate directions. After the decision on the reference the case was reheard on merits by a Full Bench of three Judges and the writ petition was allowed in part. The challenge to the validity of the order being rejected but insofar as the impugned order seeking to take over the corporate entity of the company, the corporate entity of the subsidiary and its assets, the petition was allowed and the respondents, the Union of India and the authorised person were directed to release from its control and custody and/or deliver possession of any assets or property of the company which were not referable to the industrial undertakings. Appeals to this Court were filed on behalf of the Company as well as by the Union of India and the National Textile Corporation. Two propositions were propounded on behalf of the company that: (a) Whether it was necessary to observe the rules of natural justice before issuing a notified order under section 18AA(1)(a) and further whether section 18-F impliedly excludes rules of natural justice relating to prior hearing; and it was contended (1) the mere use of the word 'immediate' in sub-clause (a) of section 18AA does not show a legislative intent to exclude the application of audi alteram partem rule altogether. (2) The word 'immediate' in clause (a) has been used in contra distinction to 'investigate'. It only means that under section 18AA action can be taken without prior investigation under section 15. The use of the word 'immediate' in section 18AA(1)(a) only dispenses with investigation under section 15 and not with the principle of audi alteram partem altogether and this is indicated by the marginal note of section 18A and para 3 of the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Amendment Bill which inserted section 18AA in 1971. (3) The word 'immediate' occurs only in clause (a) and not in clause (b) of section 18AA(1). It would be odd if intention to exclude this principle of natural justice is spelt out in one clause of the sub-section when the other clause does not exclude it. (4) Section 18-F does not exclude a pre-decisional hearing. The so-called post-decisional hearing contemplated by section 18-F cannot be and is not intended to be a substitute for a pre-decisional hearing. (5) Section 18F incorporates only a facet, albeit qualified, of section 21 of the General Clauses Act. The language of the Section implicity prohibits an enquiry into circumstances that led to the passing of the order of take-over and under it the aggrieved person is not entitled to show that on merits the order was void ab initio. (6) 'Immediacy' does not exclude a duty to act fairly because even an emergent situation can co-exist with the canons of natural justice. The only effect of urgency on the application of the principle of fair hearing would be that the width, form and duration of the hearing would be tailored to the situation and reduced to the reasonable minimum so that it does not delay and defeat the purpose of the contemplated action. (7) Where the civil consequences of the administrative action are grave and its effect is highly prejudicial to the rights and interests of the person affected and there is nothing in the language and scheme of the statute which unequivocally excludes a fair pre-decisional hearing and the post-decisional hearing provided therein is not a real remedial hearing equitable to a full right of appeal the Court should be loath to infer a legislative intent to exclude even a minimal fair hearing at the pre-decisional stage merely on ground of urgency. (8) The Central Government appointed four Government Officials including one from the office of the Textile Commissioner to study the affairs of the Company and to make recommendation. This Official Group submitted its report on February 16, 1978. The evidence on the basis of which the impugned order was passed was not disclosed to the appellant company till May 1978, only after it had filed the writ petition in the High Court. If there was anything adverse to the appellants in the survey report there was time enough about six weeks between the submission of the Survey Report and the passing of the impugned order for giving a short, reasonable opportunity to the appellants to explain the adverse findings against them. If there was immediacy situational modifications could be made to meet the requirement of fairness, by reducing the period of notice; that even the manner and form of such notice could be simplified to eliminate delay, that telephonic notice or short opportunity for furnishing their explanation to the Company might have satisfied the requirements of natural justice. Such an opportunity of hearing could have been given after the passing of a conditional tentative order and before its enforcement under section 18AA. For the interregnum suitable interim action such as freezing the assets of the Company or restraining the Company from creating further encumbrances, could be taken under section 16. On behalf of the Union of India and the Authorised Officer it was contended that (1) the presumption in favour of audi alteram partem rule stands impliedly displaced by the language scheme, setting and the purpose of the provision in section 18AA. (2) Section 18AA on its plain terms deals with situations where immediate preventive action is required. The paramount concern is to avoid serious problems which may be caused by fall in production. The purpose of an order under section 18AA is not to condemn the owner but to protect the scheduled industry. The issue under section 18AA is not solely between the Government and the management of the industrial undertaking. The object of taking action under this Section is to protect other outside interests of the community at large and the workers. (3) The rule of natural justice to give a hearing has been incorporated in section 18-F which gives an opportunity of a post-decisional hearing to the owner of the undertaking who if he feels aggrieved can on his application be heard, to show that even the original order under section 18AA was passed on invalid grounds and should be cancelled or rescinded. (4) On a true construction of section 18AA read with section 18-F the requirements of natural justice and fair play can be read into the statute only insofar as conformance to such canons can reasonably and realistically be required of it by the provision for a remedial hearing at a subsequent stage. (5) Under section 18-F the Central Government exercises curial functions and that Section confers on the aggrieved owner a right to apply to the Government to cancel the order of take-over. This section casts an obligation on the Central Government to deal with and dispose of an application filed thereunder with reasonable expedition. Allowing the appeal by the Company,<br />HELD: (Sarkaria & Desai, JJ. per Chinnappa Reddy, J. dissenting.) In the facts and circumstances of the instant case, there has been a noncompliance with the implied requirement of the audi alteram partem rule of natural justice at the pre-decisional stage. The impugned order could be struck down as invalid on that score alone. But in view of the commitment / concession that a hearing would be afforded to the Company, the case is remitted to the Central Government to give a full, fair and effective hearing. [587G-H, 588C] The phrase 'natural justice' is not capable of a static and precise definition. It cannot be imprisoned in the straight-jacket of a cast-iron formula. Rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. Hence not possible to make an exhaustive catalogue of such rules. Two fundamental maxims of natural justice have now become deeply and indelibly ingrained in the common consciousness of mankind as pre-eminently necessary to ensure that the law is applied impartially objectively and fairly. These twin principles are (i) audi alteram partem and (ii) nemo judex in re sua. Audi alteram partem is a highly effective rule devised by the Courts to ensure that a statutory authority arrives at a just decision and it is calculated to act as a healthy check on the abuse or misuse of power. Its reach should not be narrowed and its applicability circumscribed.[554C-G] The rules of natural justice can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. If a statutory provision either specifically or by inevitable implication excludes the application of the rules of natural justice then the Court cannot ignore the mandate of the Legislature. Whether or not the application of the principles of natural justice in a given case has been excluded in the exercise of statutory power depends upon the language and basic scheme of the provision conferring the power, the nature of the power the purpose for which it is conferred and the effect of that power. [556A-B] The maxim audi alteram partem has many facets. Two of them are (a) notice of the case to be met, and (b) opportunity to explain. The rule cannot be sacrificed at the altar of administrative convenience or celerity; for, convenience and justice are often not on speaking terms. Difficulties, however, arise when the statute conferring the power does not expressly exclude this rule but its exclusion is sought by implication due to the presence of certain factors such as urgency where the obligation to give notice and opportunity to be heard would obstruct the taking of prompt action of a preventive or remedial nature. Audi alteram partem rule may be disregarded in an emergent situation where immediate action brooks no delay to prevent some imminent danger or injury or hazard to paramount public interests. Section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure empowers the magistrates specified therein to make an exparte conditional order in emergent cases for removal of dangerous public nuisances. Action under section 17 Land Acquisition Act furnishes another such instance. Similarly action on grounds of public safety public health may justify disregard of the rule of prior hearing. [556C-H] Cases where owing to the compulsion of the fact situation or the necessity of taking speedy action no pre- decisional hearing is given but the action, is followed soon by a full post-decisional hearing to the person affected do not in reality constitute an exception to the audi alteram partem rule. To call such cases as exception is a misnomer because they do not exclude fair play in action but adapt it to the urgency of the situation by balancing the competing claims of hurry and hearing. [560H-561A] The general principle as distinguished from an absolute rule of uniform application seems to be that where a statute does not in terms exclude this rule of prior hearing but contemplates a post-decisional hearing amounting to a full review of the original order on merits then such a statute would be construed as excluding the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage. [561G] If the statute conferring the power is silent with regard to the giving of pre-decisional hearing to the person affected and the administrative decision taken by the authority involves civil consequences of a grave nature and no full review or appeal on merits against that decision is provided courts will be extremely reluctant to construe such a statute as excluding the duty of affording even a minimal hearing shorn of all its formal trappings and dilatory features at the pre-decisional stage, unless viewed pragmatically it would paralyse the administrative process or frustrate the need for utmost promptitude. [561H] 7(i). A comparison of the provisions of Section 18A(1)(b) and Section 18AA(1)(c), bring out two main points of distinction: First, action under Section 18A(1)(b) can be taken only after an investigation had been made under Section 15; while under Section 18AA(1)(a) or (b) action can be taken without such investigation. The language, scheme and setting of Section 18AA read in the light of the Objects and Reasons for enacting this provision make this position clear beyond doubt. Second, before taking action under Section 18A(1)(b), the Central Government has to form an opinion on the basis of the investigation conducted under section 15, in regard to the existence of the objective fact, namely: that the industrial undertaking is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest; while under section 18A(1)(a) the Government has to satisfy itself that the persons incharge of the undertaking have brought about a situation likely to cause fall in production, by committing any of the three kinds of acts specified in that provision. This shows that the preliminary objective fact attributable to the persons in charge of the management or affairs of the undertaking, on the basis of which action may be taken under section 18(A)(1)(b), is of far wider amplitude than the circumstance, the existence of which is a sine qua non for taking action under section 18AA(1). The phrase "highly detrimental to the scheduled industry or public interest" in section 18-A is capable of being construed to cover a large variety of acts or things which may be considered wrong with the manner of running the industry by the management. In contrast with it, action under section 18AA(1)(a) can be taken only if the Central Government is satisfied with regard to the existence of the twin conditions specifically mentioned therein, on the basis of evidence in its possession. [569D-H] An analysis of section 18AA(1)(a), indicates that as a necessary preliminary to the exercise of the power thereunder, the Central Government must be satisfied "from documentary or other evidence in its possession" in regard to the co-existence of two circumstances: (i) that the persons in charge of the industrial undertaking have by committing any of these acts, namely, reckless investments, or creation of incumbrances on the assets of industrial undertaking, or by diversion of funds, brought about a situation which is likely to affect the production of the article manufactured or produced in the industrial undertaking, and (ii) that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation.[570B-D] It cannot be laid down as a general proposition that whenever a statute confers a power on an administrative authority and makes the exercise of that power conditional on the formation of an opinion by that authority in regard to the existence of an immediacy, its opinion in regard to that preliminary fact is not open to judicial scrutiny at all. While it may be conceded that an element of subjectivity is always involved in the formation of such an opinion, the existence of the circumstances from which the inference constituting the opinion, as the sine qua non for action, are to be drawn, must be demonstrable, and the existence of such "circumstances", if questioned, must be proved at least prima facie. [571 E-G] From a plain reading of section 18AA, it is clear that it does not expressly in unmistakable and unequivocal terms exclude the application of the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage. [574B] In the instant case, so far as Kanpur Unit is concerned, it was lying closed for more than three months before the passing of the impugned order. There was no 'immediacy' in relation to that unit, which could absolve the Government from the obligation of complying fully with audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional or pre- takeover stage. [583A] Keshav Mills Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, [1973] 3 S.C.R. 22; Kamla Prasad Khetan v. Union of India,[1957] S.C.R. 1052; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 621; Sukhdev Singh & Ors. v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh, [1975] 3 S.C.R. 619; A. K. Kraipak v. Union of India, [1970] 1 S.C.R. 457; Ridge v. Baldwin, [1964] A.C. 40; 196; Heatley v. Tasmanian Racing & Gaming Commission, 14 Australian Law Reports 519; Nawabkhan Abbaskhan v. State of Gujarat, [1974] 3 S.C.R. 427; State of Orissa v. Dr. Bina Pani Dei, [1962] 2 S.C.R. 625; Ambalal M. Shah v. Hathi Singh Manufacturing Co. Ltd. [1962] 3 S.C.R. 171; and S. L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan & Ors., [1981] 1 S.C.R. 746, referred to. (Per Chinnappa Reddy, J. dissenting) The principles of natural justice are not attracted to the situations contemplated by section 18AA of Industries (Development and Regulation) Act. Natural justice like Ultra Vires and Public Policy is a branch of the public law and is a formidable weapon which can be wielded to secure justice to the citizen. While it may be used to protect certain fundamental liberties, civil and political rights, it may be used as indeed it is used more often than not, to protect vested interests and to obstruct the path of progressive change. The time has come to make an appropriate distinction between natural justice in its application to fundamental liberties, civil and political rights and natural justice in its application to vested interests. [590A-B] Our constitution as befits the Constitution of a Socialist Secular Democratic Republic, recognises the paramountcy of the public weal over the private interest. Natural justice, ultra vires, public policy, or any other rule of interpretation must, therefore, conform, grow and be tailored to serve the public interest and respond to the demands of an evolving society. [590C] The principles of natural justice have taken deep root in the judicial conscience of our people. They are now considered so fundamental as to be implicit in every decision making function, judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative. Where authority functions under a statute and the statute provides for the observance of the principles of natural justice in a particular manner, natural justice will have to be observed in that manner and in no other. Where the statute is silent about the observance of the principles of natural justice, such statutory silence is taken to imply compliance with the principles of natural justice. Where the conflict is between the public interest and the private interest the presumption must necessarily be weak and may, therefore, be readily displaced. The presumption is also weak, where what are involved are mere property rights. In cases of urgency, particularly where the public interest is involved, preemptive action may be a strategic necessity. Even in cases of preemptive action, if the statute so provides or if the Courts so deem fit in appropriate cases, a postponed hearing may be substituted for natural justice. [590A-C; 591F-G] 3(ii). Where natural justice is implied, the extent of the implication and the nature of the hearing must vary with the statute, the subject and the situation. [592B] The absence of the expression 'immediate action' in section 18AA(1)(b) does not make any difference. Section 18AA(1)(a) refers to a situation where immediate preventive action may avert a disaster, whereas section 18AA contemplates a situation where the disaster has occurred and action is necessary to restore normalcy. Restoration of production where production has stopped in a key industry or industrial undertaking is as important and urgent in the public interest as prevention of a situation where production may be affected. Immediate action is, therefore, as necessary in the situation contemplated by section 18AA(1)(b) as in the situation contemplated by section 18AA(1)(a). [596 F-G] The marginal note refers to the power to take over without investigation but there is no sufficient reason to suppose that the word immediate is used only to contra- distinguish it from the investigation contemplated by section 15 of the Act, though of course a consequence of immediate action under section 18AA may be to dispense with the enquiry under section 15. In fact, facts which come to light during the course of an investigation under section 15 may form the basis of action under section 18AA(1)(a). Where in the course of an investigation under section 15 it is discovered that the management have, by reckless investments or creation of encumbrances on the assets of the industrial undertaking or by diversion of funds brought about a situation which is likely to affect the production of the articles manufactured or produced in the industrial undertaking, if the Government is satisfied that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation, there is no reason why the Central Government may not straightaway take action under section 18AA(1)(a) without waiting for completion of investigation under section 15. [597A-B] Where there is a provision in the statute itself for revocation of the order by the very authority making the decision, it appears to be unnecessary to insist upon a pre- decisional observance of natural justice. [598A] The likelihood of production being jeopardized or the stoppage of production in a key industrial undertaking is a matter of grave concern affecting the public interest. Parliament has taken so serious a view of the matter that it has authorised the Central Government to take over the management of the industrial undertaking if immediate action may prevent jeopardy to production or restore production where it has already stopped. The necessity for immediate action by the Central Government contemplated by Parliament is definitely indicative of the exclusion of natural justice. It is not as if the owner of the industrial undertaking is left with no remedy. He may move the Central Government under section 18-F to cancel the order made under section 18AA. [598C-D] Neither section 18-F of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act nor section 21 of the General Clauses Act by itself excludes natural justice. The exclusion of natural justice where such exclusion is not express has to be implied by reference to the subject, the statute and the statutory situation. Where an express provision in the statute itself provides for a post decisional hearing the other provisions of the Statute will have to be read in the light of such provision and the provision for post- decisional hearing may then clinch the issue where pre- decisional natural justice appears to be excluded on the other terms of the statute. That a post-decisional hearing may also be had by the terms of section 21 of the General Clauses Act may not necessarily help in the interpretation of the provisions of the statute concerned. [599 A-C] Ridge v. Baldwin, 1964 A.C. p. 40; Annie G. Phillip v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 75 L.E.d. 1289; John H. Fahey v. Paul Mallonee, 91 L.E.d. 2030; Margarita Fuentes v. Robert L. Shevin, Attorney General of Florida, 32 L.E.d. 2d 556 and Lawrence Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 40 L.E.d. 2d 406, referred to. - Rama Rao, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh as well as the President of the Telugu Desam Party as well as respondent No. 3. The advertisements very shortly stated, refer to the auspicious gifts made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to the poor people on the eve of New Year and Sankranti. In the said advertisements, it is stated that the said Government which was formed by the Telugu Desam Party was giving to the poor people whose income was below Rs. and the said advertisements referred to a new scheme of selling sarees and dhoties at half prices to the poor people in the State of Andhra Pradesh having Green-cards. Moreover, the offer in the advertisements for the sale of dhoties and sarees at discount rates was in the nature of a benefit offered to poor persons in that State. When a Government announces the measures which are intended for the benefit of any of the classes for whose the Government can normally be expected to work like the poor or the economical backward classes, it is only in rare circumstances that such a promise can be said to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) even though such a promise might be made on the eve of elections. 8. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => '', 'counseldef' => '', 'court' => 'Supreme Court of India', 'court_type' => 'SC', 'decidedon' => '1989-09-29', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' K.N. Saikia,; M.H. Kania and; S. Ranganathan, JJ.', 'judgement' => '</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Kania, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. These two appeals arise out of the judgments in two Election Petitions in the Andhra Pradesh High Court questioning the election of respondent No. 1 as a Member of Parliament from Srikakulam No. Parliamentary Constituency in the 8th General Election to the House of the People. The points raised in these appeals are common and so are the relevant facts; and, hence, they are being disposed of by this common judgment. We propose to take note of only the few facts which are necessary for the appreciation of the controversy before us.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The polling date for the said election along with other parliamentary elections in the State of Andhra Pradesh was December 27, 1984 but in Srikakulam No. 1 Parliamentary Constituency the polling was countermanded and the date of polling was later fixed on January 28, 1985. In both the Election Petitions the election of respondent No. 1 was questioned mainly on the ground that Shri N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh as well as the President of the Telugu Desam Party as well as respondent No. 1 gave certain speeches and certain advertisements were got published by Shri N.T. Rama Rao through the Publicity Department of the Government of Andhra Pradesh in the newspapers containing certain statements which are alleged to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A) of the <a href="/act/50684/representation-of-the-people-act-1951-complete-act">Representation of the People Act, 1951</a> (hereinafter referred to as 'the said Act'). The main question canvassed before us is whether the statements contained in these aforesaid advertisements amount to a corrupt practice under Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act. Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act runs as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">123. Corrupt practices</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The following shall be deemed to be corrupt practises for the purposes of this Act :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) 'Bribery', that is to say.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(A) any gift, offer or promise by a candidate or his agent or by any other person with the consent of a candidate or his election agent of any gratification, to any person whomsover, with the object, directly or indirectly of inducing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) x x x</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) an elector to vote or refrain from voting at an election, or as a reward to.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) a person for having so stood or not stood, or for having withdrawn or not having withdrawn his candidature; or</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) an elector for having voted or refrained from voting.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The advertisements very shortly stated, refer to the auspicious gifts made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to the poor people on the eve of New Year and Sankranti. In the said advertisements, it is stated that the said Government which was formed by the Telugu Desam Party was giving to the poor people whose income was below Rs. 6,000 per year, a kilo of rice at Rs. 2 per Kg. and the said advertisements referred to a new scheme of selling sarees and dhoties at half prices to the poor people in the State of Andhra Pradesh having Green-cards. Green-cards were directed to be issued to all the persons whose annual income was below Rs. 6,000. The supply of the rice at subsidised rates as aforesaid was also to be made to the Green-card holders only. The scheme to sell sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was to be operative from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. In considering the question whether the said advertisement and the said speeches amount to a corrupt practice, we are of the view that the provisions of Section 123 of the said Act which deal with corrupt practices have to be interpreted, keeping in mind that dictates of commonsense require that they never could have been intended to treat normal election promises made in election manifestoes or usual election speeches by members of various political parties aspiring to power and by different candidates aspiring to get elected to legislative bodies concerned as corrupt practices. We are of the view that these advertisements and speeches amount to nothing more than statements extolling the achievements of the Government of the State of Andhra Pradesh under the Telugu Desam Party headed by N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister, and contain normal election promises and these statements do not amount to corrupt practices falling within the scope of Sub-clause (b) of Clause (A) of Sub-section (1) of Section 123 of the said Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. It was urged by Mr. Rao, learned Counsel for the appellants that in the impugned judgments, the High Court has incorrectly taken the view that in order to amount to bribery within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A), the transaction must amount to a bargain by the candidate with a view to get votes. It was pointed out by him that the said view has been taken in the impugned judgments, relying upon the decision of a Bench comprising to learned Judges of this Court in Ghasi Ram v. Dal Singh and Ors. :1983 SCR 102 . We have gone through to the relevant portion of that judgment (at page 109 and 110 of the said report). A careful perusal of the said judgment shows that what has been really held in that case is that if the promises given or made amount to a bargain entered into by a candidate for a vote or votes, that would amount to a corrupt practice; but it has not been held there that unless the act alleged amounts to such a bargain, it could not amount to a corrupt practice. In our view, that judgment does not lay down that in order to amount to a corrupt practice, the transaction must amount to a bargain for getting a vote. It was pointed out by Mr. Rao, however, that such a view seems to have been taken in two other decisions rendered by two Benches, each comprising two learned Judges of this Court in Bhanu Kumar Shastri v. Mohan Lal Sukhadia and Ors. : [1971]3SCR522 and Harjit Singh Mann v. S Umrao Singh and Ors. : [1980]2SCR501 . and these judgments need to be overruled. We do not propose to go into the correctness or otherwise of this view because, even on the footing that in order to amount to a corrupt practice under the aforesaid provision the alleged acts need not constitute a bargain, the the acts established in the present case, in our opinion, do not amount to a corrupt practice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Our attention was drawn by Mr. Rao to the fact that in this case the said advertisements and the speeches had to be viewed in the context of the fact that the advertisements were issued and the speeches were made after respondent No. 1 filed his nomination papers on January 4, 1985, for the election and before the election was held in the aforesaid constituency. It was further pointed out that the offer made for the sale of sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was limited to the period from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985. It cannot be denied that these factors are relevant factOrs. We cannot, however, lose sight of the fact that this offer was made not only in this constituency but throughout the State where the elections to the House of the People were scheduled to be held, and were, in fact, held on December 27, 1984. It was only in case of this constituency that the election to be held on the scheduled date was countermanded and later held on January 28, 1985. We cannot lose sight of the fact that, as far as the said speeches and the said advertisements, which were issued by the Publicity Department of the State, are concerned, they deal in the main with the achievements of the Government of Andhra Pradesh which, of course, was being run by Ministers belonging to Telugu Desam Party to which respondent No. 1 also belonged. Moreover, the offer in the advertisements for the sale of dhoties and sarees at discount rates was in the nature of a benefit offered to poor persons in that State. When a Government announces the measures which are intended for the benefit of any of the classes for whose the Government can normally be expected to work like the poor or the economical backward classes, it is only in rare circumstances that such a promise can be said to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) even though such a promise might be made on the eve of elections. Keeping this in mind, in our opinion, although the offer to sell dhoties and sarees at discount rates was of a limited duration as aforestated, it cannot be regarded as a corrupt practice. Such an offer was bound to have financial repercussions and it is quite possible the duration of the offer was limited to enable the Government to study the financial repercussions rather than from any improper motive. We find support for this view from the decision of this Court in H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh : [1969]3SCR813 . In that case an Ordinance was passed by the Government of Madhya Pradesh as a result of which a large number of agriculturists, namely, those holdings of plots of land of less than 7.5 acres area or paying land revenue not exceeding Rs. 5/- were exempted from the payment of the land revenue. It was held that such a concession does not amount to a gift, offer or promise of any gratification within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) of the said Act nor does the announcement of the declaration made at a meeting shortly before the election or the issue of a pamphlet containing that declaration at that time carry the matter any further. It was held that neither Shri D.P. Misra who was the Chief Minister nor Shri S.K. Dixit who acted as his agent were guilty of any corrupt practice within the meaning of the aforesaid provision.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. It was next contended by Mr. Rao, although very faintly, that the High Court was in error as it had not decided all other issues which were raised in the election petition. In this regard we cannot lose sight of the fact that the term of the present Lok Sabha is likely to be over within a few months and fresh elections are likely to be held and it would, therefore, be an exercise in futility to remand the matter to the High Court for deciding the remaining issues.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'AIR1990SC1889; JT1989(4)SC186; 1989(2)SCALE891; 1989Supp(2)SCC504', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors.', 'sub' => 'Election', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ), 'casename_url' => 'b-rajagopala-rao-vs-appayya-hanumanthu', 'args' => array( (int) 0 => '640942', (int) 1 => 'b-rajagopala-rao-vs-appayya-hanumanthu' ) ) $title_for_layout = 'B Rajagopala Rao and anr Vs Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors - Citation 640942 - Court Judgment | ' $desc = array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '640942', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/50684/representation-of-the-people-act-1951-complete-act">Representation of the People Act, 1951</a> - Sections 1, 3(1)(A), 123 and 123(1)(A)', 'appealno' => 'Civil Appeal Nos. 484 and 485 of 1987', 'appellant' => 'B. Rajagopala Rao and anr.', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'B. Rajagopala Rao and anr. Vs. Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors.', 'casenote' => 'Election - corrupt practices - Sections 123 and 123 (1) (A) of Representation of the People Act, 1951 - whether advertisements by public department and speeches made by respondent No. 1 to sell dhoti and sarees at discount rates amount to corrupt practices - offer was available for mass and for limited duration - such offer was bound to have financial repercussions and it is quite possible that duration of offer limited to enable Government to study financial repercussions rather than from any improper motive - offer not amounted to corrupt practices. - [ D.A. Desai,; O. Chinnappa Reddy and; R.S. Sarkaria, JJ.] The Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 empowers the Union of India in the public interest to take under its control the industries specified in the First Schedule to the Act. Item 23 of the First Schedule relates to textiles of various categories. Section 15 authorises the Central Government to make or cause to be made a full and complete investigation into the circumstances of the case if the Central Government is of the opinion that (a) in respect of any scheduled industry or industrial undertaking or undertakings (i) there has been, or is likely to be, a substantial fall in the volume of production for which, having regard to the economic conditions prevailing, there is no justification; or (ii) there has been, or is likely to be, a marked deterioration in the quality of any article... which could have been or can be avoided; or (iii) there has been or is likely to be a rise in the price of any article..... for which there is no justification; or (iv) it is necessary to take any such action for the purpose of conserving any resources of national importance; or (b) any industrial undertaking is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest. After the investigation is made under section 15, section 16(1) empowers the Central Government if action is desirable, to issue appropriate directions, and section 16(2) provides for the issue of interim directions by the Central Government pending investigation under section 15. Chapter III-A consisting of Sections 18A, 18-AA, 18-B, 18-C, 18-D, 18-E and 18-F deal with "direct management or control of Industrial Undertakings by Central Government in certain cases". Sec. 18-A empowers the Central Government by notified order, to authorise any person or body of persons to take over the management of the whole or any part of an industrial undertaking or to exercise in respect of the whole, or any part of the undertaking such functions of control as may be specified in the order, if the Central Government is of opinion that: (a) an industrial undertaking to which directions have been issued in pursuance of section 16 has failed to comply with such directions, or (b) an industrial undertaking in respect of which an investigation has been made under section 15 is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest. Section 18AA(5) stipulates that the provisions of Sections 18-B to 18 E shall be applicable to the industrial undertaking in respect of which an order has been made under section 18-AA even as they apply to an industrial undertaking taken over under Section 18-A. Section 18-F empowers the Central Government to cancel the order made under section 18-A if it appears that the purpose of the order has been fulfilled or it is not necessary that the order should remain in force. The appellant M/s. Swadeshi Cotton Mills was taken over by the Government of India by a notification dated April 13, 1978 in exercise of the powers conferred on it under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 18AA of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 on the ground that the company had by creation of encumbrances on the assets of its industrial undertakings, brought about a situation which had affected and is likely to further affect the production of articles manufactured or produced by it and that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation. The Government authorised the National Textile Corporation Limited to take over the management, subject to the conditions that the authorised person shall comply with all the directions issued from time to time by the Central Government and that the authorised person shall hold office for a period of five years. The appellant Mills challenged the aforesaid order in a writ petition in the High Court. The case was heard by a Full Bench of five Judges to consider the question whether in construing section 18AA of the Industries Development and Regulation Act, 1951, compliance with the principle of audi alteram partem is to be implied and whether hearing is to be given to the parties who would be affected by the order to be passed prior to the passing of the order or whether hearing can be given after the order is passed and whether the order passed under the said Section is vitiated by not giving of such hearing and whether such vice can be cured. The Bench by a majority answered the three questions as follows:- (a) Section 18AA(1)(a)(b) excludes the giving of prior hearing to the party who would be affected by order thereunder. (b) Section 18-F expressly provides for a post- decisional hearing to the owner of the industrial undertaking, the management of which is taken over under section 18AA to have the order made under section 18AA cancelled on any relevant ground. (c) As the taking over of management under section 18A is not vitiated by the failure to grant prior hearing the question of any such vice being cured by a grant of a subsequent hearing does not arise. The minority, however, held that in compliance with the principles of natural justice, prior hearing to the owner of the undertaking was required to be given before the passing of an order under section 18AA, that the second question did not arise as the denial of a prior hearing would not cure the vice by the grant of subsequent hearing, but it would be open to the Court to moderate the relief in such a way that the order is kept alive to the extent necessary until the making of the fresh order to subserve public interest and to make appropriate directions. After the decision on the reference the case was reheard on merits by a Full Bench of three Judges and the writ petition was allowed in part. The challenge to the validity of the order being rejected but insofar as the impugned order seeking to take over the corporate entity of the company, the corporate entity of the subsidiary and its assets, the petition was allowed and the respondents, the Union of India and the authorised person were directed to release from its control and custody and/or deliver possession of any assets or property of the company which were not referable to the industrial undertakings. Appeals to this Court were filed on behalf of the Company as well as by the Union of India and the National Textile Corporation. Two propositions were propounded on behalf of the company that: (a) Whether it was necessary to observe the rules of natural justice before issuing a notified order under section 18AA(1)(a) and further whether section 18-F impliedly excludes rules of natural justice relating to prior hearing; and it was contended (1) the mere use of the word 'immediate' in sub-clause (a) of section 18AA does not show a legislative intent to exclude the application of audi alteram partem rule altogether. (2) The word 'immediate' in clause (a) has been used in contra distinction to 'investigate'. It only means that under section 18AA action can be taken without prior investigation under section 15. The use of the word 'immediate' in section 18AA(1)(a) only dispenses with investigation under section 15 and not with the principle of audi alteram partem altogether and this is indicated by the marginal note of section 18A and para 3 of the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Amendment Bill which inserted section 18AA in 1971. (3) The word 'immediate' occurs only in clause (a) and not in clause (b) of section 18AA(1). It would be odd if intention to exclude this principle of natural justice is spelt out in one clause of the sub-section when the other clause does not exclude it. (4) Section 18-F does not exclude a pre-decisional hearing. The so-called post-decisional hearing contemplated by section 18-F cannot be and is not intended to be a substitute for a pre-decisional hearing. (5) Section 18F incorporates only a facet, albeit qualified, of section 21 of the General Clauses Act. The language of the Section implicity prohibits an enquiry into circumstances that led to the passing of the order of take-over and under it the aggrieved person is not entitled to show that on merits the order was void ab initio. (6) 'Immediacy' does not exclude a duty to act fairly because even an emergent situation can co-exist with the canons of natural justice. The only effect of urgency on the application of the principle of fair hearing would be that the width, form and duration of the hearing would be tailored to the situation and reduced to the reasonable minimum so that it does not delay and defeat the purpose of the contemplated action. (7) Where the civil consequences of the administrative action are grave and its effect is highly prejudicial to the rights and interests of the person affected and there is nothing in the language and scheme of the statute which unequivocally excludes a fair pre-decisional hearing and the post-decisional hearing provided therein is not a real remedial hearing equitable to a full right of appeal the Court should be loath to infer a legislative intent to exclude even a minimal fair hearing at the pre-decisional stage merely on ground of urgency. (8) The Central Government appointed four Government Officials including one from the office of the Textile Commissioner to study the affairs of the Company and to make recommendation. This Official Group submitted its report on February 16, 1978. The evidence on the basis of which the impugned order was passed was not disclosed to the appellant company till May 1978, only after it had filed the writ petition in the High Court. If there was anything adverse to the appellants in the survey report there was time enough about six weeks between the submission of the Survey Report and the passing of the impugned order for giving a short, reasonable opportunity to the appellants to explain the adverse findings against them. If there was immediacy situational modifications could be made to meet the requirement of fairness, by reducing the period of notice; that even the manner and form of such notice could be simplified to eliminate delay, that telephonic notice or short opportunity for furnishing their explanation to the Company might have satisfied the requirements of natural justice. Such an opportunity of hearing could have been given after the passing of a conditional tentative order and before its enforcement under section 18AA. For the interregnum suitable interim action such as freezing the assets of the Company or restraining the Company from creating further encumbrances, could be taken under section 16. On behalf of the Union of India and the Authorised Officer it was contended that (1) the presumption in favour of audi alteram partem rule stands impliedly displaced by the language scheme, setting and the purpose of the provision in section 18AA. (2) Section 18AA on its plain terms deals with situations where immediate preventive action is required. The paramount concern is to avoid serious problems which may be caused by fall in production. The purpose of an order under section 18AA is not to condemn the owner but to protect the scheduled industry. The issue under section 18AA is not solely between the Government and the management of the industrial undertaking. The object of taking action under this Section is to protect other outside interests of the community at large and the workers. (3) The rule of natural justice to give a hearing has been incorporated in section 18-F which gives an opportunity of a post-decisional hearing to the owner of the undertaking who if he feels aggrieved can on his application be heard, to show that even the original order under section 18AA was passed on invalid grounds and should be cancelled or rescinded. (4) On a true construction of section 18AA read with section 18-F the requirements of natural justice and fair play can be read into the statute only insofar as conformance to such canons can reasonably and realistically be required of it by the provision for a remedial hearing at a subsequent stage. (5) Under section 18-F the Central Government exercises curial functions and that Section confers on the aggrieved owner a right to apply to the Government to cancel the order of take-over. This section casts an obligation on the Central Government to deal with and dispose of an application filed thereunder with reasonable expedition. Allowing the appeal by the Company,<br/>HELD: (Sarkaria & Desai, JJ. per Chinnappa Reddy, J. dissenting.) In the facts and circumstances of the instant case, there has been a noncompliance with the implied requirement of the audi alteram partem rule of natural justice at the pre-decisional stage. The impugned order could be struck down as invalid on that score alone. But in view of the commitment / concession that a hearing would be afforded to the Company, the case is remitted to the Central Government to give a full, fair and effective hearing. [587G-H, 588C] The phrase 'natural justice' is not capable of a static and precise definition. It cannot be imprisoned in the straight-jacket of a cast-iron formula. Rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. Hence not possible to make an exhaustive catalogue of such rules. Two fundamental maxims of natural justice have now become deeply and indelibly ingrained in the common consciousness of mankind as pre-eminently necessary to ensure that the law is applied impartially objectively and fairly. These twin principles are (i) audi alteram partem and (ii) nemo judex in re sua. Audi alteram partem is a highly effective rule devised by the Courts to ensure that a statutory authority arrives at a just decision and it is calculated to act as a healthy check on the abuse or misuse of power. Its reach should not be narrowed and its applicability circumscribed.[554C-G] The rules of natural justice can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. If a statutory provision either specifically or by inevitable implication excludes the application of the rules of natural justice then the Court cannot ignore the mandate of the Legislature. Whether or not the application of the principles of natural justice in a given case has been excluded in the exercise of statutory power depends upon the language and basic scheme of the provision conferring the power, the nature of the power the purpose for which it is conferred and the effect of that power. [556A-B] The maxim audi alteram partem has many facets. Two of them are (a) notice of the case to be met, and (b) opportunity to explain. The rule cannot be sacrificed at the altar of administrative convenience or celerity; for, convenience and justice are often not on speaking terms. Difficulties, however, arise when the statute conferring the power does not expressly exclude this rule but its exclusion is sought by implication due to the presence of certain factors such as urgency where the obligation to give notice and opportunity to be heard would obstruct the taking of prompt action of a preventive or remedial nature. Audi alteram partem rule may be disregarded in an emergent situation where immediate action brooks no delay to prevent some imminent danger or injury or hazard to paramount public interests. Section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure empowers the magistrates specified therein to make an exparte conditional order in emergent cases for removal of dangerous public nuisances. Action under section 17 Land Acquisition Act furnishes another such instance. Similarly action on grounds of public safety public health may justify disregard of the rule of prior hearing. [556C-H] Cases where owing to the compulsion of the fact situation or the necessity of taking speedy action no pre- decisional hearing is given but the action, is followed soon by a full post-decisional hearing to the person affected do not in reality constitute an exception to the audi alteram partem rule. To call such cases as exception is a misnomer because they do not exclude fair play in action but adapt it to the urgency of the situation by balancing the competing claims of hurry and hearing. [560H-561A] The general principle as distinguished from an absolute rule of uniform application seems to be that where a statute does not in terms exclude this rule of prior hearing but contemplates a post-decisional hearing amounting to a full review of the original order on merits then such a statute would be construed as excluding the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage. [561G] If the statute conferring the power is silent with regard to the giving of pre-decisional hearing to the person affected and the administrative decision taken by the authority involves civil consequences of a grave nature and no full review or appeal on merits against that decision is provided courts will be extremely reluctant to construe such a statute as excluding the duty of affording even a minimal hearing shorn of all its formal trappings and dilatory features at the pre-decisional stage, unless viewed pragmatically it would paralyse the administrative process or frustrate the need for utmost promptitude. [561H] 7(i). A comparison of the provisions of Section 18A(1)(b) and Section 18AA(1)(c), bring out two main points of distinction: First, action under Section 18A(1)(b) can be taken only after an investigation had been made under Section 15; while under Section 18AA(1)(a) or (b) action can be taken without such investigation. The language, scheme and setting of Section 18AA read in the light of the Objects and Reasons for enacting this provision make this position clear beyond doubt. Second, before taking action under Section 18A(1)(b), the Central Government has to form an opinion on the basis of the investigation conducted under section 15, in regard to the existence of the objective fact, namely: that the industrial undertaking is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest; while under section 18A(1)(a) the Government has to satisfy itself that the persons incharge of the undertaking have brought about a situation likely to cause fall in production, by committing any of the three kinds of acts specified in that provision. This shows that the preliminary objective fact attributable to the persons in charge of the management or affairs of the undertaking, on the basis of which action may be taken under section 18(A)(1)(b), is of far wider amplitude than the circumstance, the existence of which is a sine qua non for taking action under section 18AA(1). The phrase "highly detrimental to the scheduled industry or public interest" in section 18-A is capable of being construed to cover a large variety of acts or things which may be considered wrong with the manner of running the industry by the management. In contrast with it, action under section 18AA(1)(a) can be taken only if the Central Government is satisfied with regard to the existence of the twin conditions specifically mentioned therein, on the basis of evidence in its possession. [569D-H] An analysis of section 18AA(1)(a), indicates that as a necessary preliminary to the exercise of the power thereunder, the Central Government must be satisfied "from documentary or other evidence in its possession" in regard to the co-existence of two circumstances: (i) that the persons in charge of the industrial undertaking have by committing any of these acts, namely, reckless investments, or creation of incumbrances on the assets of industrial undertaking, or by diversion of funds, brought about a situation which is likely to affect the production of the article manufactured or produced in the industrial undertaking, and (ii) that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation.[570B-D] It cannot be laid down as a general proposition that whenever a statute confers a power on an administrative authority and makes the exercise of that power conditional on the formation of an opinion by that authority in regard to the existence of an immediacy, its opinion in regard to that preliminary fact is not open to judicial scrutiny at all. While it may be conceded that an element of subjectivity is always involved in the formation of such an opinion, the existence of the circumstances from which the inference constituting the opinion, as the sine qua non for action, are to be drawn, must be demonstrable, and the existence of such "circumstances", if questioned, must be proved at least prima facie. [571 E-G] From a plain reading of section 18AA, it is clear that it does not expressly in unmistakable and unequivocal terms exclude the application of the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage. [574B] In the instant case, so far as Kanpur Unit is concerned, it was lying closed for more than three months before the passing of the impugned order. There was no 'immediacy' in relation to that unit, which could absolve the Government from the obligation of complying fully with audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional or pre- takeover stage. [583A] Keshav Mills Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, [1973] 3 S.C.R. 22; Kamla Prasad Khetan v. Union of India,[1957] S.C.R. 1052; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 621; Sukhdev Singh & Ors. v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh, [1975] 3 S.C.R. 619; A. K. Kraipak v. Union of India, [1970] 1 S.C.R. 457; Ridge v. Baldwin, [1964] A.C. 40; 196; Heatley v. Tasmanian Racing & Gaming Commission, 14 Australian Law Reports 519; Nawabkhan Abbaskhan v. State of Gujarat, [1974] 3 S.C.R. 427; State of Orissa v. Dr. Bina Pani Dei, [1962] 2 S.C.R. 625; Ambalal M. Shah v. Hathi Singh Manufacturing Co. Ltd. [1962] 3 S.C.R. 171; and S. L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan & Ors., [1981] 1 S.C.R. 746, referred to. (Per Chinnappa Reddy, J. dissenting) The principles of natural justice are not attracted to the situations contemplated by section 18AA of Industries (Development and Regulation) Act. Natural justice like Ultra Vires and Public Policy is a branch of the public law and is a formidable weapon which can be wielded to secure justice to the citizen. While it may be used to protect certain fundamental liberties, civil and political rights, it may be used as indeed it is used more often than not, to protect vested interests and to obstruct the path of progressive change. The time has come to make an appropriate distinction between natural justice in its application to fundamental liberties, civil and political rights and natural justice in its application to vested interests. [590A-B] Our constitution as befits the Constitution of a Socialist Secular Democratic Republic, recognises the paramountcy of the public weal over the private interest. Natural justice, ultra vires, public policy, or any other rule of interpretation must, therefore, conform, grow and be tailored to serve the public interest and respond to the demands of an evolving society. [590C] The principles of natural justice have taken deep root in the judicial conscience of our people. They are now considered so fundamental as to be implicit in every decision making function, judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative. Where authority functions under a statute and the statute provides for the observance of the principles of natural justice in a particular manner, natural justice will have to be observed in that manner and in no other. Where the statute is silent about the observance of the principles of natural justice, such statutory silence is taken to imply compliance with the principles of natural justice. Where the conflict is between the public interest and the private interest the presumption must necessarily be weak and may, therefore, be readily displaced. The presumption is also weak, where what are involved are mere property rights. In cases of urgency, particularly where the public interest is involved, preemptive action may be a strategic necessity. Even in cases of preemptive action, if the statute so provides or if the Courts so deem fit in appropriate cases, a postponed hearing may be substituted for natural justice. [590A-C; 591F-G] 3(ii). Where natural justice is implied, the extent of the implication and the nature of the hearing must vary with the statute, the subject and the situation. [592B] The absence of the expression 'immediate action' in section 18AA(1)(b) does not make any difference. Section 18AA(1)(a) refers to a situation where immediate preventive action may avert a disaster, whereas section 18AA contemplates a situation where the disaster has occurred and action is necessary to restore normalcy. Restoration of production where production has stopped in a key industry or industrial undertaking is as important and urgent in the public interest as prevention of a situation where production may be affected. Immediate action is, therefore, as necessary in the situation contemplated by section 18AA(1)(b) as in the situation contemplated by section 18AA(1)(a). [596 F-G] The marginal note refers to the power to take over without investigation but there is no sufficient reason to suppose that the word immediate is used only to contra- distinguish it from the investigation contemplated by section 15 of the Act, though of course a consequence of immediate action under section 18AA may be to dispense with the enquiry under section 15. In fact, facts which come to light during the course of an investigation under section 15 may form the basis of action under section 18AA(1)(a). Where in the course of an investigation under section 15 it is discovered that the management have, by reckless investments or creation of encumbrances on the assets of the industrial undertaking or by diversion of funds brought about a situation which is likely to affect the production of the articles manufactured or produced in the industrial undertaking, if the Government is satisfied that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation, there is no reason why the Central Government may not straightaway take action under section 18AA(1)(a) without waiting for completion of investigation under section 15. [597A-B] Where there is a provision in the statute itself for revocation of the order by the very authority making the decision, it appears to be unnecessary to insist upon a pre- decisional observance of natural justice. [598A] The likelihood of production being jeopardized or the stoppage of production in a key industrial undertaking is a matter of grave concern affecting the public interest. Parliament has taken so serious a view of the matter that it has authorised the Central Government to take over the management of the industrial undertaking if immediate action may prevent jeopardy to production or restore production where it has already stopped. The necessity for immediate action by the Central Government contemplated by Parliament is definitely indicative of the exclusion of natural justice. It is not as if the owner of the industrial undertaking is left with no remedy. He may move the Central Government under section 18-F to cancel the order made under section 18AA. [598C-D] Neither section 18-F of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act nor section 21 of the General Clauses Act by itself excludes natural justice. The exclusion of natural justice where such exclusion is not express has to be implied by reference to the subject, the statute and the statutory situation. Where an express provision in the statute itself provides for a post decisional hearing the other provisions of the Statute will have to be read in the light of such provision and the provision for post- decisional hearing may then clinch the issue where pre- decisional natural justice appears to be excluded on the other terms of the statute. That a post-decisional hearing may also be had by the terms of section 21 of the General Clauses Act may not necessarily help in the interpretation of the provisions of the statute concerned. [599 A-C] Ridge v. Baldwin, 1964 A.C. p. 40; Annie G. Phillip v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 75 L.E.d. 1289; John H. Fahey v. Paul Mallonee, 91 L.E.d. 2030; Margarita Fuentes v. Robert L. Shevin, Attorney General of Florida, 32 L.E.d. 2d 556 and Lawrence Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 40 L.E.d. 2d 406, referred to. - Rama Rao, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh as well as the President of the Telugu Desam Party as well as respondent No. 3. The advertisements very shortly stated, refer to the auspicious gifts made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to the poor people on the eve of New Year and Sankranti. In the said advertisements, it is stated that the said Government which was formed by the Telugu Desam Party was giving to the poor people whose income was below Rs. and the said advertisements referred to a new scheme of selling sarees and dhoties at half prices to the poor people in the State of Andhra Pradesh having Green-cards. Moreover, the offer in the advertisements for the sale of dhoties and sarees at discount rates was in the nature of a benefit offered to poor persons in that State. When a Government announces the measures which are intended for the benefit of any of the classes for whose the Government can normally be expected to work like the poor or the economical backward classes, it is only in rare circumstances that such a promise can be said to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) even though such a promise might be made on the eve of elections. 8. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => '', 'counseldef' => '', 'court' => 'Supreme Court of India', 'court_type' => 'SC', 'decidedon' => '1989-09-29', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' K.N. Saikia,; M.H. Kania and; S. Ranganathan, JJ.', 'judgement' => '</p><p>Kania, J.</p><p>1. These two appeals arise out of the judgments in two Election Petitions in the Andhra Pradesh High Court questioning the election of respondent No. 1 as a Member of Parliament from Srikakulam No. Parliamentary Constituency in the 8th General Election to the House of the People. The points raised in these appeals are common and so are the relevant facts; and, hence, they are being disposed of by this common judgment. We propose to take note of only the few facts which are necessary for the appreciation of the controversy before us.</p><p>2. The polling date for the said election along with other parliamentary elections in the State of Andhra Pradesh was December 27, 1984 but in Srikakulam No. 1 Parliamentary Constituency the polling was countermanded and the date of polling was later fixed on January 28, 1985. In both the Election Petitions the election of respondent No. 1 was questioned mainly on the ground that Shri N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh as well as the President of the Telugu Desam Party as well as respondent No. 1 gave certain speeches and certain advertisements were got published by Shri N.T. Rama Rao through the Publicity Department of the Government of Andhra Pradesh in the newspapers containing certain statements which are alleged to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A) of the <a>Representation of the People Act, 1951</a> (hereinafter referred to as 'the said Act'). The main question canvassed before us is whether the statements contained in these aforesaid advertisements amount to a corrupt practice under Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act. Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act runs as follows :</p><p>123. Corrupt practices</p><p>The following shall be deemed to be corrupt practises for the purposes of this Act :</p><p>(1) 'Bribery', that is to say.</p><p>(A) any gift, offer or promise by a candidate or his agent or by any other person with the consent of a candidate or his election agent of any gratification, to any person whomsover, with the object, directly or indirectly of inducing.</p><p>(a) x x x</p><p>(b) an elector to vote or refrain from voting at an election, or as a reward to.</p><p>(i) a person for having so stood or not stood, or for having withdrawn or not having withdrawn his candidature; or</p><p>(ii) an elector for having voted or refrained from voting.</p><p>3. The advertisements very shortly stated, refer to the auspicious gifts made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to the poor people on the eve of New Year and Sankranti. In the said advertisements, it is stated that the said Government which was formed by the Telugu Desam Party was giving to the poor people whose income was below Rs. 6,000 per year, a kilo of rice at Rs. 2 per Kg. and the said advertisements referred to a new scheme of selling sarees and dhoties at half prices to the poor people in the State of Andhra Pradesh having Green-cards. Green-cards were directed to be issued to all the persons whose annual income was below Rs. 6,000. The supply of the rice at subsidised rates as aforesaid was also to be made to the Green-card holders only. The scheme to sell sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was to be operative from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985.</p><p>4. In considering the question whether the said advertisement and the said speeches amount to a corrupt practice, we are of the view that the provisions of Section 123 of the said Act which deal with corrupt practices have to be interpreted, keeping in mind that dictates of commonsense require that they never could have been intended to treat normal election promises made in election manifestoes or usual election speeches by members of various political parties aspiring to power and by different candidates aspiring to get elected to legislative bodies concerned as corrupt practices. We are of the view that these advertisements and speeches amount to nothing more than statements extolling the achievements of the Government of the State of Andhra Pradesh under the Telugu Desam Party headed by N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister, and contain normal election promises and these statements do not amount to corrupt practices falling within the scope of Sub-clause (b) of Clause (A) of Sub-section (1) of Section 123 of the said Act.</p><p>5. It was urged by Mr. Rao, learned Counsel for the appellants that in the impugned judgments, the High Court has incorrectly taken the view that in order to amount to bribery within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A), the transaction must amount to a bargain by the candidate with a view to get votes. It was pointed out by him that the said view has been taken in the impugned judgments, relying upon the decision of a Bench comprising to learned Judges of this Court in Ghasi Ram v. Dal Singh and Ors. :1983 SCR 102 . We have gone through to the relevant portion of that judgment (at page 109 and 110 of the said report). A careful perusal of the said judgment shows that what has been really held in that case is that if the promises given or made amount to a bargain entered into by a candidate for a vote or votes, that would amount to a corrupt practice; but it has not been held there that unless the act alleged amounts to such a bargain, it could not amount to a corrupt practice. In our view, that judgment does not lay down that in order to amount to a corrupt practice, the transaction must amount to a bargain for getting a vote. It was pointed out by Mr. Rao, however, that such a view seems to have been taken in two other decisions rendered by two Benches, each comprising two learned Judges of this Court in Bhanu Kumar Shastri v. Mohan Lal Sukhadia and Ors. : [1971]3SCR522 and Harjit Singh Mann v. S Umrao Singh and Ors. : [1980]2SCR501 . and these judgments need to be overruled. We do not propose to go into the correctness or otherwise of this view because, even on the footing that in order to amount to a corrupt practice under the aforesaid provision the alleged acts need not constitute a bargain, the the acts established in the present case, in our opinion, do not amount to a corrupt practice.</p><p>6. Our attention was drawn by Mr. Rao to the fact that in this case the said advertisements and the speeches had to be viewed in the context of the fact that the advertisements were issued and the speeches were made after respondent No. 1 filed his nomination papers on January 4, 1985, for the election and before the election was held in the aforesaid constituency. It was further pointed out that the offer made for the sale of sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was limited to the period from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985. It cannot be denied that these factors are relevant factOrs. We cannot, however, lose sight of the fact that this offer was made not only in this constituency but throughout the State where the elections to the House of the People were scheduled to be held, and were, in fact, held on December 27, 1984. It was only in case of this constituency that the election to be held on the scheduled date was countermanded and later held on January 28, 1985. We cannot lose sight of the fact that, as far as the said speeches and the said advertisements, which were issued by the Publicity Department of the State, are concerned, they deal in the main with the achievements of the Government of Andhra Pradesh which, of course, was being run by Ministers belonging to Telugu Desam Party to which respondent No. 1 also belonged. Moreover, the offer in the advertisements for the sale of dhoties and sarees at discount rates was in the nature of a benefit offered to poor persons in that State. When a Government announces the measures which are intended for the benefit of any of the classes for whose the Government can normally be expected to work like the poor or the economical backward classes, it is only in rare circumstances that such a promise can be said to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) even though such a promise might be made on the eve of elections. Keeping this in mind, in our opinion, although the offer to sell dhoties and sarees at discount rates was of a limited duration as aforestated, it cannot be regarded as a corrupt practice. Such an offer was bound to have financial repercussions and it is quite possible the duration of the offer was limited to enable the Government to study the financial repercussions rather than from any improper motive. We find support for this view from the decision of this Court in H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh : [1969]3SCR813 . In that case an Ordinance was passed by the Government of Madhya Pradesh as a result of which a large number of agriculturists, namely, those holdings of plots of land of less than 7.5 acres area or paying land revenue not exceeding Rs. 5/- were exempted from the payment of the land revenue. It was held that such a concession does not amount to a gift, offer or promise of any gratification within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) of the said Act nor does the announcement of the declaration made at a meeting shortly before the election or the issue of a pamphlet containing that declaration at that time carry the matter any further. It was held that neither Shri D.P. Misra who was the Chief Minister nor Shri S.K. Dixit who acted as his agent were guilty of any corrupt practice within the meaning of the aforesaid provision.</p><p>7. It was next contended by Mr. Rao, although very faintly, that the High Court was in error as it had not decided all other issues which were raised in the election petition. In this regard we cannot lose sight of the fact that the term of the present Lok Sabha is likely to be over within a few months and fresh elections are likely to be held and it would, therefore, be an exercise in futility to remand the matter to the High Court for deciding the remaining issues.</p><p>8. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.<p></p><p>', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'AIR1990SC1889; JT1989(4)SC186; 1989(2)SCALE891; 1989Supp(2)SCC504', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors.', 'sub' => 'Election', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ) $casename_url = 'b-rajagopala-rao-vs-appayya-hanumanthu' $args = array( (int) 0 => '640942', (int) 1 => 'b-rajagopala-rao-vs-appayya-hanumanthu' ) $url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/640942/b-rajagopala-rao-vs-appayya-hanumanthu' $ctype = '' $caseref = 'H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh<br>' $content = array( (int) 0 => '', (int) 1 => '<p>Kania, J.', (int) 2 => '<p>1. These two appeals arise out of the judgments in two Election Petitions in the Andhra Pradesh High Court questioning the election of respondent No. 1 as a Member of Parliament from Srikakulam No. Parliamentary Constituency in the 8th General Election to the House of the People. The points raised in these appeals are common and so are the relevant facts; and, hence, they are being disposed of by this common judgment. We propose to take note of only the few facts which are necessary for the appreciation of the controversy before us.', (int) 3 => '<p>2. The polling date for the said election along with other parliamentary elections in the State of Andhra Pradesh was December 27, 1984 but in Srikakulam No. 1 Parliamentary Constituency the polling was countermanded and the date of polling was later fixed on January 28, 1985. In both the Election Petitions the election of respondent No. 1 was questioned mainly on the ground that Shri N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh as well as the President of the Telugu Desam Party as well as respondent No. 1 gave certain speeches and certain advertisements were got published by Shri N.T. Rama Rao through the Publicity Department of the Government of Andhra Pradesh in the newspapers containing certain statements which are alleged to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A) of the <a>Representation of the People Act, 1951</a> (hereinafter referred to as 'the said Act'). The main question canvassed before us is whether the statements contained in these aforesaid advertisements amount to a corrupt practice under Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act. Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act runs as follows :', (int) 4 => '<p>123. Corrupt practices', (int) 5 => '<p>The following shall be deemed to be corrupt practises for the purposes of this Act :', (int) 6 => '<p>(1) 'Bribery', that is to say.', (int) 7 => '<p>(A) any gift, offer or promise by a candidate or his agent or by any other person with the consent of a candidate or his election agent of any gratification, to any person whomsover, with the object, directly or indirectly of inducing.', (int) 8 => '<p>(a) x x x', (int) 9 => '<p>(b) an elector to vote or refrain from voting at an election, or as a reward to.', (int) 10 => '<p>(i) a person for having so stood or not stood, or for having withdrawn or not having withdrawn his candidature; or', (int) 11 => '<p>(ii) an elector for having voted or refrained from voting.', (int) 12 => '<p>3. The advertisements very shortly stated, refer to the auspicious gifts made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to the poor people on the eve of New Year and Sankranti. In the said advertisements, it is stated that the said Government which was formed by the Telugu Desam Party was giving to the poor people whose income was below Rs. 6,000 per year, a kilo of rice at Rs. 2 per Kg. and the said advertisements referred to a new scheme of selling sarees and dhoties at half prices to the poor people in the State of Andhra Pradesh having Green-cards. Green-cards were directed to be issued to all the persons whose annual income was below Rs. 6,000. The supply of the rice at subsidised rates as aforesaid was also to be made to the Green-card holders only. The scheme to sell sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was to be operative from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985.', (int) 13 => '<p>4. In considering the question whether the said advertisement and the said speeches amount to a corrupt practice, we are of the view that the provisions of Section 123 of the said Act which deal with corrupt practices have to be interpreted, keeping in mind that dictates of commonsense require that they never could have been intended to treat normal election promises made in election manifestoes or usual election speeches by members of various political parties aspiring to power and by different candidates aspiring to get elected to legislative bodies concerned as corrupt practices. We are of the view that these advertisements and speeches amount to nothing more than statements extolling the achievements of the Government of the State of Andhra Pradesh under the Telugu Desam Party headed by N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister, and contain normal election promises and these statements do not amount to corrupt practices falling within the scope of Sub-clause (b) of Clause (A) of Sub-section (1) of Section 123 of the said Act.', (int) 14 => '<p>5. It was urged by Mr. Rao, learned Counsel for the appellants that in the impugned judgments, the High Court has incorrectly taken the view that in order to amount to bribery within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A), the transaction must amount to a bargain by the candidate with a view to get votes. It was pointed out by him that the said view has been taken in the impugned judgments, relying upon the decision of a Bench comprising to learned Judges of this Court in Ghasi Ram v. Dal Singh and Ors. :1983 SCR 102 . We have gone through to the relevant portion of that judgment (at page 109 and 110 of the said report). A careful perusal of the said judgment shows that what has been really held in that case is that if the promises given or made amount to a bargain entered into by a candidate for a vote or votes, that would amount to a corrupt practice; but it has not been held there that unless the act alleged amounts to such a bargain, it could not amount to a corrupt practice. In our view, that judgment does not lay down that in order to amount to a corrupt practice, the transaction must amount to a bargain for getting a vote. It was pointed out by Mr. Rao, however, that such a view seems to have been taken in two other decisions rendered by two Benches, each comprising two learned Judges of this Court in Bhanu Kumar Shastri v. Mohan Lal Sukhadia and Ors. : [1971]3SCR522 and Harjit Singh Mann v. S Umrao Singh and Ors. : [1980]2SCR501 . and these judgments need to be overruled. We do not propose to go into the correctness or otherwise of this view because, even on the footing that in order to amount to a corrupt practice under the aforesaid provision the alleged acts need not constitute a bargain, the the acts established in the present case, in our opinion, do not amount to a corrupt practice.', (int) 15 => '<p>6. Our attention was drawn by Mr. Rao to the fact that in this case the said advertisements and the speeches had to be viewed in the context of the fact that the advertisements were issued and the speeches were made after respondent No. 1 filed his nomination papers on January 4, 1985, for the election and before the election was held in the aforesaid constituency. It was further pointed out that the offer made for the sale of sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was limited to the period from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985. It cannot be denied that these factors are relevant factOrs. We cannot, however, lose sight of the fact that this offer was made not only in this constituency but throughout the State where the elections to the House of the People were scheduled to be held, and were, in fact, held on December 27, 1984. It was only in case of this constituency that the election to be held on the scheduled date was countermanded and later held on January 28, 1985. We cannot lose sight of the fact that, as far as the said speeches and the said advertisements, which were issued by the Publicity Department of the State, are concerned, they deal in the main with the achievements of the Government of Andhra Pradesh which, of course, was being run by Ministers belonging to Telugu Desam Party to which respondent No. 1 also belonged. Moreover, the offer in the advertisements for the sale of dhoties and sarees at discount rates was in the nature of a benefit offered to poor persons in that State. When a Government announces the measures which are intended for the benefit of any of the classes for whose the Government can normally be expected to work like the poor or the economical backward classes, it is only in rare circumstances that such a promise can be said to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) even though such a promise might be made on the eve of elections. Keeping this in mind, in our opinion, although the offer to sell dhoties and sarees at discount rates was of a limited duration as aforestated, it cannot be regarded as a corrupt practice. Such an offer was bound to have financial repercussions and it is quite possible the duration of the offer was limited to enable the Government to study the financial repercussions rather than from any improper motive. We find support for this view from the decision of this Court in H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh : [1969]3SCR813 . In that case an Ordinance was passed by the Government of Madhya Pradesh as a result of which a large number of agriculturists, namely, those holdings of plots of land of less than 7.5 acres area or paying land revenue not exceeding Rs. 5/- were exempted from the payment of the land revenue. It was held that such a concession does not amount to a gift, offer or promise of any gratification within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) of the said Act nor does the announcement of the declaration made at a meeting shortly before the election or the issue of a pamphlet containing that declaration at that time carry the matter any further. It was held that neither Shri D.P. Misra who was the Chief Minister nor Shri S.K. Dixit who acted as his agent were guilty of any corrupt practice within the meaning of the aforesaid provision.', (int) 16 => '<p>7. It was next contended by Mr. Rao, although very faintly, that the High Court was in error as it had not decided all other issues which were raised in the election petition. In this regard we cannot lose sight of the fact that the term of the present Lok Sabha is likely to be over within a few months and fresh elections are likely to be held and it would, therefore, be an exercise in futility to remand the matter to the High Court for deciding the remaining issues.', (int) 17 => '<p>8. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.<p>', (int) 18 => '<p>' ) $paragraphAfter = (int) 1 $cnt = (int) 19 $i = (int) 0include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144 View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971 View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933 View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473 Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963 Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200 Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167 [main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109
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$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp' $dataForView = array( 'title_for_layout' => 'B Rajagopala Rao and anr Vs Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors - Citation 640942 - Court Judgment | ', 'desc' => array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '640942', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/50684/representation-of-the-people-act-1951-complete-act">Representation of the People Act, 1951</a> - Sections 1, 3(1)(A), 123 and 123(1)(A)', 'appealno' => 'Civil Appeal Nos. 484 and 485 of 1987', 'appellant' => 'B. Rajagopala Rao and anr.', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'B. Rajagopala Rao and anr. Vs. Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors.', 'casenote' => 'Election - corrupt practices - Sections 123 and 123 (1) (A) of Representation of the People Act, 1951 - whether advertisements by public department and speeches made by respondent No. 1 to sell dhoti and sarees at discount rates amount to corrupt practices - offer was available for mass and for limited duration - such offer was bound to have financial repercussions and it is quite possible that duration of offer limited to enable Government to study financial repercussions rather than from any improper motive - offer not amounted to corrupt practices. - [ D.A. Desai,; O. Chinnappa Reddy and; R.S. Sarkaria, JJ.] The Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 empowers the Union of India in the public interest to take under its control the industries specified in the First Schedule to the Act. Item 23 of the First Schedule relates to textiles of various categories. Section 15 authorises the Central Government to make or cause to be made a full and complete investigation into the circumstances of the case if the Central Government is of the opinion that (a) in respect of any scheduled industry or industrial undertaking or undertakings (i) there has been, or is likely to be, a substantial fall in the volume of production for which, having regard to the economic conditions prevailing, there is no justification; or (ii) there has been, or is likely to be, a marked deterioration in the quality of any article... which could have been or can be avoided; or (iii) there has been or is likely to be a rise in the price of any article..... for which there is no justification; or (iv) it is necessary to take any such action for the purpose of conserving any resources of national importance; or (b) any industrial undertaking is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest. After the investigation is made under section 15, section 16(1) empowers the Central Government if action is desirable, to issue appropriate directions, and section 16(2) provides for the issue of interim directions by the Central Government pending investigation under section 15. Chapter III-A consisting of Sections 18A, 18-AA, 18-B, 18-C, 18-D, 18-E and 18-F deal with "direct management or control of Industrial Undertakings by Central Government in certain cases". Sec. 18-A empowers the Central Government by notified order, to authorise any person or body of persons to take over the management of the whole or any part of an industrial undertaking or to exercise in respect of the whole, or any part of the undertaking such functions of control as may be specified in the order, if the Central Government is of opinion that: (a) an industrial undertaking to which directions have been issued in pursuance of section 16 has failed to comply with such directions, or (b) an industrial undertaking in respect of which an investigation has been made under section 15 is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest. Section 18AA(5) stipulates that the provisions of Sections 18-B to 18 E shall be applicable to the industrial undertaking in respect of which an order has been made under section 18-AA even as they apply to an industrial undertaking taken over under Section 18-A. Section 18-F empowers the Central Government to cancel the order made under section 18-A if it appears that the purpose of the order has been fulfilled or it is not necessary that the order should remain in force. The appellant M/s. Swadeshi Cotton Mills was taken over by the Government of India by a notification dated April 13, 1978 in exercise of the powers conferred on it under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 18AA of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 on the ground that the company had by creation of encumbrances on the assets of its industrial undertakings, brought about a situation which had affected and is likely to further affect the production of articles manufactured or produced by it and that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation. The Government authorised the National Textile Corporation Limited to take over the management, subject to the conditions that the authorised person shall comply with all the directions issued from time to time by the Central Government and that the authorised person shall hold office for a period of five years. The appellant Mills challenged the aforesaid order in a writ petition in the High Court. The case was heard by a Full Bench of five Judges to consider the question whether in construing section 18AA of the Industries Development and Regulation Act, 1951, compliance with the principle of audi alteram partem is to be implied and whether hearing is to be given to the parties who would be affected by the order to be passed prior to the passing of the order or whether hearing can be given after the order is passed and whether the order passed under the said Section is vitiated by not giving of such hearing and whether such vice can be cured. The Bench by a majority answered the three questions as follows:- (a) Section 18AA(1)(a)(b) excludes the giving of prior hearing to the party who would be affected by order thereunder. (b) Section 18-F expressly provides for a post- decisional hearing to the owner of the industrial undertaking, the management of which is taken over under section 18AA to have the order made under section 18AA cancelled on any relevant ground. (c) As the taking over of management under section 18A is not vitiated by the failure to grant prior hearing the question of any such vice being cured by a grant of a subsequent hearing does not arise. The minority, however, held that in compliance with the principles of natural justice, prior hearing to the owner of the undertaking was required to be given before the passing of an order under section 18AA, that the second question did not arise as the denial of a prior hearing would not cure the vice by the grant of subsequent hearing, but it would be open to the Court to moderate the relief in such a way that the order is kept alive to the extent necessary until the making of the fresh order to subserve public interest and to make appropriate directions. After the decision on the reference the case was reheard on merits by a Full Bench of three Judges and the writ petition was allowed in part. The challenge to the validity of the order being rejected but insofar as the impugned order seeking to take over the corporate entity of the company, the corporate entity of the subsidiary and its assets, the petition was allowed and the respondents, the Union of India and the authorised person were directed to release from its control and custody and/or deliver possession of any assets or property of the company which were not referable to the industrial undertakings. Appeals to this Court were filed on behalf of the Company as well as by the Union of India and the National Textile Corporation. Two propositions were propounded on behalf of the company that: (a) Whether it was necessary to observe the rules of natural justice before issuing a notified order under section 18AA(1)(a) and further whether section 18-F impliedly excludes rules of natural justice relating to prior hearing; and it was contended (1) the mere use of the word 'immediate' in sub-clause (a) of section 18AA does not show a legislative intent to exclude the application of audi alteram partem rule altogether. (2) The word 'immediate' in clause (a) has been used in contra distinction to 'investigate'. It only means that under section 18AA action can be taken without prior investigation under section 15. The use of the word 'immediate' in section 18AA(1)(a) only dispenses with investigation under section 15 and not with the principle of audi alteram partem altogether and this is indicated by the marginal note of section 18A and para 3 of the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Amendment Bill which inserted section 18AA in 1971. (3) The word 'immediate' occurs only in clause (a) and not in clause (b) of section 18AA(1). It would be odd if intention to exclude this principle of natural justice is spelt out in one clause of the sub-section when the other clause does not exclude it. (4) Section 18-F does not exclude a pre-decisional hearing. The so-called post-decisional hearing contemplated by section 18-F cannot be and is not intended to be a substitute for a pre-decisional hearing. (5) Section 18F incorporates only a facet, albeit qualified, of section 21 of the General Clauses Act. The language of the Section implicity prohibits an enquiry into circumstances that led to the passing of the order of take-over and under it the aggrieved person is not entitled to show that on merits the order was void ab initio. (6) 'Immediacy' does not exclude a duty to act fairly because even an emergent situation can co-exist with the canons of natural justice. The only effect of urgency on the application of the principle of fair hearing would be that the width, form and duration of the hearing would be tailored to the situation and reduced to the reasonable minimum so that it does not delay and defeat the purpose of the contemplated action. (7) Where the civil consequences of the administrative action are grave and its effect is highly prejudicial to the rights and interests of the person affected and there is nothing in the language and scheme of the statute which unequivocally excludes a fair pre-decisional hearing and the post-decisional hearing provided therein is not a real remedial hearing equitable to a full right of appeal the Court should be loath to infer a legislative intent to exclude even a minimal fair hearing at the pre-decisional stage merely on ground of urgency. (8) The Central Government appointed four Government Officials including one from the office of the Textile Commissioner to study the affairs of the Company and to make recommendation. This Official Group submitted its report on February 16, 1978. The evidence on the basis of which the impugned order was passed was not disclosed to the appellant company till May 1978, only after it had filed the writ petition in the High Court. If there was anything adverse to the appellants in the survey report there was time enough about six weeks between the submission of the Survey Report and the passing of the impugned order for giving a short, reasonable opportunity to the appellants to explain the adverse findings against them. If there was immediacy situational modifications could be made to meet the requirement of fairness, by reducing the period of notice; that even the manner and form of such notice could be simplified to eliminate delay, that telephonic notice or short opportunity for furnishing their explanation to the Company might have satisfied the requirements of natural justice. Such an opportunity of hearing could have been given after the passing of a conditional tentative order and before its enforcement under section 18AA. For the interregnum suitable interim action such as freezing the assets of the Company or restraining the Company from creating further encumbrances, could be taken under section 16. On behalf of the Union of India and the Authorised Officer it was contended that (1) the presumption in favour of audi alteram partem rule stands impliedly displaced by the language scheme, setting and the purpose of the provision in section 18AA. (2) Section 18AA on its plain terms deals with situations where immediate preventive action is required. The paramount concern is to avoid serious problems which may be caused by fall in production. The purpose of an order under section 18AA is not to condemn the owner but to protect the scheduled industry. The issue under section 18AA is not solely between the Government and the management of the industrial undertaking. The object of taking action under this Section is to protect other outside interests of the community at large and the workers. (3) The rule of natural justice to give a hearing has been incorporated in section 18-F which gives an opportunity of a post-decisional hearing to the owner of the undertaking who if he feels aggrieved can on his application be heard, to show that even the original order under section 18AA was passed on invalid grounds and should be cancelled or rescinded. (4) On a true construction of section 18AA read with section 18-F the requirements of natural justice and fair play can be read into the statute only insofar as conformance to such canons can reasonably and realistically be required of it by the provision for a remedial hearing at a subsequent stage. (5) Under section 18-F the Central Government exercises curial functions and that Section confers on the aggrieved owner a right to apply to the Government to cancel the order of take-over. This section casts an obligation on the Central Government to deal with and dispose of an application filed thereunder with reasonable expedition. Allowing the appeal by the Company,<br />HELD: (Sarkaria & Desai, JJ. per Chinnappa Reddy, J. dissenting.) In the facts and circumstances of the instant case, there has been a noncompliance with the implied requirement of the audi alteram partem rule of natural justice at the pre-decisional stage. The impugned order could be struck down as invalid on that score alone. But in view of the commitment / concession that a hearing would be afforded to the Company, the case is remitted to the Central Government to give a full, fair and effective hearing. [587G-H, 588C] The phrase 'natural justice' is not capable of a static and precise definition. It cannot be imprisoned in the straight-jacket of a cast-iron formula. Rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. Hence not possible to make an exhaustive catalogue of such rules. Two fundamental maxims of natural justice have now become deeply and indelibly ingrained in the common consciousness of mankind as pre-eminently necessary to ensure that the law is applied impartially objectively and fairly. These twin principles are (i) audi alteram partem and (ii) nemo judex in re sua. Audi alteram partem is a highly effective rule devised by the Courts to ensure that a statutory authority arrives at a just decision and it is calculated to act as a healthy check on the abuse or misuse of power. Its reach should not be narrowed and its applicability circumscribed.[554C-G] The rules of natural justice can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. If a statutory provision either specifically or by inevitable implication excludes the application of the rules of natural justice then the Court cannot ignore the mandate of the Legislature. Whether or not the application of the principles of natural justice in a given case has been excluded in the exercise of statutory power depends upon the language and basic scheme of the provision conferring the power, the nature of the power the purpose for which it is conferred and the effect of that power. [556A-B] The maxim audi alteram partem has many facets. Two of them are (a) notice of the case to be met, and (b) opportunity to explain. The rule cannot be sacrificed at the altar of administrative convenience or celerity; for, convenience and justice are often not on speaking terms. Difficulties, however, arise when the statute conferring the power does not expressly exclude this rule but its exclusion is sought by implication due to the presence of certain factors such as urgency where the obligation to give notice and opportunity to be heard would obstruct the taking of prompt action of a preventive or remedial nature. Audi alteram partem rule may be disregarded in an emergent situation where immediate action brooks no delay to prevent some imminent danger or injury or hazard to paramount public interests. Section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure empowers the magistrates specified therein to make an exparte conditional order in emergent cases for removal of dangerous public nuisances. Action under section 17 Land Acquisition Act furnishes another such instance. Similarly action on grounds of public safety public health may justify disregard of the rule of prior hearing. [556C-H] Cases where owing to the compulsion of the fact situation or the necessity of taking speedy action no pre- decisional hearing is given but the action, is followed soon by a full post-decisional hearing to the person affected do not in reality constitute an exception to the audi alteram partem rule. To call such cases as exception is a misnomer because they do not exclude fair play in action but adapt it to the urgency of the situation by balancing the competing claims of hurry and hearing. [560H-561A] The general principle as distinguished from an absolute rule of uniform application seems to be that where a statute does not in terms exclude this rule of prior hearing but contemplates a post-decisional hearing amounting to a full review of the original order on merits then such a statute would be construed as excluding the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage. [561G] If the statute conferring the power is silent with regard to the giving of pre-decisional hearing to the person affected and the administrative decision taken by the authority involves civil consequences of a grave nature and no full review or appeal on merits against that decision is provided courts will be extremely reluctant to construe such a statute as excluding the duty of affording even a minimal hearing shorn of all its formal trappings and dilatory features at the pre-decisional stage, unless viewed pragmatically it would paralyse the administrative process or frustrate the need for utmost promptitude. [561H] 7(i). A comparison of the provisions of Section 18A(1)(b) and Section 18AA(1)(c), bring out two main points of distinction: First, action under Section 18A(1)(b) can be taken only after an investigation had been made under Section 15; while under Section 18AA(1)(a) or (b) action can be taken without such investigation. The language, scheme and setting of Section 18AA read in the light of the Objects and Reasons for enacting this provision make this position clear beyond doubt. Second, before taking action under Section 18A(1)(b), the Central Government has to form an opinion on the basis of the investigation conducted under section 15, in regard to the existence of the objective fact, namely: that the industrial undertaking is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest; while under section 18A(1)(a) the Government has to satisfy itself that the persons incharge of the undertaking have brought about a situation likely to cause fall in production, by committing any of the three kinds of acts specified in that provision. This shows that the preliminary objective fact attributable to the persons in charge of the management or affairs of the undertaking, on the basis of which action may be taken under section 18(A)(1)(b), is of far wider amplitude than the circumstance, the existence of which is a sine qua non for taking action under section 18AA(1). The phrase "highly detrimental to the scheduled industry or public interest" in section 18-A is capable of being construed to cover a large variety of acts or things which may be considered wrong with the manner of running the industry by the management. In contrast with it, action under section 18AA(1)(a) can be taken only if the Central Government is satisfied with regard to the existence of the twin conditions specifically mentioned therein, on the basis of evidence in its possession. [569D-H] An analysis of section 18AA(1)(a), indicates that as a necessary preliminary to the exercise of the power thereunder, the Central Government must be satisfied "from documentary or other evidence in its possession" in regard to the co-existence of two circumstances: (i) that the persons in charge of the industrial undertaking have by committing any of these acts, namely, reckless investments, or creation of incumbrances on the assets of industrial undertaking, or by diversion of funds, brought about a situation which is likely to affect the production of the article manufactured or produced in the industrial undertaking, and (ii) that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation.[570B-D] It cannot be laid down as a general proposition that whenever a statute confers a power on an administrative authority and makes the exercise of that power conditional on the formation of an opinion by that authority in regard to the existence of an immediacy, its opinion in regard to that preliminary fact is not open to judicial scrutiny at all. While it may be conceded that an element of subjectivity is always involved in the formation of such an opinion, the existence of the circumstances from which the inference constituting the opinion, as the sine qua non for action, are to be drawn, must be demonstrable, and the existence of such "circumstances", if questioned, must be proved at least prima facie. [571 E-G] From a plain reading of section 18AA, it is clear that it does not expressly in unmistakable and unequivocal terms exclude the application of the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage. [574B] In the instant case, so far as Kanpur Unit is concerned, it was lying closed for more than three months before the passing of the impugned order. There was no 'immediacy' in relation to that unit, which could absolve the Government from the obligation of complying fully with audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional or pre- takeover stage. [583A] Keshav Mills Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, [1973] 3 S.C.R. 22; Kamla Prasad Khetan v. Union of India,[1957] S.C.R. 1052; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 621; Sukhdev Singh & Ors. v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh, [1975] 3 S.C.R. 619; A. K. Kraipak v. Union of India, [1970] 1 S.C.R. 457; Ridge v. Baldwin, [1964] A.C. 40; 196; Heatley v. Tasmanian Racing & Gaming Commission, 14 Australian Law Reports 519; Nawabkhan Abbaskhan v. State of Gujarat, [1974] 3 S.C.R. 427; State of Orissa v. Dr. Bina Pani Dei, [1962] 2 S.C.R. 625; Ambalal M. Shah v. Hathi Singh Manufacturing Co. Ltd. [1962] 3 S.C.R. 171; and S. L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan & Ors., [1981] 1 S.C.R. 746, referred to. (Per Chinnappa Reddy, J. dissenting) The principles of natural justice are not attracted to the situations contemplated by section 18AA of Industries (Development and Regulation) Act. Natural justice like Ultra Vires and Public Policy is a branch of the public law and is a formidable weapon which can be wielded to secure justice to the citizen. While it may be used to protect certain fundamental liberties, civil and political rights, it may be used as indeed it is used more often than not, to protect vested interests and to obstruct the path of progressive change. The time has come to make an appropriate distinction between natural justice in its application to fundamental liberties, civil and political rights and natural justice in its application to vested interests. [590A-B] Our constitution as befits the Constitution of a Socialist Secular Democratic Republic, recognises the paramountcy of the public weal over the private interest. Natural justice, ultra vires, public policy, or any other rule of interpretation must, therefore, conform, grow and be tailored to serve the public interest and respond to the demands of an evolving society. [590C] The principles of natural justice have taken deep root in the judicial conscience of our people. They are now considered so fundamental as to be implicit in every decision making function, judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative. Where authority functions under a statute and the statute provides for the observance of the principles of natural justice in a particular manner, natural justice will have to be observed in that manner and in no other. Where the statute is silent about the observance of the principles of natural justice, such statutory silence is taken to imply compliance with the principles of natural justice. Where the conflict is between the public interest and the private interest the presumption must necessarily be weak and may, therefore, be readily displaced. The presumption is also weak, where what are involved are mere property rights. In cases of urgency, particularly where the public interest is involved, preemptive action may be a strategic necessity. Even in cases of preemptive action, if the statute so provides or if the Courts so deem fit in appropriate cases, a postponed hearing may be substituted for natural justice. [590A-C; 591F-G] 3(ii). Where natural justice is implied, the extent of the implication and the nature of the hearing must vary with the statute, the subject and the situation. [592B] The absence of the expression 'immediate action' in section 18AA(1)(b) does not make any difference. Section 18AA(1)(a) refers to a situation where immediate preventive action may avert a disaster, whereas section 18AA contemplates a situation where the disaster has occurred and action is necessary to restore normalcy. Restoration of production where production has stopped in a key industry or industrial undertaking is as important and urgent in the public interest as prevention of a situation where production may be affected. Immediate action is, therefore, as necessary in the situation contemplated by section 18AA(1)(b) as in the situation contemplated by section 18AA(1)(a). [596 F-G] The marginal note refers to the power to take over without investigation but there is no sufficient reason to suppose that the word immediate is used only to contra- distinguish it from the investigation contemplated by section 15 of the Act, though of course a consequence of immediate action under section 18AA may be to dispense with the enquiry under section 15. In fact, facts which come to light during the course of an investigation under section 15 may form the basis of action under section 18AA(1)(a). Where in the course of an investigation under section 15 it is discovered that the management have, by reckless investments or creation of encumbrances on the assets of the industrial undertaking or by diversion of funds brought about a situation which is likely to affect the production of the articles manufactured or produced in the industrial undertaking, if the Government is satisfied that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation, there is no reason why the Central Government may not straightaway take action under section 18AA(1)(a) without waiting for completion of investigation under section 15. [597A-B] Where there is a provision in the statute itself for revocation of the order by the very authority making the decision, it appears to be unnecessary to insist upon a pre- decisional observance of natural justice. [598A] The likelihood of production being jeopardized or the stoppage of production in a key industrial undertaking is a matter of grave concern affecting the public interest. Parliament has taken so serious a view of the matter that it has authorised the Central Government to take over the management of the industrial undertaking if immediate action may prevent jeopardy to production or restore production where it has already stopped. The necessity for immediate action by the Central Government contemplated by Parliament is definitely indicative of the exclusion of natural justice. It is not as if the owner of the industrial undertaking is left with no remedy. He may move the Central Government under section 18-F to cancel the order made under section 18AA. [598C-D] Neither section 18-F of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act nor section 21 of the General Clauses Act by itself excludes natural justice. The exclusion of natural justice where such exclusion is not express has to be implied by reference to the subject, the statute and the statutory situation. Where an express provision in the statute itself provides for a post decisional hearing the other provisions of the Statute will have to be read in the light of such provision and the provision for post- decisional hearing may then clinch the issue where pre- decisional natural justice appears to be excluded on the other terms of the statute. That a post-decisional hearing may also be had by the terms of section 21 of the General Clauses Act may not necessarily help in the interpretation of the provisions of the statute concerned. [599 A-C] Ridge v. Baldwin, 1964 A.C. p. 40; Annie G. Phillip v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 75 L.E.d. 1289; John H. Fahey v. Paul Mallonee, 91 L.E.d. 2030; Margarita Fuentes v. Robert L. Shevin, Attorney General of Florida, 32 L.E.d. 2d 556 and Lawrence Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 40 L.E.d. 2d 406, referred to. - Rama Rao, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh as well as the President of the Telugu Desam Party as well as respondent No. 3. The advertisements very shortly stated, refer to the auspicious gifts made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to the poor people on the eve of New Year and Sankranti. In the said advertisements, it is stated that the said Government which was formed by the Telugu Desam Party was giving to the poor people whose income was below Rs. and the said advertisements referred to a new scheme of selling sarees and dhoties at half prices to the poor people in the State of Andhra Pradesh having Green-cards. Moreover, the offer in the advertisements for the sale of dhoties and sarees at discount rates was in the nature of a benefit offered to poor persons in that State. When a Government announces the measures which are intended for the benefit of any of the classes for whose the Government can normally be expected to work like the poor or the economical backward classes, it is only in rare circumstances that such a promise can be said to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) even though such a promise might be made on the eve of elections. 8. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => '', 'counseldef' => '', 'court' => 'Supreme Court of India', 'court_type' => 'SC', 'decidedon' => '1989-09-29', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' K.N. Saikia,; M.H. Kania and; S. Ranganathan, JJ.', 'judgement' => '</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Kania, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. These two appeals arise out of the judgments in two Election Petitions in the Andhra Pradesh High Court questioning the election of respondent No. 1 as a Member of Parliament from Srikakulam No. Parliamentary Constituency in the 8th General Election to the House of the People. The points raised in these appeals are common and so are the relevant facts; and, hence, they are being disposed of by this common judgment. We propose to take note of only the few facts which are necessary for the appreciation of the controversy before us.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The polling date for the said election along with other parliamentary elections in the State of Andhra Pradesh was December 27, 1984 but in Srikakulam No. 1 Parliamentary Constituency the polling was countermanded and the date of polling was later fixed on January 28, 1985. In both the Election Petitions the election of respondent No. 1 was questioned mainly on the ground that Shri N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh as well as the President of the Telugu Desam Party as well as respondent No. 1 gave certain speeches and certain advertisements were got published by Shri N.T. Rama Rao through the Publicity Department of the Government of Andhra Pradesh in the newspapers containing certain statements which are alleged to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A) of the <a href="/act/50684/representation-of-the-people-act-1951-complete-act">Representation of the People Act, 1951</a> (hereinafter referred to as 'the said Act'). The main question canvassed before us is whether the statements contained in these aforesaid advertisements amount to a corrupt practice under Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act. Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act runs as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">123. Corrupt practices</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The following shall be deemed to be corrupt practises for the purposes of this Act :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) 'Bribery', that is to say.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(A) any gift, offer or promise by a candidate or his agent or by any other person with the consent of a candidate or his election agent of any gratification, to any person whomsover, with the object, directly or indirectly of inducing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) x x x</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) an elector to vote or refrain from voting at an election, or as a reward to.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) a person for having so stood or not stood, or for having withdrawn or not having withdrawn his candidature; or</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) an elector for having voted or refrained from voting.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The advertisements very shortly stated, refer to the auspicious gifts made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to the poor people on the eve of New Year and Sankranti. In the said advertisements, it is stated that the said Government which was formed by the Telugu Desam Party was giving to the poor people whose income was below Rs. 6,000 per year, a kilo of rice at Rs. 2 per Kg. and the said advertisements referred to a new scheme of selling sarees and dhoties at half prices to the poor people in the State of Andhra Pradesh having Green-cards. Green-cards were directed to be issued to all the persons whose annual income was below Rs. 6,000. The supply of the rice at subsidised rates as aforesaid was also to be made to the Green-card holders only. The scheme to sell sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was to be operative from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. In considering the question whether the said advertisement and the said speeches amount to a corrupt practice, we are of the view that the provisions of Section 123 of the said Act which deal with corrupt practices have to be interpreted, keeping in mind that dictates of commonsense require that they never could have been intended to treat normal election promises made in election manifestoes or usual election speeches by members of various political parties aspiring to power and by different candidates aspiring to get elected to legislative bodies concerned as corrupt practices. We are of the view that these advertisements and speeches amount to nothing more than statements extolling the achievements of the Government of the State of Andhra Pradesh under the Telugu Desam Party headed by N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister, and contain normal election promises and these statements do not amount to corrupt practices falling within the scope of Sub-clause (b) of Clause (A) of Sub-section (1) of Section 123 of the said Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. It was urged by Mr. Rao, learned Counsel for the appellants that in the impugned judgments, the High Court has incorrectly taken the view that in order to amount to bribery within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A), the transaction must amount to a bargain by the candidate with a view to get votes. It was pointed out by him that the said view has been taken in the impugned judgments, relying upon the decision of a Bench comprising to learned Judges of this Court in Ghasi Ram v. Dal Singh and Ors. :1983 SCR 102 . We have gone through to the relevant portion of that judgment (at page 109 and 110 of the said report). A careful perusal of the said judgment shows that what has been really held in that case is that if the promises given or made amount to a bargain entered into by a candidate for a vote or votes, that would amount to a corrupt practice; but it has not been held there that unless the act alleged amounts to such a bargain, it could not amount to a corrupt practice. In our view, that judgment does not lay down that in order to amount to a corrupt practice, the transaction must amount to a bargain for getting a vote. It was pointed out by Mr. Rao, however, that such a view seems to have been taken in two other decisions rendered by two Benches, each comprising two learned Judges of this Court in Bhanu Kumar Shastri v. Mohan Lal Sukhadia and Ors. : [1971]3SCR522 and Harjit Singh Mann v. S Umrao Singh and Ors. : [1980]2SCR501 . and these judgments need to be overruled. We do not propose to go into the correctness or otherwise of this view because, even on the footing that in order to amount to a corrupt practice under the aforesaid provision the alleged acts need not constitute a bargain, the the acts established in the present case, in our opinion, do not amount to a corrupt practice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Our attention was drawn by Mr. Rao to the fact that in this case the said advertisements and the speeches had to be viewed in the context of the fact that the advertisements were issued and the speeches were made after respondent No. 1 filed his nomination papers on January 4, 1985, for the election and before the election was held in the aforesaid constituency. It was further pointed out that the offer made for the sale of sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was limited to the period from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985. It cannot be denied that these factors are relevant factOrs. We cannot, however, lose sight of the fact that this offer was made not only in this constituency but throughout the State where the elections to the House of the People were scheduled to be held, and were, in fact, held on December 27, 1984. It was only in case of this constituency that the election to be held on the scheduled date was countermanded and later held on January 28, 1985. We cannot lose sight of the fact that, as far as the said speeches and the said advertisements, which were issued by the Publicity Department of the State, are concerned, they deal in the main with the achievements of the Government of Andhra Pradesh which, of course, was being run by Ministers belonging to Telugu Desam Party to which respondent No. 1 also belonged. Moreover, the offer in the advertisements for the sale of dhoties and sarees at discount rates was in the nature of a benefit offered to poor persons in that State. When a Government announces the measures which are intended for the benefit of any of the classes for whose the Government can normally be expected to work like the poor or the economical backward classes, it is only in rare circumstances that such a promise can be said to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) even though such a promise might be made on the eve of elections. Keeping this in mind, in our opinion, although the offer to sell dhoties and sarees at discount rates was of a limited duration as aforestated, it cannot be regarded as a corrupt practice. Such an offer was bound to have financial repercussions and it is quite possible the duration of the offer was limited to enable the Government to study the financial repercussions rather than from any improper motive. We find support for this view from the decision of this Court in H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh : [1969]3SCR813 . In that case an Ordinance was passed by the Government of Madhya Pradesh as a result of which a large number of agriculturists, namely, those holdings of plots of land of less than 7.5 acres area or paying land revenue not exceeding Rs. 5/- were exempted from the payment of the land revenue. It was held that such a concession does not amount to a gift, offer or promise of any gratification within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) of the said Act nor does the announcement of the declaration made at a meeting shortly before the election or the issue of a pamphlet containing that declaration at that time carry the matter any further. It was held that neither Shri D.P. Misra who was the Chief Minister nor Shri S.K. Dixit who acted as his agent were guilty of any corrupt practice within the meaning of the aforesaid provision.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. It was next contended by Mr. Rao, although very faintly, that the High Court was in error as it had not decided all other issues which were raised in the election petition. In this regard we cannot lose sight of the fact that the term of the present Lok Sabha is likely to be over within a few months and fresh elections are likely to be held and it would, therefore, be an exercise in futility to remand the matter to the High Court for deciding the remaining issues.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'AIR1990SC1889; JT1989(4)SC186; 1989(2)SCALE891; 1989Supp(2)SCC504', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors.', 'sub' => 'Election', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ), 'casename_url' => 'b-rajagopala-rao-vs-appayya-hanumanthu', 'args' => array( (int) 0 => '640942', (int) 1 => 'b-rajagopala-rao-vs-appayya-hanumanthu' ) ) $title_for_layout = 'B Rajagopala Rao and anr Vs Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors - Citation 640942 - Court Judgment | ' $desc = array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '640942', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/50684/representation-of-the-people-act-1951-complete-act">Representation of the People Act, 1951</a> - Sections 1, 3(1)(A), 123 and 123(1)(A)', 'appealno' => 'Civil Appeal Nos. 484 and 485 of 1987', 'appellant' => 'B. Rajagopala Rao and anr.', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'B. Rajagopala Rao and anr. Vs. Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors.', 'casenote' => 'Election - corrupt practices - Sections 123 and 123 (1) (A) of Representation of the People Act, 1951 - whether advertisements by public department and speeches made by respondent No. 1 to sell dhoti and sarees at discount rates amount to corrupt practices - offer was available for mass and for limited duration - such offer was bound to have financial repercussions and it is quite possible that duration of offer limited to enable Government to study financial repercussions rather than from any improper motive - offer not amounted to corrupt practices. - [ D.A. Desai,; O. Chinnappa Reddy and; R.S. Sarkaria, JJ.] The Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 empowers the Union of India in the public interest to take under its control the industries specified in the First Schedule to the Act. Item 23 of the First Schedule relates to textiles of various categories. Section 15 authorises the Central Government to make or cause to be made a full and complete investigation into the circumstances of the case if the Central Government is of the opinion that (a) in respect of any scheduled industry or industrial undertaking or undertakings (i) there has been, or is likely to be, a substantial fall in the volume of production for which, having regard to the economic conditions prevailing, there is no justification; or (ii) there has been, or is likely to be, a marked deterioration in the quality of any article... which could have been or can be avoided; or (iii) there has been or is likely to be a rise in the price of any article..... for which there is no justification; or (iv) it is necessary to take any such action for the purpose of conserving any resources of national importance; or (b) any industrial undertaking is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest. After the investigation is made under section 15, section 16(1) empowers the Central Government if action is desirable, to issue appropriate directions, and section 16(2) provides for the issue of interim directions by the Central Government pending investigation under section 15. Chapter III-A consisting of Sections 18A, 18-AA, 18-B, 18-C, 18-D, 18-E and 18-F deal with "direct management or control of Industrial Undertakings by Central Government in certain cases". Sec. 18-A empowers the Central Government by notified order, to authorise any person or body of persons to take over the management of the whole or any part of an industrial undertaking or to exercise in respect of the whole, or any part of the undertaking such functions of control as may be specified in the order, if the Central Government is of opinion that: (a) an industrial undertaking to which directions have been issued in pursuance of section 16 has failed to comply with such directions, or (b) an industrial undertaking in respect of which an investigation has been made under section 15 is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest. Section 18AA(5) stipulates that the provisions of Sections 18-B to 18 E shall be applicable to the industrial undertaking in respect of which an order has been made under section 18-AA even as they apply to an industrial undertaking taken over under Section 18-A. Section 18-F empowers the Central Government to cancel the order made under section 18-A if it appears that the purpose of the order has been fulfilled or it is not necessary that the order should remain in force. The appellant M/s. Swadeshi Cotton Mills was taken over by the Government of India by a notification dated April 13, 1978 in exercise of the powers conferred on it under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 18AA of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 on the ground that the company had by creation of encumbrances on the assets of its industrial undertakings, brought about a situation which had affected and is likely to further affect the production of articles manufactured or produced by it and that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation. The Government authorised the National Textile Corporation Limited to take over the management, subject to the conditions that the authorised person shall comply with all the directions issued from time to time by the Central Government and that the authorised person shall hold office for a period of five years. The appellant Mills challenged the aforesaid order in a writ petition in the High Court. The case was heard by a Full Bench of five Judges to consider the question whether in construing section 18AA of the Industries Development and Regulation Act, 1951, compliance with the principle of audi alteram partem is to be implied and whether hearing is to be given to the parties who would be affected by the order to be passed prior to the passing of the order or whether hearing can be given after the order is passed and whether the order passed under the said Section is vitiated by not giving of such hearing and whether such vice can be cured. The Bench by a majority answered the three questions as follows:- (a) Section 18AA(1)(a)(b) excludes the giving of prior hearing to the party who would be affected by order thereunder. (b) Section 18-F expressly provides for a post- decisional hearing to the owner of the industrial undertaking, the management of which is taken over under section 18AA to have the order made under section 18AA cancelled on any relevant ground. (c) As the taking over of management under section 18A is not vitiated by the failure to grant prior hearing the question of any such vice being cured by a grant of a subsequent hearing does not arise. The minority, however, held that in compliance with the principles of natural justice, prior hearing to the owner of the undertaking was required to be given before the passing of an order under section 18AA, that the second question did not arise as the denial of a prior hearing would not cure the vice by the grant of subsequent hearing, but it would be open to the Court to moderate the relief in such a way that the order is kept alive to the extent necessary until the making of the fresh order to subserve public interest and to make appropriate directions. After the decision on the reference the case was reheard on merits by a Full Bench of three Judges and the writ petition was allowed in part. The challenge to the validity of the order being rejected but insofar as the impugned order seeking to take over the corporate entity of the company, the corporate entity of the subsidiary and its assets, the petition was allowed and the respondents, the Union of India and the authorised person were directed to release from its control and custody and/or deliver possession of any assets or property of the company which were not referable to the industrial undertakings. Appeals to this Court were filed on behalf of the Company as well as by the Union of India and the National Textile Corporation. Two propositions were propounded on behalf of the company that: (a) Whether it was necessary to observe the rules of natural justice before issuing a notified order under section 18AA(1)(a) and further whether section 18-F impliedly excludes rules of natural justice relating to prior hearing; and it was contended (1) the mere use of the word 'immediate' in sub-clause (a) of section 18AA does not show a legislative intent to exclude the application of audi alteram partem rule altogether. (2) The word 'immediate' in clause (a) has been used in contra distinction to 'investigate'. It only means that under section 18AA action can be taken without prior investigation under section 15. The use of the word 'immediate' in section 18AA(1)(a) only dispenses with investigation under section 15 and not with the principle of audi alteram partem altogether and this is indicated by the marginal note of section 18A and para 3 of the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Amendment Bill which inserted section 18AA in 1971. (3) The word 'immediate' occurs only in clause (a) and not in clause (b) of section 18AA(1). It would be odd if intention to exclude this principle of natural justice is spelt out in one clause of the sub-section when the other clause does not exclude it. (4) Section 18-F does not exclude a pre-decisional hearing. The so-called post-decisional hearing contemplated by section 18-F cannot be and is not intended to be a substitute for a pre-decisional hearing. (5) Section 18F incorporates only a facet, albeit qualified, of section 21 of the General Clauses Act. The language of the Section implicity prohibits an enquiry into circumstances that led to the passing of the order of take-over and under it the aggrieved person is not entitled to show that on merits the order was void ab initio. (6) 'Immediacy' does not exclude a duty to act fairly because even an emergent situation can co-exist with the canons of natural justice. The only effect of urgency on the application of the principle of fair hearing would be that the width, form and duration of the hearing would be tailored to the situation and reduced to the reasonable minimum so that it does not delay and defeat the purpose of the contemplated action. (7) Where the civil consequences of the administrative action are grave and its effect is highly prejudicial to the rights and interests of the person affected and there is nothing in the language and scheme of the statute which unequivocally excludes a fair pre-decisional hearing and the post-decisional hearing provided therein is not a real remedial hearing equitable to a full right of appeal the Court should be loath to infer a legislative intent to exclude even a minimal fair hearing at the pre-decisional stage merely on ground of urgency. (8) The Central Government appointed four Government Officials including one from the office of the Textile Commissioner to study the affairs of the Company and to make recommendation. This Official Group submitted its report on February 16, 1978. The evidence on the basis of which the impugned order was passed was not disclosed to the appellant company till May 1978, only after it had filed the writ petition in the High Court. If there was anything adverse to the appellants in the survey report there was time enough about six weeks between the submission of the Survey Report and the passing of the impugned order for giving a short, reasonable opportunity to the appellants to explain the adverse findings against them. If there was immediacy situational modifications could be made to meet the requirement of fairness, by reducing the period of notice; that even the manner and form of such notice could be simplified to eliminate delay, that telephonic notice or short opportunity for furnishing their explanation to the Company might have satisfied the requirements of natural justice. Such an opportunity of hearing could have been given after the passing of a conditional tentative order and before its enforcement under section 18AA. For the interregnum suitable interim action such as freezing the assets of the Company or restraining the Company from creating further encumbrances, could be taken under section 16. On behalf of the Union of India and the Authorised Officer it was contended that (1) the presumption in favour of audi alteram partem rule stands impliedly displaced by the language scheme, setting and the purpose of the provision in section 18AA. (2) Section 18AA on its plain terms deals with situations where immediate preventive action is required. The paramount concern is to avoid serious problems which may be caused by fall in production. The purpose of an order under section 18AA is not to condemn the owner but to protect the scheduled industry. The issue under section 18AA is not solely between the Government and the management of the industrial undertaking. The object of taking action under this Section is to protect other outside interests of the community at large and the workers. (3) The rule of natural justice to give a hearing has been incorporated in section 18-F which gives an opportunity of a post-decisional hearing to the owner of the undertaking who if he feels aggrieved can on his application be heard, to show that even the original order under section 18AA was passed on invalid grounds and should be cancelled or rescinded. (4) On a true construction of section 18AA read with section 18-F the requirements of natural justice and fair play can be read into the statute only insofar as conformance to such canons can reasonably and realistically be required of it by the provision for a remedial hearing at a subsequent stage. (5) Under section 18-F the Central Government exercises curial functions and that Section confers on the aggrieved owner a right to apply to the Government to cancel the order of take-over. This section casts an obligation on the Central Government to deal with and dispose of an application filed thereunder with reasonable expedition. Allowing the appeal by the Company,<br/>HELD: (Sarkaria & Desai, JJ. per Chinnappa Reddy, J. dissenting.) In the facts and circumstances of the instant case, there has been a noncompliance with the implied requirement of the audi alteram partem rule of natural justice at the pre-decisional stage. The impugned order could be struck down as invalid on that score alone. But in view of the commitment / concession that a hearing would be afforded to the Company, the case is remitted to the Central Government to give a full, fair and effective hearing. [587G-H, 588C] The phrase 'natural justice' is not capable of a static and precise definition. It cannot be imprisoned in the straight-jacket of a cast-iron formula. Rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. Hence not possible to make an exhaustive catalogue of such rules. Two fundamental maxims of natural justice have now become deeply and indelibly ingrained in the common consciousness of mankind as pre-eminently necessary to ensure that the law is applied impartially objectively and fairly. These twin principles are (i) audi alteram partem and (ii) nemo judex in re sua. Audi alteram partem is a highly effective rule devised by the Courts to ensure that a statutory authority arrives at a just decision and it is calculated to act as a healthy check on the abuse or misuse of power. Its reach should not be narrowed and its applicability circumscribed.[554C-G] The rules of natural justice can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. If a statutory provision either specifically or by inevitable implication excludes the application of the rules of natural justice then the Court cannot ignore the mandate of the Legislature. Whether or not the application of the principles of natural justice in a given case has been excluded in the exercise of statutory power depends upon the language and basic scheme of the provision conferring the power, the nature of the power the purpose for which it is conferred and the effect of that power. [556A-B] The maxim audi alteram partem has many facets. Two of them are (a) notice of the case to be met, and (b) opportunity to explain. The rule cannot be sacrificed at the altar of administrative convenience or celerity; for, convenience and justice are often not on speaking terms. Difficulties, however, arise when the statute conferring the power does not expressly exclude this rule but its exclusion is sought by implication due to the presence of certain factors such as urgency where the obligation to give notice and opportunity to be heard would obstruct the taking of prompt action of a preventive or remedial nature. Audi alteram partem rule may be disregarded in an emergent situation where immediate action brooks no delay to prevent some imminent danger or injury or hazard to paramount public interests. Section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure empowers the magistrates specified therein to make an exparte conditional order in emergent cases for removal of dangerous public nuisances. Action under section 17 Land Acquisition Act furnishes another such instance. Similarly action on grounds of public safety public health may justify disregard of the rule of prior hearing. [556C-H] Cases where owing to the compulsion of the fact situation or the necessity of taking speedy action no pre- decisional hearing is given but the action, is followed soon by a full post-decisional hearing to the person affected do not in reality constitute an exception to the audi alteram partem rule. To call such cases as exception is a misnomer because they do not exclude fair play in action but adapt it to the urgency of the situation by balancing the competing claims of hurry and hearing. [560H-561A] The general principle as distinguished from an absolute rule of uniform application seems to be that where a statute does not in terms exclude this rule of prior hearing but contemplates a post-decisional hearing amounting to a full review of the original order on merits then such a statute would be construed as excluding the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage. [561G] If the statute conferring the power is silent with regard to the giving of pre-decisional hearing to the person affected and the administrative decision taken by the authority involves civil consequences of a grave nature and no full review or appeal on merits against that decision is provided courts will be extremely reluctant to construe such a statute as excluding the duty of affording even a minimal hearing shorn of all its formal trappings and dilatory features at the pre-decisional stage, unless viewed pragmatically it would paralyse the administrative process or frustrate the need for utmost promptitude. [561H] 7(i). A comparison of the provisions of Section 18A(1)(b) and Section 18AA(1)(c), bring out two main points of distinction: First, action under Section 18A(1)(b) can be taken only after an investigation had been made under Section 15; while under Section 18AA(1)(a) or (b) action can be taken without such investigation. The language, scheme and setting of Section 18AA read in the light of the Objects and Reasons for enacting this provision make this position clear beyond doubt. Second, before taking action under Section 18A(1)(b), the Central Government has to form an opinion on the basis of the investigation conducted under section 15, in regard to the existence of the objective fact, namely: that the industrial undertaking is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest; while under section 18A(1)(a) the Government has to satisfy itself that the persons incharge of the undertaking have brought about a situation likely to cause fall in production, by committing any of the three kinds of acts specified in that provision. This shows that the preliminary objective fact attributable to the persons in charge of the management or affairs of the undertaking, on the basis of which action may be taken under section 18(A)(1)(b), is of far wider amplitude than the circumstance, the existence of which is a sine qua non for taking action under section 18AA(1). The phrase "highly detrimental to the scheduled industry or public interest" in section 18-A is capable of being construed to cover a large variety of acts or things which may be considered wrong with the manner of running the industry by the management. In contrast with it, action under section 18AA(1)(a) can be taken only if the Central Government is satisfied with regard to the existence of the twin conditions specifically mentioned therein, on the basis of evidence in its possession. [569D-H] An analysis of section 18AA(1)(a), indicates that as a necessary preliminary to the exercise of the power thereunder, the Central Government must be satisfied "from documentary or other evidence in its possession" in regard to the co-existence of two circumstances: (i) that the persons in charge of the industrial undertaking have by committing any of these acts, namely, reckless investments, or creation of incumbrances on the assets of industrial undertaking, or by diversion of funds, brought about a situation which is likely to affect the production of the article manufactured or produced in the industrial undertaking, and (ii) that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation.[570B-D] It cannot be laid down as a general proposition that whenever a statute confers a power on an administrative authority and makes the exercise of that power conditional on the formation of an opinion by that authority in regard to the existence of an immediacy, its opinion in regard to that preliminary fact is not open to judicial scrutiny at all. While it may be conceded that an element of subjectivity is always involved in the formation of such an opinion, the existence of the circumstances from which the inference constituting the opinion, as the sine qua non for action, are to be drawn, must be demonstrable, and the existence of such "circumstances", if questioned, must be proved at least prima facie. [571 E-G] From a plain reading of section 18AA, it is clear that it does not expressly in unmistakable and unequivocal terms exclude the application of the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage. [574B] In the instant case, so far as Kanpur Unit is concerned, it was lying closed for more than three months before the passing of the impugned order. There was no 'immediacy' in relation to that unit, which could absolve the Government from the obligation of complying fully with audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional or pre- takeover stage. [583A] Keshav Mills Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, [1973] 3 S.C.R. 22; Kamla Prasad Khetan v. Union of India,[1957] S.C.R. 1052; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 621; Sukhdev Singh & Ors. v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh, [1975] 3 S.C.R. 619; A. K. Kraipak v. Union of India, [1970] 1 S.C.R. 457; Ridge v. Baldwin, [1964] A.C. 40; 196; Heatley v. Tasmanian Racing & Gaming Commission, 14 Australian Law Reports 519; Nawabkhan Abbaskhan v. State of Gujarat, [1974] 3 S.C.R. 427; State of Orissa v. Dr. Bina Pani Dei, [1962] 2 S.C.R. 625; Ambalal M. Shah v. Hathi Singh Manufacturing Co. Ltd. [1962] 3 S.C.R. 171; and S. L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan & Ors., [1981] 1 S.C.R. 746, referred to. (Per Chinnappa Reddy, J. dissenting) The principles of natural justice are not attracted to the situations contemplated by section 18AA of Industries (Development and Regulation) Act. Natural justice like Ultra Vires and Public Policy is a branch of the public law and is a formidable weapon which can be wielded to secure justice to the citizen. While it may be used to protect certain fundamental liberties, civil and political rights, it may be used as indeed it is used more often than not, to protect vested interests and to obstruct the path of progressive change. The time has come to make an appropriate distinction between natural justice in its application to fundamental liberties, civil and political rights and natural justice in its application to vested interests. [590A-B] Our constitution as befits the Constitution of a Socialist Secular Democratic Republic, recognises the paramountcy of the public weal over the private interest. Natural justice, ultra vires, public policy, or any other rule of interpretation must, therefore, conform, grow and be tailored to serve the public interest and respond to the demands of an evolving society. [590C] The principles of natural justice have taken deep root in the judicial conscience of our people. They are now considered so fundamental as to be implicit in every decision making function, judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative. Where authority functions under a statute and the statute provides for the observance of the principles of natural justice in a particular manner, natural justice will have to be observed in that manner and in no other. Where the statute is silent about the observance of the principles of natural justice, such statutory silence is taken to imply compliance with the principles of natural justice. Where the conflict is between the public interest and the private interest the presumption must necessarily be weak and may, therefore, be readily displaced. The presumption is also weak, where what are involved are mere property rights. In cases of urgency, particularly where the public interest is involved, preemptive action may be a strategic necessity. Even in cases of preemptive action, if the statute so provides or if the Courts so deem fit in appropriate cases, a postponed hearing may be substituted for natural justice. [590A-C; 591F-G] 3(ii). Where natural justice is implied, the extent of the implication and the nature of the hearing must vary with the statute, the subject and the situation. [592B] The absence of the expression 'immediate action' in section 18AA(1)(b) does not make any difference. Section 18AA(1)(a) refers to a situation where immediate preventive action may avert a disaster, whereas section 18AA contemplates a situation where the disaster has occurred and action is necessary to restore normalcy. Restoration of production where production has stopped in a key industry or industrial undertaking is as important and urgent in the public interest as prevention of a situation where production may be affected. Immediate action is, therefore, as necessary in the situation contemplated by section 18AA(1)(b) as in the situation contemplated by section 18AA(1)(a). [596 F-G] The marginal note refers to the power to take over without investigation but there is no sufficient reason to suppose that the word immediate is used only to contra- distinguish it from the investigation contemplated by section 15 of the Act, though of course a consequence of immediate action under section 18AA may be to dispense with the enquiry under section 15. In fact, facts which come to light during the course of an investigation under section 15 may form the basis of action under section 18AA(1)(a). Where in the course of an investigation under section 15 it is discovered that the management have, by reckless investments or creation of encumbrances on the assets of the industrial undertaking or by diversion of funds brought about a situation which is likely to affect the production of the articles manufactured or produced in the industrial undertaking, if the Government is satisfied that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation, there is no reason why the Central Government may not straightaway take action under section 18AA(1)(a) without waiting for completion of investigation under section 15. [597A-B] Where there is a provision in the statute itself for revocation of the order by the very authority making the decision, it appears to be unnecessary to insist upon a pre- decisional observance of natural justice. [598A] The likelihood of production being jeopardized or the stoppage of production in a key industrial undertaking is a matter of grave concern affecting the public interest. Parliament has taken so serious a view of the matter that it has authorised the Central Government to take over the management of the industrial undertaking if immediate action may prevent jeopardy to production or restore production where it has already stopped. The necessity for immediate action by the Central Government contemplated by Parliament is definitely indicative of the exclusion of natural justice. It is not as if the owner of the industrial undertaking is left with no remedy. He may move the Central Government under section 18-F to cancel the order made under section 18AA. [598C-D] Neither section 18-F of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act nor section 21 of the General Clauses Act by itself excludes natural justice. The exclusion of natural justice where such exclusion is not express has to be implied by reference to the subject, the statute and the statutory situation. Where an express provision in the statute itself provides for a post decisional hearing the other provisions of the Statute will have to be read in the light of such provision and the provision for post- decisional hearing may then clinch the issue where pre- decisional natural justice appears to be excluded on the other terms of the statute. That a post-decisional hearing may also be had by the terms of section 21 of the General Clauses Act may not necessarily help in the interpretation of the provisions of the statute concerned. [599 A-C] Ridge v. Baldwin, 1964 A.C. p. 40; Annie G. Phillip v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 75 L.E.d. 1289; John H. Fahey v. Paul Mallonee, 91 L.E.d. 2030; Margarita Fuentes v. Robert L. Shevin, Attorney General of Florida, 32 L.E.d. 2d 556 and Lawrence Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 40 L.E.d. 2d 406, referred to. - Rama Rao, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh as well as the President of the Telugu Desam Party as well as respondent No. 3. The advertisements very shortly stated, refer to the auspicious gifts made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to the poor people on the eve of New Year and Sankranti. In the said advertisements, it is stated that the said Government which was formed by the Telugu Desam Party was giving to the poor people whose income was below Rs. and the said advertisements referred to a new scheme of selling sarees and dhoties at half prices to the poor people in the State of Andhra Pradesh having Green-cards. Moreover, the offer in the advertisements for the sale of dhoties and sarees at discount rates was in the nature of a benefit offered to poor persons in that State. When a Government announces the measures which are intended for the benefit of any of the classes for whose the Government can normally be expected to work like the poor or the economical backward classes, it is only in rare circumstances that such a promise can be said to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) even though such a promise might be made on the eve of elections. 8. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => '', 'counseldef' => '', 'court' => 'Supreme Court of India', 'court_type' => 'SC', 'decidedon' => '1989-09-29', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' K.N. Saikia,; M.H. Kania and; S. Ranganathan, JJ.', 'judgement' => '</p><p>Kania, J.</p><p>1. These two appeals arise out of the judgments in two Election Petitions in the Andhra Pradesh High Court questioning the election of respondent No. 1 as a Member of Parliament from Srikakulam No. Parliamentary Constituency in the 8th General Election to the House of the People. The points raised in these appeals are common and so are the relevant facts; and, hence, they are being disposed of by this common judgment. We propose to take note of only the few facts which are necessary for the appreciation of the controversy before us.</p><p>2. The polling date for the said election along with other parliamentary elections in the State of Andhra Pradesh was December 27, 1984 but in Srikakulam No. 1 Parliamentary Constituency the polling was countermanded and the date of polling was later fixed on January 28, 1985. In both the Election Petitions the election of respondent No. 1 was questioned mainly on the ground that Shri N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh as well as the President of the Telugu Desam Party as well as respondent No. 1 gave certain speeches and certain advertisements were got published by Shri N.T. Rama Rao through the Publicity Department of the Government of Andhra Pradesh in the newspapers containing certain statements which are alleged to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A) of the <a>Representation of the People Act, 1951</a> (hereinafter referred to as 'the said Act'). The main question canvassed before us is whether the statements contained in these aforesaid advertisements amount to a corrupt practice under Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act. Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act runs as follows :</p><p>123. Corrupt practices</p><p>The following shall be deemed to be corrupt practises for the purposes of this Act :</p><p>(1) 'Bribery', that is to say.</p><p>(A) any gift, offer or promise by a candidate or his agent or by any other person with the consent of a candidate or his election agent of any gratification, to any person whomsover, with the object, directly or indirectly of inducing.</p><p>(a) x x x</p><p>(b) an elector to vote or refrain from voting at an election, or as a reward to.</p><p>(i) a person for having so stood or not stood, or for having withdrawn or not having withdrawn his candidature; or</p><p>(ii) an elector for having voted or refrained from voting.</p><p>3. The advertisements very shortly stated, refer to the auspicious gifts made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to the poor people on the eve of New Year and Sankranti. In the said advertisements, it is stated that the said Government which was formed by the Telugu Desam Party was giving to the poor people whose income was below Rs. 6,000 per year, a kilo of rice at Rs. 2 per Kg. and the said advertisements referred to a new scheme of selling sarees and dhoties at half prices to the poor people in the State of Andhra Pradesh having Green-cards. Green-cards were directed to be issued to all the persons whose annual income was below Rs. 6,000. The supply of the rice at subsidised rates as aforesaid was also to be made to the Green-card holders only. The scheme to sell sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was to be operative from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985.</p><p>4. In considering the question whether the said advertisement and the said speeches amount to a corrupt practice, we are of the view that the provisions of Section 123 of the said Act which deal with corrupt practices have to be interpreted, keeping in mind that dictates of commonsense require that they never could have been intended to treat normal election promises made in election manifestoes or usual election speeches by members of various political parties aspiring to power and by different candidates aspiring to get elected to legislative bodies concerned as corrupt practices. We are of the view that these advertisements and speeches amount to nothing more than statements extolling the achievements of the Government of the State of Andhra Pradesh under the Telugu Desam Party headed by N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister, and contain normal election promises and these statements do not amount to corrupt practices falling within the scope of Sub-clause (b) of Clause (A) of Sub-section (1) of Section 123 of the said Act.</p><p>5. It was urged by Mr. Rao, learned Counsel for the appellants that in the impugned judgments, the High Court has incorrectly taken the view that in order to amount to bribery within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A), the transaction must amount to a bargain by the candidate with a view to get votes. It was pointed out by him that the said view has been taken in the impugned judgments, relying upon the decision of a Bench comprising to learned Judges of this Court in Ghasi Ram v. Dal Singh and Ors. :1983 SCR 102 . We have gone through to the relevant portion of that judgment (at page 109 and 110 of the said report). A careful perusal of the said judgment shows that what has been really held in that case is that if the promises given or made amount to a bargain entered into by a candidate for a vote or votes, that would amount to a corrupt practice; but it has not been held there that unless the act alleged amounts to such a bargain, it could not amount to a corrupt practice. In our view, that judgment does not lay down that in order to amount to a corrupt practice, the transaction must amount to a bargain for getting a vote. It was pointed out by Mr. Rao, however, that such a view seems to have been taken in two other decisions rendered by two Benches, each comprising two learned Judges of this Court in Bhanu Kumar Shastri v. Mohan Lal Sukhadia and Ors. : [1971]3SCR522 and Harjit Singh Mann v. S Umrao Singh and Ors. : [1980]2SCR501 . and these judgments need to be overruled. We do not propose to go into the correctness or otherwise of this view because, even on the footing that in order to amount to a corrupt practice under the aforesaid provision the alleged acts need not constitute a bargain, the the acts established in the present case, in our opinion, do not amount to a corrupt practice.</p><p>6. Our attention was drawn by Mr. Rao to the fact that in this case the said advertisements and the speeches had to be viewed in the context of the fact that the advertisements were issued and the speeches were made after respondent No. 1 filed his nomination papers on January 4, 1985, for the election and before the election was held in the aforesaid constituency. It was further pointed out that the offer made for the sale of sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was limited to the period from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985. It cannot be denied that these factors are relevant factOrs. We cannot, however, lose sight of the fact that this offer was made not only in this constituency but throughout the State where the elections to the House of the People were scheduled to be held, and were, in fact, held on December 27, 1984. It was only in case of this constituency that the election to be held on the scheduled date was countermanded and later held on January 28, 1985. We cannot lose sight of the fact that, as far as the said speeches and the said advertisements, which were issued by the Publicity Department of the State, are concerned, they deal in the main with the achievements of the Government of Andhra Pradesh which, of course, was being run by Ministers belonging to Telugu Desam Party to which respondent No. 1 also belonged. Moreover, the offer in the advertisements for the sale of dhoties and sarees at discount rates was in the nature of a benefit offered to poor persons in that State. When a Government announces the measures which are intended for the benefit of any of the classes for whose the Government can normally be expected to work like the poor or the economical backward classes, it is only in rare circumstances that such a promise can be said to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) even though such a promise might be made on the eve of elections. Keeping this in mind, in our opinion, although the offer to sell dhoties and sarees at discount rates was of a limited duration as aforestated, it cannot be regarded as a corrupt practice. Such an offer was bound to have financial repercussions and it is quite possible the duration of the offer was limited to enable the Government to study the financial repercussions rather than from any improper motive. We find support for this view from the decision of this Court in H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh : [1969]3SCR813 . In that case an Ordinance was passed by the Government of Madhya Pradesh as a result of which a large number of agriculturists, namely, those holdings of plots of land of less than 7.5 acres area or paying land revenue not exceeding Rs. 5/- were exempted from the payment of the land revenue. It was held that such a concession does not amount to a gift, offer or promise of any gratification within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) of the said Act nor does the announcement of the declaration made at a meeting shortly before the election or the issue of a pamphlet containing that declaration at that time carry the matter any further. It was held that neither Shri D.P. Misra who was the Chief Minister nor Shri S.K. Dixit who acted as his agent were guilty of any corrupt practice within the meaning of the aforesaid provision.</p><p>7. It was next contended by Mr. Rao, although very faintly, that the High Court was in error as it had not decided all other issues which were raised in the election petition. In this regard we cannot lose sight of the fact that the term of the present Lok Sabha is likely to be over within a few months and fresh elections are likely to be held and it would, therefore, be an exercise in futility to remand the matter to the High Court for deciding the remaining issues.</p><p>8. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.<p></p><p>', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'AIR1990SC1889; JT1989(4)SC186; 1989(2)SCALE891; 1989Supp(2)SCC504', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors.', 'sub' => 'Election', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ) $casename_url = 'b-rajagopala-rao-vs-appayya-hanumanthu' $args = array( (int) 0 => '640942', (int) 1 => 'b-rajagopala-rao-vs-appayya-hanumanthu' ) $url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/640942/b-rajagopala-rao-vs-appayya-hanumanthu' $ctype = '' $caseref = 'H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh<br>' $content = array( (int) 0 => '', (int) 1 => '<p>Kania, J.', (int) 2 => '<p>1. These two appeals arise out of the judgments in two Election Petitions in the Andhra Pradesh High Court questioning the election of respondent No. 1 as a Member of Parliament from Srikakulam No. Parliamentary Constituency in the 8th General Election to the House of the People. The points raised in these appeals are common and so are the relevant facts; and, hence, they are being disposed of by this common judgment. We propose to take note of only the few facts which are necessary for the appreciation of the controversy before us.', (int) 3 => '<p>2. The polling date for the said election along with other parliamentary elections in the State of Andhra Pradesh was December 27, 1984 but in Srikakulam No. 1 Parliamentary Constituency the polling was countermanded and the date of polling was later fixed on January 28, 1985. In both the Election Petitions the election of respondent No. 1 was questioned mainly on the ground that Shri N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh as well as the President of the Telugu Desam Party as well as respondent No. 1 gave certain speeches and certain advertisements were got published by Shri N.T. Rama Rao through the Publicity Department of the Government of Andhra Pradesh in the newspapers containing certain statements which are alleged to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A) of the <a>Representation of the People Act, 1951</a> (hereinafter referred to as 'the said Act'). The main question canvassed before us is whether the statements contained in these aforesaid advertisements amount to a corrupt practice under Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act. Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act runs as follows :', (int) 4 => '<p>123. Corrupt practices', (int) 5 => '<p>The following shall be deemed to be corrupt practises for the purposes of this Act :', (int) 6 => '<p>(1) 'Bribery', that is to say.', (int) 7 => '<p>(A) any gift, offer or promise by a candidate or his agent or by any other person with the consent of a candidate or his election agent of any gratification, to any person whomsover, with the object, directly or indirectly of inducing.', (int) 8 => '<p>(a) x x x', (int) 9 => '<p>(b) an elector to vote or refrain from voting at an election, or as a reward to.', (int) 10 => '<p>(i) a person for having so stood or not stood, or for having withdrawn or not having withdrawn his candidature; or', (int) 11 => '<p>(ii) an elector for having voted or refrained from voting.', (int) 12 => '<p>3. The advertisements very shortly stated, refer to the auspicious gifts made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to the poor people on the eve of New Year and Sankranti. In the said advertisements, it is stated that the said Government which was formed by the Telugu Desam Party was giving to the poor people whose income was below Rs. 6,000 per year, a kilo of rice at Rs. 2 per Kg. and the said advertisements referred to a new scheme of selling sarees and dhoties at half prices to the poor people in the State of Andhra Pradesh having Green-cards. Green-cards were directed to be issued to all the persons whose annual income was below Rs. 6,000. The supply of the rice at subsidised rates as aforesaid was also to be made to the Green-card holders only. The scheme to sell sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was to be operative from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985.', (int) 13 => '<p>4. In considering the question whether the said advertisement and the said speeches amount to a corrupt practice, we are of the view that the provisions of Section 123 of the said Act which deal with corrupt practices have to be interpreted, keeping in mind that dictates of commonsense require that they never could have been intended to treat normal election promises made in election manifestoes or usual election speeches by members of various political parties aspiring to power and by different candidates aspiring to get elected to legislative bodies concerned as corrupt practices. We are of the view that these advertisements and speeches amount to nothing more than statements extolling the achievements of the Government of the State of Andhra Pradesh under the Telugu Desam Party headed by N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister, and contain normal election promises and these statements do not amount to corrupt practices falling within the scope of Sub-clause (b) of Clause (A) of Sub-section (1) of Section 123 of the said Act.', (int) 14 => '<p>5. It was urged by Mr. Rao, learned Counsel for the appellants that in the impugned judgments, the High Court has incorrectly taken the view that in order to amount to bribery within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A), the transaction must amount to a bargain by the candidate with a view to get votes. It was pointed out by him that the said view has been taken in the impugned judgments, relying upon the decision of a Bench comprising to learned Judges of this Court in Ghasi Ram v. Dal Singh and Ors. :1983 SCR 102 . We have gone through to the relevant portion of that judgment (at page 109 and 110 of the said report). A careful perusal of the said judgment shows that what has been really held in that case is that if the promises given or made amount to a bargain entered into by a candidate for a vote or votes, that would amount to a corrupt practice; but it has not been held there that unless the act alleged amounts to such a bargain, it could not amount to a corrupt practice. In our view, that judgment does not lay down that in order to amount to a corrupt practice, the transaction must amount to a bargain for getting a vote. It was pointed out by Mr. Rao, however, that such a view seems to have been taken in two other decisions rendered by two Benches, each comprising two learned Judges of this Court in Bhanu Kumar Shastri v. Mohan Lal Sukhadia and Ors. : [1971]3SCR522 and Harjit Singh Mann v. S Umrao Singh and Ors. : [1980]2SCR501 . and these judgments need to be overruled. We do not propose to go into the correctness or otherwise of this view because, even on the footing that in order to amount to a corrupt practice under the aforesaid provision the alleged acts need not constitute a bargain, the the acts established in the present case, in our opinion, do not amount to a corrupt practice.', (int) 15 => '<p>6. Our attention was drawn by Mr. Rao to the fact that in this case the said advertisements and the speeches had to be viewed in the context of the fact that the advertisements were issued and the speeches were made after respondent No. 1 filed his nomination papers on January 4, 1985, for the election and before the election was held in the aforesaid constituency. It was further pointed out that the offer made for the sale of sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was limited to the period from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985. It cannot be denied that these factors are relevant factOrs. We cannot, however, lose sight of the fact that this offer was made not only in this constituency but throughout the State where the elections to the House of the People were scheduled to be held, and were, in fact, held on December 27, 1984. It was only in case of this constituency that the election to be held on the scheduled date was countermanded and later held on January 28, 1985. We cannot lose sight of the fact that, as far as the said speeches and the said advertisements, which were issued by the Publicity Department of the State, are concerned, they deal in the main with the achievements of the Government of Andhra Pradesh which, of course, was being run by Ministers belonging to Telugu Desam Party to which respondent No. 1 also belonged. Moreover, the offer in the advertisements for the sale of dhoties and sarees at discount rates was in the nature of a benefit offered to poor persons in that State. When a Government announces the measures which are intended for the benefit of any of the classes for whose the Government can normally be expected to work like the poor or the economical backward classes, it is only in rare circumstances that such a promise can be said to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) even though such a promise might be made on the eve of elections. Keeping this in mind, in our opinion, although the offer to sell dhoties and sarees at discount rates was of a limited duration as aforestated, it cannot be regarded as a corrupt practice. Such an offer was bound to have financial repercussions and it is quite possible the duration of the offer was limited to enable the Government to study the financial repercussions rather than from any improper motive. We find support for this view from the decision of this Court in H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh : [1969]3SCR813 . In that case an Ordinance was passed by the Government of Madhya Pradesh as a result of which a large number of agriculturists, namely, those holdings of plots of land of less than 7.5 acres area or paying land revenue not exceeding Rs. 5/- were exempted from the payment of the land revenue. It was held that such a concession does not amount to a gift, offer or promise of any gratification within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) of the said Act nor does the announcement of the declaration made at a meeting shortly before the election or the issue of a pamphlet containing that declaration at that time carry the matter any further. It was held that neither Shri D.P. Misra who was the Chief Minister nor Shri S.K. Dixit who acted as his agent were guilty of any corrupt practice within the meaning of the aforesaid provision.', (int) 16 => '<p>7. It was next contended by Mr. Rao, although very faintly, that the High Court was in error as it had not decided all other issues which were raised in the election petition. In this regard we cannot lose sight of the fact that the term of the present Lok Sabha is likely to be over within a few months and fresh elections are likely to be held and it would, therefore, be an exercise in futility to remand the matter to the High Court for deciding the remaining issues.', (int) 17 => '<p>8. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.<p>', (int) 18 => '<p>' ) $paragraphAfter = (int) 1 $cnt = (int) 19 $i = (int) 1include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144 View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971 View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933 View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473 Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963 Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200 Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167 [main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109
Kania, J.
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$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp' $dataForView = array( 'title_for_layout' => 'B Rajagopala Rao and anr Vs Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors - Citation 640942 - Court Judgment | ', 'desc' => array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '640942', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/50684/representation-of-the-people-act-1951-complete-act">Representation of the People Act, 1951</a> - Sections 1, 3(1)(A), 123 and 123(1)(A)', 'appealno' => 'Civil Appeal Nos. 484 and 485 of 1987', 'appellant' => 'B. Rajagopala Rao and anr.', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'B. Rajagopala Rao and anr. Vs. Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors.', 'casenote' => 'Election - corrupt practices - Sections 123 and 123 (1) (A) of Representation of the People Act, 1951 - whether advertisements by public department and speeches made by respondent No. 1 to sell dhoti and sarees at discount rates amount to corrupt practices - offer was available for mass and for limited duration - such offer was bound to have financial repercussions and it is quite possible that duration of offer limited to enable Government to study financial repercussions rather than from any improper motive - offer not amounted to corrupt practices. - [ D.A. Desai,; O. Chinnappa Reddy and; R.S. Sarkaria, JJ.] The Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 empowers the Union of India in the public interest to take under its control the industries specified in the First Schedule to the Act. Item 23 of the First Schedule relates to textiles of various categories. Section 15 authorises the Central Government to make or cause to be made a full and complete investigation into the circumstances of the case if the Central Government is of the opinion that (a) in respect of any scheduled industry or industrial undertaking or undertakings (i) there has been, or is likely to be, a substantial fall in the volume of production for which, having regard to the economic conditions prevailing, there is no justification; or (ii) there has been, or is likely to be, a marked deterioration in the quality of any article... which could have been or can be avoided; or (iii) there has been or is likely to be a rise in the price of any article..... for which there is no justification; or (iv) it is necessary to take any such action for the purpose of conserving any resources of national importance; or (b) any industrial undertaking is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest. After the investigation is made under section 15, section 16(1) empowers the Central Government if action is desirable, to issue appropriate directions, and section 16(2) provides for the issue of interim directions by the Central Government pending investigation under section 15. Chapter III-A consisting of Sections 18A, 18-AA, 18-B, 18-C, 18-D, 18-E and 18-F deal with "direct management or control of Industrial Undertakings by Central Government in certain cases". Sec. 18-A empowers the Central Government by notified order, to authorise any person or body of persons to take over the management of the whole or any part of an industrial undertaking or to exercise in respect of the whole, or any part of the undertaking such functions of control as may be specified in the order, if the Central Government is of opinion that: (a) an industrial undertaking to which directions have been issued in pursuance of section 16 has failed to comply with such directions, or (b) an industrial undertaking in respect of which an investigation has been made under section 15 is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest. Section 18AA(5) stipulates that the provisions of Sections 18-B to 18 E shall be applicable to the industrial undertaking in respect of which an order has been made under section 18-AA even as they apply to an industrial undertaking taken over under Section 18-A. Section 18-F empowers the Central Government to cancel the order made under section 18-A if it appears that the purpose of the order has been fulfilled or it is not necessary that the order should remain in force. The appellant M/s. Swadeshi Cotton Mills was taken over by the Government of India by a notification dated April 13, 1978 in exercise of the powers conferred on it under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 18AA of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 on the ground that the company had by creation of encumbrances on the assets of its industrial undertakings, brought about a situation which had affected and is likely to further affect the production of articles manufactured or produced by it and that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation. The Government authorised the National Textile Corporation Limited to take over the management, subject to the conditions that the authorised person shall comply with all the directions issued from time to time by the Central Government and that the authorised person shall hold office for a period of five years. The appellant Mills challenged the aforesaid order in a writ petition in the High Court. The case was heard by a Full Bench of five Judges to consider the question whether in construing section 18AA of the Industries Development and Regulation Act, 1951, compliance with the principle of audi alteram partem is to be implied and whether hearing is to be given to the parties who would be affected by the order to be passed prior to the passing of the order or whether hearing can be given after the order is passed and whether the order passed under the said Section is vitiated by not giving of such hearing and whether such vice can be cured. The Bench by a majority answered the three questions as follows:- (a) Section 18AA(1)(a)(b) excludes the giving of prior hearing to the party who would be affected by order thereunder. (b) Section 18-F expressly provides for a post- decisional hearing to the owner of the industrial undertaking, the management of which is taken over under section 18AA to have the order made under section 18AA cancelled on any relevant ground. (c) As the taking over of management under section 18A is not vitiated by the failure to grant prior hearing the question of any such vice being cured by a grant of a subsequent hearing does not arise. The minority, however, held that in compliance with the principles of natural justice, prior hearing to the owner of the undertaking was required to be given before the passing of an order under section 18AA, that the second question did not arise as the denial of a prior hearing would not cure the vice by the grant of subsequent hearing, but it would be open to the Court to moderate the relief in such a way that the order is kept alive to the extent necessary until the making of the fresh order to subserve public interest and to make appropriate directions. After the decision on the reference the case was reheard on merits by a Full Bench of three Judges and the writ petition was allowed in part. The challenge to the validity of the order being rejected but insofar as the impugned order seeking to take over the corporate entity of the company, the corporate entity of the subsidiary and its assets, the petition was allowed and the respondents, the Union of India and the authorised person were directed to release from its control and custody and/or deliver possession of any assets or property of the company which were not referable to the industrial undertakings. Appeals to this Court were filed on behalf of the Company as well as by the Union of India and the National Textile Corporation. Two propositions were propounded on behalf of the company that: (a) Whether it was necessary to observe the rules of natural justice before issuing a notified order under section 18AA(1)(a) and further whether section 18-F impliedly excludes rules of natural justice relating to prior hearing; and it was contended (1) the mere use of the word 'immediate' in sub-clause (a) of section 18AA does not show a legislative intent to exclude the application of audi alteram partem rule altogether. (2) The word 'immediate' in clause (a) has been used in contra distinction to 'investigate'. It only means that under section 18AA action can be taken without prior investigation under section 15. The use of the word 'immediate' in section 18AA(1)(a) only dispenses with investigation under section 15 and not with the principle of audi alteram partem altogether and this is indicated by the marginal note of section 18A and para 3 of the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Amendment Bill which inserted section 18AA in 1971. (3) The word 'immediate' occurs only in clause (a) and not in clause (b) of section 18AA(1). It would be odd if intention to exclude this principle of natural justice is spelt out in one clause of the sub-section when the other clause does not exclude it. (4) Section 18-F does not exclude a pre-decisional hearing. The so-called post-decisional hearing contemplated by section 18-F cannot be and is not intended to be a substitute for a pre-decisional hearing. (5) Section 18F incorporates only a facet, albeit qualified, of section 21 of the General Clauses Act. The language of the Section implicity prohibits an enquiry into circumstances that led to the passing of the order of take-over and under it the aggrieved person is not entitled to show that on merits the order was void ab initio. (6) 'Immediacy' does not exclude a duty to act fairly because even an emergent situation can co-exist with the canons of natural justice. The only effect of urgency on the application of the principle of fair hearing would be that the width, form and duration of the hearing would be tailored to the situation and reduced to the reasonable minimum so that it does not delay and defeat the purpose of the contemplated action. (7) Where the civil consequences of the administrative action are grave and its effect is highly prejudicial to the rights and interests of the person affected and there is nothing in the language and scheme of the statute which unequivocally excludes a fair pre-decisional hearing and the post-decisional hearing provided therein is not a real remedial hearing equitable to a full right of appeal the Court should be loath to infer a legislative intent to exclude even a minimal fair hearing at the pre-decisional stage merely on ground of urgency. (8) The Central Government appointed four Government Officials including one from the office of the Textile Commissioner to study the affairs of the Company and to make recommendation. This Official Group submitted its report on February 16, 1978. The evidence on the basis of which the impugned order was passed was not disclosed to the appellant company till May 1978, only after it had filed the writ petition in the High Court. If there was anything adverse to the appellants in the survey report there was time enough about six weeks between the submission of the Survey Report and the passing of the impugned order for giving a short, reasonable opportunity to the appellants to explain the adverse findings against them. If there was immediacy situational modifications could be made to meet the requirement of fairness, by reducing the period of notice; that even the manner and form of such notice could be simplified to eliminate delay, that telephonic notice or short opportunity for furnishing their explanation to the Company might have satisfied the requirements of natural justice. Such an opportunity of hearing could have been given after the passing of a conditional tentative order and before its enforcement under section 18AA. For the interregnum suitable interim action such as freezing the assets of the Company or restraining the Company from creating further encumbrances, could be taken under section 16. On behalf of the Union of India and the Authorised Officer it was contended that (1) the presumption in favour of audi alteram partem rule stands impliedly displaced by the language scheme, setting and the purpose of the provision in section 18AA. (2) Section 18AA on its plain terms deals with situations where immediate preventive action is required. The paramount concern is to avoid serious problems which may be caused by fall in production. The purpose of an order under section 18AA is not to condemn the owner but to protect the scheduled industry. The issue under section 18AA is not solely between the Government and the management of the industrial undertaking. The object of taking action under this Section is to protect other outside interests of the community at large and the workers. (3) The rule of natural justice to give a hearing has been incorporated in section 18-F which gives an opportunity of a post-decisional hearing to the owner of the undertaking who if he feels aggrieved can on his application be heard, to show that even the original order under section 18AA was passed on invalid grounds and should be cancelled or rescinded. (4) On a true construction of section 18AA read with section 18-F the requirements of natural justice and fair play can be read into the statute only insofar as conformance to such canons can reasonably and realistically be required of it by the provision for a remedial hearing at a subsequent stage. (5) Under section 18-F the Central Government exercises curial functions and that Section confers on the aggrieved owner a right to apply to the Government to cancel the order of take-over. This section casts an obligation on the Central Government to deal with and dispose of an application filed thereunder with reasonable expedition. Allowing the appeal by the Company,<br />HELD: (Sarkaria & Desai, JJ. per Chinnappa Reddy, J. dissenting.) In the facts and circumstances of the instant case, there has been a noncompliance with the implied requirement of the audi alteram partem rule of natural justice at the pre-decisional stage. The impugned order could be struck down as invalid on that score alone. But in view of the commitment / concession that a hearing would be afforded to the Company, the case is remitted to the Central Government to give a full, fair and effective hearing. [587G-H, 588C] The phrase 'natural justice' is not capable of a static and precise definition. It cannot be imprisoned in the straight-jacket of a cast-iron formula. Rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. Hence not possible to make an exhaustive catalogue of such rules. Two fundamental maxims of natural justice have now become deeply and indelibly ingrained in the common consciousness of mankind as pre-eminently necessary to ensure that the law is applied impartially objectively and fairly. These twin principles are (i) audi alteram partem and (ii) nemo judex in re sua. Audi alteram partem is a highly effective rule devised by the Courts to ensure that a statutory authority arrives at a just decision and it is calculated to act as a healthy check on the abuse or misuse of power. Its reach should not be narrowed and its applicability circumscribed.[554C-G] The rules of natural justice can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. If a statutory provision either specifically or by inevitable implication excludes the application of the rules of natural justice then the Court cannot ignore the mandate of the Legislature. Whether or not the application of the principles of natural justice in a given case has been excluded in the exercise of statutory power depends upon the language and basic scheme of the provision conferring the power, the nature of the power the purpose for which it is conferred and the effect of that power. [556A-B] The maxim audi alteram partem has many facets. Two of them are (a) notice of the case to be met, and (b) opportunity to explain. The rule cannot be sacrificed at the altar of administrative convenience or celerity; for, convenience and justice are often not on speaking terms. Difficulties, however, arise when the statute conferring the power does not expressly exclude this rule but its exclusion is sought by implication due to the presence of certain factors such as urgency where the obligation to give notice and opportunity to be heard would obstruct the taking of prompt action of a preventive or remedial nature. Audi alteram partem rule may be disregarded in an emergent situation where immediate action brooks no delay to prevent some imminent danger or injury or hazard to paramount public interests. Section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure empowers the magistrates specified therein to make an exparte conditional order in emergent cases for removal of dangerous public nuisances. Action under section 17 Land Acquisition Act furnishes another such instance. Similarly action on grounds of public safety public health may justify disregard of the rule of prior hearing. [556C-H] Cases where owing to the compulsion of the fact situation or the necessity of taking speedy action no pre- decisional hearing is given but the action, is followed soon by a full post-decisional hearing to the person affected do not in reality constitute an exception to the audi alteram partem rule. To call such cases as exception is a misnomer because they do not exclude fair play in action but adapt it to the urgency of the situation by balancing the competing claims of hurry and hearing. [560H-561A] The general principle as distinguished from an absolute rule of uniform application seems to be that where a statute does not in terms exclude this rule of prior hearing but contemplates a post-decisional hearing amounting to a full review of the original order on merits then such a statute would be construed as excluding the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage. [561G] If the statute conferring the power is silent with regard to the giving of pre-decisional hearing to the person affected and the administrative decision taken by the authority involves civil consequences of a grave nature and no full review or appeal on merits against that decision is provided courts will be extremely reluctant to construe such a statute as excluding the duty of affording even a minimal hearing shorn of all its formal trappings and dilatory features at the pre-decisional stage, unless viewed pragmatically it would paralyse the administrative process or frustrate the need for utmost promptitude. [561H] 7(i). A comparison of the provisions of Section 18A(1)(b) and Section 18AA(1)(c), bring out two main points of distinction: First, action under Section 18A(1)(b) can be taken only after an investigation had been made under Section 15; while under Section 18AA(1)(a) or (b) action can be taken without such investigation. The language, scheme and setting of Section 18AA read in the light of the Objects and Reasons for enacting this provision make this position clear beyond doubt. Second, before taking action under Section 18A(1)(b), the Central Government has to form an opinion on the basis of the investigation conducted under section 15, in regard to the existence of the objective fact, namely: that the industrial undertaking is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest; while under section 18A(1)(a) the Government has to satisfy itself that the persons incharge of the undertaking have brought about a situation likely to cause fall in production, by committing any of the three kinds of acts specified in that provision. This shows that the preliminary objective fact attributable to the persons in charge of the management or affairs of the undertaking, on the basis of which action may be taken under section 18(A)(1)(b), is of far wider amplitude than the circumstance, the existence of which is a sine qua non for taking action under section 18AA(1). The phrase "highly detrimental to the scheduled industry or public interest" in section 18-A is capable of being construed to cover a large variety of acts or things which may be considered wrong with the manner of running the industry by the management. In contrast with it, action under section 18AA(1)(a) can be taken only if the Central Government is satisfied with regard to the existence of the twin conditions specifically mentioned therein, on the basis of evidence in its possession. [569D-H] An analysis of section 18AA(1)(a), indicates that as a necessary preliminary to the exercise of the power thereunder, the Central Government must be satisfied "from documentary or other evidence in its possession" in regard to the co-existence of two circumstances: (i) that the persons in charge of the industrial undertaking have by committing any of these acts, namely, reckless investments, or creation of incumbrances on the assets of industrial undertaking, or by diversion of funds, brought about a situation which is likely to affect the production of the article manufactured or produced in the industrial undertaking, and (ii) that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation.[570B-D] It cannot be laid down as a general proposition that whenever a statute confers a power on an administrative authority and makes the exercise of that power conditional on the formation of an opinion by that authority in regard to the existence of an immediacy, its opinion in regard to that preliminary fact is not open to judicial scrutiny at all. While it may be conceded that an element of subjectivity is always involved in the formation of such an opinion, the existence of the circumstances from which the inference constituting the opinion, as the sine qua non for action, are to be drawn, must be demonstrable, and the existence of such "circumstances", if questioned, must be proved at least prima facie. [571 E-G] From a plain reading of section 18AA, it is clear that it does not expressly in unmistakable and unequivocal terms exclude the application of the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage. [574B] In the instant case, so far as Kanpur Unit is concerned, it was lying closed for more than three months before the passing of the impugned order. There was no 'immediacy' in relation to that unit, which could absolve the Government from the obligation of complying fully with audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional or pre- takeover stage. [583A] Keshav Mills Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, [1973] 3 S.C.R. 22; Kamla Prasad Khetan v. Union of India,[1957] S.C.R. 1052; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 621; Sukhdev Singh & Ors. v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh, [1975] 3 S.C.R. 619; A. K. Kraipak v. Union of India, [1970] 1 S.C.R. 457; Ridge v. Baldwin, [1964] A.C. 40; 196; Heatley v. Tasmanian Racing & Gaming Commission, 14 Australian Law Reports 519; Nawabkhan Abbaskhan v. State of Gujarat, [1974] 3 S.C.R. 427; State of Orissa v. Dr. Bina Pani Dei, [1962] 2 S.C.R. 625; Ambalal M. Shah v. Hathi Singh Manufacturing Co. Ltd. [1962] 3 S.C.R. 171; and S. L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan & Ors., [1981] 1 S.C.R. 746, referred to. (Per Chinnappa Reddy, J. dissenting) The principles of natural justice are not attracted to the situations contemplated by section 18AA of Industries (Development and Regulation) Act. Natural justice like Ultra Vires and Public Policy is a branch of the public law and is a formidable weapon which can be wielded to secure justice to the citizen. While it may be used to protect certain fundamental liberties, civil and political rights, it may be used as indeed it is used more often than not, to protect vested interests and to obstruct the path of progressive change. The time has come to make an appropriate distinction between natural justice in its application to fundamental liberties, civil and political rights and natural justice in its application to vested interests. [590A-B] Our constitution as befits the Constitution of a Socialist Secular Democratic Republic, recognises the paramountcy of the public weal over the private interest. Natural justice, ultra vires, public policy, or any other rule of interpretation must, therefore, conform, grow and be tailored to serve the public interest and respond to the demands of an evolving society. [590C] The principles of natural justice have taken deep root in the judicial conscience of our people. They are now considered so fundamental as to be implicit in every decision making function, judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative. Where authority functions under a statute and the statute provides for the observance of the principles of natural justice in a particular manner, natural justice will have to be observed in that manner and in no other. Where the statute is silent about the observance of the principles of natural justice, such statutory silence is taken to imply compliance with the principles of natural justice. Where the conflict is between the public interest and the private interest the presumption must necessarily be weak and may, therefore, be readily displaced. The presumption is also weak, where what are involved are mere property rights. In cases of urgency, particularly where the public interest is involved, preemptive action may be a strategic necessity. Even in cases of preemptive action, if the statute so provides or if the Courts so deem fit in appropriate cases, a postponed hearing may be substituted for natural justice. [590A-C; 591F-G] 3(ii). Where natural justice is implied, the extent of the implication and the nature of the hearing must vary with the statute, the subject and the situation. [592B] The absence of the expression 'immediate action' in section 18AA(1)(b) does not make any difference. Section 18AA(1)(a) refers to a situation where immediate preventive action may avert a disaster, whereas section 18AA contemplates a situation where the disaster has occurred and action is necessary to restore normalcy. Restoration of production where production has stopped in a key industry or industrial undertaking is as important and urgent in the public interest as prevention of a situation where production may be affected. Immediate action is, therefore, as necessary in the situation contemplated by section 18AA(1)(b) as in the situation contemplated by section 18AA(1)(a). [596 F-G] The marginal note refers to the power to take over without investigation but there is no sufficient reason to suppose that the word immediate is used only to contra- distinguish it from the investigation contemplated by section 15 of the Act, though of course a consequence of immediate action under section 18AA may be to dispense with the enquiry under section 15. In fact, facts which come to light during the course of an investigation under section 15 may form the basis of action under section 18AA(1)(a). Where in the course of an investigation under section 15 it is discovered that the management have, by reckless investments or creation of encumbrances on the assets of the industrial undertaking or by diversion of funds brought about a situation which is likely to affect the production of the articles manufactured or produced in the industrial undertaking, if the Government is satisfied that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation, there is no reason why the Central Government may not straightaway take action under section 18AA(1)(a) without waiting for completion of investigation under section 15. [597A-B] Where there is a provision in the statute itself for revocation of the order by the very authority making the decision, it appears to be unnecessary to insist upon a pre- decisional observance of natural justice. [598A] The likelihood of production being jeopardized or the stoppage of production in a key industrial undertaking is a matter of grave concern affecting the public interest. Parliament has taken so serious a view of the matter that it has authorised the Central Government to take over the management of the industrial undertaking if immediate action may prevent jeopardy to production or restore production where it has already stopped. The necessity for immediate action by the Central Government contemplated by Parliament is definitely indicative of the exclusion of natural justice. It is not as if the owner of the industrial undertaking is left with no remedy. He may move the Central Government under section 18-F to cancel the order made under section 18AA. [598C-D] Neither section 18-F of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act nor section 21 of the General Clauses Act by itself excludes natural justice. The exclusion of natural justice where such exclusion is not express has to be implied by reference to the subject, the statute and the statutory situation. Where an express provision in the statute itself provides for a post decisional hearing the other provisions of the Statute will have to be read in the light of such provision and the provision for post- decisional hearing may then clinch the issue where pre- decisional natural justice appears to be excluded on the other terms of the statute. That a post-decisional hearing may also be had by the terms of section 21 of the General Clauses Act may not necessarily help in the interpretation of the provisions of the statute concerned. [599 A-C] Ridge v. Baldwin, 1964 A.C. p. 40; Annie G. Phillip v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 75 L.E.d. 1289; John H. Fahey v. Paul Mallonee, 91 L.E.d. 2030; Margarita Fuentes v. Robert L. Shevin, Attorney General of Florida, 32 L.E.d. 2d 556 and Lawrence Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 40 L.E.d. 2d 406, referred to. - Rama Rao, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh as well as the President of the Telugu Desam Party as well as respondent No. 3. The advertisements very shortly stated, refer to the auspicious gifts made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to the poor people on the eve of New Year and Sankranti. In the said advertisements, it is stated that the said Government which was formed by the Telugu Desam Party was giving to the poor people whose income was below Rs. and the said advertisements referred to a new scheme of selling sarees and dhoties at half prices to the poor people in the State of Andhra Pradesh having Green-cards. Moreover, the offer in the advertisements for the sale of dhoties and sarees at discount rates was in the nature of a benefit offered to poor persons in that State. When a Government announces the measures which are intended for the benefit of any of the classes for whose the Government can normally be expected to work like the poor or the economical backward classes, it is only in rare circumstances that such a promise can be said to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) even though such a promise might be made on the eve of elections. 8. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => '', 'counseldef' => '', 'court' => 'Supreme Court of India', 'court_type' => 'SC', 'decidedon' => '1989-09-29', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' K.N. Saikia,; M.H. Kania and; S. Ranganathan, JJ.', 'judgement' => '</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Kania, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. These two appeals arise out of the judgments in two Election Petitions in the Andhra Pradesh High Court questioning the election of respondent No. 1 as a Member of Parliament from Srikakulam No. Parliamentary Constituency in the 8th General Election to the House of the People. The points raised in these appeals are common and so are the relevant facts; and, hence, they are being disposed of by this common judgment. We propose to take note of only the few facts which are necessary for the appreciation of the controversy before us.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The polling date for the said election along with other parliamentary elections in the State of Andhra Pradesh was December 27, 1984 but in Srikakulam No. 1 Parliamentary Constituency the polling was countermanded and the date of polling was later fixed on January 28, 1985. In both the Election Petitions the election of respondent No. 1 was questioned mainly on the ground that Shri N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh as well as the President of the Telugu Desam Party as well as respondent No. 1 gave certain speeches and certain advertisements were got published by Shri N.T. Rama Rao through the Publicity Department of the Government of Andhra Pradesh in the newspapers containing certain statements which are alleged to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A) of the <a href="/act/50684/representation-of-the-people-act-1951-complete-act">Representation of the People Act, 1951</a> (hereinafter referred to as 'the said Act'). The main question canvassed before us is whether the statements contained in these aforesaid advertisements amount to a corrupt practice under Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act. Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act runs as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">123. Corrupt practices</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The following shall be deemed to be corrupt practises for the purposes of this Act :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) 'Bribery', that is to say.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(A) any gift, offer or promise by a candidate or his agent or by any other person with the consent of a candidate or his election agent of any gratification, to any person whomsover, with the object, directly or indirectly of inducing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) x x x</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) an elector to vote or refrain from voting at an election, or as a reward to.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) a person for having so stood or not stood, or for having withdrawn or not having withdrawn his candidature; or</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) an elector for having voted or refrained from voting.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The advertisements very shortly stated, refer to the auspicious gifts made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to the poor people on the eve of New Year and Sankranti. In the said advertisements, it is stated that the said Government which was formed by the Telugu Desam Party was giving to the poor people whose income was below Rs. 6,000 per year, a kilo of rice at Rs. 2 per Kg. and the said advertisements referred to a new scheme of selling sarees and dhoties at half prices to the poor people in the State of Andhra Pradesh having Green-cards. Green-cards were directed to be issued to all the persons whose annual income was below Rs. 6,000. The supply of the rice at subsidised rates as aforesaid was also to be made to the Green-card holders only. The scheme to sell sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was to be operative from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. In considering the question whether the said advertisement and the said speeches amount to a corrupt practice, we are of the view that the provisions of Section 123 of the said Act which deal with corrupt practices have to be interpreted, keeping in mind that dictates of commonsense require that they never could have been intended to treat normal election promises made in election manifestoes or usual election speeches by members of various political parties aspiring to power and by different candidates aspiring to get elected to legislative bodies concerned as corrupt practices. We are of the view that these advertisements and speeches amount to nothing more than statements extolling the achievements of the Government of the State of Andhra Pradesh under the Telugu Desam Party headed by N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister, and contain normal election promises and these statements do not amount to corrupt practices falling within the scope of Sub-clause (b) of Clause (A) of Sub-section (1) of Section 123 of the said Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. It was urged by Mr. Rao, learned Counsel for the appellants that in the impugned judgments, the High Court has incorrectly taken the view that in order to amount to bribery within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A), the transaction must amount to a bargain by the candidate with a view to get votes. It was pointed out by him that the said view has been taken in the impugned judgments, relying upon the decision of a Bench comprising to learned Judges of this Court in Ghasi Ram v. Dal Singh and Ors. :1983 SCR 102 . We have gone through to the relevant portion of that judgment (at page 109 and 110 of the said report). A careful perusal of the said judgment shows that what has been really held in that case is that if the promises given or made amount to a bargain entered into by a candidate for a vote or votes, that would amount to a corrupt practice; but it has not been held there that unless the act alleged amounts to such a bargain, it could not amount to a corrupt practice. In our view, that judgment does not lay down that in order to amount to a corrupt practice, the transaction must amount to a bargain for getting a vote. It was pointed out by Mr. Rao, however, that such a view seems to have been taken in two other decisions rendered by two Benches, each comprising two learned Judges of this Court in Bhanu Kumar Shastri v. Mohan Lal Sukhadia and Ors. : [1971]3SCR522 and Harjit Singh Mann v. S Umrao Singh and Ors. : [1980]2SCR501 . and these judgments need to be overruled. We do not propose to go into the correctness or otherwise of this view because, even on the footing that in order to amount to a corrupt practice under the aforesaid provision the alleged acts need not constitute a bargain, the the acts established in the present case, in our opinion, do not amount to a corrupt practice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Our attention was drawn by Mr. Rao to the fact that in this case the said advertisements and the speeches had to be viewed in the context of the fact that the advertisements were issued and the speeches were made after respondent No. 1 filed his nomination papers on January 4, 1985, for the election and before the election was held in the aforesaid constituency. It was further pointed out that the offer made for the sale of sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was limited to the period from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985. It cannot be denied that these factors are relevant factOrs. We cannot, however, lose sight of the fact that this offer was made not only in this constituency but throughout the State where the elections to the House of the People were scheduled to be held, and were, in fact, held on December 27, 1984. It was only in case of this constituency that the election to be held on the scheduled date was countermanded and later held on January 28, 1985. We cannot lose sight of the fact that, as far as the said speeches and the said advertisements, which were issued by the Publicity Department of the State, are concerned, they deal in the main with the achievements of the Government of Andhra Pradesh which, of course, was being run by Ministers belonging to Telugu Desam Party to which respondent No. 1 also belonged. Moreover, the offer in the advertisements for the sale of dhoties and sarees at discount rates was in the nature of a benefit offered to poor persons in that State. When a Government announces the measures which are intended for the benefit of any of the classes for whose the Government can normally be expected to work like the poor or the economical backward classes, it is only in rare circumstances that such a promise can be said to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) even though such a promise might be made on the eve of elections. Keeping this in mind, in our opinion, although the offer to sell dhoties and sarees at discount rates was of a limited duration as aforestated, it cannot be regarded as a corrupt practice. Such an offer was bound to have financial repercussions and it is quite possible the duration of the offer was limited to enable the Government to study the financial repercussions rather than from any improper motive. We find support for this view from the decision of this Court in H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh : [1969]3SCR813 . In that case an Ordinance was passed by the Government of Madhya Pradesh as a result of which a large number of agriculturists, namely, those holdings of plots of land of less than 7.5 acres area or paying land revenue not exceeding Rs. 5/- were exempted from the payment of the land revenue. It was held that such a concession does not amount to a gift, offer or promise of any gratification within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) of the said Act nor does the announcement of the declaration made at a meeting shortly before the election or the issue of a pamphlet containing that declaration at that time carry the matter any further. It was held that neither Shri D.P. Misra who was the Chief Minister nor Shri S.K. Dixit who acted as his agent were guilty of any corrupt practice within the meaning of the aforesaid provision.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. It was next contended by Mr. Rao, although very faintly, that the High Court was in error as it had not decided all other issues which were raised in the election petition. In this regard we cannot lose sight of the fact that the term of the present Lok Sabha is likely to be over within a few months and fresh elections are likely to be held and it would, therefore, be an exercise in futility to remand the matter to the High Court for deciding the remaining issues.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'AIR1990SC1889; JT1989(4)SC186; 1989(2)SCALE891; 1989Supp(2)SCC504', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors.', 'sub' => 'Election', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ), 'casename_url' => 'b-rajagopala-rao-vs-appayya-hanumanthu', 'args' => array( (int) 0 => '640942', (int) 1 => 'b-rajagopala-rao-vs-appayya-hanumanthu' ) ) $title_for_layout = 'B Rajagopala Rao and anr Vs Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors - Citation 640942 - Court Judgment | ' $desc = array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '640942', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/50684/representation-of-the-people-act-1951-complete-act">Representation of the People Act, 1951</a> - Sections 1, 3(1)(A), 123 and 123(1)(A)', 'appealno' => 'Civil Appeal Nos. 484 and 485 of 1987', 'appellant' => 'B. Rajagopala Rao and anr.', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'B. Rajagopala Rao and anr. Vs. Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors.', 'casenote' => 'Election - corrupt practices - Sections 123 and 123 (1) (A) of Representation of the People Act, 1951 - whether advertisements by public department and speeches made by respondent No. 1 to sell dhoti and sarees at discount rates amount to corrupt practices - offer was available for mass and for limited duration - such offer was bound to have financial repercussions and it is quite possible that duration of offer limited to enable Government to study financial repercussions rather than from any improper motive - offer not amounted to corrupt practices. - [ D.A. Desai,; O. Chinnappa Reddy and; R.S. Sarkaria, JJ.] The Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 empowers the Union of India in the public interest to take under its control the industries specified in the First Schedule to the Act. Item 23 of the First Schedule relates to textiles of various categories. Section 15 authorises the Central Government to make or cause to be made a full and complete investigation into the circumstances of the case if the Central Government is of the opinion that (a) in respect of any scheduled industry or industrial undertaking or undertakings (i) there has been, or is likely to be, a substantial fall in the volume of production for which, having regard to the economic conditions prevailing, there is no justification; or (ii) there has been, or is likely to be, a marked deterioration in the quality of any article... which could have been or can be avoided; or (iii) there has been or is likely to be a rise in the price of any article..... for which there is no justification; or (iv) it is necessary to take any such action for the purpose of conserving any resources of national importance; or (b) any industrial undertaking is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest. After the investigation is made under section 15, section 16(1) empowers the Central Government if action is desirable, to issue appropriate directions, and section 16(2) provides for the issue of interim directions by the Central Government pending investigation under section 15. Chapter III-A consisting of Sections 18A, 18-AA, 18-B, 18-C, 18-D, 18-E and 18-F deal with "direct management or control of Industrial Undertakings by Central Government in certain cases". Sec. 18-A empowers the Central Government by notified order, to authorise any person or body of persons to take over the management of the whole or any part of an industrial undertaking or to exercise in respect of the whole, or any part of the undertaking such functions of control as may be specified in the order, if the Central Government is of opinion that: (a) an industrial undertaking to which directions have been issued in pursuance of section 16 has failed to comply with such directions, or (b) an industrial undertaking in respect of which an investigation has been made under section 15 is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest. Section 18AA(5) stipulates that the provisions of Sections 18-B to 18 E shall be applicable to the industrial undertaking in respect of which an order has been made under section 18-AA even as they apply to an industrial undertaking taken over under Section 18-A. Section 18-F empowers the Central Government to cancel the order made under section 18-A if it appears that the purpose of the order has been fulfilled or it is not necessary that the order should remain in force. The appellant M/s. Swadeshi Cotton Mills was taken over by the Government of India by a notification dated April 13, 1978 in exercise of the powers conferred on it under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 18AA of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 on the ground that the company had by creation of encumbrances on the assets of its industrial undertakings, brought about a situation which had affected and is likely to further affect the production of articles manufactured or produced by it and that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation. The Government authorised the National Textile Corporation Limited to take over the management, subject to the conditions that the authorised person shall comply with all the directions issued from time to time by the Central Government and that the authorised person shall hold office for a period of five years. The appellant Mills challenged the aforesaid order in a writ petition in the High Court. The case was heard by a Full Bench of five Judges to consider the question whether in construing section 18AA of the Industries Development and Regulation Act, 1951, compliance with the principle of audi alteram partem is to be implied and whether hearing is to be given to the parties who would be affected by the order to be passed prior to the passing of the order or whether hearing can be given after the order is passed and whether the order passed under the said Section is vitiated by not giving of such hearing and whether such vice can be cured. The Bench by a majority answered the three questions as follows:- (a) Section 18AA(1)(a)(b) excludes the giving of prior hearing to the party who would be affected by order thereunder. (b) Section 18-F expressly provides for a post- decisional hearing to the owner of the industrial undertaking, the management of which is taken over under section 18AA to have the order made under section 18AA cancelled on any relevant ground. (c) As the taking over of management under section 18A is not vitiated by the failure to grant prior hearing the question of any such vice being cured by a grant of a subsequent hearing does not arise. The minority, however, held that in compliance with the principles of natural justice, prior hearing to the owner of the undertaking was required to be given before the passing of an order under section 18AA, that the second question did not arise as the denial of a prior hearing would not cure the vice by the grant of subsequent hearing, but it would be open to the Court to moderate the relief in such a way that the order is kept alive to the extent necessary until the making of the fresh order to subserve public interest and to make appropriate directions. After the decision on the reference the case was reheard on merits by a Full Bench of three Judges and the writ petition was allowed in part. The challenge to the validity of the order being rejected but insofar as the impugned order seeking to take over the corporate entity of the company, the corporate entity of the subsidiary and its assets, the petition was allowed and the respondents, the Union of India and the authorised person were directed to release from its control and custody and/or deliver possession of any assets or property of the company which were not referable to the industrial undertakings. Appeals to this Court were filed on behalf of the Company as well as by the Union of India and the National Textile Corporation. Two propositions were propounded on behalf of the company that: (a) Whether it was necessary to observe the rules of natural justice before issuing a notified order under section 18AA(1)(a) and further whether section 18-F impliedly excludes rules of natural justice relating to prior hearing; and it was contended (1) the mere use of the word 'immediate' in sub-clause (a) of section 18AA does not show a legislative intent to exclude the application of audi alteram partem rule altogether. (2) The word 'immediate' in clause (a) has been used in contra distinction to 'investigate'. It only means that under section 18AA action can be taken without prior investigation under section 15. The use of the word 'immediate' in section 18AA(1)(a) only dispenses with investigation under section 15 and not with the principle of audi alteram partem altogether and this is indicated by the marginal note of section 18A and para 3 of the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Amendment Bill which inserted section 18AA in 1971. (3) The word 'immediate' occurs only in clause (a) and not in clause (b) of section 18AA(1). It would be odd if intention to exclude this principle of natural justice is spelt out in one clause of the sub-section when the other clause does not exclude it. (4) Section 18-F does not exclude a pre-decisional hearing. The so-called post-decisional hearing contemplated by section 18-F cannot be and is not intended to be a substitute for a pre-decisional hearing. (5) Section 18F incorporates only a facet, albeit qualified, of section 21 of the General Clauses Act. The language of the Section implicity prohibits an enquiry into circumstances that led to the passing of the order of take-over and under it the aggrieved person is not entitled to show that on merits the order was void ab initio. (6) 'Immediacy' does not exclude a duty to act fairly because even an emergent situation can co-exist with the canons of natural justice. The only effect of urgency on the application of the principle of fair hearing would be that the width, form and duration of the hearing would be tailored to the situation and reduced to the reasonable minimum so that it does not delay and defeat the purpose of the contemplated action. (7) Where the civil consequences of the administrative action are grave and its effect is highly prejudicial to the rights and interests of the person affected and there is nothing in the language and scheme of the statute which unequivocally excludes a fair pre-decisional hearing and the post-decisional hearing provided therein is not a real remedial hearing equitable to a full right of appeal the Court should be loath to infer a legislative intent to exclude even a minimal fair hearing at the pre-decisional stage merely on ground of urgency. (8) The Central Government appointed four Government Officials including one from the office of the Textile Commissioner to study the affairs of the Company and to make recommendation. This Official Group submitted its report on February 16, 1978. The evidence on the basis of which the impugned order was passed was not disclosed to the appellant company till May 1978, only after it had filed the writ petition in the High Court. If there was anything adverse to the appellants in the survey report there was time enough about six weeks between the submission of the Survey Report and the passing of the impugned order for giving a short, reasonable opportunity to the appellants to explain the adverse findings against them. If there was immediacy situational modifications could be made to meet the requirement of fairness, by reducing the period of notice; that even the manner and form of such notice could be simplified to eliminate delay, that telephonic notice or short opportunity for furnishing their explanation to the Company might have satisfied the requirements of natural justice. Such an opportunity of hearing could have been given after the passing of a conditional tentative order and before its enforcement under section 18AA. For the interregnum suitable interim action such as freezing the assets of the Company or restraining the Company from creating further encumbrances, could be taken under section 16. On behalf of the Union of India and the Authorised Officer it was contended that (1) the presumption in favour of audi alteram partem rule stands impliedly displaced by the language scheme, setting and the purpose of the provision in section 18AA. (2) Section 18AA on its plain terms deals with situations where immediate preventive action is required. The paramount concern is to avoid serious problems which may be caused by fall in production. The purpose of an order under section 18AA is not to condemn the owner but to protect the scheduled industry. The issue under section 18AA is not solely between the Government and the management of the industrial undertaking. The object of taking action under this Section is to protect other outside interests of the community at large and the workers. (3) The rule of natural justice to give a hearing has been incorporated in section 18-F which gives an opportunity of a post-decisional hearing to the owner of the undertaking who if he feels aggrieved can on his application be heard, to show that even the original order under section 18AA was passed on invalid grounds and should be cancelled or rescinded. (4) On a true construction of section 18AA read with section 18-F the requirements of natural justice and fair play can be read into the statute only insofar as conformance to such canons can reasonably and realistically be required of it by the provision for a remedial hearing at a subsequent stage. (5) Under section 18-F the Central Government exercises curial functions and that Section confers on the aggrieved owner a right to apply to the Government to cancel the order of take-over. This section casts an obligation on the Central Government to deal with and dispose of an application filed thereunder with reasonable expedition. Allowing the appeal by the Company,<br/>HELD: (Sarkaria & Desai, JJ. per Chinnappa Reddy, J. dissenting.) In the facts and circumstances of the instant case, there has been a noncompliance with the implied requirement of the audi alteram partem rule of natural justice at the pre-decisional stage. The impugned order could be struck down as invalid on that score alone. But in view of the commitment / concession that a hearing would be afforded to the Company, the case is remitted to the Central Government to give a full, fair and effective hearing. [587G-H, 588C] The phrase 'natural justice' is not capable of a static and precise definition. It cannot be imprisoned in the straight-jacket of a cast-iron formula. Rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. Hence not possible to make an exhaustive catalogue of such rules. Two fundamental maxims of natural justice have now become deeply and indelibly ingrained in the common consciousness of mankind as pre-eminently necessary to ensure that the law is applied impartially objectively and fairly. These twin principles are (i) audi alteram partem and (ii) nemo judex in re sua. Audi alteram partem is a highly effective rule devised by the Courts to ensure that a statutory authority arrives at a just decision and it is calculated to act as a healthy check on the abuse or misuse of power. Its reach should not be narrowed and its applicability circumscribed.[554C-G] The rules of natural justice can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. If a statutory provision either specifically or by inevitable implication excludes the application of the rules of natural justice then the Court cannot ignore the mandate of the Legislature. Whether or not the application of the principles of natural justice in a given case has been excluded in the exercise of statutory power depends upon the language and basic scheme of the provision conferring the power, the nature of the power the purpose for which it is conferred and the effect of that power. [556A-B] The maxim audi alteram partem has many facets. Two of them are (a) notice of the case to be met, and (b) opportunity to explain. The rule cannot be sacrificed at the altar of administrative convenience or celerity; for, convenience and justice are often not on speaking terms. Difficulties, however, arise when the statute conferring the power does not expressly exclude this rule but its exclusion is sought by implication due to the presence of certain factors such as urgency where the obligation to give notice and opportunity to be heard would obstruct the taking of prompt action of a preventive or remedial nature. Audi alteram partem rule may be disregarded in an emergent situation where immediate action brooks no delay to prevent some imminent danger or injury or hazard to paramount public interests. Section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure empowers the magistrates specified therein to make an exparte conditional order in emergent cases for removal of dangerous public nuisances. Action under section 17 Land Acquisition Act furnishes another such instance. Similarly action on grounds of public safety public health may justify disregard of the rule of prior hearing. [556C-H] Cases where owing to the compulsion of the fact situation or the necessity of taking speedy action no pre- decisional hearing is given but the action, is followed soon by a full post-decisional hearing to the person affected do not in reality constitute an exception to the audi alteram partem rule. To call such cases as exception is a misnomer because they do not exclude fair play in action but adapt it to the urgency of the situation by balancing the competing claims of hurry and hearing. [560H-561A] The general principle as distinguished from an absolute rule of uniform application seems to be that where a statute does not in terms exclude this rule of prior hearing but contemplates a post-decisional hearing amounting to a full review of the original order on merits then such a statute would be construed as excluding the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage. [561G] If the statute conferring the power is silent with regard to the giving of pre-decisional hearing to the person affected and the administrative decision taken by the authority involves civil consequences of a grave nature and no full review or appeal on merits against that decision is provided courts will be extremely reluctant to construe such a statute as excluding the duty of affording even a minimal hearing shorn of all its formal trappings and dilatory features at the pre-decisional stage, unless viewed pragmatically it would paralyse the administrative process or frustrate the need for utmost promptitude. [561H] 7(i). A comparison of the provisions of Section 18A(1)(b) and Section 18AA(1)(c), bring out two main points of distinction: First, action under Section 18A(1)(b) can be taken only after an investigation had been made under Section 15; while under Section 18AA(1)(a) or (b) action can be taken without such investigation. The language, scheme and setting of Section 18AA read in the light of the Objects and Reasons for enacting this provision make this position clear beyond doubt. Second, before taking action under Section 18A(1)(b), the Central Government has to form an opinion on the basis of the investigation conducted under section 15, in regard to the existence of the objective fact, namely: that the industrial undertaking is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest; while under section 18A(1)(a) the Government has to satisfy itself that the persons incharge of the undertaking have brought about a situation likely to cause fall in production, by committing any of the three kinds of acts specified in that provision. This shows that the preliminary objective fact attributable to the persons in charge of the management or affairs of the undertaking, on the basis of which action may be taken under section 18(A)(1)(b), is of far wider amplitude than the circumstance, the existence of which is a sine qua non for taking action under section 18AA(1). The phrase "highly detrimental to the scheduled industry or public interest" in section 18-A is capable of being construed to cover a large variety of acts or things which may be considered wrong with the manner of running the industry by the management. In contrast with it, action under section 18AA(1)(a) can be taken only if the Central Government is satisfied with regard to the existence of the twin conditions specifically mentioned therein, on the basis of evidence in its possession. [569D-H] An analysis of section 18AA(1)(a), indicates that as a necessary preliminary to the exercise of the power thereunder, the Central Government must be satisfied "from documentary or other evidence in its possession" in regard to the co-existence of two circumstances: (i) that the persons in charge of the industrial undertaking have by committing any of these acts, namely, reckless investments, or creation of incumbrances on the assets of industrial undertaking, or by diversion of funds, brought about a situation which is likely to affect the production of the article manufactured or produced in the industrial undertaking, and (ii) that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation.[570B-D] It cannot be laid down as a general proposition that whenever a statute confers a power on an administrative authority and makes the exercise of that power conditional on the formation of an opinion by that authority in regard to the existence of an immediacy, its opinion in regard to that preliminary fact is not open to judicial scrutiny at all. While it may be conceded that an element of subjectivity is always involved in the formation of such an opinion, the existence of the circumstances from which the inference constituting the opinion, as the sine qua non for action, are to be drawn, must be demonstrable, and the existence of such "circumstances", if questioned, must be proved at least prima facie. [571 E-G] From a plain reading of section 18AA, it is clear that it does not expressly in unmistakable and unequivocal terms exclude the application of the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage. [574B] In the instant case, so far as Kanpur Unit is concerned, it was lying closed for more than three months before the passing of the impugned order. There was no 'immediacy' in relation to that unit, which could absolve the Government from the obligation of complying fully with audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional or pre- takeover stage. [583A] Keshav Mills Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, [1973] 3 S.C.R. 22; Kamla Prasad Khetan v. Union of India,[1957] S.C.R. 1052; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 621; Sukhdev Singh & Ors. v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh, [1975] 3 S.C.R. 619; A. K. Kraipak v. Union of India, [1970] 1 S.C.R. 457; Ridge v. Baldwin, [1964] A.C. 40; 196; Heatley v. Tasmanian Racing & Gaming Commission, 14 Australian Law Reports 519; Nawabkhan Abbaskhan v. State of Gujarat, [1974] 3 S.C.R. 427; State of Orissa v. Dr. Bina Pani Dei, [1962] 2 S.C.R. 625; Ambalal M. Shah v. Hathi Singh Manufacturing Co. Ltd. [1962] 3 S.C.R. 171; and S. L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan & Ors., [1981] 1 S.C.R. 746, referred to. (Per Chinnappa Reddy, J. dissenting) The principles of natural justice are not attracted to the situations contemplated by section 18AA of Industries (Development and Regulation) Act. Natural justice like Ultra Vires and Public Policy is a branch of the public law and is a formidable weapon which can be wielded to secure justice to the citizen. While it may be used to protect certain fundamental liberties, civil and political rights, it may be used as indeed it is used more often than not, to protect vested interests and to obstruct the path of progressive change. The time has come to make an appropriate distinction between natural justice in its application to fundamental liberties, civil and political rights and natural justice in its application to vested interests. [590A-B] Our constitution as befits the Constitution of a Socialist Secular Democratic Republic, recognises the paramountcy of the public weal over the private interest. Natural justice, ultra vires, public policy, or any other rule of interpretation must, therefore, conform, grow and be tailored to serve the public interest and respond to the demands of an evolving society. [590C] The principles of natural justice have taken deep root in the judicial conscience of our people. They are now considered so fundamental as to be implicit in every decision making function, judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative. Where authority functions under a statute and the statute provides for the observance of the principles of natural justice in a particular manner, natural justice will have to be observed in that manner and in no other. Where the statute is silent about the observance of the principles of natural justice, such statutory silence is taken to imply compliance with the principles of natural justice. Where the conflict is between the public interest and the private interest the presumption must necessarily be weak and may, therefore, be readily displaced. The presumption is also weak, where what are involved are mere property rights. In cases of urgency, particularly where the public interest is involved, preemptive action may be a strategic necessity. Even in cases of preemptive action, if the statute so provides or if the Courts so deem fit in appropriate cases, a postponed hearing may be substituted for natural justice. [590A-C; 591F-G] 3(ii). Where natural justice is implied, the extent of the implication and the nature of the hearing must vary with the statute, the subject and the situation. [592B] The absence of the expression 'immediate action' in section 18AA(1)(b) does not make any difference. Section 18AA(1)(a) refers to a situation where immediate preventive action may avert a disaster, whereas section 18AA contemplates a situation where the disaster has occurred and action is necessary to restore normalcy. Restoration of production where production has stopped in a key industry or industrial undertaking is as important and urgent in the public interest as prevention of a situation where production may be affected. Immediate action is, therefore, as necessary in the situation contemplated by section 18AA(1)(b) as in the situation contemplated by section 18AA(1)(a). [596 F-G] The marginal note refers to the power to take over without investigation but there is no sufficient reason to suppose that the word immediate is used only to contra- distinguish it from the investigation contemplated by section 15 of the Act, though of course a consequence of immediate action under section 18AA may be to dispense with the enquiry under section 15. In fact, facts which come to light during the course of an investigation under section 15 may form the basis of action under section 18AA(1)(a). Where in the course of an investigation under section 15 it is discovered that the management have, by reckless investments or creation of encumbrances on the assets of the industrial undertaking or by diversion of funds brought about a situation which is likely to affect the production of the articles manufactured or produced in the industrial undertaking, if the Government is satisfied that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation, there is no reason why the Central Government may not straightaway take action under section 18AA(1)(a) without waiting for completion of investigation under section 15. [597A-B] Where there is a provision in the statute itself for revocation of the order by the very authority making the decision, it appears to be unnecessary to insist upon a pre- decisional observance of natural justice. [598A] The likelihood of production being jeopardized or the stoppage of production in a key industrial undertaking is a matter of grave concern affecting the public interest. Parliament has taken so serious a view of the matter that it has authorised the Central Government to take over the management of the industrial undertaking if immediate action may prevent jeopardy to production or restore production where it has already stopped. The necessity for immediate action by the Central Government contemplated by Parliament is definitely indicative of the exclusion of natural justice. It is not as if the owner of the industrial undertaking is left with no remedy. He may move the Central Government under section 18-F to cancel the order made under section 18AA. [598C-D] Neither section 18-F of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act nor section 21 of the General Clauses Act by itself excludes natural justice. The exclusion of natural justice where such exclusion is not express has to be implied by reference to the subject, the statute and the statutory situation. Where an express provision in the statute itself provides for a post decisional hearing the other provisions of the Statute will have to be read in the light of such provision and the provision for post- decisional hearing may then clinch the issue where pre- decisional natural justice appears to be excluded on the other terms of the statute. That a post-decisional hearing may also be had by the terms of section 21 of the General Clauses Act may not necessarily help in the interpretation of the provisions of the statute concerned. [599 A-C] Ridge v. Baldwin, 1964 A.C. p. 40; Annie G. Phillip v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 75 L.E.d. 1289; John H. Fahey v. Paul Mallonee, 91 L.E.d. 2030; Margarita Fuentes v. Robert L. Shevin, Attorney General of Florida, 32 L.E.d. 2d 556 and Lawrence Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 40 L.E.d. 2d 406, referred to. - Rama Rao, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh as well as the President of the Telugu Desam Party as well as respondent No. 3. The advertisements very shortly stated, refer to the auspicious gifts made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to the poor people on the eve of New Year and Sankranti. In the said advertisements, it is stated that the said Government which was formed by the Telugu Desam Party was giving to the poor people whose income was below Rs. and the said advertisements referred to a new scheme of selling sarees and dhoties at half prices to the poor people in the State of Andhra Pradesh having Green-cards. Moreover, the offer in the advertisements for the sale of dhoties and sarees at discount rates was in the nature of a benefit offered to poor persons in that State. When a Government announces the measures which are intended for the benefit of any of the classes for whose the Government can normally be expected to work like the poor or the economical backward classes, it is only in rare circumstances that such a promise can be said to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) even though such a promise might be made on the eve of elections. 8. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => '', 'counseldef' => '', 'court' => 'Supreme Court of India', 'court_type' => 'SC', 'decidedon' => '1989-09-29', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' K.N. Saikia,; M.H. Kania and; S. Ranganathan, JJ.', 'judgement' => '</p><p>Kania, J.</p><p>1. These two appeals arise out of the judgments in two Election Petitions in the Andhra Pradesh High Court questioning the election of respondent No. 1 as a Member of Parliament from Srikakulam No. Parliamentary Constituency in the 8th General Election to the House of the People. The points raised in these appeals are common and so are the relevant facts; and, hence, they are being disposed of by this common judgment. We propose to take note of only the few facts which are necessary for the appreciation of the controversy before us.</p><p>2. The polling date for the said election along with other parliamentary elections in the State of Andhra Pradesh was December 27, 1984 but in Srikakulam No. 1 Parliamentary Constituency the polling was countermanded and the date of polling was later fixed on January 28, 1985. In both the Election Petitions the election of respondent No. 1 was questioned mainly on the ground that Shri N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh as well as the President of the Telugu Desam Party as well as respondent No. 1 gave certain speeches and certain advertisements were got published by Shri N.T. Rama Rao through the Publicity Department of the Government of Andhra Pradesh in the newspapers containing certain statements which are alleged to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A) of the <a>Representation of the People Act, 1951</a> (hereinafter referred to as 'the said Act'). The main question canvassed before us is whether the statements contained in these aforesaid advertisements amount to a corrupt practice under Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act. Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act runs as follows :</p><p>123. Corrupt practices</p><p>The following shall be deemed to be corrupt practises for the purposes of this Act :</p><p>(1) 'Bribery', that is to say.</p><p>(A) any gift, offer or promise by a candidate or his agent or by any other person with the consent of a candidate or his election agent of any gratification, to any person whomsover, with the object, directly or indirectly of inducing.</p><p>(a) x x x</p><p>(b) an elector to vote or refrain from voting at an election, or as a reward to.</p><p>(i) a person for having so stood or not stood, or for having withdrawn or not having withdrawn his candidature; or</p><p>(ii) an elector for having voted or refrained from voting.</p><p>3. The advertisements very shortly stated, refer to the auspicious gifts made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to the poor people on the eve of New Year and Sankranti. In the said advertisements, it is stated that the said Government which was formed by the Telugu Desam Party was giving to the poor people whose income was below Rs. 6,000 per year, a kilo of rice at Rs. 2 per Kg. and the said advertisements referred to a new scheme of selling sarees and dhoties at half prices to the poor people in the State of Andhra Pradesh having Green-cards. Green-cards were directed to be issued to all the persons whose annual income was below Rs. 6,000. The supply of the rice at subsidised rates as aforesaid was also to be made to the Green-card holders only. The scheme to sell sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was to be operative from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985.</p><p>4. In considering the question whether the said advertisement and the said speeches amount to a corrupt practice, we are of the view that the provisions of Section 123 of the said Act which deal with corrupt practices have to be interpreted, keeping in mind that dictates of commonsense require that they never could have been intended to treat normal election promises made in election manifestoes or usual election speeches by members of various political parties aspiring to power and by different candidates aspiring to get elected to legislative bodies concerned as corrupt practices. We are of the view that these advertisements and speeches amount to nothing more than statements extolling the achievements of the Government of the State of Andhra Pradesh under the Telugu Desam Party headed by N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister, and contain normal election promises and these statements do not amount to corrupt practices falling within the scope of Sub-clause (b) of Clause (A) of Sub-section (1) of Section 123 of the said Act.</p><p>5. It was urged by Mr. Rao, learned Counsel for the appellants that in the impugned judgments, the High Court has incorrectly taken the view that in order to amount to bribery within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A), the transaction must amount to a bargain by the candidate with a view to get votes. It was pointed out by him that the said view has been taken in the impugned judgments, relying upon the decision of a Bench comprising to learned Judges of this Court in Ghasi Ram v. Dal Singh and Ors. :1983 SCR 102 . We have gone through to the relevant portion of that judgment (at page 109 and 110 of the said report). A careful perusal of the said judgment shows that what has been really held in that case is that if the promises given or made amount to a bargain entered into by a candidate for a vote or votes, that would amount to a corrupt practice; but it has not been held there that unless the act alleged amounts to such a bargain, it could not amount to a corrupt practice. In our view, that judgment does not lay down that in order to amount to a corrupt practice, the transaction must amount to a bargain for getting a vote. It was pointed out by Mr. Rao, however, that such a view seems to have been taken in two other decisions rendered by two Benches, each comprising two learned Judges of this Court in Bhanu Kumar Shastri v. Mohan Lal Sukhadia and Ors. : [1971]3SCR522 and Harjit Singh Mann v. S Umrao Singh and Ors. : [1980]2SCR501 . and these judgments need to be overruled. We do not propose to go into the correctness or otherwise of this view because, even on the footing that in order to amount to a corrupt practice under the aforesaid provision the alleged acts need not constitute a bargain, the the acts established in the present case, in our opinion, do not amount to a corrupt practice.</p><p>6. Our attention was drawn by Mr. Rao to the fact that in this case the said advertisements and the speeches had to be viewed in the context of the fact that the advertisements were issued and the speeches were made after respondent No. 1 filed his nomination papers on January 4, 1985, for the election and before the election was held in the aforesaid constituency. It was further pointed out that the offer made for the sale of sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was limited to the period from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985. It cannot be denied that these factors are relevant factOrs. We cannot, however, lose sight of the fact that this offer was made not only in this constituency but throughout the State where the elections to the House of the People were scheduled to be held, and were, in fact, held on December 27, 1984. It was only in case of this constituency that the election to be held on the scheduled date was countermanded and later held on January 28, 1985. We cannot lose sight of the fact that, as far as the said speeches and the said advertisements, which were issued by the Publicity Department of the State, are concerned, they deal in the main with the achievements of the Government of Andhra Pradesh which, of course, was being run by Ministers belonging to Telugu Desam Party to which respondent No. 1 also belonged. Moreover, the offer in the advertisements for the sale of dhoties and sarees at discount rates was in the nature of a benefit offered to poor persons in that State. When a Government announces the measures which are intended for the benefit of any of the classes for whose the Government can normally be expected to work like the poor or the economical backward classes, it is only in rare circumstances that such a promise can be said to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) even though such a promise might be made on the eve of elections. Keeping this in mind, in our opinion, although the offer to sell dhoties and sarees at discount rates was of a limited duration as aforestated, it cannot be regarded as a corrupt practice. Such an offer was bound to have financial repercussions and it is quite possible the duration of the offer was limited to enable the Government to study the financial repercussions rather than from any improper motive. We find support for this view from the decision of this Court in H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh : [1969]3SCR813 . In that case an Ordinance was passed by the Government of Madhya Pradesh as a result of which a large number of agriculturists, namely, those holdings of plots of land of less than 7.5 acres area or paying land revenue not exceeding Rs. 5/- were exempted from the payment of the land revenue. It was held that such a concession does not amount to a gift, offer or promise of any gratification within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) of the said Act nor does the announcement of the declaration made at a meeting shortly before the election or the issue of a pamphlet containing that declaration at that time carry the matter any further. It was held that neither Shri D.P. Misra who was the Chief Minister nor Shri S.K. Dixit who acted as his agent were guilty of any corrupt practice within the meaning of the aforesaid provision.</p><p>7. It was next contended by Mr. Rao, although very faintly, that the High Court was in error as it had not decided all other issues which were raised in the election petition. In this regard we cannot lose sight of the fact that the term of the present Lok Sabha is likely to be over within a few months and fresh elections are likely to be held and it would, therefore, be an exercise in futility to remand the matter to the High Court for deciding the remaining issues.</p><p>8. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.<p></p><p>', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'AIR1990SC1889; JT1989(4)SC186; 1989(2)SCALE891; 1989Supp(2)SCC504', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors.', 'sub' => 'Election', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ) $casename_url = 'b-rajagopala-rao-vs-appayya-hanumanthu' $args = array( (int) 0 => '640942', (int) 1 => 'b-rajagopala-rao-vs-appayya-hanumanthu' ) $url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/640942/b-rajagopala-rao-vs-appayya-hanumanthu' $ctype = '' $caseref = 'H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh<br>' $content = array( (int) 0 => '', (int) 1 => '<p>Kania, J.', (int) 2 => '<p>1. These two appeals arise out of the judgments in two Election Petitions in the Andhra Pradesh High Court questioning the election of respondent No. 1 as a Member of Parliament from Srikakulam No. Parliamentary Constituency in the 8th General Election to the House of the People. The points raised in these appeals are common and so are the relevant facts; and, hence, they are being disposed of by this common judgment. We propose to take note of only the few facts which are necessary for the appreciation of the controversy before us.', (int) 3 => '<p>2. The polling date for the said election along with other parliamentary elections in the State of Andhra Pradesh was December 27, 1984 but in Srikakulam No. 1 Parliamentary Constituency the polling was countermanded and the date of polling was later fixed on January 28, 1985. In both the Election Petitions the election of respondent No. 1 was questioned mainly on the ground that Shri N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh as well as the President of the Telugu Desam Party as well as respondent No. 1 gave certain speeches and certain advertisements were got published by Shri N.T. Rama Rao through the Publicity Department of the Government of Andhra Pradesh in the newspapers containing certain statements which are alleged to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A) of the <a>Representation of the People Act, 1951</a> (hereinafter referred to as 'the said Act'). The main question canvassed before us is whether the statements contained in these aforesaid advertisements amount to a corrupt practice under Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act. Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act runs as follows :', (int) 4 => '<p>123. Corrupt practices', (int) 5 => '<p>The following shall be deemed to be corrupt practises for the purposes of this Act :', (int) 6 => '<p>(1) 'Bribery', that is to say.', (int) 7 => '<p>(A) any gift, offer or promise by a candidate or his agent or by any other person with the consent of a candidate or his election agent of any gratification, to any person whomsover, with the object, directly or indirectly of inducing.', (int) 8 => '<p>(a) x x x', (int) 9 => '<p>(b) an elector to vote or refrain from voting at an election, or as a reward to.', (int) 10 => '<p>(i) a person for having so stood or not stood, or for having withdrawn or not having withdrawn his candidature; or', (int) 11 => '<p>(ii) an elector for having voted or refrained from voting.', (int) 12 => '<p>3. The advertisements very shortly stated, refer to the auspicious gifts made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to the poor people on the eve of New Year and Sankranti. In the said advertisements, it is stated that the said Government which was formed by the Telugu Desam Party was giving to the poor people whose income was below Rs. 6,000 per year, a kilo of rice at Rs. 2 per Kg. and the said advertisements referred to a new scheme of selling sarees and dhoties at half prices to the poor people in the State of Andhra Pradesh having Green-cards. Green-cards were directed to be issued to all the persons whose annual income was below Rs. 6,000. The supply of the rice at subsidised rates as aforesaid was also to be made to the Green-card holders only. The scheme to sell sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was to be operative from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985.', (int) 13 => '<p>4. In considering the question whether the said advertisement and the said speeches amount to a corrupt practice, we are of the view that the provisions of Section 123 of the said Act which deal with corrupt practices have to be interpreted, keeping in mind that dictates of commonsense require that they never could have been intended to treat normal election promises made in election manifestoes or usual election speeches by members of various political parties aspiring to power and by different candidates aspiring to get elected to legislative bodies concerned as corrupt practices. We are of the view that these advertisements and speeches amount to nothing more than statements extolling the achievements of the Government of the State of Andhra Pradesh under the Telugu Desam Party headed by N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister, and contain normal election promises and these statements do not amount to corrupt practices falling within the scope of Sub-clause (b) of Clause (A) of Sub-section (1) of Section 123 of the said Act.', (int) 14 => '<p>5. It was urged by Mr. Rao, learned Counsel for the appellants that in the impugned judgments, the High Court has incorrectly taken the view that in order to amount to bribery within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A), the transaction must amount to a bargain by the candidate with a view to get votes. It was pointed out by him that the said view has been taken in the impugned judgments, relying upon the decision of a Bench comprising to learned Judges of this Court in Ghasi Ram v. Dal Singh and Ors. :1983 SCR 102 . We have gone through to the relevant portion of that judgment (at page 109 and 110 of the said report). A careful perusal of the said judgment shows that what has been really held in that case is that if the promises given or made amount to a bargain entered into by a candidate for a vote or votes, that would amount to a corrupt practice; but it has not been held there that unless the act alleged amounts to such a bargain, it could not amount to a corrupt practice. In our view, that judgment does not lay down that in order to amount to a corrupt practice, the transaction must amount to a bargain for getting a vote. It was pointed out by Mr. Rao, however, that such a view seems to have been taken in two other decisions rendered by two Benches, each comprising two learned Judges of this Court in Bhanu Kumar Shastri v. Mohan Lal Sukhadia and Ors. : [1971]3SCR522 and Harjit Singh Mann v. S Umrao Singh and Ors. : [1980]2SCR501 . and these judgments need to be overruled. We do not propose to go into the correctness or otherwise of this view because, even on the footing that in order to amount to a corrupt practice under the aforesaid provision the alleged acts need not constitute a bargain, the the acts established in the present case, in our opinion, do not amount to a corrupt practice.', (int) 15 => '<p>6. Our attention was drawn by Mr. Rao to the fact that in this case the said advertisements and the speeches had to be viewed in the context of the fact that the advertisements were issued and the speeches were made after respondent No. 1 filed his nomination papers on January 4, 1985, for the election and before the election was held in the aforesaid constituency. It was further pointed out that the offer made for the sale of sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was limited to the period from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985. It cannot be denied that these factors are relevant factOrs. We cannot, however, lose sight of the fact that this offer was made not only in this constituency but throughout the State where the elections to the House of the People were scheduled to be held, and were, in fact, held on December 27, 1984. It was only in case of this constituency that the election to be held on the scheduled date was countermanded and later held on January 28, 1985. We cannot lose sight of the fact that, as far as the said speeches and the said advertisements, which were issued by the Publicity Department of the State, are concerned, they deal in the main with the achievements of the Government of Andhra Pradesh which, of course, was being run by Ministers belonging to Telugu Desam Party to which respondent No. 1 also belonged. Moreover, the offer in the advertisements for the sale of dhoties and sarees at discount rates was in the nature of a benefit offered to poor persons in that State. When a Government announces the measures which are intended for the benefit of any of the classes for whose the Government can normally be expected to work like the poor or the economical backward classes, it is only in rare circumstances that such a promise can be said to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) even though such a promise might be made on the eve of elections. Keeping this in mind, in our opinion, although the offer to sell dhoties and sarees at discount rates was of a limited duration as aforestated, it cannot be regarded as a corrupt practice. Such an offer was bound to have financial repercussions and it is quite possible the duration of the offer was limited to enable the Government to study the financial repercussions rather than from any improper motive. We find support for this view from the decision of this Court in H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh : [1969]3SCR813 . In that case an Ordinance was passed by the Government of Madhya Pradesh as a result of which a large number of agriculturists, namely, those holdings of plots of land of less than 7.5 acres area or paying land revenue not exceeding Rs. 5/- were exempted from the payment of the land revenue. It was held that such a concession does not amount to a gift, offer or promise of any gratification within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) of the said Act nor does the announcement of the declaration made at a meeting shortly before the election or the issue of a pamphlet containing that declaration at that time carry the matter any further. It was held that neither Shri D.P. Misra who was the Chief Minister nor Shri S.K. Dixit who acted as his agent were guilty of any corrupt practice within the meaning of the aforesaid provision.', (int) 16 => '<p>7. It was next contended by Mr. Rao, although very faintly, that the High Court was in error as it had not decided all other issues which were raised in the election petition. In this regard we cannot lose sight of the fact that the term of the present Lok Sabha is likely to be over within a few months and fresh elections are likely to be held and it would, therefore, be an exercise in futility to remand the matter to the High Court for deciding the remaining issues.', (int) 17 => '<p>8. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.<p>', (int) 18 => '<p>' ) $paragraphAfter = (int) 1 $cnt = (int) 19 $i = (int) 2include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144 View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971 View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933 View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473 Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963 Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200 Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167 [main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109
1. These two appeals arise out of the judgments in two Election Petitions in the Andhra Pradesh High Court questioning the election of respondent No. 1 as a Member of Parliament from Srikakulam No. Parliamentary Constituency in the 8th General Election to the House of the People. The points raised in these appeals are common and so are the relevant facts; and, hence, they are being disposed of by this common judgment. We propose to take note of only the few facts which are necessary for the appreciation of the controversy before us.
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$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp' $dataForView = array( 'title_for_layout' => 'B Rajagopala Rao and anr Vs Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors - Citation 640942 - Court Judgment | ', 'desc' => array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '640942', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/50684/representation-of-the-people-act-1951-complete-act">Representation of the People Act, 1951</a> - Sections 1, 3(1)(A), 123 and 123(1)(A)', 'appealno' => 'Civil Appeal Nos. 484 and 485 of 1987', 'appellant' => 'B. Rajagopala Rao and anr.', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'B. Rajagopala Rao and anr. Vs. Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors.', 'casenote' => 'Election - corrupt practices - Sections 123 and 123 (1) (A) of Representation of the People Act, 1951 - whether advertisements by public department and speeches made by respondent No. 1 to sell dhoti and sarees at discount rates amount to corrupt practices - offer was available for mass and for limited duration - such offer was bound to have financial repercussions and it is quite possible that duration of offer limited to enable Government to study financial repercussions rather than from any improper motive - offer not amounted to corrupt practices. - [ D.A. Desai,; O. Chinnappa Reddy and; R.S. Sarkaria, JJ.] The Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 empowers the Union of India in the public interest to take under its control the industries specified in the First Schedule to the Act. Item 23 of the First Schedule relates to textiles of various categories. Section 15 authorises the Central Government to make or cause to be made a full and complete investigation into the circumstances of the case if the Central Government is of the opinion that (a) in respect of any scheduled industry or industrial undertaking or undertakings (i) there has been, or is likely to be, a substantial fall in the volume of production for which, having regard to the economic conditions prevailing, there is no justification; or (ii) there has been, or is likely to be, a marked deterioration in the quality of any article... which could have been or can be avoided; or (iii) there has been or is likely to be a rise in the price of any article..... for which there is no justification; or (iv) it is necessary to take any such action for the purpose of conserving any resources of national importance; or (b) any industrial undertaking is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest. After the investigation is made under section 15, section 16(1) empowers the Central Government if action is desirable, to issue appropriate directions, and section 16(2) provides for the issue of interim directions by the Central Government pending investigation under section 15. Chapter III-A consisting of Sections 18A, 18-AA, 18-B, 18-C, 18-D, 18-E and 18-F deal with "direct management or control of Industrial Undertakings by Central Government in certain cases". Sec. 18-A empowers the Central Government by notified order, to authorise any person or body of persons to take over the management of the whole or any part of an industrial undertaking or to exercise in respect of the whole, or any part of the undertaking such functions of control as may be specified in the order, if the Central Government is of opinion that: (a) an industrial undertaking to which directions have been issued in pursuance of section 16 has failed to comply with such directions, or (b) an industrial undertaking in respect of which an investigation has been made under section 15 is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest. Section 18AA(5) stipulates that the provisions of Sections 18-B to 18 E shall be applicable to the industrial undertaking in respect of which an order has been made under section 18-AA even as they apply to an industrial undertaking taken over under Section 18-A. Section 18-F empowers the Central Government to cancel the order made under section 18-A if it appears that the purpose of the order has been fulfilled or it is not necessary that the order should remain in force. The appellant M/s. Swadeshi Cotton Mills was taken over by the Government of India by a notification dated April 13, 1978 in exercise of the powers conferred on it under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 18AA of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 on the ground that the company had by creation of encumbrances on the assets of its industrial undertakings, brought about a situation which had affected and is likely to further affect the production of articles manufactured or produced by it and that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation. The Government authorised the National Textile Corporation Limited to take over the management, subject to the conditions that the authorised person shall comply with all the directions issued from time to time by the Central Government and that the authorised person shall hold office for a period of five years. The appellant Mills challenged the aforesaid order in a writ petition in the High Court. The case was heard by a Full Bench of five Judges to consider the question whether in construing section 18AA of the Industries Development and Regulation Act, 1951, compliance with the principle of audi alteram partem is to be implied and whether hearing is to be given to the parties who would be affected by the order to be passed prior to the passing of the order or whether hearing can be given after the order is passed and whether the order passed under the said Section is vitiated by not giving of such hearing and whether such vice can be cured. The Bench by a majority answered the three questions as follows:- (a) Section 18AA(1)(a)(b) excludes the giving of prior hearing to the party who would be affected by order thereunder. (b) Section 18-F expressly provides for a post- decisional hearing to the owner of the industrial undertaking, the management of which is taken over under section 18AA to have the order made under section 18AA cancelled on any relevant ground. (c) As the taking over of management under section 18A is not vitiated by the failure to grant prior hearing the question of any such vice being cured by a grant of a subsequent hearing does not arise. The minority, however, held that in compliance with the principles of natural justice, prior hearing to the owner of the undertaking was required to be given before the passing of an order under section 18AA, that the second question did not arise as the denial of a prior hearing would not cure the vice by the grant of subsequent hearing, but it would be open to the Court to moderate the relief in such a way that the order is kept alive to the extent necessary until the making of the fresh order to subserve public interest and to make appropriate directions. After the decision on the reference the case was reheard on merits by a Full Bench of three Judges and the writ petition was allowed in part. The challenge to the validity of the order being rejected but insofar as the impugned order seeking to take over the corporate entity of the company, the corporate entity of the subsidiary and its assets, the petition was allowed and the respondents, the Union of India and the authorised person were directed to release from its control and custody and/or deliver possession of any assets or property of the company which were not referable to the industrial undertakings. Appeals to this Court were filed on behalf of the Company as well as by the Union of India and the National Textile Corporation. Two propositions were propounded on behalf of the company that: (a) Whether it was necessary to observe the rules of natural justice before issuing a notified order under section 18AA(1)(a) and further whether section 18-F impliedly excludes rules of natural justice relating to prior hearing; and it was contended (1) the mere use of the word 'immediate' in sub-clause (a) of section 18AA does not show a legislative intent to exclude the application of audi alteram partem rule altogether. (2) The word 'immediate' in clause (a) has been used in contra distinction to 'investigate'. It only means that under section 18AA action can be taken without prior investigation under section 15. The use of the word 'immediate' in section 18AA(1)(a) only dispenses with investigation under section 15 and not with the principle of audi alteram partem altogether and this is indicated by the marginal note of section 18A and para 3 of the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Amendment Bill which inserted section 18AA in 1971. (3) The word 'immediate' occurs only in clause (a) and not in clause (b) of section 18AA(1). It would be odd if intention to exclude this principle of natural justice is spelt out in one clause of the sub-section when the other clause does not exclude it. (4) Section 18-F does not exclude a pre-decisional hearing. The so-called post-decisional hearing contemplated by section 18-F cannot be and is not intended to be a substitute for a pre-decisional hearing. (5) Section 18F incorporates only a facet, albeit qualified, of section 21 of the General Clauses Act. The language of the Section implicity prohibits an enquiry into circumstances that led to the passing of the order of take-over and under it the aggrieved person is not entitled to show that on merits the order was void ab initio. (6) 'Immediacy' does not exclude a duty to act fairly because even an emergent situation can co-exist with the canons of natural justice. The only effect of urgency on the application of the principle of fair hearing would be that the width, form and duration of the hearing would be tailored to the situation and reduced to the reasonable minimum so that it does not delay and defeat the purpose of the contemplated action. (7) Where the civil consequences of the administrative action are grave and its effect is highly prejudicial to the rights and interests of the person affected and there is nothing in the language and scheme of the statute which unequivocally excludes a fair pre-decisional hearing and the post-decisional hearing provided therein is not a real remedial hearing equitable to a full right of appeal the Court should be loath to infer a legislative intent to exclude even a minimal fair hearing at the pre-decisional stage merely on ground of urgency. (8) The Central Government appointed four Government Officials including one from the office of the Textile Commissioner to study the affairs of the Company and to make recommendation. This Official Group submitted its report on February 16, 1978. The evidence on the basis of which the impugned order was passed was not disclosed to the appellant company till May 1978, only after it had filed the writ petition in the High Court. If there was anything adverse to the appellants in the survey report there was time enough about six weeks between the submission of the Survey Report and the passing of the impugned order for giving a short, reasonable opportunity to the appellants to explain the adverse findings against them. If there was immediacy situational modifications could be made to meet the requirement of fairness, by reducing the period of notice; that even the manner and form of such notice could be simplified to eliminate delay, that telephonic notice or short opportunity for furnishing their explanation to the Company might have satisfied the requirements of natural justice. Such an opportunity of hearing could have been given after the passing of a conditional tentative order and before its enforcement under section 18AA. For the interregnum suitable interim action such as freezing the assets of the Company or restraining the Company from creating further encumbrances, could be taken under section 16. On behalf of the Union of India and the Authorised Officer it was contended that (1) the presumption in favour of audi alteram partem rule stands impliedly displaced by the language scheme, setting and the purpose of the provision in section 18AA. (2) Section 18AA on its plain terms deals with situations where immediate preventive action is required. The paramount concern is to avoid serious problems which may be caused by fall in production. The purpose of an order under section 18AA is not to condemn the owner but to protect the scheduled industry. The issue under section 18AA is not solely between the Government and the management of the industrial undertaking. The object of taking action under this Section is to protect other outside interests of the community at large and the workers. (3) The rule of natural justice to give a hearing has been incorporated in section 18-F which gives an opportunity of a post-decisional hearing to the owner of the undertaking who if he feels aggrieved can on his application be heard, to show that even the original order under section 18AA was passed on invalid grounds and should be cancelled or rescinded. (4) On a true construction of section 18AA read with section 18-F the requirements of natural justice and fair play can be read into the statute only insofar as conformance to such canons can reasonably and realistically be required of it by the provision for a remedial hearing at a subsequent stage. (5) Under section 18-F the Central Government exercises curial functions and that Section confers on the aggrieved owner a right to apply to the Government to cancel the order of take-over. This section casts an obligation on the Central Government to deal with and dispose of an application filed thereunder with reasonable expedition. Allowing the appeal by the Company,<br />HELD: (Sarkaria & Desai, JJ. per Chinnappa Reddy, J. dissenting.) In the facts and circumstances of the instant case, there has been a noncompliance with the implied requirement of the audi alteram partem rule of natural justice at the pre-decisional stage. The impugned order could be struck down as invalid on that score alone. But in view of the commitment / concession that a hearing would be afforded to the Company, the case is remitted to the Central Government to give a full, fair and effective hearing. [587G-H, 588C] The phrase 'natural justice' is not capable of a static and precise definition. It cannot be imprisoned in the straight-jacket of a cast-iron formula. Rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. Hence not possible to make an exhaustive catalogue of such rules. Two fundamental maxims of natural justice have now become deeply and indelibly ingrained in the common consciousness of mankind as pre-eminently necessary to ensure that the law is applied impartially objectively and fairly. These twin principles are (i) audi alteram partem and (ii) nemo judex in re sua. Audi alteram partem is a highly effective rule devised by the Courts to ensure that a statutory authority arrives at a just decision and it is calculated to act as a healthy check on the abuse or misuse of power. Its reach should not be narrowed and its applicability circumscribed.[554C-G] The rules of natural justice can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. If a statutory provision either specifically or by inevitable implication excludes the application of the rules of natural justice then the Court cannot ignore the mandate of the Legislature. Whether or not the application of the principles of natural justice in a given case has been excluded in the exercise of statutory power depends upon the language and basic scheme of the provision conferring the power, the nature of the power the purpose for which it is conferred and the effect of that power. [556A-B] The maxim audi alteram partem has many facets. Two of them are (a) notice of the case to be met, and (b) opportunity to explain. The rule cannot be sacrificed at the altar of administrative convenience or celerity; for, convenience and justice are often not on speaking terms. Difficulties, however, arise when the statute conferring the power does not expressly exclude this rule but its exclusion is sought by implication due to the presence of certain factors such as urgency where the obligation to give notice and opportunity to be heard would obstruct the taking of prompt action of a preventive or remedial nature. Audi alteram partem rule may be disregarded in an emergent situation where immediate action brooks no delay to prevent some imminent danger or injury or hazard to paramount public interests. Section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure empowers the magistrates specified therein to make an exparte conditional order in emergent cases for removal of dangerous public nuisances. Action under section 17 Land Acquisition Act furnishes another such instance. Similarly action on grounds of public safety public health may justify disregard of the rule of prior hearing. [556C-H] Cases where owing to the compulsion of the fact situation or the necessity of taking speedy action no pre- decisional hearing is given but the action, is followed soon by a full post-decisional hearing to the person affected do not in reality constitute an exception to the audi alteram partem rule. To call such cases as exception is a misnomer because they do not exclude fair play in action but adapt it to the urgency of the situation by balancing the competing claims of hurry and hearing. [560H-561A] The general principle as distinguished from an absolute rule of uniform application seems to be that where a statute does not in terms exclude this rule of prior hearing but contemplates a post-decisional hearing amounting to a full review of the original order on merits then such a statute would be construed as excluding the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage. [561G] If the statute conferring the power is silent with regard to the giving of pre-decisional hearing to the person affected and the administrative decision taken by the authority involves civil consequences of a grave nature and no full review or appeal on merits against that decision is provided courts will be extremely reluctant to construe such a statute as excluding the duty of affording even a minimal hearing shorn of all its formal trappings and dilatory features at the pre-decisional stage, unless viewed pragmatically it would paralyse the administrative process or frustrate the need for utmost promptitude. [561H] 7(i). A comparison of the provisions of Section 18A(1)(b) and Section 18AA(1)(c), bring out two main points of distinction: First, action under Section 18A(1)(b) can be taken only after an investigation had been made under Section 15; while under Section 18AA(1)(a) or (b) action can be taken without such investigation. The language, scheme and setting of Section 18AA read in the light of the Objects and Reasons for enacting this provision make this position clear beyond doubt. Second, before taking action under Section 18A(1)(b), the Central Government has to form an opinion on the basis of the investigation conducted under section 15, in regard to the existence of the objective fact, namely: that the industrial undertaking is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest; while under section 18A(1)(a) the Government has to satisfy itself that the persons incharge of the undertaking have brought about a situation likely to cause fall in production, by committing any of the three kinds of acts specified in that provision. This shows that the preliminary objective fact attributable to the persons in charge of the management or affairs of the undertaking, on the basis of which action may be taken under section 18(A)(1)(b), is of far wider amplitude than the circumstance, the existence of which is a sine qua non for taking action under section 18AA(1). The phrase "highly detrimental to the scheduled industry or public interest" in section 18-A is capable of being construed to cover a large variety of acts or things which may be considered wrong with the manner of running the industry by the management. In contrast with it, action under section 18AA(1)(a) can be taken only if the Central Government is satisfied with regard to the existence of the twin conditions specifically mentioned therein, on the basis of evidence in its possession. [569D-H] An analysis of section 18AA(1)(a), indicates that as a necessary preliminary to the exercise of the power thereunder, the Central Government must be satisfied "from documentary or other evidence in its possession" in regard to the co-existence of two circumstances: (i) that the persons in charge of the industrial undertaking have by committing any of these acts, namely, reckless investments, or creation of incumbrances on the assets of industrial undertaking, or by diversion of funds, brought about a situation which is likely to affect the production of the article manufactured or produced in the industrial undertaking, and (ii) that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation.[570B-D] It cannot be laid down as a general proposition that whenever a statute confers a power on an administrative authority and makes the exercise of that power conditional on the formation of an opinion by that authority in regard to the existence of an immediacy, its opinion in regard to that preliminary fact is not open to judicial scrutiny at all. While it may be conceded that an element of subjectivity is always involved in the formation of such an opinion, the existence of the circumstances from which the inference constituting the opinion, as the sine qua non for action, are to be drawn, must be demonstrable, and the existence of such "circumstances", if questioned, must be proved at least prima facie. [571 E-G] From a plain reading of section 18AA, it is clear that it does not expressly in unmistakable and unequivocal terms exclude the application of the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage. [574B] In the instant case, so far as Kanpur Unit is concerned, it was lying closed for more than three months before the passing of the impugned order. There was no 'immediacy' in relation to that unit, which could absolve the Government from the obligation of complying fully with audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional or pre- takeover stage. [583A] Keshav Mills Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, [1973] 3 S.C.R. 22; Kamla Prasad Khetan v. Union of India,[1957] S.C.R. 1052; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 621; Sukhdev Singh & Ors. v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh, [1975] 3 S.C.R. 619; A. K. Kraipak v. Union of India, [1970] 1 S.C.R. 457; Ridge v. Baldwin, [1964] A.C. 40; 196; Heatley v. Tasmanian Racing & Gaming Commission, 14 Australian Law Reports 519; Nawabkhan Abbaskhan v. State of Gujarat, [1974] 3 S.C.R. 427; State of Orissa v. Dr. Bina Pani Dei, [1962] 2 S.C.R. 625; Ambalal M. Shah v. Hathi Singh Manufacturing Co. Ltd. [1962] 3 S.C.R. 171; and S. L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan & Ors., [1981] 1 S.C.R. 746, referred to. (Per Chinnappa Reddy, J. dissenting) The principles of natural justice are not attracted to the situations contemplated by section 18AA of Industries (Development and Regulation) Act. Natural justice like Ultra Vires and Public Policy is a branch of the public law and is a formidable weapon which can be wielded to secure justice to the citizen. While it may be used to protect certain fundamental liberties, civil and political rights, it may be used as indeed it is used more often than not, to protect vested interests and to obstruct the path of progressive change. The time has come to make an appropriate distinction between natural justice in its application to fundamental liberties, civil and political rights and natural justice in its application to vested interests. [590A-B] Our constitution as befits the Constitution of a Socialist Secular Democratic Republic, recognises the paramountcy of the public weal over the private interest. Natural justice, ultra vires, public policy, or any other rule of interpretation must, therefore, conform, grow and be tailored to serve the public interest and respond to the demands of an evolving society. [590C] The principles of natural justice have taken deep root in the judicial conscience of our people. They are now considered so fundamental as to be implicit in every decision making function, judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative. Where authority functions under a statute and the statute provides for the observance of the principles of natural justice in a particular manner, natural justice will have to be observed in that manner and in no other. Where the statute is silent about the observance of the principles of natural justice, such statutory silence is taken to imply compliance with the principles of natural justice. Where the conflict is between the public interest and the private interest the presumption must necessarily be weak and may, therefore, be readily displaced. The presumption is also weak, where what are involved are mere property rights. In cases of urgency, particularly where the public interest is involved, preemptive action may be a strategic necessity. Even in cases of preemptive action, if the statute so provides or if the Courts so deem fit in appropriate cases, a postponed hearing may be substituted for natural justice. [590A-C; 591F-G] 3(ii). Where natural justice is implied, the extent of the implication and the nature of the hearing must vary with the statute, the subject and the situation. [592B] The absence of the expression 'immediate action' in section 18AA(1)(b) does not make any difference. Section 18AA(1)(a) refers to a situation where immediate preventive action may avert a disaster, whereas section 18AA contemplates a situation where the disaster has occurred and action is necessary to restore normalcy. Restoration of production where production has stopped in a key industry or industrial undertaking is as important and urgent in the public interest as prevention of a situation where production may be affected. Immediate action is, therefore, as necessary in the situation contemplated by section 18AA(1)(b) as in the situation contemplated by section 18AA(1)(a). [596 F-G] The marginal note refers to the power to take over without investigation but there is no sufficient reason to suppose that the word immediate is used only to contra- distinguish it from the investigation contemplated by section 15 of the Act, though of course a consequence of immediate action under section 18AA may be to dispense with the enquiry under section 15. In fact, facts which come to light during the course of an investigation under section 15 may form the basis of action under section 18AA(1)(a). Where in the course of an investigation under section 15 it is discovered that the management have, by reckless investments or creation of encumbrances on the assets of the industrial undertaking or by diversion of funds brought about a situation which is likely to affect the production of the articles manufactured or produced in the industrial undertaking, if the Government is satisfied that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation, there is no reason why the Central Government may not straightaway take action under section 18AA(1)(a) without waiting for completion of investigation under section 15. [597A-B] Where there is a provision in the statute itself for revocation of the order by the very authority making the decision, it appears to be unnecessary to insist upon a pre- decisional observance of natural justice. [598A] The likelihood of production being jeopardized or the stoppage of production in a key industrial undertaking is a matter of grave concern affecting the public interest. Parliament has taken so serious a view of the matter that it has authorised the Central Government to take over the management of the industrial undertaking if immediate action may prevent jeopardy to production or restore production where it has already stopped. The necessity for immediate action by the Central Government contemplated by Parliament is definitely indicative of the exclusion of natural justice. It is not as if the owner of the industrial undertaking is left with no remedy. He may move the Central Government under section 18-F to cancel the order made under section 18AA. [598C-D] Neither section 18-F of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act nor section 21 of the General Clauses Act by itself excludes natural justice. The exclusion of natural justice where such exclusion is not express has to be implied by reference to the subject, the statute and the statutory situation. Where an express provision in the statute itself provides for a post decisional hearing the other provisions of the Statute will have to be read in the light of such provision and the provision for post- decisional hearing may then clinch the issue where pre- decisional natural justice appears to be excluded on the other terms of the statute. That a post-decisional hearing may also be had by the terms of section 21 of the General Clauses Act may not necessarily help in the interpretation of the provisions of the statute concerned. [599 A-C] Ridge v. Baldwin, 1964 A.C. p. 40; Annie G. Phillip v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 75 L.E.d. 1289; John H. Fahey v. Paul Mallonee, 91 L.E.d. 2030; Margarita Fuentes v. Robert L. Shevin, Attorney General of Florida, 32 L.E.d. 2d 556 and Lawrence Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 40 L.E.d. 2d 406, referred to. - Rama Rao, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh as well as the President of the Telugu Desam Party as well as respondent No. 3. The advertisements very shortly stated, refer to the auspicious gifts made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to the poor people on the eve of New Year and Sankranti. In the said advertisements, it is stated that the said Government which was formed by the Telugu Desam Party was giving to the poor people whose income was below Rs. and the said advertisements referred to a new scheme of selling sarees and dhoties at half prices to the poor people in the State of Andhra Pradesh having Green-cards. Moreover, the offer in the advertisements for the sale of dhoties and sarees at discount rates was in the nature of a benefit offered to poor persons in that State. When a Government announces the measures which are intended for the benefit of any of the classes for whose the Government can normally be expected to work like the poor or the economical backward classes, it is only in rare circumstances that such a promise can be said to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) even though such a promise might be made on the eve of elections. 8. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => '', 'counseldef' => '', 'court' => 'Supreme Court of India', 'court_type' => 'SC', 'decidedon' => '1989-09-29', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' K.N. Saikia,; M.H. Kania and; S. Ranganathan, JJ.', 'judgement' => '</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Kania, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. These two appeals arise out of the judgments in two Election Petitions in the Andhra Pradesh High Court questioning the election of respondent No. 1 as a Member of Parliament from Srikakulam No. Parliamentary Constituency in the 8th General Election to the House of the People. The points raised in these appeals are common and so are the relevant facts; and, hence, they are being disposed of by this common judgment. We propose to take note of only the few facts which are necessary for the appreciation of the controversy before us.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The polling date for the said election along with other parliamentary elections in the State of Andhra Pradesh was December 27, 1984 but in Srikakulam No. 1 Parliamentary Constituency the polling was countermanded and the date of polling was later fixed on January 28, 1985. In both the Election Petitions the election of respondent No. 1 was questioned mainly on the ground that Shri N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh as well as the President of the Telugu Desam Party as well as respondent No. 1 gave certain speeches and certain advertisements were got published by Shri N.T. Rama Rao through the Publicity Department of the Government of Andhra Pradesh in the newspapers containing certain statements which are alleged to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A) of the <a href="/act/50684/representation-of-the-people-act-1951-complete-act">Representation of the People Act, 1951</a> (hereinafter referred to as 'the said Act'). The main question canvassed before us is whether the statements contained in these aforesaid advertisements amount to a corrupt practice under Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act. Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act runs as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">123. Corrupt practices</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The following shall be deemed to be corrupt practises for the purposes of this Act :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) 'Bribery', that is to say.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(A) any gift, offer or promise by a candidate or his agent or by any other person with the consent of a candidate or his election agent of any gratification, to any person whomsover, with the object, directly or indirectly of inducing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) x x x</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) an elector to vote or refrain from voting at an election, or as a reward to.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) a person for having so stood or not stood, or for having withdrawn or not having withdrawn his candidature; or</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) an elector for having voted or refrained from voting.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The advertisements very shortly stated, refer to the auspicious gifts made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to the poor people on the eve of New Year and Sankranti. In the said advertisements, it is stated that the said Government which was formed by the Telugu Desam Party was giving to the poor people whose income was below Rs. 6,000 per year, a kilo of rice at Rs. 2 per Kg. and the said advertisements referred to a new scheme of selling sarees and dhoties at half prices to the poor people in the State of Andhra Pradesh having Green-cards. Green-cards were directed to be issued to all the persons whose annual income was below Rs. 6,000. The supply of the rice at subsidised rates as aforesaid was also to be made to the Green-card holders only. The scheme to sell sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was to be operative from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. In considering the question whether the said advertisement and the said speeches amount to a corrupt practice, we are of the view that the provisions of Section 123 of the said Act which deal with corrupt practices have to be interpreted, keeping in mind that dictates of commonsense require that they never could have been intended to treat normal election promises made in election manifestoes or usual election speeches by members of various political parties aspiring to power and by different candidates aspiring to get elected to legislative bodies concerned as corrupt practices. We are of the view that these advertisements and speeches amount to nothing more than statements extolling the achievements of the Government of the State of Andhra Pradesh under the Telugu Desam Party headed by N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister, and contain normal election promises and these statements do not amount to corrupt practices falling within the scope of Sub-clause (b) of Clause (A) of Sub-section (1) of Section 123 of the said Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. It was urged by Mr. Rao, learned Counsel for the appellants that in the impugned judgments, the High Court has incorrectly taken the view that in order to amount to bribery within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A), the transaction must amount to a bargain by the candidate with a view to get votes. It was pointed out by him that the said view has been taken in the impugned judgments, relying upon the decision of a Bench comprising to learned Judges of this Court in Ghasi Ram v. Dal Singh and Ors. :1983 SCR 102 . We have gone through to the relevant portion of that judgment (at page 109 and 110 of the said report). A careful perusal of the said judgment shows that what has been really held in that case is that if the promises given or made amount to a bargain entered into by a candidate for a vote or votes, that would amount to a corrupt practice; but it has not been held there that unless the act alleged amounts to such a bargain, it could not amount to a corrupt practice. In our view, that judgment does not lay down that in order to amount to a corrupt practice, the transaction must amount to a bargain for getting a vote. It was pointed out by Mr. Rao, however, that such a view seems to have been taken in two other decisions rendered by two Benches, each comprising two learned Judges of this Court in Bhanu Kumar Shastri v. Mohan Lal Sukhadia and Ors. : [1971]3SCR522 and Harjit Singh Mann v. S Umrao Singh and Ors. : [1980]2SCR501 . and these judgments need to be overruled. We do not propose to go into the correctness or otherwise of this view because, even on the footing that in order to amount to a corrupt practice under the aforesaid provision the alleged acts need not constitute a bargain, the the acts established in the present case, in our opinion, do not amount to a corrupt practice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Our attention was drawn by Mr. Rao to the fact that in this case the said advertisements and the speeches had to be viewed in the context of the fact that the advertisements were issued and the speeches were made after respondent No. 1 filed his nomination papers on January 4, 1985, for the election and before the election was held in the aforesaid constituency. It was further pointed out that the offer made for the sale of sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was limited to the period from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985. It cannot be denied that these factors are relevant factOrs. We cannot, however, lose sight of the fact that this offer was made not only in this constituency but throughout the State where the elections to the House of the People were scheduled to be held, and were, in fact, held on December 27, 1984. It was only in case of this constituency that the election to be held on the scheduled date was countermanded and later held on January 28, 1985. We cannot lose sight of the fact that, as far as the said speeches and the said advertisements, which were issued by the Publicity Department of the State, are concerned, they deal in the main with the achievements of the Government of Andhra Pradesh which, of course, was being run by Ministers belonging to Telugu Desam Party to which respondent No. 1 also belonged. Moreover, the offer in the advertisements for the sale of dhoties and sarees at discount rates was in the nature of a benefit offered to poor persons in that State. When a Government announces the measures which are intended for the benefit of any of the classes for whose the Government can normally be expected to work like the poor or the economical backward classes, it is only in rare circumstances that such a promise can be said to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) even though such a promise might be made on the eve of elections. Keeping this in mind, in our opinion, although the offer to sell dhoties and sarees at discount rates was of a limited duration as aforestated, it cannot be regarded as a corrupt practice. Such an offer was bound to have financial repercussions and it is quite possible the duration of the offer was limited to enable the Government to study the financial repercussions rather than from any improper motive. We find support for this view from the decision of this Court in H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh : [1969]3SCR813 . In that case an Ordinance was passed by the Government of Madhya Pradesh as a result of which a large number of agriculturists, namely, those holdings of plots of land of less than 7.5 acres area or paying land revenue not exceeding Rs. 5/- were exempted from the payment of the land revenue. It was held that such a concession does not amount to a gift, offer or promise of any gratification within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) of the said Act nor does the announcement of the declaration made at a meeting shortly before the election or the issue of a pamphlet containing that declaration at that time carry the matter any further. It was held that neither Shri D.P. Misra who was the Chief Minister nor Shri S.K. Dixit who acted as his agent were guilty of any corrupt practice within the meaning of the aforesaid provision.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. It was next contended by Mr. Rao, although very faintly, that the High Court was in error as it had not decided all other issues which were raised in the election petition. In this regard we cannot lose sight of the fact that the term of the present Lok Sabha is likely to be over within a few months and fresh elections are likely to be held and it would, therefore, be an exercise in futility to remand the matter to the High Court for deciding the remaining issues.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'AIR1990SC1889; JT1989(4)SC186; 1989(2)SCALE891; 1989Supp(2)SCC504', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors.', 'sub' => 'Election', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ), 'casename_url' => 'b-rajagopala-rao-vs-appayya-hanumanthu', 'args' => array( (int) 0 => '640942', (int) 1 => 'b-rajagopala-rao-vs-appayya-hanumanthu' ) ) $title_for_layout = 'B Rajagopala Rao and anr Vs Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors - Citation 640942 - Court Judgment | ' $desc = array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '640942', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/50684/representation-of-the-people-act-1951-complete-act">Representation of the People Act, 1951</a> - Sections 1, 3(1)(A), 123 and 123(1)(A)', 'appealno' => 'Civil Appeal Nos. 484 and 485 of 1987', 'appellant' => 'B. Rajagopala Rao and anr.', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'B. Rajagopala Rao and anr. Vs. Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors.', 'casenote' => 'Election - corrupt practices - Sections 123 and 123 (1) (A) of Representation of the People Act, 1951 - whether advertisements by public department and speeches made by respondent No. 1 to sell dhoti and sarees at discount rates amount to corrupt practices - offer was available for mass and for limited duration - such offer was bound to have financial repercussions and it is quite possible that duration of offer limited to enable Government to study financial repercussions rather than from any improper motive - offer not amounted to corrupt practices. - [ D.A. Desai,; O. Chinnappa Reddy and; R.S. Sarkaria, JJ.] The Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 empowers the Union of India in the public interest to take under its control the industries specified in the First Schedule to the Act. Item 23 of the First Schedule relates to textiles of various categories. Section 15 authorises the Central Government to make or cause to be made a full and complete investigation into the circumstances of the case if the Central Government is of the opinion that (a) in respect of any scheduled industry or industrial undertaking or undertakings (i) there has been, or is likely to be, a substantial fall in the volume of production for which, having regard to the economic conditions prevailing, there is no justification; or (ii) there has been, or is likely to be, a marked deterioration in the quality of any article... which could have been or can be avoided; or (iii) there has been or is likely to be a rise in the price of any article..... for which there is no justification; or (iv) it is necessary to take any such action for the purpose of conserving any resources of national importance; or (b) any industrial undertaking is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest. After the investigation is made under section 15, section 16(1) empowers the Central Government if action is desirable, to issue appropriate directions, and section 16(2) provides for the issue of interim directions by the Central Government pending investigation under section 15. Chapter III-A consisting of Sections 18A, 18-AA, 18-B, 18-C, 18-D, 18-E and 18-F deal with "direct management or control of Industrial Undertakings by Central Government in certain cases". Sec. 18-A empowers the Central Government by notified order, to authorise any person or body of persons to take over the management of the whole or any part of an industrial undertaking or to exercise in respect of the whole, or any part of the undertaking such functions of control as may be specified in the order, if the Central Government is of opinion that: (a) an industrial undertaking to which directions have been issued in pursuance of section 16 has failed to comply with such directions, or (b) an industrial undertaking in respect of which an investigation has been made under section 15 is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest. Section 18AA(5) stipulates that the provisions of Sections 18-B to 18 E shall be applicable to the industrial undertaking in respect of which an order has been made under section 18-AA even as they apply to an industrial undertaking taken over under Section 18-A. Section 18-F empowers the Central Government to cancel the order made under section 18-A if it appears that the purpose of the order has been fulfilled or it is not necessary that the order should remain in force. The appellant M/s. Swadeshi Cotton Mills was taken over by the Government of India by a notification dated April 13, 1978 in exercise of the powers conferred on it under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 18AA of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 on the ground that the company had by creation of encumbrances on the assets of its industrial undertakings, brought about a situation which had affected and is likely to further affect the production of articles manufactured or produced by it and that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation. The Government authorised the National Textile Corporation Limited to take over the management, subject to the conditions that the authorised person shall comply with all the directions issued from time to time by the Central Government and that the authorised person shall hold office for a period of five years. The appellant Mills challenged the aforesaid order in a writ petition in the High Court. The case was heard by a Full Bench of five Judges to consider the question whether in construing section 18AA of the Industries Development and Regulation Act, 1951, compliance with the principle of audi alteram partem is to be implied and whether hearing is to be given to the parties who would be affected by the order to be passed prior to the passing of the order or whether hearing can be given after the order is passed and whether the order passed under the said Section is vitiated by not giving of such hearing and whether such vice can be cured. The Bench by a majority answered the three questions as follows:- (a) Section 18AA(1)(a)(b) excludes the giving of prior hearing to the party who would be affected by order thereunder. (b) Section 18-F expressly provides for a post- decisional hearing to the owner of the industrial undertaking, the management of which is taken over under section 18AA to have the order made under section 18AA cancelled on any relevant ground. (c) As the taking over of management under section 18A is not vitiated by the failure to grant prior hearing the question of any such vice being cured by a grant of a subsequent hearing does not arise. The minority, however, held that in compliance with the principles of natural justice, prior hearing to the owner of the undertaking was required to be given before the passing of an order under section 18AA, that the second question did not arise as the denial of a prior hearing would not cure the vice by the grant of subsequent hearing, but it would be open to the Court to moderate the relief in such a way that the order is kept alive to the extent necessary until the making of the fresh order to subserve public interest and to make appropriate directions. After the decision on the reference the case was reheard on merits by a Full Bench of three Judges and the writ petition was allowed in part. The challenge to the validity of the order being rejected but insofar as the impugned order seeking to take over the corporate entity of the company, the corporate entity of the subsidiary and its assets, the petition was allowed and the respondents, the Union of India and the authorised person were directed to release from its control and custody and/or deliver possession of any assets or property of the company which were not referable to the industrial undertakings. Appeals to this Court were filed on behalf of the Company as well as by the Union of India and the National Textile Corporation. Two propositions were propounded on behalf of the company that: (a) Whether it was necessary to observe the rules of natural justice before issuing a notified order under section 18AA(1)(a) and further whether section 18-F impliedly excludes rules of natural justice relating to prior hearing; and it was contended (1) the mere use of the word 'immediate' in sub-clause (a) of section 18AA does not show a legislative intent to exclude the application of audi alteram partem rule altogether. (2) The word 'immediate' in clause (a) has been used in contra distinction to 'investigate'. It only means that under section 18AA action can be taken without prior investigation under section 15. The use of the word 'immediate' in section 18AA(1)(a) only dispenses with investigation under section 15 and not with the principle of audi alteram partem altogether and this is indicated by the marginal note of section 18A and para 3 of the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Amendment Bill which inserted section 18AA in 1971. (3) The word 'immediate' occurs only in clause (a) and not in clause (b) of section 18AA(1). It would be odd if intention to exclude this principle of natural justice is spelt out in one clause of the sub-section when the other clause does not exclude it. (4) Section 18-F does not exclude a pre-decisional hearing. The so-called post-decisional hearing contemplated by section 18-F cannot be and is not intended to be a substitute for a pre-decisional hearing. (5) Section 18F incorporates only a facet, albeit qualified, of section 21 of the General Clauses Act. The language of the Section implicity prohibits an enquiry into circumstances that led to the passing of the order of take-over and under it the aggrieved person is not entitled to show that on merits the order was void ab initio. (6) 'Immediacy' does not exclude a duty to act fairly because even an emergent situation can co-exist with the canons of natural justice. The only effect of urgency on the application of the principle of fair hearing would be that the width, form and duration of the hearing would be tailored to the situation and reduced to the reasonable minimum so that it does not delay and defeat the purpose of the contemplated action. (7) Where the civil consequences of the administrative action are grave and its effect is highly prejudicial to the rights and interests of the person affected and there is nothing in the language and scheme of the statute which unequivocally excludes a fair pre-decisional hearing and the post-decisional hearing provided therein is not a real remedial hearing equitable to a full right of appeal the Court should be loath to infer a legislative intent to exclude even a minimal fair hearing at the pre-decisional stage merely on ground of urgency. (8) The Central Government appointed four Government Officials including one from the office of the Textile Commissioner to study the affairs of the Company and to make recommendation. This Official Group submitted its report on February 16, 1978. The evidence on the basis of which the impugned order was passed was not disclosed to the appellant company till May 1978, only after it had filed the writ petition in the High Court. If there was anything adverse to the appellants in the survey report there was time enough about six weeks between the submission of the Survey Report and the passing of the impugned order for giving a short, reasonable opportunity to the appellants to explain the adverse findings against them. If there was immediacy situational modifications could be made to meet the requirement of fairness, by reducing the period of notice; that even the manner and form of such notice could be simplified to eliminate delay, that telephonic notice or short opportunity for furnishing their explanation to the Company might have satisfied the requirements of natural justice. Such an opportunity of hearing could have been given after the passing of a conditional tentative order and before its enforcement under section 18AA. For the interregnum suitable interim action such as freezing the assets of the Company or restraining the Company from creating further encumbrances, could be taken under section 16. On behalf of the Union of India and the Authorised Officer it was contended that (1) the presumption in favour of audi alteram partem rule stands impliedly displaced by the language scheme, setting and the purpose of the provision in section 18AA. (2) Section 18AA on its plain terms deals with situations where immediate preventive action is required. The paramount concern is to avoid serious problems which may be caused by fall in production. The purpose of an order under section 18AA is not to condemn the owner but to protect the scheduled industry. The issue under section 18AA is not solely between the Government and the management of the industrial undertaking. The object of taking action under this Section is to protect other outside interests of the community at large and the workers. (3) The rule of natural justice to give a hearing has been incorporated in section 18-F which gives an opportunity of a post-decisional hearing to the owner of the undertaking who if he feels aggrieved can on his application be heard, to show that even the original order under section 18AA was passed on invalid grounds and should be cancelled or rescinded. (4) On a true construction of section 18AA read with section 18-F the requirements of natural justice and fair play can be read into the statute only insofar as conformance to such canons can reasonably and realistically be required of it by the provision for a remedial hearing at a subsequent stage. (5) Under section 18-F the Central Government exercises curial functions and that Section confers on the aggrieved owner a right to apply to the Government to cancel the order of take-over. This section casts an obligation on the Central Government to deal with and dispose of an application filed thereunder with reasonable expedition. Allowing the appeal by the Company,<br/>HELD: (Sarkaria & Desai, JJ. per Chinnappa Reddy, J. dissenting.) In the facts and circumstances of the instant case, there has been a noncompliance with the implied requirement of the audi alteram partem rule of natural justice at the pre-decisional stage. The impugned order could be struck down as invalid on that score alone. But in view of the commitment / concession that a hearing would be afforded to the Company, the case is remitted to the Central Government to give a full, fair and effective hearing. [587G-H, 588C] The phrase 'natural justice' is not capable of a static and precise definition. It cannot be imprisoned in the straight-jacket of a cast-iron formula. Rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. Hence not possible to make an exhaustive catalogue of such rules. Two fundamental maxims of natural justice have now become deeply and indelibly ingrained in the common consciousness of mankind as pre-eminently necessary to ensure that the law is applied impartially objectively and fairly. These twin principles are (i) audi alteram partem and (ii) nemo judex in re sua. Audi alteram partem is a highly effective rule devised by the Courts to ensure that a statutory authority arrives at a just decision and it is calculated to act as a healthy check on the abuse or misuse of power. Its reach should not be narrowed and its applicability circumscribed.[554C-G] The rules of natural justice can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. If a statutory provision either specifically or by inevitable implication excludes the application of the rules of natural justice then the Court cannot ignore the mandate of the Legislature. Whether or not the application of the principles of natural justice in a given case has been excluded in the exercise of statutory power depends upon the language and basic scheme of the provision conferring the power, the nature of the power the purpose for which it is conferred and the effect of that power. [556A-B] The maxim audi alteram partem has many facets. Two of them are (a) notice of the case to be met, and (b) opportunity to explain. The rule cannot be sacrificed at the altar of administrative convenience or celerity; for, convenience and justice are often not on speaking terms. Difficulties, however, arise when the statute conferring the power does not expressly exclude this rule but its exclusion is sought by implication due to the presence of certain factors such as urgency where the obligation to give notice and opportunity to be heard would obstruct the taking of prompt action of a preventive or remedial nature. Audi alteram partem rule may be disregarded in an emergent situation where immediate action brooks no delay to prevent some imminent danger or injury or hazard to paramount public interests. Section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure empowers the magistrates specified therein to make an exparte conditional order in emergent cases for removal of dangerous public nuisances. Action under section 17 Land Acquisition Act furnishes another such instance. Similarly action on grounds of public safety public health may justify disregard of the rule of prior hearing. [556C-H] Cases where owing to the compulsion of the fact situation or the necessity of taking speedy action no pre- decisional hearing is given but the action, is followed soon by a full post-decisional hearing to the person affected do not in reality constitute an exception to the audi alteram partem rule. To call such cases as exception is a misnomer because they do not exclude fair play in action but adapt it to the urgency of the situation by balancing the competing claims of hurry and hearing. [560H-561A] The general principle as distinguished from an absolute rule of uniform application seems to be that where a statute does not in terms exclude this rule of prior hearing but contemplates a post-decisional hearing amounting to a full review of the original order on merits then such a statute would be construed as excluding the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage. [561G] If the statute conferring the power is silent with regard to the giving of pre-decisional hearing to the person affected and the administrative decision taken by the authority involves civil consequences of a grave nature and no full review or appeal on merits against that decision is provided courts will be extremely reluctant to construe such a statute as excluding the duty of affording even a minimal hearing shorn of all its formal trappings and dilatory features at the pre-decisional stage, unless viewed pragmatically it would paralyse the administrative process or frustrate the need for utmost promptitude. [561H] 7(i). A comparison of the provisions of Section 18A(1)(b) and Section 18AA(1)(c), bring out two main points of distinction: First, action under Section 18A(1)(b) can be taken only after an investigation had been made under Section 15; while under Section 18AA(1)(a) or (b) action can be taken without such investigation. The language, scheme and setting of Section 18AA read in the light of the Objects and Reasons for enacting this provision make this position clear beyond doubt. Second, before taking action under Section 18A(1)(b), the Central Government has to form an opinion on the basis of the investigation conducted under section 15, in regard to the existence of the objective fact, namely: that the industrial undertaking is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest; while under section 18A(1)(a) the Government has to satisfy itself that the persons incharge of the undertaking have brought about a situation likely to cause fall in production, by committing any of the three kinds of acts specified in that provision. This shows that the preliminary objective fact attributable to the persons in charge of the management or affairs of the undertaking, on the basis of which action may be taken under section 18(A)(1)(b), is of far wider amplitude than the circumstance, the existence of which is a sine qua non for taking action under section 18AA(1). The phrase "highly detrimental to the scheduled industry or public interest" in section 18-A is capable of being construed to cover a large variety of acts or things which may be considered wrong with the manner of running the industry by the management. In contrast with it, action under section 18AA(1)(a) can be taken only if the Central Government is satisfied with regard to the existence of the twin conditions specifically mentioned therein, on the basis of evidence in its possession. [569D-H] An analysis of section 18AA(1)(a), indicates that as a necessary preliminary to the exercise of the power thereunder, the Central Government must be satisfied "from documentary or other evidence in its possession" in regard to the co-existence of two circumstances: (i) that the persons in charge of the industrial undertaking have by committing any of these acts, namely, reckless investments, or creation of incumbrances on the assets of industrial undertaking, or by diversion of funds, brought about a situation which is likely to affect the production of the article manufactured or produced in the industrial undertaking, and (ii) that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation.[570B-D] It cannot be laid down as a general proposition that whenever a statute confers a power on an administrative authority and makes the exercise of that power conditional on the formation of an opinion by that authority in regard to the existence of an immediacy, its opinion in regard to that preliminary fact is not open to judicial scrutiny at all. While it may be conceded that an element of subjectivity is always involved in the formation of such an opinion, the existence of the circumstances from which the inference constituting the opinion, as the sine qua non for action, are to be drawn, must be demonstrable, and the existence of such "circumstances", if questioned, must be proved at least prima facie. [571 E-G] From a plain reading of section 18AA, it is clear that it does not expressly in unmistakable and unequivocal terms exclude the application of the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage. [574B] In the instant case, so far as Kanpur Unit is concerned, it was lying closed for more than three months before the passing of the impugned order. There was no 'immediacy' in relation to that unit, which could absolve the Government from the obligation of complying fully with audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional or pre- takeover stage. [583A] Keshav Mills Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, [1973] 3 S.C.R. 22; Kamla Prasad Khetan v. Union of India,[1957] S.C.R. 1052; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 621; Sukhdev Singh & Ors. v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh, [1975] 3 S.C.R. 619; A. K. Kraipak v. Union of India, [1970] 1 S.C.R. 457; Ridge v. Baldwin, [1964] A.C. 40; 196; Heatley v. Tasmanian Racing & Gaming Commission, 14 Australian Law Reports 519; Nawabkhan Abbaskhan v. State of Gujarat, [1974] 3 S.C.R. 427; State of Orissa v. Dr. Bina Pani Dei, [1962] 2 S.C.R. 625; Ambalal M. Shah v. Hathi Singh Manufacturing Co. Ltd. [1962] 3 S.C.R. 171; and S. L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan & Ors., [1981] 1 S.C.R. 746, referred to. (Per Chinnappa Reddy, J. dissenting) The principles of natural justice are not attracted to the situations contemplated by section 18AA of Industries (Development and Regulation) Act. Natural justice like Ultra Vires and Public Policy is a branch of the public law and is a formidable weapon which can be wielded to secure justice to the citizen. While it may be used to protect certain fundamental liberties, civil and political rights, it may be used as indeed it is used more often than not, to protect vested interests and to obstruct the path of progressive change. The time has come to make an appropriate distinction between natural justice in its application to fundamental liberties, civil and political rights and natural justice in its application to vested interests. [590A-B] Our constitution as befits the Constitution of a Socialist Secular Democratic Republic, recognises the paramountcy of the public weal over the private interest. Natural justice, ultra vires, public policy, or any other rule of interpretation must, therefore, conform, grow and be tailored to serve the public interest and respond to the demands of an evolving society. [590C] The principles of natural justice have taken deep root in the judicial conscience of our people. They are now considered so fundamental as to be implicit in every decision making function, judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative. Where authority functions under a statute and the statute provides for the observance of the principles of natural justice in a particular manner, natural justice will have to be observed in that manner and in no other. Where the statute is silent about the observance of the principles of natural justice, such statutory silence is taken to imply compliance with the principles of natural justice. Where the conflict is between the public interest and the private interest the presumption must necessarily be weak and may, therefore, be readily displaced. The presumption is also weak, where what are involved are mere property rights. In cases of urgency, particularly where the public interest is involved, preemptive action may be a strategic necessity. Even in cases of preemptive action, if the statute so provides or if the Courts so deem fit in appropriate cases, a postponed hearing may be substituted for natural justice. [590A-C; 591F-G] 3(ii). Where natural justice is implied, the extent of the implication and the nature of the hearing must vary with the statute, the subject and the situation. [592B] The absence of the expression 'immediate action' in section 18AA(1)(b) does not make any difference. Section 18AA(1)(a) refers to a situation where immediate preventive action may avert a disaster, whereas section 18AA contemplates a situation where the disaster has occurred and action is necessary to restore normalcy. Restoration of production where production has stopped in a key industry or industrial undertaking is as important and urgent in the public interest as prevention of a situation where production may be affected. Immediate action is, therefore, as necessary in the situation contemplated by section 18AA(1)(b) as in the situation contemplated by section 18AA(1)(a). [596 F-G] The marginal note refers to the power to take over without investigation but there is no sufficient reason to suppose that the word immediate is used only to contra- distinguish it from the investigation contemplated by section 15 of the Act, though of course a consequence of immediate action under section 18AA may be to dispense with the enquiry under section 15. In fact, facts which come to light during the course of an investigation under section 15 may form the basis of action under section 18AA(1)(a). Where in the course of an investigation under section 15 it is discovered that the management have, by reckless investments or creation of encumbrances on the assets of the industrial undertaking or by diversion of funds brought about a situation which is likely to affect the production of the articles manufactured or produced in the industrial undertaking, if the Government is satisfied that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation, there is no reason why the Central Government may not straightaway take action under section 18AA(1)(a) without waiting for completion of investigation under section 15. [597A-B] Where there is a provision in the statute itself for revocation of the order by the very authority making the decision, it appears to be unnecessary to insist upon a pre- decisional observance of natural justice. [598A] The likelihood of production being jeopardized or the stoppage of production in a key industrial undertaking is a matter of grave concern affecting the public interest. Parliament has taken so serious a view of the matter that it has authorised the Central Government to take over the management of the industrial undertaking if immediate action may prevent jeopardy to production or restore production where it has already stopped. The necessity for immediate action by the Central Government contemplated by Parliament is definitely indicative of the exclusion of natural justice. It is not as if the owner of the industrial undertaking is left with no remedy. He may move the Central Government under section 18-F to cancel the order made under section 18AA. [598C-D] Neither section 18-F of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act nor section 21 of the General Clauses Act by itself excludes natural justice. The exclusion of natural justice where such exclusion is not express has to be implied by reference to the subject, the statute and the statutory situation. Where an express provision in the statute itself provides for a post decisional hearing the other provisions of the Statute will have to be read in the light of such provision and the provision for post- decisional hearing may then clinch the issue where pre- decisional natural justice appears to be excluded on the other terms of the statute. That a post-decisional hearing may also be had by the terms of section 21 of the General Clauses Act may not necessarily help in the interpretation of the provisions of the statute concerned. [599 A-C] Ridge v. Baldwin, 1964 A.C. p. 40; Annie G. Phillip v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 75 L.E.d. 1289; John H. Fahey v. Paul Mallonee, 91 L.E.d. 2030; Margarita Fuentes v. Robert L. Shevin, Attorney General of Florida, 32 L.E.d. 2d 556 and Lawrence Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 40 L.E.d. 2d 406, referred to. - Rama Rao, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh as well as the President of the Telugu Desam Party as well as respondent No. 3. The advertisements very shortly stated, refer to the auspicious gifts made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to the poor people on the eve of New Year and Sankranti. In the said advertisements, it is stated that the said Government which was formed by the Telugu Desam Party was giving to the poor people whose income was below Rs. and the said advertisements referred to a new scheme of selling sarees and dhoties at half prices to the poor people in the State of Andhra Pradesh having Green-cards. Moreover, the offer in the advertisements for the sale of dhoties and sarees at discount rates was in the nature of a benefit offered to poor persons in that State. When a Government announces the measures which are intended for the benefit of any of the classes for whose the Government can normally be expected to work like the poor or the economical backward classes, it is only in rare circumstances that such a promise can be said to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) even though such a promise might be made on the eve of elections. 8. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => '', 'counseldef' => '', 'court' => 'Supreme Court of India', 'court_type' => 'SC', 'decidedon' => '1989-09-29', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' K.N. Saikia,; M.H. Kania and; S. Ranganathan, JJ.', 'judgement' => '</p><p>Kania, J.</p><p>1. These two appeals arise out of the judgments in two Election Petitions in the Andhra Pradesh High Court questioning the election of respondent No. 1 as a Member of Parliament from Srikakulam No. Parliamentary Constituency in the 8th General Election to the House of the People. The points raised in these appeals are common and so are the relevant facts; and, hence, they are being disposed of by this common judgment. We propose to take note of only the few facts which are necessary for the appreciation of the controversy before us.</p><p>2. The polling date for the said election along with other parliamentary elections in the State of Andhra Pradesh was December 27, 1984 but in Srikakulam No. 1 Parliamentary Constituency the polling was countermanded and the date of polling was later fixed on January 28, 1985. In both the Election Petitions the election of respondent No. 1 was questioned mainly on the ground that Shri N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh as well as the President of the Telugu Desam Party as well as respondent No. 1 gave certain speeches and certain advertisements were got published by Shri N.T. Rama Rao through the Publicity Department of the Government of Andhra Pradesh in the newspapers containing certain statements which are alleged to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A) of the <a>Representation of the People Act, 1951</a> (hereinafter referred to as 'the said Act'). The main question canvassed before us is whether the statements contained in these aforesaid advertisements amount to a corrupt practice under Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act. Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act runs as follows :</p><p>123. Corrupt practices</p><p>The following shall be deemed to be corrupt practises for the purposes of this Act :</p><p>(1) 'Bribery', that is to say.</p><p>(A) any gift, offer or promise by a candidate or his agent or by any other person with the consent of a candidate or his election agent of any gratification, to any person whomsover, with the object, directly or indirectly of inducing.</p><p>(a) x x x</p><p>(b) an elector to vote or refrain from voting at an election, or as a reward to.</p><p>(i) a person for having so stood or not stood, or for having withdrawn or not having withdrawn his candidature; or</p><p>(ii) an elector for having voted or refrained from voting.</p><p>3. The advertisements very shortly stated, refer to the auspicious gifts made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to the poor people on the eve of New Year and Sankranti. In the said advertisements, it is stated that the said Government which was formed by the Telugu Desam Party was giving to the poor people whose income was below Rs. 6,000 per year, a kilo of rice at Rs. 2 per Kg. and the said advertisements referred to a new scheme of selling sarees and dhoties at half prices to the poor people in the State of Andhra Pradesh having Green-cards. Green-cards were directed to be issued to all the persons whose annual income was below Rs. 6,000. The supply of the rice at subsidised rates as aforesaid was also to be made to the Green-card holders only. The scheme to sell sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was to be operative from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985.</p><p>4. In considering the question whether the said advertisement and the said speeches amount to a corrupt practice, we are of the view that the provisions of Section 123 of the said Act which deal with corrupt practices have to be interpreted, keeping in mind that dictates of commonsense require that they never could have been intended to treat normal election promises made in election manifestoes or usual election speeches by members of various political parties aspiring to power and by different candidates aspiring to get elected to legislative bodies concerned as corrupt practices. We are of the view that these advertisements and speeches amount to nothing more than statements extolling the achievements of the Government of the State of Andhra Pradesh under the Telugu Desam Party headed by N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister, and contain normal election promises and these statements do not amount to corrupt practices falling within the scope of Sub-clause (b) of Clause (A) of Sub-section (1) of Section 123 of the said Act.</p><p>5. It was urged by Mr. Rao, learned Counsel for the appellants that in the impugned judgments, the High Court has incorrectly taken the view that in order to amount to bribery within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A), the transaction must amount to a bargain by the candidate with a view to get votes. It was pointed out by him that the said view has been taken in the impugned judgments, relying upon the decision of a Bench comprising to learned Judges of this Court in Ghasi Ram v. Dal Singh and Ors. :1983 SCR 102 . We have gone through to the relevant portion of that judgment (at page 109 and 110 of the said report). A careful perusal of the said judgment shows that what has been really held in that case is that if the promises given or made amount to a bargain entered into by a candidate for a vote or votes, that would amount to a corrupt practice; but it has not been held there that unless the act alleged amounts to such a bargain, it could not amount to a corrupt practice. In our view, that judgment does not lay down that in order to amount to a corrupt practice, the transaction must amount to a bargain for getting a vote. It was pointed out by Mr. Rao, however, that such a view seems to have been taken in two other decisions rendered by two Benches, each comprising two learned Judges of this Court in Bhanu Kumar Shastri v. Mohan Lal Sukhadia and Ors. : [1971]3SCR522 and Harjit Singh Mann v. S Umrao Singh and Ors. : [1980]2SCR501 . and these judgments need to be overruled. We do not propose to go into the correctness or otherwise of this view because, even on the footing that in order to amount to a corrupt practice under the aforesaid provision the alleged acts need not constitute a bargain, the the acts established in the present case, in our opinion, do not amount to a corrupt practice.</p><p>6. Our attention was drawn by Mr. Rao to the fact that in this case the said advertisements and the speeches had to be viewed in the context of the fact that the advertisements were issued and the speeches were made after respondent No. 1 filed his nomination papers on January 4, 1985, for the election and before the election was held in the aforesaid constituency. It was further pointed out that the offer made for the sale of sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was limited to the period from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985. It cannot be denied that these factors are relevant factOrs. We cannot, however, lose sight of the fact that this offer was made not only in this constituency but throughout the State where the elections to the House of the People were scheduled to be held, and were, in fact, held on December 27, 1984. It was only in case of this constituency that the election to be held on the scheduled date was countermanded and later held on January 28, 1985. We cannot lose sight of the fact that, as far as the said speeches and the said advertisements, which were issued by the Publicity Department of the State, are concerned, they deal in the main with the achievements of the Government of Andhra Pradesh which, of course, was being run by Ministers belonging to Telugu Desam Party to which respondent No. 1 also belonged. Moreover, the offer in the advertisements for the sale of dhoties and sarees at discount rates was in the nature of a benefit offered to poor persons in that State. When a Government announces the measures which are intended for the benefit of any of the classes for whose the Government can normally be expected to work like the poor or the economical backward classes, it is only in rare circumstances that such a promise can be said to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) even though such a promise might be made on the eve of elections. Keeping this in mind, in our opinion, although the offer to sell dhoties and sarees at discount rates was of a limited duration as aforestated, it cannot be regarded as a corrupt practice. Such an offer was bound to have financial repercussions and it is quite possible the duration of the offer was limited to enable the Government to study the financial repercussions rather than from any improper motive. We find support for this view from the decision of this Court in H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh : [1969]3SCR813 . In that case an Ordinance was passed by the Government of Madhya Pradesh as a result of which a large number of agriculturists, namely, those holdings of plots of land of less than 7.5 acres area or paying land revenue not exceeding Rs. 5/- were exempted from the payment of the land revenue. It was held that such a concession does not amount to a gift, offer or promise of any gratification within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) of the said Act nor does the announcement of the declaration made at a meeting shortly before the election or the issue of a pamphlet containing that declaration at that time carry the matter any further. It was held that neither Shri D.P. Misra who was the Chief Minister nor Shri S.K. Dixit who acted as his agent were guilty of any corrupt practice within the meaning of the aforesaid provision.</p><p>7. It was next contended by Mr. Rao, although very faintly, that the High Court was in error as it had not decided all other issues which were raised in the election petition. In this regard we cannot lose sight of the fact that the term of the present Lok Sabha is likely to be over within a few months and fresh elections are likely to be held and it would, therefore, be an exercise in futility to remand the matter to the High Court for deciding the remaining issues.</p><p>8. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.<p></p><p>', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'AIR1990SC1889; JT1989(4)SC186; 1989(2)SCALE891; 1989Supp(2)SCC504', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors.', 'sub' => 'Election', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ) $casename_url = 'b-rajagopala-rao-vs-appayya-hanumanthu' $args = array( (int) 0 => '640942', (int) 1 => 'b-rajagopala-rao-vs-appayya-hanumanthu' ) $url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/640942/b-rajagopala-rao-vs-appayya-hanumanthu' $ctype = '' $caseref = 'H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh<br>' $content = array( (int) 0 => '', (int) 1 => '<p>Kania, J.', (int) 2 => '<p>1. These two appeals arise out of the judgments in two Election Petitions in the Andhra Pradesh High Court questioning the election of respondent No. 1 as a Member of Parliament from Srikakulam No. Parliamentary Constituency in the 8th General Election to the House of the People. The points raised in these appeals are common and so are the relevant facts; and, hence, they are being disposed of by this common judgment. We propose to take note of only the few facts which are necessary for the appreciation of the controversy before us.', (int) 3 => '<p>2. The polling date for the said election along with other parliamentary elections in the State of Andhra Pradesh was December 27, 1984 but in Srikakulam No. 1 Parliamentary Constituency the polling was countermanded and the date of polling was later fixed on January 28, 1985. In both the Election Petitions the election of respondent No. 1 was questioned mainly on the ground that Shri N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh as well as the President of the Telugu Desam Party as well as respondent No. 1 gave certain speeches and certain advertisements were got published by Shri N.T. Rama Rao through the Publicity Department of the Government of Andhra Pradesh in the newspapers containing certain statements which are alleged to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A) of the <a>Representation of the People Act, 1951</a> (hereinafter referred to as 'the said Act'). The main question canvassed before us is whether the statements contained in these aforesaid advertisements amount to a corrupt practice under Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act. Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act runs as follows :', (int) 4 => '<p>123. Corrupt practices', (int) 5 => '<p>The following shall be deemed to be corrupt practises for the purposes of this Act :', (int) 6 => '<p>(1) 'Bribery', that is to say.', (int) 7 => '<p>(A) any gift, offer or promise by a candidate or his agent or by any other person with the consent of a candidate or his election agent of any gratification, to any person whomsover, with the object, directly or indirectly of inducing.', (int) 8 => '<p>(a) x x x', (int) 9 => '<p>(b) an elector to vote or refrain from voting at an election, or as a reward to.', (int) 10 => '<p>(i) a person for having so stood or not stood, or for having withdrawn or not having withdrawn his candidature; or', (int) 11 => '<p>(ii) an elector for having voted or refrained from voting.', (int) 12 => '<p>3. The advertisements very shortly stated, refer to the auspicious gifts made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to the poor people on the eve of New Year and Sankranti. In the said advertisements, it is stated that the said Government which was formed by the Telugu Desam Party was giving to the poor people whose income was below Rs. 6,000 per year, a kilo of rice at Rs. 2 per Kg. and the said advertisements referred to a new scheme of selling sarees and dhoties at half prices to the poor people in the State of Andhra Pradesh having Green-cards. Green-cards were directed to be issued to all the persons whose annual income was below Rs. 6,000. The supply of the rice at subsidised rates as aforesaid was also to be made to the Green-card holders only. The scheme to sell sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was to be operative from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985.', (int) 13 => '<p>4. In considering the question whether the said advertisement and the said speeches amount to a corrupt practice, we are of the view that the provisions of Section 123 of the said Act which deal with corrupt practices have to be interpreted, keeping in mind that dictates of commonsense require that they never could have been intended to treat normal election promises made in election manifestoes or usual election speeches by members of various political parties aspiring to power and by different candidates aspiring to get elected to legislative bodies concerned as corrupt practices. We are of the view that these advertisements and speeches amount to nothing more than statements extolling the achievements of the Government of the State of Andhra Pradesh under the Telugu Desam Party headed by N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister, and contain normal election promises and these statements do not amount to corrupt practices falling within the scope of Sub-clause (b) of Clause (A) of Sub-section (1) of Section 123 of the said Act.', (int) 14 => '<p>5. It was urged by Mr. Rao, learned Counsel for the appellants that in the impugned judgments, the High Court has incorrectly taken the view that in order to amount to bribery within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A), the transaction must amount to a bargain by the candidate with a view to get votes. It was pointed out by him that the said view has been taken in the impugned judgments, relying upon the decision of a Bench comprising to learned Judges of this Court in Ghasi Ram v. Dal Singh and Ors. :1983 SCR 102 . We have gone through to the relevant portion of that judgment (at page 109 and 110 of the said report). A careful perusal of the said judgment shows that what has been really held in that case is that if the promises given or made amount to a bargain entered into by a candidate for a vote or votes, that would amount to a corrupt practice; but it has not been held there that unless the act alleged amounts to such a bargain, it could not amount to a corrupt practice. In our view, that judgment does not lay down that in order to amount to a corrupt practice, the transaction must amount to a bargain for getting a vote. It was pointed out by Mr. Rao, however, that such a view seems to have been taken in two other decisions rendered by two Benches, each comprising two learned Judges of this Court in Bhanu Kumar Shastri v. Mohan Lal Sukhadia and Ors. : [1971]3SCR522 and Harjit Singh Mann v. S Umrao Singh and Ors. : [1980]2SCR501 . and these judgments need to be overruled. We do not propose to go into the correctness or otherwise of this view because, even on the footing that in order to amount to a corrupt practice under the aforesaid provision the alleged acts need not constitute a bargain, the the acts established in the present case, in our opinion, do not amount to a corrupt practice.', (int) 15 => '<p>6. Our attention was drawn by Mr. Rao to the fact that in this case the said advertisements and the speeches had to be viewed in the context of the fact that the advertisements were issued and the speeches were made after respondent No. 1 filed his nomination papers on January 4, 1985, for the election and before the election was held in the aforesaid constituency. It was further pointed out that the offer made for the sale of sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was limited to the period from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985. It cannot be denied that these factors are relevant factOrs. We cannot, however, lose sight of the fact that this offer was made not only in this constituency but throughout the State where the elections to the House of the People were scheduled to be held, and were, in fact, held on December 27, 1984. It was only in case of this constituency that the election to be held on the scheduled date was countermanded and later held on January 28, 1985. We cannot lose sight of the fact that, as far as the said speeches and the said advertisements, which were issued by the Publicity Department of the State, are concerned, they deal in the main with the achievements of the Government of Andhra Pradesh which, of course, was being run by Ministers belonging to Telugu Desam Party to which respondent No. 1 also belonged. Moreover, the offer in the advertisements for the sale of dhoties and sarees at discount rates was in the nature of a benefit offered to poor persons in that State. When a Government announces the measures which are intended for the benefit of any of the classes for whose the Government can normally be expected to work like the poor or the economical backward classes, it is only in rare circumstances that such a promise can be said to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) even though such a promise might be made on the eve of elections. Keeping this in mind, in our opinion, although the offer to sell dhoties and sarees at discount rates was of a limited duration as aforestated, it cannot be regarded as a corrupt practice. Such an offer was bound to have financial repercussions and it is quite possible the duration of the offer was limited to enable the Government to study the financial repercussions rather than from any improper motive. We find support for this view from the decision of this Court in H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh : [1969]3SCR813 . In that case an Ordinance was passed by the Government of Madhya Pradesh as a result of which a large number of agriculturists, namely, those holdings of plots of land of less than 7.5 acres area or paying land revenue not exceeding Rs. 5/- were exempted from the payment of the land revenue. It was held that such a concession does not amount to a gift, offer or promise of any gratification within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) of the said Act nor does the announcement of the declaration made at a meeting shortly before the election or the issue of a pamphlet containing that declaration at that time carry the matter any further. It was held that neither Shri D.P. Misra who was the Chief Minister nor Shri S.K. Dixit who acted as his agent were guilty of any corrupt practice within the meaning of the aforesaid provision.', (int) 16 => '<p>7. It was next contended by Mr. Rao, although very faintly, that the High Court was in error as it had not decided all other issues which were raised in the election petition. In this regard we cannot lose sight of the fact that the term of the present Lok Sabha is likely to be over within a few months and fresh elections are likely to be held and it would, therefore, be an exercise in futility to remand the matter to the High Court for deciding the remaining issues.', (int) 17 => '<p>8. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.<p>', (int) 18 => '<p>' ) $paragraphAfter = (int) 1 $cnt = (int) 19 $i = (int) 3include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144 View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971 View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933 View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473 Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963 Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200 Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167 [main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109
2. The polling date for the said election along with other parliamentary elections in the State of Andhra Pradesh was December 27, 1984 but in Srikakulam No. 1 Parliamentary Constituency the polling was countermanded and the date of polling was later fixed on January 28, 1985. In both the Election Petitions the election of respondent No. 1 was questioned mainly on the ground that Shri N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh as well as the President of the Telugu Desam Party as well as respondent No. 1 gave certain speeches and certain advertisements were got published by Shri N.T. Rama Rao through the Publicity Department of the Government of Andhra Pradesh in the newspapers containing certain statements which are alleged to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (hereinafter referred to as 'the said Act'). The main question canvassed before us is whether the statements contained in these aforesaid advertisements amount to a corrupt practice under Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act. Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act runs as follows :
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$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp' $dataForView = array( 'title_for_layout' => 'B Rajagopala Rao and anr Vs Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors - Citation 640942 - Court Judgment | ', 'desc' => array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '640942', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/50684/representation-of-the-people-act-1951-complete-act">Representation of the People Act, 1951</a> - Sections 1, 3(1)(A), 123 and 123(1)(A)', 'appealno' => 'Civil Appeal Nos. 484 and 485 of 1987', 'appellant' => 'B. Rajagopala Rao and anr.', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'B. Rajagopala Rao and anr. Vs. Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors.', 'casenote' => 'Election - corrupt practices - Sections 123 and 123 (1) (A) of Representation of the People Act, 1951 - whether advertisements by public department and speeches made by respondent No. 1 to sell dhoti and sarees at discount rates amount to corrupt practices - offer was available for mass and for limited duration - such offer was bound to have financial repercussions and it is quite possible that duration of offer limited to enable Government to study financial repercussions rather than from any improper motive - offer not amounted to corrupt practices. - [ D.A. Desai,; O. Chinnappa Reddy and; R.S. Sarkaria, JJ.] The Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 empowers the Union of India in the public interest to take under its control the industries specified in the First Schedule to the Act. Item 23 of the First Schedule relates to textiles of various categories. Section 15 authorises the Central Government to make or cause to be made a full and complete investigation into the circumstances of the case if the Central Government is of the opinion that (a) in respect of any scheduled industry or industrial undertaking or undertakings (i) there has been, or is likely to be, a substantial fall in the volume of production for which, having regard to the economic conditions prevailing, there is no justification; or (ii) there has been, or is likely to be, a marked deterioration in the quality of any article... which could have been or can be avoided; or (iii) there has been or is likely to be a rise in the price of any article..... for which there is no justification; or (iv) it is necessary to take any such action for the purpose of conserving any resources of national importance; or (b) any industrial undertaking is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest. After the investigation is made under section 15, section 16(1) empowers the Central Government if action is desirable, to issue appropriate directions, and section 16(2) provides for the issue of interim directions by the Central Government pending investigation under section 15. Chapter III-A consisting of Sections 18A, 18-AA, 18-B, 18-C, 18-D, 18-E and 18-F deal with "direct management or control of Industrial Undertakings by Central Government in certain cases". Sec. 18-A empowers the Central Government by notified order, to authorise any person or body of persons to take over the management of the whole or any part of an industrial undertaking or to exercise in respect of the whole, or any part of the undertaking such functions of control as may be specified in the order, if the Central Government is of opinion that: (a) an industrial undertaking to which directions have been issued in pursuance of section 16 has failed to comply with such directions, or (b) an industrial undertaking in respect of which an investigation has been made under section 15 is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest. Section 18AA(5) stipulates that the provisions of Sections 18-B to 18 E shall be applicable to the industrial undertaking in respect of which an order has been made under section 18-AA even as they apply to an industrial undertaking taken over under Section 18-A. Section 18-F empowers the Central Government to cancel the order made under section 18-A if it appears that the purpose of the order has been fulfilled or it is not necessary that the order should remain in force. The appellant M/s. Swadeshi Cotton Mills was taken over by the Government of India by a notification dated April 13, 1978 in exercise of the powers conferred on it under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 18AA of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 on the ground that the company had by creation of encumbrances on the assets of its industrial undertakings, brought about a situation which had affected and is likely to further affect the production of articles manufactured or produced by it and that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation. The Government authorised the National Textile Corporation Limited to take over the management, subject to the conditions that the authorised person shall comply with all the directions issued from time to time by the Central Government and that the authorised person shall hold office for a period of five years. The appellant Mills challenged the aforesaid order in a writ petition in the High Court. The case was heard by a Full Bench of five Judges to consider the question whether in construing section 18AA of the Industries Development and Regulation Act, 1951, compliance with the principle of audi alteram partem is to be implied and whether hearing is to be given to the parties who would be affected by the order to be passed prior to the passing of the order or whether hearing can be given after the order is passed and whether the order passed under the said Section is vitiated by not giving of such hearing and whether such vice can be cured. The Bench by a majority answered the three questions as follows:- (a) Section 18AA(1)(a)(b) excludes the giving of prior hearing to the party who would be affected by order thereunder. (b) Section 18-F expressly provides for a post- decisional hearing to the owner of the industrial undertaking, the management of which is taken over under section 18AA to have the order made under section 18AA cancelled on any relevant ground. (c) As the taking over of management under section 18A is not vitiated by the failure to grant prior hearing the question of any such vice being cured by a grant of a subsequent hearing does not arise. The minority, however, held that in compliance with the principles of natural justice, prior hearing to the owner of the undertaking was required to be given before the passing of an order under section 18AA, that the second question did not arise as the denial of a prior hearing would not cure the vice by the grant of subsequent hearing, but it would be open to the Court to moderate the relief in such a way that the order is kept alive to the extent necessary until the making of the fresh order to subserve public interest and to make appropriate directions. After the decision on the reference the case was reheard on merits by a Full Bench of three Judges and the writ petition was allowed in part. The challenge to the validity of the order being rejected but insofar as the impugned order seeking to take over the corporate entity of the company, the corporate entity of the subsidiary and its assets, the petition was allowed and the respondents, the Union of India and the authorised person were directed to release from its control and custody and/or deliver possession of any assets or property of the company which were not referable to the industrial undertakings. Appeals to this Court were filed on behalf of the Company as well as by the Union of India and the National Textile Corporation. Two propositions were propounded on behalf of the company that: (a) Whether it was necessary to observe the rules of natural justice before issuing a notified order under section 18AA(1)(a) and further whether section 18-F impliedly excludes rules of natural justice relating to prior hearing; and it was contended (1) the mere use of the word 'immediate' in sub-clause (a) of section 18AA does not show a legislative intent to exclude the application of audi alteram partem rule altogether. (2) The word 'immediate' in clause (a) has been used in contra distinction to 'investigate'. It only means that under section 18AA action can be taken without prior investigation under section 15. The use of the word 'immediate' in section 18AA(1)(a) only dispenses with investigation under section 15 and not with the principle of audi alteram partem altogether and this is indicated by the marginal note of section 18A and para 3 of the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Amendment Bill which inserted section 18AA in 1971. (3) The word 'immediate' occurs only in clause (a) and not in clause (b) of section 18AA(1). It would be odd if intention to exclude this principle of natural justice is spelt out in one clause of the sub-section when the other clause does not exclude it. (4) Section 18-F does not exclude a pre-decisional hearing. The so-called post-decisional hearing contemplated by section 18-F cannot be and is not intended to be a substitute for a pre-decisional hearing. (5) Section 18F incorporates only a facet, albeit qualified, of section 21 of the General Clauses Act. The language of the Section implicity prohibits an enquiry into circumstances that led to the passing of the order of take-over and under it the aggrieved person is not entitled to show that on merits the order was void ab initio. (6) 'Immediacy' does not exclude a duty to act fairly because even an emergent situation can co-exist with the canons of natural justice. The only effect of urgency on the application of the principle of fair hearing would be that the width, form and duration of the hearing would be tailored to the situation and reduced to the reasonable minimum so that it does not delay and defeat the purpose of the contemplated action. (7) Where the civil consequences of the administrative action are grave and its effect is highly prejudicial to the rights and interests of the person affected and there is nothing in the language and scheme of the statute which unequivocally excludes a fair pre-decisional hearing and the post-decisional hearing provided therein is not a real remedial hearing equitable to a full right of appeal the Court should be loath to infer a legislative intent to exclude even a minimal fair hearing at the pre-decisional stage merely on ground of urgency. (8) The Central Government appointed four Government Officials including one from the office of the Textile Commissioner to study the affairs of the Company and to make recommendation. This Official Group submitted its report on February 16, 1978. The evidence on the basis of which the impugned order was passed was not disclosed to the appellant company till May 1978, only after it had filed the writ petition in the High Court. If there was anything adverse to the appellants in the survey report there was time enough about six weeks between the submission of the Survey Report and the passing of the impugned order for giving a short, reasonable opportunity to the appellants to explain the adverse findings against them. If there was immediacy situational modifications could be made to meet the requirement of fairness, by reducing the period of notice; that even the manner and form of such notice could be simplified to eliminate delay, that telephonic notice or short opportunity for furnishing their explanation to the Company might have satisfied the requirements of natural justice. Such an opportunity of hearing could have been given after the passing of a conditional tentative order and before its enforcement under section 18AA. For the interregnum suitable interim action such as freezing the assets of the Company or restraining the Company from creating further encumbrances, could be taken under section 16. On behalf of the Union of India and the Authorised Officer it was contended that (1) the presumption in favour of audi alteram partem rule stands impliedly displaced by the language scheme, setting and the purpose of the provision in section 18AA. (2) Section 18AA on its plain terms deals with situations where immediate preventive action is required. The paramount concern is to avoid serious problems which may be caused by fall in production. The purpose of an order under section 18AA is not to condemn the owner but to protect the scheduled industry. The issue under section 18AA is not solely between the Government and the management of the industrial undertaking. The object of taking action under this Section is to protect other outside interests of the community at large and the workers. (3) The rule of natural justice to give a hearing has been incorporated in section 18-F which gives an opportunity of a post-decisional hearing to the owner of the undertaking who if he feels aggrieved can on his application be heard, to show that even the original order under section 18AA was passed on invalid grounds and should be cancelled or rescinded. (4) On a true construction of section 18AA read with section 18-F the requirements of natural justice and fair play can be read into the statute only insofar as conformance to such canons can reasonably and realistically be required of it by the provision for a remedial hearing at a subsequent stage. (5) Under section 18-F the Central Government exercises curial functions and that Section confers on the aggrieved owner a right to apply to the Government to cancel the order of take-over. This section casts an obligation on the Central Government to deal with and dispose of an application filed thereunder with reasonable expedition. Allowing the appeal by the Company,<br />HELD: (Sarkaria & Desai, JJ. per Chinnappa Reddy, J. dissenting.) In the facts and circumstances of the instant case, there has been a noncompliance with the implied requirement of the audi alteram partem rule of natural justice at the pre-decisional stage. The impugned order could be struck down as invalid on that score alone. But in view of the commitment / concession that a hearing would be afforded to the Company, the case is remitted to the Central Government to give a full, fair and effective hearing. [587G-H, 588C] The phrase 'natural justice' is not capable of a static and precise definition. It cannot be imprisoned in the straight-jacket of a cast-iron formula. Rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. Hence not possible to make an exhaustive catalogue of such rules. Two fundamental maxims of natural justice have now become deeply and indelibly ingrained in the common consciousness of mankind as pre-eminently necessary to ensure that the law is applied impartially objectively and fairly. These twin principles are (i) audi alteram partem and (ii) nemo judex in re sua. Audi alteram partem is a highly effective rule devised by the Courts to ensure that a statutory authority arrives at a just decision and it is calculated to act as a healthy check on the abuse or misuse of power. Its reach should not be narrowed and its applicability circumscribed.[554C-G] The rules of natural justice can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. If a statutory provision either specifically or by inevitable implication excludes the application of the rules of natural justice then the Court cannot ignore the mandate of the Legislature. Whether or not the application of the principles of natural justice in a given case has been excluded in the exercise of statutory power depends upon the language and basic scheme of the provision conferring the power, the nature of the power the purpose for which it is conferred and the effect of that power. [556A-B] The maxim audi alteram partem has many facets. Two of them are (a) notice of the case to be met, and (b) opportunity to explain. The rule cannot be sacrificed at the altar of administrative convenience or celerity; for, convenience and justice are often not on speaking terms. Difficulties, however, arise when the statute conferring the power does not expressly exclude this rule but its exclusion is sought by implication due to the presence of certain factors such as urgency where the obligation to give notice and opportunity to be heard would obstruct the taking of prompt action of a preventive or remedial nature. Audi alteram partem rule may be disregarded in an emergent situation where immediate action brooks no delay to prevent some imminent danger or injury or hazard to paramount public interests. Section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure empowers the magistrates specified therein to make an exparte conditional order in emergent cases for removal of dangerous public nuisances. Action under section 17 Land Acquisition Act furnishes another such instance. Similarly action on grounds of public safety public health may justify disregard of the rule of prior hearing. [556C-H] Cases where owing to the compulsion of the fact situation or the necessity of taking speedy action no pre- decisional hearing is given but the action, is followed soon by a full post-decisional hearing to the person affected do not in reality constitute an exception to the audi alteram partem rule. To call such cases as exception is a misnomer because they do not exclude fair play in action but adapt it to the urgency of the situation by balancing the competing claims of hurry and hearing. [560H-561A] The general principle as distinguished from an absolute rule of uniform application seems to be that where a statute does not in terms exclude this rule of prior hearing but contemplates a post-decisional hearing amounting to a full review of the original order on merits then such a statute would be construed as excluding the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage. [561G] If the statute conferring the power is silent with regard to the giving of pre-decisional hearing to the person affected and the administrative decision taken by the authority involves civil consequences of a grave nature and no full review or appeal on merits against that decision is provided courts will be extremely reluctant to construe such a statute as excluding the duty of affording even a minimal hearing shorn of all its formal trappings and dilatory features at the pre-decisional stage, unless viewed pragmatically it would paralyse the administrative process or frustrate the need for utmost promptitude. [561H] 7(i). A comparison of the provisions of Section 18A(1)(b) and Section 18AA(1)(c), bring out two main points of distinction: First, action under Section 18A(1)(b) can be taken only after an investigation had been made under Section 15; while under Section 18AA(1)(a) or (b) action can be taken without such investigation. The language, scheme and setting of Section 18AA read in the light of the Objects and Reasons for enacting this provision make this position clear beyond doubt. Second, before taking action under Section 18A(1)(b), the Central Government has to form an opinion on the basis of the investigation conducted under section 15, in regard to the existence of the objective fact, namely: that the industrial undertaking is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest; while under section 18A(1)(a) the Government has to satisfy itself that the persons incharge of the undertaking have brought about a situation likely to cause fall in production, by committing any of the three kinds of acts specified in that provision. This shows that the preliminary objective fact attributable to the persons in charge of the management or affairs of the undertaking, on the basis of which action may be taken under section 18(A)(1)(b), is of far wider amplitude than the circumstance, the existence of which is a sine qua non for taking action under section 18AA(1). The phrase "highly detrimental to the scheduled industry or public interest" in section 18-A is capable of being construed to cover a large variety of acts or things which may be considered wrong with the manner of running the industry by the management. In contrast with it, action under section 18AA(1)(a) can be taken only if the Central Government is satisfied with regard to the existence of the twin conditions specifically mentioned therein, on the basis of evidence in its possession. [569D-H] An analysis of section 18AA(1)(a), indicates that as a necessary preliminary to the exercise of the power thereunder, the Central Government must be satisfied "from documentary or other evidence in its possession" in regard to the co-existence of two circumstances: (i) that the persons in charge of the industrial undertaking have by committing any of these acts, namely, reckless investments, or creation of incumbrances on the assets of industrial undertaking, or by diversion of funds, brought about a situation which is likely to affect the production of the article manufactured or produced in the industrial undertaking, and (ii) that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation.[570B-D] It cannot be laid down as a general proposition that whenever a statute confers a power on an administrative authority and makes the exercise of that power conditional on the formation of an opinion by that authority in regard to the existence of an immediacy, its opinion in regard to that preliminary fact is not open to judicial scrutiny at all. While it may be conceded that an element of subjectivity is always involved in the formation of such an opinion, the existence of the circumstances from which the inference constituting the opinion, as the sine qua non for action, are to be drawn, must be demonstrable, and the existence of such "circumstances", if questioned, must be proved at least prima facie. [571 E-G] From a plain reading of section 18AA, it is clear that it does not expressly in unmistakable and unequivocal terms exclude the application of the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage. [574B] In the instant case, so far as Kanpur Unit is concerned, it was lying closed for more than three months before the passing of the impugned order. There was no 'immediacy' in relation to that unit, which could absolve the Government from the obligation of complying fully with audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional or pre- takeover stage. [583A] Keshav Mills Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, [1973] 3 S.C.R. 22; Kamla Prasad Khetan v. Union of India,[1957] S.C.R. 1052; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 621; Sukhdev Singh & Ors. v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh, [1975] 3 S.C.R. 619; A. K. Kraipak v. Union of India, [1970] 1 S.C.R. 457; Ridge v. Baldwin, [1964] A.C. 40; 196; Heatley v. Tasmanian Racing & Gaming Commission, 14 Australian Law Reports 519; Nawabkhan Abbaskhan v. State of Gujarat, [1974] 3 S.C.R. 427; State of Orissa v. Dr. Bina Pani Dei, [1962] 2 S.C.R. 625; Ambalal M. Shah v. Hathi Singh Manufacturing Co. Ltd. [1962] 3 S.C.R. 171; and S. L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan & Ors., [1981] 1 S.C.R. 746, referred to. (Per Chinnappa Reddy, J. dissenting) The principles of natural justice are not attracted to the situations contemplated by section 18AA of Industries (Development and Regulation) Act. Natural justice like Ultra Vires and Public Policy is a branch of the public law and is a formidable weapon which can be wielded to secure justice to the citizen. While it may be used to protect certain fundamental liberties, civil and political rights, it may be used as indeed it is used more often than not, to protect vested interests and to obstruct the path of progressive change. The time has come to make an appropriate distinction between natural justice in its application to fundamental liberties, civil and political rights and natural justice in its application to vested interests. [590A-B] Our constitution as befits the Constitution of a Socialist Secular Democratic Republic, recognises the paramountcy of the public weal over the private interest. Natural justice, ultra vires, public policy, or any other rule of interpretation must, therefore, conform, grow and be tailored to serve the public interest and respond to the demands of an evolving society. [590C] The principles of natural justice have taken deep root in the judicial conscience of our people. They are now considered so fundamental as to be implicit in every decision making function, judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative. Where authority functions under a statute and the statute provides for the observance of the principles of natural justice in a particular manner, natural justice will have to be observed in that manner and in no other. Where the statute is silent about the observance of the principles of natural justice, such statutory silence is taken to imply compliance with the principles of natural justice. Where the conflict is between the public interest and the private interest the presumption must necessarily be weak and may, therefore, be readily displaced. The presumption is also weak, where what are involved are mere property rights. In cases of urgency, particularly where the public interest is involved, preemptive action may be a strategic necessity. Even in cases of preemptive action, if the statute so provides or if the Courts so deem fit in appropriate cases, a postponed hearing may be substituted for natural justice. [590A-C; 591F-G] 3(ii). Where natural justice is implied, the extent of the implication and the nature of the hearing must vary with the statute, the subject and the situation. [592B] The absence of the expression 'immediate action' in section 18AA(1)(b) does not make any difference. Section 18AA(1)(a) refers to a situation where immediate preventive action may avert a disaster, whereas section 18AA contemplates a situation where the disaster has occurred and action is necessary to restore normalcy. Restoration of production where production has stopped in a key industry or industrial undertaking is as important and urgent in the public interest as prevention of a situation where production may be affected. Immediate action is, therefore, as necessary in the situation contemplated by section 18AA(1)(b) as in the situation contemplated by section 18AA(1)(a). [596 F-G] The marginal note refers to the power to take over without investigation but there is no sufficient reason to suppose that the word immediate is used only to contra- distinguish it from the investigation contemplated by section 15 of the Act, though of course a consequence of immediate action under section 18AA may be to dispense with the enquiry under section 15. In fact, facts which come to light during the course of an investigation under section 15 may form the basis of action under section 18AA(1)(a). Where in the course of an investigation under section 15 it is discovered that the management have, by reckless investments or creation of encumbrances on the assets of the industrial undertaking or by diversion of funds brought about a situation which is likely to affect the production of the articles manufactured or produced in the industrial undertaking, if the Government is satisfied that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation, there is no reason why the Central Government may not straightaway take action under section 18AA(1)(a) without waiting for completion of investigation under section 15. [597A-B] Where there is a provision in the statute itself for revocation of the order by the very authority making the decision, it appears to be unnecessary to insist upon a pre- decisional observance of natural justice. [598A] The likelihood of production being jeopardized or the stoppage of production in a key industrial undertaking is a matter of grave concern affecting the public interest. Parliament has taken so serious a view of the matter that it has authorised the Central Government to take over the management of the industrial undertaking if immediate action may prevent jeopardy to production or restore production where it has already stopped. The necessity for immediate action by the Central Government contemplated by Parliament is definitely indicative of the exclusion of natural justice. It is not as if the owner of the industrial undertaking is left with no remedy. He may move the Central Government under section 18-F to cancel the order made under section 18AA. [598C-D] Neither section 18-F of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act nor section 21 of the General Clauses Act by itself excludes natural justice. The exclusion of natural justice where such exclusion is not express has to be implied by reference to the subject, the statute and the statutory situation. Where an express provision in the statute itself provides for a post decisional hearing the other provisions of the Statute will have to be read in the light of such provision and the provision for post- decisional hearing may then clinch the issue where pre- decisional natural justice appears to be excluded on the other terms of the statute. That a post-decisional hearing may also be had by the terms of section 21 of the General Clauses Act may not necessarily help in the interpretation of the provisions of the statute concerned. [599 A-C] Ridge v. Baldwin, 1964 A.C. p. 40; Annie G. Phillip v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 75 L.E.d. 1289; John H. Fahey v. Paul Mallonee, 91 L.E.d. 2030; Margarita Fuentes v. Robert L. Shevin, Attorney General of Florida, 32 L.E.d. 2d 556 and Lawrence Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 40 L.E.d. 2d 406, referred to. - Rama Rao, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh as well as the President of the Telugu Desam Party as well as respondent No. 3. The advertisements very shortly stated, refer to the auspicious gifts made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to the poor people on the eve of New Year and Sankranti. In the said advertisements, it is stated that the said Government which was formed by the Telugu Desam Party was giving to the poor people whose income was below Rs. and the said advertisements referred to a new scheme of selling sarees and dhoties at half prices to the poor people in the State of Andhra Pradesh having Green-cards. Moreover, the offer in the advertisements for the sale of dhoties and sarees at discount rates was in the nature of a benefit offered to poor persons in that State. When a Government announces the measures which are intended for the benefit of any of the classes for whose the Government can normally be expected to work like the poor or the economical backward classes, it is only in rare circumstances that such a promise can be said to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) even though such a promise might be made on the eve of elections. 8. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => '', 'counseldef' => '', 'court' => 'Supreme Court of India', 'court_type' => 'SC', 'decidedon' => '1989-09-29', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' K.N. Saikia,; M.H. Kania and; S. Ranganathan, JJ.', 'judgement' => '</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Kania, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. These two appeals arise out of the judgments in two Election Petitions in the Andhra Pradesh High Court questioning the election of respondent No. 1 as a Member of Parliament from Srikakulam No. Parliamentary Constituency in the 8th General Election to the House of the People. The points raised in these appeals are common and so are the relevant facts; and, hence, they are being disposed of by this common judgment. We propose to take note of only the few facts which are necessary for the appreciation of the controversy before us.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The polling date for the said election along with other parliamentary elections in the State of Andhra Pradesh was December 27, 1984 but in Srikakulam No. 1 Parliamentary Constituency the polling was countermanded and the date of polling was later fixed on January 28, 1985. In both the Election Petitions the election of respondent No. 1 was questioned mainly on the ground that Shri N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh as well as the President of the Telugu Desam Party as well as respondent No. 1 gave certain speeches and certain advertisements were got published by Shri N.T. Rama Rao through the Publicity Department of the Government of Andhra Pradesh in the newspapers containing certain statements which are alleged to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A) of the <a href="/act/50684/representation-of-the-people-act-1951-complete-act">Representation of the People Act, 1951</a> (hereinafter referred to as 'the said Act'). The main question canvassed before us is whether the statements contained in these aforesaid advertisements amount to a corrupt practice under Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act. Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act runs as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">123. Corrupt practices</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The following shall be deemed to be corrupt practises for the purposes of this Act :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) 'Bribery', that is to say.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(A) any gift, offer or promise by a candidate or his agent or by any other person with the consent of a candidate or his election agent of any gratification, to any person whomsover, with the object, directly or indirectly of inducing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) x x x</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) an elector to vote or refrain from voting at an election, or as a reward to.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) a person for having so stood or not stood, or for having withdrawn or not having withdrawn his candidature; or</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) an elector for having voted or refrained from voting.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The advertisements very shortly stated, refer to the auspicious gifts made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to the poor people on the eve of New Year and Sankranti. In the said advertisements, it is stated that the said Government which was formed by the Telugu Desam Party was giving to the poor people whose income was below Rs. 6,000 per year, a kilo of rice at Rs. 2 per Kg. and the said advertisements referred to a new scheme of selling sarees and dhoties at half prices to the poor people in the State of Andhra Pradesh having Green-cards. Green-cards were directed to be issued to all the persons whose annual income was below Rs. 6,000. The supply of the rice at subsidised rates as aforesaid was also to be made to the Green-card holders only. The scheme to sell sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was to be operative from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. In considering the question whether the said advertisement and the said speeches amount to a corrupt practice, we are of the view that the provisions of Section 123 of the said Act which deal with corrupt practices have to be interpreted, keeping in mind that dictates of commonsense require that they never could have been intended to treat normal election promises made in election manifestoes or usual election speeches by members of various political parties aspiring to power and by different candidates aspiring to get elected to legislative bodies concerned as corrupt practices. We are of the view that these advertisements and speeches amount to nothing more than statements extolling the achievements of the Government of the State of Andhra Pradesh under the Telugu Desam Party headed by N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister, and contain normal election promises and these statements do not amount to corrupt practices falling within the scope of Sub-clause (b) of Clause (A) of Sub-section (1) of Section 123 of the said Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. It was urged by Mr. Rao, learned Counsel for the appellants that in the impugned judgments, the High Court has incorrectly taken the view that in order to amount to bribery within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A), the transaction must amount to a bargain by the candidate with a view to get votes. It was pointed out by him that the said view has been taken in the impugned judgments, relying upon the decision of a Bench comprising to learned Judges of this Court in Ghasi Ram v. Dal Singh and Ors. :1983 SCR 102 . We have gone through to the relevant portion of that judgment (at page 109 and 110 of the said report). A careful perusal of the said judgment shows that what has been really held in that case is that if the promises given or made amount to a bargain entered into by a candidate for a vote or votes, that would amount to a corrupt practice; but it has not been held there that unless the act alleged amounts to such a bargain, it could not amount to a corrupt practice. In our view, that judgment does not lay down that in order to amount to a corrupt practice, the transaction must amount to a bargain for getting a vote. It was pointed out by Mr. Rao, however, that such a view seems to have been taken in two other decisions rendered by two Benches, each comprising two learned Judges of this Court in Bhanu Kumar Shastri v. Mohan Lal Sukhadia and Ors. : [1971]3SCR522 and Harjit Singh Mann v. S Umrao Singh and Ors. : [1980]2SCR501 . and these judgments need to be overruled. We do not propose to go into the correctness or otherwise of this view because, even on the footing that in order to amount to a corrupt practice under the aforesaid provision the alleged acts need not constitute a bargain, the the acts established in the present case, in our opinion, do not amount to a corrupt practice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Our attention was drawn by Mr. Rao to the fact that in this case the said advertisements and the speeches had to be viewed in the context of the fact that the advertisements were issued and the speeches were made after respondent No. 1 filed his nomination papers on January 4, 1985, for the election and before the election was held in the aforesaid constituency. It was further pointed out that the offer made for the sale of sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was limited to the period from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985. It cannot be denied that these factors are relevant factOrs. We cannot, however, lose sight of the fact that this offer was made not only in this constituency but throughout the State where the elections to the House of the People were scheduled to be held, and were, in fact, held on December 27, 1984. It was only in case of this constituency that the election to be held on the scheduled date was countermanded and later held on January 28, 1985. We cannot lose sight of the fact that, as far as the said speeches and the said advertisements, which were issued by the Publicity Department of the State, are concerned, they deal in the main with the achievements of the Government of Andhra Pradesh which, of course, was being run by Ministers belonging to Telugu Desam Party to which respondent No. 1 also belonged. Moreover, the offer in the advertisements for the sale of dhoties and sarees at discount rates was in the nature of a benefit offered to poor persons in that State. When a Government announces the measures which are intended for the benefit of any of the classes for whose the Government can normally be expected to work like the poor or the economical backward classes, it is only in rare circumstances that such a promise can be said to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) even though such a promise might be made on the eve of elections. Keeping this in mind, in our opinion, although the offer to sell dhoties and sarees at discount rates was of a limited duration as aforestated, it cannot be regarded as a corrupt practice. Such an offer was bound to have financial repercussions and it is quite possible the duration of the offer was limited to enable the Government to study the financial repercussions rather than from any improper motive. We find support for this view from the decision of this Court in H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh : [1969]3SCR813 . In that case an Ordinance was passed by the Government of Madhya Pradesh as a result of which a large number of agriculturists, namely, those holdings of plots of land of less than 7.5 acres area or paying land revenue not exceeding Rs. 5/- were exempted from the payment of the land revenue. It was held that such a concession does not amount to a gift, offer or promise of any gratification within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) of the said Act nor does the announcement of the declaration made at a meeting shortly before the election or the issue of a pamphlet containing that declaration at that time carry the matter any further. It was held that neither Shri D.P. Misra who was the Chief Minister nor Shri S.K. Dixit who acted as his agent were guilty of any corrupt practice within the meaning of the aforesaid provision.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. It was next contended by Mr. Rao, although very faintly, that the High Court was in error as it had not decided all other issues which were raised in the election petition. In this regard we cannot lose sight of the fact that the term of the present Lok Sabha is likely to be over within a few months and fresh elections are likely to be held and it would, therefore, be an exercise in futility to remand the matter to the High Court for deciding the remaining issues.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'AIR1990SC1889; JT1989(4)SC186; 1989(2)SCALE891; 1989Supp(2)SCC504', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors.', 'sub' => 'Election', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ), 'casename_url' => 'b-rajagopala-rao-vs-appayya-hanumanthu', 'args' => array( (int) 0 => '640942', (int) 1 => 'b-rajagopala-rao-vs-appayya-hanumanthu' ) ) $title_for_layout = 'B Rajagopala Rao and anr Vs Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors - Citation 640942 - Court Judgment | ' $desc = array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '640942', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/50684/representation-of-the-people-act-1951-complete-act">Representation of the People Act, 1951</a> - Sections 1, 3(1)(A), 123 and 123(1)(A)', 'appealno' => 'Civil Appeal Nos. 484 and 485 of 1987', 'appellant' => 'B. Rajagopala Rao and anr.', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'B. Rajagopala Rao and anr. Vs. Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors.', 'casenote' => 'Election - corrupt practices - Sections 123 and 123 (1) (A) of Representation of the People Act, 1951 - whether advertisements by public department and speeches made by respondent No. 1 to sell dhoti and sarees at discount rates amount to corrupt practices - offer was available for mass and for limited duration - such offer was bound to have financial repercussions and it is quite possible that duration of offer limited to enable Government to study financial repercussions rather than from any improper motive - offer not amounted to corrupt practices. - [ D.A. Desai,; O. Chinnappa Reddy and; R.S. Sarkaria, JJ.] The Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 empowers the Union of India in the public interest to take under its control the industries specified in the First Schedule to the Act. Item 23 of the First Schedule relates to textiles of various categories. Section 15 authorises the Central Government to make or cause to be made a full and complete investigation into the circumstances of the case if the Central Government is of the opinion that (a) in respect of any scheduled industry or industrial undertaking or undertakings (i) there has been, or is likely to be, a substantial fall in the volume of production for which, having regard to the economic conditions prevailing, there is no justification; or (ii) there has been, or is likely to be, a marked deterioration in the quality of any article... which could have been or can be avoided; or (iii) there has been or is likely to be a rise in the price of any article..... for which there is no justification; or (iv) it is necessary to take any such action for the purpose of conserving any resources of national importance; or (b) any industrial undertaking is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest. After the investigation is made under section 15, section 16(1) empowers the Central Government if action is desirable, to issue appropriate directions, and section 16(2) provides for the issue of interim directions by the Central Government pending investigation under section 15. Chapter III-A consisting of Sections 18A, 18-AA, 18-B, 18-C, 18-D, 18-E and 18-F deal with "direct management or control of Industrial Undertakings by Central Government in certain cases". Sec. 18-A empowers the Central Government by notified order, to authorise any person or body of persons to take over the management of the whole or any part of an industrial undertaking or to exercise in respect of the whole, or any part of the undertaking such functions of control as may be specified in the order, if the Central Government is of opinion that: (a) an industrial undertaking to which directions have been issued in pursuance of section 16 has failed to comply with such directions, or (b) an industrial undertaking in respect of which an investigation has been made under section 15 is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest. Section 18AA(5) stipulates that the provisions of Sections 18-B to 18 E shall be applicable to the industrial undertaking in respect of which an order has been made under section 18-AA even as they apply to an industrial undertaking taken over under Section 18-A. Section 18-F empowers the Central Government to cancel the order made under section 18-A if it appears that the purpose of the order has been fulfilled or it is not necessary that the order should remain in force. The appellant M/s. Swadeshi Cotton Mills was taken over by the Government of India by a notification dated April 13, 1978 in exercise of the powers conferred on it under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 18AA of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 on the ground that the company had by creation of encumbrances on the assets of its industrial undertakings, brought about a situation which had affected and is likely to further affect the production of articles manufactured or produced by it and that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation. The Government authorised the National Textile Corporation Limited to take over the management, subject to the conditions that the authorised person shall comply with all the directions issued from time to time by the Central Government and that the authorised person shall hold office for a period of five years. The appellant Mills challenged the aforesaid order in a writ petition in the High Court. The case was heard by a Full Bench of five Judges to consider the question whether in construing section 18AA of the Industries Development and Regulation Act, 1951, compliance with the principle of audi alteram partem is to be implied and whether hearing is to be given to the parties who would be affected by the order to be passed prior to the passing of the order or whether hearing can be given after the order is passed and whether the order passed under the said Section is vitiated by not giving of such hearing and whether such vice can be cured. The Bench by a majority answered the three questions as follows:- (a) Section 18AA(1)(a)(b) excludes the giving of prior hearing to the party who would be affected by order thereunder. (b) Section 18-F expressly provides for a post- decisional hearing to the owner of the industrial undertaking, the management of which is taken over under section 18AA to have the order made under section 18AA cancelled on any relevant ground. (c) As the taking over of management under section 18A is not vitiated by the failure to grant prior hearing the question of any such vice being cured by a grant of a subsequent hearing does not arise. The minority, however, held that in compliance with the principles of natural justice, prior hearing to the owner of the undertaking was required to be given before the passing of an order under section 18AA, that the second question did not arise as the denial of a prior hearing would not cure the vice by the grant of subsequent hearing, but it would be open to the Court to moderate the relief in such a way that the order is kept alive to the extent necessary until the making of the fresh order to subserve public interest and to make appropriate directions. After the decision on the reference the case was reheard on merits by a Full Bench of three Judges and the writ petition was allowed in part. The challenge to the validity of the order being rejected but insofar as the impugned order seeking to take over the corporate entity of the company, the corporate entity of the subsidiary and its assets, the petition was allowed and the respondents, the Union of India and the authorised person were directed to release from its control and custody and/or deliver possession of any assets or property of the company which were not referable to the industrial undertakings. Appeals to this Court were filed on behalf of the Company as well as by the Union of India and the National Textile Corporation. Two propositions were propounded on behalf of the company that: (a) Whether it was necessary to observe the rules of natural justice before issuing a notified order under section 18AA(1)(a) and further whether section 18-F impliedly excludes rules of natural justice relating to prior hearing; and it was contended (1) the mere use of the word 'immediate' in sub-clause (a) of section 18AA does not show a legislative intent to exclude the application of audi alteram partem rule altogether. (2) The word 'immediate' in clause (a) has been used in contra distinction to 'investigate'. It only means that under section 18AA action can be taken without prior investigation under section 15. The use of the word 'immediate' in section 18AA(1)(a) only dispenses with investigation under section 15 and not with the principle of audi alteram partem altogether and this is indicated by the marginal note of section 18A and para 3 of the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Amendment Bill which inserted section 18AA in 1971. (3) The word 'immediate' occurs only in clause (a) and not in clause (b) of section 18AA(1). It would be odd if intention to exclude this principle of natural justice is spelt out in one clause of the sub-section when the other clause does not exclude it. (4) Section 18-F does not exclude a pre-decisional hearing. The so-called post-decisional hearing contemplated by section 18-F cannot be and is not intended to be a substitute for a pre-decisional hearing. (5) Section 18F incorporates only a facet, albeit qualified, of section 21 of the General Clauses Act. The language of the Section implicity prohibits an enquiry into circumstances that led to the passing of the order of take-over and under it the aggrieved person is not entitled to show that on merits the order was void ab initio. (6) 'Immediacy' does not exclude a duty to act fairly because even an emergent situation can co-exist with the canons of natural justice. The only effect of urgency on the application of the principle of fair hearing would be that the width, form and duration of the hearing would be tailored to the situation and reduced to the reasonable minimum so that it does not delay and defeat the purpose of the contemplated action. (7) Where the civil consequences of the administrative action are grave and its effect is highly prejudicial to the rights and interests of the person affected and there is nothing in the language and scheme of the statute which unequivocally excludes a fair pre-decisional hearing and the post-decisional hearing provided therein is not a real remedial hearing equitable to a full right of appeal the Court should be loath to infer a legislative intent to exclude even a minimal fair hearing at the pre-decisional stage merely on ground of urgency. (8) The Central Government appointed four Government Officials including one from the office of the Textile Commissioner to study the affairs of the Company and to make recommendation. This Official Group submitted its report on February 16, 1978. The evidence on the basis of which the impugned order was passed was not disclosed to the appellant company till May 1978, only after it had filed the writ petition in the High Court. If there was anything adverse to the appellants in the survey report there was time enough about six weeks between the submission of the Survey Report and the passing of the impugned order for giving a short, reasonable opportunity to the appellants to explain the adverse findings against them. If there was immediacy situational modifications could be made to meet the requirement of fairness, by reducing the period of notice; that even the manner and form of such notice could be simplified to eliminate delay, that telephonic notice or short opportunity for furnishing their explanation to the Company might have satisfied the requirements of natural justice. Such an opportunity of hearing could have been given after the passing of a conditional tentative order and before its enforcement under section 18AA. For the interregnum suitable interim action such as freezing the assets of the Company or restraining the Company from creating further encumbrances, could be taken under section 16. On behalf of the Union of India and the Authorised Officer it was contended that (1) the presumption in favour of audi alteram partem rule stands impliedly displaced by the language scheme, setting and the purpose of the provision in section 18AA. (2) Section 18AA on its plain terms deals with situations where immediate preventive action is required. The paramount concern is to avoid serious problems which may be caused by fall in production. The purpose of an order under section 18AA is not to condemn the owner but to protect the scheduled industry. The issue under section 18AA is not solely between the Government and the management of the industrial undertaking. The object of taking action under this Section is to protect other outside interests of the community at large and the workers. (3) The rule of natural justice to give a hearing has been incorporated in section 18-F which gives an opportunity of a post-decisional hearing to the owner of the undertaking who if he feels aggrieved can on his application be heard, to show that even the original order under section 18AA was passed on invalid grounds and should be cancelled or rescinded. (4) On a true construction of section 18AA read with section 18-F the requirements of natural justice and fair play can be read into the statute only insofar as conformance to such canons can reasonably and realistically be required of it by the provision for a remedial hearing at a subsequent stage. (5) Under section 18-F the Central Government exercises curial functions and that Section confers on the aggrieved owner a right to apply to the Government to cancel the order of take-over. This section casts an obligation on the Central Government to deal with and dispose of an application filed thereunder with reasonable expedition. Allowing the appeal by the Company,<br/>HELD: (Sarkaria & Desai, JJ. per Chinnappa Reddy, J. dissenting.) In the facts and circumstances of the instant case, there has been a noncompliance with the implied requirement of the audi alteram partem rule of natural justice at the pre-decisional stage. The impugned order could be struck down as invalid on that score alone. But in view of the commitment / concession that a hearing would be afforded to the Company, the case is remitted to the Central Government to give a full, fair and effective hearing. [587G-H, 588C] The phrase 'natural justice' is not capable of a static and precise definition. It cannot be imprisoned in the straight-jacket of a cast-iron formula. Rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. Hence not possible to make an exhaustive catalogue of such rules. Two fundamental maxims of natural justice have now become deeply and indelibly ingrained in the common consciousness of mankind as pre-eminently necessary to ensure that the law is applied impartially objectively and fairly. These twin principles are (i) audi alteram partem and (ii) nemo judex in re sua. Audi alteram partem is a highly effective rule devised by the Courts to ensure that a statutory authority arrives at a just decision and it is calculated to act as a healthy check on the abuse or misuse of power. Its reach should not be narrowed and its applicability circumscribed.[554C-G] The rules of natural justice can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. If a statutory provision either specifically or by inevitable implication excludes the application of the rules of natural justice then the Court cannot ignore the mandate of the Legislature. Whether or not the application of the principles of natural justice in a given case has been excluded in the exercise of statutory power depends upon the language and basic scheme of the provision conferring the power, the nature of the power the purpose for which it is conferred and the effect of that power. [556A-B] The maxim audi alteram partem has many facets. Two of them are (a) notice of the case to be met, and (b) opportunity to explain. The rule cannot be sacrificed at the altar of administrative convenience or celerity; for, convenience and justice are often not on speaking terms. Difficulties, however, arise when the statute conferring the power does not expressly exclude this rule but its exclusion is sought by implication due to the presence of certain factors such as urgency where the obligation to give notice and opportunity to be heard would obstruct the taking of prompt action of a preventive or remedial nature. Audi alteram partem rule may be disregarded in an emergent situation where immediate action brooks no delay to prevent some imminent danger or injury or hazard to paramount public interests. Section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure empowers the magistrates specified therein to make an exparte conditional order in emergent cases for removal of dangerous public nuisances. Action under section 17 Land Acquisition Act furnishes another such instance. Similarly action on grounds of public safety public health may justify disregard of the rule of prior hearing. [556C-H] Cases where owing to the compulsion of the fact situation or the necessity of taking speedy action no pre- decisional hearing is given but the action, is followed soon by a full post-decisional hearing to the person affected do not in reality constitute an exception to the audi alteram partem rule. To call such cases as exception is a misnomer because they do not exclude fair play in action but adapt it to the urgency of the situation by balancing the competing claims of hurry and hearing. [560H-561A] The general principle as distinguished from an absolute rule of uniform application seems to be that where a statute does not in terms exclude this rule of prior hearing but contemplates a post-decisional hearing amounting to a full review of the original order on merits then such a statute would be construed as excluding the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage. [561G] If the statute conferring the power is silent with regard to the giving of pre-decisional hearing to the person affected and the administrative decision taken by the authority involves civil consequences of a grave nature and no full review or appeal on merits against that decision is provided courts will be extremely reluctant to construe such a statute as excluding the duty of affording even a minimal hearing shorn of all its formal trappings and dilatory features at the pre-decisional stage, unless viewed pragmatically it would paralyse the administrative process or frustrate the need for utmost promptitude. [561H] 7(i). A comparison of the provisions of Section 18A(1)(b) and Section 18AA(1)(c), bring out two main points of distinction: First, action under Section 18A(1)(b) can be taken only after an investigation had been made under Section 15; while under Section 18AA(1)(a) or (b) action can be taken without such investigation. The language, scheme and setting of Section 18AA read in the light of the Objects and Reasons for enacting this provision make this position clear beyond doubt. Second, before taking action under Section 18A(1)(b), the Central Government has to form an opinion on the basis of the investigation conducted under section 15, in regard to the existence of the objective fact, namely: that the industrial undertaking is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest; while under section 18A(1)(a) the Government has to satisfy itself that the persons incharge of the undertaking have brought about a situation likely to cause fall in production, by committing any of the three kinds of acts specified in that provision. This shows that the preliminary objective fact attributable to the persons in charge of the management or affairs of the undertaking, on the basis of which action may be taken under section 18(A)(1)(b), is of far wider amplitude than the circumstance, the existence of which is a sine qua non for taking action under section 18AA(1). The phrase "highly detrimental to the scheduled industry or public interest" in section 18-A is capable of being construed to cover a large variety of acts or things which may be considered wrong with the manner of running the industry by the management. In contrast with it, action under section 18AA(1)(a) can be taken only if the Central Government is satisfied with regard to the existence of the twin conditions specifically mentioned therein, on the basis of evidence in its possession. [569D-H] An analysis of section 18AA(1)(a), indicates that as a necessary preliminary to the exercise of the power thereunder, the Central Government must be satisfied "from documentary or other evidence in its possession" in regard to the co-existence of two circumstances: (i) that the persons in charge of the industrial undertaking have by committing any of these acts, namely, reckless investments, or creation of incumbrances on the assets of industrial undertaking, or by diversion of funds, brought about a situation which is likely to affect the production of the article manufactured or produced in the industrial undertaking, and (ii) that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation.[570B-D] It cannot be laid down as a general proposition that whenever a statute confers a power on an administrative authority and makes the exercise of that power conditional on the formation of an opinion by that authority in regard to the existence of an immediacy, its opinion in regard to that preliminary fact is not open to judicial scrutiny at all. While it may be conceded that an element of subjectivity is always involved in the formation of such an opinion, the existence of the circumstances from which the inference constituting the opinion, as the sine qua non for action, are to be drawn, must be demonstrable, and the existence of such "circumstances", if questioned, must be proved at least prima facie. [571 E-G] From a plain reading of section 18AA, it is clear that it does not expressly in unmistakable and unequivocal terms exclude the application of the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage. [574B] In the instant case, so far as Kanpur Unit is concerned, it was lying closed for more than three months before the passing of the impugned order. There was no 'immediacy' in relation to that unit, which could absolve the Government from the obligation of complying fully with audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional or pre- takeover stage. [583A] Keshav Mills Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, [1973] 3 S.C.R. 22; Kamla Prasad Khetan v. Union of India,[1957] S.C.R. 1052; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 621; Sukhdev Singh & Ors. v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh, [1975] 3 S.C.R. 619; A. K. Kraipak v. Union of India, [1970] 1 S.C.R. 457; Ridge v. Baldwin, [1964] A.C. 40; 196; Heatley v. Tasmanian Racing & Gaming Commission, 14 Australian Law Reports 519; Nawabkhan Abbaskhan v. State of Gujarat, [1974] 3 S.C.R. 427; State of Orissa v. Dr. Bina Pani Dei, [1962] 2 S.C.R. 625; Ambalal M. Shah v. Hathi Singh Manufacturing Co. Ltd. [1962] 3 S.C.R. 171; and S. L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan & Ors., [1981] 1 S.C.R. 746, referred to. (Per Chinnappa Reddy, J. dissenting) The principles of natural justice are not attracted to the situations contemplated by section 18AA of Industries (Development and Regulation) Act. Natural justice like Ultra Vires and Public Policy is a branch of the public law and is a formidable weapon which can be wielded to secure justice to the citizen. While it may be used to protect certain fundamental liberties, civil and political rights, it may be used as indeed it is used more often than not, to protect vested interests and to obstruct the path of progressive change. The time has come to make an appropriate distinction between natural justice in its application to fundamental liberties, civil and political rights and natural justice in its application to vested interests. [590A-B] Our constitution as befits the Constitution of a Socialist Secular Democratic Republic, recognises the paramountcy of the public weal over the private interest. Natural justice, ultra vires, public policy, or any other rule of interpretation must, therefore, conform, grow and be tailored to serve the public interest and respond to the demands of an evolving society. [590C] The principles of natural justice have taken deep root in the judicial conscience of our people. They are now considered so fundamental as to be implicit in every decision making function, judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative. Where authority functions under a statute and the statute provides for the observance of the principles of natural justice in a particular manner, natural justice will have to be observed in that manner and in no other. Where the statute is silent about the observance of the principles of natural justice, such statutory silence is taken to imply compliance with the principles of natural justice. Where the conflict is between the public interest and the private interest the presumption must necessarily be weak and may, therefore, be readily displaced. The presumption is also weak, where what are involved are mere property rights. In cases of urgency, particularly where the public interest is involved, preemptive action may be a strategic necessity. Even in cases of preemptive action, if the statute so provides or if the Courts so deem fit in appropriate cases, a postponed hearing may be substituted for natural justice. [590A-C; 591F-G] 3(ii). Where natural justice is implied, the extent of the implication and the nature of the hearing must vary with the statute, the subject and the situation. [592B] The absence of the expression 'immediate action' in section 18AA(1)(b) does not make any difference. Section 18AA(1)(a) refers to a situation where immediate preventive action may avert a disaster, whereas section 18AA contemplates a situation where the disaster has occurred and action is necessary to restore normalcy. Restoration of production where production has stopped in a key industry or industrial undertaking is as important and urgent in the public interest as prevention of a situation where production may be affected. Immediate action is, therefore, as necessary in the situation contemplated by section 18AA(1)(b) as in the situation contemplated by section 18AA(1)(a). [596 F-G] The marginal note refers to the power to take over without investigation but there is no sufficient reason to suppose that the word immediate is used only to contra- distinguish it from the investigation contemplated by section 15 of the Act, though of course a consequence of immediate action under section 18AA may be to dispense with the enquiry under section 15. In fact, facts which come to light during the course of an investigation under section 15 may form the basis of action under section 18AA(1)(a). Where in the course of an investigation under section 15 it is discovered that the management have, by reckless investments or creation of encumbrances on the assets of the industrial undertaking or by diversion of funds brought about a situation which is likely to affect the production of the articles manufactured or produced in the industrial undertaking, if the Government is satisfied that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation, there is no reason why the Central Government may not straightaway take action under section 18AA(1)(a) without waiting for completion of investigation under section 15. [597A-B] Where there is a provision in the statute itself for revocation of the order by the very authority making the decision, it appears to be unnecessary to insist upon a pre- decisional observance of natural justice. [598A] The likelihood of production being jeopardized or the stoppage of production in a key industrial undertaking is a matter of grave concern affecting the public interest. Parliament has taken so serious a view of the matter that it has authorised the Central Government to take over the management of the industrial undertaking if immediate action may prevent jeopardy to production or restore production where it has already stopped. The necessity for immediate action by the Central Government contemplated by Parliament is definitely indicative of the exclusion of natural justice. It is not as if the owner of the industrial undertaking is left with no remedy. He may move the Central Government under section 18-F to cancel the order made under section 18AA. [598C-D] Neither section 18-F of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act nor section 21 of the General Clauses Act by itself excludes natural justice. The exclusion of natural justice where such exclusion is not express has to be implied by reference to the subject, the statute and the statutory situation. Where an express provision in the statute itself provides for a post decisional hearing the other provisions of the Statute will have to be read in the light of such provision and the provision for post- decisional hearing may then clinch the issue where pre- decisional natural justice appears to be excluded on the other terms of the statute. That a post-decisional hearing may also be had by the terms of section 21 of the General Clauses Act may not necessarily help in the interpretation of the provisions of the statute concerned. [599 A-C] Ridge v. Baldwin, 1964 A.C. p. 40; Annie G. Phillip v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 75 L.E.d. 1289; John H. Fahey v. Paul Mallonee, 91 L.E.d. 2030; Margarita Fuentes v. Robert L. Shevin, Attorney General of Florida, 32 L.E.d. 2d 556 and Lawrence Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 40 L.E.d. 2d 406, referred to. - Rama Rao, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh as well as the President of the Telugu Desam Party as well as respondent No. 3. The advertisements very shortly stated, refer to the auspicious gifts made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to the poor people on the eve of New Year and Sankranti. In the said advertisements, it is stated that the said Government which was formed by the Telugu Desam Party was giving to the poor people whose income was below Rs. and the said advertisements referred to a new scheme of selling sarees and dhoties at half prices to the poor people in the State of Andhra Pradesh having Green-cards. Moreover, the offer in the advertisements for the sale of dhoties and sarees at discount rates was in the nature of a benefit offered to poor persons in that State. When a Government announces the measures which are intended for the benefit of any of the classes for whose the Government can normally be expected to work like the poor or the economical backward classes, it is only in rare circumstances that such a promise can be said to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) even though such a promise might be made on the eve of elections. 8. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => '', 'counseldef' => '', 'court' => 'Supreme Court of India', 'court_type' => 'SC', 'decidedon' => '1989-09-29', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' K.N. Saikia,; M.H. Kania and; S. Ranganathan, JJ.', 'judgement' => '</p><p>Kania, J.</p><p>1. These two appeals arise out of the judgments in two Election Petitions in the Andhra Pradesh High Court questioning the election of respondent No. 1 as a Member of Parliament from Srikakulam No. Parliamentary Constituency in the 8th General Election to the House of the People. The points raised in these appeals are common and so are the relevant facts; and, hence, they are being disposed of by this common judgment. We propose to take note of only the few facts which are necessary for the appreciation of the controversy before us.</p><p>2. The polling date for the said election along with other parliamentary elections in the State of Andhra Pradesh was December 27, 1984 but in Srikakulam No. 1 Parliamentary Constituency the polling was countermanded and the date of polling was later fixed on January 28, 1985. In both the Election Petitions the election of respondent No. 1 was questioned mainly on the ground that Shri N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh as well as the President of the Telugu Desam Party as well as respondent No. 1 gave certain speeches and certain advertisements were got published by Shri N.T. Rama Rao through the Publicity Department of the Government of Andhra Pradesh in the newspapers containing certain statements which are alleged to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A) of the <a>Representation of the People Act, 1951</a> (hereinafter referred to as 'the said Act'). The main question canvassed before us is whether the statements contained in these aforesaid advertisements amount to a corrupt practice under Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act. Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act runs as follows :</p><p>123. Corrupt practices</p><p>The following shall be deemed to be corrupt practises for the purposes of this Act :</p><p>(1) 'Bribery', that is to say.</p><p>(A) any gift, offer or promise by a candidate or his agent or by any other person with the consent of a candidate or his election agent of any gratification, to any person whomsover, with the object, directly or indirectly of inducing.</p><p>(a) x x x</p><p>(b) an elector to vote or refrain from voting at an election, or as a reward to.</p><p>(i) a person for having so stood or not stood, or for having withdrawn or not having withdrawn his candidature; or</p><p>(ii) an elector for having voted or refrained from voting.</p><p>3. The advertisements very shortly stated, refer to the auspicious gifts made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to the poor people on the eve of New Year and Sankranti. In the said advertisements, it is stated that the said Government which was formed by the Telugu Desam Party was giving to the poor people whose income was below Rs. 6,000 per year, a kilo of rice at Rs. 2 per Kg. and the said advertisements referred to a new scheme of selling sarees and dhoties at half prices to the poor people in the State of Andhra Pradesh having Green-cards. Green-cards were directed to be issued to all the persons whose annual income was below Rs. 6,000. The supply of the rice at subsidised rates as aforesaid was also to be made to the Green-card holders only. The scheme to sell sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was to be operative from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985.</p><p>4. In considering the question whether the said advertisement and the said speeches amount to a corrupt practice, we are of the view that the provisions of Section 123 of the said Act which deal with corrupt practices have to be interpreted, keeping in mind that dictates of commonsense require that they never could have been intended to treat normal election promises made in election manifestoes or usual election speeches by members of various political parties aspiring to power and by different candidates aspiring to get elected to legislative bodies concerned as corrupt practices. We are of the view that these advertisements and speeches amount to nothing more than statements extolling the achievements of the Government of the State of Andhra Pradesh under the Telugu Desam Party headed by N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister, and contain normal election promises and these statements do not amount to corrupt practices falling within the scope of Sub-clause (b) of Clause (A) of Sub-section (1) of Section 123 of the said Act.</p><p>5. It was urged by Mr. Rao, learned Counsel for the appellants that in the impugned judgments, the High Court has incorrectly taken the view that in order to amount to bribery within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A), the transaction must amount to a bargain by the candidate with a view to get votes. It was pointed out by him that the said view has been taken in the impugned judgments, relying upon the decision of a Bench comprising to learned Judges of this Court in Ghasi Ram v. Dal Singh and Ors. :1983 SCR 102 . We have gone through to the relevant portion of that judgment (at page 109 and 110 of the said report). A careful perusal of the said judgment shows that what has been really held in that case is that if the promises given or made amount to a bargain entered into by a candidate for a vote or votes, that would amount to a corrupt practice; but it has not been held there that unless the act alleged amounts to such a bargain, it could not amount to a corrupt practice. In our view, that judgment does not lay down that in order to amount to a corrupt practice, the transaction must amount to a bargain for getting a vote. It was pointed out by Mr. Rao, however, that such a view seems to have been taken in two other decisions rendered by two Benches, each comprising two learned Judges of this Court in Bhanu Kumar Shastri v. Mohan Lal Sukhadia and Ors. : [1971]3SCR522 and Harjit Singh Mann v. S Umrao Singh and Ors. : [1980]2SCR501 . and these judgments need to be overruled. We do not propose to go into the correctness or otherwise of this view because, even on the footing that in order to amount to a corrupt practice under the aforesaid provision the alleged acts need not constitute a bargain, the the acts established in the present case, in our opinion, do not amount to a corrupt practice.</p><p>6. Our attention was drawn by Mr. Rao to the fact that in this case the said advertisements and the speeches had to be viewed in the context of the fact that the advertisements were issued and the speeches were made after respondent No. 1 filed his nomination papers on January 4, 1985, for the election and before the election was held in the aforesaid constituency. It was further pointed out that the offer made for the sale of sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was limited to the period from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985. It cannot be denied that these factors are relevant factOrs. We cannot, however, lose sight of the fact that this offer was made not only in this constituency but throughout the State where the elections to the House of the People were scheduled to be held, and were, in fact, held on December 27, 1984. It was only in case of this constituency that the election to be held on the scheduled date was countermanded and later held on January 28, 1985. We cannot lose sight of the fact that, as far as the said speeches and the said advertisements, which were issued by the Publicity Department of the State, are concerned, they deal in the main with the achievements of the Government of Andhra Pradesh which, of course, was being run by Ministers belonging to Telugu Desam Party to which respondent No. 1 also belonged. Moreover, the offer in the advertisements for the sale of dhoties and sarees at discount rates was in the nature of a benefit offered to poor persons in that State. When a Government announces the measures which are intended for the benefit of any of the classes for whose the Government can normally be expected to work like the poor or the economical backward classes, it is only in rare circumstances that such a promise can be said to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) even though such a promise might be made on the eve of elections. Keeping this in mind, in our opinion, although the offer to sell dhoties and sarees at discount rates was of a limited duration as aforestated, it cannot be regarded as a corrupt practice. Such an offer was bound to have financial repercussions and it is quite possible the duration of the offer was limited to enable the Government to study the financial repercussions rather than from any improper motive. We find support for this view from the decision of this Court in H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh : [1969]3SCR813 . In that case an Ordinance was passed by the Government of Madhya Pradesh as a result of which a large number of agriculturists, namely, those holdings of plots of land of less than 7.5 acres area or paying land revenue not exceeding Rs. 5/- were exempted from the payment of the land revenue. It was held that such a concession does not amount to a gift, offer or promise of any gratification within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) of the said Act nor does the announcement of the declaration made at a meeting shortly before the election or the issue of a pamphlet containing that declaration at that time carry the matter any further. It was held that neither Shri D.P. Misra who was the Chief Minister nor Shri S.K. Dixit who acted as his agent were guilty of any corrupt practice within the meaning of the aforesaid provision.</p><p>7. It was next contended by Mr. Rao, although very faintly, that the High Court was in error as it had not decided all other issues which were raised in the election petition. In this regard we cannot lose sight of the fact that the term of the present Lok Sabha is likely to be over within a few months and fresh elections are likely to be held and it would, therefore, be an exercise in futility to remand the matter to the High Court for deciding the remaining issues.</p><p>8. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.<p></p><p>', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'AIR1990SC1889; JT1989(4)SC186; 1989(2)SCALE891; 1989Supp(2)SCC504', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors.', 'sub' => 'Election', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ) $casename_url = 'b-rajagopala-rao-vs-appayya-hanumanthu' $args = array( (int) 0 => '640942', (int) 1 => 'b-rajagopala-rao-vs-appayya-hanumanthu' ) $url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/640942/b-rajagopala-rao-vs-appayya-hanumanthu' $ctype = '' $caseref = 'H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh<br>' $content = array( (int) 0 => '', (int) 1 => '<p>Kania, J.', (int) 2 => '<p>1. These two appeals arise out of the judgments in two Election Petitions in the Andhra Pradesh High Court questioning the election of respondent No. 1 as a Member of Parliament from Srikakulam No. Parliamentary Constituency in the 8th General Election to the House of the People. The points raised in these appeals are common and so are the relevant facts; and, hence, they are being disposed of by this common judgment. We propose to take note of only the few facts which are necessary for the appreciation of the controversy before us.', (int) 3 => '<p>2. The polling date for the said election along with other parliamentary elections in the State of Andhra Pradesh was December 27, 1984 but in Srikakulam No. 1 Parliamentary Constituency the polling was countermanded and the date of polling was later fixed on January 28, 1985. In both the Election Petitions the election of respondent No. 1 was questioned mainly on the ground that Shri N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh as well as the President of the Telugu Desam Party as well as respondent No. 1 gave certain speeches and certain advertisements were got published by Shri N.T. Rama Rao through the Publicity Department of the Government of Andhra Pradesh in the newspapers containing certain statements which are alleged to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A) of the <a>Representation of the People Act, 1951</a> (hereinafter referred to as 'the said Act'). The main question canvassed before us is whether the statements contained in these aforesaid advertisements amount to a corrupt practice under Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act. Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act runs as follows :', (int) 4 => '<p>123. Corrupt practices', (int) 5 => '<p>The following shall be deemed to be corrupt practises for the purposes of this Act :', (int) 6 => '<p>(1) 'Bribery', that is to say.', (int) 7 => '<p>(A) any gift, offer or promise by a candidate or his agent or by any other person with the consent of a candidate or his election agent of any gratification, to any person whomsover, with the object, directly or indirectly of inducing.', (int) 8 => '<p>(a) x x x', (int) 9 => '<p>(b) an elector to vote or refrain from voting at an election, or as a reward to.', (int) 10 => '<p>(i) a person for having so stood or not stood, or for having withdrawn or not having withdrawn his candidature; or', (int) 11 => '<p>(ii) an elector for having voted or refrained from voting.', (int) 12 => '<p>3. The advertisements very shortly stated, refer to the auspicious gifts made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to the poor people on the eve of New Year and Sankranti. In the said advertisements, it is stated that the said Government which was formed by the Telugu Desam Party was giving to the poor people whose income was below Rs. 6,000 per year, a kilo of rice at Rs. 2 per Kg. and the said advertisements referred to a new scheme of selling sarees and dhoties at half prices to the poor people in the State of Andhra Pradesh having Green-cards. Green-cards were directed to be issued to all the persons whose annual income was below Rs. 6,000. The supply of the rice at subsidised rates as aforesaid was also to be made to the Green-card holders only. The scheme to sell sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was to be operative from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985.', (int) 13 => '<p>4. In considering the question whether the said advertisement and the said speeches amount to a corrupt practice, we are of the view that the provisions of Section 123 of the said Act which deal with corrupt practices have to be interpreted, keeping in mind that dictates of commonsense require that they never could have been intended to treat normal election promises made in election manifestoes or usual election speeches by members of various political parties aspiring to power and by different candidates aspiring to get elected to legislative bodies concerned as corrupt practices. We are of the view that these advertisements and speeches amount to nothing more than statements extolling the achievements of the Government of the State of Andhra Pradesh under the Telugu Desam Party headed by N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister, and contain normal election promises and these statements do not amount to corrupt practices falling within the scope of Sub-clause (b) of Clause (A) of Sub-section (1) of Section 123 of the said Act.', (int) 14 => '<p>5. It was urged by Mr. Rao, learned Counsel for the appellants that in the impugned judgments, the High Court has incorrectly taken the view that in order to amount to bribery within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A), the transaction must amount to a bargain by the candidate with a view to get votes. It was pointed out by him that the said view has been taken in the impugned judgments, relying upon the decision of a Bench comprising to learned Judges of this Court in Ghasi Ram v. Dal Singh and Ors. :1983 SCR 102 . We have gone through to the relevant portion of that judgment (at page 109 and 110 of the said report). A careful perusal of the said judgment shows that what has been really held in that case is that if the promises given or made amount to a bargain entered into by a candidate for a vote or votes, that would amount to a corrupt practice; but it has not been held there that unless the act alleged amounts to such a bargain, it could not amount to a corrupt practice. In our view, that judgment does not lay down that in order to amount to a corrupt practice, the transaction must amount to a bargain for getting a vote. It was pointed out by Mr. Rao, however, that such a view seems to have been taken in two other decisions rendered by two Benches, each comprising two learned Judges of this Court in Bhanu Kumar Shastri v. Mohan Lal Sukhadia and Ors. : [1971]3SCR522 and Harjit Singh Mann v. S Umrao Singh and Ors. : [1980]2SCR501 . and these judgments need to be overruled. We do not propose to go into the correctness or otherwise of this view because, even on the footing that in order to amount to a corrupt practice under the aforesaid provision the alleged acts need not constitute a bargain, the the acts established in the present case, in our opinion, do not amount to a corrupt practice.', (int) 15 => '<p>6. Our attention was drawn by Mr. Rao to the fact that in this case the said advertisements and the speeches had to be viewed in the context of the fact that the advertisements were issued and the speeches were made after respondent No. 1 filed his nomination papers on January 4, 1985, for the election and before the election was held in the aforesaid constituency. It was further pointed out that the offer made for the sale of sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was limited to the period from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985. It cannot be denied that these factors are relevant factOrs. We cannot, however, lose sight of the fact that this offer was made not only in this constituency but throughout the State where the elections to the House of the People were scheduled to be held, and were, in fact, held on December 27, 1984. It was only in case of this constituency that the election to be held on the scheduled date was countermanded and later held on January 28, 1985. We cannot lose sight of the fact that, as far as the said speeches and the said advertisements, which were issued by the Publicity Department of the State, are concerned, they deal in the main with the achievements of the Government of Andhra Pradesh which, of course, was being run by Ministers belonging to Telugu Desam Party to which respondent No. 1 also belonged. Moreover, the offer in the advertisements for the sale of dhoties and sarees at discount rates was in the nature of a benefit offered to poor persons in that State. When a Government announces the measures which are intended for the benefit of any of the classes for whose the Government can normally be expected to work like the poor or the economical backward classes, it is only in rare circumstances that such a promise can be said to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) even though such a promise might be made on the eve of elections. Keeping this in mind, in our opinion, although the offer to sell dhoties and sarees at discount rates was of a limited duration as aforestated, it cannot be regarded as a corrupt practice. Such an offer was bound to have financial repercussions and it is quite possible the duration of the offer was limited to enable the Government to study the financial repercussions rather than from any improper motive. We find support for this view from the decision of this Court in H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh : [1969]3SCR813 . In that case an Ordinance was passed by the Government of Madhya Pradesh as a result of which a large number of agriculturists, namely, those holdings of plots of land of less than 7.5 acres area or paying land revenue not exceeding Rs. 5/- were exempted from the payment of the land revenue. It was held that such a concession does not amount to a gift, offer or promise of any gratification within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) of the said Act nor does the announcement of the declaration made at a meeting shortly before the election or the issue of a pamphlet containing that declaration at that time carry the matter any further. It was held that neither Shri D.P. Misra who was the Chief Minister nor Shri S.K. Dixit who acted as his agent were guilty of any corrupt practice within the meaning of the aforesaid provision.', (int) 16 => '<p>7. It was next contended by Mr. Rao, although very faintly, that the High Court was in error as it had not decided all other issues which were raised in the election petition. In this regard we cannot lose sight of the fact that the term of the present Lok Sabha is likely to be over within a few months and fresh elections are likely to be held and it would, therefore, be an exercise in futility to remand the matter to the High Court for deciding the remaining issues.', (int) 17 => '<p>8. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.<p>', (int) 18 => '<p>' ) $paragraphAfter = (int) 1 $cnt = (int) 19 $i = (int) 4include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144 View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971 View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933 View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473 Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963 Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200 Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167 [main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109
123. Corrupt practices
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$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp' $dataForView = array( 'title_for_layout' => 'B Rajagopala Rao and anr Vs Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors - Citation 640942 - Court Judgment | ', 'desc' => array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '640942', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/50684/representation-of-the-people-act-1951-complete-act">Representation of the People Act, 1951</a> - Sections 1, 3(1)(A), 123 and 123(1)(A)', 'appealno' => 'Civil Appeal Nos. 484 and 485 of 1987', 'appellant' => 'B. Rajagopala Rao and anr.', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'B. Rajagopala Rao and anr. Vs. Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors.', 'casenote' => 'Election - corrupt practices - Sections 123 and 123 (1) (A) of Representation of the People Act, 1951 - whether advertisements by public department and speeches made by respondent No. 1 to sell dhoti and sarees at discount rates amount to corrupt practices - offer was available for mass and for limited duration - such offer was bound to have financial repercussions and it is quite possible that duration of offer limited to enable Government to study financial repercussions rather than from any improper motive - offer not amounted to corrupt practices. - [ D.A. Desai,; O. Chinnappa Reddy and; R.S. Sarkaria, JJ.] The Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 empowers the Union of India in the public interest to take under its control the industries specified in the First Schedule to the Act. Item 23 of the First Schedule relates to textiles of various categories. Section 15 authorises the Central Government to make or cause to be made a full and complete investigation into the circumstances of the case if the Central Government is of the opinion that (a) in respect of any scheduled industry or industrial undertaking or undertakings (i) there has been, or is likely to be, a substantial fall in the volume of production for which, having regard to the economic conditions prevailing, there is no justification; or (ii) there has been, or is likely to be, a marked deterioration in the quality of any article... which could have been or can be avoided; or (iii) there has been or is likely to be a rise in the price of any article..... for which there is no justification; or (iv) it is necessary to take any such action for the purpose of conserving any resources of national importance; or (b) any industrial undertaking is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest. After the investigation is made under section 15, section 16(1) empowers the Central Government if action is desirable, to issue appropriate directions, and section 16(2) provides for the issue of interim directions by the Central Government pending investigation under section 15. Chapter III-A consisting of Sections 18A, 18-AA, 18-B, 18-C, 18-D, 18-E and 18-F deal with "direct management or control of Industrial Undertakings by Central Government in certain cases". Sec. 18-A empowers the Central Government by notified order, to authorise any person or body of persons to take over the management of the whole or any part of an industrial undertaking or to exercise in respect of the whole, or any part of the undertaking such functions of control as may be specified in the order, if the Central Government is of opinion that: (a) an industrial undertaking to which directions have been issued in pursuance of section 16 has failed to comply with such directions, or (b) an industrial undertaking in respect of which an investigation has been made under section 15 is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest. Section 18AA(5) stipulates that the provisions of Sections 18-B to 18 E shall be applicable to the industrial undertaking in respect of which an order has been made under section 18-AA even as they apply to an industrial undertaking taken over under Section 18-A. Section 18-F empowers the Central Government to cancel the order made under section 18-A if it appears that the purpose of the order has been fulfilled or it is not necessary that the order should remain in force. The appellant M/s. Swadeshi Cotton Mills was taken over by the Government of India by a notification dated April 13, 1978 in exercise of the powers conferred on it under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 18AA of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 on the ground that the company had by creation of encumbrances on the assets of its industrial undertakings, brought about a situation which had affected and is likely to further affect the production of articles manufactured or produced by it and that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation. The Government authorised the National Textile Corporation Limited to take over the management, subject to the conditions that the authorised person shall comply with all the directions issued from time to time by the Central Government and that the authorised person shall hold office for a period of five years. The appellant Mills challenged the aforesaid order in a writ petition in the High Court. The case was heard by a Full Bench of five Judges to consider the question whether in construing section 18AA of the Industries Development and Regulation Act, 1951, compliance with the principle of audi alteram partem is to be implied and whether hearing is to be given to the parties who would be affected by the order to be passed prior to the passing of the order or whether hearing can be given after the order is passed and whether the order passed under the said Section is vitiated by not giving of such hearing and whether such vice can be cured. The Bench by a majority answered the three questions as follows:- (a) Section 18AA(1)(a)(b) excludes the giving of prior hearing to the party who would be affected by order thereunder. (b) Section 18-F expressly provides for a post- decisional hearing to the owner of the industrial undertaking, the management of which is taken over under section 18AA to have the order made under section 18AA cancelled on any relevant ground. (c) As the taking over of management under section 18A is not vitiated by the failure to grant prior hearing the question of any such vice being cured by a grant of a subsequent hearing does not arise. The minority, however, held that in compliance with the principles of natural justice, prior hearing to the owner of the undertaking was required to be given before the passing of an order under section 18AA, that the second question did not arise as the denial of a prior hearing would not cure the vice by the grant of subsequent hearing, but it would be open to the Court to moderate the relief in such a way that the order is kept alive to the extent necessary until the making of the fresh order to subserve public interest and to make appropriate directions. After the decision on the reference the case was reheard on merits by a Full Bench of three Judges and the writ petition was allowed in part. The challenge to the validity of the order being rejected but insofar as the impugned order seeking to take over the corporate entity of the company, the corporate entity of the subsidiary and its assets, the petition was allowed and the respondents, the Union of India and the authorised person were directed to release from its control and custody and/or deliver possession of any assets or property of the company which were not referable to the industrial undertakings. Appeals to this Court were filed on behalf of the Company as well as by the Union of India and the National Textile Corporation. Two propositions were propounded on behalf of the company that: (a) Whether it was necessary to observe the rules of natural justice before issuing a notified order under section 18AA(1)(a) and further whether section 18-F impliedly excludes rules of natural justice relating to prior hearing; and it was contended (1) the mere use of the word 'immediate' in sub-clause (a) of section 18AA does not show a legislative intent to exclude the application of audi alteram partem rule altogether. (2) The word 'immediate' in clause (a) has been used in contra distinction to 'investigate'. It only means that under section 18AA action can be taken without prior investigation under section 15. The use of the word 'immediate' in section 18AA(1)(a) only dispenses with investigation under section 15 and not with the principle of audi alteram partem altogether and this is indicated by the marginal note of section 18A and para 3 of the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Amendment Bill which inserted section 18AA in 1971. (3) The word 'immediate' occurs only in clause (a) and not in clause (b) of section 18AA(1). It would be odd if intention to exclude this principle of natural justice is spelt out in one clause of the sub-section when the other clause does not exclude it. (4) Section 18-F does not exclude a pre-decisional hearing. The so-called post-decisional hearing contemplated by section 18-F cannot be and is not intended to be a substitute for a pre-decisional hearing. (5) Section 18F incorporates only a facet, albeit qualified, of section 21 of the General Clauses Act. The language of the Section implicity prohibits an enquiry into circumstances that led to the passing of the order of take-over and under it the aggrieved person is not entitled to show that on merits the order was void ab initio. (6) 'Immediacy' does not exclude a duty to act fairly because even an emergent situation can co-exist with the canons of natural justice. The only effect of urgency on the application of the principle of fair hearing would be that the width, form and duration of the hearing would be tailored to the situation and reduced to the reasonable minimum so that it does not delay and defeat the purpose of the contemplated action. (7) Where the civil consequences of the administrative action are grave and its effect is highly prejudicial to the rights and interests of the person affected and there is nothing in the language and scheme of the statute which unequivocally excludes a fair pre-decisional hearing and the post-decisional hearing provided therein is not a real remedial hearing equitable to a full right of appeal the Court should be loath to infer a legislative intent to exclude even a minimal fair hearing at the pre-decisional stage merely on ground of urgency. (8) The Central Government appointed four Government Officials including one from the office of the Textile Commissioner to study the affairs of the Company and to make recommendation. This Official Group submitted its report on February 16, 1978. The evidence on the basis of which the impugned order was passed was not disclosed to the appellant company till May 1978, only after it had filed the writ petition in the High Court. If there was anything adverse to the appellants in the survey report there was time enough about six weeks between the submission of the Survey Report and the passing of the impugned order for giving a short, reasonable opportunity to the appellants to explain the adverse findings against them. If there was immediacy situational modifications could be made to meet the requirement of fairness, by reducing the period of notice; that even the manner and form of such notice could be simplified to eliminate delay, that telephonic notice or short opportunity for furnishing their explanation to the Company might have satisfied the requirements of natural justice. Such an opportunity of hearing could have been given after the passing of a conditional tentative order and before its enforcement under section 18AA. For the interregnum suitable interim action such as freezing the assets of the Company or restraining the Company from creating further encumbrances, could be taken under section 16. On behalf of the Union of India and the Authorised Officer it was contended that (1) the presumption in favour of audi alteram partem rule stands impliedly displaced by the language scheme, setting and the purpose of the provision in section 18AA. (2) Section 18AA on its plain terms deals with situations where immediate preventive action is required. The paramount concern is to avoid serious problems which may be caused by fall in production. The purpose of an order under section 18AA is not to condemn the owner but to protect the scheduled industry. The issue under section 18AA is not solely between the Government and the management of the industrial undertaking. The object of taking action under this Section is to protect other outside interests of the community at large and the workers. (3) The rule of natural justice to give a hearing has been incorporated in section 18-F which gives an opportunity of a post-decisional hearing to the owner of the undertaking who if he feels aggrieved can on his application be heard, to show that even the original order under section 18AA was passed on invalid grounds and should be cancelled or rescinded. (4) On a true construction of section 18AA read with section 18-F the requirements of natural justice and fair play can be read into the statute only insofar as conformance to such canons can reasonably and realistically be required of it by the provision for a remedial hearing at a subsequent stage. (5) Under section 18-F the Central Government exercises curial functions and that Section confers on the aggrieved owner a right to apply to the Government to cancel the order of take-over. This section casts an obligation on the Central Government to deal with and dispose of an application filed thereunder with reasonable expedition. Allowing the appeal by the Company,<br />HELD: (Sarkaria & Desai, JJ. per Chinnappa Reddy, J. dissenting.) In the facts and circumstances of the instant case, there has been a noncompliance with the implied requirement of the audi alteram partem rule of natural justice at the pre-decisional stage. The impugned order could be struck down as invalid on that score alone. But in view of the commitment / concession that a hearing would be afforded to the Company, the case is remitted to the Central Government to give a full, fair and effective hearing. [587G-H, 588C] The phrase 'natural justice' is not capable of a static and precise definition. It cannot be imprisoned in the straight-jacket of a cast-iron formula. Rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. Hence not possible to make an exhaustive catalogue of such rules. Two fundamental maxims of natural justice have now become deeply and indelibly ingrained in the common consciousness of mankind as pre-eminently necessary to ensure that the law is applied impartially objectively and fairly. These twin principles are (i) audi alteram partem and (ii) nemo judex in re sua. Audi alteram partem is a highly effective rule devised by the Courts to ensure that a statutory authority arrives at a just decision and it is calculated to act as a healthy check on the abuse or misuse of power. Its reach should not be narrowed and its applicability circumscribed.[554C-G] The rules of natural justice can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. If a statutory provision either specifically or by inevitable implication excludes the application of the rules of natural justice then the Court cannot ignore the mandate of the Legislature. Whether or not the application of the principles of natural justice in a given case has been excluded in the exercise of statutory power depends upon the language and basic scheme of the provision conferring the power, the nature of the power the purpose for which it is conferred and the effect of that power. [556A-B] The maxim audi alteram partem has many facets. Two of them are (a) notice of the case to be met, and (b) opportunity to explain. The rule cannot be sacrificed at the altar of administrative convenience or celerity; for, convenience and justice are often not on speaking terms. Difficulties, however, arise when the statute conferring the power does not expressly exclude this rule but its exclusion is sought by implication due to the presence of certain factors such as urgency where the obligation to give notice and opportunity to be heard would obstruct the taking of prompt action of a preventive or remedial nature. Audi alteram partem rule may be disregarded in an emergent situation where immediate action brooks no delay to prevent some imminent danger or injury or hazard to paramount public interests. Section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure empowers the magistrates specified therein to make an exparte conditional order in emergent cases for removal of dangerous public nuisances. Action under section 17 Land Acquisition Act furnishes another such instance. Similarly action on grounds of public safety public health may justify disregard of the rule of prior hearing. [556C-H] Cases where owing to the compulsion of the fact situation or the necessity of taking speedy action no pre- decisional hearing is given but the action, is followed soon by a full post-decisional hearing to the person affected do not in reality constitute an exception to the audi alteram partem rule. To call such cases as exception is a misnomer because they do not exclude fair play in action but adapt it to the urgency of the situation by balancing the competing claims of hurry and hearing. [560H-561A] The general principle as distinguished from an absolute rule of uniform application seems to be that where a statute does not in terms exclude this rule of prior hearing but contemplates a post-decisional hearing amounting to a full review of the original order on merits then such a statute would be construed as excluding the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage. [561G] If the statute conferring the power is silent with regard to the giving of pre-decisional hearing to the person affected and the administrative decision taken by the authority involves civil consequences of a grave nature and no full review or appeal on merits against that decision is provided courts will be extremely reluctant to construe such a statute as excluding the duty of affording even a minimal hearing shorn of all its formal trappings and dilatory features at the pre-decisional stage, unless viewed pragmatically it would paralyse the administrative process or frustrate the need for utmost promptitude. [561H] 7(i). A comparison of the provisions of Section 18A(1)(b) and Section 18AA(1)(c), bring out two main points of distinction: First, action under Section 18A(1)(b) can be taken only after an investigation had been made under Section 15; while under Section 18AA(1)(a) or (b) action can be taken without such investigation. The language, scheme and setting of Section 18AA read in the light of the Objects and Reasons for enacting this provision make this position clear beyond doubt. Second, before taking action under Section 18A(1)(b), the Central Government has to form an opinion on the basis of the investigation conducted under section 15, in regard to the existence of the objective fact, namely: that the industrial undertaking is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest; while under section 18A(1)(a) the Government has to satisfy itself that the persons incharge of the undertaking have brought about a situation likely to cause fall in production, by committing any of the three kinds of acts specified in that provision. This shows that the preliminary objective fact attributable to the persons in charge of the management or affairs of the undertaking, on the basis of which action may be taken under section 18(A)(1)(b), is of far wider amplitude than the circumstance, the existence of which is a sine qua non for taking action under section 18AA(1). The phrase "highly detrimental to the scheduled industry or public interest" in section 18-A is capable of being construed to cover a large variety of acts or things which may be considered wrong with the manner of running the industry by the management. In contrast with it, action under section 18AA(1)(a) can be taken only if the Central Government is satisfied with regard to the existence of the twin conditions specifically mentioned therein, on the basis of evidence in its possession. [569D-H] An analysis of section 18AA(1)(a), indicates that as a necessary preliminary to the exercise of the power thereunder, the Central Government must be satisfied "from documentary or other evidence in its possession" in regard to the co-existence of two circumstances: (i) that the persons in charge of the industrial undertaking have by committing any of these acts, namely, reckless investments, or creation of incumbrances on the assets of industrial undertaking, or by diversion of funds, brought about a situation which is likely to affect the production of the article manufactured or produced in the industrial undertaking, and (ii) that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation.[570B-D] It cannot be laid down as a general proposition that whenever a statute confers a power on an administrative authority and makes the exercise of that power conditional on the formation of an opinion by that authority in regard to the existence of an immediacy, its opinion in regard to that preliminary fact is not open to judicial scrutiny at all. While it may be conceded that an element of subjectivity is always involved in the formation of such an opinion, the existence of the circumstances from which the inference constituting the opinion, as the sine qua non for action, are to be drawn, must be demonstrable, and the existence of such "circumstances", if questioned, must be proved at least prima facie. [571 E-G] From a plain reading of section 18AA, it is clear that it does not expressly in unmistakable and unequivocal terms exclude the application of the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage. [574B] In the instant case, so far as Kanpur Unit is concerned, it was lying closed for more than three months before the passing of the impugned order. There was no 'immediacy' in relation to that unit, which could absolve the Government from the obligation of complying fully with audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional or pre- takeover stage. [583A] Keshav Mills Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, [1973] 3 S.C.R. 22; Kamla Prasad Khetan v. Union of India,[1957] S.C.R. 1052; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 621; Sukhdev Singh & Ors. v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh, [1975] 3 S.C.R. 619; A. K. Kraipak v. Union of India, [1970] 1 S.C.R. 457; Ridge v. Baldwin, [1964] A.C. 40; 196; Heatley v. Tasmanian Racing & Gaming Commission, 14 Australian Law Reports 519; Nawabkhan Abbaskhan v. State of Gujarat, [1974] 3 S.C.R. 427; State of Orissa v. Dr. Bina Pani Dei, [1962] 2 S.C.R. 625; Ambalal M. Shah v. Hathi Singh Manufacturing Co. Ltd. [1962] 3 S.C.R. 171; and S. L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan & Ors., [1981] 1 S.C.R. 746, referred to. (Per Chinnappa Reddy, J. dissenting) The principles of natural justice are not attracted to the situations contemplated by section 18AA of Industries (Development and Regulation) Act. Natural justice like Ultra Vires and Public Policy is a branch of the public law and is a formidable weapon which can be wielded to secure justice to the citizen. While it may be used to protect certain fundamental liberties, civil and political rights, it may be used as indeed it is used more often than not, to protect vested interests and to obstruct the path of progressive change. The time has come to make an appropriate distinction between natural justice in its application to fundamental liberties, civil and political rights and natural justice in its application to vested interests. [590A-B] Our constitution as befits the Constitution of a Socialist Secular Democratic Republic, recognises the paramountcy of the public weal over the private interest. Natural justice, ultra vires, public policy, or any other rule of interpretation must, therefore, conform, grow and be tailored to serve the public interest and respond to the demands of an evolving society. [590C] The principles of natural justice have taken deep root in the judicial conscience of our people. They are now considered so fundamental as to be implicit in every decision making function, judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative. Where authority functions under a statute and the statute provides for the observance of the principles of natural justice in a particular manner, natural justice will have to be observed in that manner and in no other. Where the statute is silent about the observance of the principles of natural justice, such statutory silence is taken to imply compliance with the principles of natural justice. Where the conflict is between the public interest and the private interest the presumption must necessarily be weak and may, therefore, be readily displaced. The presumption is also weak, where what are involved are mere property rights. In cases of urgency, particularly where the public interest is involved, preemptive action may be a strategic necessity. Even in cases of preemptive action, if the statute so provides or if the Courts so deem fit in appropriate cases, a postponed hearing may be substituted for natural justice. [590A-C; 591F-G] 3(ii). Where natural justice is implied, the extent of the implication and the nature of the hearing must vary with the statute, the subject and the situation. [592B] The absence of the expression 'immediate action' in section 18AA(1)(b) does not make any difference. Section 18AA(1)(a) refers to a situation where immediate preventive action may avert a disaster, whereas section 18AA contemplates a situation where the disaster has occurred and action is necessary to restore normalcy. Restoration of production where production has stopped in a key industry or industrial undertaking is as important and urgent in the public interest as prevention of a situation where production may be affected. Immediate action is, therefore, as necessary in the situation contemplated by section 18AA(1)(b) as in the situation contemplated by section 18AA(1)(a). [596 F-G] The marginal note refers to the power to take over without investigation but there is no sufficient reason to suppose that the word immediate is used only to contra- distinguish it from the investigation contemplated by section 15 of the Act, though of course a consequence of immediate action under section 18AA may be to dispense with the enquiry under section 15. In fact, facts which come to light during the course of an investigation under section 15 may form the basis of action under section 18AA(1)(a). Where in the course of an investigation under section 15 it is discovered that the management have, by reckless investments or creation of encumbrances on the assets of the industrial undertaking or by diversion of funds brought about a situation which is likely to affect the production of the articles manufactured or produced in the industrial undertaking, if the Government is satisfied that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation, there is no reason why the Central Government may not straightaway take action under section 18AA(1)(a) without waiting for completion of investigation under section 15. [597A-B] Where there is a provision in the statute itself for revocation of the order by the very authority making the decision, it appears to be unnecessary to insist upon a pre- decisional observance of natural justice. [598A] The likelihood of production being jeopardized or the stoppage of production in a key industrial undertaking is a matter of grave concern affecting the public interest. Parliament has taken so serious a view of the matter that it has authorised the Central Government to take over the management of the industrial undertaking if immediate action may prevent jeopardy to production or restore production where it has already stopped. The necessity for immediate action by the Central Government contemplated by Parliament is definitely indicative of the exclusion of natural justice. It is not as if the owner of the industrial undertaking is left with no remedy. He may move the Central Government under section 18-F to cancel the order made under section 18AA. [598C-D] Neither section 18-F of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act nor section 21 of the General Clauses Act by itself excludes natural justice. The exclusion of natural justice where such exclusion is not express has to be implied by reference to the subject, the statute and the statutory situation. Where an express provision in the statute itself provides for a post decisional hearing the other provisions of the Statute will have to be read in the light of such provision and the provision for post- decisional hearing may then clinch the issue where pre- decisional natural justice appears to be excluded on the other terms of the statute. That a post-decisional hearing may also be had by the terms of section 21 of the General Clauses Act may not necessarily help in the interpretation of the provisions of the statute concerned. [599 A-C] Ridge v. Baldwin, 1964 A.C. p. 40; Annie G. Phillip v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 75 L.E.d. 1289; John H. Fahey v. Paul Mallonee, 91 L.E.d. 2030; Margarita Fuentes v. Robert L. Shevin, Attorney General of Florida, 32 L.E.d. 2d 556 and Lawrence Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 40 L.E.d. 2d 406, referred to. - Rama Rao, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh as well as the President of the Telugu Desam Party as well as respondent No. 3. The advertisements very shortly stated, refer to the auspicious gifts made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to the poor people on the eve of New Year and Sankranti. In the said advertisements, it is stated that the said Government which was formed by the Telugu Desam Party was giving to the poor people whose income was below Rs. and the said advertisements referred to a new scheme of selling sarees and dhoties at half prices to the poor people in the State of Andhra Pradesh having Green-cards. Moreover, the offer in the advertisements for the sale of dhoties and sarees at discount rates was in the nature of a benefit offered to poor persons in that State. When a Government announces the measures which are intended for the benefit of any of the classes for whose the Government can normally be expected to work like the poor or the economical backward classes, it is only in rare circumstances that such a promise can be said to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) even though such a promise might be made on the eve of elections. 8. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => '', 'counseldef' => '', 'court' => 'Supreme Court of India', 'court_type' => 'SC', 'decidedon' => '1989-09-29', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' K.N. Saikia,; M.H. Kania and; S. Ranganathan, JJ.', 'judgement' => '</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Kania, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. These two appeals arise out of the judgments in two Election Petitions in the Andhra Pradesh High Court questioning the election of respondent No. 1 as a Member of Parliament from Srikakulam No. Parliamentary Constituency in the 8th General Election to the House of the People. The points raised in these appeals are common and so are the relevant facts; and, hence, they are being disposed of by this common judgment. We propose to take note of only the few facts which are necessary for the appreciation of the controversy before us.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The polling date for the said election along with other parliamentary elections in the State of Andhra Pradesh was December 27, 1984 but in Srikakulam No. 1 Parliamentary Constituency the polling was countermanded and the date of polling was later fixed on January 28, 1985. In both the Election Petitions the election of respondent No. 1 was questioned mainly on the ground that Shri N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh as well as the President of the Telugu Desam Party as well as respondent No. 1 gave certain speeches and certain advertisements were got published by Shri N.T. Rama Rao through the Publicity Department of the Government of Andhra Pradesh in the newspapers containing certain statements which are alleged to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A) of the <a href="/act/50684/representation-of-the-people-act-1951-complete-act">Representation of the People Act, 1951</a> (hereinafter referred to as 'the said Act'). The main question canvassed before us is whether the statements contained in these aforesaid advertisements amount to a corrupt practice under Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act. Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act runs as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">123. Corrupt practices</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The following shall be deemed to be corrupt practises for the purposes of this Act :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) 'Bribery', that is to say.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(A) any gift, offer or promise by a candidate or his agent or by any other person with the consent of a candidate or his election agent of any gratification, to any person whomsover, with the object, directly or indirectly of inducing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) x x x</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) an elector to vote or refrain from voting at an election, or as a reward to.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) a person for having so stood or not stood, or for having withdrawn or not having withdrawn his candidature; or</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) an elector for having voted or refrained from voting.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The advertisements very shortly stated, refer to the auspicious gifts made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to the poor people on the eve of New Year and Sankranti. In the said advertisements, it is stated that the said Government which was formed by the Telugu Desam Party was giving to the poor people whose income was below Rs. 6,000 per year, a kilo of rice at Rs. 2 per Kg. and the said advertisements referred to a new scheme of selling sarees and dhoties at half prices to the poor people in the State of Andhra Pradesh having Green-cards. Green-cards were directed to be issued to all the persons whose annual income was below Rs. 6,000. The supply of the rice at subsidised rates as aforesaid was also to be made to the Green-card holders only. The scheme to sell sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was to be operative from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. In considering the question whether the said advertisement and the said speeches amount to a corrupt practice, we are of the view that the provisions of Section 123 of the said Act which deal with corrupt practices have to be interpreted, keeping in mind that dictates of commonsense require that they never could have been intended to treat normal election promises made in election manifestoes or usual election speeches by members of various political parties aspiring to power and by different candidates aspiring to get elected to legislative bodies concerned as corrupt practices. We are of the view that these advertisements and speeches amount to nothing more than statements extolling the achievements of the Government of the State of Andhra Pradesh under the Telugu Desam Party headed by N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister, and contain normal election promises and these statements do not amount to corrupt practices falling within the scope of Sub-clause (b) of Clause (A) of Sub-section (1) of Section 123 of the said Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. It was urged by Mr. Rao, learned Counsel for the appellants that in the impugned judgments, the High Court has incorrectly taken the view that in order to amount to bribery within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A), the transaction must amount to a bargain by the candidate with a view to get votes. It was pointed out by him that the said view has been taken in the impugned judgments, relying upon the decision of a Bench comprising to learned Judges of this Court in Ghasi Ram v. Dal Singh and Ors. :1983 SCR 102 . We have gone through to the relevant portion of that judgment (at page 109 and 110 of the said report). A careful perusal of the said judgment shows that what has been really held in that case is that if the promises given or made amount to a bargain entered into by a candidate for a vote or votes, that would amount to a corrupt practice; but it has not been held there that unless the act alleged amounts to such a bargain, it could not amount to a corrupt practice. In our view, that judgment does not lay down that in order to amount to a corrupt practice, the transaction must amount to a bargain for getting a vote. It was pointed out by Mr. Rao, however, that such a view seems to have been taken in two other decisions rendered by two Benches, each comprising two learned Judges of this Court in Bhanu Kumar Shastri v. Mohan Lal Sukhadia and Ors. : [1971]3SCR522 and Harjit Singh Mann v. S Umrao Singh and Ors. : [1980]2SCR501 . and these judgments need to be overruled. We do not propose to go into the correctness or otherwise of this view because, even on the footing that in order to amount to a corrupt practice under the aforesaid provision the alleged acts need not constitute a bargain, the the acts established in the present case, in our opinion, do not amount to a corrupt practice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Our attention was drawn by Mr. Rao to the fact that in this case the said advertisements and the speeches had to be viewed in the context of the fact that the advertisements were issued and the speeches were made after respondent No. 1 filed his nomination papers on January 4, 1985, for the election and before the election was held in the aforesaid constituency. It was further pointed out that the offer made for the sale of sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was limited to the period from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985. It cannot be denied that these factors are relevant factOrs. We cannot, however, lose sight of the fact that this offer was made not only in this constituency but throughout the State where the elections to the House of the People were scheduled to be held, and were, in fact, held on December 27, 1984. It was only in case of this constituency that the election to be held on the scheduled date was countermanded and later held on January 28, 1985. We cannot lose sight of the fact that, as far as the said speeches and the said advertisements, which were issued by the Publicity Department of the State, are concerned, they deal in the main with the achievements of the Government of Andhra Pradesh which, of course, was being run by Ministers belonging to Telugu Desam Party to which respondent No. 1 also belonged. Moreover, the offer in the advertisements for the sale of dhoties and sarees at discount rates was in the nature of a benefit offered to poor persons in that State. When a Government announces the measures which are intended for the benefit of any of the classes for whose the Government can normally be expected to work like the poor or the economical backward classes, it is only in rare circumstances that such a promise can be said to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) even though such a promise might be made on the eve of elections. Keeping this in mind, in our opinion, although the offer to sell dhoties and sarees at discount rates was of a limited duration as aforestated, it cannot be regarded as a corrupt practice. Such an offer was bound to have financial repercussions and it is quite possible the duration of the offer was limited to enable the Government to study the financial repercussions rather than from any improper motive. We find support for this view from the decision of this Court in H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh : [1969]3SCR813 . In that case an Ordinance was passed by the Government of Madhya Pradesh as a result of which a large number of agriculturists, namely, those holdings of plots of land of less than 7.5 acres area or paying land revenue not exceeding Rs. 5/- were exempted from the payment of the land revenue. It was held that such a concession does not amount to a gift, offer or promise of any gratification within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) of the said Act nor does the announcement of the declaration made at a meeting shortly before the election or the issue of a pamphlet containing that declaration at that time carry the matter any further. It was held that neither Shri D.P. Misra who was the Chief Minister nor Shri S.K. Dixit who acted as his agent were guilty of any corrupt practice within the meaning of the aforesaid provision.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. It was next contended by Mr. Rao, although very faintly, that the High Court was in error as it had not decided all other issues which were raised in the election petition. In this regard we cannot lose sight of the fact that the term of the present Lok Sabha is likely to be over within a few months and fresh elections are likely to be held and it would, therefore, be an exercise in futility to remand the matter to the High Court for deciding the remaining issues.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'AIR1990SC1889; JT1989(4)SC186; 1989(2)SCALE891; 1989Supp(2)SCC504', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors.', 'sub' => 'Election', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ), 'casename_url' => 'b-rajagopala-rao-vs-appayya-hanumanthu', 'args' => array( (int) 0 => '640942', (int) 1 => 'b-rajagopala-rao-vs-appayya-hanumanthu' ) ) $title_for_layout = 'B Rajagopala Rao and anr Vs Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors - Citation 640942 - Court Judgment | ' $desc = array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '640942', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/50684/representation-of-the-people-act-1951-complete-act">Representation of the People Act, 1951</a> - Sections 1, 3(1)(A), 123 and 123(1)(A)', 'appealno' => 'Civil Appeal Nos. 484 and 485 of 1987', 'appellant' => 'B. Rajagopala Rao and anr.', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'B. Rajagopala Rao and anr. Vs. Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors.', 'casenote' => 'Election - corrupt practices - Sections 123 and 123 (1) (A) of Representation of the People Act, 1951 - whether advertisements by public department and speeches made by respondent No. 1 to sell dhoti and sarees at discount rates amount to corrupt practices - offer was available for mass and for limited duration - such offer was bound to have financial repercussions and it is quite possible that duration of offer limited to enable Government to study financial repercussions rather than from any improper motive - offer not amounted to corrupt practices. - [ D.A. Desai,; O. Chinnappa Reddy and; R.S. Sarkaria, JJ.] The Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 empowers the Union of India in the public interest to take under its control the industries specified in the First Schedule to the Act. Item 23 of the First Schedule relates to textiles of various categories. Section 15 authorises the Central Government to make or cause to be made a full and complete investigation into the circumstances of the case if the Central Government is of the opinion that (a) in respect of any scheduled industry or industrial undertaking or undertakings (i) there has been, or is likely to be, a substantial fall in the volume of production for which, having regard to the economic conditions prevailing, there is no justification; or (ii) there has been, or is likely to be, a marked deterioration in the quality of any article... which could have been or can be avoided; or (iii) there has been or is likely to be a rise in the price of any article..... for which there is no justification; or (iv) it is necessary to take any such action for the purpose of conserving any resources of national importance; or (b) any industrial undertaking is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest. After the investigation is made under section 15, section 16(1) empowers the Central Government if action is desirable, to issue appropriate directions, and section 16(2) provides for the issue of interim directions by the Central Government pending investigation under section 15. Chapter III-A consisting of Sections 18A, 18-AA, 18-B, 18-C, 18-D, 18-E and 18-F deal with "direct management or control of Industrial Undertakings by Central Government in certain cases". Sec. 18-A empowers the Central Government by notified order, to authorise any person or body of persons to take over the management of the whole or any part of an industrial undertaking or to exercise in respect of the whole, or any part of the undertaking such functions of control as may be specified in the order, if the Central Government is of opinion that: (a) an industrial undertaking to which directions have been issued in pursuance of section 16 has failed to comply with such directions, or (b) an industrial undertaking in respect of which an investigation has been made under section 15 is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest. Section 18AA(5) stipulates that the provisions of Sections 18-B to 18 E shall be applicable to the industrial undertaking in respect of which an order has been made under section 18-AA even as they apply to an industrial undertaking taken over under Section 18-A. Section 18-F empowers the Central Government to cancel the order made under section 18-A if it appears that the purpose of the order has been fulfilled or it is not necessary that the order should remain in force. The appellant M/s. Swadeshi Cotton Mills was taken over by the Government of India by a notification dated April 13, 1978 in exercise of the powers conferred on it under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 18AA of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 on the ground that the company had by creation of encumbrances on the assets of its industrial undertakings, brought about a situation which had affected and is likely to further affect the production of articles manufactured or produced by it and that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation. The Government authorised the National Textile Corporation Limited to take over the management, subject to the conditions that the authorised person shall comply with all the directions issued from time to time by the Central Government and that the authorised person shall hold office for a period of five years. The appellant Mills challenged the aforesaid order in a writ petition in the High Court. The case was heard by a Full Bench of five Judges to consider the question whether in construing section 18AA of the Industries Development and Regulation Act, 1951, compliance with the principle of audi alteram partem is to be implied and whether hearing is to be given to the parties who would be affected by the order to be passed prior to the passing of the order or whether hearing can be given after the order is passed and whether the order passed under the said Section is vitiated by not giving of such hearing and whether such vice can be cured. The Bench by a majority answered the three questions as follows:- (a) Section 18AA(1)(a)(b) excludes the giving of prior hearing to the party who would be affected by order thereunder. (b) Section 18-F expressly provides for a post- decisional hearing to the owner of the industrial undertaking, the management of which is taken over under section 18AA to have the order made under section 18AA cancelled on any relevant ground. (c) As the taking over of management under section 18A is not vitiated by the failure to grant prior hearing the question of any such vice being cured by a grant of a subsequent hearing does not arise. The minority, however, held that in compliance with the principles of natural justice, prior hearing to the owner of the undertaking was required to be given before the passing of an order under section 18AA, that the second question did not arise as the denial of a prior hearing would not cure the vice by the grant of subsequent hearing, but it would be open to the Court to moderate the relief in such a way that the order is kept alive to the extent necessary until the making of the fresh order to subserve public interest and to make appropriate directions. After the decision on the reference the case was reheard on merits by a Full Bench of three Judges and the writ petition was allowed in part. The challenge to the validity of the order being rejected but insofar as the impugned order seeking to take over the corporate entity of the company, the corporate entity of the subsidiary and its assets, the petition was allowed and the respondents, the Union of India and the authorised person were directed to release from its control and custody and/or deliver possession of any assets or property of the company which were not referable to the industrial undertakings. Appeals to this Court were filed on behalf of the Company as well as by the Union of India and the National Textile Corporation. Two propositions were propounded on behalf of the company that: (a) Whether it was necessary to observe the rules of natural justice before issuing a notified order under section 18AA(1)(a) and further whether section 18-F impliedly excludes rules of natural justice relating to prior hearing; and it was contended (1) the mere use of the word 'immediate' in sub-clause (a) of section 18AA does not show a legislative intent to exclude the application of audi alteram partem rule altogether. (2) The word 'immediate' in clause (a) has been used in contra distinction to 'investigate'. It only means that under section 18AA action can be taken without prior investigation under section 15. The use of the word 'immediate' in section 18AA(1)(a) only dispenses with investigation under section 15 and not with the principle of audi alteram partem altogether and this is indicated by the marginal note of section 18A and para 3 of the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Amendment Bill which inserted section 18AA in 1971. (3) The word 'immediate' occurs only in clause (a) and not in clause (b) of section 18AA(1). It would be odd if intention to exclude this principle of natural justice is spelt out in one clause of the sub-section when the other clause does not exclude it. (4) Section 18-F does not exclude a pre-decisional hearing. The so-called post-decisional hearing contemplated by section 18-F cannot be and is not intended to be a substitute for a pre-decisional hearing. (5) Section 18F incorporates only a facet, albeit qualified, of section 21 of the General Clauses Act. The language of the Section implicity prohibits an enquiry into circumstances that led to the passing of the order of take-over and under it the aggrieved person is not entitled to show that on merits the order was void ab initio. (6) 'Immediacy' does not exclude a duty to act fairly because even an emergent situation can co-exist with the canons of natural justice. The only effect of urgency on the application of the principle of fair hearing would be that the width, form and duration of the hearing would be tailored to the situation and reduced to the reasonable minimum so that it does not delay and defeat the purpose of the contemplated action. (7) Where the civil consequences of the administrative action are grave and its effect is highly prejudicial to the rights and interests of the person affected and there is nothing in the language and scheme of the statute which unequivocally excludes a fair pre-decisional hearing and the post-decisional hearing provided therein is not a real remedial hearing equitable to a full right of appeal the Court should be loath to infer a legislative intent to exclude even a minimal fair hearing at the pre-decisional stage merely on ground of urgency. (8) The Central Government appointed four Government Officials including one from the office of the Textile Commissioner to study the affairs of the Company and to make recommendation. This Official Group submitted its report on February 16, 1978. The evidence on the basis of which the impugned order was passed was not disclosed to the appellant company till May 1978, only after it had filed the writ petition in the High Court. If there was anything adverse to the appellants in the survey report there was time enough about six weeks between the submission of the Survey Report and the passing of the impugned order for giving a short, reasonable opportunity to the appellants to explain the adverse findings against them. If there was immediacy situational modifications could be made to meet the requirement of fairness, by reducing the period of notice; that even the manner and form of such notice could be simplified to eliminate delay, that telephonic notice or short opportunity for furnishing their explanation to the Company might have satisfied the requirements of natural justice. Such an opportunity of hearing could have been given after the passing of a conditional tentative order and before its enforcement under section 18AA. For the interregnum suitable interim action such as freezing the assets of the Company or restraining the Company from creating further encumbrances, could be taken under section 16. On behalf of the Union of India and the Authorised Officer it was contended that (1) the presumption in favour of audi alteram partem rule stands impliedly displaced by the language scheme, setting and the purpose of the provision in section 18AA. (2) Section 18AA on its plain terms deals with situations where immediate preventive action is required. The paramount concern is to avoid serious problems which may be caused by fall in production. The purpose of an order under section 18AA is not to condemn the owner but to protect the scheduled industry. The issue under section 18AA is not solely between the Government and the management of the industrial undertaking. The object of taking action under this Section is to protect other outside interests of the community at large and the workers. (3) The rule of natural justice to give a hearing has been incorporated in section 18-F which gives an opportunity of a post-decisional hearing to the owner of the undertaking who if he feels aggrieved can on his application be heard, to show that even the original order under section 18AA was passed on invalid grounds and should be cancelled or rescinded. (4) On a true construction of section 18AA read with section 18-F the requirements of natural justice and fair play can be read into the statute only insofar as conformance to such canons can reasonably and realistically be required of it by the provision for a remedial hearing at a subsequent stage. (5) Under section 18-F the Central Government exercises curial functions and that Section confers on the aggrieved owner a right to apply to the Government to cancel the order of take-over. This section casts an obligation on the Central Government to deal with and dispose of an application filed thereunder with reasonable expedition. Allowing the appeal by the Company,<br/>HELD: (Sarkaria & Desai, JJ. per Chinnappa Reddy, J. dissenting.) In the facts and circumstances of the instant case, there has been a noncompliance with the implied requirement of the audi alteram partem rule of natural justice at the pre-decisional stage. The impugned order could be struck down as invalid on that score alone. But in view of the commitment / concession that a hearing would be afforded to the Company, the case is remitted to the Central Government to give a full, fair and effective hearing. [587G-H, 588C] The phrase 'natural justice' is not capable of a static and precise definition. It cannot be imprisoned in the straight-jacket of a cast-iron formula. Rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. Hence not possible to make an exhaustive catalogue of such rules. Two fundamental maxims of natural justice have now become deeply and indelibly ingrained in the common consciousness of mankind as pre-eminently necessary to ensure that the law is applied impartially objectively and fairly. These twin principles are (i) audi alteram partem and (ii) nemo judex in re sua. Audi alteram partem is a highly effective rule devised by the Courts to ensure that a statutory authority arrives at a just decision and it is calculated to act as a healthy check on the abuse or misuse of power. Its reach should not be narrowed and its applicability circumscribed.[554C-G] The rules of natural justice can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. If a statutory provision either specifically or by inevitable implication excludes the application of the rules of natural justice then the Court cannot ignore the mandate of the Legislature. Whether or not the application of the principles of natural justice in a given case has been excluded in the exercise of statutory power depends upon the language and basic scheme of the provision conferring the power, the nature of the power the purpose for which it is conferred and the effect of that power. [556A-B] The maxim audi alteram partem has many facets. Two of them are (a) notice of the case to be met, and (b) opportunity to explain. The rule cannot be sacrificed at the altar of administrative convenience or celerity; for, convenience and justice are often not on speaking terms. Difficulties, however, arise when the statute conferring the power does not expressly exclude this rule but its exclusion is sought by implication due to the presence of certain factors such as urgency where the obligation to give notice and opportunity to be heard would obstruct the taking of prompt action of a preventive or remedial nature. Audi alteram partem rule may be disregarded in an emergent situation where immediate action brooks no delay to prevent some imminent danger or injury or hazard to paramount public interests. Section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure empowers the magistrates specified therein to make an exparte conditional order in emergent cases for removal of dangerous public nuisances. Action under section 17 Land Acquisition Act furnishes another such instance. Similarly action on grounds of public safety public health may justify disregard of the rule of prior hearing. [556C-H] Cases where owing to the compulsion of the fact situation or the necessity of taking speedy action no pre- decisional hearing is given but the action, is followed soon by a full post-decisional hearing to the person affected do not in reality constitute an exception to the audi alteram partem rule. To call such cases as exception is a misnomer because they do not exclude fair play in action but adapt it to the urgency of the situation by balancing the competing claims of hurry and hearing. [560H-561A] The general principle as distinguished from an absolute rule of uniform application seems to be that where a statute does not in terms exclude this rule of prior hearing but contemplates a post-decisional hearing amounting to a full review of the original order on merits then such a statute would be construed as excluding the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage. [561G] If the statute conferring the power is silent with regard to the giving of pre-decisional hearing to the person affected and the administrative decision taken by the authority involves civil consequences of a grave nature and no full review or appeal on merits against that decision is provided courts will be extremely reluctant to construe such a statute as excluding the duty of affording even a minimal hearing shorn of all its formal trappings and dilatory features at the pre-decisional stage, unless viewed pragmatically it would paralyse the administrative process or frustrate the need for utmost promptitude. [561H] 7(i). A comparison of the provisions of Section 18A(1)(b) and Section 18AA(1)(c), bring out two main points of distinction: First, action under Section 18A(1)(b) can be taken only after an investigation had been made under Section 15; while under Section 18AA(1)(a) or (b) action can be taken without such investigation. The language, scheme and setting of Section 18AA read in the light of the Objects and Reasons for enacting this provision make this position clear beyond doubt. Second, before taking action under Section 18A(1)(b), the Central Government has to form an opinion on the basis of the investigation conducted under section 15, in regard to the existence of the objective fact, namely: that the industrial undertaking is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest; while under section 18A(1)(a) the Government has to satisfy itself that the persons incharge of the undertaking have brought about a situation likely to cause fall in production, by committing any of the three kinds of acts specified in that provision. This shows that the preliminary objective fact attributable to the persons in charge of the management or affairs of the undertaking, on the basis of which action may be taken under section 18(A)(1)(b), is of far wider amplitude than the circumstance, the existence of which is a sine qua non for taking action under section 18AA(1). The phrase "highly detrimental to the scheduled industry or public interest" in section 18-A is capable of being construed to cover a large variety of acts or things which may be considered wrong with the manner of running the industry by the management. In contrast with it, action under section 18AA(1)(a) can be taken only if the Central Government is satisfied with regard to the existence of the twin conditions specifically mentioned therein, on the basis of evidence in its possession. [569D-H] An analysis of section 18AA(1)(a), indicates that as a necessary preliminary to the exercise of the power thereunder, the Central Government must be satisfied "from documentary or other evidence in its possession" in regard to the co-existence of two circumstances: (i) that the persons in charge of the industrial undertaking have by committing any of these acts, namely, reckless investments, or creation of incumbrances on the assets of industrial undertaking, or by diversion of funds, brought about a situation which is likely to affect the production of the article manufactured or produced in the industrial undertaking, and (ii) that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation.[570B-D] It cannot be laid down as a general proposition that whenever a statute confers a power on an administrative authority and makes the exercise of that power conditional on the formation of an opinion by that authority in regard to the existence of an immediacy, its opinion in regard to that preliminary fact is not open to judicial scrutiny at all. While it may be conceded that an element of subjectivity is always involved in the formation of such an opinion, the existence of the circumstances from which the inference constituting the opinion, as the sine qua non for action, are to be drawn, must be demonstrable, and the existence of such "circumstances", if questioned, must be proved at least prima facie. [571 E-G] From a plain reading of section 18AA, it is clear that it does not expressly in unmistakable and unequivocal terms exclude the application of the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage. [574B] In the instant case, so far as Kanpur Unit is concerned, it was lying closed for more than three months before the passing of the impugned order. There was no 'immediacy' in relation to that unit, which could absolve the Government from the obligation of complying fully with audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional or pre- takeover stage. [583A] Keshav Mills Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, [1973] 3 S.C.R. 22; Kamla Prasad Khetan v. Union of India,[1957] S.C.R. 1052; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 621; Sukhdev Singh & Ors. v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh, [1975] 3 S.C.R. 619; A. K. Kraipak v. Union of India, [1970] 1 S.C.R. 457; Ridge v. Baldwin, [1964] A.C. 40; 196; Heatley v. Tasmanian Racing & Gaming Commission, 14 Australian Law Reports 519; Nawabkhan Abbaskhan v. State of Gujarat, [1974] 3 S.C.R. 427; State of Orissa v. Dr. Bina Pani Dei, [1962] 2 S.C.R. 625; Ambalal M. Shah v. Hathi Singh Manufacturing Co. Ltd. [1962] 3 S.C.R. 171; and S. L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan & Ors., [1981] 1 S.C.R. 746, referred to. (Per Chinnappa Reddy, J. dissenting) The principles of natural justice are not attracted to the situations contemplated by section 18AA of Industries (Development and Regulation) Act. Natural justice like Ultra Vires and Public Policy is a branch of the public law and is a formidable weapon which can be wielded to secure justice to the citizen. While it may be used to protect certain fundamental liberties, civil and political rights, it may be used as indeed it is used more often than not, to protect vested interests and to obstruct the path of progressive change. The time has come to make an appropriate distinction between natural justice in its application to fundamental liberties, civil and political rights and natural justice in its application to vested interests. [590A-B] Our constitution as befits the Constitution of a Socialist Secular Democratic Republic, recognises the paramountcy of the public weal over the private interest. Natural justice, ultra vires, public policy, or any other rule of interpretation must, therefore, conform, grow and be tailored to serve the public interest and respond to the demands of an evolving society. [590C] The principles of natural justice have taken deep root in the judicial conscience of our people. They are now considered so fundamental as to be implicit in every decision making function, judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative. Where authority functions under a statute and the statute provides for the observance of the principles of natural justice in a particular manner, natural justice will have to be observed in that manner and in no other. Where the statute is silent about the observance of the principles of natural justice, such statutory silence is taken to imply compliance with the principles of natural justice. Where the conflict is between the public interest and the private interest the presumption must necessarily be weak and may, therefore, be readily displaced. The presumption is also weak, where what are involved are mere property rights. In cases of urgency, particularly where the public interest is involved, preemptive action may be a strategic necessity. Even in cases of preemptive action, if the statute so provides or if the Courts so deem fit in appropriate cases, a postponed hearing may be substituted for natural justice. [590A-C; 591F-G] 3(ii). Where natural justice is implied, the extent of the implication and the nature of the hearing must vary with the statute, the subject and the situation. [592B] The absence of the expression 'immediate action' in section 18AA(1)(b) does not make any difference. Section 18AA(1)(a) refers to a situation where immediate preventive action may avert a disaster, whereas section 18AA contemplates a situation where the disaster has occurred and action is necessary to restore normalcy. Restoration of production where production has stopped in a key industry or industrial undertaking is as important and urgent in the public interest as prevention of a situation where production may be affected. Immediate action is, therefore, as necessary in the situation contemplated by section 18AA(1)(b) as in the situation contemplated by section 18AA(1)(a). [596 F-G] The marginal note refers to the power to take over without investigation but there is no sufficient reason to suppose that the word immediate is used only to contra- distinguish it from the investigation contemplated by section 15 of the Act, though of course a consequence of immediate action under section 18AA may be to dispense with the enquiry under section 15. In fact, facts which come to light during the course of an investigation under section 15 may form the basis of action under section 18AA(1)(a). Where in the course of an investigation under section 15 it is discovered that the management have, by reckless investments or creation of encumbrances on the assets of the industrial undertaking or by diversion of funds brought about a situation which is likely to affect the production of the articles manufactured or produced in the industrial undertaking, if the Government is satisfied that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation, there is no reason why the Central Government may not straightaway take action under section 18AA(1)(a) without waiting for completion of investigation under section 15. [597A-B] Where there is a provision in the statute itself for revocation of the order by the very authority making the decision, it appears to be unnecessary to insist upon a pre- decisional observance of natural justice. [598A] The likelihood of production being jeopardized or the stoppage of production in a key industrial undertaking is a matter of grave concern affecting the public interest. Parliament has taken so serious a view of the matter that it has authorised the Central Government to take over the management of the industrial undertaking if immediate action may prevent jeopardy to production or restore production where it has already stopped. The necessity for immediate action by the Central Government contemplated by Parliament is definitely indicative of the exclusion of natural justice. It is not as if the owner of the industrial undertaking is left with no remedy. He may move the Central Government under section 18-F to cancel the order made under section 18AA. [598C-D] Neither section 18-F of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act nor section 21 of the General Clauses Act by itself excludes natural justice. The exclusion of natural justice where such exclusion is not express has to be implied by reference to the subject, the statute and the statutory situation. Where an express provision in the statute itself provides for a post decisional hearing the other provisions of the Statute will have to be read in the light of such provision and the provision for post- decisional hearing may then clinch the issue where pre- decisional natural justice appears to be excluded on the other terms of the statute. That a post-decisional hearing may also be had by the terms of section 21 of the General Clauses Act may not necessarily help in the interpretation of the provisions of the statute concerned. [599 A-C] Ridge v. Baldwin, 1964 A.C. p. 40; Annie G. Phillip v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 75 L.E.d. 1289; John H. Fahey v. Paul Mallonee, 91 L.E.d. 2030; Margarita Fuentes v. Robert L. Shevin, Attorney General of Florida, 32 L.E.d. 2d 556 and Lawrence Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 40 L.E.d. 2d 406, referred to. - Rama Rao, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh as well as the President of the Telugu Desam Party as well as respondent No. 3. The advertisements very shortly stated, refer to the auspicious gifts made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to the poor people on the eve of New Year and Sankranti. In the said advertisements, it is stated that the said Government which was formed by the Telugu Desam Party was giving to the poor people whose income was below Rs. and the said advertisements referred to a new scheme of selling sarees and dhoties at half prices to the poor people in the State of Andhra Pradesh having Green-cards. Moreover, the offer in the advertisements for the sale of dhoties and sarees at discount rates was in the nature of a benefit offered to poor persons in that State. When a Government announces the measures which are intended for the benefit of any of the classes for whose the Government can normally be expected to work like the poor or the economical backward classes, it is only in rare circumstances that such a promise can be said to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) even though such a promise might be made on the eve of elections. 8. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => '', 'counseldef' => '', 'court' => 'Supreme Court of India', 'court_type' => 'SC', 'decidedon' => '1989-09-29', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' K.N. Saikia,; M.H. Kania and; S. Ranganathan, JJ.', 'judgement' => '</p><p>Kania, J.</p><p>1. These two appeals arise out of the judgments in two Election Petitions in the Andhra Pradesh High Court questioning the election of respondent No. 1 as a Member of Parliament from Srikakulam No. Parliamentary Constituency in the 8th General Election to the House of the People. The points raised in these appeals are common and so are the relevant facts; and, hence, they are being disposed of by this common judgment. We propose to take note of only the few facts which are necessary for the appreciation of the controversy before us.</p><p>2. The polling date for the said election along with other parliamentary elections in the State of Andhra Pradesh was December 27, 1984 but in Srikakulam No. 1 Parliamentary Constituency the polling was countermanded and the date of polling was later fixed on January 28, 1985. In both the Election Petitions the election of respondent No. 1 was questioned mainly on the ground that Shri N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh as well as the President of the Telugu Desam Party as well as respondent No. 1 gave certain speeches and certain advertisements were got published by Shri N.T. Rama Rao through the Publicity Department of the Government of Andhra Pradesh in the newspapers containing certain statements which are alleged to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A) of the <a>Representation of the People Act, 1951</a> (hereinafter referred to as 'the said Act'). The main question canvassed before us is whether the statements contained in these aforesaid advertisements amount to a corrupt practice under Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act. Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act runs as follows :</p><p>123. Corrupt practices</p><p>The following shall be deemed to be corrupt practises for the purposes of this Act :</p><p>(1) 'Bribery', that is to say.</p><p>(A) any gift, offer or promise by a candidate or his agent or by any other person with the consent of a candidate or his election agent of any gratification, to any person whomsover, with the object, directly or indirectly of inducing.</p><p>(a) x x x</p><p>(b) an elector to vote or refrain from voting at an election, or as a reward to.</p><p>(i) a person for having so stood or not stood, or for having withdrawn or not having withdrawn his candidature; or</p><p>(ii) an elector for having voted or refrained from voting.</p><p>3. The advertisements very shortly stated, refer to the auspicious gifts made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to the poor people on the eve of New Year and Sankranti. In the said advertisements, it is stated that the said Government which was formed by the Telugu Desam Party was giving to the poor people whose income was below Rs. 6,000 per year, a kilo of rice at Rs. 2 per Kg. and the said advertisements referred to a new scheme of selling sarees and dhoties at half prices to the poor people in the State of Andhra Pradesh having Green-cards. Green-cards were directed to be issued to all the persons whose annual income was below Rs. 6,000. The supply of the rice at subsidised rates as aforesaid was also to be made to the Green-card holders only. The scheme to sell sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was to be operative from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985.</p><p>4. In considering the question whether the said advertisement and the said speeches amount to a corrupt practice, we are of the view that the provisions of Section 123 of the said Act which deal with corrupt practices have to be interpreted, keeping in mind that dictates of commonsense require that they never could have been intended to treat normal election promises made in election manifestoes or usual election speeches by members of various political parties aspiring to power and by different candidates aspiring to get elected to legislative bodies concerned as corrupt practices. We are of the view that these advertisements and speeches amount to nothing more than statements extolling the achievements of the Government of the State of Andhra Pradesh under the Telugu Desam Party headed by N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister, and contain normal election promises and these statements do not amount to corrupt practices falling within the scope of Sub-clause (b) of Clause (A) of Sub-section (1) of Section 123 of the said Act.</p><p>5. It was urged by Mr. Rao, learned Counsel for the appellants that in the impugned judgments, the High Court has incorrectly taken the view that in order to amount to bribery within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A), the transaction must amount to a bargain by the candidate with a view to get votes. It was pointed out by him that the said view has been taken in the impugned judgments, relying upon the decision of a Bench comprising to learned Judges of this Court in Ghasi Ram v. Dal Singh and Ors. :1983 SCR 102 . We have gone through to the relevant portion of that judgment (at page 109 and 110 of the said report). A careful perusal of the said judgment shows that what has been really held in that case is that if the promises given or made amount to a bargain entered into by a candidate for a vote or votes, that would amount to a corrupt practice; but it has not been held there that unless the act alleged amounts to such a bargain, it could not amount to a corrupt practice. In our view, that judgment does not lay down that in order to amount to a corrupt practice, the transaction must amount to a bargain for getting a vote. It was pointed out by Mr. Rao, however, that such a view seems to have been taken in two other decisions rendered by two Benches, each comprising two learned Judges of this Court in Bhanu Kumar Shastri v. Mohan Lal Sukhadia and Ors. : [1971]3SCR522 and Harjit Singh Mann v. S Umrao Singh and Ors. : [1980]2SCR501 . and these judgments need to be overruled. We do not propose to go into the correctness or otherwise of this view because, even on the footing that in order to amount to a corrupt practice under the aforesaid provision the alleged acts need not constitute a bargain, the the acts established in the present case, in our opinion, do not amount to a corrupt practice.</p><p>6. Our attention was drawn by Mr. Rao to the fact that in this case the said advertisements and the speeches had to be viewed in the context of the fact that the advertisements were issued and the speeches were made after respondent No. 1 filed his nomination papers on January 4, 1985, for the election and before the election was held in the aforesaid constituency. It was further pointed out that the offer made for the sale of sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was limited to the period from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985. It cannot be denied that these factors are relevant factOrs. We cannot, however, lose sight of the fact that this offer was made not only in this constituency but throughout the State where the elections to the House of the People were scheduled to be held, and were, in fact, held on December 27, 1984. It was only in case of this constituency that the election to be held on the scheduled date was countermanded and later held on January 28, 1985. We cannot lose sight of the fact that, as far as the said speeches and the said advertisements, which were issued by the Publicity Department of the State, are concerned, they deal in the main with the achievements of the Government of Andhra Pradesh which, of course, was being run by Ministers belonging to Telugu Desam Party to which respondent No. 1 also belonged. Moreover, the offer in the advertisements for the sale of dhoties and sarees at discount rates was in the nature of a benefit offered to poor persons in that State. When a Government announces the measures which are intended for the benefit of any of the classes for whose the Government can normally be expected to work like the poor or the economical backward classes, it is only in rare circumstances that such a promise can be said to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) even though such a promise might be made on the eve of elections. Keeping this in mind, in our opinion, although the offer to sell dhoties and sarees at discount rates was of a limited duration as aforestated, it cannot be regarded as a corrupt practice. Such an offer was bound to have financial repercussions and it is quite possible the duration of the offer was limited to enable the Government to study the financial repercussions rather than from any improper motive. We find support for this view from the decision of this Court in H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh : [1969]3SCR813 . In that case an Ordinance was passed by the Government of Madhya Pradesh as a result of which a large number of agriculturists, namely, those holdings of plots of land of less than 7.5 acres area or paying land revenue not exceeding Rs. 5/- were exempted from the payment of the land revenue. It was held that such a concession does not amount to a gift, offer or promise of any gratification within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) of the said Act nor does the announcement of the declaration made at a meeting shortly before the election or the issue of a pamphlet containing that declaration at that time carry the matter any further. It was held that neither Shri D.P. Misra who was the Chief Minister nor Shri S.K. Dixit who acted as his agent were guilty of any corrupt practice within the meaning of the aforesaid provision.</p><p>7. It was next contended by Mr. Rao, although very faintly, that the High Court was in error as it had not decided all other issues which were raised in the election petition. In this regard we cannot lose sight of the fact that the term of the present Lok Sabha is likely to be over within a few months and fresh elections are likely to be held and it would, therefore, be an exercise in futility to remand the matter to the High Court for deciding the remaining issues.</p><p>8. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.<p></p><p>', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'AIR1990SC1889; JT1989(4)SC186; 1989(2)SCALE891; 1989Supp(2)SCC504', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors.', 'sub' => 'Election', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ) $casename_url = 'b-rajagopala-rao-vs-appayya-hanumanthu' $args = array( (int) 0 => '640942', (int) 1 => 'b-rajagopala-rao-vs-appayya-hanumanthu' ) $url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/640942/b-rajagopala-rao-vs-appayya-hanumanthu' $ctype = '' $caseref = 'H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh<br>' $content = array( (int) 0 => '', (int) 1 => '<p>Kania, J.', (int) 2 => '<p>1. These two appeals arise out of the judgments in two Election Petitions in the Andhra Pradesh High Court questioning the election of respondent No. 1 as a Member of Parliament from Srikakulam No. Parliamentary Constituency in the 8th General Election to the House of the People. The points raised in these appeals are common and so are the relevant facts; and, hence, they are being disposed of by this common judgment. We propose to take note of only the few facts which are necessary for the appreciation of the controversy before us.', (int) 3 => '<p>2. The polling date for the said election along with other parliamentary elections in the State of Andhra Pradesh was December 27, 1984 but in Srikakulam No. 1 Parliamentary Constituency the polling was countermanded and the date of polling was later fixed on January 28, 1985. In both the Election Petitions the election of respondent No. 1 was questioned mainly on the ground that Shri N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh as well as the President of the Telugu Desam Party as well as respondent No. 1 gave certain speeches and certain advertisements were got published by Shri N.T. Rama Rao through the Publicity Department of the Government of Andhra Pradesh in the newspapers containing certain statements which are alleged to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A) of the <a>Representation of the People Act, 1951</a> (hereinafter referred to as 'the said Act'). The main question canvassed before us is whether the statements contained in these aforesaid advertisements amount to a corrupt practice under Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act. Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act runs as follows :', (int) 4 => '<p>123. Corrupt practices', (int) 5 => '<p>The following shall be deemed to be corrupt practises for the purposes of this Act :', (int) 6 => '<p>(1) 'Bribery', that is to say.', (int) 7 => '<p>(A) any gift, offer or promise by a candidate or his agent or by any other person with the consent of a candidate or his election agent of any gratification, to any person whomsover, with the object, directly or indirectly of inducing.', (int) 8 => '<p>(a) x x x', (int) 9 => '<p>(b) an elector to vote or refrain from voting at an election, or as a reward to.', (int) 10 => '<p>(i) a person for having so stood or not stood, or for having withdrawn or not having withdrawn his candidature; or', (int) 11 => '<p>(ii) an elector for having voted or refrained from voting.', (int) 12 => '<p>3. The advertisements very shortly stated, refer to the auspicious gifts made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to the poor people on the eve of New Year and Sankranti. In the said advertisements, it is stated that the said Government which was formed by the Telugu Desam Party was giving to the poor people whose income was below Rs. 6,000 per year, a kilo of rice at Rs. 2 per Kg. and the said advertisements referred to a new scheme of selling sarees and dhoties at half prices to the poor people in the State of Andhra Pradesh having Green-cards. Green-cards were directed to be issued to all the persons whose annual income was below Rs. 6,000. The supply of the rice at subsidised rates as aforesaid was also to be made to the Green-card holders only. The scheme to sell sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was to be operative from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985.', (int) 13 => '<p>4. In considering the question whether the said advertisement and the said speeches amount to a corrupt practice, we are of the view that the provisions of Section 123 of the said Act which deal with corrupt practices have to be interpreted, keeping in mind that dictates of commonsense require that they never could have been intended to treat normal election promises made in election manifestoes or usual election speeches by members of various political parties aspiring to power and by different candidates aspiring to get elected to legislative bodies concerned as corrupt practices. We are of the view that these advertisements and speeches amount to nothing more than statements extolling the achievements of the Government of the State of Andhra Pradesh under the Telugu Desam Party headed by N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister, and contain normal election promises and these statements do not amount to corrupt practices falling within the scope of Sub-clause (b) of Clause (A) of Sub-section (1) of Section 123 of the said Act.', (int) 14 => '<p>5. It was urged by Mr. Rao, learned Counsel for the appellants that in the impugned judgments, the High Court has incorrectly taken the view that in order to amount to bribery within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A), the transaction must amount to a bargain by the candidate with a view to get votes. It was pointed out by him that the said view has been taken in the impugned judgments, relying upon the decision of a Bench comprising to learned Judges of this Court in Ghasi Ram v. Dal Singh and Ors. :1983 SCR 102 . We have gone through to the relevant portion of that judgment (at page 109 and 110 of the said report). A careful perusal of the said judgment shows that what has been really held in that case is that if the promises given or made amount to a bargain entered into by a candidate for a vote or votes, that would amount to a corrupt practice; but it has not been held there that unless the act alleged amounts to such a bargain, it could not amount to a corrupt practice. In our view, that judgment does not lay down that in order to amount to a corrupt practice, the transaction must amount to a bargain for getting a vote. It was pointed out by Mr. Rao, however, that such a view seems to have been taken in two other decisions rendered by two Benches, each comprising two learned Judges of this Court in Bhanu Kumar Shastri v. Mohan Lal Sukhadia and Ors. : [1971]3SCR522 and Harjit Singh Mann v. S Umrao Singh and Ors. : [1980]2SCR501 . and these judgments need to be overruled. We do not propose to go into the correctness or otherwise of this view because, even on the footing that in order to amount to a corrupt practice under the aforesaid provision the alleged acts need not constitute a bargain, the the acts established in the present case, in our opinion, do not amount to a corrupt practice.', (int) 15 => '<p>6. Our attention was drawn by Mr. Rao to the fact that in this case the said advertisements and the speeches had to be viewed in the context of the fact that the advertisements were issued and the speeches were made after respondent No. 1 filed his nomination papers on January 4, 1985, for the election and before the election was held in the aforesaid constituency. It was further pointed out that the offer made for the sale of sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was limited to the period from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985. It cannot be denied that these factors are relevant factOrs. We cannot, however, lose sight of the fact that this offer was made not only in this constituency but throughout the State where the elections to the House of the People were scheduled to be held, and were, in fact, held on December 27, 1984. It was only in case of this constituency that the election to be held on the scheduled date was countermanded and later held on January 28, 1985. We cannot lose sight of the fact that, as far as the said speeches and the said advertisements, which were issued by the Publicity Department of the State, are concerned, they deal in the main with the achievements of the Government of Andhra Pradesh which, of course, was being run by Ministers belonging to Telugu Desam Party to which respondent No. 1 also belonged. Moreover, the offer in the advertisements for the sale of dhoties and sarees at discount rates was in the nature of a benefit offered to poor persons in that State. When a Government announces the measures which are intended for the benefit of any of the classes for whose the Government can normally be expected to work like the poor or the economical backward classes, it is only in rare circumstances that such a promise can be said to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) even though such a promise might be made on the eve of elections. Keeping this in mind, in our opinion, although the offer to sell dhoties and sarees at discount rates was of a limited duration as aforestated, it cannot be regarded as a corrupt practice. Such an offer was bound to have financial repercussions and it is quite possible the duration of the offer was limited to enable the Government to study the financial repercussions rather than from any improper motive. We find support for this view from the decision of this Court in H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh : [1969]3SCR813 . In that case an Ordinance was passed by the Government of Madhya Pradesh as a result of which a large number of agriculturists, namely, those holdings of plots of land of less than 7.5 acres area or paying land revenue not exceeding Rs. 5/- were exempted from the payment of the land revenue. It was held that such a concession does not amount to a gift, offer or promise of any gratification within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) of the said Act nor does the announcement of the declaration made at a meeting shortly before the election or the issue of a pamphlet containing that declaration at that time carry the matter any further. It was held that neither Shri D.P. Misra who was the Chief Minister nor Shri S.K. Dixit who acted as his agent were guilty of any corrupt practice within the meaning of the aforesaid provision.', (int) 16 => '<p>7. It was next contended by Mr. Rao, although very faintly, that the High Court was in error as it had not decided all other issues which were raised in the election petition. In this regard we cannot lose sight of the fact that the term of the present Lok Sabha is likely to be over within a few months and fresh elections are likely to be held and it would, therefore, be an exercise in futility to remand the matter to the High Court for deciding the remaining issues.', (int) 17 => '<p>8. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.<p>', (int) 18 => '<p>' ) $paragraphAfter = (int) 1 $cnt = (int) 19 $i = (int) 5include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144 View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971 View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933 View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473 Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963 Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200 Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167 [main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109
The following shall be deemed to be corrupt practises for the purposes of this Act :
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$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp' $dataForView = array( 'title_for_layout' => 'B Rajagopala Rao and anr Vs Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors - Citation 640942 - Court Judgment | ', 'desc' => array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '640942', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/50684/representation-of-the-people-act-1951-complete-act">Representation of the People Act, 1951</a> - Sections 1, 3(1)(A), 123 and 123(1)(A)', 'appealno' => 'Civil Appeal Nos. 484 and 485 of 1987', 'appellant' => 'B. Rajagopala Rao and anr.', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'B. Rajagopala Rao and anr. Vs. Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors.', 'casenote' => 'Election - corrupt practices - Sections 123 and 123 (1) (A) of Representation of the People Act, 1951 - whether advertisements by public department and speeches made by respondent No. 1 to sell dhoti and sarees at discount rates amount to corrupt practices - offer was available for mass and for limited duration - such offer was bound to have financial repercussions and it is quite possible that duration of offer limited to enable Government to study financial repercussions rather than from any improper motive - offer not amounted to corrupt practices. - [ D.A. Desai,; O. Chinnappa Reddy and; R.S. Sarkaria, JJ.] The Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 empowers the Union of India in the public interest to take under its control the industries specified in the First Schedule to the Act. Item 23 of the First Schedule relates to textiles of various categories. Section 15 authorises the Central Government to make or cause to be made a full and complete investigation into the circumstances of the case if the Central Government is of the opinion that (a) in respect of any scheduled industry or industrial undertaking or undertakings (i) there has been, or is likely to be, a substantial fall in the volume of production for which, having regard to the economic conditions prevailing, there is no justification; or (ii) there has been, or is likely to be, a marked deterioration in the quality of any article... which could have been or can be avoided; or (iii) there has been or is likely to be a rise in the price of any article..... for which there is no justification; or (iv) it is necessary to take any such action for the purpose of conserving any resources of national importance; or (b) any industrial undertaking is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest. After the investigation is made under section 15, section 16(1) empowers the Central Government if action is desirable, to issue appropriate directions, and section 16(2) provides for the issue of interim directions by the Central Government pending investigation under section 15. Chapter III-A consisting of Sections 18A, 18-AA, 18-B, 18-C, 18-D, 18-E and 18-F deal with "direct management or control of Industrial Undertakings by Central Government in certain cases". Sec. 18-A empowers the Central Government by notified order, to authorise any person or body of persons to take over the management of the whole or any part of an industrial undertaking or to exercise in respect of the whole, or any part of the undertaking such functions of control as may be specified in the order, if the Central Government is of opinion that: (a) an industrial undertaking to which directions have been issued in pursuance of section 16 has failed to comply with such directions, or (b) an industrial undertaking in respect of which an investigation has been made under section 15 is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest. Section 18AA(5) stipulates that the provisions of Sections 18-B to 18 E shall be applicable to the industrial undertaking in respect of which an order has been made under section 18-AA even as they apply to an industrial undertaking taken over under Section 18-A. Section 18-F empowers the Central Government to cancel the order made under section 18-A if it appears that the purpose of the order has been fulfilled or it is not necessary that the order should remain in force. The appellant M/s. Swadeshi Cotton Mills was taken over by the Government of India by a notification dated April 13, 1978 in exercise of the powers conferred on it under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 18AA of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 on the ground that the company had by creation of encumbrances on the assets of its industrial undertakings, brought about a situation which had affected and is likely to further affect the production of articles manufactured or produced by it and that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation. The Government authorised the National Textile Corporation Limited to take over the management, subject to the conditions that the authorised person shall comply with all the directions issued from time to time by the Central Government and that the authorised person shall hold office for a period of five years. The appellant Mills challenged the aforesaid order in a writ petition in the High Court. The case was heard by a Full Bench of five Judges to consider the question whether in construing section 18AA of the Industries Development and Regulation Act, 1951, compliance with the principle of audi alteram partem is to be implied and whether hearing is to be given to the parties who would be affected by the order to be passed prior to the passing of the order or whether hearing can be given after the order is passed and whether the order passed under the said Section is vitiated by not giving of such hearing and whether such vice can be cured. The Bench by a majority answered the three questions as follows:- (a) Section 18AA(1)(a)(b) excludes the giving of prior hearing to the party who would be affected by order thereunder. (b) Section 18-F expressly provides for a post- decisional hearing to the owner of the industrial undertaking, the management of which is taken over under section 18AA to have the order made under section 18AA cancelled on any relevant ground. (c) As the taking over of management under section 18A is not vitiated by the failure to grant prior hearing the question of any such vice being cured by a grant of a subsequent hearing does not arise. The minority, however, held that in compliance with the principles of natural justice, prior hearing to the owner of the undertaking was required to be given before the passing of an order under section 18AA, that the second question did not arise as the denial of a prior hearing would not cure the vice by the grant of subsequent hearing, but it would be open to the Court to moderate the relief in such a way that the order is kept alive to the extent necessary until the making of the fresh order to subserve public interest and to make appropriate directions. After the decision on the reference the case was reheard on merits by a Full Bench of three Judges and the writ petition was allowed in part. The challenge to the validity of the order being rejected but insofar as the impugned order seeking to take over the corporate entity of the company, the corporate entity of the subsidiary and its assets, the petition was allowed and the respondents, the Union of India and the authorised person were directed to release from its control and custody and/or deliver possession of any assets or property of the company which were not referable to the industrial undertakings. Appeals to this Court were filed on behalf of the Company as well as by the Union of India and the National Textile Corporation. Two propositions were propounded on behalf of the company that: (a) Whether it was necessary to observe the rules of natural justice before issuing a notified order under section 18AA(1)(a) and further whether section 18-F impliedly excludes rules of natural justice relating to prior hearing; and it was contended (1) the mere use of the word 'immediate' in sub-clause (a) of section 18AA does not show a legislative intent to exclude the application of audi alteram partem rule altogether. (2) The word 'immediate' in clause (a) has been used in contra distinction to 'investigate'. It only means that under section 18AA action can be taken without prior investigation under section 15. The use of the word 'immediate' in section 18AA(1)(a) only dispenses with investigation under section 15 and not with the principle of audi alteram partem altogether and this is indicated by the marginal note of section 18A and para 3 of the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Amendment Bill which inserted section 18AA in 1971. (3) The word 'immediate' occurs only in clause (a) and not in clause (b) of section 18AA(1). It would be odd if intention to exclude this principle of natural justice is spelt out in one clause of the sub-section when the other clause does not exclude it. (4) Section 18-F does not exclude a pre-decisional hearing. The so-called post-decisional hearing contemplated by section 18-F cannot be and is not intended to be a substitute for a pre-decisional hearing. (5) Section 18F incorporates only a facet, albeit qualified, of section 21 of the General Clauses Act. The language of the Section implicity prohibits an enquiry into circumstances that led to the passing of the order of take-over and under it the aggrieved person is not entitled to show that on merits the order was void ab initio. (6) 'Immediacy' does not exclude a duty to act fairly because even an emergent situation can co-exist with the canons of natural justice. The only effect of urgency on the application of the principle of fair hearing would be that the width, form and duration of the hearing would be tailored to the situation and reduced to the reasonable minimum so that it does not delay and defeat the purpose of the contemplated action. (7) Where the civil consequences of the administrative action are grave and its effect is highly prejudicial to the rights and interests of the person affected and there is nothing in the language and scheme of the statute which unequivocally excludes a fair pre-decisional hearing and the post-decisional hearing provided therein is not a real remedial hearing equitable to a full right of appeal the Court should be loath to infer a legislative intent to exclude even a minimal fair hearing at the pre-decisional stage merely on ground of urgency. (8) The Central Government appointed four Government Officials including one from the office of the Textile Commissioner to study the affairs of the Company and to make recommendation. This Official Group submitted its report on February 16, 1978. The evidence on the basis of which the impugned order was passed was not disclosed to the appellant company till May 1978, only after it had filed the writ petition in the High Court. If there was anything adverse to the appellants in the survey report there was time enough about six weeks between the submission of the Survey Report and the passing of the impugned order for giving a short, reasonable opportunity to the appellants to explain the adverse findings against them. If there was immediacy situational modifications could be made to meet the requirement of fairness, by reducing the period of notice; that even the manner and form of such notice could be simplified to eliminate delay, that telephonic notice or short opportunity for furnishing their explanation to the Company might have satisfied the requirements of natural justice. Such an opportunity of hearing could have been given after the passing of a conditional tentative order and before its enforcement under section 18AA. For the interregnum suitable interim action such as freezing the assets of the Company or restraining the Company from creating further encumbrances, could be taken under section 16. On behalf of the Union of India and the Authorised Officer it was contended that (1) the presumption in favour of audi alteram partem rule stands impliedly displaced by the language scheme, setting and the purpose of the provision in section 18AA. (2) Section 18AA on its plain terms deals with situations where immediate preventive action is required. The paramount concern is to avoid serious problems which may be caused by fall in production. The purpose of an order under section 18AA is not to condemn the owner but to protect the scheduled industry. The issue under section 18AA is not solely between the Government and the management of the industrial undertaking. The object of taking action under this Section is to protect other outside interests of the community at large and the workers. (3) The rule of natural justice to give a hearing has been incorporated in section 18-F which gives an opportunity of a post-decisional hearing to the owner of the undertaking who if he feels aggrieved can on his application be heard, to show that even the original order under section 18AA was passed on invalid grounds and should be cancelled or rescinded. (4) On a true construction of section 18AA read with section 18-F the requirements of natural justice and fair play can be read into the statute only insofar as conformance to such canons can reasonably and realistically be required of it by the provision for a remedial hearing at a subsequent stage. (5) Under section 18-F the Central Government exercises curial functions and that Section confers on the aggrieved owner a right to apply to the Government to cancel the order of take-over. This section casts an obligation on the Central Government to deal with and dispose of an application filed thereunder with reasonable expedition. Allowing the appeal by the Company,<br />HELD: (Sarkaria & Desai, JJ. per Chinnappa Reddy, J. dissenting.) In the facts and circumstances of the instant case, there has been a noncompliance with the implied requirement of the audi alteram partem rule of natural justice at the pre-decisional stage. The impugned order could be struck down as invalid on that score alone. But in view of the commitment / concession that a hearing would be afforded to the Company, the case is remitted to the Central Government to give a full, fair and effective hearing. [587G-H, 588C] The phrase 'natural justice' is not capable of a static and precise definition. It cannot be imprisoned in the straight-jacket of a cast-iron formula. Rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. Hence not possible to make an exhaustive catalogue of such rules. Two fundamental maxims of natural justice have now become deeply and indelibly ingrained in the common consciousness of mankind as pre-eminently necessary to ensure that the law is applied impartially objectively and fairly. These twin principles are (i) audi alteram partem and (ii) nemo judex in re sua. Audi alteram partem is a highly effective rule devised by the Courts to ensure that a statutory authority arrives at a just decision and it is calculated to act as a healthy check on the abuse or misuse of power. Its reach should not be narrowed and its applicability circumscribed.[554C-G] The rules of natural justice can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. If a statutory provision either specifically or by inevitable implication excludes the application of the rules of natural justice then the Court cannot ignore the mandate of the Legislature. Whether or not the application of the principles of natural justice in a given case has been excluded in the exercise of statutory power depends upon the language and basic scheme of the provision conferring the power, the nature of the power the purpose for which it is conferred and the effect of that power. [556A-B] The maxim audi alteram partem has many facets. Two of them are (a) notice of the case to be met, and (b) opportunity to explain. The rule cannot be sacrificed at the altar of administrative convenience or celerity; for, convenience and justice are often not on speaking terms. Difficulties, however, arise when the statute conferring the power does not expressly exclude this rule but its exclusion is sought by implication due to the presence of certain factors such as urgency where the obligation to give notice and opportunity to be heard would obstruct the taking of prompt action of a preventive or remedial nature. Audi alteram partem rule may be disregarded in an emergent situation where immediate action brooks no delay to prevent some imminent danger or injury or hazard to paramount public interests. Section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure empowers the magistrates specified therein to make an exparte conditional order in emergent cases for removal of dangerous public nuisances. Action under section 17 Land Acquisition Act furnishes another such instance. Similarly action on grounds of public safety public health may justify disregard of the rule of prior hearing. [556C-H] Cases where owing to the compulsion of the fact situation or the necessity of taking speedy action no pre- decisional hearing is given but the action, is followed soon by a full post-decisional hearing to the person affected do not in reality constitute an exception to the audi alteram partem rule. To call such cases as exception is a misnomer because they do not exclude fair play in action but adapt it to the urgency of the situation by balancing the competing claims of hurry and hearing. [560H-561A] The general principle as distinguished from an absolute rule of uniform application seems to be that where a statute does not in terms exclude this rule of prior hearing but contemplates a post-decisional hearing amounting to a full review of the original order on merits then such a statute would be construed as excluding the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage. [561G] If the statute conferring the power is silent with regard to the giving of pre-decisional hearing to the person affected and the administrative decision taken by the authority involves civil consequences of a grave nature and no full review or appeal on merits against that decision is provided courts will be extremely reluctant to construe such a statute as excluding the duty of affording even a minimal hearing shorn of all its formal trappings and dilatory features at the pre-decisional stage, unless viewed pragmatically it would paralyse the administrative process or frustrate the need for utmost promptitude. [561H] 7(i). A comparison of the provisions of Section 18A(1)(b) and Section 18AA(1)(c), bring out two main points of distinction: First, action under Section 18A(1)(b) can be taken only after an investigation had been made under Section 15; while under Section 18AA(1)(a) or (b) action can be taken without such investigation. The language, scheme and setting of Section 18AA read in the light of the Objects and Reasons for enacting this provision make this position clear beyond doubt. Second, before taking action under Section 18A(1)(b), the Central Government has to form an opinion on the basis of the investigation conducted under section 15, in regard to the existence of the objective fact, namely: that the industrial undertaking is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest; while under section 18A(1)(a) the Government has to satisfy itself that the persons incharge of the undertaking have brought about a situation likely to cause fall in production, by committing any of the three kinds of acts specified in that provision. This shows that the preliminary objective fact attributable to the persons in charge of the management or affairs of the undertaking, on the basis of which action may be taken under section 18(A)(1)(b), is of far wider amplitude than the circumstance, the existence of which is a sine qua non for taking action under section 18AA(1). The phrase "highly detrimental to the scheduled industry or public interest" in section 18-A is capable of being construed to cover a large variety of acts or things which may be considered wrong with the manner of running the industry by the management. In contrast with it, action under section 18AA(1)(a) can be taken only if the Central Government is satisfied with regard to the existence of the twin conditions specifically mentioned therein, on the basis of evidence in its possession. [569D-H] An analysis of section 18AA(1)(a), indicates that as a necessary preliminary to the exercise of the power thereunder, the Central Government must be satisfied "from documentary or other evidence in its possession" in regard to the co-existence of two circumstances: (i) that the persons in charge of the industrial undertaking have by committing any of these acts, namely, reckless investments, or creation of incumbrances on the assets of industrial undertaking, or by diversion of funds, brought about a situation which is likely to affect the production of the article manufactured or produced in the industrial undertaking, and (ii) that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation.[570B-D] It cannot be laid down as a general proposition that whenever a statute confers a power on an administrative authority and makes the exercise of that power conditional on the formation of an opinion by that authority in regard to the existence of an immediacy, its opinion in regard to that preliminary fact is not open to judicial scrutiny at all. While it may be conceded that an element of subjectivity is always involved in the formation of such an opinion, the existence of the circumstances from which the inference constituting the opinion, as the sine qua non for action, are to be drawn, must be demonstrable, and the existence of such "circumstances", if questioned, must be proved at least prima facie. [571 E-G] From a plain reading of section 18AA, it is clear that it does not expressly in unmistakable and unequivocal terms exclude the application of the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage. [574B] In the instant case, so far as Kanpur Unit is concerned, it was lying closed for more than three months before the passing of the impugned order. There was no 'immediacy' in relation to that unit, which could absolve the Government from the obligation of complying fully with audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional or pre- takeover stage. [583A] Keshav Mills Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, [1973] 3 S.C.R. 22; Kamla Prasad Khetan v. Union of India,[1957] S.C.R. 1052; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 621; Sukhdev Singh & Ors. v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh, [1975] 3 S.C.R. 619; A. K. Kraipak v. Union of India, [1970] 1 S.C.R. 457; Ridge v. Baldwin, [1964] A.C. 40; 196; Heatley v. Tasmanian Racing & Gaming Commission, 14 Australian Law Reports 519; Nawabkhan Abbaskhan v. State of Gujarat, [1974] 3 S.C.R. 427; State of Orissa v. Dr. Bina Pani Dei, [1962] 2 S.C.R. 625; Ambalal M. Shah v. Hathi Singh Manufacturing Co. Ltd. [1962] 3 S.C.R. 171; and S. L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan & Ors., [1981] 1 S.C.R. 746, referred to. (Per Chinnappa Reddy, J. dissenting) The principles of natural justice are not attracted to the situations contemplated by section 18AA of Industries (Development and Regulation) Act. Natural justice like Ultra Vires and Public Policy is a branch of the public law and is a formidable weapon which can be wielded to secure justice to the citizen. While it may be used to protect certain fundamental liberties, civil and political rights, it may be used as indeed it is used more often than not, to protect vested interests and to obstruct the path of progressive change. The time has come to make an appropriate distinction between natural justice in its application to fundamental liberties, civil and political rights and natural justice in its application to vested interests. [590A-B] Our constitution as befits the Constitution of a Socialist Secular Democratic Republic, recognises the paramountcy of the public weal over the private interest. Natural justice, ultra vires, public policy, or any other rule of interpretation must, therefore, conform, grow and be tailored to serve the public interest and respond to the demands of an evolving society. [590C] The principles of natural justice have taken deep root in the judicial conscience of our people. They are now considered so fundamental as to be implicit in every decision making function, judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative. Where authority functions under a statute and the statute provides for the observance of the principles of natural justice in a particular manner, natural justice will have to be observed in that manner and in no other. Where the statute is silent about the observance of the principles of natural justice, such statutory silence is taken to imply compliance with the principles of natural justice. Where the conflict is between the public interest and the private interest the presumption must necessarily be weak and may, therefore, be readily displaced. The presumption is also weak, where what are involved are mere property rights. In cases of urgency, particularly where the public interest is involved, preemptive action may be a strategic necessity. Even in cases of preemptive action, if the statute so provides or if the Courts so deem fit in appropriate cases, a postponed hearing may be substituted for natural justice. [590A-C; 591F-G] 3(ii). Where natural justice is implied, the extent of the implication and the nature of the hearing must vary with the statute, the subject and the situation. [592B] The absence of the expression 'immediate action' in section 18AA(1)(b) does not make any difference. Section 18AA(1)(a) refers to a situation where immediate preventive action may avert a disaster, whereas section 18AA contemplates a situation where the disaster has occurred and action is necessary to restore normalcy. Restoration of production where production has stopped in a key industry or industrial undertaking is as important and urgent in the public interest as prevention of a situation where production may be affected. Immediate action is, therefore, as necessary in the situation contemplated by section 18AA(1)(b) as in the situation contemplated by section 18AA(1)(a). [596 F-G] The marginal note refers to the power to take over without investigation but there is no sufficient reason to suppose that the word immediate is used only to contra- distinguish it from the investigation contemplated by section 15 of the Act, though of course a consequence of immediate action under section 18AA may be to dispense with the enquiry under section 15. In fact, facts which come to light during the course of an investigation under section 15 may form the basis of action under section 18AA(1)(a). Where in the course of an investigation under section 15 it is discovered that the management have, by reckless investments or creation of encumbrances on the assets of the industrial undertaking or by diversion of funds brought about a situation which is likely to affect the production of the articles manufactured or produced in the industrial undertaking, if the Government is satisfied that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation, there is no reason why the Central Government may not straightaway take action under section 18AA(1)(a) without waiting for completion of investigation under section 15. [597A-B] Where there is a provision in the statute itself for revocation of the order by the very authority making the decision, it appears to be unnecessary to insist upon a pre- decisional observance of natural justice. [598A] The likelihood of production being jeopardized or the stoppage of production in a key industrial undertaking is a matter of grave concern affecting the public interest. Parliament has taken so serious a view of the matter that it has authorised the Central Government to take over the management of the industrial undertaking if immediate action may prevent jeopardy to production or restore production where it has already stopped. The necessity for immediate action by the Central Government contemplated by Parliament is definitely indicative of the exclusion of natural justice. It is not as if the owner of the industrial undertaking is left with no remedy. He may move the Central Government under section 18-F to cancel the order made under section 18AA. [598C-D] Neither section 18-F of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act nor section 21 of the General Clauses Act by itself excludes natural justice. The exclusion of natural justice where such exclusion is not express has to be implied by reference to the subject, the statute and the statutory situation. Where an express provision in the statute itself provides for a post decisional hearing the other provisions of the Statute will have to be read in the light of such provision and the provision for post- decisional hearing may then clinch the issue where pre- decisional natural justice appears to be excluded on the other terms of the statute. That a post-decisional hearing may also be had by the terms of section 21 of the General Clauses Act may not necessarily help in the interpretation of the provisions of the statute concerned. [599 A-C] Ridge v. Baldwin, 1964 A.C. p. 40; Annie G. Phillip v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 75 L.E.d. 1289; John H. Fahey v. Paul Mallonee, 91 L.E.d. 2030; Margarita Fuentes v. Robert L. Shevin, Attorney General of Florida, 32 L.E.d. 2d 556 and Lawrence Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 40 L.E.d. 2d 406, referred to. - Rama Rao, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh as well as the President of the Telugu Desam Party as well as respondent No. 3. The advertisements very shortly stated, refer to the auspicious gifts made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to the poor people on the eve of New Year and Sankranti. In the said advertisements, it is stated that the said Government which was formed by the Telugu Desam Party was giving to the poor people whose income was below Rs. and the said advertisements referred to a new scheme of selling sarees and dhoties at half prices to the poor people in the State of Andhra Pradesh having Green-cards. Moreover, the offer in the advertisements for the sale of dhoties and sarees at discount rates was in the nature of a benefit offered to poor persons in that State. When a Government announces the measures which are intended for the benefit of any of the classes for whose the Government can normally be expected to work like the poor or the economical backward classes, it is only in rare circumstances that such a promise can be said to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) even though such a promise might be made on the eve of elections. 8. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => '', 'counseldef' => '', 'court' => 'Supreme Court of India', 'court_type' => 'SC', 'decidedon' => '1989-09-29', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' K.N. Saikia,; M.H. Kania and; S. Ranganathan, JJ.', 'judgement' => '</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Kania, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. These two appeals arise out of the judgments in two Election Petitions in the Andhra Pradesh High Court questioning the election of respondent No. 1 as a Member of Parliament from Srikakulam No. Parliamentary Constituency in the 8th General Election to the House of the People. The points raised in these appeals are common and so are the relevant facts; and, hence, they are being disposed of by this common judgment. We propose to take note of only the few facts which are necessary for the appreciation of the controversy before us.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The polling date for the said election along with other parliamentary elections in the State of Andhra Pradesh was December 27, 1984 but in Srikakulam No. 1 Parliamentary Constituency the polling was countermanded and the date of polling was later fixed on January 28, 1985. In both the Election Petitions the election of respondent No. 1 was questioned mainly on the ground that Shri N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh as well as the President of the Telugu Desam Party as well as respondent No. 1 gave certain speeches and certain advertisements were got published by Shri N.T. Rama Rao through the Publicity Department of the Government of Andhra Pradesh in the newspapers containing certain statements which are alleged to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A) of the <a href="/act/50684/representation-of-the-people-act-1951-complete-act">Representation of the People Act, 1951</a> (hereinafter referred to as 'the said Act'). The main question canvassed before us is whether the statements contained in these aforesaid advertisements amount to a corrupt practice under Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act. Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act runs as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">123. Corrupt practices</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The following shall be deemed to be corrupt practises for the purposes of this Act :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) 'Bribery', that is to say.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(A) any gift, offer or promise by a candidate or his agent or by any other person with the consent of a candidate or his election agent of any gratification, to any person whomsover, with the object, directly or indirectly of inducing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) x x x</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) an elector to vote or refrain from voting at an election, or as a reward to.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) a person for having so stood or not stood, or for having withdrawn or not having withdrawn his candidature; or</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) an elector for having voted or refrained from voting.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The advertisements very shortly stated, refer to the auspicious gifts made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to the poor people on the eve of New Year and Sankranti. In the said advertisements, it is stated that the said Government which was formed by the Telugu Desam Party was giving to the poor people whose income was below Rs. 6,000 per year, a kilo of rice at Rs. 2 per Kg. and the said advertisements referred to a new scheme of selling sarees and dhoties at half prices to the poor people in the State of Andhra Pradesh having Green-cards. Green-cards were directed to be issued to all the persons whose annual income was below Rs. 6,000. The supply of the rice at subsidised rates as aforesaid was also to be made to the Green-card holders only. The scheme to sell sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was to be operative from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. In considering the question whether the said advertisement and the said speeches amount to a corrupt practice, we are of the view that the provisions of Section 123 of the said Act which deal with corrupt practices have to be interpreted, keeping in mind that dictates of commonsense require that they never could have been intended to treat normal election promises made in election manifestoes or usual election speeches by members of various political parties aspiring to power and by different candidates aspiring to get elected to legislative bodies concerned as corrupt practices. We are of the view that these advertisements and speeches amount to nothing more than statements extolling the achievements of the Government of the State of Andhra Pradesh under the Telugu Desam Party headed by N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister, and contain normal election promises and these statements do not amount to corrupt practices falling within the scope of Sub-clause (b) of Clause (A) of Sub-section (1) of Section 123 of the said Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. It was urged by Mr. Rao, learned Counsel for the appellants that in the impugned judgments, the High Court has incorrectly taken the view that in order to amount to bribery within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A), the transaction must amount to a bargain by the candidate with a view to get votes. It was pointed out by him that the said view has been taken in the impugned judgments, relying upon the decision of a Bench comprising to learned Judges of this Court in Ghasi Ram v. Dal Singh and Ors. :1983 SCR 102 . We have gone through to the relevant portion of that judgment (at page 109 and 110 of the said report). A careful perusal of the said judgment shows that what has been really held in that case is that if the promises given or made amount to a bargain entered into by a candidate for a vote or votes, that would amount to a corrupt practice; but it has not been held there that unless the act alleged amounts to such a bargain, it could not amount to a corrupt practice. In our view, that judgment does not lay down that in order to amount to a corrupt practice, the transaction must amount to a bargain for getting a vote. It was pointed out by Mr. Rao, however, that such a view seems to have been taken in two other decisions rendered by two Benches, each comprising two learned Judges of this Court in Bhanu Kumar Shastri v. Mohan Lal Sukhadia and Ors. : [1971]3SCR522 and Harjit Singh Mann v. S Umrao Singh and Ors. : [1980]2SCR501 . and these judgments need to be overruled. We do not propose to go into the correctness or otherwise of this view because, even on the footing that in order to amount to a corrupt practice under the aforesaid provision the alleged acts need not constitute a bargain, the the acts established in the present case, in our opinion, do not amount to a corrupt practice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Our attention was drawn by Mr. Rao to the fact that in this case the said advertisements and the speeches had to be viewed in the context of the fact that the advertisements were issued and the speeches were made after respondent No. 1 filed his nomination papers on January 4, 1985, for the election and before the election was held in the aforesaid constituency. It was further pointed out that the offer made for the sale of sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was limited to the period from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985. It cannot be denied that these factors are relevant factOrs. We cannot, however, lose sight of the fact that this offer was made not only in this constituency but throughout the State where the elections to the House of the People were scheduled to be held, and were, in fact, held on December 27, 1984. It was only in case of this constituency that the election to be held on the scheduled date was countermanded and later held on January 28, 1985. We cannot lose sight of the fact that, as far as the said speeches and the said advertisements, which were issued by the Publicity Department of the State, are concerned, they deal in the main with the achievements of the Government of Andhra Pradesh which, of course, was being run by Ministers belonging to Telugu Desam Party to which respondent No. 1 also belonged. Moreover, the offer in the advertisements for the sale of dhoties and sarees at discount rates was in the nature of a benefit offered to poor persons in that State. When a Government announces the measures which are intended for the benefit of any of the classes for whose the Government can normally be expected to work like the poor or the economical backward classes, it is only in rare circumstances that such a promise can be said to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) even though such a promise might be made on the eve of elections. Keeping this in mind, in our opinion, although the offer to sell dhoties and sarees at discount rates was of a limited duration as aforestated, it cannot be regarded as a corrupt practice. Such an offer was bound to have financial repercussions and it is quite possible the duration of the offer was limited to enable the Government to study the financial repercussions rather than from any improper motive. We find support for this view from the decision of this Court in H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh : [1969]3SCR813 . In that case an Ordinance was passed by the Government of Madhya Pradesh as a result of which a large number of agriculturists, namely, those holdings of plots of land of less than 7.5 acres area or paying land revenue not exceeding Rs. 5/- were exempted from the payment of the land revenue. It was held that such a concession does not amount to a gift, offer or promise of any gratification within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) of the said Act nor does the announcement of the declaration made at a meeting shortly before the election or the issue of a pamphlet containing that declaration at that time carry the matter any further. It was held that neither Shri D.P. Misra who was the Chief Minister nor Shri S.K. Dixit who acted as his agent were guilty of any corrupt practice within the meaning of the aforesaid provision.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. It was next contended by Mr. Rao, although very faintly, that the High Court was in error as it had not decided all other issues which were raised in the election petition. In this regard we cannot lose sight of the fact that the term of the present Lok Sabha is likely to be over within a few months and fresh elections are likely to be held and it would, therefore, be an exercise in futility to remand the matter to the High Court for deciding the remaining issues.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'AIR1990SC1889; JT1989(4)SC186; 1989(2)SCALE891; 1989Supp(2)SCC504', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors.', 'sub' => 'Election', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ), 'casename_url' => 'b-rajagopala-rao-vs-appayya-hanumanthu', 'args' => array( (int) 0 => '640942', (int) 1 => 'b-rajagopala-rao-vs-appayya-hanumanthu' ) ) $title_for_layout = 'B Rajagopala Rao and anr Vs Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors - Citation 640942 - Court Judgment | ' $desc = array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '640942', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/50684/representation-of-the-people-act-1951-complete-act">Representation of the People Act, 1951</a> - Sections 1, 3(1)(A), 123 and 123(1)(A)', 'appealno' => 'Civil Appeal Nos. 484 and 485 of 1987', 'appellant' => 'B. Rajagopala Rao and anr.', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'B. Rajagopala Rao and anr. Vs. Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors.', 'casenote' => 'Election - corrupt practices - Sections 123 and 123 (1) (A) of Representation of the People Act, 1951 - whether advertisements by public department and speeches made by respondent No. 1 to sell dhoti and sarees at discount rates amount to corrupt practices - offer was available for mass and for limited duration - such offer was bound to have financial repercussions and it is quite possible that duration of offer limited to enable Government to study financial repercussions rather than from any improper motive - offer not amounted to corrupt practices. - [ D.A. Desai,; O. Chinnappa Reddy and; R.S. Sarkaria, JJ.] The Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 empowers the Union of India in the public interest to take under its control the industries specified in the First Schedule to the Act. Item 23 of the First Schedule relates to textiles of various categories. Section 15 authorises the Central Government to make or cause to be made a full and complete investigation into the circumstances of the case if the Central Government is of the opinion that (a) in respect of any scheduled industry or industrial undertaking or undertakings (i) there has been, or is likely to be, a substantial fall in the volume of production for which, having regard to the economic conditions prevailing, there is no justification; or (ii) there has been, or is likely to be, a marked deterioration in the quality of any article... which could have been or can be avoided; or (iii) there has been or is likely to be a rise in the price of any article..... for which there is no justification; or (iv) it is necessary to take any such action for the purpose of conserving any resources of national importance; or (b) any industrial undertaking is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest. After the investigation is made under section 15, section 16(1) empowers the Central Government if action is desirable, to issue appropriate directions, and section 16(2) provides for the issue of interim directions by the Central Government pending investigation under section 15. Chapter III-A consisting of Sections 18A, 18-AA, 18-B, 18-C, 18-D, 18-E and 18-F deal with "direct management or control of Industrial Undertakings by Central Government in certain cases". Sec. 18-A empowers the Central Government by notified order, to authorise any person or body of persons to take over the management of the whole or any part of an industrial undertaking or to exercise in respect of the whole, or any part of the undertaking such functions of control as may be specified in the order, if the Central Government is of opinion that: (a) an industrial undertaking to which directions have been issued in pursuance of section 16 has failed to comply with such directions, or (b) an industrial undertaking in respect of which an investigation has been made under section 15 is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest. Section 18AA(5) stipulates that the provisions of Sections 18-B to 18 E shall be applicable to the industrial undertaking in respect of which an order has been made under section 18-AA even as they apply to an industrial undertaking taken over under Section 18-A. Section 18-F empowers the Central Government to cancel the order made under section 18-A if it appears that the purpose of the order has been fulfilled or it is not necessary that the order should remain in force. The appellant M/s. Swadeshi Cotton Mills was taken over by the Government of India by a notification dated April 13, 1978 in exercise of the powers conferred on it under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 18AA of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 on the ground that the company had by creation of encumbrances on the assets of its industrial undertakings, brought about a situation which had affected and is likely to further affect the production of articles manufactured or produced by it and that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation. The Government authorised the National Textile Corporation Limited to take over the management, subject to the conditions that the authorised person shall comply with all the directions issued from time to time by the Central Government and that the authorised person shall hold office for a period of five years. The appellant Mills challenged the aforesaid order in a writ petition in the High Court. The case was heard by a Full Bench of five Judges to consider the question whether in construing section 18AA of the Industries Development and Regulation Act, 1951, compliance with the principle of audi alteram partem is to be implied and whether hearing is to be given to the parties who would be affected by the order to be passed prior to the passing of the order or whether hearing can be given after the order is passed and whether the order passed under the said Section is vitiated by not giving of such hearing and whether such vice can be cured. The Bench by a majority answered the three questions as follows:- (a) Section 18AA(1)(a)(b) excludes the giving of prior hearing to the party who would be affected by order thereunder. (b) Section 18-F expressly provides for a post- decisional hearing to the owner of the industrial undertaking, the management of which is taken over under section 18AA to have the order made under section 18AA cancelled on any relevant ground. (c) As the taking over of management under section 18A is not vitiated by the failure to grant prior hearing the question of any such vice being cured by a grant of a subsequent hearing does not arise. The minority, however, held that in compliance with the principles of natural justice, prior hearing to the owner of the undertaking was required to be given before the passing of an order under section 18AA, that the second question did not arise as the denial of a prior hearing would not cure the vice by the grant of subsequent hearing, but it would be open to the Court to moderate the relief in such a way that the order is kept alive to the extent necessary until the making of the fresh order to subserve public interest and to make appropriate directions. After the decision on the reference the case was reheard on merits by a Full Bench of three Judges and the writ petition was allowed in part. The challenge to the validity of the order being rejected but insofar as the impugned order seeking to take over the corporate entity of the company, the corporate entity of the subsidiary and its assets, the petition was allowed and the respondents, the Union of India and the authorised person were directed to release from its control and custody and/or deliver possession of any assets or property of the company which were not referable to the industrial undertakings. Appeals to this Court were filed on behalf of the Company as well as by the Union of India and the National Textile Corporation. Two propositions were propounded on behalf of the company that: (a) Whether it was necessary to observe the rules of natural justice before issuing a notified order under section 18AA(1)(a) and further whether section 18-F impliedly excludes rules of natural justice relating to prior hearing; and it was contended (1) the mere use of the word 'immediate' in sub-clause (a) of section 18AA does not show a legislative intent to exclude the application of audi alteram partem rule altogether. (2) The word 'immediate' in clause (a) has been used in contra distinction to 'investigate'. It only means that under section 18AA action can be taken without prior investigation under section 15. The use of the word 'immediate' in section 18AA(1)(a) only dispenses with investigation under section 15 and not with the principle of audi alteram partem altogether and this is indicated by the marginal note of section 18A and para 3 of the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Amendment Bill which inserted section 18AA in 1971. (3) The word 'immediate' occurs only in clause (a) and not in clause (b) of section 18AA(1). It would be odd if intention to exclude this principle of natural justice is spelt out in one clause of the sub-section when the other clause does not exclude it. (4) Section 18-F does not exclude a pre-decisional hearing. The so-called post-decisional hearing contemplated by section 18-F cannot be and is not intended to be a substitute for a pre-decisional hearing. (5) Section 18F incorporates only a facet, albeit qualified, of section 21 of the General Clauses Act. The language of the Section implicity prohibits an enquiry into circumstances that led to the passing of the order of take-over and under it the aggrieved person is not entitled to show that on merits the order was void ab initio. (6) 'Immediacy' does not exclude a duty to act fairly because even an emergent situation can co-exist with the canons of natural justice. The only effect of urgency on the application of the principle of fair hearing would be that the width, form and duration of the hearing would be tailored to the situation and reduced to the reasonable minimum so that it does not delay and defeat the purpose of the contemplated action. (7) Where the civil consequences of the administrative action are grave and its effect is highly prejudicial to the rights and interests of the person affected and there is nothing in the language and scheme of the statute which unequivocally excludes a fair pre-decisional hearing and the post-decisional hearing provided therein is not a real remedial hearing equitable to a full right of appeal the Court should be loath to infer a legislative intent to exclude even a minimal fair hearing at the pre-decisional stage merely on ground of urgency. (8) The Central Government appointed four Government Officials including one from the office of the Textile Commissioner to study the affairs of the Company and to make recommendation. This Official Group submitted its report on February 16, 1978. The evidence on the basis of which the impugned order was passed was not disclosed to the appellant company till May 1978, only after it had filed the writ petition in the High Court. If there was anything adverse to the appellants in the survey report there was time enough about six weeks between the submission of the Survey Report and the passing of the impugned order for giving a short, reasonable opportunity to the appellants to explain the adverse findings against them. If there was immediacy situational modifications could be made to meet the requirement of fairness, by reducing the period of notice; that even the manner and form of such notice could be simplified to eliminate delay, that telephonic notice or short opportunity for furnishing their explanation to the Company might have satisfied the requirements of natural justice. Such an opportunity of hearing could have been given after the passing of a conditional tentative order and before its enforcement under section 18AA. For the interregnum suitable interim action such as freezing the assets of the Company or restraining the Company from creating further encumbrances, could be taken under section 16. On behalf of the Union of India and the Authorised Officer it was contended that (1) the presumption in favour of audi alteram partem rule stands impliedly displaced by the language scheme, setting and the purpose of the provision in section 18AA. (2) Section 18AA on its plain terms deals with situations where immediate preventive action is required. The paramount concern is to avoid serious problems which may be caused by fall in production. The purpose of an order under section 18AA is not to condemn the owner but to protect the scheduled industry. The issue under section 18AA is not solely between the Government and the management of the industrial undertaking. The object of taking action under this Section is to protect other outside interests of the community at large and the workers. (3) The rule of natural justice to give a hearing has been incorporated in section 18-F which gives an opportunity of a post-decisional hearing to the owner of the undertaking who if he feels aggrieved can on his application be heard, to show that even the original order under section 18AA was passed on invalid grounds and should be cancelled or rescinded. (4) On a true construction of section 18AA read with section 18-F the requirements of natural justice and fair play can be read into the statute only insofar as conformance to such canons can reasonably and realistically be required of it by the provision for a remedial hearing at a subsequent stage. (5) Under section 18-F the Central Government exercises curial functions and that Section confers on the aggrieved owner a right to apply to the Government to cancel the order of take-over. This section casts an obligation on the Central Government to deal with and dispose of an application filed thereunder with reasonable expedition. Allowing the appeal by the Company,<br/>HELD: (Sarkaria & Desai, JJ. per Chinnappa Reddy, J. dissenting.) In the facts and circumstances of the instant case, there has been a noncompliance with the implied requirement of the audi alteram partem rule of natural justice at the pre-decisional stage. The impugned order could be struck down as invalid on that score alone. But in view of the commitment / concession that a hearing would be afforded to the Company, the case is remitted to the Central Government to give a full, fair and effective hearing. [587G-H, 588C] The phrase 'natural justice' is not capable of a static and precise definition. It cannot be imprisoned in the straight-jacket of a cast-iron formula. Rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. Hence not possible to make an exhaustive catalogue of such rules. Two fundamental maxims of natural justice have now become deeply and indelibly ingrained in the common consciousness of mankind as pre-eminently necessary to ensure that the law is applied impartially objectively and fairly. These twin principles are (i) audi alteram partem and (ii) nemo judex in re sua. Audi alteram partem is a highly effective rule devised by the Courts to ensure that a statutory authority arrives at a just decision and it is calculated to act as a healthy check on the abuse or misuse of power. Its reach should not be narrowed and its applicability circumscribed.[554C-G] The rules of natural justice can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. If a statutory provision either specifically or by inevitable implication excludes the application of the rules of natural justice then the Court cannot ignore the mandate of the Legislature. Whether or not the application of the principles of natural justice in a given case has been excluded in the exercise of statutory power depends upon the language and basic scheme of the provision conferring the power, the nature of the power the purpose for which it is conferred and the effect of that power. [556A-B] The maxim audi alteram partem has many facets. Two of them are (a) notice of the case to be met, and (b) opportunity to explain. The rule cannot be sacrificed at the altar of administrative convenience or celerity; for, convenience and justice are often not on speaking terms. Difficulties, however, arise when the statute conferring the power does not expressly exclude this rule but its exclusion is sought by implication due to the presence of certain factors such as urgency where the obligation to give notice and opportunity to be heard would obstruct the taking of prompt action of a preventive or remedial nature. Audi alteram partem rule may be disregarded in an emergent situation where immediate action brooks no delay to prevent some imminent danger or injury or hazard to paramount public interests. Section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure empowers the magistrates specified therein to make an exparte conditional order in emergent cases for removal of dangerous public nuisances. Action under section 17 Land Acquisition Act furnishes another such instance. Similarly action on grounds of public safety public health may justify disregard of the rule of prior hearing. [556C-H] Cases where owing to the compulsion of the fact situation or the necessity of taking speedy action no pre- decisional hearing is given but the action, is followed soon by a full post-decisional hearing to the person affected do not in reality constitute an exception to the audi alteram partem rule. To call such cases as exception is a misnomer because they do not exclude fair play in action but adapt it to the urgency of the situation by balancing the competing claims of hurry and hearing. [560H-561A] The general principle as distinguished from an absolute rule of uniform application seems to be that where a statute does not in terms exclude this rule of prior hearing but contemplates a post-decisional hearing amounting to a full review of the original order on merits then such a statute would be construed as excluding the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage. [561G] If the statute conferring the power is silent with regard to the giving of pre-decisional hearing to the person affected and the administrative decision taken by the authority involves civil consequences of a grave nature and no full review or appeal on merits against that decision is provided courts will be extremely reluctant to construe such a statute as excluding the duty of affording even a minimal hearing shorn of all its formal trappings and dilatory features at the pre-decisional stage, unless viewed pragmatically it would paralyse the administrative process or frustrate the need for utmost promptitude. [561H] 7(i). A comparison of the provisions of Section 18A(1)(b) and Section 18AA(1)(c), bring out two main points of distinction: First, action under Section 18A(1)(b) can be taken only after an investigation had been made under Section 15; while under Section 18AA(1)(a) or (b) action can be taken without such investigation. The language, scheme and setting of Section 18AA read in the light of the Objects and Reasons for enacting this provision make this position clear beyond doubt. Second, before taking action under Section 18A(1)(b), the Central Government has to form an opinion on the basis of the investigation conducted under section 15, in regard to the existence of the objective fact, namely: that the industrial undertaking is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest; while under section 18A(1)(a) the Government has to satisfy itself that the persons incharge of the undertaking have brought about a situation likely to cause fall in production, by committing any of the three kinds of acts specified in that provision. This shows that the preliminary objective fact attributable to the persons in charge of the management or affairs of the undertaking, on the basis of which action may be taken under section 18(A)(1)(b), is of far wider amplitude than the circumstance, the existence of which is a sine qua non for taking action under section 18AA(1). The phrase "highly detrimental to the scheduled industry or public interest" in section 18-A is capable of being construed to cover a large variety of acts or things which may be considered wrong with the manner of running the industry by the management. In contrast with it, action under section 18AA(1)(a) can be taken only if the Central Government is satisfied with regard to the existence of the twin conditions specifically mentioned therein, on the basis of evidence in its possession. [569D-H] An analysis of section 18AA(1)(a), indicates that as a necessary preliminary to the exercise of the power thereunder, the Central Government must be satisfied "from documentary or other evidence in its possession" in regard to the co-existence of two circumstances: (i) that the persons in charge of the industrial undertaking have by committing any of these acts, namely, reckless investments, or creation of incumbrances on the assets of industrial undertaking, or by diversion of funds, brought about a situation which is likely to affect the production of the article manufactured or produced in the industrial undertaking, and (ii) that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation.[570B-D] It cannot be laid down as a general proposition that whenever a statute confers a power on an administrative authority and makes the exercise of that power conditional on the formation of an opinion by that authority in regard to the existence of an immediacy, its opinion in regard to that preliminary fact is not open to judicial scrutiny at all. While it may be conceded that an element of subjectivity is always involved in the formation of such an opinion, the existence of the circumstances from which the inference constituting the opinion, as the sine qua non for action, are to be drawn, must be demonstrable, and the existence of such "circumstances", if questioned, must be proved at least prima facie. [571 E-G] From a plain reading of section 18AA, it is clear that it does not expressly in unmistakable and unequivocal terms exclude the application of the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage. [574B] In the instant case, so far as Kanpur Unit is concerned, it was lying closed for more than three months before the passing of the impugned order. There was no 'immediacy' in relation to that unit, which could absolve the Government from the obligation of complying fully with audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional or pre- takeover stage. [583A] Keshav Mills Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, [1973] 3 S.C.R. 22; Kamla Prasad Khetan v. Union of India,[1957] S.C.R. 1052; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 621; Sukhdev Singh & Ors. v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh, [1975] 3 S.C.R. 619; A. K. Kraipak v. Union of India, [1970] 1 S.C.R. 457; Ridge v. Baldwin, [1964] A.C. 40; 196; Heatley v. Tasmanian Racing & Gaming Commission, 14 Australian Law Reports 519; Nawabkhan Abbaskhan v. State of Gujarat, [1974] 3 S.C.R. 427; State of Orissa v. Dr. Bina Pani Dei, [1962] 2 S.C.R. 625; Ambalal M. Shah v. Hathi Singh Manufacturing Co. Ltd. [1962] 3 S.C.R. 171; and S. L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan & Ors., [1981] 1 S.C.R. 746, referred to. (Per Chinnappa Reddy, J. dissenting) The principles of natural justice are not attracted to the situations contemplated by section 18AA of Industries (Development and Regulation) Act. Natural justice like Ultra Vires and Public Policy is a branch of the public law and is a formidable weapon which can be wielded to secure justice to the citizen. While it may be used to protect certain fundamental liberties, civil and political rights, it may be used as indeed it is used more often than not, to protect vested interests and to obstruct the path of progressive change. The time has come to make an appropriate distinction between natural justice in its application to fundamental liberties, civil and political rights and natural justice in its application to vested interests. [590A-B] Our constitution as befits the Constitution of a Socialist Secular Democratic Republic, recognises the paramountcy of the public weal over the private interest. Natural justice, ultra vires, public policy, or any other rule of interpretation must, therefore, conform, grow and be tailored to serve the public interest and respond to the demands of an evolving society. [590C] The principles of natural justice have taken deep root in the judicial conscience of our people. They are now considered so fundamental as to be implicit in every decision making function, judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative. Where authority functions under a statute and the statute provides for the observance of the principles of natural justice in a particular manner, natural justice will have to be observed in that manner and in no other. Where the statute is silent about the observance of the principles of natural justice, such statutory silence is taken to imply compliance with the principles of natural justice. Where the conflict is between the public interest and the private interest the presumption must necessarily be weak and may, therefore, be readily displaced. The presumption is also weak, where what are involved are mere property rights. In cases of urgency, particularly where the public interest is involved, preemptive action may be a strategic necessity. Even in cases of preemptive action, if the statute so provides or if the Courts so deem fit in appropriate cases, a postponed hearing may be substituted for natural justice. [590A-C; 591F-G] 3(ii). Where natural justice is implied, the extent of the implication and the nature of the hearing must vary with the statute, the subject and the situation. [592B] The absence of the expression 'immediate action' in section 18AA(1)(b) does not make any difference. Section 18AA(1)(a) refers to a situation where immediate preventive action may avert a disaster, whereas section 18AA contemplates a situation where the disaster has occurred and action is necessary to restore normalcy. Restoration of production where production has stopped in a key industry or industrial undertaking is as important and urgent in the public interest as prevention of a situation where production may be affected. Immediate action is, therefore, as necessary in the situation contemplated by section 18AA(1)(b) as in the situation contemplated by section 18AA(1)(a). [596 F-G] The marginal note refers to the power to take over without investigation but there is no sufficient reason to suppose that the word immediate is used only to contra- distinguish it from the investigation contemplated by section 15 of the Act, though of course a consequence of immediate action under section 18AA may be to dispense with the enquiry under section 15. In fact, facts which come to light during the course of an investigation under section 15 may form the basis of action under section 18AA(1)(a). Where in the course of an investigation under section 15 it is discovered that the management have, by reckless investments or creation of encumbrances on the assets of the industrial undertaking or by diversion of funds brought about a situation which is likely to affect the production of the articles manufactured or produced in the industrial undertaking, if the Government is satisfied that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation, there is no reason why the Central Government may not straightaway take action under section 18AA(1)(a) without waiting for completion of investigation under section 15. [597A-B] Where there is a provision in the statute itself for revocation of the order by the very authority making the decision, it appears to be unnecessary to insist upon a pre- decisional observance of natural justice. [598A] The likelihood of production being jeopardized or the stoppage of production in a key industrial undertaking is a matter of grave concern affecting the public interest. Parliament has taken so serious a view of the matter that it has authorised the Central Government to take over the management of the industrial undertaking if immediate action may prevent jeopardy to production or restore production where it has already stopped. The necessity for immediate action by the Central Government contemplated by Parliament is definitely indicative of the exclusion of natural justice. It is not as if the owner of the industrial undertaking is left with no remedy. He may move the Central Government under section 18-F to cancel the order made under section 18AA. [598C-D] Neither section 18-F of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act nor section 21 of the General Clauses Act by itself excludes natural justice. The exclusion of natural justice where such exclusion is not express has to be implied by reference to the subject, the statute and the statutory situation. Where an express provision in the statute itself provides for a post decisional hearing the other provisions of the Statute will have to be read in the light of such provision and the provision for post- decisional hearing may then clinch the issue where pre- decisional natural justice appears to be excluded on the other terms of the statute. That a post-decisional hearing may also be had by the terms of section 21 of the General Clauses Act may not necessarily help in the interpretation of the provisions of the statute concerned. [599 A-C] Ridge v. Baldwin, 1964 A.C. p. 40; Annie G. Phillip v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 75 L.E.d. 1289; John H. Fahey v. Paul Mallonee, 91 L.E.d. 2030; Margarita Fuentes v. Robert L. Shevin, Attorney General of Florida, 32 L.E.d. 2d 556 and Lawrence Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 40 L.E.d. 2d 406, referred to. - Rama Rao, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh as well as the President of the Telugu Desam Party as well as respondent No. 3. The advertisements very shortly stated, refer to the auspicious gifts made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to the poor people on the eve of New Year and Sankranti. In the said advertisements, it is stated that the said Government which was formed by the Telugu Desam Party was giving to the poor people whose income was below Rs. and the said advertisements referred to a new scheme of selling sarees and dhoties at half prices to the poor people in the State of Andhra Pradesh having Green-cards. Moreover, the offer in the advertisements for the sale of dhoties and sarees at discount rates was in the nature of a benefit offered to poor persons in that State. When a Government announces the measures which are intended for the benefit of any of the classes for whose the Government can normally be expected to work like the poor or the economical backward classes, it is only in rare circumstances that such a promise can be said to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) even though such a promise might be made on the eve of elections. 8. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => '', 'counseldef' => '', 'court' => 'Supreme Court of India', 'court_type' => 'SC', 'decidedon' => '1989-09-29', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' K.N. Saikia,; M.H. Kania and; S. Ranganathan, JJ.', 'judgement' => '</p><p>Kania, J.</p><p>1. These two appeals arise out of the judgments in two Election Petitions in the Andhra Pradesh High Court questioning the election of respondent No. 1 as a Member of Parliament from Srikakulam No. Parliamentary Constituency in the 8th General Election to the House of the People. The points raised in these appeals are common and so are the relevant facts; and, hence, they are being disposed of by this common judgment. We propose to take note of only the few facts which are necessary for the appreciation of the controversy before us.</p><p>2. The polling date for the said election along with other parliamentary elections in the State of Andhra Pradesh was December 27, 1984 but in Srikakulam No. 1 Parliamentary Constituency the polling was countermanded and the date of polling was later fixed on January 28, 1985. In both the Election Petitions the election of respondent No. 1 was questioned mainly on the ground that Shri N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh as well as the President of the Telugu Desam Party as well as respondent No. 1 gave certain speeches and certain advertisements were got published by Shri N.T. Rama Rao through the Publicity Department of the Government of Andhra Pradesh in the newspapers containing certain statements which are alleged to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A) of the <a>Representation of the People Act, 1951</a> (hereinafter referred to as 'the said Act'). The main question canvassed before us is whether the statements contained in these aforesaid advertisements amount to a corrupt practice under Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act. Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act runs as follows :</p><p>123. Corrupt practices</p><p>The following shall be deemed to be corrupt practises for the purposes of this Act :</p><p>(1) 'Bribery', that is to say.</p><p>(A) any gift, offer or promise by a candidate or his agent or by any other person with the consent of a candidate or his election agent of any gratification, to any person whomsover, with the object, directly or indirectly of inducing.</p><p>(a) x x x</p><p>(b) an elector to vote or refrain from voting at an election, or as a reward to.</p><p>(i) a person for having so stood or not stood, or for having withdrawn or not having withdrawn his candidature; or</p><p>(ii) an elector for having voted or refrained from voting.</p><p>3. The advertisements very shortly stated, refer to the auspicious gifts made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to the poor people on the eve of New Year and Sankranti. In the said advertisements, it is stated that the said Government which was formed by the Telugu Desam Party was giving to the poor people whose income was below Rs. 6,000 per year, a kilo of rice at Rs. 2 per Kg. and the said advertisements referred to a new scheme of selling sarees and dhoties at half prices to the poor people in the State of Andhra Pradesh having Green-cards. Green-cards were directed to be issued to all the persons whose annual income was below Rs. 6,000. The supply of the rice at subsidised rates as aforesaid was also to be made to the Green-card holders only. The scheme to sell sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was to be operative from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985.</p><p>4. In considering the question whether the said advertisement and the said speeches amount to a corrupt practice, we are of the view that the provisions of Section 123 of the said Act which deal with corrupt practices have to be interpreted, keeping in mind that dictates of commonsense require that they never could have been intended to treat normal election promises made in election manifestoes or usual election speeches by members of various political parties aspiring to power and by different candidates aspiring to get elected to legislative bodies concerned as corrupt practices. We are of the view that these advertisements and speeches amount to nothing more than statements extolling the achievements of the Government of the State of Andhra Pradesh under the Telugu Desam Party headed by N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister, and contain normal election promises and these statements do not amount to corrupt practices falling within the scope of Sub-clause (b) of Clause (A) of Sub-section (1) of Section 123 of the said Act.</p><p>5. It was urged by Mr. Rao, learned Counsel for the appellants that in the impugned judgments, the High Court has incorrectly taken the view that in order to amount to bribery within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A), the transaction must amount to a bargain by the candidate with a view to get votes. It was pointed out by him that the said view has been taken in the impugned judgments, relying upon the decision of a Bench comprising to learned Judges of this Court in Ghasi Ram v. Dal Singh and Ors. :1983 SCR 102 . We have gone through to the relevant portion of that judgment (at page 109 and 110 of the said report). A careful perusal of the said judgment shows that what has been really held in that case is that if the promises given or made amount to a bargain entered into by a candidate for a vote or votes, that would amount to a corrupt practice; but it has not been held there that unless the act alleged amounts to such a bargain, it could not amount to a corrupt practice. In our view, that judgment does not lay down that in order to amount to a corrupt practice, the transaction must amount to a bargain for getting a vote. It was pointed out by Mr. Rao, however, that such a view seems to have been taken in two other decisions rendered by two Benches, each comprising two learned Judges of this Court in Bhanu Kumar Shastri v. Mohan Lal Sukhadia and Ors. : [1971]3SCR522 and Harjit Singh Mann v. S Umrao Singh and Ors. : [1980]2SCR501 . and these judgments need to be overruled. We do not propose to go into the correctness or otherwise of this view because, even on the footing that in order to amount to a corrupt practice under the aforesaid provision the alleged acts need not constitute a bargain, the the acts established in the present case, in our opinion, do not amount to a corrupt practice.</p><p>6. Our attention was drawn by Mr. Rao to the fact that in this case the said advertisements and the speeches had to be viewed in the context of the fact that the advertisements were issued and the speeches were made after respondent No. 1 filed his nomination papers on January 4, 1985, for the election and before the election was held in the aforesaid constituency. It was further pointed out that the offer made for the sale of sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was limited to the period from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985. It cannot be denied that these factors are relevant factOrs. We cannot, however, lose sight of the fact that this offer was made not only in this constituency but throughout the State where the elections to the House of the People were scheduled to be held, and were, in fact, held on December 27, 1984. It was only in case of this constituency that the election to be held on the scheduled date was countermanded and later held on January 28, 1985. We cannot lose sight of the fact that, as far as the said speeches and the said advertisements, which were issued by the Publicity Department of the State, are concerned, they deal in the main with the achievements of the Government of Andhra Pradesh which, of course, was being run by Ministers belonging to Telugu Desam Party to which respondent No. 1 also belonged. Moreover, the offer in the advertisements for the sale of dhoties and sarees at discount rates was in the nature of a benefit offered to poor persons in that State. When a Government announces the measures which are intended for the benefit of any of the classes for whose the Government can normally be expected to work like the poor or the economical backward classes, it is only in rare circumstances that such a promise can be said to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) even though such a promise might be made on the eve of elections. Keeping this in mind, in our opinion, although the offer to sell dhoties and sarees at discount rates was of a limited duration as aforestated, it cannot be regarded as a corrupt practice. Such an offer was bound to have financial repercussions and it is quite possible the duration of the offer was limited to enable the Government to study the financial repercussions rather than from any improper motive. We find support for this view from the decision of this Court in H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh : [1969]3SCR813 . In that case an Ordinance was passed by the Government of Madhya Pradesh as a result of which a large number of agriculturists, namely, those holdings of plots of land of less than 7.5 acres area or paying land revenue not exceeding Rs. 5/- were exempted from the payment of the land revenue. It was held that such a concession does not amount to a gift, offer or promise of any gratification within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) of the said Act nor does the announcement of the declaration made at a meeting shortly before the election or the issue of a pamphlet containing that declaration at that time carry the matter any further. It was held that neither Shri D.P. Misra who was the Chief Minister nor Shri S.K. Dixit who acted as his agent were guilty of any corrupt practice within the meaning of the aforesaid provision.</p><p>7. It was next contended by Mr. Rao, although very faintly, that the High Court was in error as it had not decided all other issues which were raised in the election petition. In this regard we cannot lose sight of the fact that the term of the present Lok Sabha is likely to be over within a few months and fresh elections are likely to be held and it would, therefore, be an exercise in futility to remand the matter to the High Court for deciding the remaining issues.</p><p>8. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.<p></p><p>', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'AIR1990SC1889; JT1989(4)SC186; 1989(2)SCALE891; 1989Supp(2)SCC504', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors.', 'sub' => 'Election', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ) $casename_url = 'b-rajagopala-rao-vs-appayya-hanumanthu' $args = array( (int) 0 => '640942', (int) 1 => 'b-rajagopala-rao-vs-appayya-hanumanthu' ) $url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/640942/b-rajagopala-rao-vs-appayya-hanumanthu' $ctype = '' $caseref = 'H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh<br>' $content = array( (int) 0 => '', (int) 1 => '<p>Kania, J.', (int) 2 => '<p>1. These two appeals arise out of the judgments in two Election Petitions in the Andhra Pradesh High Court questioning the election of respondent No. 1 as a Member of Parliament from Srikakulam No. Parliamentary Constituency in the 8th General Election to the House of the People. The points raised in these appeals are common and so are the relevant facts; and, hence, they are being disposed of by this common judgment. We propose to take note of only the few facts which are necessary for the appreciation of the controversy before us.', (int) 3 => '<p>2. The polling date for the said election along with other parliamentary elections in the State of Andhra Pradesh was December 27, 1984 but in Srikakulam No. 1 Parliamentary Constituency the polling was countermanded and the date of polling was later fixed on January 28, 1985. In both the Election Petitions the election of respondent No. 1 was questioned mainly on the ground that Shri N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh as well as the President of the Telugu Desam Party as well as respondent No. 1 gave certain speeches and certain advertisements were got published by Shri N.T. Rama Rao through the Publicity Department of the Government of Andhra Pradesh in the newspapers containing certain statements which are alleged to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A) of the <a>Representation of the People Act, 1951</a> (hereinafter referred to as 'the said Act'). The main question canvassed before us is whether the statements contained in these aforesaid advertisements amount to a corrupt practice under Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act. Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act runs as follows :', (int) 4 => '<p>123. Corrupt practices', (int) 5 => '<p>The following shall be deemed to be corrupt practises for the purposes of this Act :', (int) 6 => '<p>(1) 'Bribery', that is to say.', (int) 7 => '<p>(A) any gift, offer or promise by a candidate or his agent or by any other person with the consent of a candidate or his election agent of any gratification, to any person whomsover, with the object, directly or indirectly of inducing.', (int) 8 => '<p>(a) x x x', (int) 9 => '<p>(b) an elector to vote or refrain from voting at an election, or as a reward to.', (int) 10 => '<p>(i) a person for having so stood or not stood, or for having withdrawn or not having withdrawn his candidature; or', (int) 11 => '<p>(ii) an elector for having voted or refrained from voting.', (int) 12 => '<p>3. The advertisements very shortly stated, refer to the auspicious gifts made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to the poor people on the eve of New Year and Sankranti. In the said advertisements, it is stated that the said Government which was formed by the Telugu Desam Party was giving to the poor people whose income was below Rs. 6,000 per year, a kilo of rice at Rs. 2 per Kg. and the said advertisements referred to a new scheme of selling sarees and dhoties at half prices to the poor people in the State of Andhra Pradesh having Green-cards. Green-cards were directed to be issued to all the persons whose annual income was below Rs. 6,000. The supply of the rice at subsidised rates as aforesaid was also to be made to the Green-card holders only. The scheme to sell sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was to be operative from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985.', (int) 13 => '<p>4. In considering the question whether the said advertisement and the said speeches amount to a corrupt practice, we are of the view that the provisions of Section 123 of the said Act which deal with corrupt practices have to be interpreted, keeping in mind that dictates of commonsense require that they never could have been intended to treat normal election promises made in election manifestoes or usual election speeches by members of various political parties aspiring to power and by different candidates aspiring to get elected to legislative bodies concerned as corrupt practices. We are of the view that these advertisements and speeches amount to nothing more than statements extolling the achievements of the Government of the State of Andhra Pradesh under the Telugu Desam Party headed by N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister, and contain normal election promises and these statements do not amount to corrupt practices falling within the scope of Sub-clause (b) of Clause (A) of Sub-section (1) of Section 123 of the said Act.', (int) 14 => '<p>5. It was urged by Mr. Rao, learned Counsel for the appellants that in the impugned judgments, the High Court has incorrectly taken the view that in order to amount to bribery within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A), the transaction must amount to a bargain by the candidate with a view to get votes. It was pointed out by him that the said view has been taken in the impugned judgments, relying upon the decision of a Bench comprising to learned Judges of this Court in Ghasi Ram v. Dal Singh and Ors. :1983 SCR 102 . We have gone through to the relevant portion of that judgment (at page 109 and 110 of the said report). A careful perusal of the said judgment shows that what has been really held in that case is that if the promises given or made amount to a bargain entered into by a candidate for a vote or votes, that would amount to a corrupt practice; but it has not been held there that unless the act alleged amounts to such a bargain, it could not amount to a corrupt practice. In our view, that judgment does not lay down that in order to amount to a corrupt practice, the transaction must amount to a bargain for getting a vote. It was pointed out by Mr. Rao, however, that such a view seems to have been taken in two other decisions rendered by two Benches, each comprising two learned Judges of this Court in Bhanu Kumar Shastri v. Mohan Lal Sukhadia and Ors. : [1971]3SCR522 and Harjit Singh Mann v. S Umrao Singh and Ors. : [1980]2SCR501 . and these judgments need to be overruled. We do not propose to go into the correctness or otherwise of this view because, even on the footing that in order to amount to a corrupt practice under the aforesaid provision the alleged acts need not constitute a bargain, the the acts established in the present case, in our opinion, do not amount to a corrupt practice.', (int) 15 => '<p>6. Our attention was drawn by Mr. Rao to the fact that in this case the said advertisements and the speeches had to be viewed in the context of the fact that the advertisements were issued and the speeches were made after respondent No. 1 filed his nomination papers on January 4, 1985, for the election and before the election was held in the aforesaid constituency. It was further pointed out that the offer made for the sale of sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was limited to the period from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985. It cannot be denied that these factors are relevant factOrs. We cannot, however, lose sight of the fact that this offer was made not only in this constituency but throughout the State where the elections to the House of the People were scheduled to be held, and were, in fact, held on December 27, 1984. It was only in case of this constituency that the election to be held on the scheduled date was countermanded and later held on January 28, 1985. We cannot lose sight of the fact that, as far as the said speeches and the said advertisements, which were issued by the Publicity Department of the State, are concerned, they deal in the main with the achievements of the Government of Andhra Pradesh which, of course, was being run by Ministers belonging to Telugu Desam Party to which respondent No. 1 also belonged. Moreover, the offer in the advertisements for the sale of dhoties and sarees at discount rates was in the nature of a benefit offered to poor persons in that State. When a Government announces the measures which are intended for the benefit of any of the classes for whose the Government can normally be expected to work like the poor or the economical backward classes, it is only in rare circumstances that such a promise can be said to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) even though such a promise might be made on the eve of elections. Keeping this in mind, in our opinion, although the offer to sell dhoties and sarees at discount rates was of a limited duration as aforestated, it cannot be regarded as a corrupt practice. Such an offer was bound to have financial repercussions and it is quite possible the duration of the offer was limited to enable the Government to study the financial repercussions rather than from any improper motive. We find support for this view from the decision of this Court in H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh : [1969]3SCR813 . In that case an Ordinance was passed by the Government of Madhya Pradesh as a result of which a large number of agriculturists, namely, those holdings of plots of land of less than 7.5 acres area or paying land revenue not exceeding Rs. 5/- were exempted from the payment of the land revenue. It was held that such a concession does not amount to a gift, offer or promise of any gratification within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) of the said Act nor does the announcement of the declaration made at a meeting shortly before the election or the issue of a pamphlet containing that declaration at that time carry the matter any further. It was held that neither Shri D.P. Misra who was the Chief Minister nor Shri S.K. Dixit who acted as his agent were guilty of any corrupt practice within the meaning of the aforesaid provision.', (int) 16 => '<p>7. It was next contended by Mr. Rao, although very faintly, that the High Court was in error as it had not decided all other issues which were raised in the election petition. In this regard we cannot lose sight of the fact that the term of the present Lok Sabha is likely to be over within a few months and fresh elections are likely to be held and it would, therefore, be an exercise in futility to remand the matter to the High Court for deciding the remaining issues.', (int) 17 => '<p>8. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.<p>', (int) 18 => '<p>' ) $paragraphAfter = (int) 1 $cnt = (int) 19 $i = (int) 6include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144 View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971 View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933 View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473 Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963 Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200 Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167 [main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109
(1) 'Bribery', that is to say.
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$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp' $dataForView = array( 'title_for_layout' => 'B Rajagopala Rao and anr Vs Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors - Citation 640942 - Court Judgment | ', 'desc' => array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '640942', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/50684/representation-of-the-people-act-1951-complete-act">Representation of the People Act, 1951</a> - Sections 1, 3(1)(A), 123 and 123(1)(A)', 'appealno' => 'Civil Appeal Nos. 484 and 485 of 1987', 'appellant' => 'B. Rajagopala Rao and anr.', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'B. Rajagopala Rao and anr. Vs. Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors.', 'casenote' => 'Election - corrupt practices - Sections 123 and 123 (1) (A) of Representation of the People Act, 1951 - whether advertisements by public department and speeches made by respondent No. 1 to sell dhoti and sarees at discount rates amount to corrupt practices - offer was available for mass and for limited duration - such offer was bound to have financial repercussions and it is quite possible that duration of offer limited to enable Government to study financial repercussions rather than from any improper motive - offer not amounted to corrupt practices. - [ D.A. Desai,; O. Chinnappa Reddy and; R.S. Sarkaria, JJ.] The Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 empowers the Union of India in the public interest to take under its control the industries specified in the First Schedule to the Act. Item 23 of the First Schedule relates to textiles of various categories. Section 15 authorises the Central Government to make or cause to be made a full and complete investigation into the circumstances of the case if the Central Government is of the opinion that (a) in respect of any scheduled industry or industrial undertaking or undertakings (i) there has been, or is likely to be, a substantial fall in the volume of production for which, having regard to the economic conditions prevailing, there is no justification; or (ii) there has been, or is likely to be, a marked deterioration in the quality of any article... which could have been or can be avoided; or (iii) there has been or is likely to be a rise in the price of any article..... for which there is no justification; or (iv) it is necessary to take any such action for the purpose of conserving any resources of national importance; or (b) any industrial undertaking is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest. After the investigation is made under section 15, section 16(1) empowers the Central Government if action is desirable, to issue appropriate directions, and section 16(2) provides for the issue of interim directions by the Central Government pending investigation under section 15. Chapter III-A consisting of Sections 18A, 18-AA, 18-B, 18-C, 18-D, 18-E and 18-F deal with "direct management or control of Industrial Undertakings by Central Government in certain cases". Sec. 18-A empowers the Central Government by notified order, to authorise any person or body of persons to take over the management of the whole or any part of an industrial undertaking or to exercise in respect of the whole, or any part of the undertaking such functions of control as may be specified in the order, if the Central Government is of opinion that: (a) an industrial undertaking to which directions have been issued in pursuance of section 16 has failed to comply with such directions, or (b) an industrial undertaking in respect of which an investigation has been made under section 15 is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest. Section 18AA(5) stipulates that the provisions of Sections 18-B to 18 E shall be applicable to the industrial undertaking in respect of which an order has been made under section 18-AA even as they apply to an industrial undertaking taken over under Section 18-A. Section 18-F empowers the Central Government to cancel the order made under section 18-A if it appears that the purpose of the order has been fulfilled or it is not necessary that the order should remain in force. The appellant M/s. Swadeshi Cotton Mills was taken over by the Government of India by a notification dated April 13, 1978 in exercise of the powers conferred on it under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 18AA of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 on the ground that the company had by creation of encumbrances on the assets of its industrial undertakings, brought about a situation which had affected and is likely to further affect the production of articles manufactured or produced by it and that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation. The Government authorised the National Textile Corporation Limited to take over the management, subject to the conditions that the authorised person shall comply with all the directions issued from time to time by the Central Government and that the authorised person shall hold office for a period of five years. The appellant Mills challenged the aforesaid order in a writ petition in the High Court. The case was heard by a Full Bench of five Judges to consider the question whether in construing section 18AA of the Industries Development and Regulation Act, 1951, compliance with the principle of audi alteram partem is to be implied and whether hearing is to be given to the parties who would be affected by the order to be passed prior to the passing of the order or whether hearing can be given after the order is passed and whether the order passed under the said Section is vitiated by not giving of such hearing and whether such vice can be cured. The Bench by a majority answered the three questions as follows:- (a) Section 18AA(1)(a)(b) excludes the giving of prior hearing to the party who would be affected by order thereunder. (b) Section 18-F expressly provides for a post- decisional hearing to the owner of the industrial undertaking, the management of which is taken over under section 18AA to have the order made under section 18AA cancelled on any relevant ground. (c) As the taking over of management under section 18A is not vitiated by the failure to grant prior hearing the question of any such vice being cured by a grant of a subsequent hearing does not arise. The minority, however, held that in compliance with the principles of natural justice, prior hearing to the owner of the undertaking was required to be given before the passing of an order under section 18AA, that the second question did not arise as the denial of a prior hearing would not cure the vice by the grant of subsequent hearing, but it would be open to the Court to moderate the relief in such a way that the order is kept alive to the extent necessary until the making of the fresh order to subserve public interest and to make appropriate directions. After the decision on the reference the case was reheard on merits by a Full Bench of three Judges and the writ petition was allowed in part. The challenge to the validity of the order being rejected but insofar as the impugned order seeking to take over the corporate entity of the company, the corporate entity of the subsidiary and its assets, the petition was allowed and the respondents, the Union of India and the authorised person were directed to release from its control and custody and/or deliver possession of any assets or property of the company which were not referable to the industrial undertakings. Appeals to this Court were filed on behalf of the Company as well as by the Union of India and the National Textile Corporation. Two propositions were propounded on behalf of the company that: (a) Whether it was necessary to observe the rules of natural justice before issuing a notified order under section 18AA(1)(a) and further whether section 18-F impliedly excludes rules of natural justice relating to prior hearing; and it was contended (1) the mere use of the word 'immediate' in sub-clause (a) of section 18AA does not show a legislative intent to exclude the application of audi alteram partem rule altogether. (2) The word 'immediate' in clause (a) has been used in contra distinction to 'investigate'. It only means that under section 18AA action can be taken without prior investigation under section 15. The use of the word 'immediate' in section 18AA(1)(a) only dispenses with investigation under section 15 and not with the principle of audi alteram partem altogether and this is indicated by the marginal note of section 18A and para 3 of the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Amendment Bill which inserted section 18AA in 1971. (3) The word 'immediate' occurs only in clause (a) and not in clause (b) of section 18AA(1). It would be odd if intention to exclude this principle of natural justice is spelt out in one clause of the sub-section when the other clause does not exclude it. (4) Section 18-F does not exclude a pre-decisional hearing. The so-called post-decisional hearing contemplated by section 18-F cannot be and is not intended to be a substitute for a pre-decisional hearing. (5) Section 18F incorporates only a facet, albeit qualified, of section 21 of the General Clauses Act. The language of the Section implicity prohibits an enquiry into circumstances that led to the passing of the order of take-over and under it the aggrieved person is not entitled to show that on merits the order was void ab initio. (6) 'Immediacy' does not exclude a duty to act fairly because even an emergent situation can co-exist with the canons of natural justice. The only effect of urgency on the application of the principle of fair hearing would be that the width, form and duration of the hearing would be tailored to the situation and reduced to the reasonable minimum so that it does not delay and defeat the purpose of the contemplated action. (7) Where the civil consequences of the administrative action are grave and its effect is highly prejudicial to the rights and interests of the person affected and there is nothing in the language and scheme of the statute which unequivocally excludes a fair pre-decisional hearing and the post-decisional hearing provided therein is not a real remedial hearing equitable to a full right of appeal the Court should be loath to infer a legislative intent to exclude even a minimal fair hearing at the pre-decisional stage merely on ground of urgency. (8) The Central Government appointed four Government Officials including one from the office of the Textile Commissioner to study the affairs of the Company and to make recommendation. This Official Group submitted its report on February 16, 1978. The evidence on the basis of which the impugned order was passed was not disclosed to the appellant company till May 1978, only after it had filed the writ petition in the High Court. If there was anything adverse to the appellants in the survey report there was time enough about six weeks between the submission of the Survey Report and the passing of the impugned order for giving a short, reasonable opportunity to the appellants to explain the adverse findings against them. If there was immediacy situational modifications could be made to meet the requirement of fairness, by reducing the period of notice; that even the manner and form of such notice could be simplified to eliminate delay, that telephonic notice or short opportunity for furnishing their explanation to the Company might have satisfied the requirements of natural justice. Such an opportunity of hearing could have been given after the passing of a conditional tentative order and before its enforcement under section 18AA. For the interregnum suitable interim action such as freezing the assets of the Company or restraining the Company from creating further encumbrances, could be taken under section 16. On behalf of the Union of India and the Authorised Officer it was contended that (1) the presumption in favour of audi alteram partem rule stands impliedly displaced by the language scheme, setting and the purpose of the provision in section 18AA. (2) Section 18AA on its plain terms deals with situations where immediate preventive action is required. The paramount concern is to avoid serious problems which may be caused by fall in production. The purpose of an order under section 18AA is not to condemn the owner but to protect the scheduled industry. The issue under section 18AA is not solely between the Government and the management of the industrial undertaking. The object of taking action under this Section is to protect other outside interests of the community at large and the workers. (3) The rule of natural justice to give a hearing has been incorporated in section 18-F which gives an opportunity of a post-decisional hearing to the owner of the undertaking who if he feels aggrieved can on his application be heard, to show that even the original order under section 18AA was passed on invalid grounds and should be cancelled or rescinded. (4) On a true construction of section 18AA read with section 18-F the requirements of natural justice and fair play can be read into the statute only insofar as conformance to such canons can reasonably and realistically be required of it by the provision for a remedial hearing at a subsequent stage. (5) Under section 18-F the Central Government exercises curial functions and that Section confers on the aggrieved owner a right to apply to the Government to cancel the order of take-over. This section casts an obligation on the Central Government to deal with and dispose of an application filed thereunder with reasonable expedition. Allowing the appeal by the Company,<br />HELD: (Sarkaria & Desai, JJ. per Chinnappa Reddy, J. dissenting.) In the facts and circumstances of the instant case, there has been a noncompliance with the implied requirement of the audi alteram partem rule of natural justice at the pre-decisional stage. The impugned order could be struck down as invalid on that score alone. But in view of the commitment / concession that a hearing would be afforded to the Company, the case is remitted to the Central Government to give a full, fair and effective hearing. [587G-H, 588C] The phrase 'natural justice' is not capable of a static and precise definition. It cannot be imprisoned in the straight-jacket of a cast-iron formula. Rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. Hence not possible to make an exhaustive catalogue of such rules. Two fundamental maxims of natural justice have now become deeply and indelibly ingrained in the common consciousness of mankind as pre-eminently necessary to ensure that the law is applied impartially objectively and fairly. These twin principles are (i) audi alteram partem and (ii) nemo judex in re sua. Audi alteram partem is a highly effective rule devised by the Courts to ensure that a statutory authority arrives at a just decision and it is calculated to act as a healthy check on the abuse or misuse of power. Its reach should not be narrowed and its applicability circumscribed.[554C-G] The rules of natural justice can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. If a statutory provision either specifically or by inevitable implication excludes the application of the rules of natural justice then the Court cannot ignore the mandate of the Legislature. Whether or not the application of the principles of natural justice in a given case has been excluded in the exercise of statutory power depends upon the language and basic scheme of the provision conferring the power, the nature of the power the purpose for which it is conferred and the effect of that power. [556A-B] The maxim audi alteram partem has many facets. Two of them are (a) notice of the case to be met, and (b) opportunity to explain. The rule cannot be sacrificed at the altar of administrative convenience or celerity; for, convenience and justice are often not on speaking terms. Difficulties, however, arise when the statute conferring the power does not expressly exclude this rule but its exclusion is sought by implication due to the presence of certain factors such as urgency where the obligation to give notice and opportunity to be heard would obstruct the taking of prompt action of a preventive or remedial nature. Audi alteram partem rule may be disregarded in an emergent situation where immediate action brooks no delay to prevent some imminent danger or injury or hazard to paramount public interests. Section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure empowers the magistrates specified therein to make an exparte conditional order in emergent cases for removal of dangerous public nuisances. Action under section 17 Land Acquisition Act furnishes another such instance. Similarly action on grounds of public safety public health may justify disregard of the rule of prior hearing. [556C-H] Cases where owing to the compulsion of the fact situation or the necessity of taking speedy action no pre- decisional hearing is given but the action, is followed soon by a full post-decisional hearing to the person affected do not in reality constitute an exception to the audi alteram partem rule. To call such cases as exception is a misnomer because they do not exclude fair play in action but adapt it to the urgency of the situation by balancing the competing claims of hurry and hearing. [560H-561A] The general principle as distinguished from an absolute rule of uniform application seems to be that where a statute does not in terms exclude this rule of prior hearing but contemplates a post-decisional hearing amounting to a full review of the original order on merits then such a statute would be construed as excluding the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage. [561G] If the statute conferring the power is silent with regard to the giving of pre-decisional hearing to the person affected and the administrative decision taken by the authority involves civil consequences of a grave nature and no full review or appeal on merits against that decision is provided courts will be extremely reluctant to construe such a statute as excluding the duty of affording even a minimal hearing shorn of all its formal trappings and dilatory features at the pre-decisional stage, unless viewed pragmatically it would paralyse the administrative process or frustrate the need for utmost promptitude. [561H] 7(i). A comparison of the provisions of Section 18A(1)(b) and Section 18AA(1)(c), bring out two main points of distinction: First, action under Section 18A(1)(b) can be taken only after an investigation had been made under Section 15; while under Section 18AA(1)(a) or (b) action can be taken without such investigation. The language, scheme and setting of Section 18AA read in the light of the Objects and Reasons for enacting this provision make this position clear beyond doubt. Second, before taking action under Section 18A(1)(b), the Central Government has to form an opinion on the basis of the investigation conducted under section 15, in regard to the existence of the objective fact, namely: that the industrial undertaking is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest; while under section 18A(1)(a) the Government has to satisfy itself that the persons incharge of the undertaking have brought about a situation likely to cause fall in production, by committing any of the three kinds of acts specified in that provision. This shows that the preliminary objective fact attributable to the persons in charge of the management or affairs of the undertaking, on the basis of which action may be taken under section 18(A)(1)(b), is of far wider amplitude than the circumstance, the existence of which is a sine qua non for taking action under section 18AA(1). The phrase "highly detrimental to the scheduled industry or public interest" in section 18-A is capable of being construed to cover a large variety of acts or things which may be considered wrong with the manner of running the industry by the management. In contrast with it, action under section 18AA(1)(a) can be taken only if the Central Government is satisfied with regard to the existence of the twin conditions specifically mentioned therein, on the basis of evidence in its possession. [569D-H] An analysis of section 18AA(1)(a), indicates that as a necessary preliminary to the exercise of the power thereunder, the Central Government must be satisfied "from documentary or other evidence in its possession" in regard to the co-existence of two circumstances: (i) that the persons in charge of the industrial undertaking have by committing any of these acts, namely, reckless investments, or creation of incumbrances on the assets of industrial undertaking, or by diversion of funds, brought about a situation which is likely to affect the production of the article manufactured or produced in the industrial undertaking, and (ii) that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation.[570B-D] It cannot be laid down as a general proposition that whenever a statute confers a power on an administrative authority and makes the exercise of that power conditional on the formation of an opinion by that authority in regard to the existence of an immediacy, its opinion in regard to that preliminary fact is not open to judicial scrutiny at all. While it may be conceded that an element of subjectivity is always involved in the formation of such an opinion, the existence of the circumstances from which the inference constituting the opinion, as the sine qua non for action, are to be drawn, must be demonstrable, and the existence of such "circumstances", if questioned, must be proved at least prima facie. [571 E-G] From a plain reading of section 18AA, it is clear that it does not expressly in unmistakable and unequivocal terms exclude the application of the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage. [574B] In the instant case, so far as Kanpur Unit is concerned, it was lying closed for more than three months before the passing of the impugned order. There was no 'immediacy' in relation to that unit, which could absolve the Government from the obligation of complying fully with audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional or pre- takeover stage. [583A] Keshav Mills Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, [1973] 3 S.C.R. 22; Kamla Prasad Khetan v. Union of India,[1957] S.C.R. 1052; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 621; Sukhdev Singh & Ors. v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh, [1975] 3 S.C.R. 619; A. K. Kraipak v. Union of India, [1970] 1 S.C.R. 457; Ridge v. Baldwin, [1964] A.C. 40; 196; Heatley v. Tasmanian Racing & Gaming Commission, 14 Australian Law Reports 519; Nawabkhan Abbaskhan v. State of Gujarat, [1974] 3 S.C.R. 427; State of Orissa v. Dr. Bina Pani Dei, [1962] 2 S.C.R. 625; Ambalal M. Shah v. Hathi Singh Manufacturing Co. Ltd. [1962] 3 S.C.R. 171; and S. L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan & Ors., [1981] 1 S.C.R. 746, referred to. (Per Chinnappa Reddy, J. dissenting) The principles of natural justice are not attracted to the situations contemplated by section 18AA of Industries (Development and Regulation) Act. Natural justice like Ultra Vires and Public Policy is a branch of the public law and is a formidable weapon which can be wielded to secure justice to the citizen. While it may be used to protect certain fundamental liberties, civil and political rights, it may be used as indeed it is used more often than not, to protect vested interests and to obstruct the path of progressive change. The time has come to make an appropriate distinction between natural justice in its application to fundamental liberties, civil and political rights and natural justice in its application to vested interests. [590A-B] Our constitution as befits the Constitution of a Socialist Secular Democratic Republic, recognises the paramountcy of the public weal over the private interest. Natural justice, ultra vires, public policy, or any other rule of interpretation must, therefore, conform, grow and be tailored to serve the public interest and respond to the demands of an evolving society. [590C] The principles of natural justice have taken deep root in the judicial conscience of our people. They are now considered so fundamental as to be implicit in every decision making function, judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative. Where authority functions under a statute and the statute provides for the observance of the principles of natural justice in a particular manner, natural justice will have to be observed in that manner and in no other. Where the statute is silent about the observance of the principles of natural justice, such statutory silence is taken to imply compliance with the principles of natural justice. Where the conflict is between the public interest and the private interest the presumption must necessarily be weak and may, therefore, be readily displaced. The presumption is also weak, where what are involved are mere property rights. In cases of urgency, particularly where the public interest is involved, preemptive action may be a strategic necessity. Even in cases of preemptive action, if the statute so provides or if the Courts so deem fit in appropriate cases, a postponed hearing may be substituted for natural justice. [590A-C; 591F-G] 3(ii). Where natural justice is implied, the extent of the implication and the nature of the hearing must vary with the statute, the subject and the situation. [592B] The absence of the expression 'immediate action' in section 18AA(1)(b) does not make any difference. Section 18AA(1)(a) refers to a situation where immediate preventive action may avert a disaster, whereas section 18AA contemplates a situation where the disaster has occurred and action is necessary to restore normalcy. Restoration of production where production has stopped in a key industry or industrial undertaking is as important and urgent in the public interest as prevention of a situation where production may be affected. Immediate action is, therefore, as necessary in the situation contemplated by section 18AA(1)(b) as in the situation contemplated by section 18AA(1)(a). [596 F-G] The marginal note refers to the power to take over without investigation but there is no sufficient reason to suppose that the word immediate is used only to contra- distinguish it from the investigation contemplated by section 15 of the Act, though of course a consequence of immediate action under section 18AA may be to dispense with the enquiry under section 15. In fact, facts which come to light during the course of an investigation under section 15 may form the basis of action under section 18AA(1)(a). Where in the course of an investigation under section 15 it is discovered that the management have, by reckless investments or creation of encumbrances on the assets of the industrial undertaking or by diversion of funds brought about a situation which is likely to affect the production of the articles manufactured or produced in the industrial undertaking, if the Government is satisfied that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation, there is no reason why the Central Government may not straightaway take action under section 18AA(1)(a) without waiting for completion of investigation under section 15. [597A-B] Where there is a provision in the statute itself for revocation of the order by the very authority making the decision, it appears to be unnecessary to insist upon a pre- decisional observance of natural justice. [598A] The likelihood of production being jeopardized or the stoppage of production in a key industrial undertaking is a matter of grave concern affecting the public interest. Parliament has taken so serious a view of the matter that it has authorised the Central Government to take over the management of the industrial undertaking if immediate action may prevent jeopardy to production or restore production where it has already stopped. The necessity for immediate action by the Central Government contemplated by Parliament is definitely indicative of the exclusion of natural justice. It is not as if the owner of the industrial undertaking is left with no remedy. He may move the Central Government under section 18-F to cancel the order made under section 18AA. [598C-D] Neither section 18-F of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act nor section 21 of the General Clauses Act by itself excludes natural justice. The exclusion of natural justice where such exclusion is not express has to be implied by reference to the subject, the statute and the statutory situation. Where an express provision in the statute itself provides for a post decisional hearing the other provisions of the Statute will have to be read in the light of such provision and the provision for post- decisional hearing may then clinch the issue where pre- decisional natural justice appears to be excluded on the other terms of the statute. That a post-decisional hearing may also be had by the terms of section 21 of the General Clauses Act may not necessarily help in the interpretation of the provisions of the statute concerned. [599 A-C] Ridge v. Baldwin, 1964 A.C. p. 40; Annie G. Phillip v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 75 L.E.d. 1289; John H. Fahey v. Paul Mallonee, 91 L.E.d. 2030; Margarita Fuentes v. Robert L. Shevin, Attorney General of Florida, 32 L.E.d. 2d 556 and Lawrence Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 40 L.E.d. 2d 406, referred to. - Rama Rao, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh as well as the President of the Telugu Desam Party as well as respondent No. 3. The advertisements very shortly stated, refer to the auspicious gifts made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to the poor people on the eve of New Year and Sankranti. In the said advertisements, it is stated that the said Government which was formed by the Telugu Desam Party was giving to the poor people whose income was below Rs. and the said advertisements referred to a new scheme of selling sarees and dhoties at half prices to the poor people in the State of Andhra Pradesh having Green-cards. Moreover, the offer in the advertisements for the sale of dhoties and sarees at discount rates was in the nature of a benefit offered to poor persons in that State. When a Government announces the measures which are intended for the benefit of any of the classes for whose the Government can normally be expected to work like the poor or the economical backward classes, it is only in rare circumstances that such a promise can be said to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) even though such a promise might be made on the eve of elections. 8. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => '', 'counseldef' => '', 'court' => 'Supreme Court of India', 'court_type' => 'SC', 'decidedon' => '1989-09-29', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' K.N. Saikia,; M.H. Kania and; S. Ranganathan, JJ.', 'judgement' => '</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Kania, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. These two appeals arise out of the judgments in two Election Petitions in the Andhra Pradesh High Court questioning the election of respondent No. 1 as a Member of Parliament from Srikakulam No. Parliamentary Constituency in the 8th General Election to the House of the People. The points raised in these appeals are common and so are the relevant facts; and, hence, they are being disposed of by this common judgment. We propose to take note of only the few facts which are necessary for the appreciation of the controversy before us.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The polling date for the said election along with other parliamentary elections in the State of Andhra Pradesh was December 27, 1984 but in Srikakulam No. 1 Parliamentary Constituency the polling was countermanded and the date of polling was later fixed on January 28, 1985. In both the Election Petitions the election of respondent No. 1 was questioned mainly on the ground that Shri N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh as well as the President of the Telugu Desam Party as well as respondent No. 1 gave certain speeches and certain advertisements were got published by Shri N.T. Rama Rao through the Publicity Department of the Government of Andhra Pradesh in the newspapers containing certain statements which are alleged to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A) of the <a href="/act/50684/representation-of-the-people-act-1951-complete-act">Representation of the People Act, 1951</a> (hereinafter referred to as 'the said Act'). The main question canvassed before us is whether the statements contained in these aforesaid advertisements amount to a corrupt practice under Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act. Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act runs as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">123. Corrupt practices</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The following shall be deemed to be corrupt practises for the purposes of this Act :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) 'Bribery', that is to say.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(A) any gift, offer or promise by a candidate or his agent or by any other person with the consent of a candidate or his election agent of any gratification, to any person whomsover, with the object, directly or indirectly of inducing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) x x x</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) an elector to vote or refrain from voting at an election, or as a reward to.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) a person for having so stood or not stood, or for having withdrawn or not having withdrawn his candidature; or</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) an elector for having voted or refrained from voting.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The advertisements very shortly stated, refer to the auspicious gifts made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to the poor people on the eve of New Year and Sankranti. In the said advertisements, it is stated that the said Government which was formed by the Telugu Desam Party was giving to the poor people whose income was below Rs. 6,000 per year, a kilo of rice at Rs. 2 per Kg. and the said advertisements referred to a new scheme of selling sarees and dhoties at half prices to the poor people in the State of Andhra Pradesh having Green-cards. Green-cards were directed to be issued to all the persons whose annual income was below Rs. 6,000. The supply of the rice at subsidised rates as aforesaid was also to be made to the Green-card holders only. The scheme to sell sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was to be operative from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. In considering the question whether the said advertisement and the said speeches amount to a corrupt practice, we are of the view that the provisions of Section 123 of the said Act which deal with corrupt practices have to be interpreted, keeping in mind that dictates of commonsense require that they never could have been intended to treat normal election promises made in election manifestoes or usual election speeches by members of various political parties aspiring to power and by different candidates aspiring to get elected to legislative bodies concerned as corrupt practices. We are of the view that these advertisements and speeches amount to nothing more than statements extolling the achievements of the Government of the State of Andhra Pradesh under the Telugu Desam Party headed by N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister, and contain normal election promises and these statements do not amount to corrupt practices falling within the scope of Sub-clause (b) of Clause (A) of Sub-section (1) of Section 123 of the said Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. It was urged by Mr. Rao, learned Counsel for the appellants that in the impugned judgments, the High Court has incorrectly taken the view that in order to amount to bribery within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A), the transaction must amount to a bargain by the candidate with a view to get votes. It was pointed out by him that the said view has been taken in the impugned judgments, relying upon the decision of a Bench comprising to learned Judges of this Court in Ghasi Ram v. Dal Singh and Ors. :1983 SCR 102 . We have gone through to the relevant portion of that judgment (at page 109 and 110 of the said report). A careful perusal of the said judgment shows that what has been really held in that case is that if the promises given or made amount to a bargain entered into by a candidate for a vote or votes, that would amount to a corrupt practice; but it has not been held there that unless the act alleged amounts to such a bargain, it could not amount to a corrupt practice. In our view, that judgment does not lay down that in order to amount to a corrupt practice, the transaction must amount to a bargain for getting a vote. It was pointed out by Mr. Rao, however, that such a view seems to have been taken in two other decisions rendered by two Benches, each comprising two learned Judges of this Court in Bhanu Kumar Shastri v. Mohan Lal Sukhadia and Ors. : [1971]3SCR522 and Harjit Singh Mann v. S Umrao Singh and Ors. : [1980]2SCR501 . and these judgments need to be overruled. We do not propose to go into the correctness or otherwise of this view because, even on the footing that in order to amount to a corrupt practice under the aforesaid provision the alleged acts need not constitute a bargain, the the acts established in the present case, in our opinion, do not amount to a corrupt practice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Our attention was drawn by Mr. Rao to the fact that in this case the said advertisements and the speeches had to be viewed in the context of the fact that the advertisements were issued and the speeches were made after respondent No. 1 filed his nomination papers on January 4, 1985, for the election and before the election was held in the aforesaid constituency. It was further pointed out that the offer made for the sale of sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was limited to the period from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985. It cannot be denied that these factors are relevant factOrs. We cannot, however, lose sight of the fact that this offer was made not only in this constituency but throughout the State where the elections to the House of the People were scheduled to be held, and were, in fact, held on December 27, 1984. It was only in case of this constituency that the election to be held on the scheduled date was countermanded and later held on January 28, 1985. We cannot lose sight of the fact that, as far as the said speeches and the said advertisements, which were issued by the Publicity Department of the State, are concerned, they deal in the main with the achievements of the Government of Andhra Pradesh which, of course, was being run by Ministers belonging to Telugu Desam Party to which respondent No. 1 also belonged. Moreover, the offer in the advertisements for the sale of dhoties and sarees at discount rates was in the nature of a benefit offered to poor persons in that State. When a Government announces the measures which are intended for the benefit of any of the classes for whose the Government can normally be expected to work like the poor or the economical backward classes, it is only in rare circumstances that such a promise can be said to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) even though such a promise might be made on the eve of elections. Keeping this in mind, in our opinion, although the offer to sell dhoties and sarees at discount rates was of a limited duration as aforestated, it cannot be regarded as a corrupt practice. Such an offer was bound to have financial repercussions and it is quite possible the duration of the offer was limited to enable the Government to study the financial repercussions rather than from any improper motive. We find support for this view from the decision of this Court in H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh : [1969]3SCR813 . In that case an Ordinance was passed by the Government of Madhya Pradesh as a result of which a large number of agriculturists, namely, those holdings of plots of land of less than 7.5 acres area or paying land revenue not exceeding Rs. 5/- were exempted from the payment of the land revenue. It was held that such a concession does not amount to a gift, offer or promise of any gratification within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) of the said Act nor does the announcement of the declaration made at a meeting shortly before the election or the issue of a pamphlet containing that declaration at that time carry the matter any further. It was held that neither Shri D.P. Misra who was the Chief Minister nor Shri S.K. Dixit who acted as his agent were guilty of any corrupt practice within the meaning of the aforesaid provision.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. It was next contended by Mr. Rao, although very faintly, that the High Court was in error as it had not decided all other issues which were raised in the election petition. In this regard we cannot lose sight of the fact that the term of the present Lok Sabha is likely to be over within a few months and fresh elections are likely to be held and it would, therefore, be an exercise in futility to remand the matter to the High Court for deciding the remaining issues.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'AIR1990SC1889; JT1989(4)SC186; 1989(2)SCALE891; 1989Supp(2)SCC504', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors.', 'sub' => 'Election', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ), 'casename_url' => 'b-rajagopala-rao-vs-appayya-hanumanthu', 'args' => array( (int) 0 => '640942', (int) 1 => 'b-rajagopala-rao-vs-appayya-hanumanthu' ) ) $title_for_layout = 'B Rajagopala Rao and anr Vs Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors - Citation 640942 - Court Judgment | ' $desc = array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '640942', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/50684/representation-of-the-people-act-1951-complete-act">Representation of the People Act, 1951</a> - Sections 1, 3(1)(A), 123 and 123(1)(A)', 'appealno' => 'Civil Appeal Nos. 484 and 485 of 1987', 'appellant' => 'B. Rajagopala Rao and anr.', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'B. Rajagopala Rao and anr. Vs. Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors.', 'casenote' => 'Election - corrupt practices - Sections 123 and 123 (1) (A) of Representation of the People Act, 1951 - whether advertisements by public department and speeches made by respondent No. 1 to sell dhoti and sarees at discount rates amount to corrupt practices - offer was available for mass and for limited duration - such offer was bound to have financial repercussions and it is quite possible that duration of offer limited to enable Government to study financial repercussions rather than from any improper motive - offer not amounted to corrupt practices. - [ D.A. Desai,; O. Chinnappa Reddy and; R.S. Sarkaria, JJ.] The Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 empowers the Union of India in the public interest to take under its control the industries specified in the First Schedule to the Act. Item 23 of the First Schedule relates to textiles of various categories. Section 15 authorises the Central Government to make or cause to be made a full and complete investigation into the circumstances of the case if the Central Government is of the opinion that (a) in respect of any scheduled industry or industrial undertaking or undertakings (i) there has been, or is likely to be, a substantial fall in the volume of production for which, having regard to the economic conditions prevailing, there is no justification; or (ii) there has been, or is likely to be, a marked deterioration in the quality of any article... which could have been or can be avoided; or (iii) there has been or is likely to be a rise in the price of any article..... for which there is no justification; or (iv) it is necessary to take any such action for the purpose of conserving any resources of national importance; or (b) any industrial undertaking is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest. After the investigation is made under section 15, section 16(1) empowers the Central Government if action is desirable, to issue appropriate directions, and section 16(2) provides for the issue of interim directions by the Central Government pending investigation under section 15. Chapter III-A consisting of Sections 18A, 18-AA, 18-B, 18-C, 18-D, 18-E and 18-F deal with "direct management or control of Industrial Undertakings by Central Government in certain cases". Sec. 18-A empowers the Central Government by notified order, to authorise any person or body of persons to take over the management of the whole or any part of an industrial undertaking or to exercise in respect of the whole, or any part of the undertaking such functions of control as may be specified in the order, if the Central Government is of opinion that: (a) an industrial undertaking to which directions have been issued in pursuance of section 16 has failed to comply with such directions, or (b) an industrial undertaking in respect of which an investigation has been made under section 15 is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest. Section 18AA(5) stipulates that the provisions of Sections 18-B to 18 E shall be applicable to the industrial undertaking in respect of which an order has been made under section 18-AA even as they apply to an industrial undertaking taken over under Section 18-A. Section 18-F empowers the Central Government to cancel the order made under section 18-A if it appears that the purpose of the order has been fulfilled or it is not necessary that the order should remain in force. The appellant M/s. Swadeshi Cotton Mills was taken over by the Government of India by a notification dated April 13, 1978 in exercise of the powers conferred on it under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 18AA of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 on the ground that the company had by creation of encumbrances on the assets of its industrial undertakings, brought about a situation which had affected and is likely to further affect the production of articles manufactured or produced by it and that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation. The Government authorised the National Textile Corporation Limited to take over the management, subject to the conditions that the authorised person shall comply with all the directions issued from time to time by the Central Government and that the authorised person shall hold office for a period of five years. The appellant Mills challenged the aforesaid order in a writ petition in the High Court. The case was heard by a Full Bench of five Judges to consider the question whether in construing section 18AA of the Industries Development and Regulation Act, 1951, compliance with the principle of audi alteram partem is to be implied and whether hearing is to be given to the parties who would be affected by the order to be passed prior to the passing of the order or whether hearing can be given after the order is passed and whether the order passed under the said Section is vitiated by not giving of such hearing and whether such vice can be cured. The Bench by a majority answered the three questions as follows:- (a) Section 18AA(1)(a)(b) excludes the giving of prior hearing to the party who would be affected by order thereunder. (b) Section 18-F expressly provides for a post- decisional hearing to the owner of the industrial undertaking, the management of which is taken over under section 18AA to have the order made under section 18AA cancelled on any relevant ground. (c) As the taking over of management under section 18A is not vitiated by the failure to grant prior hearing the question of any such vice being cured by a grant of a subsequent hearing does not arise. The minority, however, held that in compliance with the principles of natural justice, prior hearing to the owner of the undertaking was required to be given before the passing of an order under section 18AA, that the second question did not arise as the denial of a prior hearing would not cure the vice by the grant of subsequent hearing, but it would be open to the Court to moderate the relief in such a way that the order is kept alive to the extent necessary until the making of the fresh order to subserve public interest and to make appropriate directions. After the decision on the reference the case was reheard on merits by a Full Bench of three Judges and the writ petition was allowed in part. The challenge to the validity of the order being rejected but insofar as the impugned order seeking to take over the corporate entity of the company, the corporate entity of the subsidiary and its assets, the petition was allowed and the respondents, the Union of India and the authorised person were directed to release from its control and custody and/or deliver possession of any assets or property of the company which were not referable to the industrial undertakings. Appeals to this Court were filed on behalf of the Company as well as by the Union of India and the National Textile Corporation. Two propositions were propounded on behalf of the company that: (a) Whether it was necessary to observe the rules of natural justice before issuing a notified order under section 18AA(1)(a) and further whether section 18-F impliedly excludes rules of natural justice relating to prior hearing; and it was contended (1) the mere use of the word 'immediate' in sub-clause (a) of section 18AA does not show a legislative intent to exclude the application of audi alteram partem rule altogether. (2) The word 'immediate' in clause (a) has been used in contra distinction to 'investigate'. It only means that under section 18AA action can be taken without prior investigation under section 15. The use of the word 'immediate' in section 18AA(1)(a) only dispenses with investigation under section 15 and not with the principle of audi alteram partem altogether and this is indicated by the marginal note of section 18A and para 3 of the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Amendment Bill which inserted section 18AA in 1971. (3) The word 'immediate' occurs only in clause (a) and not in clause (b) of section 18AA(1). It would be odd if intention to exclude this principle of natural justice is spelt out in one clause of the sub-section when the other clause does not exclude it. (4) Section 18-F does not exclude a pre-decisional hearing. The so-called post-decisional hearing contemplated by section 18-F cannot be and is not intended to be a substitute for a pre-decisional hearing. (5) Section 18F incorporates only a facet, albeit qualified, of section 21 of the General Clauses Act. The language of the Section implicity prohibits an enquiry into circumstances that led to the passing of the order of take-over and under it the aggrieved person is not entitled to show that on merits the order was void ab initio. (6) 'Immediacy' does not exclude a duty to act fairly because even an emergent situation can co-exist with the canons of natural justice. The only effect of urgency on the application of the principle of fair hearing would be that the width, form and duration of the hearing would be tailored to the situation and reduced to the reasonable minimum so that it does not delay and defeat the purpose of the contemplated action. (7) Where the civil consequences of the administrative action are grave and its effect is highly prejudicial to the rights and interests of the person affected and there is nothing in the language and scheme of the statute which unequivocally excludes a fair pre-decisional hearing and the post-decisional hearing provided therein is not a real remedial hearing equitable to a full right of appeal the Court should be loath to infer a legislative intent to exclude even a minimal fair hearing at the pre-decisional stage merely on ground of urgency. (8) The Central Government appointed four Government Officials including one from the office of the Textile Commissioner to study the affairs of the Company and to make recommendation. This Official Group submitted its report on February 16, 1978. The evidence on the basis of which the impugned order was passed was not disclosed to the appellant company till May 1978, only after it had filed the writ petition in the High Court. If there was anything adverse to the appellants in the survey report there was time enough about six weeks between the submission of the Survey Report and the passing of the impugned order for giving a short, reasonable opportunity to the appellants to explain the adverse findings against them. If there was immediacy situational modifications could be made to meet the requirement of fairness, by reducing the period of notice; that even the manner and form of such notice could be simplified to eliminate delay, that telephonic notice or short opportunity for furnishing their explanation to the Company might have satisfied the requirements of natural justice. Such an opportunity of hearing could have been given after the passing of a conditional tentative order and before its enforcement under section 18AA. For the interregnum suitable interim action such as freezing the assets of the Company or restraining the Company from creating further encumbrances, could be taken under section 16. On behalf of the Union of India and the Authorised Officer it was contended that (1) the presumption in favour of audi alteram partem rule stands impliedly displaced by the language scheme, setting and the purpose of the provision in section 18AA. (2) Section 18AA on its plain terms deals with situations where immediate preventive action is required. The paramount concern is to avoid serious problems which may be caused by fall in production. The purpose of an order under section 18AA is not to condemn the owner but to protect the scheduled industry. The issue under section 18AA is not solely between the Government and the management of the industrial undertaking. The object of taking action under this Section is to protect other outside interests of the community at large and the workers. (3) The rule of natural justice to give a hearing has been incorporated in section 18-F which gives an opportunity of a post-decisional hearing to the owner of the undertaking who if he feels aggrieved can on his application be heard, to show that even the original order under section 18AA was passed on invalid grounds and should be cancelled or rescinded. (4) On a true construction of section 18AA read with section 18-F the requirements of natural justice and fair play can be read into the statute only insofar as conformance to such canons can reasonably and realistically be required of it by the provision for a remedial hearing at a subsequent stage. (5) Under section 18-F the Central Government exercises curial functions and that Section confers on the aggrieved owner a right to apply to the Government to cancel the order of take-over. This section casts an obligation on the Central Government to deal with and dispose of an application filed thereunder with reasonable expedition. Allowing the appeal by the Company,<br/>HELD: (Sarkaria & Desai, JJ. per Chinnappa Reddy, J. dissenting.) In the facts and circumstances of the instant case, there has been a noncompliance with the implied requirement of the audi alteram partem rule of natural justice at the pre-decisional stage. The impugned order could be struck down as invalid on that score alone. But in view of the commitment / concession that a hearing would be afforded to the Company, the case is remitted to the Central Government to give a full, fair and effective hearing. [587G-H, 588C] The phrase 'natural justice' is not capable of a static and precise definition. It cannot be imprisoned in the straight-jacket of a cast-iron formula. Rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. Hence not possible to make an exhaustive catalogue of such rules. Two fundamental maxims of natural justice have now become deeply and indelibly ingrained in the common consciousness of mankind as pre-eminently necessary to ensure that the law is applied impartially objectively and fairly. These twin principles are (i) audi alteram partem and (ii) nemo judex in re sua. Audi alteram partem is a highly effective rule devised by the Courts to ensure that a statutory authority arrives at a just decision and it is calculated to act as a healthy check on the abuse or misuse of power. Its reach should not be narrowed and its applicability circumscribed.[554C-G] The rules of natural justice can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. If a statutory provision either specifically or by inevitable implication excludes the application of the rules of natural justice then the Court cannot ignore the mandate of the Legislature. Whether or not the application of the principles of natural justice in a given case has been excluded in the exercise of statutory power depends upon the language and basic scheme of the provision conferring the power, the nature of the power the purpose for which it is conferred and the effect of that power. [556A-B] The maxim audi alteram partem has many facets. Two of them are (a) notice of the case to be met, and (b) opportunity to explain. The rule cannot be sacrificed at the altar of administrative convenience or celerity; for, convenience and justice are often not on speaking terms. Difficulties, however, arise when the statute conferring the power does not expressly exclude this rule but its exclusion is sought by implication due to the presence of certain factors such as urgency where the obligation to give notice and opportunity to be heard would obstruct the taking of prompt action of a preventive or remedial nature. Audi alteram partem rule may be disregarded in an emergent situation where immediate action brooks no delay to prevent some imminent danger or injury or hazard to paramount public interests. Section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure empowers the magistrates specified therein to make an exparte conditional order in emergent cases for removal of dangerous public nuisances. Action under section 17 Land Acquisition Act furnishes another such instance. Similarly action on grounds of public safety public health may justify disregard of the rule of prior hearing. [556C-H] Cases where owing to the compulsion of the fact situation or the necessity of taking speedy action no pre- decisional hearing is given but the action, is followed soon by a full post-decisional hearing to the person affected do not in reality constitute an exception to the audi alteram partem rule. To call such cases as exception is a misnomer because they do not exclude fair play in action but adapt it to the urgency of the situation by balancing the competing claims of hurry and hearing. [560H-561A] The general principle as distinguished from an absolute rule of uniform application seems to be that where a statute does not in terms exclude this rule of prior hearing but contemplates a post-decisional hearing amounting to a full review of the original order on merits then such a statute would be construed as excluding the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage. [561G] If the statute conferring the power is silent with regard to the giving of pre-decisional hearing to the person affected and the administrative decision taken by the authority involves civil consequences of a grave nature and no full review or appeal on merits against that decision is provided courts will be extremely reluctant to construe such a statute as excluding the duty of affording even a minimal hearing shorn of all its formal trappings and dilatory features at the pre-decisional stage, unless viewed pragmatically it would paralyse the administrative process or frustrate the need for utmost promptitude. [561H] 7(i). A comparison of the provisions of Section 18A(1)(b) and Section 18AA(1)(c), bring out two main points of distinction: First, action under Section 18A(1)(b) can be taken only after an investigation had been made under Section 15; while under Section 18AA(1)(a) or (b) action can be taken without such investigation. The language, scheme and setting of Section 18AA read in the light of the Objects and Reasons for enacting this provision make this position clear beyond doubt. Second, before taking action under Section 18A(1)(b), the Central Government has to form an opinion on the basis of the investigation conducted under section 15, in regard to the existence of the objective fact, namely: that the industrial undertaking is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest; while under section 18A(1)(a) the Government has to satisfy itself that the persons incharge of the undertaking have brought about a situation likely to cause fall in production, by committing any of the three kinds of acts specified in that provision. This shows that the preliminary objective fact attributable to the persons in charge of the management or affairs of the undertaking, on the basis of which action may be taken under section 18(A)(1)(b), is of far wider amplitude than the circumstance, the existence of which is a sine qua non for taking action under section 18AA(1). The phrase "highly detrimental to the scheduled industry or public interest" in section 18-A is capable of being construed to cover a large variety of acts or things which may be considered wrong with the manner of running the industry by the management. In contrast with it, action under section 18AA(1)(a) can be taken only if the Central Government is satisfied with regard to the existence of the twin conditions specifically mentioned therein, on the basis of evidence in its possession. [569D-H] An analysis of section 18AA(1)(a), indicates that as a necessary preliminary to the exercise of the power thereunder, the Central Government must be satisfied "from documentary or other evidence in its possession" in regard to the co-existence of two circumstances: (i) that the persons in charge of the industrial undertaking have by committing any of these acts, namely, reckless investments, or creation of incumbrances on the assets of industrial undertaking, or by diversion of funds, brought about a situation which is likely to affect the production of the article manufactured or produced in the industrial undertaking, and (ii) that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation.[570B-D] It cannot be laid down as a general proposition that whenever a statute confers a power on an administrative authority and makes the exercise of that power conditional on the formation of an opinion by that authority in regard to the existence of an immediacy, its opinion in regard to that preliminary fact is not open to judicial scrutiny at all. While it may be conceded that an element of subjectivity is always involved in the formation of such an opinion, the existence of the circumstances from which the inference constituting the opinion, as the sine qua non for action, are to be drawn, must be demonstrable, and the existence of such "circumstances", if questioned, must be proved at least prima facie. [571 E-G] From a plain reading of section 18AA, it is clear that it does not expressly in unmistakable and unequivocal terms exclude the application of the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage. [574B] In the instant case, so far as Kanpur Unit is concerned, it was lying closed for more than three months before the passing of the impugned order. There was no 'immediacy' in relation to that unit, which could absolve the Government from the obligation of complying fully with audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional or pre- takeover stage. [583A] Keshav Mills Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, [1973] 3 S.C.R. 22; Kamla Prasad Khetan v. Union of India,[1957] S.C.R. 1052; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 621; Sukhdev Singh & Ors. v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh, [1975] 3 S.C.R. 619; A. K. Kraipak v. Union of India, [1970] 1 S.C.R. 457; Ridge v. Baldwin, [1964] A.C. 40; 196; Heatley v. Tasmanian Racing & Gaming Commission, 14 Australian Law Reports 519; Nawabkhan Abbaskhan v. State of Gujarat, [1974] 3 S.C.R. 427; State of Orissa v. Dr. Bina Pani Dei, [1962] 2 S.C.R. 625; Ambalal M. Shah v. Hathi Singh Manufacturing Co. Ltd. [1962] 3 S.C.R. 171; and S. L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan & Ors., [1981] 1 S.C.R. 746, referred to. (Per Chinnappa Reddy, J. dissenting) The principles of natural justice are not attracted to the situations contemplated by section 18AA of Industries (Development and Regulation) Act. Natural justice like Ultra Vires and Public Policy is a branch of the public law and is a formidable weapon which can be wielded to secure justice to the citizen. While it may be used to protect certain fundamental liberties, civil and political rights, it may be used as indeed it is used more often than not, to protect vested interests and to obstruct the path of progressive change. The time has come to make an appropriate distinction between natural justice in its application to fundamental liberties, civil and political rights and natural justice in its application to vested interests. [590A-B] Our constitution as befits the Constitution of a Socialist Secular Democratic Republic, recognises the paramountcy of the public weal over the private interest. Natural justice, ultra vires, public policy, or any other rule of interpretation must, therefore, conform, grow and be tailored to serve the public interest and respond to the demands of an evolving society. [590C] The principles of natural justice have taken deep root in the judicial conscience of our people. They are now considered so fundamental as to be implicit in every decision making function, judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative. Where authority functions under a statute and the statute provides for the observance of the principles of natural justice in a particular manner, natural justice will have to be observed in that manner and in no other. Where the statute is silent about the observance of the principles of natural justice, such statutory silence is taken to imply compliance with the principles of natural justice. Where the conflict is between the public interest and the private interest the presumption must necessarily be weak and may, therefore, be readily displaced. The presumption is also weak, where what are involved are mere property rights. In cases of urgency, particularly where the public interest is involved, preemptive action may be a strategic necessity. Even in cases of preemptive action, if the statute so provides or if the Courts so deem fit in appropriate cases, a postponed hearing may be substituted for natural justice. [590A-C; 591F-G] 3(ii). Where natural justice is implied, the extent of the implication and the nature of the hearing must vary with the statute, the subject and the situation. [592B] The absence of the expression 'immediate action' in section 18AA(1)(b) does not make any difference. Section 18AA(1)(a) refers to a situation where immediate preventive action may avert a disaster, whereas section 18AA contemplates a situation where the disaster has occurred and action is necessary to restore normalcy. Restoration of production where production has stopped in a key industry or industrial undertaking is as important and urgent in the public interest as prevention of a situation where production may be affected. Immediate action is, therefore, as necessary in the situation contemplated by section 18AA(1)(b) as in the situation contemplated by section 18AA(1)(a). [596 F-G] The marginal note refers to the power to take over without investigation but there is no sufficient reason to suppose that the word immediate is used only to contra- distinguish it from the investigation contemplated by section 15 of the Act, though of course a consequence of immediate action under section 18AA may be to dispense with the enquiry under section 15. In fact, facts which come to light during the course of an investigation under section 15 may form the basis of action under section 18AA(1)(a). Where in the course of an investigation under section 15 it is discovered that the management have, by reckless investments or creation of encumbrances on the assets of the industrial undertaking or by diversion of funds brought about a situation which is likely to affect the production of the articles manufactured or produced in the industrial undertaking, if the Government is satisfied that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation, there is no reason why the Central Government may not straightaway take action under section 18AA(1)(a) without waiting for completion of investigation under section 15. [597A-B] Where there is a provision in the statute itself for revocation of the order by the very authority making the decision, it appears to be unnecessary to insist upon a pre- decisional observance of natural justice. [598A] The likelihood of production being jeopardized or the stoppage of production in a key industrial undertaking is a matter of grave concern affecting the public interest. Parliament has taken so serious a view of the matter that it has authorised the Central Government to take over the management of the industrial undertaking if immediate action may prevent jeopardy to production or restore production where it has already stopped. The necessity for immediate action by the Central Government contemplated by Parliament is definitely indicative of the exclusion of natural justice. It is not as if the owner of the industrial undertaking is left with no remedy. He may move the Central Government under section 18-F to cancel the order made under section 18AA. [598C-D] Neither section 18-F of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act nor section 21 of the General Clauses Act by itself excludes natural justice. The exclusion of natural justice where such exclusion is not express has to be implied by reference to the subject, the statute and the statutory situation. Where an express provision in the statute itself provides for a post decisional hearing the other provisions of the Statute will have to be read in the light of such provision and the provision for post- decisional hearing may then clinch the issue where pre- decisional natural justice appears to be excluded on the other terms of the statute. That a post-decisional hearing may also be had by the terms of section 21 of the General Clauses Act may not necessarily help in the interpretation of the provisions of the statute concerned. [599 A-C] Ridge v. Baldwin, 1964 A.C. p. 40; Annie G. Phillip v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 75 L.E.d. 1289; John H. Fahey v. Paul Mallonee, 91 L.E.d. 2030; Margarita Fuentes v. Robert L. Shevin, Attorney General of Florida, 32 L.E.d. 2d 556 and Lawrence Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 40 L.E.d. 2d 406, referred to. - Rama Rao, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh as well as the President of the Telugu Desam Party as well as respondent No. 3. The advertisements very shortly stated, refer to the auspicious gifts made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to the poor people on the eve of New Year and Sankranti. In the said advertisements, it is stated that the said Government which was formed by the Telugu Desam Party was giving to the poor people whose income was below Rs. and the said advertisements referred to a new scheme of selling sarees and dhoties at half prices to the poor people in the State of Andhra Pradesh having Green-cards. Moreover, the offer in the advertisements for the sale of dhoties and sarees at discount rates was in the nature of a benefit offered to poor persons in that State. When a Government announces the measures which are intended for the benefit of any of the classes for whose the Government can normally be expected to work like the poor or the economical backward classes, it is only in rare circumstances that such a promise can be said to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) even though such a promise might be made on the eve of elections. 8. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => '', 'counseldef' => '', 'court' => 'Supreme Court of India', 'court_type' => 'SC', 'decidedon' => '1989-09-29', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' K.N. Saikia,; M.H. Kania and; S. Ranganathan, JJ.', 'judgement' => '</p><p>Kania, J.</p><p>1. These two appeals arise out of the judgments in two Election Petitions in the Andhra Pradesh High Court questioning the election of respondent No. 1 as a Member of Parliament from Srikakulam No. Parliamentary Constituency in the 8th General Election to the House of the People. The points raised in these appeals are common and so are the relevant facts; and, hence, they are being disposed of by this common judgment. We propose to take note of only the few facts which are necessary for the appreciation of the controversy before us.</p><p>2. The polling date for the said election along with other parliamentary elections in the State of Andhra Pradesh was December 27, 1984 but in Srikakulam No. 1 Parliamentary Constituency the polling was countermanded and the date of polling was later fixed on January 28, 1985. In both the Election Petitions the election of respondent No. 1 was questioned mainly on the ground that Shri N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh as well as the President of the Telugu Desam Party as well as respondent No. 1 gave certain speeches and certain advertisements were got published by Shri N.T. Rama Rao through the Publicity Department of the Government of Andhra Pradesh in the newspapers containing certain statements which are alleged to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A) of the <a>Representation of the People Act, 1951</a> (hereinafter referred to as 'the said Act'). The main question canvassed before us is whether the statements contained in these aforesaid advertisements amount to a corrupt practice under Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act. Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act runs as follows :</p><p>123. Corrupt practices</p><p>The following shall be deemed to be corrupt practises for the purposes of this Act :</p><p>(1) 'Bribery', that is to say.</p><p>(A) any gift, offer or promise by a candidate or his agent or by any other person with the consent of a candidate or his election agent of any gratification, to any person whomsover, with the object, directly or indirectly of inducing.</p><p>(a) x x x</p><p>(b) an elector to vote or refrain from voting at an election, or as a reward to.</p><p>(i) a person for having so stood or not stood, or for having withdrawn or not having withdrawn his candidature; or</p><p>(ii) an elector for having voted or refrained from voting.</p><p>3. The advertisements very shortly stated, refer to the auspicious gifts made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to the poor people on the eve of New Year and Sankranti. In the said advertisements, it is stated that the said Government which was formed by the Telugu Desam Party was giving to the poor people whose income was below Rs. 6,000 per year, a kilo of rice at Rs. 2 per Kg. and the said advertisements referred to a new scheme of selling sarees and dhoties at half prices to the poor people in the State of Andhra Pradesh having Green-cards. Green-cards were directed to be issued to all the persons whose annual income was below Rs. 6,000. The supply of the rice at subsidised rates as aforesaid was also to be made to the Green-card holders only. The scheme to sell sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was to be operative from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985.</p><p>4. In considering the question whether the said advertisement and the said speeches amount to a corrupt practice, we are of the view that the provisions of Section 123 of the said Act which deal with corrupt practices have to be interpreted, keeping in mind that dictates of commonsense require that they never could have been intended to treat normal election promises made in election manifestoes or usual election speeches by members of various political parties aspiring to power and by different candidates aspiring to get elected to legislative bodies concerned as corrupt practices. We are of the view that these advertisements and speeches amount to nothing more than statements extolling the achievements of the Government of the State of Andhra Pradesh under the Telugu Desam Party headed by N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister, and contain normal election promises and these statements do not amount to corrupt practices falling within the scope of Sub-clause (b) of Clause (A) of Sub-section (1) of Section 123 of the said Act.</p><p>5. It was urged by Mr. Rao, learned Counsel for the appellants that in the impugned judgments, the High Court has incorrectly taken the view that in order to amount to bribery within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A), the transaction must amount to a bargain by the candidate with a view to get votes. It was pointed out by him that the said view has been taken in the impugned judgments, relying upon the decision of a Bench comprising to learned Judges of this Court in Ghasi Ram v. Dal Singh and Ors. :1983 SCR 102 . We have gone through to the relevant portion of that judgment (at page 109 and 110 of the said report). A careful perusal of the said judgment shows that what has been really held in that case is that if the promises given or made amount to a bargain entered into by a candidate for a vote or votes, that would amount to a corrupt practice; but it has not been held there that unless the act alleged amounts to such a bargain, it could not amount to a corrupt practice. In our view, that judgment does not lay down that in order to amount to a corrupt practice, the transaction must amount to a bargain for getting a vote. It was pointed out by Mr. Rao, however, that such a view seems to have been taken in two other decisions rendered by two Benches, each comprising two learned Judges of this Court in Bhanu Kumar Shastri v. Mohan Lal Sukhadia and Ors. : [1971]3SCR522 and Harjit Singh Mann v. S Umrao Singh and Ors. : [1980]2SCR501 . and these judgments need to be overruled. We do not propose to go into the correctness or otherwise of this view because, even on the footing that in order to amount to a corrupt practice under the aforesaid provision the alleged acts need not constitute a bargain, the the acts established in the present case, in our opinion, do not amount to a corrupt practice.</p><p>6. Our attention was drawn by Mr. Rao to the fact that in this case the said advertisements and the speeches had to be viewed in the context of the fact that the advertisements were issued and the speeches were made after respondent No. 1 filed his nomination papers on January 4, 1985, for the election and before the election was held in the aforesaid constituency. It was further pointed out that the offer made for the sale of sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was limited to the period from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985. It cannot be denied that these factors are relevant factOrs. We cannot, however, lose sight of the fact that this offer was made not only in this constituency but throughout the State where the elections to the House of the People were scheduled to be held, and were, in fact, held on December 27, 1984. It was only in case of this constituency that the election to be held on the scheduled date was countermanded and later held on January 28, 1985. We cannot lose sight of the fact that, as far as the said speeches and the said advertisements, which were issued by the Publicity Department of the State, are concerned, they deal in the main with the achievements of the Government of Andhra Pradesh which, of course, was being run by Ministers belonging to Telugu Desam Party to which respondent No. 1 also belonged. Moreover, the offer in the advertisements for the sale of dhoties and sarees at discount rates was in the nature of a benefit offered to poor persons in that State. When a Government announces the measures which are intended for the benefit of any of the classes for whose the Government can normally be expected to work like the poor or the economical backward classes, it is only in rare circumstances that such a promise can be said to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) even though such a promise might be made on the eve of elections. Keeping this in mind, in our opinion, although the offer to sell dhoties and sarees at discount rates was of a limited duration as aforestated, it cannot be regarded as a corrupt practice. Such an offer was bound to have financial repercussions and it is quite possible the duration of the offer was limited to enable the Government to study the financial repercussions rather than from any improper motive. We find support for this view from the decision of this Court in H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh : [1969]3SCR813 . In that case an Ordinance was passed by the Government of Madhya Pradesh as a result of which a large number of agriculturists, namely, those holdings of plots of land of less than 7.5 acres area or paying land revenue not exceeding Rs. 5/- were exempted from the payment of the land revenue. It was held that such a concession does not amount to a gift, offer or promise of any gratification within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) of the said Act nor does the announcement of the declaration made at a meeting shortly before the election or the issue of a pamphlet containing that declaration at that time carry the matter any further. It was held that neither Shri D.P. Misra who was the Chief Minister nor Shri S.K. Dixit who acted as his agent were guilty of any corrupt practice within the meaning of the aforesaid provision.</p><p>7. It was next contended by Mr. Rao, although very faintly, that the High Court was in error as it had not decided all other issues which were raised in the election petition. In this regard we cannot lose sight of the fact that the term of the present Lok Sabha is likely to be over within a few months and fresh elections are likely to be held and it would, therefore, be an exercise in futility to remand the matter to the High Court for deciding the remaining issues.</p><p>8. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.<p></p><p>', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'AIR1990SC1889; JT1989(4)SC186; 1989(2)SCALE891; 1989Supp(2)SCC504', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors.', 'sub' => 'Election', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ) $casename_url = 'b-rajagopala-rao-vs-appayya-hanumanthu' $args = array( (int) 0 => '640942', (int) 1 => 'b-rajagopala-rao-vs-appayya-hanumanthu' ) $url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/640942/b-rajagopala-rao-vs-appayya-hanumanthu' $ctype = '' $caseref = 'H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh<br>' $content = array( (int) 0 => '', (int) 1 => '<p>Kania, J.', (int) 2 => '<p>1. These two appeals arise out of the judgments in two Election Petitions in the Andhra Pradesh High Court questioning the election of respondent No. 1 as a Member of Parliament from Srikakulam No. Parliamentary Constituency in the 8th General Election to the House of the People. The points raised in these appeals are common and so are the relevant facts; and, hence, they are being disposed of by this common judgment. We propose to take note of only the few facts which are necessary for the appreciation of the controversy before us.', (int) 3 => '<p>2. The polling date for the said election along with other parliamentary elections in the State of Andhra Pradesh was December 27, 1984 but in Srikakulam No. 1 Parliamentary Constituency the polling was countermanded and the date of polling was later fixed on January 28, 1985. In both the Election Petitions the election of respondent No. 1 was questioned mainly on the ground that Shri N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh as well as the President of the Telugu Desam Party as well as respondent No. 1 gave certain speeches and certain advertisements were got published by Shri N.T. Rama Rao through the Publicity Department of the Government of Andhra Pradesh in the newspapers containing certain statements which are alleged to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A) of the <a>Representation of the People Act, 1951</a> (hereinafter referred to as 'the said Act'). The main question canvassed before us is whether the statements contained in these aforesaid advertisements amount to a corrupt practice under Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act. Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act runs as follows :', (int) 4 => '<p>123. Corrupt practices', (int) 5 => '<p>The following shall be deemed to be corrupt practises for the purposes of this Act :', (int) 6 => '<p>(1) 'Bribery', that is to say.', (int) 7 => '<p>(A) any gift, offer or promise by a candidate or his agent or by any other person with the consent of a candidate or his election agent of any gratification, to any person whomsover, with the object, directly or indirectly of inducing.', (int) 8 => '<p>(a) x x x', (int) 9 => '<p>(b) an elector to vote or refrain from voting at an election, or as a reward to.', (int) 10 => '<p>(i) a person for having so stood or not stood, or for having withdrawn or not having withdrawn his candidature; or', (int) 11 => '<p>(ii) an elector for having voted or refrained from voting.', (int) 12 => '<p>3. The advertisements very shortly stated, refer to the auspicious gifts made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to the poor people on the eve of New Year and Sankranti. In the said advertisements, it is stated that the said Government which was formed by the Telugu Desam Party was giving to the poor people whose income was below Rs. 6,000 per year, a kilo of rice at Rs. 2 per Kg. and the said advertisements referred to a new scheme of selling sarees and dhoties at half prices to the poor people in the State of Andhra Pradesh having Green-cards. Green-cards were directed to be issued to all the persons whose annual income was below Rs. 6,000. The supply of the rice at subsidised rates as aforesaid was also to be made to the Green-card holders only. The scheme to sell sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was to be operative from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985.', (int) 13 => '<p>4. In considering the question whether the said advertisement and the said speeches amount to a corrupt practice, we are of the view that the provisions of Section 123 of the said Act which deal with corrupt practices have to be interpreted, keeping in mind that dictates of commonsense require that they never could have been intended to treat normal election promises made in election manifestoes or usual election speeches by members of various political parties aspiring to power and by different candidates aspiring to get elected to legislative bodies concerned as corrupt practices. We are of the view that these advertisements and speeches amount to nothing more than statements extolling the achievements of the Government of the State of Andhra Pradesh under the Telugu Desam Party headed by N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister, and contain normal election promises and these statements do not amount to corrupt practices falling within the scope of Sub-clause (b) of Clause (A) of Sub-section (1) of Section 123 of the said Act.', (int) 14 => '<p>5. It was urged by Mr. Rao, learned Counsel for the appellants that in the impugned judgments, the High Court has incorrectly taken the view that in order to amount to bribery within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A), the transaction must amount to a bargain by the candidate with a view to get votes. It was pointed out by him that the said view has been taken in the impugned judgments, relying upon the decision of a Bench comprising to learned Judges of this Court in Ghasi Ram v. Dal Singh and Ors. :1983 SCR 102 . We have gone through to the relevant portion of that judgment (at page 109 and 110 of the said report). A careful perusal of the said judgment shows that what has been really held in that case is that if the promises given or made amount to a bargain entered into by a candidate for a vote or votes, that would amount to a corrupt practice; but it has not been held there that unless the act alleged amounts to such a bargain, it could not amount to a corrupt practice. In our view, that judgment does not lay down that in order to amount to a corrupt practice, the transaction must amount to a bargain for getting a vote. It was pointed out by Mr. Rao, however, that such a view seems to have been taken in two other decisions rendered by two Benches, each comprising two learned Judges of this Court in Bhanu Kumar Shastri v. Mohan Lal Sukhadia and Ors. : [1971]3SCR522 and Harjit Singh Mann v. S Umrao Singh and Ors. : [1980]2SCR501 . and these judgments need to be overruled. We do not propose to go into the correctness or otherwise of this view because, even on the footing that in order to amount to a corrupt practice under the aforesaid provision the alleged acts need not constitute a bargain, the the acts established in the present case, in our opinion, do not amount to a corrupt practice.', (int) 15 => '<p>6. Our attention was drawn by Mr. Rao to the fact that in this case the said advertisements and the speeches had to be viewed in the context of the fact that the advertisements were issued and the speeches were made after respondent No. 1 filed his nomination papers on January 4, 1985, for the election and before the election was held in the aforesaid constituency. It was further pointed out that the offer made for the sale of sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was limited to the period from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985. It cannot be denied that these factors are relevant factOrs. We cannot, however, lose sight of the fact that this offer was made not only in this constituency but throughout the State where the elections to the House of the People were scheduled to be held, and were, in fact, held on December 27, 1984. It was only in case of this constituency that the election to be held on the scheduled date was countermanded and later held on January 28, 1985. We cannot lose sight of the fact that, as far as the said speeches and the said advertisements, which were issued by the Publicity Department of the State, are concerned, they deal in the main with the achievements of the Government of Andhra Pradesh which, of course, was being run by Ministers belonging to Telugu Desam Party to which respondent No. 1 also belonged. Moreover, the offer in the advertisements for the sale of dhoties and sarees at discount rates was in the nature of a benefit offered to poor persons in that State. When a Government announces the measures which are intended for the benefit of any of the classes for whose the Government can normally be expected to work like the poor or the economical backward classes, it is only in rare circumstances that such a promise can be said to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) even though such a promise might be made on the eve of elections. Keeping this in mind, in our opinion, although the offer to sell dhoties and sarees at discount rates was of a limited duration as aforestated, it cannot be regarded as a corrupt practice. Such an offer was bound to have financial repercussions and it is quite possible the duration of the offer was limited to enable the Government to study the financial repercussions rather than from any improper motive. We find support for this view from the decision of this Court in H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh : [1969]3SCR813 . In that case an Ordinance was passed by the Government of Madhya Pradesh as a result of which a large number of agriculturists, namely, those holdings of plots of land of less than 7.5 acres area or paying land revenue not exceeding Rs. 5/- were exempted from the payment of the land revenue. It was held that such a concession does not amount to a gift, offer or promise of any gratification within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) of the said Act nor does the announcement of the declaration made at a meeting shortly before the election or the issue of a pamphlet containing that declaration at that time carry the matter any further. It was held that neither Shri D.P. Misra who was the Chief Minister nor Shri S.K. Dixit who acted as his agent were guilty of any corrupt practice within the meaning of the aforesaid provision.', (int) 16 => '<p>7. It was next contended by Mr. Rao, although very faintly, that the High Court was in error as it had not decided all other issues which were raised in the election petition. In this regard we cannot lose sight of the fact that the term of the present Lok Sabha is likely to be over within a few months and fresh elections are likely to be held and it would, therefore, be an exercise in futility to remand the matter to the High Court for deciding the remaining issues.', (int) 17 => '<p>8. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.<p>', (int) 18 => '<p>' ) $paragraphAfter = (int) 1 $cnt = (int) 19 $i = (int) 7include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144 View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971 View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933 View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473 Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963 Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200 Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167 [main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109
(A) any gift, offer or promise by a candidate or his agent or by any other person with the consent of a candidate or his election agent of any gratification, to any person whomsover, with the object, directly or indirectly of inducing.
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$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp' $dataForView = array( 'title_for_layout' => 'B Rajagopala Rao and anr Vs Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors - Citation 640942 - Court Judgment | ', 'desc' => array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '640942', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/50684/representation-of-the-people-act-1951-complete-act">Representation of the People Act, 1951</a> - Sections 1, 3(1)(A), 123 and 123(1)(A)', 'appealno' => 'Civil Appeal Nos. 484 and 485 of 1987', 'appellant' => 'B. Rajagopala Rao and anr.', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'B. Rajagopala Rao and anr. Vs. Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors.', 'casenote' => 'Election - corrupt practices - Sections 123 and 123 (1) (A) of Representation of the People Act, 1951 - whether advertisements by public department and speeches made by respondent No. 1 to sell dhoti and sarees at discount rates amount to corrupt practices - offer was available for mass and for limited duration - such offer was bound to have financial repercussions and it is quite possible that duration of offer limited to enable Government to study financial repercussions rather than from any improper motive - offer not amounted to corrupt practices. - [ D.A. Desai,; O. Chinnappa Reddy and; R.S. Sarkaria, JJ.] The Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 empowers the Union of India in the public interest to take under its control the industries specified in the First Schedule to the Act. Item 23 of the First Schedule relates to textiles of various categories. Section 15 authorises the Central Government to make or cause to be made a full and complete investigation into the circumstances of the case if the Central Government is of the opinion that (a) in respect of any scheduled industry or industrial undertaking or undertakings (i) there has been, or is likely to be, a substantial fall in the volume of production for which, having regard to the economic conditions prevailing, there is no justification; or (ii) there has been, or is likely to be, a marked deterioration in the quality of any article... which could have been or can be avoided; or (iii) there has been or is likely to be a rise in the price of any article..... for which there is no justification; or (iv) it is necessary to take any such action for the purpose of conserving any resources of national importance; or (b) any industrial undertaking is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest. After the investigation is made under section 15, section 16(1) empowers the Central Government if action is desirable, to issue appropriate directions, and section 16(2) provides for the issue of interim directions by the Central Government pending investigation under section 15. Chapter III-A consisting of Sections 18A, 18-AA, 18-B, 18-C, 18-D, 18-E and 18-F deal with "direct management or control of Industrial Undertakings by Central Government in certain cases". Sec. 18-A empowers the Central Government by notified order, to authorise any person or body of persons to take over the management of the whole or any part of an industrial undertaking or to exercise in respect of the whole, or any part of the undertaking such functions of control as may be specified in the order, if the Central Government is of opinion that: (a) an industrial undertaking to which directions have been issued in pursuance of section 16 has failed to comply with such directions, or (b) an industrial undertaking in respect of which an investigation has been made under section 15 is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest. Section 18AA(5) stipulates that the provisions of Sections 18-B to 18 E shall be applicable to the industrial undertaking in respect of which an order has been made under section 18-AA even as they apply to an industrial undertaking taken over under Section 18-A. Section 18-F empowers the Central Government to cancel the order made under section 18-A if it appears that the purpose of the order has been fulfilled or it is not necessary that the order should remain in force. The appellant M/s. Swadeshi Cotton Mills was taken over by the Government of India by a notification dated April 13, 1978 in exercise of the powers conferred on it under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 18AA of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 on the ground that the company had by creation of encumbrances on the assets of its industrial undertakings, brought about a situation which had affected and is likely to further affect the production of articles manufactured or produced by it and that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation. The Government authorised the National Textile Corporation Limited to take over the management, subject to the conditions that the authorised person shall comply with all the directions issued from time to time by the Central Government and that the authorised person shall hold office for a period of five years. The appellant Mills challenged the aforesaid order in a writ petition in the High Court. The case was heard by a Full Bench of five Judges to consider the question whether in construing section 18AA of the Industries Development and Regulation Act, 1951, compliance with the principle of audi alteram partem is to be implied and whether hearing is to be given to the parties who would be affected by the order to be passed prior to the passing of the order or whether hearing can be given after the order is passed and whether the order passed under the said Section is vitiated by not giving of such hearing and whether such vice can be cured. The Bench by a majority answered the three questions as follows:- (a) Section 18AA(1)(a)(b) excludes the giving of prior hearing to the party who would be affected by order thereunder. (b) Section 18-F expressly provides for a post- decisional hearing to the owner of the industrial undertaking, the management of which is taken over under section 18AA to have the order made under section 18AA cancelled on any relevant ground. (c) As the taking over of management under section 18A is not vitiated by the failure to grant prior hearing the question of any such vice being cured by a grant of a subsequent hearing does not arise. The minority, however, held that in compliance with the principles of natural justice, prior hearing to the owner of the undertaking was required to be given before the passing of an order under section 18AA, that the second question did not arise as the denial of a prior hearing would not cure the vice by the grant of subsequent hearing, but it would be open to the Court to moderate the relief in such a way that the order is kept alive to the extent necessary until the making of the fresh order to subserve public interest and to make appropriate directions. After the decision on the reference the case was reheard on merits by a Full Bench of three Judges and the writ petition was allowed in part. The challenge to the validity of the order being rejected but insofar as the impugned order seeking to take over the corporate entity of the company, the corporate entity of the subsidiary and its assets, the petition was allowed and the respondents, the Union of India and the authorised person were directed to release from its control and custody and/or deliver possession of any assets or property of the company which were not referable to the industrial undertakings. Appeals to this Court were filed on behalf of the Company as well as by the Union of India and the National Textile Corporation. Two propositions were propounded on behalf of the company that: (a) Whether it was necessary to observe the rules of natural justice before issuing a notified order under section 18AA(1)(a) and further whether section 18-F impliedly excludes rules of natural justice relating to prior hearing; and it was contended (1) the mere use of the word 'immediate' in sub-clause (a) of section 18AA does not show a legislative intent to exclude the application of audi alteram partem rule altogether. (2) The word 'immediate' in clause (a) has been used in contra distinction to 'investigate'. It only means that under section 18AA action can be taken without prior investigation under section 15. The use of the word 'immediate' in section 18AA(1)(a) only dispenses with investigation under section 15 and not with the principle of audi alteram partem altogether and this is indicated by the marginal note of section 18A and para 3 of the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Amendment Bill which inserted section 18AA in 1971. (3) The word 'immediate' occurs only in clause (a) and not in clause (b) of section 18AA(1). It would be odd if intention to exclude this principle of natural justice is spelt out in one clause of the sub-section when the other clause does not exclude it. (4) Section 18-F does not exclude a pre-decisional hearing. The so-called post-decisional hearing contemplated by section 18-F cannot be and is not intended to be a substitute for a pre-decisional hearing. (5) Section 18F incorporates only a facet, albeit qualified, of section 21 of the General Clauses Act. The language of the Section implicity prohibits an enquiry into circumstances that led to the passing of the order of take-over and under it the aggrieved person is not entitled to show that on merits the order was void ab initio. (6) 'Immediacy' does not exclude a duty to act fairly because even an emergent situation can co-exist with the canons of natural justice. The only effect of urgency on the application of the principle of fair hearing would be that the width, form and duration of the hearing would be tailored to the situation and reduced to the reasonable minimum so that it does not delay and defeat the purpose of the contemplated action. (7) Where the civil consequences of the administrative action are grave and its effect is highly prejudicial to the rights and interests of the person affected and there is nothing in the language and scheme of the statute which unequivocally excludes a fair pre-decisional hearing and the post-decisional hearing provided therein is not a real remedial hearing equitable to a full right of appeal the Court should be loath to infer a legislative intent to exclude even a minimal fair hearing at the pre-decisional stage merely on ground of urgency. (8) The Central Government appointed four Government Officials including one from the office of the Textile Commissioner to study the affairs of the Company and to make recommendation. This Official Group submitted its report on February 16, 1978. The evidence on the basis of which the impugned order was passed was not disclosed to the appellant company till May 1978, only after it had filed the writ petition in the High Court. If there was anything adverse to the appellants in the survey report there was time enough about six weeks between the submission of the Survey Report and the passing of the impugned order for giving a short, reasonable opportunity to the appellants to explain the adverse findings against them. If there was immediacy situational modifications could be made to meet the requirement of fairness, by reducing the period of notice; that even the manner and form of such notice could be simplified to eliminate delay, that telephonic notice or short opportunity for furnishing their explanation to the Company might have satisfied the requirements of natural justice. Such an opportunity of hearing could have been given after the passing of a conditional tentative order and before its enforcement under section 18AA. For the interregnum suitable interim action such as freezing the assets of the Company or restraining the Company from creating further encumbrances, could be taken under section 16. On behalf of the Union of India and the Authorised Officer it was contended that (1) the presumption in favour of audi alteram partem rule stands impliedly displaced by the language scheme, setting and the purpose of the provision in section 18AA. (2) Section 18AA on its plain terms deals with situations where immediate preventive action is required. The paramount concern is to avoid serious problems which may be caused by fall in production. The purpose of an order under section 18AA is not to condemn the owner but to protect the scheduled industry. The issue under section 18AA is not solely between the Government and the management of the industrial undertaking. The object of taking action under this Section is to protect other outside interests of the community at large and the workers. (3) The rule of natural justice to give a hearing has been incorporated in section 18-F which gives an opportunity of a post-decisional hearing to the owner of the undertaking who if he feels aggrieved can on his application be heard, to show that even the original order under section 18AA was passed on invalid grounds and should be cancelled or rescinded. (4) On a true construction of section 18AA read with section 18-F the requirements of natural justice and fair play can be read into the statute only insofar as conformance to such canons can reasonably and realistically be required of it by the provision for a remedial hearing at a subsequent stage. (5) Under section 18-F the Central Government exercises curial functions and that Section confers on the aggrieved owner a right to apply to the Government to cancel the order of take-over. This section casts an obligation on the Central Government to deal with and dispose of an application filed thereunder with reasonable expedition. Allowing the appeal by the Company,<br />HELD: (Sarkaria & Desai, JJ. per Chinnappa Reddy, J. dissenting.) In the facts and circumstances of the instant case, there has been a noncompliance with the implied requirement of the audi alteram partem rule of natural justice at the pre-decisional stage. The impugned order could be struck down as invalid on that score alone. But in view of the commitment / concession that a hearing would be afforded to the Company, the case is remitted to the Central Government to give a full, fair and effective hearing. [587G-H, 588C] The phrase 'natural justice' is not capable of a static and precise definition. It cannot be imprisoned in the straight-jacket of a cast-iron formula. Rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. Hence not possible to make an exhaustive catalogue of such rules. Two fundamental maxims of natural justice have now become deeply and indelibly ingrained in the common consciousness of mankind as pre-eminently necessary to ensure that the law is applied impartially objectively and fairly. These twin principles are (i) audi alteram partem and (ii) nemo judex in re sua. Audi alteram partem is a highly effective rule devised by the Courts to ensure that a statutory authority arrives at a just decision and it is calculated to act as a healthy check on the abuse or misuse of power. Its reach should not be narrowed and its applicability circumscribed.[554C-G] The rules of natural justice can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. If a statutory provision either specifically or by inevitable implication excludes the application of the rules of natural justice then the Court cannot ignore the mandate of the Legislature. Whether or not the application of the principles of natural justice in a given case has been excluded in the exercise of statutory power depends upon the language and basic scheme of the provision conferring the power, the nature of the power the purpose for which it is conferred and the effect of that power. [556A-B] The maxim audi alteram partem has many facets. Two of them are (a) notice of the case to be met, and (b) opportunity to explain. The rule cannot be sacrificed at the altar of administrative convenience or celerity; for, convenience and justice are often not on speaking terms. Difficulties, however, arise when the statute conferring the power does not expressly exclude this rule but its exclusion is sought by implication due to the presence of certain factors such as urgency where the obligation to give notice and opportunity to be heard would obstruct the taking of prompt action of a preventive or remedial nature. Audi alteram partem rule may be disregarded in an emergent situation where immediate action brooks no delay to prevent some imminent danger or injury or hazard to paramount public interests. Section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure empowers the magistrates specified therein to make an exparte conditional order in emergent cases for removal of dangerous public nuisances. Action under section 17 Land Acquisition Act furnishes another such instance. Similarly action on grounds of public safety public health may justify disregard of the rule of prior hearing. [556C-H] Cases where owing to the compulsion of the fact situation or the necessity of taking speedy action no pre- decisional hearing is given but the action, is followed soon by a full post-decisional hearing to the person affected do not in reality constitute an exception to the audi alteram partem rule. To call such cases as exception is a misnomer because they do not exclude fair play in action but adapt it to the urgency of the situation by balancing the competing claims of hurry and hearing. [560H-561A] The general principle as distinguished from an absolute rule of uniform application seems to be that where a statute does not in terms exclude this rule of prior hearing but contemplates a post-decisional hearing amounting to a full review of the original order on merits then such a statute would be construed as excluding the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage. [561G] If the statute conferring the power is silent with regard to the giving of pre-decisional hearing to the person affected and the administrative decision taken by the authority involves civil consequences of a grave nature and no full review or appeal on merits against that decision is provided courts will be extremely reluctant to construe such a statute as excluding the duty of affording even a minimal hearing shorn of all its formal trappings and dilatory features at the pre-decisional stage, unless viewed pragmatically it would paralyse the administrative process or frustrate the need for utmost promptitude. [561H] 7(i). A comparison of the provisions of Section 18A(1)(b) and Section 18AA(1)(c), bring out two main points of distinction: First, action under Section 18A(1)(b) can be taken only after an investigation had been made under Section 15; while under Section 18AA(1)(a) or (b) action can be taken without such investigation. The language, scheme and setting of Section 18AA read in the light of the Objects and Reasons for enacting this provision make this position clear beyond doubt. Second, before taking action under Section 18A(1)(b), the Central Government has to form an opinion on the basis of the investigation conducted under section 15, in regard to the existence of the objective fact, namely: that the industrial undertaking is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest; while under section 18A(1)(a) the Government has to satisfy itself that the persons incharge of the undertaking have brought about a situation likely to cause fall in production, by committing any of the three kinds of acts specified in that provision. This shows that the preliminary objective fact attributable to the persons in charge of the management or affairs of the undertaking, on the basis of which action may be taken under section 18(A)(1)(b), is of far wider amplitude than the circumstance, the existence of which is a sine qua non for taking action under section 18AA(1). The phrase "highly detrimental to the scheduled industry or public interest" in section 18-A is capable of being construed to cover a large variety of acts or things which may be considered wrong with the manner of running the industry by the management. In contrast with it, action under section 18AA(1)(a) can be taken only if the Central Government is satisfied with regard to the existence of the twin conditions specifically mentioned therein, on the basis of evidence in its possession. [569D-H] An analysis of section 18AA(1)(a), indicates that as a necessary preliminary to the exercise of the power thereunder, the Central Government must be satisfied "from documentary or other evidence in its possession" in regard to the co-existence of two circumstances: (i) that the persons in charge of the industrial undertaking have by committing any of these acts, namely, reckless investments, or creation of incumbrances on the assets of industrial undertaking, or by diversion of funds, brought about a situation which is likely to affect the production of the article manufactured or produced in the industrial undertaking, and (ii) that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation.[570B-D] It cannot be laid down as a general proposition that whenever a statute confers a power on an administrative authority and makes the exercise of that power conditional on the formation of an opinion by that authority in regard to the existence of an immediacy, its opinion in regard to that preliminary fact is not open to judicial scrutiny at all. While it may be conceded that an element of subjectivity is always involved in the formation of such an opinion, the existence of the circumstances from which the inference constituting the opinion, as the sine qua non for action, are to be drawn, must be demonstrable, and the existence of such "circumstances", if questioned, must be proved at least prima facie. [571 E-G] From a plain reading of section 18AA, it is clear that it does not expressly in unmistakable and unequivocal terms exclude the application of the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage. [574B] In the instant case, so far as Kanpur Unit is concerned, it was lying closed for more than three months before the passing of the impugned order. There was no 'immediacy' in relation to that unit, which could absolve the Government from the obligation of complying fully with audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional or pre- takeover stage. [583A] Keshav Mills Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, [1973] 3 S.C.R. 22; Kamla Prasad Khetan v. Union of India,[1957] S.C.R. 1052; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 621; Sukhdev Singh & Ors. v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh, [1975] 3 S.C.R. 619; A. K. Kraipak v. Union of India, [1970] 1 S.C.R. 457; Ridge v. Baldwin, [1964] A.C. 40; 196; Heatley v. Tasmanian Racing & Gaming Commission, 14 Australian Law Reports 519; Nawabkhan Abbaskhan v. State of Gujarat, [1974] 3 S.C.R. 427; State of Orissa v. Dr. Bina Pani Dei, [1962] 2 S.C.R. 625; Ambalal M. Shah v. Hathi Singh Manufacturing Co. Ltd. [1962] 3 S.C.R. 171; and S. L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan & Ors., [1981] 1 S.C.R. 746, referred to. (Per Chinnappa Reddy, J. dissenting) The principles of natural justice are not attracted to the situations contemplated by section 18AA of Industries (Development and Regulation) Act. Natural justice like Ultra Vires and Public Policy is a branch of the public law and is a formidable weapon which can be wielded to secure justice to the citizen. While it may be used to protect certain fundamental liberties, civil and political rights, it may be used as indeed it is used more often than not, to protect vested interests and to obstruct the path of progressive change. The time has come to make an appropriate distinction between natural justice in its application to fundamental liberties, civil and political rights and natural justice in its application to vested interests. [590A-B] Our constitution as befits the Constitution of a Socialist Secular Democratic Republic, recognises the paramountcy of the public weal over the private interest. Natural justice, ultra vires, public policy, or any other rule of interpretation must, therefore, conform, grow and be tailored to serve the public interest and respond to the demands of an evolving society. [590C] The principles of natural justice have taken deep root in the judicial conscience of our people. They are now considered so fundamental as to be implicit in every decision making function, judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative. Where authority functions under a statute and the statute provides for the observance of the principles of natural justice in a particular manner, natural justice will have to be observed in that manner and in no other. Where the statute is silent about the observance of the principles of natural justice, such statutory silence is taken to imply compliance with the principles of natural justice. Where the conflict is between the public interest and the private interest the presumption must necessarily be weak and may, therefore, be readily displaced. The presumption is also weak, where what are involved are mere property rights. In cases of urgency, particularly where the public interest is involved, preemptive action may be a strategic necessity. Even in cases of preemptive action, if the statute so provides or if the Courts so deem fit in appropriate cases, a postponed hearing may be substituted for natural justice. [590A-C; 591F-G] 3(ii). Where natural justice is implied, the extent of the implication and the nature of the hearing must vary with the statute, the subject and the situation. [592B] The absence of the expression 'immediate action' in section 18AA(1)(b) does not make any difference. Section 18AA(1)(a) refers to a situation where immediate preventive action may avert a disaster, whereas section 18AA contemplates a situation where the disaster has occurred and action is necessary to restore normalcy. Restoration of production where production has stopped in a key industry or industrial undertaking is as important and urgent in the public interest as prevention of a situation where production may be affected. Immediate action is, therefore, as necessary in the situation contemplated by section 18AA(1)(b) as in the situation contemplated by section 18AA(1)(a). [596 F-G] The marginal note refers to the power to take over without investigation but there is no sufficient reason to suppose that the word immediate is used only to contra- distinguish it from the investigation contemplated by section 15 of the Act, though of course a consequence of immediate action under section 18AA may be to dispense with the enquiry under section 15. In fact, facts which come to light during the course of an investigation under section 15 may form the basis of action under section 18AA(1)(a). Where in the course of an investigation under section 15 it is discovered that the management have, by reckless investments or creation of encumbrances on the assets of the industrial undertaking or by diversion of funds brought about a situation which is likely to affect the production of the articles manufactured or produced in the industrial undertaking, if the Government is satisfied that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation, there is no reason why the Central Government may not straightaway take action under section 18AA(1)(a) without waiting for completion of investigation under section 15. [597A-B] Where there is a provision in the statute itself for revocation of the order by the very authority making the decision, it appears to be unnecessary to insist upon a pre- decisional observance of natural justice. [598A] The likelihood of production being jeopardized or the stoppage of production in a key industrial undertaking is a matter of grave concern affecting the public interest. Parliament has taken so serious a view of the matter that it has authorised the Central Government to take over the management of the industrial undertaking if immediate action may prevent jeopardy to production or restore production where it has already stopped. The necessity for immediate action by the Central Government contemplated by Parliament is definitely indicative of the exclusion of natural justice. It is not as if the owner of the industrial undertaking is left with no remedy. He may move the Central Government under section 18-F to cancel the order made under section 18AA. [598C-D] Neither section 18-F of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act nor section 21 of the General Clauses Act by itself excludes natural justice. The exclusion of natural justice where such exclusion is not express has to be implied by reference to the subject, the statute and the statutory situation. Where an express provision in the statute itself provides for a post decisional hearing the other provisions of the Statute will have to be read in the light of such provision and the provision for post- decisional hearing may then clinch the issue where pre- decisional natural justice appears to be excluded on the other terms of the statute. That a post-decisional hearing may also be had by the terms of section 21 of the General Clauses Act may not necessarily help in the interpretation of the provisions of the statute concerned. [599 A-C] Ridge v. Baldwin, 1964 A.C. p. 40; Annie G. Phillip v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 75 L.E.d. 1289; John H. Fahey v. Paul Mallonee, 91 L.E.d. 2030; Margarita Fuentes v. Robert L. Shevin, Attorney General of Florida, 32 L.E.d. 2d 556 and Lawrence Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 40 L.E.d. 2d 406, referred to. - Rama Rao, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh as well as the President of the Telugu Desam Party as well as respondent No. 3. The advertisements very shortly stated, refer to the auspicious gifts made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to the poor people on the eve of New Year and Sankranti. In the said advertisements, it is stated that the said Government which was formed by the Telugu Desam Party was giving to the poor people whose income was below Rs. and the said advertisements referred to a new scheme of selling sarees and dhoties at half prices to the poor people in the State of Andhra Pradesh having Green-cards. Moreover, the offer in the advertisements for the sale of dhoties and sarees at discount rates was in the nature of a benefit offered to poor persons in that State. When a Government announces the measures which are intended for the benefit of any of the classes for whose the Government can normally be expected to work like the poor or the economical backward classes, it is only in rare circumstances that such a promise can be said to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) even though such a promise might be made on the eve of elections. 8. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => '', 'counseldef' => '', 'court' => 'Supreme Court of India', 'court_type' => 'SC', 'decidedon' => '1989-09-29', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' K.N. Saikia,; M.H. Kania and; S. Ranganathan, JJ.', 'judgement' => '</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Kania, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. These two appeals arise out of the judgments in two Election Petitions in the Andhra Pradesh High Court questioning the election of respondent No. 1 as a Member of Parliament from Srikakulam No. Parliamentary Constituency in the 8th General Election to the House of the People. The points raised in these appeals are common and so are the relevant facts; and, hence, they are being disposed of by this common judgment. We propose to take note of only the few facts which are necessary for the appreciation of the controversy before us.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The polling date for the said election along with other parliamentary elections in the State of Andhra Pradesh was December 27, 1984 but in Srikakulam No. 1 Parliamentary Constituency the polling was countermanded and the date of polling was later fixed on January 28, 1985. In both the Election Petitions the election of respondent No. 1 was questioned mainly on the ground that Shri N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh as well as the President of the Telugu Desam Party as well as respondent No. 1 gave certain speeches and certain advertisements were got published by Shri N.T. Rama Rao through the Publicity Department of the Government of Andhra Pradesh in the newspapers containing certain statements which are alleged to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A) of the <a href="/act/50684/representation-of-the-people-act-1951-complete-act">Representation of the People Act, 1951</a> (hereinafter referred to as 'the said Act'). The main question canvassed before us is whether the statements contained in these aforesaid advertisements amount to a corrupt practice under Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act. Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act runs as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">123. Corrupt practices</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The following shall be deemed to be corrupt practises for the purposes of this Act :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) 'Bribery', that is to say.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(A) any gift, offer or promise by a candidate or his agent or by any other person with the consent of a candidate or his election agent of any gratification, to any person whomsover, with the object, directly or indirectly of inducing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) x x x</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) an elector to vote or refrain from voting at an election, or as a reward to.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) a person for having so stood or not stood, or for having withdrawn or not having withdrawn his candidature; or</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) an elector for having voted or refrained from voting.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The advertisements very shortly stated, refer to the auspicious gifts made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to the poor people on the eve of New Year and Sankranti. In the said advertisements, it is stated that the said Government which was formed by the Telugu Desam Party was giving to the poor people whose income was below Rs. 6,000 per year, a kilo of rice at Rs. 2 per Kg. and the said advertisements referred to a new scheme of selling sarees and dhoties at half prices to the poor people in the State of Andhra Pradesh having Green-cards. Green-cards were directed to be issued to all the persons whose annual income was below Rs. 6,000. The supply of the rice at subsidised rates as aforesaid was also to be made to the Green-card holders only. The scheme to sell sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was to be operative from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. In considering the question whether the said advertisement and the said speeches amount to a corrupt practice, we are of the view that the provisions of Section 123 of the said Act which deal with corrupt practices have to be interpreted, keeping in mind that dictates of commonsense require that they never could have been intended to treat normal election promises made in election manifestoes or usual election speeches by members of various political parties aspiring to power and by different candidates aspiring to get elected to legislative bodies concerned as corrupt practices. We are of the view that these advertisements and speeches amount to nothing more than statements extolling the achievements of the Government of the State of Andhra Pradesh under the Telugu Desam Party headed by N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister, and contain normal election promises and these statements do not amount to corrupt practices falling within the scope of Sub-clause (b) of Clause (A) of Sub-section (1) of Section 123 of the said Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. It was urged by Mr. Rao, learned Counsel for the appellants that in the impugned judgments, the High Court has incorrectly taken the view that in order to amount to bribery within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A), the transaction must amount to a bargain by the candidate with a view to get votes. It was pointed out by him that the said view has been taken in the impugned judgments, relying upon the decision of a Bench comprising to learned Judges of this Court in Ghasi Ram v. Dal Singh and Ors. :1983 SCR 102 . We have gone through to the relevant portion of that judgment (at page 109 and 110 of the said report). A careful perusal of the said judgment shows that what has been really held in that case is that if the promises given or made amount to a bargain entered into by a candidate for a vote or votes, that would amount to a corrupt practice; but it has not been held there that unless the act alleged amounts to such a bargain, it could not amount to a corrupt practice. In our view, that judgment does not lay down that in order to amount to a corrupt practice, the transaction must amount to a bargain for getting a vote. It was pointed out by Mr. Rao, however, that such a view seems to have been taken in two other decisions rendered by two Benches, each comprising two learned Judges of this Court in Bhanu Kumar Shastri v. Mohan Lal Sukhadia and Ors. : [1971]3SCR522 and Harjit Singh Mann v. S Umrao Singh and Ors. : [1980]2SCR501 . and these judgments need to be overruled. We do not propose to go into the correctness or otherwise of this view because, even on the footing that in order to amount to a corrupt practice under the aforesaid provision the alleged acts need not constitute a bargain, the the acts established in the present case, in our opinion, do not amount to a corrupt practice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Our attention was drawn by Mr. Rao to the fact that in this case the said advertisements and the speeches had to be viewed in the context of the fact that the advertisements were issued and the speeches were made after respondent No. 1 filed his nomination papers on January 4, 1985, for the election and before the election was held in the aforesaid constituency. It was further pointed out that the offer made for the sale of sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was limited to the period from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985. It cannot be denied that these factors are relevant factOrs. We cannot, however, lose sight of the fact that this offer was made not only in this constituency but throughout the State where the elections to the House of the People were scheduled to be held, and were, in fact, held on December 27, 1984. It was only in case of this constituency that the election to be held on the scheduled date was countermanded and later held on January 28, 1985. We cannot lose sight of the fact that, as far as the said speeches and the said advertisements, which were issued by the Publicity Department of the State, are concerned, they deal in the main with the achievements of the Government of Andhra Pradesh which, of course, was being run by Ministers belonging to Telugu Desam Party to which respondent No. 1 also belonged. Moreover, the offer in the advertisements for the sale of dhoties and sarees at discount rates was in the nature of a benefit offered to poor persons in that State. When a Government announces the measures which are intended for the benefit of any of the classes for whose the Government can normally be expected to work like the poor or the economical backward classes, it is only in rare circumstances that such a promise can be said to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) even though such a promise might be made on the eve of elections. Keeping this in mind, in our opinion, although the offer to sell dhoties and sarees at discount rates was of a limited duration as aforestated, it cannot be regarded as a corrupt practice. Such an offer was bound to have financial repercussions and it is quite possible the duration of the offer was limited to enable the Government to study the financial repercussions rather than from any improper motive. We find support for this view from the decision of this Court in H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh : [1969]3SCR813 . In that case an Ordinance was passed by the Government of Madhya Pradesh as a result of which a large number of agriculturists, namely, those holdings of plots of land of less than 7.5 acres area or paying land revenue not exceeding Rs. 5/- were exempted from the payment of the land revenue. It was held that such a concession does not amount to a gift, offer or promise of any gratification within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) of the said Act nor does the announcement of the declaration made at a meeting shortly before the election or the issue of a pamphlet containing that declaration at that time carry the matter any further. It was held that neither Shri D.P. Misra who was the Chief Minister nor Shri S.K. Dixit who acted as his agent were guilty of any corrupt practice within the meaning of the aforesaid provision.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. It was next contended by Mr. Rao, although very faintly, that the High Court was in error as it had not decided all other issues which were raised in the election petition. In this regard we cannot lose sight of the fact that the term of the present Lok Sabha is likely to be over within a few months and fresh elections are likely to be held and it would, therefore, be an exercise in futility to remand the matter to the High Court for deciding the remaining issues.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'AIR1990SC1889; JT1989(4)SC186; 1989(2)SCALE891; 1989Supp(2)SCC504', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors.', 'sub' => 'Election', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ), 'casename_url' => 'b-rajagopala-rao-vs-appayya-hanumanthu', 'args' => array( (int) 0 => '640942', (int) 1 => 'b-rajagopala-rao-vs-appayya-hanumanthu' ) ) $title_for_layout = 'B Rajagopala Rao and anr Vs Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors - Citation 640942 - Court Judgment | ' $desc = array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '640942', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/50684/representation-of-the-people-act-1951-complete-act">Representation of the People Act, 1951</a> - Sections 1, 3(1)(A), 123 and 123(1)(A)', 'appealno' => 'Civil Appeal Nos. 484 and 485 of 1987', 'appellant' => 'B. Rajagopala Rao and anr.', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'B. Rajagopala Rao and anr. Vs. Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors.', 'casenote' => 'Election - corrupt practices - Sections 123 and 123 (1) (A) of Representation of the People Act, 1951 - whether advertisements by public department and speeches made by respondent No. 1 to sell dhoti and sarees at discount rates amount to corrupt practices - offer was available for mass and for limited duration - such offer was bound to have financial repercussions and it is quite possible that duration of offer limited to enable Government to study financial repercussions rather than from any improper motive - offer not amounted to corrupt practices. - [ D.A. Desai,; O. Chinnappa Reddy and; R.S. Sarkaria, JJ.] The Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 empowers the Union of India in the public interest to take under its control the industries specified in the First Schedule to the Act. Item 23 of the First Schedule relates to textiles of various categories. Section 15 authorises the Central Government to make or cause to be made a full and complete investigation into the circumstances of the case if the Central Government is of the opinion that (a) in respect of any scheduled industry or industrial undertaking or undertakings (i) there has been, or is likely to be, a substantial fall in the volume of production for which, having regard to the economic conditions prevailing, there is no justification; or (ii) there has been, or is likely to be, a marked deterioration in the quality of any article... which could have been or can be avoided; or (iii) there has been or is likely to be a rise in the price of any article..... for which there is no justification; or (iv) it is necessary to take any such action for the purpose of conserving any resources of national importance; or (b) any industrial undertaking is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest. After the investigation is made under section 15, section 16(1) empowers the Central Government if action is desirable, to issue appropriate directions, and section 16(2) provides for the issue of interim directions by the Central Government pending investigation under section 15. Chapter III-A consisting of Sections 18A, 18-AA, 18-B, 18-C, 18-D, 18-E and 18-F deal with "direct management or control of Industrial Undertakings by Central Government in certain cases". Sec. 18-A empowers the Central Government by notified order, to authorise any person or body of persons to take over the management of the whole or any part of an industrial undertaking or to exercise in respect of the whole, or any part of the undertaking such functions of control as may be specified in the order, if the Central Government is of opinion that: (a) an industrial undertaking to which directions have been issued in pursuance of section 16 has failed to comply with such directions, or (b) an industrial undertaking in respect of which an investigation has been made under section 15 is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest. Section 18AA(5) stipulates that the provisions of Sections 18-B to 18 E shall be applicable to the industrial undertaking in respect of which an order has been made under section 18-AA even as they apply to an industrial undertaking taken over under Section 18-A. Section 18-F empowers the Central Government to cancel the order made under section 18-A if it appears that the purpose of the order has been fulfilled or it is not necessary that the order should remain in force. The appellant M/s. Swadeshi Cotton Mills was taken over by the Government of India by a notification dated April 13, 1978 in exercise of the powers conferred on it under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 18AA of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 on the ground that the company had by creation of encumbrances on the assets of its industrial undertakings, brought about a situation which had affected and is likely to further affect the production of articles manufactured or produced by it and that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation. The Government authorised the National Textile Corporation Limited to take over the management, subject to the conditions that the authorised person shall comply with all the directions issued from time to time by the Central Government and that the authorised person shall hold office for a period of five years. The appellant Mills challenged the aforesaid order in a writ petition in the High Court. The case was heard by a Full Bench of five Judges to consider the question whether in construing section 18AA of the Industries Development and Regulation Act, 1951, compliance with the principle of audi alteram partem is to be implied and whether hearing is to be given to the parties who would be affected by the order to be passed prior to the passing of the order or whether hearing can be given after the order is passed and whether the order passed under the said Section is vitiated by not giving of such hearing and whether such vice can be cured. The Bench by a majority answered the three questions as follows:- (a) Section 18AA(1)(a)(b) excludes the giving of prior hearing to the party who would be affected by order thereunder. (b) Section 18-F expressly provides for a post- decisional hearing to the owner of the industrial undertaking, the management of which is taken over under section 18AA to have the order made under section 18AA cancelled on any relevant ground. (c) As the taking over of management under section 18A is not vitiated by the failure to grant prior hearing the question of any such vice being cured by a grant of a subsequent hearing does not arise. The minority, however, held that in compliance with the principles of natural justice, prior hearing to the owner of the undertaking was required to be given before the passing of an order under section 18AA, that the second question did not arise as the denial of a prior hearing would not cure the vice by the grant of subsequent hearing, but it would be open to the Court to moderate the relief in such a way that the order is kept alive to the extent necessary until the making of the fresh order to subserve public interest and to make appropriate directions. After the decision on the reference the case was reheard on merits by a Full Bench of three Judges and the writ petition was allowed in part. The challenge to the validity of the order being rejected but insofar as the impugned order seeking to take over the corporate entity of the company, the corporate entity of the subsidiary and its assets, the petition was allowed and the respondents, the Union of India and the authorised person were directed to release from its control and custody and/or deliver possession of any assets or property of the company which were not referable to the industrial undertakings. Appeals to this Court were filed on behalf of the Company as well as by the Union of India and the National Textile Corporation. Two propositions were propounded on behalf of the company that: (a) Whether it was necessary to observe the rules of natural justice before issuing a notified order under section 18AA(1)(a) and further whether section 18-F impliedly excludes rules of natural justice relating to prior hearing; and it was contended (1) the mere use of the word 'immediate' in sub-clause (a) of section 18AA does not show a legislative intent to exclude the application of audi alteram partem rule altogether. (2) The word 'immediate' in clause (a) has been used in contra distinction to 'investigate'. It only means that under section 18AA action can be taken without prior investigation under section 15. The use of the word 'immediate' in section 18AA(1)(a) only dispenses with investigation under section 15 and not with the principle of audi alteram partem altogether and this is indicated by the marginal note of section 18A and para 3 of the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Amendment Bill which inserted section 18AA in 1971. (3) The word 'immediate' occurs only in clause (a) and not in clause (b) of section 18AA(1). It would be odd if intention to exclude this principle of natural justice is spelt out in one clause of the sub-section when the other clause does not exclude it. (4) Section 18-F does not exclude a pre-decisional hearing. The so-called post-decisional hearing contemplated by section 18-F cannot be and is not intended to be a substitute for a pre-decisional hearing. (5) Section 18F incorporates only a facet, albeit qualified, of section 21 of the General Clauses Act. The language of the Section implicity prohibits an enquiry into circumstances that led to the passing of the order of take-over and under it the aggrieved person is not entitled to show that on merits the order was void ab initio. (6) 'Immediacy' does not exclude a duty to act fairly because even an emergent situation can co-exist with the canons of natural justice. The only effect of urgency on the application of the principle of fair hearing would be that the width, form and duration of the hearing would be tailored to the situation and reduced to the reasonable minimum so that it does not delay and defeat the purpose of the contemplated action. (7) Where the civil consequences of the administrative action are grave and its effect is highly prejudicial to the rights and interests of the person affected and there is nothing in the language and scheme of the statute which unequivocally excludes a fair pre-decisional hearing and the post-decisional hearing provided therein is not a real remedial hearing equitable to a full right of appeal the Court should be loath to infer a legislative intent to exclude even a minimal fair hearing at the pre-decisional stage merely on ground of urgency. (8) The Central Government appointed four Government Officials including one from the office of the Textile Commissioner to study the affairs of the Company and to make recommendation. This Official Group submitted its report on February 16, 1978. The evidence on the basis of which the impugned order was passed was not disclosed to the appellant company till May 1978, only after it had filed the writ petition in the High Court. If there was anything adverse to the appellants in the survey report there was time enough about six weeks between the submission of the Survey Report and the passing of the impugned order for giving a short, reasonable opportunity to the appellants to explain the adverse findings against them. If there was immediacy situational modifications could be made to meet the requirement of fairness, by reducing the period of notice; that even the manner and form of such notice could be simplified to eliminate delay, that telephonic notice or short opportunity for furnishing their explanation to the Company might have satisfied the requirements of natural justice. Such an opportunity of hearing could have been given after the passing of a conditional tentative order and before its enforcement under section 18AA. For the interregnum suitable interim action such as freezing the assets of the Company or restraining the Company from creating further encumbrances, could be taken under section 16. On behalf of the Union of India and the Authorised Officer it was contended that (1) the presumption in favour of audi alteram partem rule stands impliedly displaced by the language scheme, setting and the purpose of the provision in section 18AA. (2) Section 18AA on its plain terms deals with situations where immediate preventive action is required. The paramount concern is to avoid serious problems which may be caused by fall in production. The purpose of an order under section 18AA is not to condemn the owner but to protect the scheduled industry. The issue under section 18AA is not solely between the Government and the management of the industrial undertaking. The object of taking action under this Section is to protect other outside interests of the community at large and the workers. (3) The rule of natural justice to give a hearing has been incorporated in section 18-F which gives an opportunity of a post-decisional hearing to the owner of the undertaking who if he feels aggrieved can on his application be heard, to show that even the original order under section 18AA was passed on invalid grounds and should be cancelled or rescinded. (4) On a true construction of section 18AA read with section 18-F the requirements of natural justice and fair play can be read into the statute only insofar as conformance to such canons can reasonably and realistically be required of it by the provision for a remedial hearing at a subsequent stage. (5) Under section 18-F the Central Government exercises curial functions and that Section confers on the aggrieved owner a right to apply to the Government to cancel the order of take-over. This section casts an obligation on the Central Government to deal with and dispose of an application filed thereunder with reasonable expedition. Allowing the appeal by the Company,<br/>HELD: (Sarkaria & Desai, JJ. per Chinnappa Reddy, J. dissenting.) In the facts and circumstances of the instant case, there has been a noncompliance with the implied requirement of the audi alteram partem rule of natural justice at the pre-decisional stage. The impugned order could be struck down as invalid on that score alone. But in view of the commitment / concession that a hearing would be afforded to the Company, the case is remitted to the Central Government to give a full, fair and effective hearing. [587G-H, 588C] The phrase 'natural justice' is not capable of a static and precise definition. It cannot be imprisoned in the straight-jacket of a cast-iron formula. Rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. Hence not possible to make an exhaustive catalogue of such rules. Two fundamental maxims of natural justice have now become deeply and indelibly ingrained in the common consciousness of mankind as pre-eminently necessary to ensure that the law is applied impartially objectively and fairly. These twin principles are (i) audi alteram partem and (ii) nemo judex in re sua. Audi alteram partem is a highly effective rule devised by the Courts to ensure that a statutory authority arrives at a just decision and it is calculated to act as a healthy check on the abuse or misuse of power. Its reach should not be narrowed and its applicability circumscribed.[554C-G] The rules of natural justice can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. If a statutory provision either specifically or by inevitable implication excludes the application of the rules of natural justice then the Court cannot ignore the mandate of the Legislature. Whether or not the application of the principles of natural justice in a given case has been excluded in the exercise of statutory power depends upon the language and basic scheme of the provision conferring the power, the nature of the power the purpose for which it is conferred and the effect of that power. [556A-B] The maxim audi alteram partem has many facets. Two of them are (a) notice of the case to be met, and (b) opportunity to explain. The rule cannot be sacrificed at the altar of administrative convenience or celerity; for, convenience and justice are often not on speaking terms. Difficulties, however, arise when the statute conferring the power does not expressly exclude this rule but its exclusion is sought by implication due to the presence of certain factors such as urgency where the obligation to give notice and opportunity to be heard would obstruct the taking of prompt action of a preventive or remedial nature. Audi alteram partem rule may be disregarded in an emergent situation where immediate action brooks no delay to prevent some imminent danger or injury or hazard to paramount public interests. Section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure empowers the magistrates specified therein to make an exparte conditional order in emergent cases for removal of dangerous public nuisances. Action under section 17 Land Acquisition Act furnishes another such instance. Similarly action on grounds of public safety public health may justify disregard of the rule of prior hearing. [556C-H] Cases where owing to the compulsion of the fact situation or the necessity of taking speedy action no pre- decisional hearing is given but the action, is followed soon by a full post-decisional hearing to the person affected do not in reality constitute an exception to the audi alteram partem rule. To call such cases as exception is a misnomer because they do not exclude fair play in action but adapt it to the urgency of the situation by balancing the competing claims of hurry and hearing. [560H-561A] The general principle as distinguished from an absolute rule of uniform application seems to be that where a statute does not in terms exclude this rule of prior hearing but contemplates a post-decisional hearing amounting to a full review of the original order on merits then such a statute would be construed as excluding the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage. [561G] If the statute conferring the power is silent with regard to the giving of pre-decisional hearing to the person affected and the administrative decision taken by the authority involves civil consequences of a grave nature and no full review or appeal on merits against that decision is provided courts will be extremely reluctant to construe such a statute as excluding the duty of affording even a minimal hearing shorn of all its formal trappings and dilatory features at the pre-decisional stage, unless viewed pragmatically it would paralyse the administrative process or frustrate the need for utmost promptitude. [561H] 7(i). A comparison of the provisions of Section 18A(1)(b) and Section 18AA(1)(c), bring out two main points of distinction: First, action under Section 18A(1)(b) can be taken only after an investigation had been made under Section 15; while under Section 18AA(1)(a) or (b) action can be taken without such investigation. The language, scheme and setting of Section 18AA read in the light of the Objects and Reasons for enacting this provision make this position clear beyond doubt. Second, before taking action under Section 18A(1)(b), the Central Government has to form an opinion on the basis of the investigation conducted under section 15, in regard to the existence of the objective fact, namely: that the industrial undertaking is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest; while under section 18A(1)(a) the Government has to satisfy itself that the persons incharge of the undertaking have brought about a situation likely to cause fall in production, by committing any of the three kinds of acts specified in that provision. This shows that the preliminary objective fact attributable to the persons in charge of the management or affairs of the undertaking, on the basis of which action may be taken under section 18(A)(1)(b), is of far wider amplitude than the circumstance, the existence of which is a sine qua non for taking action under section 18AA(1). The phrase "highly detrimental to the scheduled industry or public interest" in section 18-A is capable of being construed to cover a large variety of acts or things which may be considered wrong with the manner of running the industry by the management. In contrast with it, action under section 18AA(1)(a) can be taken only if the Central Government is satisfied with regard to the existence of the twin conditions specifically mentioned therein, on the basis of evidence in its possession. [569D-H] An analysis of section 18AA(1)(a), indicates that as a necessary preliminary to the exercise of the power thereunder, the Central Government must be satisfied "from documentary or other evidence in its possession" in regard to the co-existence of two circumstances: (i) that the persons in charge of the industrial undertaking have by committing any of these acts, namely, reckless investments, or creation of incumbrances on the assets of industrial undertaking, or by diversion of funds, brought about a situation which is likely to affect the production of the article manufactured or produced in the industrial undertaking, and (ii) that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation.[570B-D] It cannot be laid down as a general proposition that whenever a statute confers a power on an administrative authority and makes the exercise of that power conditional on the formation of an opinion by that authority in regard to the existence of an immediacy, its opinion in regard to that preliminary fact is not open to judicial scrutiny at all. While it may be conceded that an element of subjectivity is always involved in the formation of such an opinion, the existence of the circumstances from which the inference constituting the opinion, as the sine qua non for action, are to be drawn, must be demonstrable, and the existence of such "circumstances", if questioned, must be proved at least prima facie. [571 E-G] From a plain reading of section 18AA, it is clear that it does not expressly in unmistakable and unequivocal terms exclude the application of the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage. [574B] In the instant case, so far as Kanpur Unit is concerned, it was lying closed for more than three months before the passing of the impugned order. There was no 'immediacy' in relation to that unit, which could absolve the Government from the obligation of complying fully with audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional or pre- takeover stage. [583A] Keshav Mills Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, [1973] 3 S.C.R. 22; Kamla Prasad Khetan v. Union of India,[1957] S.C.R. 1052; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 621; Sukhdev Singh & Ors. v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh, [1975] 3 S.C.R. 619; A. K. Kraipak v. Union of India, [1970] 1 S.C.R. 457; Ridge v. Baldwin, [1964] A.C. 40; 196; Heatley v. Tasmanian Racing & Gaming Commission, 14 Australian Law Reports 519; Nawabkhan Abbaskhan v. State of Gujarat, [1974] 3 S.C.R. 427; State of Orissa v. Dr. Bina Pani Dei, [1962] 2 S.C.R. 625; Ambalal M. Shah v. Hathi Singh Manufacturing Co. Ltd. [1962] 3 S.C.R. 171; and S. L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan & Ors., [1981] 1 S.C.R. 746, referred to. (Per Chinnappa Reddy, J. dissenting) The principles of natural justice are not attracted to the situations contemplated by section 18AA of Industries (Development and Regulation) Act. Natural justice like Ultra Vires and Public Policy is a branch of the public law and is a formidable weapon which can be wielded to secure justice to the citizen. While it may be used to protect certain fundamental liberties, civil and political rights, it may be used as indeed it is used more often than not, to protect vested interests and to obstruct the path of progressive change. The time has come to make an appropriate distinction between natural justice in its application to fundamental liberties, civil and political rights and natural justice in its application to vested interests. [590A-B] Our constitution as befits the Constitution of a Socialist Secular Democratic Republic, recognises the paramountcy of the public weal over the private interest. Natural justice, ultra vires, public policy, or any other rule of interpretation must, therefore, conform, grow and be tailored to serve the public interest and respond to the demands of an evolving society. [590C] The principles of natural justice have taken deep root in the judicial conscience of our people. They are now considered so fundamental as to be implicit in every decision making function, judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative. Where authority functions under a statute and the statute provides for the observance of the principles of natural justice in a particular manner, natural justice will have to be observed in that manner and in no other. Where the statute is silent about the observance of the principles of natural justice, such statutory silence is taken to imply compliance with the principles of natural justice. Where the conflict is between the public interest and the private interest the presumption must necessarily be weak and may, therefore, be readily displaced. The presumption is also weak, where what are involved are mere property rights. In cases of urgency, particularly where the public interest is involved, preemptive action may be a strategic necessity. Even in cases of preemptive action, if the statute so provides or if the Courts so deem fit in appropriate cases, a postponed hearing may be substituted for natural justice. [590A-C; 591F-G] 3(ii). Where natural justice is implied, the extent of the implication and the nature of the hearing must vary with the statute, the subject and the situation. [592B] The absence of the expression 'immediate action' in section 18AA(1)(b) does not make any difference. Section 18AA(1)(a) refers to a situation where immediate preventive action may avert a disaster, whereas section 18AA contemplates a situation where the disaster has occurred and action is necessary to restore normalcy. Restoration of production where production has stopped in a key industry or industrial undertaking is as important and urgent in the public interest as prevention of a situation where production may be affected. Immediate action is, therefore, as necessary in the situation contemplated by section 18AA(1)(b) as in the situation contemplated by section 18AA(1)(a). [596 F-G] The marginal note refers to the power to take over without investigation but there is no sufficient reason to suppose that the word immediate is used only to contra- distinguish it from the investigation contemplated by section 15 of the Act, though of course a consequence of immediate action under section 18AA may be to dispense with the enquiry under section 15. In fact, facts which come to light during the course of an investigation under section 15 may form the basis of action under section 18AA(1)(a). Where in the course of an investigation under section 15 it is discovered that the management have, by reckless investments or creation of encumbrances on the assets of the industrial undertaking or by diversion of funds brought about a situation which is likely to affect the production of the articles manufactured or produced in the industrial undertaking, if the Government is satisfied that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation, there is no reason why the Central Government may not straightaway take action under section 18AA(1)(a) without waiting for completion of investigation under section 15. [597A-B] Where there is a provision in the statute itself for revocation of the order by the very authority making the decision, it appears to be unnecessary to insist upon a pre- decisional observance of natural justice. [598A] The likelihood of production being jeopardized or the stoppage of production in a key industrial undertaking is a matter of grave concern affecting the public interest. Parliament has taken so serious a view of the matter that it has authorised the Central Government to take over the management of the industrial undertaking if immediate action may prevent jeopardy to production or restore production where it has already stopped. The necessity for immediate action by the Central Government contemplated by Parliament is definitely indicative of the exclusion of natural justice. It is not as if the owner of the industrial undertaking is left with no remedy. He may move the Central Government under section 18-F to cancel the order made under section 18AA. [598C-D] Neither section 18-F of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act nor section 21 of the General Clauses Act by itself excludes natural justice. The exclusion of natural justice where such exclusion is not express has to be implied by reference to the subject, the statute and the statutory situation. Where an express provision in the statute itself provides for a post decisional hearing the other provisions of the Statute will have to be read in the light of such provision and the provision for post- decisional hearing may then clinch the issue where pre- decisional natural justice appears to be excluded on the other terms of the statute. That a post-decisional hearing may also be had by the terms of section 21 of the General Clauses Act may not necessarily help in the interpretation of the provisions of the statute concerned. [599 A-C] Ridge v. Baldwin, 1964 A.C. p. 40; Annie G. Phillip v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 75 L.E.d. 1289; John H. Fahey v. Paul Mallonee, 91 L.E.d. 2030; Margarita Fuentes v. Robert L. Shevin, Attorney General of Florida, 32 L.E.d. 2d 556 and Lawrence Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 40 L.E.d. 2d 406, referred to. - Rama Rao, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh as well as the President of the Telugu Desam Party as well as respondent No. 3. The advertisements very shortly stated, refer to the auspicious gifts made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to the poor people on the eve of New Year and Sankranti. In the said advertisements, it is stated that the said Government which was formed by the Telugu Desam Party was giving to the poor people whose income was below Rs. and the said advertisements referred to a new scheme of selling sarees and dhoties at half prices to the poor people in the State of Andhra Pradesh having Green-cards. Moreover, the offer in the advertisements for the sale of dhoties and sarees at discount rates was in the nature of a benefit offered to poor persons in that State. When a Government announces the measures which are intended for the benefit of any of the classes for whose the Government can normally be expected to work like the poor or the economical backward classes, it is only in rare circumstances that such a promise can be said to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) even though such a promise might be made on the eve of elections. 8. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => '', 'counseldef' => '', 'court' => 'Supreme Court of India', 'court_type' => 'SC', 'decidedon' => '1989-09-29', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' K.N. Saikia,; M.H. Kania and; S. Ranganathan, JJ.', 'judgement' => '</p><p>Kania, J.</p><p>1. These two appeals arise out of the judgments in two Election Petitions in the Andhra Pradesh High Court questioning the election of respondent No. 1 as a Member of Parliament from Srikakulam No. Parliamentary Constituency in the 8th General Election to the House of the People. The points raised in these appeals are common and so are the relevant facts; and, hence, they are being disposed of by this common judgment. We propose to take note of only the few facts which are necessary for the appreciation of the controversy before us.</p><p>2. The polling date for the said election along with other parliamentary elections in the State of Andhra Pradesh was December 27, 1984 but in Srikakulam No. 1 Parliamentary Constituency the polling was countermanded and the date of polling was later fixed on January 28, 1985. In both the Election Petitions the election of respondent No. 1 was questioned mainly on the ground that Shri N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh as well as the President of the Telugu Desam Party as well as respondent No. 1 gave certain speeches and certain advertisements were got published by Shri N.T. Rama Rao through the Publicity Department of the Government of Andhra Pradesh in the newspapers containing certain statements which are alleged to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A) of the <a>Representation of the People Act, 1951</a> (hereinafter referred to as 'the said Act'). The main question canvassed before us is whether the statements contained in these aforesaid advertisements amount to a corrupt practice under Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act. Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act runs as follows :</p><p>123. Corrupt practices</p><p>The following shall be deemed to be corrupt practises for the purposes of this Act :</p><p>(1) 'Bribery', that is to say.</p><p>(A) any gift, offer or promise by a candidate or his agent or by any other person with the consent of a candidate or his election agent of any gratification, to any person whomsover, with the object, directly or indirectly of inducing.</p><p>(a) x x x</p><p>(b) an elector to vote or refrain from voting at an election, or as a reward to.</p><p>(i) a person for having so stood or not stood, or for having withdrawn or not having withdrawn his candidature; or</p><p>(ii) an elector for having voted or refrained from voting.</p><p>3. The advertisements very shortly stated, refer to the auspicious gifts made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to the poor people on the eve of New Year and Sankranti. In the said advertisements, it is stated that the said Government which was formed by the Telugu Desam Party was giving to the poor people whose income was below Rs. 6,000 per year, a kilo of rice at Rs. 2 per Kg. and the said advertisements referred to a new scheme of selling sarees and dhoties at half prices to the poor people in the State of Andhra Pradesh having Green-cards. Green-cards were directed to be issued to all the persons whose annual income was below Rs. 6,000. The supply of the rice at subsidised rates as aforesaid was also to be made to the Green-card holders only. The scheme to sell sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was to be operative from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985.</p><p>4. In considering the question whether the said advertisement and the said speeches amount to a corrupt practice, we are of the view that the provisions of Section 123 of the said Act which deal with corrupt practices have to be interpreted, keeping in mind that dictates of commonsense require that they never could have been intended to treat normal election promises made in election manifestoes or usual election speeches by members of various political parties aspiring to power and by different candidates aspiring to get elected to legislative bodies concerned as corrupt practices. We are of the view that these advertisements and speeches amount to nothing more than statements extolling the achievements of the Government of the State of Andhra Pradesh under the Telugu Desam Party headed by N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister, and contain normal election promises and these statements do not amount to corrupt practices falling within the scope of Sub-clause (b) of Clause (A) of Sub-section (1) of Section 123 of the said Act.</p><p>5. It was urged by Mr. Rao, learned Counsel for the appellants that in the impugned judgments, the High Court has incorrectly taken the view that in order to amount to bribery within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A), the transaction must amount to a bargain by the candidate with a view to get votes. It was pointed out by him that the said view has been taken in the impugned judgments, relying upon the decision of a Bench comprising to learned Judges of this Court in Ghasi Ram v. Dal Singh and Ors. :1983 SCR 102 . We have gone through to the relevant portion of that judgment (at page 109 and 110 of the said report). A careful perusal of the said judgment shows that what has been really held in that case is that if the promises given or made amount to a bargain entered into by a candidate for a vote or votes, that would amount to a corrupt practice; but it has not been held there that unless the act alleged amounts to such a bargain, it could not amount to a corrupt practice. In our view, that judgment does not lay down that in order to amount to a corrupt practice, the transaction must amount to a bargain for getting a vote. It was pointed out by Mr. Rao, however, that such a view seems to have been taken in two other decisions rendered by two Benches, each comprising two learned Judges of this Court in Bhanu Kumar Shastri v. Mohan Lal Sukhadia and Ors. : [1971]3SCR522 and Harjit Singh Mann v. S Umrao Singh and Ors. : [1980]2SCR501 . and these judgments need to be overruled. We do not propose to go into the correctness or otherwise of this view because, even on the footing that in order to amount to a corrupt practice under the aforesaid provision the alleged acts need not constitute a bargain, the the acts established in the present case, in our opinion, do not amount to a corrupt practice.</p><p>6. Our attention was drawn by Mr. Rao to the fact that in this case the said advertisements and the speeches had to be viewed in the context of the fact that the advertisements were issued and the speeches were made after respondent No. 1 filed his nomination papers on January 4, 1985, for the election and before the election was held in the aforesaid constituency. It was further pointed out that the offer made for the sale of sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was limited to the period from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985. It cannot be denied that these factors are relevant factOrs. We cannot, however, lose sight of the fact that this offer was made not only in this constituency but throughout the State where the elections to the House of the People were scheduled to be held, and were, in fact, held on December 27, 1984. It was only in case of this constituency that the election to be held on the scheduled date was countermanded and later held on January 28, 1985. We cannot lose sight of the fact that, as far as the said speeches and the said advertisements, which were issued by the Publicity Department of the State, are concerned, they deal in the main with the achievements of the Government of Andhra Pradesh which, of course, was being run by Ministers belonging to Telugu Desam Party to which respondent No. 1 also belonged. Moreover, the offer in the advertisements for the sale of dhoties and sarees at discount rates was in the nature of a benefit offered to poor persons in that State. When a Government announces the measures which are intended for the benefit of any of the classes for whose the Government can normally be expected to work like the poor or the economical backward classes, it is only in rare circumstances that such a promise can be said to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) even though such a promise might be made on the eve of elections. Keeping this in mind, in our opinion, although the offer to sell dhoties and sarees at discount rates was of a limited duration as aforestated, it cannot be regarded as a corrupt practice. Such an offer was bound to have financial repercussions and it is quite possible the duration of the offer was limited to enable the Government to study the financial repercussions rather than from any improper motive. We find support for this view from the decision of this Court in H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh : [1969]3SCR813 . In that case an Ordinance was passed by the Government of Madhya Pradesh as a result of which a large number of agriculturists, namely, those holdings of plots of land of less than 7.5 acres area or paying land revenue not exceeding Rs. 5/- were exempted from the payment of the land revenue. It was held that such a concession does not amount to a gift, offer or promise of any gratification within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) of the said Act nor does the announcement of the declaration made at a meeting shortly before the election or the issue of a pamphlet containing that declaration at that time carry the matter any further. It was held that neither Shri D.P. Misra who was the Chief Minister nor Shri S.K. Dixit who acted as his agent were guilty of any corrupt practice within the meaning of the aforesaid provision.</p><p>7. It was next contended by Mr. Rao, although very faintly, that the High Court was in error as it had not decided all other issues which were raised in the election petition. In this regard we cannot lose sight of the fact that the term of the present Lok Sabha is likely to be over within a few months and fresh elections are likely to be held and it would, therefore, be an exercise in futility to remand the matter to the High Court for deciding the remaining issues.</p><p>8. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.<p></p><p>', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'AIR1990SC1889; JT1989(4)SC186; 1989(2)SCALE891; 1989Supp(2)SCC504', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors.', 'sub' => 'Election', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ) $casename_url = 'b-rajagopala-rao-vs-appayya-hanumanthu' $args = array( (int) 0 => '640942', (int) 1 => 'b-rajagopala-rao-vs-appayya-hanumanthu' ) $url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/640942/b-rajagopala-rao-vs-appayya-hanumanthu' $ctype = '' $caseref = 'H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh<br>' $content = array( (int) 0 => '', (int) 1 => '<p>Kania, J.', (int) 2 => '<p>1. These two appeals arise out of the judgments in two Election Petitions in the Andhra Pradesh High Court questioning the election of respondent No. 1 as a Member of Parliament from Srikakulam No. Parliamentary Constituency in the 8th General Election to the House of the People. The points raised in these appeals are common and so are the relevant facts; and, hence, they are being disposed of by this common judgment. We propose to take note of only the few facts which are necessary for the appreciation of the controversy before us.', (int) 3 => '<p>2. The polling date for the said election along with other parliamentary elections in the State of Andhra Pradesh was December 27, 1984 but in Srikakulam No. 1 Parliamentary Constituency the polling was countermanded and the date of polling was later fixed on January 28, 1985. In both the Election Petitions the election of respondent No. 1 was questioned mainly on the ground that Shri N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh as well as the President of the Telugu Desam Party as well as respondent No. 1 gave certain speeches and certain advertisements were got published by Shri N.T. Rama Rao through the Publicity Department of the Government of Andhra Pradesh in the newspapers containing certain statements which are alleged to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A) of the <a>Representation of the People Act, 1951</a> (hereinafter referred to as 'the said Act'). The main question canvassed before us is whether the statements contained in these aforesaid advertisements amount to a corrupt practice under Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act. Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act runs as follows :', (int) 4 => '<p>123. Corrupt practices', (int) 5 => '<p>The following shall be deemed to be corrupt practises for the purposes of this Act :', (int) 6 => '<p>(1) 'Bribery', that is to say.', (int) 7 => '<p>(A) any gift, offer or promise by a candidate or his agent or by any other person with the consent of a candidate or his election agent of any gratification, to any person whomsover, with the object, directly or indirectly of inducing.', (int) 8 => '<p>(a) x x x', (int) 9 => '<p>(b) an elector to vote or refrain from voting at an election, or as a reward to.', (int) 10 => '<p>(i) a person for having so stood or not stood, or for having withdrawn or not having withdrawn his candidature; or', (int) 11 => '<p>(ii) an elector for having voted or refrained from voting.', (int) 12 => '<p>3. The advertisements very shortly stated, refer to the auspicious gifts made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to the poor people on the eve of New Year and Sankranti. In the said advertisements, it is stated that the said Government which was formed by the Telugu Desam Party was giving to the poor people whose income was below Rs. 6,000 per year, a kilo of rice at Rs. 2 per Kg. and the said advertisements referred to a new scheme of selling sarees and dhoties at half prices to the poor people in the State of Andhra Pradesh having Green-cards. Green-cards were directed to be issued to all the persons whose annual income was below Rs. 6,000. The supply of the rice at subsidised rates as aforesaid was also to be made to the Green-card holders only. The scheme to sell sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was to be operative from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985.', (int) 13 => '<p>4. In considering the question whether the said advertisement and the said speeches amount to a corrupt practice, we are of the view that the provisions of Section 123 of the said Act which deal with corrupt practices have to be interpreted, keeping in mind that dictates of commonsense require that they never could have been intended to treat normal election promises made in election manifestoes or usual election speeches by members of various political parties aspiring to power and by different candidates aspiring to get elected to legislative bodies concerned as corrupt practices. We are of the view that these advertisements and speeches amount to nothing more than statements extolling the achievements of the Government of the State of Andhra Pradesh under the Telugu Desam Party headed by N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister, and contain normal election promises and these statements do not amount to corrupt practices falling within the scope of Sub-clause (b) of Clause (A) of Sub-section (1) of Section 123 of the said Act.', (int) 14 => '<p>5. It was urged by Mr. Rao, learned Counsel for the appellants that in the impugned judgments, the High Court has incorrectly taken the view that in order to amount to bribery within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A), the transaction must amount to a bargain by the candidate with a view to get votes. It was pointed out by him that the said view has been taken in the impugned judgments, relying upon the decision of a Bench comprising to learned Judges of this Court in Ghasi Ram v. Dal Singh and Ors. :1983 SCR 102 . We have gone through to the relevant portion of that judgment (at page 109 and 110 of the said report). A careful perusal of the said judgment shows that what has been really held in that case is that if the promises given or made amount to a bargain entered into by a candidate for a vote or votes, that would amount to a corrupt practice; but it has not been held there that unless the act alleged amounts to such a bargain, it could not amount to a corrupt practice. In our view, that judgment does not lay down that in order to amount to a corrupt practice, the transaction must amount to a bargain for getting a vote. It was pointed out by Mr. Rao, however, that such a view seems to have been taken in two other decisions rendered by two Benches, each comprising two learned Judges of this Court in Bhanu Kumar Shastri v. Mohan Lal Sukhadia and Ors. : [1971]3SCR522 and Harjit Singh Mann v. S Umrao Singh and Ors. : [1980]2SCR501 . and these judgments need to be overruled. We do not propose to go into the correctness or otherwise of this view because, even on the footing that in order to amount to a corrupt practice under the aforesaid provision the alleged acts need not constitute a bargain, the the acts established in the present case, in our opinion, do not amount to a corrupt practice.', (int) 15 => '<p>6. Our attention was drawn by Mr. Rao to the fact that in this case the said advertisements and the speeches had to be viewed in the context of the fact that the advertisements were issued and the speeches were made after respondent No. 1 filed his nomination papers on January 4, 1985, for the election and before the election was held in the aforesaid constituency. It was further pointed out that the offer made for the sale of sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was limited to the period from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985. It cannot be denied that these factors are relevant factOrs. We cannot, however, lose sight of the fact that this offer was made not only in this constituency but throughout the State where the elections to the House of the People were scheduled to be held, and were, in fact, held on December 27, 1984. It was only in case of this constituency that the election to be held on the scheduled date was countermanded and later held on January 28, 1985. We cannot lose sight of the fact that, as far as the said speeches and the said advertisements, which were issued by the Publicity Department of the State, are concerned, they deal in the main with the achievements of the Government of Andhra Pradesh which, of course, was being run by Ministers belonging to Telugu Desam Party to which respondent No. 1 also belonged. Moreover, the offer in the advertisements for the sale of dhoties and sarees at discount rates was in the nature of a benefit offered to poor persons in that State. When a Government announces the measures which are intended for the benefit of any of the classes for whose the Government can normally be expected to work like the poor or the economical backward classes, it is only in rare circumstances that such a promise can be said to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) even though such a promise might be made on the eve of elections. Keeping this in mind, in our opinion, although the offer to sell dhoties and sarees at discount rates was of a limited duration as aforestated, it cannot be regarded as a corrupt practice. Such an offer was bound to have financial repercussions and it is quite possible the duration of the offer was limited to enable the Government to study the financial repercussions rather than from any improper motive. We find support for this view from the decision of this Court in H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh : [1969]3SCR813 . In that case an Ordinance was passed by the Government of Madhya Pradesh as a result of which a large number of agriculturists, namely, those holdings of plots of land of less than 7.5 acres area or paying land revenue not exceeding Rs. 5/- were exempted from the payment of the land revenue. It was held that such a concession does not amount to a gift, offer or promise of any gratification within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) of the said Act nor does the announcement of the declaration made at a meeting shortly before the election or the issue of a pamphlet containing that declaration at that time carry the matter any further. It was held that neither Shri D.P. Misra who was the Chief Minister nor Shri S.K. Dixit who acted as his agent were guilty of any corrupt practice within the meaning of the aforesaid provision.', (int) 16 => '<p>7. It was next contended by Mr. Rao, although very faintly, that the High Court was in error as it had not decided all other issues which were raised in the election petition. In this regard we cannot lose sight of the fact that the term of the present Lok Sabha is likely to be over within a few months and fresh elections are likely to be held and it would, therefore, be an exercise in futility to remand the matter to the High Court for deciding the remaining issues.', (int) 17 => '<p>8. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.<p>', (int) 18 => '<p>' ) $paragraphAfter = (int) 1 $cnt = (int) 19 $i = (int) 8include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144 View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971 View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933 View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473 Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963 Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200 Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167 [main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109
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$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp' $dataForView = array( 'title_for_layout' => 'B Rajagopala Rao and anr Vs Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors - Citation 640942 - Court Judgment | ', 'desc' => array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '640942', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/50684/representation-of-the-people-act-1951-complete-act">Representation of the People Act, 1951</a> - Sections 1, 3(1)(A), 123 and 123(1)(A)', 'appealno' => 'Civil Appeal Nos. 484 and 485 of 1987', 'appellant' => 'B. Rajagopala Rao and anr.', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'B. Rajagopala Rao and anr. Vs. Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors.', 'casenote' => 'Election - corrupt practices - Sections 123 and 123 (1) (A) of Representation of the People Act, 1951 - whether advertisements by public department and speeches made by respondent No. 1 to sell dhoti and sarees at discount rates amount to corrupt practices - offer was available for mass and for limited duration - such offer was bound to have financial repercussions and it is quite possible that duration of offer limited to enable Government to study financial repercussions rather than from any improper motive - offer not amounted to corrupt practices. - [ D.A. Desai,; O. Chinnappa Reddy and; R.S. Sarkaria, JJ.] The Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 empowers the Union of India in the public interest to take under its control the industries specified in the First Schedule to the Act. Item 23 of the First Schedule relates to textiles of various categories. Section 15 authorises the Central Government to make or cause to be made a full and complete investigation into the circumstances of the case if the Central Government is of the opinion that (a) in respect of any scheduled industry or industrial undertaking or undertakings (i) there has been, or is likely to be, a substantial fall in the volume of production for which, having regard to the economic conditions prevailing, there is no justification; or (ii) there has been, or is likely to be, a marked deterioration in the quality of any article... which could have been or can be avoided; or (iii) there has been or is likely to be a rise in the price of any article..... for which there is no justification; or (iv) it is necessary to take any such action for the purpose of conserving any resources of national importance; or (b) any industrial undertaking is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest. After the investigation is made under section 15, section 16(1) empowers the Central Government if action is desirable, to issue appropriate directions, and section 16(2) provides for the issue of interim directions by the Central Government pending investigation under section 15. Chapter III-A consisting of Sections 18A, 18-AA, 18-B, 18-C, 18-D, 18-E and 18-F deal with "direct management or control of Industrial Undertakings by Central Government in certain cases". Sec. 18-A empowers the Central Government by notified order, to authorise any person or body of persons to take over the management of the whole or any part of an industrial undertaking or to exercise in respect of the whole, or any part of the undertaking such functions of control as may be specified in the order, if the Central Government is of opinion that: (a) an industrial undertaking to which directions have been issued in pursuance of section 16 has failed to comply with such directions, or (b) an industrial undertaking in respect of which an investigation has been made under section 15 is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest. Section 18AA(5) stipulates that the provisions of Sections 18-B to 18 E shall be applicable to the industrial undertaking in respect of which an order has been made under section 18-AA even as they apply to an industrial undertaking taken over under Section 18-A. Section 18-F empowers the Central Government to cancel the order made under section 18-A if it appears that the purpose of the order has been fulfilled or it is not necessary that the order should remain in force. The appellant M/s. Swadeshi Cotton Mills was taken over by the Government of India by a notification dated April 13, 1978 in exercise of the powers conferred on it under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 18AA of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 on the ground that the company had by creation of encumbrances on the assets of its industrial undertakings, brought about a situation which had affected and is likely to further affect the production of articles manufactured or produced by it and that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation. The Government authorised the National Textile Corporation Limited to take over the management, subject to the conditions that the authorised person shall comply with all the directions issued from time to time by the Central Government and that the authorised person shall hold office for a period of five years. The appellant Mills challenged the aforesaid order in a writ petition in the High Court. The case was heard by a Full Bench of five Judges to consider the question whether in construing section 18AA of the Industries Development and Regulation Act, 1951, compliance with the principle of audi alteram partem is to be implied and whether hearing is to be given to the parties who would be affected by the order to be passed prior to the passing of the order or whether hearing can be given after the order is passed and whether the order passed under the said Section is vitiated by not giving of such hearing and whether such vice can be cured. The Bench by a majority answered the three questions as follows:- (a) Section 18AA(1)(a)(b) excludes the giving of prior hearing to the party who would be affected by order thereunder. (b) Section 18-F expressly provides for a post- decisional hearing to the owner of the industrial undertaking, the management of which is taken over under section 18AA to have the order made under section 18AA cancelled on any relevant ground. (c) As the taking over of management under section 18A is not vitiated by the failure to grant prior hearing the question of any such vice being cured by a grant of a subsequent hearing does not arise. The minority, however, held that in compliance with the principles of natural justice, prior hearing to the owner of the undertaking was required to be given before the passing of an order under section 18AA, that the second question did not arise as the denial of a prior hearing would not cure the vice by the grant of subsequent hearing, but it would be open to the Court to moderate the relief in such a way that the order is kept alive to the extent necessary until the making of the fresh order to subserve public interest and to make appropriate directions. After the decision on the reference the case was reheard on merits by a Full Bench of three Judges and the writ petition was allowed in part. The challenge to the validity of the order being rejected but insofar as the impugned order seeking to take over the corporate entity of the company, the corporate entity of the subsidiary and its assets, the petition was allowed and the respondents, the Union of India and the authorised person were directed to release from its control and custody and/or deliver possession of any assets or property of the company which were not referable to the industrial undertakings. Appeals to this Court were filed on behalf of the Company as well as by the Union of India and the National Textile Corporation. Two propositions were propounded on behalf of the company that: (a) Whether it was necessary to observe the rules of natural justice before issuing a notified order under section 18AA(1)(a) and further whether section 18-F impliedly excludes rules of natural justice relating to prior hearing; and it was contended (1) the mere use of the word 'immediate' in sub-clause (a) of section 18AA does not show a legislative intent to exclude the application of audi alteram partem rule altogether. (2) The word 'immediate' in clause (a) has been used in contra distinction to 'investigate'. It only means that under section 18AA action can be taken without prior investigation under section 15. The use of the word 'immediate' in section 18AA(1)(a) only dispenses with investigation under section 15 and not with the principle of audi alteram partem altogether and this is indicated by the marginal note of section 18A and para 3 of the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Amendment Bill which inserted section 18AA in 1971. (3) The word 'immediate' occurs only in clause (a) and not in clause (b) of section 18AA(1). It would be odd if intention to exclude this principle of natural justice is spelt out in one clause of the sub-section when the other clause does not exclude it. (4) Section 18-F does not exclude a pre-decisional hearing. The so-called post-decisional hearing contemplated by section 18-F cannot be and is not intended to be a substitute for a pre-decisional hearing. (5) Section 18F incorporates only a facet, albeit qualified, of section 21 of the General Clauses Act. The language of the Section implicity prohibits an enquiry into circumstances that led to the passing of the order of take-over and under it the aggrieved person is not entitled to show that on merits the order was void ab initio. (6) 'Immediacy' does not exclude a duty to act fairly because even an emergent situation can co-exist with the canons of natural justice. The only effect of urgency on the application of the principle of fair hearing would be that the width, form and duration of the hearing would be tailored to the situation and reduced to the reasonable minimum so that it does not delay and defeat the purpose of the contemplated action. (7) Where the civil consequences of the administrative action are grave and its effect is highly prejudicial to the rights and interests of the person affected and there is nothing in the language and scheme of the statute which unequivocally excludes a fair pre-decisional hearing and the post-decisional hearing provided therein is not a real remedial hearing equitable to a full right of appeal the Court should be loath to infer a legislative intent to exclude even a minimal fair hearing at the pre-decisional stage merely on ground of urgency. (8) The Central Government appointed four Government Officials including one from the office of the Textile Commissioner to study the affairs of the Company and to make recommendation. This Official Group submitted its report on February 16, 1978. The evidence on the basis of which the impugned order was passed was not disclosed to the appellant company till May 1978, only after it had filed the writ petition in the High Court. If there was anything adverse to the appellants in the survey report there was time enough about six weeks between the submission of the Survey Report and the passing of the impugned order for giving a short, reasonable opportunity to the appellants to explain the adverse findings against them. If there was immediacy situational modifications could be made to meet the requirement of fairness, by reducing the period of notice; that even the manner and form of such notice could be simplified to eliminate delay, that telephonic notice or short opportunity for furnishing their explanation to the Company might have satisfied the requirements of natural justice. Such an opportunity of hearing could have been given after the passing of a conditional tentative order and before its enforcement under section 18AA. For the interregnum suitable interim action such as freezing the assets of the Company or restraining the Company from creating further encumbrances, could be taken under section 16. On behalf of the Union of India and the Authorised Officer it was contended that (1) the presumption in favour of audi alteram partem rule stands impliedly displaced by the language scheme, setting and the purpose of the provision in section 18AA. (2) Section 18AA on its plain terms deals with situations where immediate preventive action is required. The paramount concern is to avoid serious problems which may be caused by fall in production. The purpose of an order under section 18AA is not to condemn the owner but to protect the scheduled industry. The issue under section 18AA is not solely between the Government and the management of the industrial undertaking. The object of taking action under this Section is to protect other outside interests of the community at large and the workers. (3) The rule of natural justice to give a hearing has been incorporated in section 18-F which gives an opportunity of a post-decisional hearing to the owner of the undertaking who if he feels aggrieved can on his application be heard, to show that even the original order under section 18AA was passed on invalid grounds and should be cancelled or rescinded. (4) On a true construction of section 18AA read with section 18-F the requirements of natural justice and fair play can be read into the statute only insofar as conformance to such canons can reasonably and realistically be required of it by the provision for a remedial hearing at a subsequent stage. (5) Under section 18-F the Central Government exercises curial functions and that Section confers on the aggrieved owner a right to apply to the Government to cancel the order of take-over. This section casts an obligation on the Central Government to deal with and dispose of an application filed thereunder with reasonable expedition. Allowing the appeal by the Company,<br />HELD: (Sarkaria & Desai, JJ. per Chinnappa Reddy, J. dissenting.) In the facts and circumstances of the instant case, there has been a noncompliance with the implied requirement of the audi alteram partem rule of natural justice at the pre-decisional stage. The impugned order could be struck down as invalid on that score alone. But in view of the commitment / concession that a hearing would be afforded to the Company, the case is remitted to the Central Government to give a full, fair and effective hearing. [587G-H, 588C] The phrase 'natural justice' is not capable of a static and precise definition. It cannot be imprisoned in the straight-jacket of a cast-iron formula. Rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. Hence not possible to make an exhaustive catalogue of such rules. Two fundamental maxims of natural justice have now become deeply and indelibly ingrained in the common consciousness of mankind as pre-eminently necessary to ensure that the law is applied impartially objectively and fairly. These twin principles are (i) audi alteram partem and (ii) nemo judex in re sua. Audi alteram partem is a highly effective rule devised by the Courts to ensure that a statutory authority arrives at a just decision and it is calculated to act as a healthy check on the abuse or misuse of power. Its reach should not be narrowed and its applicability circumscribed.[554C-G] The rules of natural justice can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. If a statutory provision either specifically or by inevitable implication excludes the application of the rules of natural justice then the Court cannot ignore the mandate of the Legislature. Whether or not the application of the principles of natural justice in a given case has been excluded in the exercise of statutory power depends upon the language and basic scheme of the provision conferring the power, the nature of the power the purpose for which it is conferred and the effect of that power. [556A-B] The maxim audi alteram partem has many facets. Two of them are (a) notice of the case to be met, and (b) opportunity to explain. The rule cannot be sacrificed at the altar of administrative convenience or celerity; for, convenience and justice are often not on speaking terms. Difficulties, however, arise when the statute conferring the power does not expressly exclude this rule but its exclusion is sought by implication due to the presence of certain factors such as urgency where the obligation to give notice and opportunity to be heard would obstruct the taking of prompt action of a preventive or remedial nature. Audi alteram partem rule may be disregarded in an emergent situation where immediate action brooks no delay to prevent some imminent danger or injury or hazard to paramount public interests. Section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure empowers the magistrates specified therein to make an exparte conditional order in emergent cases for removal of dangerous public nuisances. Action under section 17 Land Acquisition Act furnishes another such instance. Similarly action on grounds of public safety public health may justify disregard of the rule of prior hearing. [556C-H] Cases where owing to the compulsion of the fact situation or the necessity of taking speedy action no pre- decisional hearing is given but the action, is followed soon by a full post-decisional hearing to the person affected do not in reality constitute an exception to the audi alteram partem rule. To call such cases as exception is a misnomer because they do not exclude fair play in action but adapt it to the urgency of the situation by balancing the competing claims of hurry and hearing. [560H-561A] The general principle as distinguished from an absolute rule of uniform application seems to be that where a statute does not in terms exclude this rule of prior hearing but contemplates a post-decisional hearing amounting to a full review of the original order on merits then such a statute would be construed as excluding the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage. [561G] If the statute conferring the power is silent with regard to the giving of pre-decisional hearing to the person affected and the administrative decision taken by the authority involves civil consequences of a grave nature and no full review or appeal on merits against that decision is provided courts will be extremely reluctant to construe such a statute as excluding the duty of affording even a minimal hearing shorn of all its formal trappings and dilatory features at the pre-decisional stage, unless viewed pragmatically it would paralyse the administrative process or frustrate the need for utmost promptitude. [561H] 7(i). A comparison of the provisions of Section 18A(1)(b) and Section 18AA(1)(c), bring out two main points of distinction: First, action under Section 18A(1)(b) can be taken only after an investigation had been made under Section 15; while under Section 18AA(1)(a) or (b) action can be taken without such investigation. The language, scheme and setting of Section 18AA read in the light of the Objects and Reasons for enacting this provision make this position clear beyond doubt. Second, before taking action under Section 18A(1)(b), the Central Government has to form an opinion on the basis of the investigation conducted under section 15, in regard to the existence of the objective fact, namely: that the industrial undertaking is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest; while under section 18A(1)(a) the Government has to satisfy itself that the persons incharge of the undertaking have brought about a situation likely to cause fall in production, by committing any of the three kinds of acts specified in that provision. This shows that the preliminary objective fact attributable to the persons in charge of the management or affairs of the undertaking, on the basis of which action may be taken under section 18(A)(1)(b), is of far wider amplitude than the circumstance, the existence of which is a sine qua non for taking action under section 18AA(1). The phrase "highly detrimental to the scheduled industry or public interest" in section 18-A is capable of being construed to cover a large variety of acts or things which may be considered wrong with the manner of running the industry by the management. In contrast with it, action under section 18AA(1)(a) can be taken only if the Central Government is satisfied with regard to the existence of the twin conditions specifically mentioned therein, on the basis of evidence in its possession. [569D-H] An analysis of section 18AA(1)(a), indicates that as a necessary preliminary to the exercise of the power thereunder, the Central Government must be satisfied "from documentary or other evidence in its possession" in regard to the co-existence of two circumstances: (i) that the persons in charge of the industrial undertaking have by committing any of these acts, namely, reckless investments, or creation of incumbrances on the assets of industrial undertaking, or by diversion of funds, brought about a situation which is likely to affect the production of the article manufactured or produced in the industrial undertaking, and (ii) that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation.[570B-D] It cannot be laid down as a general proposition that whenever a statute confers a power on an administrative authority and makes the exercise of that power conditional on the formation of an opinion by that authority in regard to the existence of an immediacy, its opinion in regard to that preliminary fact is not open to judicial scrutiny at all. While it may be conceded that an element of subjectivity is always involved in the formation of such an opinion, the existence of the circumstances from which the inference constituting the opinion, as the sine qua non for action, are to be drawn, must be demonstrable, and the existence of such "circumstances", if questioned, must be proved at least prima facie. [571 E-G] From a plain reading of section 18AA, it is clear that it does not expressly in unmistakable and unequivocal terms exclude the application of the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage. [574B] In the instant case, so far as Kanpur Unit is concerned, it was lying closed for more than three months before the passing of the impugned order. There was no 'immediacy' in relation to that unit, which could absolve the Government from the obligation of complying fully with audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional or pre- takeover stage. [583A] Keshav Mills Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, [1973] 3 S.C.R. 22; Kamla Prasad Khetan v. Union of India,[1957] S.C.R. 1052; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 621; Sukhdev Singh & Ors. v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh, [1975] 3 S.C.R. 619; A. K. Kraipak v. Union of India, [1970] 1 S.C.R. 457; Ridge v. Baldwin, [1964] A.C. 40; 196; Heatley v. Tasmanian Racing & Gaming Commission, 14 Australian Law Reports 519; Nawabkhan Abbaskhan v. State of Gujarat, [1974] 3 S.C.R. 427; State of Orissa v. Dr. Bina Pani Dei, [1962] 2 S.C.R. 625; Ambalal M. Shah v. Hathi Singh Manufacturing Co. Ltd. [1962] 3 S.C.R. 171; and S. L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan & Ors., [1981] 1 S.C.R. 746, referred to. (Per Chinnappa Reddy, J. dissenting) The principles of natural justice are not attracted to the situations contemplated by section 18AA of Industries (Development and Regulation) Act. Natural justice like Ultra Vires and Public Policy is a branch of the public law and is a formidable weapon which can be wielded to secure justice to the citizen. While it may be used to protect certain fundamental liberties, civil and political rights, it may be used as indeed it is used more often than not, to protect vested interests and to obstruct the path of progressive change. The time has come to make an appropriate distinction between natural justice in its application to fundamental liberties, civil and political rights and natural justice in its application to vested interests. [590A-B] Our constitution as befits the Constitution of a Socialist Secular Democratic Republic, recognises the paramountcy of the public weal over the private interest. Natural justice, ultra vires, public policy, or any other rule of interpretation must, therefore, conform, grow and be tailored to serve the public interest and respond to the demands of an evolving society. [590C] The principles of natural justice have taken deep root in the judicial conscience of our people. They are now considered so fundamental as to be implicit in every decision making function, judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative. Where authority functions under a statute and the statute provides for the observance of the principles of natural justice in a particular manner, natural justice will have to be observed in that manner and in no other. Where the statute is silent about the observance of the principles of natural justice, such statutory silence is taken to imply compliance with the principles of natural justice. Where the conflict is between the public interest and the private interest the presumption must necessarily be weak and may, therefore, be readily displaced. The presumption is also weak, where what are involved are mere property rights. In cases of urgency, particularly where the public interest is involved, preemptive action may be a strategic necessity. Even in cases of preemptive action, if the statute so provides or if the Courts so deem fit in appropriate cases, a postponed hearing may be substituted for natural justice. [590A-C; 591F-G] 3(ii). Where natural justice is implied, the extent of the implication and the nature of the hearing must vary with the statute, the subject and the situation. [592B] The absence of the expression 'immediate action' in section 18AA(1)(b) does not make any difference. Section 18AA(1)(a) refers to a situation where immediate preventive action may avert a disaster, whereas section 18AA contemplates a situation where the disaster has occurred and action is necessary to restore normalcy. Restoration of production where production has stopped in a key industry or industrial undertaking is as important and urgent in the public interest as prevention of a situation where production may be affected. Immediate action is, therefore, as necessary in the situation contemplated by section 18AA(1)(b) as in the situation contemplated by section 18AA(1)(a). [596 F-G] The marginal note refers to the power to take over without investigation but there is no sufficient reason to suppose that the word immediate is used only to contra- distinguish it from the investigation contemplated by section 15 of the Act, though of course a consequence of immediate action under section 18AA may be to dispense with the enquiry under section 15. In fact, facts which come to light during the course of an investigation under section 15 may form the basis of action under section 18AA(1)(a). Where in the course of an investigation under section 15 it is discovered that the management have, by reckless investments or creation of encumbrances on the assets of the industrial undertaking or by diversion of funds brought about a situation which is likely to affect the production of the articles manufactured or produced in the industrial undertaking, if the Government is satisfied that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation, there is no reason why the Central Government may not straightaway take action under section 18AA(1)(a) without waiting for completion of investigation under section 15. [597A-B] Where there is a provision in the statute itself for revocation of the order by the very authority making the decision, it appears to be unnecessary to insist upon a pre- decisional observance of natural justice. [598A] The likelihood of production being jeopardized or the stoppage of production in a key industrial undertaking is a matter of grave concern affecting the public interest. Parliament has taken so serious a view of the matter that it has authorised the Central Government to take over the management of the industrial undertaking if immediate action may prevent jeopardy to production or restore production where it has already stopped. The necessity for immediate action by the Central Government contemplated by Parliament is definitely indicative of the exclusion of natural justice. It is not as if the owner of the industrial undertaking is left with no remedy. He may move the Central Government under section 18-F to cancel the order made under section 18AA. [598C-D] Neither section 18-F of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act nor section 21 of the General Clauses Act by itself excludes natural justice. The exclusion of natural justice where such exclusion is not express has to be implied by reference to the subject, the statute and the statutory situation. Where an express provision in the statute itself provides for a post decisional hearing the other provisions of the Statute will have to be read in the light of such provision and the provision for post- decisional hearing may then clinch the issue where pre- decisional natural justice appears to be excluded on the other terms of the statute. That a post-decisional hearing may also be had by the terms of section 21 of the General Clauses Act may not necessarily help in the interpretation of the provisions of the statute concerned. [599 A-C] Ridge v. Baldwin, 1964 A.C. p. 40; Annie G. Phillip v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 75 L.E.d. 1289; John H. Fahey v. Paul Mallonee, 91 L.E.d. 2030; Margarita Fuentes v. Robert L. Shevin, Attorney General of Florida, 32 L.E.d. 2d 556 and Lawrence Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 40 L.E.d. 2d 406, referred to. - Rama Rao, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh as well as the President of the Telugu Desam Party as well as respondent No. 3. The advertisements very shortly stated, refer to the auspicious gifts made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to the poor people on the eve of New Year and Sankranti. In the said advertisements, it is stated that the said Government which was formed by the Telugu Desam Party was giving to the poor people whose income was below Rs. and the said advertisements referred to a new scheme of selling sarees and dhoties at half prices to the poor people in the State of Andhra Pradesh having Green-cards. Moreover, the offer in the advertisements for the sale of dhoties and sarees at discount rates was in the nature of a benefit offered to poor persons in that State. When a Government announces the measures which are intended for the benefit of any of the classes for whose the Government can normally be expected to work like the poor or the economical backward classes, it is only in rare circumstances that such a promise can be said to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) even though such a promise might be made on the eve of elections. 8. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => '', 'counseldef' => '', 'court' => 'Supreme Court of India', 'court_type' => 'SC', 'decidedon' => '1989-09-29', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' K.N. Saikia,; M.H. Kania and; S. Ranganathan, JJ.', 'judgement' => '</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Kania, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. These two appeals arise out of the judgments in two Election Petitions in the Andhra Pradesh High Court questioning the election of respondent No. 1 as a Member of Parliament from Srikakulam No. Parliamentary Constituency in the 8th General Election to the House of the People. The points raised in these appeals are common and so are the relevant facts; and, hence, they are being disposed of by this common judgment. We propose to take note of only the few facts which are necessary for the appreciation of the controversy before us.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The polling date for the said election along with other parliamentary elections in the State of Andhra Pradesh was December 27, 1984 but in Srikakulam No. 1 Parliamentary Constituency the polling was countermanded and the date of polling was later fixed on January 28, 1985. In both the Election Petitions the election of respondent No. 1 was questioned mainly on the ground that Shri N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh as well as the President of the Telugu Desam Party as well as respondent No. 1 gave certain speeches and certain advertisements were got published by Shri N.T. Rama Rao through the Publicity Department of the Government of Andhra Pradesh in the newspapers containing certain statements which are alleged to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A) of the <a href="/act/50684/representation-of-the-people-act-1951-complete-act">Representation of the People Act, 1951</a> (hereinafter referred to as 'the said Act'). The main question canvassed before us is whether the statements contained in these aforesaid advertisements amount to a corrupt practice under Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act. Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act runs as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">123. Corrupt practices</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The following shall be deemed to be corrupt practises for the purposes of this Act :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) 'Bribery', that is to say.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(A) any gift, offer or promise by a candidate or his agent or by any other person with the consent of a candidate or his election agent of any gratification, to any person whomsover, with the object, directly or indirectly of inducing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) x x x</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) an elector to vote or refrain from voting at an election, or as a reward to.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) a person for having so stood or not stood, or for having withdrawn or not having withdrawn his candidature; or</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) an elector for having voted or refrained from voting.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The advertisements very shortly stated, refer to the auspicious gifts made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to the poor people on the eve of New Year and Sankranti. In the said advertisements, it is stated that the said Government which was formed by the Telugu Desam Party was giving to the poor people whose income was below Rs. 6,000 per year, a kilo of rice at Rs. 2 per Kg. and the said advertisements referred to a new scheme of selling sarees and dhoties at half prices to the poor people in the State of Andhra Pradesh having Green-cards. Green-cards were directed to be issued to all the persons whose annual income was below Rs. 6,000. The supply of the rice at subsidised rates as aforesaid was also to be made to the Green-card holders only. The scheme to sell sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was to be operative from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. In considering the question whether the said advertisement and the said speeches amount to a corrupt practice, we are of the view that the provisions of Section 123 of the said Act which deal with corrupt practices have to be interpreted, keeping in mind that dictates of commonsense require that they never could have been intended to treat normal election promises made in election manifestoes or usual election speeches by members of various political parties aspiring to power and by different candidates aspiring to get elected to legislative bodies concerned as corrupt practices. We are of the view that these advertisements and speeches amount to nothing more than statements extolling the achievements of the Government of the State of Andhra Pradesh under the Telugu Desam Party headed by N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister, and contain normal election promises and these statements do not amount to corrupt practices falling within the scope of Sub-clause (b) of Clause (A) of Sub-section (1) of Section 123 of the said Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. It was urged by Mr. Rao, learned Counsel for the appellants that in the impugned judgments, the High Court has incorrectly taken the view that in order to amount to bribery within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A), the transaction must amount to a bargain by the candidate with a view to get votes. It was pointed out by him that the said view has been taken in the impugned judgments, relying upon the decision of a Bench comprising to learned Judges of this Court in Ghasi Ram v. Dal Singh and Ors. :1983 SCR 102 . We have gone through to the relevant portion of that judgment (at page 109 and 110 of the said report). A careful perusal of the said judgment shows that what has been really held in that case is that if the promises given or made amount to a bargain entered into by a candidate for a vote or votes, that would amount to a corrupt practice; but it has not been held there that unless the act alleged amounts to such a bargain, it could not amount to a corrupt practice. In our view, that judgment does not lay down that in order to amount to a corrupt practice, the transaction must amount to a bargain for getting a vote. It was pointed out by Mr. Rao, however, that such a view seems to have been taken in two other decisions rendered by two Benches, each comprising two learned Judges of this Court in Bhanu Kumar Shastri v. Mohan Lal Sukhadia and Ors. : [1971]3SCR522 and Harjit Singh Mann v. S Umrao Singh and Ors. : [1980]2SCR501 . and these judgments need to be overruled. We do not propose to go into the correctness or otherwise of this view because, even on the footing that in order to amount to a corrupt practice under the aforesaid provision the alleged acts need not constitute a bargain, the the acts established in the present case, in our opinion, do not amount to a corrupt practice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Our attention was drawn by Mr. Rao to the fact that in this case the said advertisements and the speeches had to be viewed in the context of the fact that the advertisements were issued and the speeches were made after respondent No. 1 filed his nomination papers on January 4, 1985, for the election and before the election was held in the aforesaid constituency. It was further pointed out that the offer made for the sale of sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was limited to the period from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985. It cannot be denied that these factors are relevant factOrs. We cannot, however, lose sight of the fact that this offer was made not only in this constituency but throughout the State where the elections to the House of the People were scheduled to be held, and were, in fact, held on December 27, 1984. It was only in case of this constituency that the election to be held on the scheduled date was countermanded and later held on January 28, 1985. We cannot lose sight of the fact that, as far as the said speeches and the said advertisements, which were issued by the Publicity Department of the State, are concerned, they deal in the main with the achievements of the Government of Andhra Pradesh which, of course, was being run by Ministers belonging to Telugu Desam Party to which respondent No. 1 also belonged. Moreover, the offer in the advertisements for the sale of dhoties and sarees at discount rates was in the nature of a benefit offered to poor persons in that State. When a Government announces the measures which are intended for the benefit of any of the classes for whose the Government can normally be expected to work like the poor or the economical backward classes, it is only in rare circumstances that such a promise can be said to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) even though such a promise might be made on the eve of elections. Keeping this in mind, in our opinion, although the offer to sell dhoties and sarees at discount rates was of a limited duration as aforestated, it cannot be regarded as a corrupt practice. Such an offer was bound to have financial repercussions and it is quite possible the duration of the offer was limited to enable the Government to study the financial repercussions rather than from any improper motive. We find support for this view from the decision of this Court in H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh : [1969]3SCR813 . In that case an Ordinance was passed by the Government of Madhya Pradesh as a result of which a large number of agriculturists, namely, those holdings of plots of land of less than 7.5 acres area or paying land revenue not exceeding Rs. 5/- were exempted from the payment of the land revenue. It was held that such a concession does not amount to a gift, offer or promise of any gratification within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) of the said Act nor does the announcement of the declaration made at a meeting shortly before the election or the issue of a pamphlet containing that declaration at that time carry the matter any further. It was held that neither Shri D.P. Misra who was the Chief Minister nor Shri S.K. Dixit who acted as his agent were guilty of any corrupt practice within the meaning of the aforesaid provision.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. It was next contended by Mr. Rao, although very faintly, that the High Court was in error as it had not decided all other issues which were raised in the election petition. In this regard we cannot lose sight of the fact that the term of the present Lok Sabha is likely to be over within a few months and fresh elections are likely to be held and it would, therefore, be an exercise in futility to remand the matter to the High Court for deciding the remaining issues.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'AIR1990SC1889; JT1989(4)SC186; 1989(2)SCALE891; 1989Supp(2)SCC504', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors.', 'sub' => 'Election', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ), 'casename_url' => 'b-rajagopala-rao-vs-appayya-hanumanthu', 'args' => array( (int) 0 => '640942', (int) 1 => 'b-rajagopala-rao-vs-appayya-hanumanthu' ) ) $title_for_layout = 'B Rajagopala Rao and anr Vs Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors - Citation 640942 - Court Judgment | ' $desc = array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '640942', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/50684/representation-of-the-people-act-1951-complete-act">Representation of the People Act, 1951</a> - Sections 1, 3(1)(A), 123 and 123(1)(A)', 'appealno' => 'Civil Appeal Nos. 484 and 485 of 1987', 'appellant' => 'B. Rajagopala Rao and anr.', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'B. Rajagopala Rao and anr. Vs. Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors.', 'casenote' => 'Election - corrupt practices - Sections 123 and 123 (1) (A) of Representation of the People Act, 1951 - whether advertisements by public department and speeches made by respondent No. 1 to sell dhoti and sarees at discount rates amount to corrupt practices - offer was available for mass and for limited duration - such offer was bound to have financial repercussions and it is quite possible that duration of offer limited to enable Government to study financial repercussions rather than from any improper motive - offer not amounted to corrupt practices. - [ D.A. Desai,; O. Chinnappa Reddy and; R.S. Sarkaria, JJ.] The Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 empowers the Union of India in the public interest to take under its control the industries specified in the First Schedule to the Act. Item 23 of the First Schedule relates to textiles of various categories. Section 15 authorises the Central Government to make or cause to be made a full and complete investigation into the circumstances of the case if the Central Government is of the opinion that (a) in respect of any scheduled industry or industrial undertaking or undertakings (i) there has been, or is likely to be, a substantial fall in the volume of production for which, having regard to the economic conditions prevailing, there is no justification; or (ii) there has been, or is likely to be, a marked deterioration in the quality of any article... which could have been or can be avoided; or (iii) there has been or is likely to be a rise in the price of any article..... for which there is no justification; or (iv) it is necessary to take any such action for the purpose of conserving any resources of national importance; or (b) any industrial undertaking is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest. After the investigation is made under section 15, section 16(1) empowers the Central Government if action is desirable, to issue appropriate directions, and section 16(2) provides for the issue of interim directions by the Central Government pending investigation under section 15. Chapter III-A consisting of Sections 18A, 18-AA, 18-B, 18-C, 18-D, 18-E and 18-F deal with "direct management or control of Industrial Undertakings by Central Government in certain cases". Sec. 18-A empowers the Central Government by notified order, to authorise any person or body of persons to take over the management of the whole or any part of an industrial undertaking or to exercise in respect of the whole, or any part of the undertaking such functions of control as may be specified in the order, if the Central Government is of opinion that: (a) an industrial undertaking to which directions have been issued in pursuance of section 16 has failed to comply with such directions, or (b) an industrial undertaking in respect of which an investigation has been made under section 15 is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest. Section 18AA(5) stipulates that the provisions of Sections 18-B to 18 E shall be applicable to the industrial undertaking in respect of which an order has been made under section 18-AA even as they apply to an industrial undertaking taken over under Section 18-A. Section 18-F empowers the Central Government to cancel the order made under section 18-A if it appears that the purpose of the order has been fulfilled or it is not necessary that the order should remain in force. The appellant M/s. Swadeshi Cotton Mills was taken over by the Government of India by a notification dated April 13, 1978 in exercise of the powers conferred on it under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 18AA of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 on the ground that the company had by creation of encumbrances on the assets of its industrial undertakings, brought about a situation which had affected and is likely to further affect the production of articles manufactured or produced by it and that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation. The Government authorised the National Textile Corporation Limited to take over the management, subject to the conditions that the authorised person shall comply with all the directions issued from time to time by the Central Government and that the authorised person shall hold office for a period of five years. The appellant Mills challenged the aforesaid order in a writ petition in the High Court. The case was heard by a Full Bench of five Judges to consider the question whether in construing section 18AA of the Industries Development and Regulation Act, 1951, compliance with the principle of audi alteram partem is to be implied and whether hearing is to be given to the parties who would be affected by the order to be passed prior to the passing of the order or whether hearing can be given after the order is passed and whether the order passed under the said Section is vitiated by not giving of such hearing and whether such vice can be cured. The Bench by a majority answered the three questions as follows:- (a) Section 18AA(1)(a)(b) excludes the giving of prior hearing to the party who would be affected by order thereunder. (b) Section 18-F expressly provides for a post- decisional hearing to the owner of the industrial undertaking, the management of which is taken over under section 18AA to have the order made under section 18AA cancelled on any relevant ground. (c) As the taking over of management under section 18A is not vitiated by the failure to grant prior hearing the question of any such vice being cured by a grant of a subsequent hearing does not arise. The minority, however, held that in compliance with the principles of natural justice, prior hearing to the owner of the undertaking was required to be given before the passing of an order under section 18AA, that the second question did not arise as the denial of a prior hearing would not cure the vice by the grant of subsequent hearing, but it would be open to the Court to moderate the relief in such a way that the order is kept alive to the extent necessary until the making of the fresh order to subserve public interest and to make appropriate directions. After the decision on the reference the case was reheard on merits by a Full Bench of three Judges and the writ petition was allowed in part. The challenge to the validity of the order being rejected but insofar as the impugned order seeking to take over the corporate entity of the company, the corporate entity of the subsidiary and its assets, the petition was allowed and the respondents, the Union of India and the authorised person were directed to release from its control and custody and/or deliver possession of any assets or property of the company which were not referable to the industrial undertakings. Appeals to this Court were filed on behalf of the Company as well as by the Union of India and the National Textile Corporation. Two propositions were propounded on behalf of the company that: (a) Whether it was necessary to observe the rules of natural justice before issuing a notified order under section 18AA(1)(a) and further whether section 18-F impliedly excludes rules of natural justice relating to prior hearing; and it was contended (1) the mere use of the word 'immediate' in sub-clause (a) of section 18AA does not show a legislative intent to exclude the application of audi alteram partem rule altogether. (2) The word 'immediate' in clause (a) has been used in contra distinction to 'investigate'. It only means that under section 18AA action can be taken without prior investigation under section 15. The use of the word 'immediate' in section 18AA(1)(a) only dispenses with investigation under section 15 and not with the principle of audi alteram partem altogether and this is indicated by the marginal note of section 18A and para 3 of the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Amendment Bill which inserted section 18AA in 1971. (3) The word 'immediate' occurs only in clause (a) and not in clause (b) of section 18AA(1). It would be odd if intention to exclude this principle of natural justice is spelt out in one clause of the sub-section when the other clause does not exclude it. (4) Section 18-F does not exclude a pre-decisional hearing. The so-called post-decisional hearing contemplated by section 18-F cannot be and is not intended to be a substitute for a pre-decisional hearing. (5) Section 18F incorporates only a facet, albeit qualified, of section 21 of the General Clauses Act. The language of the Section implicity prohibits an enquiry into circumstances that led to the passing of the order of take-over and under it the aggrieved person is not entitled to show that on merits the order was void ab initio. (6) 'Immediacy' does not exclude a duty to act fairly because even an emergent situation can co-exist with the canons of natural justice. The only effect of urgency on the application of the principle of fair hearing would be that the width, form and duration of the hearing would be tailored to the situation and reduced to the reasonable minimum so that it does not delay and defeat the purpose of the contemplated action. (7) Where the civil consequences of the administrative action are grave and its effect is highly prejudicial to the rights and interests of the person affected and there is nothing in the language and scheme of the statute which unequivocally excludes a fair pre-decisional hearing and the post-decisional hearing provided therein is not a real remedial hearing equitable to a full right of appeal the Court should be loath to infer a legislative intent to exclude even a minimal fair hearing at the pre-decisional stage merely on ground of urgency. (8) The Central Government appointed four Government Officials including one from the office of the Textile Commissioner to study the affairs of the Company and to make recommendation. This Official Group submitted its report on February 16, 1978. The evidence on the basis of which the impugned order was passed was not disclosed to the appellant company till May 1978, only after it had filed the writ petition in the High Court. If there was anything adverse to the appellants in the survey report there was time enough about six weeks between the submission of the Survey Report and the passing of the impugned order for giving a short, reasonable opportunity to the appellants to explain the adverse findings against them. If there was immediacy situational modifications could be made to meet the requirement of fairness, by reducing the period of notice; that even the manner and form of such notice could be simplified to eliminate delay, that telephonic notice or short opportunity for furnishing their explanation to the Company might have satisfied the requirements of natural justice. Such an opportunity of hearing could have been given after the passing of a conditional tentative order and before its enforcement under section 18AA. For the interregnum suitable interim action such as freezing the assets of the Company or restraining the Company from creating further encumbrances, could be taken under section 16. On behalf of the Union of India and the Authorised Officer it was contended that (1) the presumption in favour of audi alteram partem rule stands impliedly displaced by the language scheme, setting and the purpose of the provision in section 18AA. (2) Section 18AA on its plain terms deals with situations where immediate preventive action is required. The paramount concern is to avoid serious problems which may be caused by fall in production. The purpose of an order under section 18AA is not to condemn the owner but to protect the scheduled industry. The issue under section 18AA is not solely between the Government and the management of the industrial undertaking. The object of taking action under this Section is to protect other outside interests of the community at large and the workers. (3) The rule of natural justice to give a hearing has been incorporated in section 18-F which gives an opportunity of a post-decisional hearing to the owner of the undertaking who if he feels aggrieved can on his application be heard, to show that even the original order under section 18AA was passed on invalid grounds and should be cancelled or rescinded. (4) On a true construction of section 18AA read with section 18-F the requirements of natural justice and fair play can be read into the statute only insofar as conformance to such canons can reasonably and realistically be required of it by the provision for a remedial hearing at a subsequent stage. (5) Under section 18-F the Central Government exercises curial functions and that Section confers on the aggrieved owner a right to apply to the Government to cancel the order of take-over. This section casts an obligation on the Central Government to deal with and dispose of an application filed thereunder with reasonable expedition. Allowing the appeal by the Company,<br/>HELD: (Sarkaria & Desai, JJ. per Chinnappa Reddy, J. dissenting.) In the facts and circumstances of the instant case, there has been a noncompliance with the implied requirement of the audi alteram partem rule of natural justice at the pre-decisional stage. The impugned order could be struck down as invalid on that score alone. But in view of the commitment / concession that a hearing would be afforded to the Company, the case is remitted to the Central Government to give a full, fair and effective hearing. [587G-H, 588C] The phrase 'natural justice' is not capable of a static and precise definition. It cannot be imprisoned in the straight-jacket of a cast-iron formula. Rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. Hence not possible to make an exhaustive catalogue of such rules. Two fundamental maxims of natural justice have now become deeply and indelibly ingrained in the common consciousness of mankind as pre-eminently necessary to ensure that the law is applied impartially objectively and fairly. These twin principles are (i) audi alteram partem and (ii) nemo judex in re sua. Audi alteram partem is a highly effective rule devised by the Courts to ensure that a statutory authority arrives at a just decision and it is calculated to act as a healthy check on the abuse or misuse of power. Its reach should not be narrowed and its applicability circumscribed.[554C-G] The rules of natural justice can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. If a statutory provision either specifically or by inevitable implication excludes the application of the rules of natural justice then the Court cannot ignore the mandate of the Legislature. Whether or not the application of the principles of natural justice in a given case has been excluded in the exercise of statutory power depends upon the language and basic scheme of the provision conferring the power, the nature of the power the purpose for which it is conferred and the effect of that power. [556A-B] The maxim audi alteram partem has many facets. Two of them are (a) notice of the case to be met, and (b) opportunity to explain. The rule cannot be sacrificed at the altar of administrative convenience or celerity; for, convenience and justice are often not on speaking terms. Difficulties, however, arise when the statute conferring the power does not expressly exclude this rule but its exclusion is sought by implication due to the presence of certain factors such as urgency where the obligation to give notice and opportunity to be heard would obstruct the taking of prompt action of a preventive or remedial nature. Audi alteram partem rule may be disregarded in an emergent situation where immediate action brooks no delay to prevent some imminent danger or injury or hazard to paramount public interests. Section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure empowers the magistrates specified therein to make an exparte conditional order in emergent cases for removal of dangerous public nuisances. Action under section 17 Land Acquisition Act furnishes another such instance. Similarly action on grounds of public safety public health may justify disregard of the rule of prior hearing. [556C-H] Cases where owing to the compulsion of the fact situation or the necessity of taking speedy action no pre- decisional hearing is given but the action, is followed soon by a full post-decisional hearing to the person affected do not in reality constitute an exception to the audi alteram partem rule. To call such cases as exception is a misnomer because they do not exclude fair play in action but adapt it to the urgency of the situation by balancing the competing claims of hurry and hearing. [560H-561A] The general principle as distinguished from an absolute rule of uniform application seems to be that where a statute does not in terms exclude this rule of prior hearing but contemplates a post-decisional hearing amounting to a full review of the original order on merits then such a statute would be construed as excluding the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage. [561G] If the statute conferring the power is silent with regard to the giving of pre-decisional hearing to the person affected and the administrative decision taken by the authority involves civil consequences of a grave nature and no full review or appeal on merits against that decision is provided courts will be extremely reluctant to construe such a statute as excluding the duty of affording even a minimal hearing shorn of all its formal trappings and dilatory features at the pre-decisional stage, unless viewed pragmatically it would paralyse the administrative process or frustrate the need for utmost promptitude. [561H] 7(i). A comparison of the provisions of Section 18A(1)(b) and Section 18AA(1)(c), bring out two main points of distinction: First, action under Section 18A(1)(b) can be taken only after an investigation had been made under Section 15; while under Section 18AA(1)(a) or (b) action can be taken without such investigation. The language, scheme and setting of Section 18AA read in the light of the Objects and Reasons for enacting this provision make this position clear beyond doubt. Second, before taking action under Section 18A(1)(b), the Central Government has to form an opinion on the basis of the investigation conducted under section 15, in regard to the existence of the objective fact, namely: that the industrial undertaking is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest; while under section 18A(1)(a) the Government has to satisfy itself that the persons incharge of the undertaking have brought about a situation likely to cause fall in production, by committing any of the three kinds of acts specified in that provision. This shows that the preliminary objective fact attributable to the persons in charge of the management or affairs of the undertaking, on the basis of which action may be taken under section 18(A)(1)(b), is of far wider amplitude than the circumstance, the existence of which is a sine qua non for taking action under section 18AA(1). The phrase "highly detrimental to the scheduled industry or public interest" in section 18-A is capable of being construed to cover a large variety of acts or things which may be considered wrong with the manner of running the industry by the management. In contrast with it, action under section 18AA(1)(a) can be taken only if the Central Government is satisfied with regard to the existence of the twin conditions specifically mentioned therein, on the basis of evidence in its possession. [569D-H] An analysis of section 18AA(1)(a), indicates that as a necessary preliminary to the exercise of the power thereunder, the Central Government must be satisfied "from documentary or other evidence in its possession" in regard to the co-existence of two circumstances: (i) that the persons in charge of the industrial undertaking have by committing any of these acts, namely, reckless investments, or creation of incumbrances on the assets of industrial undertaking, or by diversion of funds, brought about a situation which is likely to affect the production of the article manufactured or produced in the industrial undertaking, and (ii) that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation.[570B-D] It cannot be laid down as a general proposition that whenever a statute confers a power on an administrative authority and makes the exercise of that power conditional on the formation of an opinion by that authority in regard to the existence of an immediacy, its opinion in regard to that preliminary fact is not open to judicial scrutiny at all. While it may be conceded that an element of subjectivity is always involved in the formation of such an opinion, the existence of the circumstances from which the inference constituting the opinion, as the sine qua non for action, are to be drawn, must be demonstrable, and the existence of such "circumstances", if questioned, must be proved at least prima facie. [571 E-G] From a plain reading of section 18AA, it is clear that it does not expressly in unmistakable and unequivocal terms exclude the application of the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage. [574B] In the instant case, so far as Kanpur Unit is concerned, it was lying closed for more than three months before the passing of the impugned order. There was no 'immediacy' in relation to that unit, which could absolve the Government from the obligation of complying fully with audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional or pre- takeover stage. [583A] Keshav Mills Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, [1973] 3 S.C.R. 22; Kamla Prasad Khetan v. Union of India,[1957] S.C.R. 1052; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 621; Sukhdev Singh & Ors. v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh, [1975] 3 S.C.R. 619; A. K. Kraipak v. Union of India, [1970] 1 S.C.R. 457; Ridge v. Baldwin, [1964] A.C. 40; 196; Heatley v. Tasmanian Racing & Gaming Commission, 14 Australian Law Reports 519; Nawabkhan Abbaskhan v. State of Gujarat, [1974] 3 S.C.R. 427; State of Orissa v. Dr. Bina Pani Dei, [1962] 2 S.C.R. 625; Ambalal M. Shah v. Hathi Singh Manufacturing Co. Ltd. [1962] 3 S.C.R. 171; and S. L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan & Ors., [1981] 1 S.C.R. 746, referred to. (Per Chinnappa Reddy, J. dissenting) The principles of natural justice are not attracted to the situations contemplated by section 18AA of Industries (Development and Regulation) Act. Natural justice like Ultra Vires and Public Policy is a branch of the public law and is a formidable weapon which can be wielded to secure justice to the citizen. While it may be used to protect certain fundamental liberties, civil and political rights, it may be used as indeed it is used more often than not, to protect vested interests and to obstruct the path of progressive change. The time has come to make an appropriate distinction between natural justice in its application to fundamental liberties, civil and political rights and natural justice in its application to vested interests. [590A-B] Our constitution as befits the Constitution of a Socialist Secular Democratic Republic, recognises the paramountcy of the public weal over the private interest. Natural justice, ultra vires, public policy, or any other rule of interpretation must, therefore, conform, grow and be tailored to serve the public interest and respond to the demands of an evolving society. [590C] The principles of natural justice have taken deep root in the judicial conscience of our people. They are now considered so fundamental as to be implicit in every decision making function, judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative. Where authority functions under a statute and the statute provides for the observance of the principles of natural justice in a particular manner, natural justice will have to be observed in that manner and in no other. Where the statute is silent about the observance of the principles of natural justice, such statutory silence is taken to imply compliance with the principles of natural justice. Where the conflict is between the public interest and the private interest the presumption must necessarily be weak and may, therefore, be readily displaced. The presumption is also weak, where what are involved are mere property rights. In cases of urgency, particularly where the public interest is involved, preemptive action may be a strategic necessity. Even in cases of preemptive action, if the statute so provides or if the Courts so deem fit in appropriate cases, a postponed hearing may be substituted for natural justice. [590A-C; 591F-G] 3(ii). Where natural justice is implied, the extent of the implication and the nature of the hearing must vary with the statute, the subject and the situation. [592B] The absence of the expression 'immediate action' in section 18AA(1)(b) does not make any difference. Section 18AA(1)(a) refers to a situation where immediate preventive action may avert a disaster, whereas section 18AA contemplates a situation where the disaster has occurred and action is necessary to restore normalcy. Restoration of production where production has stopped in a key industry or industrial undertaking is as important and urgent in the public interest as prevention of a situation where production may be affected. Immediate action is, therefore, as necessary in the situation contemplated by section 18AA(1)(b) as in the situation contemplated by section 18AA(1)(a). [596 F-G] The marginal note refers to the power to take over without investigation but there is no sufficient reason to suppose that the word immediate is used only to contra- distinguish it from the investigation contemplated by section 15 of the Act, though of course a consequence of immediate action under section 18AA may be to dispense with the enquiry under section 15. In fact, facts which come to light during the course of an investigation under section 15 may form the basis of action under section 18AA(1)(a). Where in the course of an investigation under section 15 it is discovered that the management have, by reckless investments or creation of encumbrances on the assets of the industrial undertaking or by diversion of funds brought about a situation which is likely to affect the production of the articles manufactured or produced in the industrial undertaking, if the Government is satisfied that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation, there is no reason why the Central Government may not straightaway take action under section 18AA(1)(a) without waiting for completion of investigation under section 15. [597A-B] Where there is a provision in the statute itself for revocation of the order by the very authority making the decision, it appears to be unnecessary to insist upon a pre- decisional observance of natural justice. [598A] The likelihood of production being jeopardized or the stoppage of production in a key industrial undertaking is a matter of grave concern affecting the public interest. Parliament has taken so serious a view of the matter that it has authorised the Central Government to take over the management of the industrial undertaking if immediate action may prevent jeopardy to production or restore production where it has already stopped. The necessity for immediate action by the Central Government contemplated by Parliament is definitely indicative of the exclusion of natural justice. It is not as if the owner of the industrial undertaking is left with no remedy. He may move the Central Government under section 18-F to cancel the order made under section 18AA. [598C-D] Neither section 18-F of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act nor section 21 of the General Clauses Act by itself excludes natural justice. The exclusion of natural justice where such exclusion is not express has to be implied by reference to the subject, the statute and the statutory situation. Where an express provision in the statute itself provides for a post decisional hearing the other provisions of the Statute will have to be read in the light of such provision and the provision for post- decisional hearing may then clinch the issue where pre- decisional natural justice appears to be excluded on the other terms of the statute. That a post-decisional hearing may also be had by the terms of section 21 of the General Clauses Act may not necessarily help in the interpretation of the provisions of the statute concerned. [599 A-C] Ridge v. Baldwin, 1964 A.C. p. 40; Annie G. Phillip v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 75 L.E.d. 1289; John H. Fahey v. Paul Mallonee, 91 L.E.d. 2030; Margarita Fuentes v. Robert L. Shevin, Attorney General of Florida, 32 L.E.d. 2d 556 and Lawrence Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 40 L.E.d. 2d 406, referred to. - Rama Rao, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh as well as the President of the Telugu Desam Party as well as respondent No. 3. The advertisements very shortly stated, refer to the auspicious gifts made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to the poor people on the eve of New Year and Sankranti. In the said advertisements, it is stated that the said Government which was formed by the Telugu Desam Party was giving to the poor people whose income was below Rs. and the said advertisements referred to a new scheme of selling sarees and dhoties at half prices to the poor people in the State of Andhra Pradesh having Green-cards. Moreover, the offer in the advertisements for the sale of dhoties and sarees at discount rates was in the nature of a benefit offered to poor persons in that State. When a Government announces the measures which are intended for the benefit of any of the classes for whose the Government can normally be expected to work like the poor or the economical backward classes, it is only in rare circumstances that such a promise can be said to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) even though such a promise might be made on the eve of elections. 8. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => '', 'counseldef' => '', 'court' => 'Supreme Court of India', 'court_type' => 'SC', 'decidedon' => '1989-09-29', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' K.N. Saikia,; M.H. Kania and; S. Ranganathan, JJ.', 'judgement' => '</p><p>Kania, J.</p><p>1. These two appeals arise out of the judgments in two Election Petitions in the Andhra Pradesh High Court questioning the election of respondent No. 1 as a Member of Parliament from Srikakulam No. Parliamentary Constituency in the 8th General Election to the House of the People. The points raised in these appeals are common and so are the relevant facts; and, hence, they are being disposed of by this common judgment. We propose to take note of only the few facts which are necessary for the appreciation of the controversy before us.</p><p>2. The polling date for the said election along with other parliamentary elections in the State of Andhra Pradesh was December 27, 1984 but in Srikakulam No. 1 Parliamentary Constituency the polling was countermanded and the date of polling was later fixed on January 28, 1985. In both the Election Petitions the election of respondent No. 1 was questioned mainly on the ground that Shri N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh as well as the President of the Telugu Desam Party as well as respondent No. 1 gave certain speeches and certain advertisements were got published by Shri N.T. Rama Rao through the Publicity Department of the Government of Andhra Pradesh in the newspapers containing certain statements which are alleged to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A) of the <a>Representation of the People Act, 1951</a> (hereinafter referred to as 'the said Act'). The main question canvassed before us is whether the statements contained in these aforesaid advertisements amount to a corrupt practice under Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act. Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act runs as follows :</p><p>123. Corrupt practices</p><p>The following shall be deemed to be corrupt practises for the purposes of this Act :</p><p>(1) 'Bribery', that is to say.</p><p>(A) any gift, offer or promise by a candidate or his agent or by any other person with the consent of a candidate or his election agent of any gratification, to any person whomsover, with the object, directly or indirectly of inducing.</p><p>(a) x x x</p><p>(b) an elector to vote or refrain from voting at an election, or as a reward to.</p><p>(i) a person for having so stood or not stood, or for having withdrawn or not having withdrawn his candidature; or</p><p>(ii) an elector for having voted or refrained from voting.</p><p>3. The advertisements very shortly stated, refer to the auspicious gifts made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to the poor people on the eve of New Year and Sankranti. In the said advertisements, it is stated that the said Government which was formed by the Telugu Desam Party was giving to the poor people whose income was below Rs. 6,000 per year, a kilo of rice at Rs. 2 per Kg. and the said advertisements referred to a new scheme of selling sarees and dhoties at half prices to the poor people in the State of Andhra Pradesh having Green-cards. Green-cards were directed to be issued to all the persons whose annual income was below Rs. 6,000. The supply of the rice at subsidised rates as aforesaid was also to be made to the Green-card holders only. The scheme to sell sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was to be operative from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985.</p><p>4. In considering the question whether the said advertisement and the said speeches amount to a corrupt practice, we are of the view that the provisions of Section 123 of the said Act which deal with corrupt practices have to be interpreted, keeping in mind that dictates of commonsense require that they never could have been intended to treat normal election promises made in election manifestoes or usual election speeches by members of various political parties aspiring to power and by different candidates aspiring to get elected to legislative bodies concerned as corrupt practices. We are of the view that these advertisements and speeches amount to nothing more than statements extolling the achievements of the Government of the State of Andhra Pradesh under the Telugu Desam Party headed by N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister, and contain normal election promises and these statements do not amount to corrupt practices falling within the scope of Sub-clause (b) of Clause (A) of Sub-section (1) of Section 123 of the said Act.</p><p>5. It was urged by Mr. Rao, learned Counsel for the appellants that in the impugned judgments, the High Court has incorrectly taken the view that in order to amount to bribery within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A), the transaction must amount to a bargain by the candidate with a view to get votes. It was pointed out by him that the said view has been taken in the impugned judgments, relying upon the decision of a Bench comprising to learned Judges of this Court in Ghasi Ram v. Dal Singh and Ors. :1983 SCR 102 . We have gone through to the relevant portion of that judgment (at page 109 and 110 of the said report). A careful perusal of the said judgment shows that what has been really held in that case is that if the promises given or made amount to a bargain entered into by a candidate for a vote or votes, that would amount to a corrupt practice; but it has not been held there that unless the act alleged amounts to such a bargain, it could not amount to a corrupt practice. In our view, that judgment does not lay down that in order to amount to a corrupt practice, the transaction must amount to a bargain for getting a vote. It was pointed out by Mr. Rao, however, that such a view seems to have been taken in two other decisions rendered by two Benches, each comprising two learned Judges of this Court in Bhanu Kumar Shastri v. Mohan Lal Sukhadia and Ors. : [1971]3SCR522 and Harjit Singh Mann v. S Umrao Singh and Ors. : [1980]2SCR501 . and these judgments need to be overruled. We do not propose to go into the correctness or otherwise of this view because, even on the footing that in order to amount to a corrupt practice under the aforesaid provision the alleged acts need not constitute a bargain, the the acts established in the present case, in our opinion, do not amount to a corrupt practice.</p><p>6. Our attention was drawn by Mr. Rao to the fact that in this case the said advertisements and the speeches had to be viewed in the context of the fact that the advertisements were issued and the speeches were made after respondent No. 1 filed his nomination papers on January 4, 1985, for the election and before the election was held in the aforesaid constituency. It was further pointed out that the offer made for the sale of sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was limited to the period from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985. It cannot be denied that these factors are relevant factOrs. We cannot, however, lose sight of the fact that this offer was made not only in this constituency but throughout the State where the elections to the House of the People were scheduled to be held, and were, in fact, held on December 27, 1984. It was only in case of this constituency that the election to be held on the scheduled date was countermanded and later held on January 28, 1985. We cannot lose sight of the fact that, as far as the said speeches and the said advertisements, which were issued by the Publicity Department of the State, are concerned, they deal in the main with the achievements of the Government of Andhra Pradesh which, of course, was being run by Ministers belonging to Telugu Desam Party to which respondent No. 1 also belonged. Moreover, the offer in the advertisements for the sale of dhoties and sarees at discount rates was in the nature of a benefit offered to poor persons in that State. When a Government announces the measures which are intended for the benefit of any of the classes for whose the Government can normally be expected to work like the poor or the economical backward classes, it is only in rare circumstances that such a promise can be said to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) even though such a promise might be made on the eve of elections. Keeping this in mind, in our opinion, although the offer to sell dhoties and sarees at discount rates was of a limited duration as aforestated, it cannot be regarded as a corrupt practice. Such an offer was bound to have financial repercussions and it is quite possible the duration of the offer was limited to enable the Government to study the financial repercussions rather than from any improper motive. We find support for this view from the decision of this Court in H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh : [1969]3SCR813 . In that case an Ordinance was passed by the Government of Madhya Pradesh as a result of which a large number of agriculturists, namely, those holdings of plots of land of less than 7.5 acres area or paying land revenue not exceeding Rs. 5/- were exempted from the payment of the land revenue. It was held that such a concession does not amount to a gift, offer or promise of any gratification within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) of the said Act nor does the announcement of the declaration made at a meeting shortly before the election or the issue of a pamphlet containing that declaration at that time carry the matter any further. It was held that neither Shri D.P. Misra who was the Chief Minister nor Shri S.K. Dixit who acted as his agent were guilty of any corrupt practice within the meaning of the aforesaid provision.</p><p>7. It was next contended by Mr. Rao, although very faintly, that the High Court was in error as it had not decided all other issues which were raised in the election petition. In this regard we cannot lose sight of the fact that the term of the present Lok Sabha is likely to be over within a few months and fresh elections are likely to be held and it would, therefore, be an exercise in futility to remand the matter to the High Court for deciding the remaining issues.</p><p>8. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.<p></p><p>', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'AIR1990SC1889; JT1989(4)SC186; 1989(2)SCALE891; 1989Supp(2)SCC504', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors.', 'sub' => 'Election', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ) $casename_url = 'b-rajagopala-rao-vs-appayya-hanumanthu' $args = array( (int) 0 => '640942', (int) 1 => 'b-rajagopala-rao-vs-appayya-hanumanthu' ) $url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/640942/b-rajagopala-rao-vs-appayya-hanumanthu' $ctype = '' $caseref = 'H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh<br>' $content = array( (int) 0 => '', (int) 1 => '<p>Kania, J.', (int) 2 => '<p>1. These two appeals arise out of the judgments in two Election Petitions in the Andhra Pradesh High Court questioning the election of respondent No. 1 as a Member of Parliament from Srikakulam No. Parliamentary Constituency in the 8th General Election to the House of the People. The points raised in these appeals are common and so are the relevant facts; and, hence, they are being disposed of by this common judgment. We propose to take note of only the few facts which are necessary for the appreciation of the controversy before us.', (int) 3 => '<p>2. The polling date for the said election along with other parliamentary elections in the State of Andhra Pradesh was December 27, 1984 but in Srikakulam No. 1 Parliamentary Constituency the polling was countermanded and the date of polling was later fixed on January 28, 1985. In both the Election Petitions the election of respondent No. 1 was questioned mainly on the ground that Shri N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh as well as the President of the Telugu Desam Party as well as respondent No. 1 gave certain speeches and certain advertisements were got published by Shri N.T. Rama Rao through the Publicity Department of the Government of Andhra Pradesh in the newspapers containing certain statements which are alleged to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A) of the <a>Representation of the People Act, 1951</a> (hereinafter referred to as 'the said Act'). The main question canvassed before us is whether the statements contained in these aforesaid advertisements amount to a corrupt practice under Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act. Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act runs as follows :', (int) 4 => '<p>123. Corrupt practices', (int) 5 => '<p>The following shall be deemed to be corrupt practises for the purposes of this Act :', (int) 6 => '<p>(1) 'Bribery', that is to say.', (int) 7 => '<p>(A) any gift, offer or promise by a candidate or his agent or by any other person with the consent of a candidate or his election agent of any gratification, to any person whomsover, with the object, directly or indirectly of inducing.', (int) 8 => '<p>(a) x x x', (int) 9 => '<p>(b) an elector to vote or refrain from voting at an election, or as a reward to.', (int) 10 => '<p>(i) a person for having so stood or not stood, or for having withdrawn or not having withdrawn his candidature; or', (int) 11 => '<p>(ii) an elector for having voted or refrained from voting.', (int) 12 => '<p>3. The advertisements very shortly stated, refer to the auspicious gifts made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to the poor people on the eve of New Year and Sankranti. In the said advertisements, it is stated that the said Government which was formed by the Telugu Desam Party was giving to the poor people whose income was below Rs. 6,000 per year, a kilo of rice at Rs. 2 per Kg. and the said advertisements referred to a new scheme of selling sarees and dhoties at half prices to the poor people in the State of Andhra Pradesh having Green-cards. Green-cards were directed to be issued to all the persons whose annual income was below Rs. 6,000. The supply of the rice at subsidised rates as aforesaid was also to be made to the Green-card holders only. The scheme to sell sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was to be operative from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985.', (int) 13 => '<p>4. In considering the question whether the said advertisement and the said speeches amount to a corrupt practice, we are of the view that the provisions of Section 123 of the said Act which deal with corrupt practices have to be interpreted, keeping in mind that dictates of commonsense require that they never could have been intended to treat normal election promises made in election manifestoes or usual election speeches by members of various political parties aspiring to power and by different candidates aspiring to get elected to legislative bodies concerned as corrupt practices. We are of the view that these advertisements and speeches amount to nothing more than statements extolling the achievements of the Government of the State of Andhra Pradesh under the Telugu Desam Party headed by N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister, and contain normal election promises and these statements do not amount to corrupt practices falling within the scope of Sub-clause (b) of Clause (A) of Sub-section (1) of Section 123 of the said Act.', (int) 14 => '<p>5. It was urged by Mr. Rao, learned Counsel for the appellants that in the impugned judgments, the High Court has incorrectly taken the view that in order to amount to bribery within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A), the transaction must amount to a bargain by the candidate with a view to get votes. It was pointed out by him that the said view has been taken in the impugned judgments, relying upon the decision of a Bench comprising to learned Judges of this Court in Ghasi Ram v. Dal Singh and Ors. :1983 SCR 102 . We have gone through to the relevant portion of that judgment (at page 109 and 110 of the said report). A careful perusal of the said judgment shows that what has been really held in that case is that if the promises given or made amount to a bargain entered into by a candidate for a vote or votes, that would amount to a corrupt practice; but it has not been held there that unless the act alleged amounts to such a bargain, it could not amount to a corrupt practice. In our view, that judgment does not lay down that in order to amount to a corrupt practice, the transaction must amount to a bargain for getting a vote. It was pointed out by Mr. Rao, however, that such a view seems to have been taken in two other decisions rendered by two Benches, each comprising two learned Judges of this Court in Bhanu Kumar Shastri v. Mohan Lal Sukhadia and Ors. : [1971]3SCR522 and Harjit Singh Mann v. S Umrao Singh and Ors. : [1980]2SCR501 . and these judgments need to be overruled. We do not propose to go into the correctness or otherwise of this view because, even on the footing that in order to amount to a corrupt practice under the aforesaid provision the alleged acts need not constitute a bargain, the the acts established in the present case, in our opinion, do not amount to a corrupt practice.', (int) 15 => '<p>6. Our attention was drawn by Mr. Rao to the fact that in this case the said advertisements and the speeches had to be viewed in the context of the fact that the advertisements were issued and the speeches were made after respondent No. 1 filed his nomination papers on January 4, 1985, for the election and before the election was held in the aforesaid constituency. It was further pointed out that the offer made for the sale of sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was limited to the period from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985. It cannot be denied that these factors are relevant factOrs. We cannot, however, lose sight of the fact that this offer was made not only in this constituency but throughout the State where the elections to the House of the People were scheduled to be held, and were, in fact, held on December 27, 1984. It was only in case of this constituency that the election to be held on the scheduled date was countermanded and later held on January 28, 1985. We cannot lose sight of the fact that, as far as the said speeches and the said advertisements, which were issued by the Publicity Department of the State, are concerned, they deal in the main with the achievements of the Government of Andhra Pradesh which, of course, was being run by Ministers belonging to Telugu Desam Party to which respondent No. 1 also belonged. Moreover, the offer in the advertisements for the sale of dhoties and sarees at discount rates was in the nature of a benefit offered to poor persons in that State. When a Government announces the measures which are intended for the benefit of any of the classes for whose the Government can normally be expected to work like the poor or the economical backward classes, it is only in rare circumstances that such a promise can be said to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) even though such a promise might be made on the eve of elections. Keeping this in mind, in our opinion, although the offer to sell dhoties and sarees at discount rates was of a limited duration as aforestated, it cannot be regarded as a corrupt practice. Such an offer was bound to have financial repercussions and it is quite possible the duration of the offer was limited to enable the Government to study the financial repercussions rather than from any improper motive. We find support for this view from the decision of this Court in H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh : [1969]3SCR813 . In that case an Ordinance was passed by the Government of Madhya Pradesh as a result of which a large number of agriculturists, namely, those holdings of plots of land of less than 7.5 acres area or paying land revenue not exceeding Rs. 5/- were exempted from the payment of the land revenue. It was held that such a concession does not amount to a gift, offer or promise of any gratification within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) of the said Act nor does the announcement of the declaration made at a meeting shortly before the election or the issue of a pamphlet containing that declaration at that time carry the matter any further. It was held that neither Shri D.P. Misra who was the Chief Minister nor Shri S.K. Dixit who acted as his agent were guilty of any corrupt practice within the meaning of the aforesaid provision.', (int) 16 => '<p>7. It was next contended by Mr. Rao, although very faintly, that the High Court was in error as it had not decided all other issues which were raised in the election petition. In this regard we cannot lose sight of the fact that the term of the present Lok Sabha is likely to be over within a few months and fresh elections are likely to be held and it would, therefore, be an exercise in futility to remand the matter to the High Court for deciding the remaining issues.', (int) 17 => '<p>8. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.<p>', (int) 18 => '<p>' ) $paragraphAfter = (int) 1 $cnt = (int) 19 $i = (int) 9include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144 View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971 View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933 View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473 Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963 Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200 Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167 [main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109
(b) an elector to vote or refrain from voting at an election, or as a reward to.
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$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp' $dataForView = array( 'title_for_layout' => 'B Rajagopala Rao and anr Vs Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors - Citation 640942 - Court Judgment | ', 'desc' => array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '640942', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/50684/representation-of-the-people-act-1951-complete-act">Representation of the People Act, 1951</a> - Sections 1, 3(1)(A), 123 and 123(1)(A)', 'appealno' => 'Civil Appeal Nos. 484 and 485 of 1987', 'appellant' => 'B. Rajagopala Rao and anr.', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'B. Rajagopala Rao and anr. Vs. Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors.', 'casenote' => 'Election - corrupt practices - Sections 123 and 123 (1) (A) of Representation of the People Act, 1951 - whether advertisements by public department and speeches made by respondent No. 1 to sell dhoti and sarees at discount rates amount to corrupt practices - offer was available for mass and for limited duration - such offer was bound to have financial repercussions and it is quite possible that duration of offer limited to enable Government to study financial repercussions rather than from any improper motive - offer not amounted to corrupt practices. - [ D.A. Desai,; O. Chinnappa Reddy and; R.S. Sarkaria, JJ.] The Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 empowers the Union of India in the public interest to take under its control the industries specified in the First Schedule to the Act. Item 23 of the First Schedule relates to textiles of various categories. Section 15 authorises the Central Government to make or cause to be made a full and complete investigation into the circumstances of the case if the Central Government is of the opinion that (a) in respect of any scheduled industry or industrial undertaking or undertakings (i) there has been, or is likely to be, a substantial fall in the volume of production for which, having regard to the economic conditions prevailing, there is no justification; or (ii) there has been, or is likely to be, a marked deterioration in the quality of any article... which could have been or can be avoided; or (iii) there has been or is likely to be a rise in the price of any article..... for which there is no justification; or (iv) it is necessary to take any such action for the purpose of conserving any resources of national importance; or (b) any industrial undertaking is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest. After the investigation is made under section 15, section 16(1) empowers the Central Government if action is desirable, to issue appropriate directions, and section 16(2) provides for the issue of interim directions by the Central Government pending investigation under section 15. Chapter III-A consisting of Sections 18A, 18-AA, 18-B, 18-C, 18-D, 18-E and 18-F deal with "direct management or control of Industrial Undertakings by Central Government in certain cases". Sec. 18-A empowers the Central Government by notified order, to authorise any person or body of persons to take over the management of the whole or any part of an industrial undertaking or to exercise in respect of the whole, or any part of the undertaking such functions of control as may be specified in the order, if the Central Government is of opinion that: (a) an industrial undertaking to which directions have been issued in pursuance of section 16 has failed to comply with such directions, or (b) an industrial undertaking in respect of which an investigation has been made under section 15 is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest. Section 18AA(5) stipulates that the provisions of Sections 18-B to 18 E shall be applicable to the industrial undertaking in respect of which an order has been made under section 18-AA even as they apply to an industrial undertaking taken over under Section 18-A. Section 18-F empowers the Central Government to cancel the order made under section 18-A if it appears that the purpose of the order has been fulfilled or it is not necessary that the order should remain in force. The appellant M/s. Swadeshi Cotton Mills was taken over by the Government of India by a notification dated April 13, 1978 in exercise of the powers conferred on it under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 18AA of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 on the ground that the company had by creation of encumbrances on the assets of its industrial undertakings, brought about a situation which had affected and is likely to further affect the production of articles manufactured or produced by it and that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation. The Government authorised the National Textile Corporation Limited to take over the management, subject to the conditions that the authorised person shall comply with all the directions issued from time to time by the Central Government and that the authorised person shall hold office for a period of five years. The appellant Mills challenged the aforesaid order in a writ petition in the High Court. The case was heard by a Full Bench of five Judges to consider the question whether in construing section 18AA of the Industries Development and Regulation Act, 1951, compliance with the principle of audi alteram partem is to be implied and whether hearing is to be given to the parties who would be affected by the order to be passed prior to the passing of the order or whether hearing can be given after the order is passed and whether the order passed under the said Section is vitiated by not giving of such hearing and whether such vice can be cured. The Bench by a majority answered the three questions as follows:- (a) Section 18AA(1)(a)(b) excludes the giving of prior hearing to the party who would be affected by order thereunder. (b) Section 18-F expressly provides for a post- decisional hearing to the owner of the industrial undertaking, the management of which is taken over under section 18AA to have the order made under section 18AA cancelled on any relevant ground. (c) As the taking over of management under section 18A is not vitiated by the failure to grant prior hearing the question of any such vice being cured by a grant of a subsequent hearing does not arise. The minority, however, held that in compliance with the principles of natural justice, prior hearing to the owner of the undertaking was required to be given before the passing of an order under section 18AA, that the second question did not arise as the denial of a prior hearing would not cure the vice by the grant of subsequent hearing, but it would be open to the Court to moderate the relief in such a way that the order is kept alive to the extent necessary until the making of the fresh order to subserve public interest and to make appropriate directions. After the decision on the reference the case was reheard on merits by a Full Bench of three Judges and the writ petition was allowed in part. The challenge to the validity of the order being rejected but insofar as the impugned order seeking to take over the corporate entity of the company, the corporate entity of the subsidiary and its assets, the petition was allowed and the respondents, the Union of India and the authorised person were directed to release from its control and custody and/or deliver possession of any assets or property of the company which were not referable to the industrial undertakings. Appeals to this Court were filed on behalf of the Company as well as by the Union of India and the National Textile Corporation. Two propositions were propounded on behalf of the company that: (a) Whether it was necessary to observe the rules of natural justice before issuing a notified order under section 18AA(1)(a) and further whether section 18-F impliedly excludes rules of natural justice relating to prior hearing; and it was contended (1) the mere use of the word 'immediate' in sub-clause (a) of section 18AA does not show a legislative intent to exclude the application of audi alteram partem rule altogether. (2) The word 'immediate' in clause (a) has been used in contra distinction to 'investigate'. It only means that under section 18AA action can be taken without prior investigation under section 15. The use of the word 'immediate' in section 18AA(1)(a) only dispenses with investigation under section 15 and not with the principle of audi alteram partem altogether and this is indicated by the marginal note of section 18A and para 3 of the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Amendment Bill which inserted section 18AA in 1971. (3) The word 'immediate' occurs only in clause (a) and not in clause (b) of section 18AA(1). It would be odd if intention to exclude this principle of natural justice is spelt out in one clause of the sub-section when the other clause does not exclude it. (4) Section 18-F does not exclude a pre-decisional hearing. The so-called post-decisional hearing contemplated by section 18-F cannot be and is not intended to be a substitute for a pre-decisional hearing. (5) Section 18F incorporates only a facet, albeit qualified, of section 21 of the General Clauses Act. The language of the Section implicity prohibits an enquiry into circumstances that led to the passing of the order of take-over and under it the aggrieved person is not entitled to show that on merits the order was void ab initio. (6) 'Immediacy' does not exclude a duty to act fairly because even an emergent situation can co-exist with the canons of natural justice. The only effect of urgency on the application of the principle of fair hearing would be that the width, form and duration of the hearing would be tailored to the situation and reduced to the reasonable minimum so that it does not delay and defeat the purpose of the contemplated action. (7) Where the civil consequences of the administrative action are grave and its effect is highly prejudicial to the rights and interests of the person affected and there is nothing in the language and scheme of the statute which unequivocally excludes a fair pre-decisional hearing and the post-decisional hearing provided therein is not a real remedial hearing equitable to a full right of appeal the Court should be loath to infer a legislative intent to exclude even a minimal fair hearing at the pre-decisional stage merely on ground of urgency. (8) The Central Government appointed four Government Officials including one from the office of the Textile Commissioner to study the affairs of the Company and to make recommendation. This Official Group submitted its report on February 16, 1978. The evidence on the basis of which the impugned order was passed was not disclosed to the appellant company till May 1978, only after it had filed the writ petition in the High Court. If there was anything adverse to the appellants in the survey report there was time enough about six weeks between the submission of the Survey Report and the passing of the impugned order for giving a short, reasonable opportunity to the appellants to explain the adverse findings against them. If there was immediacy situational modifications could be made to meet the requirement of fairness, by reducing the period of notice; that even the manner and form of such notice could be simplified to eliminate delay, that telephonic notice or short opportunity for furnishing their explanation to the Company might have satisfied the requirements of natural justice. Such an opportunity of hearing could have been given after the passing of a conditional tentative order and before its enforcement under section 18AA. For the interregnum suitable interim action such as freezing the assets of the Company or restraining the Company from creating further encumbrances, could be taken under section 16. On behalf of the Union of India and the Authorised Officer it was contended that (1) the presumption in favour of audi alteram partem rule stands impliedly displaced by the language scheme, setting and the purpose of the provision in section 18AA. (2) Section 18AA on its plain terms deals with situations where immediate preventive action is required. The paramount concern is to avoid serious problems which may be caused by fall in production. The purpose of an order under section 18AA is not to condemn the owner but to protect the scheduled industry. The issue under section 18AA is not solely between the Government and the management of the industrial undertaking. The object of taking action under this Section is to protect other outside interests of the community at large and the workers. (3) The rule of natural justice to give a hearing has been incorporated in section 18-F which gives an opportunity of a post-decisional hearing to the owner of the undertaking who if he feels aggrieved can on his application be heard, to show that even the original order under section 18AA was passed on invalid grounds and should be cancelled or rescinded. (4) On a true construction of section 18AA read with section 18-F the requirements of natural justice and fair play can be read into the statute only insofar as conformance to such canons can reasonably and realistically be required of it by the provision for a remedial hearing at a subsequent stage. (5) Under section 18-F the Central Government exercises curial functions and that Section confers on the aggrieved owner a right to apply to the Government to cancel the order of take-over. This section casts an obligation on the Central Government to deal with and dispose of an application filed thereunder with reasonable expedition. Allowing the appeal by the Company,<br />HELD: (Sarkaria & Desai, JJ. per Chinnappa Reddy, J. dissenting.) In the facts and circumstances of the instant case, there has been a noncompliance with the implied requirement of the audi alteram partem rule of natural justice at the pre-decisional stage. The impugned order could be struck down as invalid on that score alone. But in view of the commitment / concession that a hearing would be afforded to the Company, the case is remitted to the Central Government to give a full, fair and effective hearing. [587G-H, 588C] The phrase 'natural justice' is not capable of a static and precise definition. It cannot be imprisoned in the straight-jacket of a cast-iron formula. Rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. Hence not possible to make an exhaustive catalogue of such rules. Two fundamental maxims of natural justice have now become deeply and indelibly ingrained in the common consciousness of mankind as pre-eminently necessary to ensure that the law is applied impartially objectively and fairly. These twin principles are (i) audi alteram partem and (ii) nemo judex in re sua. Audi alteram partem is a highly effective rule devised by the Courts to ensure that a statutory authority arrives at a just decision and it is calculated to act as a healthy check on the abuse or misuse of power. Its reach should not be narrowed and its applicability circumscribed.[554C-G] The rules of natural justice can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. If a statutory provision either specifically or by inevitable implication excludes the application of the rules of natural justice then the Court cannot ignore the mandate of the Legislature. Whether or not the application of the principles of natural justice in a given case has been excluded in the exercise of statutory power depends upon the language and basic scheme of the provision conferring the power, the nature of the power the purpose for which it is conferred and the effect of that power. [556A-B] The maxim audi alteram partem has many facets. Two of them are (a) notice of the case to be met, and (b) opportunity to explain. The rule cannot be sacrificed at the altar of administrative convenience or celerity; for, convenience and justice are often not on speaking terms. Difficulties, however, arise when the statute conferring the power does not expressly exclude this rule but its exclusion is sought by implication due to the presence of certain factors such as urgency where the obligation to give notice and opportunity to be heard would obstruct the taking of prompt action of a preventive or remedial nature. Audi alteram partem rule may be disregarded in an emergent situation where immediate action brooks no delay to prevent some imminent danger or injury or hazard to paramount public interests. Section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure empowers the magistrates specified therein to make an exparte conditional order in emergent cases for removal of dangerous public nuisances. Action under section 17 Land Acquisition Act furnishes another such instance. Similarly action on grounds of public safety public health may justify disregard of the rule of prior hearing. [556C-H] Cases where owing to the compulsion of the fact situation or the necessity of taking speedy action no pre- decisional hearing is given but the action, is followed soon by a full post-decisional hearing to the person affected do not in reality constitute an exception to the audi alteram partem rule. To call such cases as exception is a misnomer because they do not exclude fair play in action but adapt it to the urgency of the situation by balancing the competing claims of hurry and hearing. [560H-561A] The general principle as distinguished from an absolute rule of uniform application seems to be that where a statute does not in terms exclude this rule of prior hearing but contemplates a post-decisional hearing amounting to a full review of the original order on merits then such a statute would be construed as excluding the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage. [561G] If the statute conferring the power is silent with regard to the giving of pre-decisional hearing to the person affected and the administrative decision taken by the authority involves civil consequences of a grave nature and no full review or appeal on merits against that decision is provided courts will be extremely reluctant to construe such a statute as excluding the duty of affording even a minimal hearing shorn of all its formal trappings and dilatory features at the pre-decisional stage, unless viewed pragmatically it would paralyse the administrative process or frustrate the need for utmost promptitude. [561H] 7(i). A comparison of the provisions of Section 18A(1)(b) and Section 18AA(1)(c), bring out two main points of distinction: First, action under Section 18A(1)(b) can be taken only after an investigation had been made under Section 15; while under Section 18AA(1)(a) or (b) action can be taken without such investigation. The language, scheme and setting of Section 18AA read in the light of the Objects and Reasons for enacting this provision make this position clear beyond doubt. Second, before taking action under Section 18A(1)(b), the Central Government has to form an opinion on the basis of the investigation conducted under section 15, in regard to the existence of the objective fact, namely: that the industrial undertaking is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest; while under section 18A(1)(a) the Government has to satisfy itself that the persons incharge of the undertaking have brought about a situation likely to cause fall in production, by committing any of the three kinds of acts specified in that provision. This shows that the preliminary objective fact attributable to the persons in charge of the management or affairs of the undertaking, on the basis of which action may be taken under section 18(A)(1)(b), is of far wider amplitude than the circumstance, the existence of which is a sine qua non for taking action under section 18AA(1). The phrase "highly detrimental to the scheduled industry or public interest" in section 18-A is capable of being construed to cover a large variety of acts or things which may be considered wrong with the manner of running the industry by the management. In contrast with it, action under section 18AA(1)(a) can be taken only if the Central Government is satisfied with regard to the existence of the twin conditions specifically mentioned therein, on the basis of evidence in its possession. [569D-H] An analysis of section 18AA(1)(a), indicates that as a necessary preliminary to the exercise of the power thereunder, the Central Government must be satisfied "from documentary or other evidence in its possession" in regard to the co-existence of two circumstances: (i) that the persons in charge of the industrial undertaking have by committing any of these acts, namely, reckless investments, or creation of incumbrances on the assets of industrial undertaking, or by diversion of funds, brought about a situation which is likely to affect the production of the article manufactured or produced in the industrial undertaking, and (ii) that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation.[570B-D] It cannot be laid down as a general proposition that whenever a statute confers a power on an administrative authority and makes the exercise of that power conditional on the formation of an opinion by that authority in regard to the existence of an immediacy, its opinion in regard to that preliminary fact is not open to judicial scrutiny at all. While it may be conceded that an element of subjectivity is always involved in the formation of such an opinion, the existence of the circumstances from which the inference constituting the opinion, as the sine qua non for action, are to be drawn, must be demonstrable, and the existence of such "circumstances", if questioned, must be proved at least prima facie. [571 E-G] From a plain reading of section 18AA, it is clear that it does not expressly in unmistakable and unequivocal terms exclude the application of the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage. [574B] In the instant case, so far as Kanpur Unit is concerned, it was lying closed for more than three months before the passing of the impugned order. There was no 'immediacy' in relation to that unit, which could absolve the Government from the obligation of complying fully with audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional or pre- takeover stage. [583A] Keshav Mills Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, [1973] 3 S.C.R. 22; Kamla Prasad Khetan v. Union of India,[1957] S.C.R. 1052; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 621; Sukhdev Singh & Ors. v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh, [1975] 3 S.C.R. 619; A. K. Kraipak v. Union of India, [1970] 1 S.C.R. 457; Ridge v. Baldwin, [1964] A.C. 40; 196; Heatley v. Tasmanian Racing & Gaming Commission, 14 Australian Law Reports 519; Nawabkhan Abbaskhan v. State of Gujarat, [1974] 3 S.C.R. 427; State of Orissa v. Dr. Bina Pani Dei, [1962] 2 S.C.R. 625; Ambalal M. Shah v. Hathi Singh Manufacturing Co. Ltd. [1962] 3 S.C.R. 171; and S. L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan & Ors., [1981] 1 S.C.R. 746, referred to. (Per Chinnappa Reddy, J. dissenting) The principles of natural justice are not attracted to the situations contemplated by section 18AA of Industries (Development and Regulation) Act. Natural justice like Ultra Vires and Public Policy is a branch of the public law and is a formidable weapon which can be wielded to secure justice to the citizen. While it may be used to protect certain fundamental liberties, civil and political rights, it may be used as indeed it is used more often than not, to protect vested interests and to obstruct the path of progressive change. The time has come to make an appropriate distinction between natural justice in its application to fundamental liberties, civil and political rights and natural justice in its application to vested interests. [590A-B] Our constitution as befits the Constitution of a Socialist Secular Democratic Republic, recognises the paramountcy of the public weal over the private interest. Natural justice, ultra vires, public policy, or any other rule of interpretation must, therefore, conform, grow and be tailored to serve the public interest and respond to the demands of an evolving society. [590C] The principles of natural justice have taken deep root in the judicial conscience of our people. They are now considered so fundamental as to be implicit in every decision making function, judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative. Where authority functions under a statute and the statute provides for the observance of the principles of natural justice in a particular manner, natural justice will have to be observed in that manner and in no other. Where the statute is silent about the observance of the principles of natural justice, such statutory silence is taken to imply compliance with the principles of natural justice. Where the conflict is between the public interest and the private interest the presumption must necessarily be weak and may, therefore, be readily displaced. The presumption is also weak, where what are involved are mere property rights. In cases of urgency, particularly where the public interest is involved, preemptive action may be a strategic necessity. Even in cases of preemptive action, if the statute so provides or if the Courts so deem fit in appropriate cases, a postponed hearing may be substituted for natural justice. [590A-C; 591F-G] 3(ii). Where natural justice is implied, the extent of the implication and the nature of the hearing must vary with the statute, the subject and the situation. [592B] The absence of the expression 'immediate action' in section 18AA(1)(b) does not make any difference. Section 18AA(1)(a) refers to a situation where immediate preventive action may avert a disaster, whereas section 18AA contemplates a situation where the disaster has occurred and action is necessary to restore normalcy. Restoration of production where production has stopped in a key industry or industrial undertaking is as important and urgent in the public interest as prevention of a situation where production may be affected. Immediate action is, therefore, as necessary in the situation contemplated by section 18AA(1)(b) as in the situation contemplated by section 18AA(1)(a). [596 F-G] The marginal note refers to the power to take over without investigation but there is no sufficient reason to suppose that the word immediate is used only to contra- distinguish it from the investigation contemplated by section 15 of the Act, though of course a consequence of immediate action under section 18AA may be to dispense with the enquiry under section 15. In fact, facts which come to light during the course of an investigation under section 15 may form the basis of action under section 18AA(1)(a). Where in the course of an investigation under section 15 it is discovered that the management have, by reckless investments or creation of encumbrances on the assets of the industrial undertaking or by diversion of funds brought about a situation which is likely to affect the production of the articles manufactured or produced in the industrial undertaking, if the Government is satisfied that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation, there is no reason why the Central Government may not straightaway take action under section 18AA(1)(a) without waiting for completion of investigation under section 15. [597A-B] Where there is a provision in the statute itself for revocation of the order by the very authority making the decision, it appears to be unnecessary to insist upon a pre- decisional observance of natural justice. [598A] The likelihood of production being jeopardized or the stoppage of production in a key industrial undertaking is a matter of grave concern affecting the public interest. Parliament has taken so serious a view of the matter that it has authorised the Central Government to take over the management of the industrial undertaking if immediate action may prevent jeopardy to production or restore production where it has already stopped. The necessity for immediate action by the Central Government contemplated by Parliament is definitely indicative of the exclusion of natural justice. It is not as if the owner of the industrial undertaking is left with no remedy. He may move the Central Government under section 18-F to cancel the order made under section 18AA. [598C-D] Neither section 18-F of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act nor section 21 of the General Clauses Act by itself excludes natural justice. The exclusion of natural justice where such exclusion is not express has to be implied by reference to the subject, the statute and the statutory situation. Where an express provision in the statute itself provides for a post decisional hearing the other provisions of the Statute will have to be read in the light of such provision and the provision for post- decisional hearing may then clinch the issue where pre- decisional natural justice appears to be excluded on the other terms of the statute. That a post-decisional hearing may also be had by the terms of section 21 of the General Clauses Act may not necessarily help in the interpretation of the provisions of the statute concerned. [599 A-C] Ridge v. Baldwin, 1964 A.C. p. 40; Annie G. Phillip v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 75 L.E.d. 1289; John H. Fahey v. Paul Mallonee, 91 L.E.d. 2030; Margarita Fuentes v. Robert L. Shevin, Attorney General of Florida, 32 L.E.d. 2d 556 and Lawrence Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 40 L.E.d. 2d 406, referred to. - Rama Rao, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh as well as the President of the Telugu Desam Party as well as respondent No. 3. The advertisements very shortly stated, refer to the auspicious gifts made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to the poor people on the eve of New Year and Sankranti. In the said advertisements, it is stated that the said Government which was formed by the Telugu Desam Party was giving to the poor people whose income was below Rs. and the said advertisements referred to a new scheme of selling sarees and dhoties at half prices to the poor people in the State of Andhra Pradesh having Green-cards. Moreover, the offer in the advertisements for the sale of dhoties and sarees at discount rates was in the nature of a benefit offered to poor persons in that State. When a Government announces the measures which are intended for the benefit of any of the classes for whose the Government can normally be expected to work like the poor or the economical backward classes, it is only in rare circumstances that such a promise can be said to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) even though such a promise might be made on the eve of elections. 8. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => '', 'counseldef' => '', 'court' => 'Supreme Court of India', 'court_type' => 'SC', 'decidedon' => '1989-09-29', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' K.N. Saikia,; M.H. Kania and; S. Ranganathan, JJ.', 'judgement' => '</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Kania, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. These two appeals arise out of the judgments in two Election Petitions in the Andhra Pradesh High Court questioning the election of respondent No. 1 as a Member of Parliament from Srikakulam No. Parliamentary Constituency in the 8th General Election to the House of the People. The points raised in these appeals are common and so are the relevant facts; and, hence, they are being disposed of by this common judgment. We propose to take note of only the few facts which are necessary for the appreciation of the controversy before us.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The polling date for the said election along with other parliamentary elections in the State of Andhra Pradesh was December 27, 1984 but in Srikakulam No. 1 Parliamentary Constituency the polling was countermanded and the date of polling was later fixed on January 28, 1985. In both the Election Petitions the election of respondent No. 1 was questioned mainly on the ground that Shri N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh as well as the President of the Telugu Desam Party as well as respondent No. 1 gave certain speeches and certain advertisements were got published by Shri N.T. Rama Rao through the Publicity Department of the Government of Andhra Pradesh in the newspapers containing certain statements which are alleged to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A) of the <a href="/act/50684/representation-of-the-people-act-1951-complete-act">Representation of the People Act, 1951</a> (hereinafter referred to as 'the said Act'). The main question canvassed before us is whether the statements contained in these aforesaid advertisements amount to a corrupt practice under Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act. Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act runs as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">123. Corrupt practices</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The following shall be deemed to be corrupt practises for the purposes of this Act :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) 'Bribery', that is to say.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(A) any gift, offer or promise by a candidate or his agent or by any other person with the consent of a candidate or his election agent of any gratification, to any person whomsover, with the object, directly or indirectly of inducing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) x x x</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) an elector to vote or refrain from voting at an election, or as a reward to.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) a person for having so stood or not stood, or for having withdrawn or not having withdrawn his candidature; or</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) an elector for having voted or refrained from voting.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The advertisements very shortly stated, refer to the auspicious gifts made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to the poor people on the eve of New Year and Sankranti. In the said advertisements, it is stated that the said Government which was formed by the Telugu Desam Party was giving to the poor people whose income was below Rs. 6,000 per year, a kilo of rice at Rs. 2 per Kg. and the said advertisements referred to a new scheme of selling sarees and dhoties at half prices to the poor people in the State of Andhra Pradesh having Green-cards. Green-cards were directed to be issued to all the persons whose annual income was below Rs. 6,000. The supply of the rice at subsidised rates as aforesaid was also to be made to the Green-card holders only. The scheme to sell sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was to be operative from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. In considering the question whether the said advertisement and the said speeches amount to a corrupt practice, we are of the view that the provisions of Section 123 of the said Act which deal with corrupt practices have to be interpreted, keeping in mind that dictates of commonsense require that they never could have been intended to treat normal election promises made in election manifestoes or usual election speeches by members of various political parties aspiring to power and by different candidates aspiring to get elected to legislative bodies concerned as corrupt practices. We are of the view that these advertisements and speeches amount to nothing more than statements extolling the achievements of the Government of the State of Andhra Pradesh under the Telugu Desam Party headed by N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister, and contain normal election promises and these statements do not amount to corrupt practices falling within the scope of Sub-clause (b) of Clause (A) of Sub-section (1) of Section 123 of the said Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. It was urged by Mr. Rao, learned Counsel for the appellants that in the impugned judgments, the High Court has incorrectly taken the view that in order to amount to bribery within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A), the transaction must amount to a bargain by the candidate with a view to get votes. It was pointed out by him that the said view has been taken in the impugned judgments, relying upon the decision of a Bench comprising to learned Judges of this Court in Ghasi Ram v. Dal Singh and Ors. :1983 SCR 102 . We have gone through to the relevant portion of that judgment (at page 109 and 110 of the said report). A careful perusal of the said judgment shows that what has been really held in that case is that if the promises given or made amount to a bargain entered into by a candidate for a vote or votes, that would amount to a corrupt practice; but it has not been held there that unless the act alleged amounts to such a bargain, it could not amount to a corrupt practice. In our view, that judgment does not lay down that in order to amount to a corrupt practice, the transaction must amount to a bargain for getting a vote. It was pointed out by Mr. Rao, however, that such a view seems to have been taken in two other decisions rendered by two Benches, each comprising two learned Judges of this Court in Bhanu Kumar Shastri v. Mohan Lal Sukhadia and Ors. : [1971]3SCR522 and Harjit Singh Mann v. S Umrao Singh and Ors. : [1980]2SCR501 . and these judgments need to be overruled. We do not propose to go into the correctness or otherwise of this view because, even on the footing that in order to amount to a corrupt practice under the aforesaid provision the alleged acts need not constitute a bargain, the the acts established in the present case, in our opinion, do not amount to a corrupt practice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Our attention was drawn by Mr. Rao to the fact that in this case the said advertisements and the speeches had to be viewed in the context of the fact that the advertisements were issued and the speeches were made after respondent No. 1 filed his nomination papers on January 4, 1985, for the election and before the election was held in the aforesaid constituency. It was further pointed out that the offer made for the sale of sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was limited to the period from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985. It cannot be denied that these factors are relevant factOrs. We cannot, however, lose sight of the fact that this offer was made not only in this constituency but throughout the State where the elections to the House of the People were scheduled to be held, and were, in fact, held on December 27, 1984. It was only in case of this constituency that the election to be held on the scheduled date was countermanded and later held on January 28, 1985. We cannot lose sight of the fact that, as far as the said speeches and the said advertisements, which were issued by the Publicity Department of the State, are concerned, they deal in the main with the achievements of the Government of Andhra Pradesh which, of course, was being run by Ministers belonging to Telugu Desam Party to which respondent No. 1 also belonged. Moreover, the offer in the advertisements for the sale of dhoties and sarees at discount rates was in the nature of a benefit offered to poor persons in that State. When a Government announces the measures which are intended for the benefit of any of the classes for whose the Government can normally be expected to work like the poor or the economical backward classes, it is only in rare circumstances that such a promise can be said to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) even though such a promise might be made on the eve of elections. Keeping this in mind, in our opinion, although the offer to sell dhoties and sarees at discount rates was of a limited duration as aforestated, it cannot be regarded as a corrupt practice. Such an offer was bound to have financial repercussions and it is quite possible the duration of the offer was limited to enable the Government to study the financial repercussions rather than from any improper motive. We find support for this view from the decision of this Court in H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh : [1969]3SCR813 . In that case an Ordinance was passed by the Government of Madhya Pradesh as a result of which a large number of agriculturists, namely, those holdings of plots of land of less than 7.5 acres area or paying land revenue not exceeding Rs. 5/- were exempted from the payment of the land revenue. It was held that such a concession does not amount to a gift, offer or promise of any gratification within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) of the said Act nor does the announcement of the declaration made at a meeting shortly before the election or the issue of a pamphlet containing that declaration at that time carry the matter any further. It was held that neither Shri D.P. Misra who was the Chief Minister nor Shri S.K. Dixit who acted as his agent were guilty of any corrupt practice within the meaning of the aforesaid provision.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. It was next contended by Mr. Rao, although very faintly, that the High Court was in error as it had not decided all other issues which were raised in the election petition. In this regard we cannot lose sight of the fact that the term of the present Lok Sabha is likely to be over within a few months and fresh elections are likely to be held and it would, therefore, be an exercise in futility to remand the matter to the High Court for deciding the remaining issues.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'AIR1990SC1889; JT1989(4)SC186; 1989(2)SCALE891; 1989Supp(2)SCC504', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors.', 'sub' => 'Election', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ), 'casename_url' => 'b-rajagopala-rao-vs-appayya-hanumanthu', 'args' => array( (int) 0 => '640942', (int) 1 => 'b-rajagopala-rao-vs-appayya-hanumanthu' ) ) $title_for_layout = 'B Rajagopala Rao and anr Vs Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors - Citation 640942 - Court Judgment | ' $desc = array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '640942', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/50684/representation-of-the-people-act-1951-complete-act">Representation of the People Act, 1951</a> - Sections 1, 3(1)(A), 123 and 123(1)(A)', 'appealno' => 'Civil Appeal Nos. 484 and 485 of 1987', 'appellant' => 'B. Rajagopala Rao and anr.', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'B. Rajagopala Rao and anr. Vs. Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors.', 'casenote' => 'Election - corrupt practices - Sections 123 and 123 (1) (A) of Representation of the People Act, 1951 - whether advertisements by public department and speeches made by respondent No. 1 to sell dhoti and sarees at discount rates amount to corrupt practices - offer was available for mass and for limited duration - such offer was bound to have financial repercussions and it is quite possible that duration of offer limited to enable Government to study financial repercussions rather than from any improper motive - offer not amounted to corrupt practices. - [ D.A. Desai,; O. Chinnappa Reddy and; R.S. Sarkaria, JJ.] The Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 empowers the Union of India in the public interest to take under its control the industries specified in the First Schedule to the Act. Item 23 of the First Schedule relates to textiles of various categories. Section 15 authorises the Central Government to make or cause to be made a full and complete investigation into the circumstances of the case if the Central Government is of the opinion that (a) in respect of any scheduled industry or industrial undertaking or undertakings (i) there has been, or is likely to be, a substantial fall in the volume of production for which, having regard to the economic conditions prevailing, there is no justification; or (ii) there has been, or is likely to be, a marked deterioration in the quality of any article... which could have been or can be avoided; or (iii) there has been or is likely to be a rise in the price of any article..... for which there is no justification; or (iv) it is necessary to take any such action for the purpose of conserving any resources of national importance; or (b) any industrial undertaking is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest. After the investigation is made under section 15, section 16(1) empowers the Central Government if action is desirable, to issue appropriate directions, and section 16(2) provides for the issue of interim directions by the Central Government pending investigation under section 15. Chapter III-A consisting of Sections 18A, 18-AA, 18-B, 18-C, 18-D, 18-E and 18-F deal with "direct management or control of Industrial Undertakings by Central Government in certain cases". Sec. 18-A empowers the Central Government by notified order, to authorise any person or body of persons to take over the management of the whole or any part of an industrial undertaking or to exercise in respect of the whole, or any part of the undertaking such functions of control as may be specified in the order, if the Central Government is of opinion that: (a) an industrial undertaking to which directions have been issued in pursuance of section 16 has failed to comply with such directions, or (b) an industrial undertaking in respect of which an investigation has been made under section 15 is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest. Section 18AA(5) stipulates that the provisions of Sections 18-B to 18 E shall be applicable to the industrial undertaking in respect of which an order has been made under section 18-AA even as they apply to an industrial undertaking taken over under Section 18-A. Section 18-F empowers the Central Government to cancel the order made under section 18-A if it appears that the purpose of the order has been fulfilled or it is not necessary that the order should remain in force. The appellant M/s. Swadeshi Cotton Mills was taken over by the Government of India by a notification dated April 13, 1978 in exercise of the powers conferred on it under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 18AA of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 on the ground that the company had by creation of encumbrances on the assets of its industrial undertakings, brought about a situation which had affected and is likely to further affect the production of articles manufactured or produced by it and that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation. The Government authorised the National Textile Corporation Limited to take over the management, subject to the conditions that the authorised person shall comply with all the directions issued from time to time by the Central Government and that the authorised person shall hold office for a period of five years. The appellant Mills challenged the aforesaid order in a writ petition in the High Court. The case was heard by a Full Bench of five Judges to consider the question whether in construing section 18AA of the Industries Development and Regulation Act, 1951, compliance with the principle of audi alteram partem is to be implied and whether hearing is to be given to the parties who would be affected by the order to be passed prior to the passing of the order or whether hearing can be given after the order is passed and whether the order passed under the said Section is vitiated by not giving of such hearing and whether such vice can be cured. The Bench by a majority answered the three questions as follows:- (a) Section 18AA(1)(a)(b) excludes the giving of prior hearing to the party who would be affected by order thereunder. (b) Section 18-F expressly provides for a post- decisional hearing to the owner of the industrial undertaking, the management of which is taken over under section 18AA to have the order made under section 18AA cancelled on any relevant ground. (c) As the taking over of management under section 18A is not vitiated by the failure to grant prior hearing the question of any such vice being cured by a grant of a subsequent hearing does not arise. The minority, however, held that in compliance with the principles of natural justice, prior hearing to the owner of the undertaking was required to be given before the passing of an order under section 18AA, that the second question did not arise as the denial of a prior hearing would not cure the vice by the grant of subsequent hearing, but it would be open to the Court to moderate the relief in such a way that the order is kept alive to the extent necessary until the making of the fresh order to subserve public interest and to make appropriate directions. After the decision on the reference the case was reheard on merits by a Full Bench of three Judges and the writ petition was allowed in part. The challenge to the validity of the order being rejected but insofar as the impugned order seeking to take over the corporate entity of the company, the corporate entity of the subsidiary and its assets, the petition was allowed and the respondents, the Union of India and the authorised person were directed to release from its control and custody and/or deliver possession of any assets or property of the company which were not referable to the industrial undertakings. Appeals to this Court were filed on behalf of the Company as well as by the Union of India and the National Textile Corporation. Two propositions were propounded on behalf of the company that: (a) Whether it was necessary to observe the rules of natural justice before issuing a notified order under section 18AA(1)(a) and further whether section 18-F impliedly excludes rules of natural justice relating to prior hearing; and it was contended (1) the mere use of the word 'immediate' in sub-clause (a) of section 18AA does not show a legislative intent to exclude the application of audi alteram partem rule altogether. (2) The word 'immediate' in clause (a) has been used in contra distinction to 'investigate'. It only means that under section 18AA action can be taken without prior investigation under section 15. The use of the word 'immediate' in section 18AA(1)(a) only dispenses with investigation under section 15 and not with the principle of audi alteram partem altogether and this is indicated by the marginal note of section 18A and para 3 of the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Amendment Bill which inserted section 18AA in 1971. (3) The word 'immediate' occurs only in clause (a) and not in clause (b) of section 18AA(1). It would be odd if intention to exclude this principle of natural justice is spelt out in one clause of the sub-section when the other clause does not exclude it. (4) Section 18-F does not exclude a pre-decisional hearing. The so-called post-decisional hearing contemplated by section 18-F cannot be and is not intended to be a substitute for a pre-decisional hearing. (5) Section 18F incorporates only a facet, albeit qualified, of section 21 of the General Clauses Act. The language of the Section implicity prohibits an enquiry into circumstances that led to the passing of the order of take-over and under it the aggrieved person is not entitled to show that on merits the order was void ab initio. (6) 'Immediacy' does not exclude a duty to act fairly because even an emergent situation can co-exist with the canons of natural justice. The only effect of urgency on the application of the principle of fair hearing would be that the width, form and duration of the hearing would be tailored to the situation and reduced to the reasonable minimum so that it does not delay and defeat the purpose of the contemplated action. (7) Where the civil consequences of the administrative action are grave and its effect is highly prejudicial to the rights and interests of the person affected and there is nothing in the language and scheme of the statute which unequivocally excludes a fair pre-decisional hearing and the post-decisional hearing provided therein is not a real remedial hearing equitable to a full right of appeal the Court should be loath to infer a legislative intent to exclude even a minimal fair hearing at the pre-decisional stage merely on ground of urgency. (8) The Central Government appointed four Government Officials including one from the office of the Textile Commissioner to study the affairs of the Company and to make recommendation. This Official Group submitted its report on February 16, 1978. The evidence on the basis of which the impugned order was passed was not disclosed to the appellant company till May 1978, only after it had filed the writ petition in the High Court. If there was anything adverse to the appellants in the survey report there was time enough about six weeks between the submission of the Survey Report and the passing of the impugned order for giving a short, reasonable opportunity to the appellants to explain the adverse findings against them. If there was immediacy situational modifications could be made to meet the requirement of fairness, by reducing the period of notice; that even the manner and form of such notice could be simplified to eliminate delay, that telephonic notice or short opportunity for furnishing their explanation to the Company might have satisfied the requirements of natural justice. Such an opportunity of hearing could have been given after the passing of a conditional tentative order and before its enforcement under section 18AA. For the interregnum suitable interim action such as freezing the assets of the Company or restraining the Company from creating further encumbrances, could be taken under section 16. On behalf of the Union of India and the Authorised Officer it was contended that (1) the presumption in favour of audi alteram partem rule stands impliedly displaced by the language scheme, setting and the purpose of the provision in section 18AA. (2) Section 18AA on its plain terms deals with situations where immediate preventive action is required. The paramount concern is to avoid serious problems which may be caused by fall in production. The purpose of an order under section 18AA is not to condemn the owner but to protect the scheduled industry. The issue under section 18AA is not solely between the Government and the management of the industrial undertaking. The object of taking action under this Section is to protect other outside interests of the community at large and the workers. (3) The rule of natural justice to give a hearing has been incorporated in section 18-F which gives an opportunity of a post-decisional hearing to the owner of the undertaking who if he feels aggrieved can on his application be heard, to show that even the original order under section 18AA was passed on invalid grounds and should be cancelled or rescinded. (4) On a true construction of section 18AA read with section 18-F the requirements of natural justice and fair play can be read into the statute only insofar as conformance to such canons can reasonably and realistically be required of it by the provision for a remedial hearing at a subsequent stage. (5) Under section 18-F the Central Government exercises curial functions and that Section confers on the aggrieved owner a right to apply to the Government to cancel the order of take-over. This section casts an obligation on the Central Government to deal with and dispose of an application filed thereunder with reasonable expedition. Allowing the appeal by the Company,<br/>HELD: (Sarkaria & Desai, JJ. per Chinnappa Reddy, J. dissenting.) In the facts and circumstances of the instant case, there has been a noncompliance with the implied requirement of the audi alteram partem rule of natural justice at the pre-decisional stage. The impugned order could be struck down as invalid on that score alone. But in view of the commitment / concession that a hearing would be afforded to the Company, the case is remitted to the Central Government to give a full, fair and effective hearing. [587G-H, 588C] The phrase 'natural justice' is not capable of a static and precise definition. It cannot be imprisoned in the straight-jacket of a cast-iron formula. Rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. Hence not possible to make an exhaustive catalogue of such rules. Two fundamental maxims of natural justice have now become deeply and indelibly ingrained in the common consciousness of mankind as pre-eminently necessary to ensure that the law is applied impartially objectively and fairly. These twin principles are (i) audi alteram partem and (ii) nemo judex in re sua. Audi alteram partem is a highly effective rule devised by the Courts to ensure that a statutory authority arrives at a just decision and it is calculated to act as a healthy check on the abuse or misuse of power. Its reach should not be narrowed and its applicability circumscribed.[554C-G] The rules of natural justice can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. If a statutory provision either specifically or by inevitable implication excludes the application of the rules of natural justice then the Court cannot ignore the mandate of the Legislature. Whether or not the application of the principles of natural justice in a given case has been excluded in the exercise of statutory power depends upon the language and basic scheme of the provision conferring the power, the nature of the power the purpose for which it is conferred and the effect of that power. [556A-B] The maxim audi alteram partem has many facets. Two of them are (a) notice of the case to be met, and (b) opportunity to explain. The rule cannot be sacrificed at the altar of administrative convenience or celerity; for, convenience and justice are often not on speaking terms. Difficulties, however, arise when the statute conferring the power does not expressly exclude this rule but its exclusion is sought by implication due to the presence of certain factors such as urgency where the obligation to give notice and opportunity to be heard would obstruct the taking of prompt action of a preventive or remedial nature. Audi alteram partem rule may be disregarded in an emergent situation where immediate action brooks no delay to prevent some imminent danger or injury or hazard to paramount public interests. Section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure empowers the magistrates specified therein to make an exparte conditional order in emergent cases for removal of dangerous public nuisances. Action under section 17 Land Acquisition Act furnishes another such instance. Similarly action on grounds of public safety public health may justify disregard of the rule of prior hearing. [556C-H] Cases where owing to the compulsion of the fact situation or the necessity of taking speedy action no pre- decisional hearing is given but the action, is followed soon by a full post-decisional hearing to the person affected do not in reality constitute an exception to the audi alteram partem rule. To call such cases as exception is a misnomer because they do not exclude fair play in action but adapt it to the urgency of the situation by balancing the competing claims of hurry and hearing. [560H-561A] The general principle as distinguished from an absolute rule of uniform application seems to be that where a statute does not in terms exclude this rule of prior hearing but contemplates a post-decisional hearing amounting to a full review of the original order on merits then such a statute would be construed as excluding the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage. [561G] If the statute conferring the power is silent with regard to the giving of pre-decisional hearing to the person affected and the administrative decision taken by the authority involves civil consequences of a grave nature and no full review or appeal on merits against that decision is provided courts will be extremely reluctant to construe such a statute as excluding the duty of affording even a minimal hearing shorn of all its formal trappings and dilatory features at the pre-decisional stage, unless viewed pragmatically it would paralyse the administrative process or frustrate the need for utmost promptitude. [561H] 7(i). A comparison of the provisions of Section 18A(1)(b) and Section 18AA(1)(c), bring out two main points of distinction: First, action under Section 18A(1)(b) can be taken only after an investigation had been made under Section 15; while under Section 18AA(1)(a) or (b) action can be taken without such investigation. The language, scheme and setting of Section 18AA read in the light of the Objects and Reasons for enacting this provision make this position clear beyond doubt. Second, before taking action under Section 18A(1)(b), the Central Government has to form an opinion on the basis of the investigation conducted under section 15, in regard to the existence of the objective fact, namely: that the industrial undertaking is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest; while under section 18A(1)(a) the Government has to satisfy itself that the persons incharge of the undertaking have brought about a situation likely to cause fall in production, by committing any of the three kinds of acts specified in that provision. This shows that the preliminary objective fact attributable to the persons in charge of the management or affairs of the undertaking, on the basis of which action may be taken under section 18(A)(1)(b), is of far wider amplitude than the circumstance, the existence of which is a sine qua non for taking action under section 18AA(1). The phrase "highly detrimental to the scheduled industry or public interest" in section 18-A is capable of being construed to cover a large variety of acts or things which may be considered wrong with the manner of running the industry by the management. In contrast with it, action under section 18AA(1)(a) can be taken only if the Central Government is satisfied with regard to the existence of the twin conditions specifically mentioned therein, on the basis of evidence in its possession. [569D-H] An analysis of section 18AA(1)(a), indicates that as a necessary preliminary to the exercise of the power thereunder, the Central Government must be satisfied "from documentary or other evidence in its possession" in regard to the co-existence of two circumstances: (i) that the persons in charge of the industrial undertaking have by committing any of these acts, namely, reckless investments, or creation of incumbrances on the assets of industrial undertaking, or by diversion of funds, brought about a situation which is likely to affect the production of the article manufactured or produced in the industrial undertaking, and (ii) that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation.[570B-D] It cannot be laid down as a general proposition that whenever a statute confers a power on an administrative authority and makes the exercise of that power conditional on the formation of an opinion by that authority in regard to the existence of an immediacy, its opinion in regard to that preliminary fact is not open to judicial scrutiny at all. While it may be conceded that an element of subjectivity is always involved in the formation of such an opinion, the existence of the circumstances from which the inference constituting the opinion, as the sine qua non for action, are to be drawn, must be demonstrable, and the existence of such "circumstances", if questioned, must be proved at least prima facie. [571 E-G] From a plain reading of section 18AA, it is clear that it does not expressly in unmistakable and unequivocal terms exclude the application of the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage. [574B] In the instant case, so far as Kanpur Unit is concerned, it was lying closed for more than three months before the passing of the impugned order. There was no 'immediacy' in relation to that unit, which could absolve the Government from the obligation of complying fully with audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional or pre- takeover stage. [583A] Keshav Mills Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, [1973] 3 S.C.R. 22; Kamla Prasad Khetan v. Union of India,[1957] S.C.R. 1052; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 621; Sukhdev Singh & Ors. v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh, [1975] 3 S.C.R. 619; A. K. Kraipak v. Union of India, [1970] 1 S.C.R. 457; Ridge v. Baldwin, [1964] A.C. 40; 196; Heatley v. Tasmanian Racing & Gaming Commission, 14 Australian Law Reports 519; Nawabkhan Abbaskhan v. State of Gujarat, [1974] 3 S.C.R. 427; State of Orissa v. Dr. Bina Pani Dei, [1962] 2 S.C.R. 625; Ambalal M. Shah v. Hathi Singh Manufacturing Co. Ltd. [1962] 3 S.C.R. 171; and S. L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan & Ors., [1981] 1 S.C.R. 746, referred to. (Per Chinnappa Reddy, J. dissenting) The principles of natural justice are not attracted to the situations contemplated by section 18AA of Industries (Development and Regulation) Act. Natural justice like Ultra Vires and Public Policy is a branch of the public law and is a formidable weapon which can be wielded to secure justice to the citizen. While it may be used to protect certain fundamental liberties, civil and political rights, it may be used as indeed it is used more often than not, to protect vested interests and to obstruct the path of progressive change. The time has come to make an appropriate distinction between natural justice in its application to fundamental liberties, civil and political rights and natural justice in its application to vested interests. [590A-B] Our constitution as befits the Constitution of a Socialist Secular Democratic Republic, recognises the paramountcy of the public weal over the private interest. Natural justice, ultra vires, public policy, or any other rule of interpretation must, therefore, conform, grow and be tailored to serve the public interest and respond to the demands of an evolving society. [590C] The principles of natural justice have taken deep root in the judicial conscience of our people. They are now considered so fundamental as to be implicit in every decision making function, judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative. Where authority functions under a statute and the statute provides for the observance of the principles of natural justice in a particular manner, natural justice will have to be observed in that manner and in no other. Where the statute is silent about the observance of the principles of natural justice, such statutory silence is taken to imply compliance with the principles of natural justice. Where the conflict is between the public interest and the private interest the presumption must necessarily be weak and may, therefore, be readily displaced. The presumption is also weak, where what are involved are mere property rights. In cases of urgency, particularly where the public interest is involved, preemptive action may be a strategic necessity. Even in cases of preemptive action, if the statute so provides or if the Courts so deem fit in appropriate cases, a postponed hearing may be substituted for natural justice. [590A-C; 591F-G] 3(ii). Where natural justice is implied, the extent of the implication and the nature of the hearing must vary with the statute, the subject and the situation. [592B] The absence of the expression 'immediate action' in section 18AA(1)(b) does not make any difference. Section 18AA(1)(a) refers to a situation where immediate preventive action may avert a disaster, whereas section 18AA contemplates a situation where the disaster has occurred and action is necessary to restore normalcy. Restoration of production where production has stopped in a key industry or industrial undertaking is as important and urgent in the public interest as prevention of a situation where production may be affected. Immediate action is, therefore, as necessary in the situation contemplated by section 18AA(1)(b) as in the situation contemplated by section 18AA(1)(a). [596 F-G] The marginal note refers to the power to take over without investigation but there is no sufficient reason to suppose that the word immediate is used only to contra- distinguish it from the investigation contemplated by section 15 of the Act, though of course a consequence of immediate action under section 18AA may be to dispense with the enquiry under section 15. In fact, facts which come to light during the course of an investigation under section 15 may form the basis of action under section 18AA(1)(a). Where in the course of an investigation under section 15 it is discovered that the management have, by reckless investments or creation of encumbrances on the assets of the industrial undertaking or by diversion of funds brought about a situation which is likely to affect the production of the articles manufactured or produced in the industrial undertaking, if the Government is satisfied that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation, there is no reason why the Central Government may not straightaway take action under section 18AA(1)(a) without waiting for completion of investigation under section 15. [597A-B] Where there is a provision in the statute itself for revocation of the order by the very authority making the decision, it appears to be unnecessary to insist upon a pre- decisional observance of natural justice. [598A] The likelihood of production being jeopardized or the stoppage of production in a key industrial undertaking is a matter of grave concern affecting the public interest. Parliament has taken so serious a view of the matter that it has authorised the Central Government to take over the management of the industrial undertaking if immediate action may prevent jeopardy to production or restore production where it has already stopped. The necessity for immediate action by the Central Government contemplated by Parliament is definitely indicative of the exclusion of natural justice. It is not as if the owner of the industrial undertaking is left with no remedy. He may move the Central Government under section 18-F to cancel the order made under section 18AA. [598C-D] Neither section 18-F of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act nor section 21 of the General Clauses Act by itself excludes natural justice. The exclusion of natural justice where such exclusion is not express has to be implied by reference to the subject, the statute and the statutory situation. Where an express provision in the statute itself provides for a post decisional hearing the other provisions of the Statute will have to be read in the light of such provision and the provision for post- decisional hearing may then clinch the issue where pre- decisional natural justice appears to be excluded on the other terms of the statute. That a post-decisional hearing may also be had by the terms of section 21 of the General Clauses Act may not necessarily help in the interpretation of the provisions of the statute concerned. [599 A-C] Ridge v. Baldwin, 1964 A.C. p. 40; Annie G. Phillip v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 75 L.E.d. 1289; John H. Fahey v. Paul Mallonee, 91 L.E.d. 2030; Margarita Fuentes v. Robert L. Shevin, Attorney General of Florida, 32 L.E.d. 2d 556 and Lawrence Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 40 L.E.d. 2d 406, referred to. - Rama Rao, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh as well as the President of the Telugu Desam Party as well as respondent No. 3. The advertisements very shortly stated, refer to the auspicious gifts made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to the poor people on the eve of New Year and Sankranti. In the said advertisements, it is stated that the said Government which was formed by the Telugu Desam Party was giving to the poor people whose income was below Rs. and the said advertisements referred to a new scheme of selling sarees and dhoties at half prices to the poor people in the State of Andhra Pradesh having Green-cards. Moreover, the offer in the advertisements for the sale of dhoties and sarees at discount rates was in the nature of a benefit offered to poor persons in that State. When a Government announces the measures which are intended for the benefit of any of the classes for whose the Government can normally be expected to work like the poor or the economical backward classes, it is only in rare circumstances that such a promise can be said to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) even though such a promise might be made on the eve of elections. 8. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => '', 'counseldef' => '', 'court' => 'Supreme Court of India', 'court_type' => 'SC', 'decidedon' => '1989-09-29', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' K.N. Saikia,; M.H. Kania and; S. Ranganathan, JJ.', 'judgement' => '</p><p>Kania, J.</p><p>1. These two appeals arise out of the judgments in two Election Petitions in the Andhra Pradesh High Court questioning the election of respondent No. 1 as a Member of Parliament from Srikakulam No. Parliamentary Constituency in the 8th General Election to the House of the People. The points raised in these appeals are common and so are the relevant facts; and, hence, they are being disposed of by this common judgment. We propose to take note of only the few facts which are necessary for the appreciation of the controversy before us.</p><p>2. The polling date for the said election along with other parliamentary elections in the State of Andhra Pradesh was December 27, 1984 but in Srikakulam No. 1 Parliamentary Constituency the polling was countermanded and the date of polling was later fixed on January 28, 1985. In both the Election Petitions the election of respondent No. 1 was questioned mainly on the ground that Shri N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh as well as the President of the Telugu Desam Party as well as respondent No. 1 gave certain speeches and certain advertisements were got published by Shri N.T. Rama Rao through the Publicity Department of the Government of Andhra Pradesh in the newspapers containing certain statements which are alleged to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A) of the <a>Representation of the People Act, 1951</a> (hereinafter referred to as 'the said Act'). The main question canvassed before us is whether the statements contained in these aforesaid advertisements amount to a corrupt practice under Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act. Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act runs as follows :</p><p>123. Corrupt practices</p><p>The following shall be deemed to be corrupt practises for the purposes of this Act :</p><p>(1) 'Bribery', that is to say.</p><p>(A) any gift, offer or promise by a candidate or his agent or by any other person with the consent of a candidate or his election agent of any gratification, to any person whomsover, with the object, directly or indirectly of inducing.</p><p>(a) x x x</p><p>(b) an elector to vote or refrain from voting at an election, or as a reward to.</p><p>(i) a person for having so stood or not stood, or for having withdrawn or not having withdrawn his candidature; or</p><p>(ii) an elector for having voted or refrained from voting.</p><p>3. The advertisements very shortly stated, refer to the auspicious gifts made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to the poor people on the eve of New Year and Sankranti. In the said advertisements, it is stated that the said Government which was formed by the Telugu Desam Party was giving to the poor people whose income was below Rs. 6,000 per year, a kilo of rice at Rs. 2 per Kg. and the said advertisements referred to a new scheme of selling sarees and dhoties at half prices to the poor people in the State of Andhra Pradesh having Green-cards. Green-cards were directed to be issued to all the persons whose annual income was below Rs. 6,000. The supply of the rice at subsidised rates as aforesaid was also to be made to the Green-card holders only. The scheme to sell sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was to be operative from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985.</p><p>4. In considering the question whether the said advertisement and the said speeches amount to a corrupt practice, we are of the view that the provisions of Section 123 of the said Act which deal with corrupt practices have to be interpreted, keeping in mind that dictates of commonsense require that they never could have been intended to treat normal election promises made in election manifestoes or usual election speeches by members of various political parties aspiring to power and by different candidates aspiring to get elected to legislative bodies concerned as corrupt practices. We are of the view that these advertisements and speeches amount to nothing more than statements extolling the achievements of the Government of the State of Andhra Pradesh under the Telugu Desam Party headed by N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister, and contain normal election promises and these statements do not amount to corrupt practices falling within the scope of Sub-clause (b) of Clause (A) of Sub-section (1) of Section 123 of the said Act.</p><p>5. It was urged by Mr. Rao, learned Counsel for the appellants that in the impugned judgments, the High Court has incorrectly taken the view that in order to amount to bribery within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A), the transaction must amount to a bargain by the candidate with a view to get votes. It was pointed out by him that the said view has been taken in the impugned judgments, relying upon the decision of a Bench comprising to learned Judges of this Court in Ghasi Ram v. Dal Singh and Ors. :1983 SCR 102 . We have gone through to the relevant portion of that judgment (at page 109 and 110 of the said report). A careful perusal of the said judgment shows that what has been really held in that case is that if the promises given or made amount to a bargain entered into by a candidate for a vote or votes, that would amount to a corrupt practice; but it has not been held there that unless the act alleged amounts to such a bargain, it could not amount to a corrupt practice. In our view, that judgment does not lay down that in order to amount to a corrupt practice, the transaction must amount to a bargain for getting a vote. It was pointed out by Mr. Rao, however, that such a view seems to have been taken in two other decisions rendered by two Benches, each comprising two learned Judges of this Court in Bhanu Kumar Shastri v. Mohan Lal Sukhadia and Ors. : [1971]3SCR522 and Harjit Singh Mann v. S Umrao Singh and Ors. : [1980]2SCR501 . and these judgments need to be overruled. We do not propose to go into the correctness or otherwise of this view because, even on the footing that in order to amount to a corrupt practice under the aforesaid provision the alleged acts need not constitute a bargain, the the acts established in the present case, in our opinion, do not amount to a corrupt practice.</p><p>6. Our attention was drawn by Mr. Rao to the fact that in this case the said advertisements and the speeches had to be viewed in the context of the fact that the advertisements were issued and the speeches were made after respondent No. 1 filed his nomination papers on January 4, 1985, for the election and before the election was held in the aforesaid constituency. It was further pointed out that the offer made for the sale of sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was limited to the period from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985. It cannot be denied that these factors are relevant factOrs. We cannot, however, lose sight of the fact that this offer was made not only in this constituency but throughout the State where the elections to the House of the People were scheduled to be held, and were, in fact, held on December 27, 1984. It was only in case of this constituency that the election to be held on the scheduled date was countermanded and later held on January 28, 1985. We cannot lose sight of the fact that, as far as the said speeches and the said advertisements, which were issued by the Publicity Department of the State, are concerned, they deal in the main with the achievements of the Government of Andhra Pradesh which, of course, was being run by Ministers belonging to Telugu Desam Party to which respondent No. 1 also belonged. Moreover, the offer in the advertisements for the sale of dhoties and sarees at discount rates was in the nature of a benefit offered to poor persons in that State. When a Government announces the measures which are intended for the benefit of any of the classes for whose the Government can normally be expected to work like the poor or the economical backward classes, it is only in rare circumstances that such a promise can be said to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) even though such a promise might be made on the eve of elections. Keeping this in mind, in our opinion, although the offer to sell dhoties and sarees at discount rates was of a limited duration as aforestated, it cannot be regarded as a corrupt practice. Such an offer was bound to have financial repercussions and it is quite possible the duration of the offer was limited to enable the Government to study the financial repercussions rather than from any improper motive. We find support for this view from the decision of this Court in H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh : [1969]3SCR813 . In that case an Ordinance was passed by the Government of Madhya Pradesh as a result of which a large number of agriculturists, namely, those holdings of plots of land of less than 7.5 acres area or paying land revenue not exceeding Rs. 5/- were exempted from the payment of the land revenue. It was held that such a concession does not amount to a gift, offer or promise of any gratification within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) of the said Act nor does the announcement of the declaration made at a meeting shortly before the election or the issue of a pamphlet containing that declaration at that time carry the matter any further. It was held that neither Shri D.P. Misra who was the Chief Minister nor Shri S.K. Dixit who acted as his agent were guilty of any corrupt practice within the meaning of the aforesaid provision.</p><p>7. It was next contended by Mr. Rao, although very faintly, that the High Court was in error as it had not decided all other issues which were raised in the election petition. In this regard we cannot lose sight of the fact that the term of the present Lok Sabha is likely to be over within a few months and fresh elections are likely to be held and it would, therefore, be an exercise in futility to remand the matter to the High Court for deciding the remaining issues.</p><p>8. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.<p></p><p>', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'AIR1990SC1889; JT1989(4)SC186; 1989(2)SCALE891; 1989Supp(2)SCC504', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors.', 'sub' => 'Election', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ) $casename_url = 'b-rajagopala-rao-vs-appayya-hanumanthu' $args = array( (int) 0 => '640942', (int) 1 => 'b-rajagopala-rao-vs-appayya-hanumanthu' ) $url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/640942/b-rajagopala-rao-vs-appayya-hanumanthu' $ctype = '' $caseref = 'H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh<br>' $content = array( (int) 0 => '', (int) 1 => '<p>Kania, J.', (int) 2 => '<p>1. These two appeals arise out of the judgments in two Election Petitions in the Andhra Pradesh High Court questioning the election of respondent No. 1 as a Member of Parliament from Srikakulam No. Parliamentary Constituency in the 8th General Election to the House of the People. The points raised in these appeals are common and so are the relevant facts; and, hence, they are being disposed of by this common judgment. We propose to take note of only the few facts which are necessary for the appreciation of the controversy before us.', (int) 3 => '<p>2. The polling date for the said election along with other parliamentary elections in the State of Andhra Pradesh was December 27, 1984 but in Srikakulam No. 1 Parliamentary Constituency the polling was countermanded and the date of polling was later fixed on January 28, 1985. In both the Election Petitions the election of respondent No. 1 was questioned mainly on the ground that Shri N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh as well as the President of the Telugu Desam Party as well as respondent No. 1 gave certain speeches and certain advertisements were got published by Shri N.T. Rama Rao through the Publicity Department of the Government of Andhra Pradesh in the newspapers containing certain statements which are alleged to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A) of the <a>Representation of the People Act, 1951</a> (hereinafter referred to as 'the said Act'). The main question canvassed before us is whether the statements contained in these aforesaid advertisements amount to a corrupt practice under Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act. Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act runs as follows :', (int) 4 => '<p>123. Corrupt practices', (int) 5 => '<p>The following shall be deemed to be corrupt practises for the purposes of this Act :', (int) 6 => '<p>(1) 'Bribery', that is to say.', (int) 7 => '<p>(A) any gift, offer or promise by a candidate or his agent or by any other person with the consent of a candidate or his election agent of any gratification, to any person whomsover, with the object, directly or indirectly of inducing.', (int) 8 => '<p>(a) x x x', (int) 9 => '<p>(b) an elector to vote or refrain from voting at an election, or as a reward to.', (int) 10 => '<p>(i) a person for having so stood or not stood, or for having withdrawn or not having withdrawn his candidature; or', (int) 11 => '<p>(ii) an elector for having voted or refrained from voting.', (int) 12 => '<p>3. The advertisements very shortly stated, refer to the auspicious gifts made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to the poor people on the eve of New Year and Sankranti. In the said advertisements, it is stated that the said Government which was formed by the Telugu Desam Party was giving to the poor people whose income was below Rs. 6,000 per year, a kilo of rice at Rs. 2 per Kg. and the said advertisements referred to a new scheme of selling sarees and dhoties at half prices to the poor people in the State of Andhra Pradesh having Green-cards. Green-cards were directed to be issued to all the persons whose annual income was below Rs. 6,000. The supply of the rice at subsidised rates as aforesaid was also to be made to the Green-card holders only. The scheme to sell sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was to be operative from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985.', (int) 13 => '<p>4. In considering the question whether the said advertisement and the said speeches amount to a corrupt practice, we are of the view that the provisions of Section 123 of the said Act which deal with corrupt practices have to be interpreted, keeping in mind that dictates of commonsense require that they never could have been intended to treat normal election promises made in election manifestoes or usual election speeches by members of various political parties aspiring to power and by different candidates aspiring to get elected to legislative bodies concerned as corrupt practices. We are of the view that these advertisements and speeches amount to nothing more than statements extolling the achievements of the Government of the State of Andhra Pradesh under the Telugu Desam Party headed by N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister, and contain normal election promises and these statements do not amount to corrupt practices falling within the scope of Sub-clause (b) of Clause (A) of Sub-section (1) of Section 123 of the said Act.', (int) 14 => '<p>5. It was urged by Mr. Rao, learned Counsel for the appellants that in the impugned judgments, the High Court has incorrectly taken the view that in order to amount to bribery within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A), the transaction must amount to a bargain by the candidate with a view to get votes. It was pointed out by him that the said view has been taken in the impugned judgments, relying upon the decision of a Bench comprising to learned Judges of this Court in Ghasi Ram v. Dal Singh and Ors. :1983 SCR 102 . We have gone through to the relevant portion of that judgment (at page 109 and 110 of the said report). A careful perusal of the said judgment shows that what has been really held in that case is that if the promises given or made amount to a bargain entered into by a candidate for a vote or votes, that would amount to a corrupt practice; but it has not been held there that unless the act alleged amounts to such a bargain, it could not amount to a corrupt practice. In our view, that judgment does not lay down that in order to amount to a corrupt practice, the transaction must amount to a bargain for getting a vote. It was pointed out by Mr. Rao, however, that such a view seems to have been taken in two other decisions rendered by two Benches, each comprising two learned Judges of this Court in Bhanu Kumar Shastri v. Mohan Lal Sukhadia and Ors. : [1971]3SCR522 and Harjit Singh Mann v. S Umrao Singh and Ors. : [1980]2SCR501 . and these judgments need to be overruled. We do not propose to go into the correctness or otherwise of this view because, even on the footing that in order to amount to a corrupt practice under the aforesaid provision the alleged acts need not constitute a bargain, the the acts established in the present case, in our opinion, do not amount to a corrupt practice.', (int) 15 => '<p>6. Our attention was drawn by Mr. Rao to the fact that in this case the said advertisements and the speeches had to be viewed in the context of the fact that the advertisements were issued and the speeches were made after respondent No. 1 filed his nomination papers on January 4, 1985, for the election and before the election was held in the aforesaid constituency. It was further pointed out that the offer made for the sale of sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was limited to the period from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985. It cannot be denied that these factors are relevant factOrs. We cannot, however, lose sight of the fact that this offer was made not only in this constituency but throughout the State where the elections to the House of the People were scheduled to be held, and were, in fact, held on December 27, 1984. It was only in case of this constituency that the election to be held on the scheduled date was countermanded and later held on January 28, 1985. We cannot lose sight of the fact that, as far as the said speeches and the said advertisements, which were issued by the Publicity Department of the State, are concerned, they deal in the main with the achievements of the Government of Andhra Pradesh which, of course, was being run by Ministers belonging to Telugu Desam Party to which respondent No. 1 also belonged. Moreover, the offer in the advertisements for the sale of dhoties and sarees at discount rates was in the nature of a benefit offered to poor persons in that State. When a Government announces the measures which are intended for the benefit of any of the classes for whose the Government can normally be expected to work like the poor or the economical backward classes, it is only in rare circumstances that such a promise can be said to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) even though such a promise might be made on the eve of elections. Keeping this in mind, in our opinion, although the offer to sell dhoties and sarees at discount rates was of a limited duration as aforestated, it cannot be regarded as a corrupt practice. Such an offer was bound to have financial repercussions and it is quite possible the duration of the offer was limited to enable the Government to study the financial repercussions rather than from any improper motive. We find support for this view from the decision of this Court in H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh : [1969]3SCR813 . In that case an Ordinance was passed by the Government of Madhya Pradesh as a result of which a large number of agriculturists, namely, those holdings of plots of land of less than 7.5 acres area or paying land revenue not exceeding Rs. 5/- were exempted from the payment of the land revenue. It was held that such a concession does not amount to a gift, offer or promise of any gratification within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) of the said Act nor does the announcement of the declaration made at a meeting shortly before the election or the issue of a pamphlet containing that declaration at that time carry the matter any further. It was held that neither Shri D.P. Misra who was the Chief Minister nor Shri S.K. Dixit who acted as his agent were guilty of any corrupt practice within the meaning of the aforesaid provision.', (int) 16 => '<p>7. It was next contended by Mr. Rao, although very faintly, that the High Court was in error as it had not decided all other issues which were raised in the election petition. In this regard we cannot lose sight of the fact that the term of the present Lok Sabha is likely to be over within a few months and fresh elections are likely to be held and it would, therefore, be an exercise in futility to remand the matter to the High Court for deciding the remaining issues.', (int) 17 => '<p>8. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.<p>', (int) 18 => '<p>' ) $paragraphAfter = (int) 1 $cnt = (int) 19 $i = (int) 10include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144 View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971 View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933 View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473 Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963 Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200 Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167 [main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109
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$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp' $dataForView = array( 'title_for_layout' => 'B Rajagopala Rao and anr Vs Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors - Citation 640942 - Court Judgment | ', 'desc' => array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '640942', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/50684/representation-of-the-people-act-1951-complete-act">Representation of the People Act, 1951</a> - Sections 1, 3(1)(A), 123 and 123(1)(A)', 'appealno' => 'Civil Appeal Nos. 484 and 485 of 1987', 'appellant' => 'B. Rajagopala Rao and anr.', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'B. Rajagopala Rao and anr. Vs. Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors.', 'casenote' => 'Election - corrupt practices - Sections 123 and 123 (1) (A) of Representation of the People Act, 1951 - whether advertisements by public department and speeches made by respondent No. 1 to sell dhoti and sarees at discount rates amount to corrupt practices - offer was available for mass and for limited duration - such offer was bound to have financial repercussions and it is quite possible that duration of offer limited to enable Government to study financial repercussions rather than from any improper motive - offer not amounted to corrupt practices. - [ D.A. Desai,; O. Chinnappa Reddy and; R.S. Sarkaria, JJ.] The Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 empowers the Union of India in the public interest to take under its control the industries specified in the First Schedule to the Act. Item 23 of the First Schedule relates to textiles of various categories. Section 15 authorises the Central Government to make or cause to be made a full and complete investigation into the circumstances of the case if the Central Government is of the opinion that (a) in respect of any scheduled industry or industrial undertaking or undertakings (i) there has been, or is likely to be, a substantial fall in the volume of production for which, having regard to the economic conditions prevailing, there is no justification; or (ii) there has been, or is likely to be, a marked deterioration in the quality of any article... which could have been or can be avoided; or (iii) there has been or is likely to be a rise in the price of any article..... for which there is no justification; or (iv) it is necessary to take any such action for the purpose of conserving any resources of national importance; or (b) any industrial undertaking is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest. After the investigation is made under section 15, section 16(1) empowers the Central Government if action is desirable, to issue appropriate directions, and section 16(2) provides for the issue of interim directions by the Central Government pending investigation under section 15. Chapter III-A consisting of Sections 18A, 18-AA, 18-B, 18-C, 18-D, 18-E and 18-F deal with "direct management or control of Industrial Undertakings by Central Government in certain cases". Sec. 18-A empowers the Central Government by notified order, to authorise any person or body of persons to take over the management of the whole or any part of an industrial undertaking or to exercise in respect of the whole, or any part of the undertaking such functions of control as may be specified in the order, if the Central Government is of opinion that: (a) an industrial undertaking to which directions have been issued in pursuance of section 16 has failed to comply with such directions, or (b) an industrial undertaking in respect of which an investigation has been made under section 15 is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest. Section 18AA(5) stipulates that the provisions of Sections 18-B to 18 E shall be applicable to the industrial undertaking in respect of which an order has been made under section 18-AA even as they apply to an industrial undertaking taken over under Section 18-A. Section 18-F empowers the Central Government to cancel the order made under section 18-A if it appears that the purpose of the order has been fulfilled or it is not necessary that the order should remain in force. The appellant M/s. Swadeshi Cotton Mills was taken over by the Government of India by a notification dated April 13, 1978 in exercise of the powers conferred on it under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 18AA of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 on the ground that the company had by creation of encumbrances on the assets of its industrial undertakings, brought about a situation which had affected and is likely to further affect the production of articles manufactured or produced by it and that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation. The Government authorised the National Textile Corporation Limited to take over the management, subject to the conditions that the authorised person shall comply with all the directions issued from time to time by the Central Government and that the authorised person shall hold office for a period of five years. The appellant Mills challenged the aforesaid order in a writ petition in the High Court. The case was heard by a Full Bench of five Judges to consider the question whether in construing section 18AA of the Industries Development and Regulation Act, 1951, compliance with the principle of audi alteram partem is to be implied and whether hearing is to be given to the parties who would be affected by the order to be passed prior to the passing of the order or whether hearing can be given after the order is passed and whether the order passed under the said Section is vitiated by not giving of such hearing and whether such vice can be cured. The Bench by a majority answered the three questions as follows:- (a) Section 18AA(1)(a)(b) excludes the giving of prior hearing to the party who would be affected by order thereunder. (b) Section 18-F expressly provides for a post- decisional hearing to the owner of the industrial undertaking, the management of which is taken over under section 18AA to have the order made under section 18AA cancelled on any relevant ground. (c) As the taking over of management under section 18A is not vitiated by the failure to grant prior hearing the question of any such vice being cured by a grant of a subsequent hearing does not arise. The minority, however, held that in compliance with the principles of natural justice, prior hearing to the owner of the undertaking was required to be given before the passing of an order under section 18AA, that the second question did not arise as the denial of a prior hearing would not cure the vice by the grant of subsequent hearing, but it would be open to the Court to moderate the relief in such a way that the order is kept alive to the extent necessary until the making of the fresh order to subserve public interest and to make appropriate directions. After the decision on the reference the case was reheard on merits by a Full Bench of three Judges and the writ petition was allowed in part. The challenge to the validity of the order being rejected but insofar as the impugned order seeking to take over the corporate entity of the company, the corporate entity of the subsidiary and its assets, the petition was allowed and the respondents, the Union of India and the authorised person were directed to release from its control and custody and/or deliver possession of any assets or property of the company which were not referable to the industrial undertakings. Appeals to this Court were filed on behalf of the Company as well as by the Union of India and the National Textile Corporation. Two propositions were propounded on behalf of the company that: (a) Whether it was necessary to observe the rules of natural justice before issuing a notified order under section 18AA(1)(a) and further whether section 18-F impliedly excludes rules of natural justice relating to prior hearing; and it was contended (1) the mere use of the word 'immediate' in sub-clause (a) of section 18AA does not show a legislative intent to exclude the application of audi alteram partem rule altogether. (2) The word 'immediate' in clause (a) has been used in contra distinction to 'investigate'. It only means that under section 18AA action can be taken without prior investigation under section 15. The use of the word 'immediate' in section 18AA(1)(a) only dispenses with investigation under section 15 and not with the principle of audi alteram partem altogether and this is indicated by the marginal note of section 18A and para 3 of the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Amendment Bill which inserted section 18AA in 1971. (3) The word 'immediate' occurs only in clause (a) and not in clause (b) of section 18AA(1). It would be odd if intention to exclude this principle of natural justice is spelt out in one clause of the sub-section when the other clause does not exclude it. (4) Section 18-F does not exclude a pre-decisional hearing. The so-called post-decisional hearing contemplated by section 18-F cannot be and is not intended to be a substitute for a pre-decisional hearing. (5) Section 18F incorporates only a facet, albeit qualified, of section 21 of the General Clauses Act. The language of the Section implicity prohibits an enquiry into circumstances that led to the passing of the order of take-over and under it the aggrieved person is not entitled to show that on merits the order was void ab initio. (6) 'Immediacy' does not exclude a duty to act fairly because even an emergent situation can co-exist with the canons of natural justice. The only effect of urgency on the application of the principle of fair hearing would be that the width, form and duration of the hearing would be tailored to the situation and reduced to the reasonable minimum so that it does not delay and defeat the purpose of the contemplated action. (7) Where the civil consequences of the administrative action are grave and its effect is highly prejudicial to the rights and interests of the person affected and there is nothing in the language and scheme of the statute which unequivocally excludes a fair pre-decisional hearing and the post-decisional hearing provided therein is not a real remedial hearing equitable to a full right of appeal the Court should be loath to infer a legislative intent to exclude even a minimal fair hearing at the pre-decisional stage merely on ground of urgency. (8) The Central Government appointed four Government Officials including one from the office of the Textile Commissioner to study the affairs of the Company and to make recommendation. This Official Group submitted its report on February 16, 1978. The evidence on the basis of which the impugned order was passed was not disclosed to the appellant company till May 1978, only after it had filed the writ petition in the High Court. If there was anything adverse to the appellants in the survey report there was time enough about six weeks between the submission of the Survey Report and the passing of the impugned order for giving a short, reasonable opportunity to the appellants to explain the adverse findings against them. If there was immediacy situational modifications could be made to meet the requirement of fairness, by reducing the period of notice; that even the manner and form of such notice could be simplified to eliminate delay, that telephonic notice or short opportunity for furnishing their explanation to the Company might have satisfied the requirements of natural justice. Such an opportunity of hearing could have been given after the passing of a conditional tentative order and before its enforcement under section 18AA. For the interregnum suitable interim action such as freezing the assets of the Company or restraining the Company from creating further encumbrances, could be taken under section 16. On behalf of the Union of India and the Authorised Officer it was contended that (1) the presumption in favour of audi alteram partem rule stands impliedly displaced by the language scheme, setting and the purpose of the provision in section 18AA. (2) Section 18AA on its plain terms deals with situations where immediate preventive action is required. The paramount concern is to avoid serious problems which may be caused by fall in production. The purpose of an order under section 18AA is not to condemn the owner but to protect the scheduled industry. The issue under section 18AA is not solely between the Government and the management of the industrial undertaking. The object of taking action under this Section is to protect other outside interests of the community at large and the workers. (3) The rule of natural justice to give a hearing has been incorporated in section 18-F which gives an opportunity of a post-decisional hearing to the owner of the undertaking who if he feels aggrieved can on his application be heard, to show that even the original order under section 18AA was passed on invalid grounds and should be cancelled or rescinded. (4) On a true construction of section 18AA read with section 18-F the requirements of natural justice and fair play can be read into the statute only insofar as conformance to such canons can reasonably and realistically be required of it by the provision for a remedial hearing at a subsequent stage. (5) Under section 18-F the Central Government exercises curial functions and that Section confers on the aggrieved owner a right to apply to the Government to cancel the order of take-over. This section casts an obligation on the Central Government to deal with and dispose of an application filed thereunder with reasonable expedition. Allowing the appeal by the Company,<br />HELD: (Sarkaria & Desai, JJ. per Chinnappa Reddy, J. dissenting.) In the facts and circumstances of the instant case, there has been a noncompliance with the implied requirement of the audi alteram partem rule of natural justice at the pre-decisional stage. The impugned order could be struck down as invalid on that score alone. But in view of the commitment / concession that a hearing would be afforded to the Company, the case is remitted to the Central Government to give a full, fair and effective hearing. [587G-H, 588C] The phrase 'natural justice' is not capable of a static and precise definition. It cannot be imprisoned in the straight-jacket of a cast-iron formula. Rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. Hence not possible to make an exhaustive catalogue of such rules. Two fundamental maxims of natural justice have now become deeply and indelibly ingrained in the common consciousness of mankind as pre-eminently necessary to ensure that the law is applied impartially objectively and fairly. These twin principles are (i) audi alteram partem and (ii) nemo judex in re sua. Audi alteram partem is a highly effective rule devised by the Courts to ensure that a statutory authority arrives at a just decision and it is calculated to act as a healthy check on the abuse or misuse of power. Its reach should not be narrowed and its applicability circumscribed.[554C-G] The rules of natural justice can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. If a statutory provision either specifically or by inevitable implication excludes the application of the rules of natural justice then the Court cannot ignore the mandate of the Legislature. Whether or not the application of the principles of natural justice in a given case has been excluded in the exercise of statutory power depends upon the language and basic scheme of the provision conferring the power, the nature of the power the purpose for which it is conferred and the effect of that power. [556A-B] The maxim audi alteram partem has many facets. Two of them are (a) notice of the case to be met, and (b) opportunity to explain. The rule cannot be sacrificed at the altar of administrative convenience or celerity; for, convenience and justice are often not on speaking terms. Difficulties, however, arise when the statute conferring the power does not expressly exclude this rule but its exclusion is sought by implication due to the presence of certain factors such as urgency where the obligation to give notice and opportunity to be heard would obstruct the taking of prompt action of a preventive or remedial nature. Audi alteram partem rule may be disregarded in an emergent situation where immediate action brooks no delay to prevent some imminent danger or injury or hazard to paramount public interests. Section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure empowers the magistrates specified therein to make an exparte conditional order in emergent cases for removal of dangerous public nuisances. Action under section 17 Land Acquisition Act furnishes another such instance. Similarly action on grounds of public safety public health may justify disregard of the rule of prior hearing. [556C-H] Cases where owing to the compulsion of the fact situation or the necessity of taking speedy action no pre- decisional hearing is given but the action, is followed soon by a full post-decisional hearing to the person affected do not in reality constitute an exception to the audi alteram partem rule. To call such cases as exception is a misnomer because they do not exclude fair play in action but adapt it to the urgency of the situation by balancing the competing claims of hurry and hearing. [560H-561A] The general principle as distinguished from an absolute rule of uniform application seems to be that where a statute does not in terms exclude this rule of prior hearing but contemplates a post-decisional hearing amounting to a full review of the original order on merits then such a statute would be construed as excluding the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage. [561G] If the statute conferring the power is silent with regard to the giving of pre-decisional hearing to the person affected and the administrative decision taken by the authority involves civil consequences of a grave nature and no full review or appeal on merits against that decision is provided courts will be extremely reluctant to construe such a statute as excluding the duty of affording even a minimal hearing shorn of all its formal trappings and dilatory features at the pre-decisional stage, unless viewed pragmatically it would paralyse the administrative process or frustrate the need for utmost promptitude. [561H] 7(i). A comparison of the provisions of Section 18A(1)(b) and Section 18AA(1)(c), bring out two main points of distinction: First, action under Section 18A(1)(b) can be taken only after an investigation had been made under Section 15; while under Section 18AA(1)(a) or (b) action can be taken without such investigation. The language, scheme and setting of Section 18AA read in the light of the Objects and Reasons for enacting this provision make this position clear beyond doubt. Second, before taking action under Section 18A(1)(b), the Central Government has to form an opinion on the basis of the investigation conducted under section 15, in regard to the existence of the objective fact, namely: that the industrial undertaking is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest; while under section 18A(1)(a) the Government has to satisfy itself that the persons incharge of the undertaking have brought about a situation likely to cause fall in production, by committing any of the three kinds of acts specified in that provision. This shows that the preliminary objective fact attributable to the persons in charge of the management or affairs of the undertaking, on the basis of which action may be taken under section 18(A)(1)(b), is of far wider amplitude than the circumstance, the existence of which is a sine qua non for taking action under section 18AA(1). The phrase "highly detrimental to the scheduled industry or public interest" in section 18-A is capable of being construed to cover a large variety of acts or things which may be considered wrong with the manner of running the industry by the management. In contrast with it, action under section 18AA(1)(a) can be taken only if the Central Government is satisfied with regard to the existence of the twin conditions specifically mentioned therein, on the basis of evidence in its possession. [569D-H] An analysis of section 18AA(1)(a), indicates that as a necessary preliminary to the exercise of the power thereunder, the Central Government must be satisfied "from documentary or other evidence in its possession" in regard to the co-existence of two circumstances: (i) that the persons in charge of the industrial undertaking have by committing any of these acts, namely, reckless investments, or creation of incumbrances on the assets of industrial undertaking, or by diversion of funds, brought about a situation which is likely to affect the production of the article manufactured or produced in the industrial undertaking, and (ii) that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation.[570B-D] It cannot be laid down as a general proposition that whenever a statute confers a power on an administrative authority and makes the exercise of that power conditional on the formation of an opinion by that authority in regard to the existence of an immediacy, its opinion in regard to that preliminary fact is not open to judicial scrutiny at all. While it may be conceded that an element of subjectivity is always involved in the formation of such an opinion, the existence of the circumstances from which the inference constituting the opinion, as the sine qua non for action, are to be drawn, must be demonstrable, and the existence of such "circumstances", if questioned, must be proved at least prima facie. [571 E-G] From a plain reading of section 18AA, it is clear that it does not expressly in unmistakable and unequivocal terms exclude the application of the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage. [574B] In the instant case, so far as Kanpur Unit is concerned, it was lying closed for more than three months before the passing of the impugned order. There was no 'immediacy' in relation to that unit, which could absolve the Government from the obligation of complying fully with audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional or pre- takeover stage. [583A] Keshav Mills Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, [1973] 3 S.C.R. 22; Kamla Prasad Khetan v. Union of India,[1957] S.C.R. 1052; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 621; Sukhdev Singh & Ors. v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh, [1975] 3 S.C.R. 619; A. K. Kraipak v. Union of India, [1970] 1 S.C.R. 457; Ridge v. Baldwin, [1964] A.C. 40; 196; Heatley v. Tasmanian Racing & Gaming Commission, 14 Australian Law Reports 519; Nawabkhan Abbaskhan v. State of Gujarat, [1974] 3 S.C.R. 427; State of Orissa v. Dr. Bina Pani Dei, [1962] 2 S.C.R. 625; Ambalal M. Shah v. Hathi Singh Manufacturing Co. Ltd. [1962] 3 S.C.R. 171; and S. L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan & Ors., [1981] 1 S.C.R. 746, referred to. (Per Chinnappa Reddy, J. dissenting) The principles of natural justice are not attracted to the situations contemplated by section 18AA of Industries (Development and Regulation) Act. Natural justice like Ultra Vires and Public Policy is a branch of the public law and is a formidable weapon which can be wielded to secure justice to the citizen. While it may be used to protect certain fundamental liberties, civil and political rights, it may be used as indeed it is used more often than not, to protect vested interests and to obstruct the path of progressive change. The time has come to make an appropriate distinction between natural justice in its application to fundamental liberties, civil and political rights and natural justice in its application to vested interests. [590A-B] Our constitution as befits the Constitution of a Socialist Secular Democratic Republic, recognises the paramountcy of the public weal over the private interest. Natural justice, ultra vires, public policy, or any other rule of interpretation must, therefore, conform, grow and be tailored to serve the public interest and respond to the demands of an evolving society. [590C] The principles of natural justice have taken deep root in the judicial conscience of our people. They are now considered so fundamental as to be implicit in every decision making function, judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative. Where authority functions under a statute and the statute provides for the observance of the principles of natural justice in a particular manner, natural justice will have to be observed in that manner and in no other. Where the statute is silent about the observance of the principles of natural justice, such statutory silence is taken to imply compliance with the principles of natural justice. Where the conflict is between the public interest and the private interest the presumption must necessarily be weak and may, therefore, be readily displaced. The presumption is also weak, where what are involved are mere property rights. In cases of urgency, particularly where the public interest is involved, preemptive action may be a strategic necessity. Even in cases of preemptive action, if the statute so provides or if the Courts so deem fit in appropriate cases, a postponed hearing may be substituted for natural justice. [590A-C; 591F-G] 3(ii). Where natural justice is implied, the extent of the implication and the nature of the hearing must vary with the statute, the subject and the situation. [592B] The absence of the expression 'immediate action' in section 18AA(1)(b) does not make any difference. Section 18AA(1)(a) refers to a situation where immediate preventive action may avert a disaster, whereas section 18AA contemplates a situation where the disaster has occurred and action is necessary to restore normalcy. Restoration of production where production has stopped in a key industry or industrial undertaking is as important and urgent in the public interest as prevention of a situation where production may be affected. Immediate action is, therefore, as necessary in the situation contemplated by section 18AA(1)(b) as in the situation contemplated by section 18AA(1)(a). [596 F-G] The marginal note refers to the power to take over without investigation but there is no sufficient reason to suppose that the word immediate is used only to contra- distinguish it from the investigation contemplated by section 15 of the Act, though of course a consequence of immediate action under section 18AA may be to dispense with the enquiry under section 15. In fact, facts which come to light during the course of an investigation under section 15 may form the basis of action under section 18AA(1)(a). Where in the course of an investigation under section 15 it is discovered that the management have, by reckless investments or creation of encumbrances on the assets of the industrial undertaking or by diversion of funds brought about a situation which is likely to affect the production of the articles manufactured or produced in the industrial undertaking, if the Government is satisfied that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation, there is no reason why the Central Government may not straightaway take action under section 18AA(1)(a) without waiting for completion of investigation under section 15. [597A-B] Where there is a provision in the statute itself for revocation of the order by the very authority making the decision, it appears to be unnecessary to insist upon a pre- decisional observance of natural justice. [598A] The likelihood of production being jeopardized or the stoppage of production in a key industrial undertaking is a matter of grave concern affecting the public interest. Parliament has taken so serious a view of the matter that it has authorised the Central Government to take over the management of the industrial undertaking if immediate action may prevent jeopardy to production or restore production where it has already stopped. The necessity for immediate action by the Central Government contemplated by Parliament is definitely indicative of the exclusion of natural justice. It is not as if the owner of the industrial undertaking is left with no remedy. He may move the Central Government under section 18-F to cancel the order made under section 18AA. [598C-D] Neither section 18-F of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act nor section 21 of the General Clauses Act by itself excludes natural justice. The exclusion of natural justice where such exclusion is not express has to be implied by reference to the subject, the statute and the statutory situation. Where an express provision in the statute itself provides for a post decisional hearing the other provisions of the Statute will have to be read in the light of such provision and the provision for post- decisional hearing may then clinch the issue where pre- decisional natural justice appears to be excluded on the other terms of the statute. That a post-decisional hearing may also be had by the terms of section 21 of the General Clauses Act may not necessarily help in the interpretation of the provisions of the statute concerned. [599 A-C] Ridge v. Baldwin, 1964 A.C. p. 40; Annie G. Phillip v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 75 L.E.d. 1289; John H. Fahey v. Paul Mallonee, 91 L.E.d. 2030; Margarita Fuentes v. Robert L. Shevin, Attorney General of Florida, 32 L.E.d. 2d 556 and Lawrence Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 40 L.E.d. 2d 406, referred to. - Rama Rao, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh as well as the President of the Telugu Desam Party as well as respondent No. 3. The advertisements very shortly stated, refer to the auspicious gifts made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to the poor people on the eve of New Year and Sankranti. In the said advertisements, it is stated that the said Government which was formed by the Telugu Desam Party was giving to the poor people whose income was below Rs. and the said advertisements referred to a new scheme of selling sarees and dhoties at half prices to the poor people in the State of Andhra Pradesh having Green-cards. Moreover, the offer in the advertisements for the sale of dhoties and sarees at discount rates was in the nature of a benefit offered to poor persons in that State. When a Government announces the measures which are intended for the benefit of any of the classes for whose the Government can normally be expected to work like the poor or the economical backward classes, it is only in rare circumstances that such a promise can be said to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) even though such a promise might be made on the eve of elections. 8. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => '', 'counseldef' => '', 'court' => 'Supreme Court of India', 'court_type' => 'SC', 'decidedon' => '1989-09-29', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' K.N. Saikia,; M.H. Kania and; S. Ranganathan, JJ.', 'judgement' => '</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Kania, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. These two appeals arise out of the judgments in two Election Petitions in the Andhra Pradesh High Court questioning the election of respondent No. 1 as a Member of Parliament from Srikakulam No. Parliamentary Constituency in the 8th General Election to the House of the People. The points raised in these appeals are common and so are the relevant facts; and, hence, they are being disposed of by this common judgment. We propose to take note of only the few facts which are necessary for the appreciation of the controversy before us.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The polling date for the said election along with other parliamentary elections in the State of Andhra Pradesh was December 27, 1984 but in Srikakulam No. 1 Parliamentary Constituency the polling was countermanded and the date of polling was later fixed on January 28, 1985. In both the Election Petitions the election of respondent No. 1 was questioned mainly on the ground that Shri N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh as well as the President of the Telugu Desam Party as well as respondent No. 1 gave certain speeches and certain advertisements were got published by Shri N.T. Rama Rao through the Publicity Department of the Government of Andhra Pradesh in the newspapers containing certain statements which are alleged to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A) of the <a href="/act/50684/representation-of-the-people-act-1951-complete-act">Representation of the People Act, 1951</a> (hereinafter referred to as 'the said Act'). The main question canvassed before us is whether the statements contained in these aforesaid advertisements amount to a corrupt practice under Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act. Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act runs as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">123. Corrupt practices</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The following shall be deemed to be corrupt practises for the purposes of this Act :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) 'Bribery', that is to say.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(A) any gift, offer or promise by a candidate or his agent or by any other person with the consent of a candidate or his election agent of any gratification, to any person whomsover, with the object, directly or indirectly of inducing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) x x x</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) an elector to vote or refrain from voting at an election, or as a reward to.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) a person for having so stood or not stood, or for having withdrawn or not having withdrawn his candidature; or</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) an elector for having voted or refrained from voting.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The advertisements very shortly stated, refer to the auspicious gifts made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to the poor people on the eve of New Year and Sankranti. In the said advertisements, it is stated that the said Government which was formed by the Telugu Desam Party was giving to the poor people whose income was below Rs. 6,000 per year, a kilo of rice at Rs. 2 per Kg. and the said advertisements referred to a new scheme of selling sarees and dhoties at half prices to the poor people in the State of Andhra Pradesh having Green-cards. Green-cards were directed to be issued to all the persons whose annual income was below Rs. 6,000. The supply of the rice at subsidised rates as aforesaid was also to be made to the Green-card holders only. The scheme to sell sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was to be operative from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. In considering the question whether the said advertisement and the said speeches amount to a corrupt practice, we are of the view that the provisions of Section 123 of the said Act which deal with corrupt practices have to be interpreted, keeping in mind that dictates of commonsense require that they never could have been intended to treat normal election promises made in election manifestoes or usual election speeches by members of various political parties aspiring to power and by different candidates aspiring to get elected to legislative bodies concerned as corrupt practices. We are of the view that these advertisements and speeches amount to nothing more than statements extolling the achievements of the Government of the State of Andhra Pradesh under the Telugu Desam Party headed by N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister, and contain normal election promises and these statements do not amount to corrupt practices falling within the scope of Sub-clause (b) of Clause (A) of Sub-section (1) of Section 123 of the said Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. It was urged by Mr. Rao, learned Counsel for the appellants that in the impugned judgments, the High Court has incorrectly taken the view that in order to amount to bribery within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A), the transaction must amount to a bargain by the candidate with a view to get votes. It was pointed out by him that the said view has been taken in the impugned judgments, relying upon the decision of a Bench comprising to learned Judges of this Court in Ghasi Ram v. Dal Singh and Ors. :1983 SCR 102 . We have gone through to the relevant portion of that judgment (at page 109 and 110 of the said report). A careful perusal of the said judgment shows that what has been really held in that case is that if the promises given or made amount to a bargain entered into by a candidate for a vote or votes, that would amount to a corrupt practice; but it has not been held there that unless the act alleged amounts to such a bargain, it could not amount to a corrupt practice. In our view, that judgment does not lay down that in order to amount to a corrupt practice, the transaction must amount to a bargain for getting a vote. It was pointed out by Mr. Rao, however, that such a view seems to have been taken in two other decisions rendered by two Benches, each comprising two learned Judges of this Court in Bhanu Kumar Shastri v. Mohan Lal Sukhadia and Ors. : [1971]3SCR522 and Harjit Singh Mann v. S Umrao Singh and Ors. : [1980]2SCR501 . and these judgments need to be overruled. We do not propose to go into the correctness or otherwise of this view because, even on the footing that in order to amount to a corrupt practice under the aforesaid provision the alleged acts need not constitute a bargain, the the acts established in the present case, in our opinion, do not amount to a corrupt practice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Our attention was drawn by Mr. Rao to the fact that in this case the said advertisements and the speeches had to be viewed in the context of the fact that the advertisements were issued and the speeches were made after respondent No. 1 filed his nomination papers on January 4, 1985, for the election and before the election was held in the aforesaid constituency. It was further pointed out that the offer made for the sale of sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was limited to the period from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985. It cannot be denied that these factors are relevant factOrs. We cannot, however, lose sight of the fact that this offer was made not only in this constituency but throughout the State where the elections to the House of the People were scheduled to be held, and were, in fact, held on December 27, 1984. It was only in case of this constituency that the election to be held on the scheduled date was countermanded and later held on January 28, 1985. We cannot lose sight of the fact that, as far as the said speeches and the said advertisements, which were issued by the Publicity Department of the State, are concerned, they deal in the main with the achievements of the Government of Andhra Pradesh which, of course, was being run by Ministers belonging to Telugu Desam Party to which respondent No. 1 also belonged. Moreover, the offer in the advertisements for the sale of dhoties and sarees at discount rates was in the nature of a benefit offered to poor persons in that State. When a Government announces the measures which are intended for the benefit of any of the classes for whose the Government can normally be expected to work like the poor or the economical backward classes, it is only in rare circumstances that such a promise can be said to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) even though such a promise might be made on the eve of elections. Keeping this in mind, in our opinion, although the offer to sell dhoties and sarees at discount rates was of a limited duration as aforestated, it cannot be regarded as a corrupt practice. Such an offer was bound to have financial repercussions and it is quite possible the duration of the offer was limited to enable the Government to study the financial repercussions rather than from any improper motive. We find support for this view from the decision of this Court in H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh : [1969]3SCR813 . In that case an Ordinance was passed by the Government of Madhya Pradesh as a result of which a large number of agriculturists, namely, those holdings of plots of land of less than 7.5 acres area or paying land revenue not exceeding Rs. 5/- were exempted from the payment of the land revenue. It was held that such a concession does not amount to a gift, offer or promise of any gratification within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) of the said Act nor does the announcement of the declaration made at a meeting shortly before the election or the issue of a pamphlet containing that declaration at that time carry the matter any further. It was held that neither Shri D.P. Misra who was the Chief Minister nor Shri S.K. Dixit who acted as his agent were guilty of any corrupt practice within the meaning of the aforesaid provision.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. It was next contended by Mr. Rao, although very faintly, that the High Court was in error as it had not decided all other issues which were raised in the election petition. In this regard we cannot lose sight of the fact that the term of the present Lok Sabha is likely to be over within a few months and fresh elections are likely to be held and it would, therefore, be an exercise in futility to remand the matter to the High Court for deciding the remaining issues.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'AIR1990SC1889; JT1989(4)SC186; 1989(2)SCALE891; 1989Supp(2)SCC504', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors.', 'sub' => 'Election', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ), 'casename_url' => 'b-rajagopala-rao-vs-appayya-hanumanthu', 'args' => array( (int) 0 => '640942', (int) 1 => 'b-rajagopala-rao-vs-appayya-hanumanthu' ) ) $title_for_layout = 'B Rajagopala Rao and anr Vs Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors - Citation 640942 - Court Judgment | ' $desc = array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '640942', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/50684/representation-of-the-people-act-1951-complete-act">Representation of the People Act, 1951</a> - Sections 1, 3(1)(A), 123 and 123(1)(A)', 'appealno' => 'Civil Appeal Nos. 484 and 485 of 1987', 'appellant' => 'B. Rajagopala Rao and anr.', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'B. Rajagopala Rao and anr. Vs. Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors.', 'casenote' => 'Election - corrupt practices - Sections 123 and 123 (1) (A) of Representation of the People Act, 1951 - whether advertisements by public department and speeches made by respondent No. 1 to sell dhoti and sarees at discount rates amount to corrupt practices - offer was available for mass and for limited duration - such offer was bound to have financial repercussions and it is quite possible that duration of offer limited to enable Government to study financial repercussions rather than from any improper motive - offer not amounted to corrupt practices. - [ D.A. Desai,; O. Chinnappa Reddy and; R.S. Sarkaria, JJ.] The Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 empowers the Union of India in the public interest to take under its control the industries specified in the First Schedule to the Act. Item 23 of the First Schedule relates to textiles of various categories. Section 15 authorises the Central Government to make or cause to be made a full and complete investigation into the circumstances of the case if the Central Government is of the opinion that (a) in respect of any scheduled industry or industrial undertaking or undertakings (i) there has been, or is likely to be, a substantial fall in the volume of production for which, having regard to the economic conditions prevailing, there is no justification; or (ii) there has been, or is likely to be, a marked deterioration in the quality of any article... which could have been or can be avoided; or (iii) there has been or is likely to be a rise in the price of any article..... for which there is no justification; or (iv) it is necessary to take any such action for the purpose of conserving any resources of national importance; or (b) any industrial undertaking is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest. After the investigation is made under section 15, section 16(1) empowers the Central Government if action is desirable, to issue appropriate directions, and section 16(2) provides for the issue of interim directions by the Central Government pending investigation under section 15. Chapter III-A consisting of Sections 18A, 18-AA, 18-B, 18-C, 18-D, 18-E and 18-F deal with "direct management or control of Industrial Undertakings by Central Government in certain cases". Sec. 18-A empowers the Central Government by notified order, to authorise any person or body of persons to take over the management of the whole or any part of an industrial undertaking or to exercise in respect of the whole, or any part of the undertaking such functions of control as may be specified in the order, if the Central Government is of opinion that: (a) an industrial undertaking to which directions have been issued in pursuance of section 16 has failed to comply with such directions, or (b) an industrial undertaking in respect of which an investigation has been made under section 15 is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest. Section 18AA(5) stipulates that the provisions of Sections 18-B to 18 E shall be applicable to the industrial undertaking in respect of which an order has been made under section 18-AA even as they apply to an industrial undertaking taken over under Section 18-A. Section 18-F empowers the Central Government to cancel the order made under section 18-A if it appears that the purpose of the order has been fulfilled or it is not necessary that the order should remain in force. The appellant M/s. Swadeshi Cotton Mills was taken over by the Government of India by a notification dated April 13, 1978 in exercise of the powers conferred on it under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 18AA of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 on the ground that the company had by creation of encumbrances on the assets of its industrial undertakings, brought about a situation which had affected and is likely to further affect the production of articles manufactured or produced by it and that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation. The Government authorised the National Textile Corporation Limited to take over the management, subject to the conditions that the authorised person shall comply with all the directions issued from time to time by the Central Government and that the authorised person shall hold office for a period of five years. The appellant Mills challenged the aforesaid order in a writ petition in the High Court. The case was heard by a Full Bench of five Judges to consider the question whether in construing section 18AA of the Industries Development and Regulation Act, 1951, compliance with the principle of audi alteram partem is to be implied and whether hearing is to be given to the parties who would be affected by the order to be passed prior to the passing of the order or whether hearing can be given after the order is passed and whether the order passed under the said Section is vitiated by not giving of such hearing and whether such vice can be cured. The Bench by a majority answered the three questions as follows:- (a) Section 18AA(1)(a)(b) excludes the giving of prior hearing to the party who would be affected by order thereunder. (b) Section 18-F expressly provides for a post- decisional hearing to the owner of the industrial undertaking, the management of which is taken over under section 18AA to have the order made under section 18AA cancelled on any relevant ground. (c) As the taking over of management under section 18A is not vitiated by the failure to grant prior hearing the question of any such vice being cured by a grant of a subsequent hearing does not arise. The minority, however, held that in compliance with the principles of natural justice, prior hearing to the owner of the undertaking was required to be given before the passing of an order under section 18AA, that the second question did not arise as the denial of a prior hearing would not cure the vice by the grant of subsequent hearing, but it would be open to the Court to moderate the relief in such a way that the order is kept alive to the extent necessary until the making of the fresh order to subserve public interest and to make appropriate directions. After the decision on the reference the case was reheard on merits by a Full Bench of three Judges and the writ petition was allowed in part. The challenge to the validity of the order being rejected but insofar as the impugned order seeking to take over the corporate entity of the company, the corporate entity of the subsidiary and its assets, the petition was allowed and the respondents, the Union of India and the authorised person were directed to release from its control and custody and/or deliver possession of any assets or property of the company which were not referable to the industrial undertakings. Appeals to this Court were filed on behalf of the Company as well as by the Union of India and the National Textile Corporation. Two propositions were propounded on behalf of the company that: (a) Whether it was necessary to observe the rules of natural justice before issuing a notified order under section 18AA(1)(a) and further whether section 18-F impliedly excludes rules of natural justice relating to prior hearing; and it was contended (1) the mere use of the word 'immediate' in sub-clause (a) of section 18AA does not show a legislative intent to exclude the application of audi alteram partem rule altogether. (2) The word 'immediate' in clause (a) has been used in contra distinction to 'investigate'. It only means that under section 18AA action can be taken without prior investigation under section 15. The use of the word 'immediate' in section 18AA(1)(a) only dispenses with investigation under section 15 and not with the principle of audi alteram partem altogether and this is indicated by the marginal note of section 18A and para 3 of the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Amendment Bill which inserted section 18AA in 1971. (3) The word 'immediate' occurs only in clause (a) and not in clause (b) of section 18AA(1). It would be odd if intention to exclude this principle of natural justice is spelt out in one clause of the sub-section when the other clause does not exclude it. (4) Section 18-F does not exclude a pre-decisional hearing. The so-called post-decisional hearing contemplated by section 18-F cannot be and is not intended to be a substitute for a pre-decisional hearing. (5) Section 18F incorporates only a facet, albeit qualified, of section 21 of the General Clauses Act. The language of the Section implicity prohibits an enquiry into circumstances that led to the passing of the order of take-over and under it the aggrieved person is not entitled to show that on merits the order was void ab initio. (6) 'Immediacy' does not exclude a duty to act fairly because even an emergent situation can co-exist with the canons of natural justice. The only effect of urgency on the application of the principle of fair hearing would be that the width, form and duration of the hearing would be tailored to the situation and reduced to the reasonable minimum so that it does not delay and defeat the purpose of the contemplated action. (7) Where the civil consequences of the administrative action are grave and its effect is highly prejudicial to the rights and interests of the person affected and there is nothing in the language and scheme of the statute which unequivocally excludes a fair pre-decisional hearing and the post-decisional hearing provided therein is not a real remedial hearing equitable to a full right of appeal the Court should be loath to infer a legislative intent to exclude even a minimal fair hearing at the pre-decisional stage merely on ground of urgency. (8) The Central Government appointed four Government Officials including one from the office of the Textile Commissioner to study the affairs of the Company and to make recommendation. This Official Group submitted its report on February 16, 1978. The evidence on the basis of which the impugned order was passed was not disclosed to the appellant company till May 1978, only after it had filed the writ petition in the High Court. If there was anything adverse to the appellants in the survey report there was time enough about six weeks between the submission of the Survey Report and the passing of the impugned order for giving a short, reasonable opportunity to the appellants to explain the adverse findings against them. If there was immediacy situational modifications could be made to meet the requirement of fairness, by reducing the period of notice; that even the manner and form of such notice could be simplified to eliminate delay, that telephonic notice or short opportunity for furnishing their explanation to the Company might have satisfied the requirements of natural justice. Such an opportunity of hearing could have been given after the passing of a conditional tentative order and before its enforcement under section 18AA. For the interregnum suitable interim action such as freezing the assets of the Company or restraining the Company from creating further encumbrances, could be taken under section 16. On behalf of the Union of India and the Authorised Officer it was contended that (1) the presumption in favour of audi alteram partem rule stands impliedly displaced by the language scheme, setting and the purpose of the provision in section 18AA. (2) Section 18AA on its plain terms deals with situations where immediate preventive action is required. The paramount concern is to avoid serious problems which may be caused by fall in production. The purpose of an order under section 18AA is not to condemn the owner but to protect the scheduled industry. The issue under section 18AA is not solely between the Government and the management of the industrial undertaking. The object of taking action under this Section is to protect other outside interests of the community at large and the workers. (3) The rule of natural justice to give a hearing has been incorporated in section 18-F which gives an opportunity of a post-decisional hearing to the owner of the undertaking who if he feels aggrieved can on his application be heard, to show that even the original order under section 18AA was passed on invalid grounds and should be cancelled or rescinded. (4) On a true construction of section 18AA read with section 18-F the requirements of natural justice and fair play can be read into the statute only insofar as conformance to such canons can reasonably and realistically be required of it by the provision for a remedial hearing at a subsequent stage. (5) Under section 18-F the Central Government exercises curial functions and that Section confers on the aggrieved owner a right to apply to the Government to cancel the order of take-over. This section casts an obligation on the Central Government to deal with and dispose of an application filed thereunder with reasonable expedition. Allowing the appeal by the Company,<br/>HELD: (Sarkaria & Desai, JJ. per Chinnappa Reddy, J. dissenting.) In the facts and circumstances of the instant case, there has been a noncompliance with the implied requirement of the audi alteram partem rule of natural justice at the pre-decisional stage. The impugned order could be struck down as invalid on that score alone. But in view of the commitment / concession that a hearing would be afforded to the Company, the case is remitted to the Central Government to give a full, fair and effective hearing. [587G-H, 588C] The phrase 'natural justice' is not capable of a static and precise definition. It cannot be imprisoned in the straight-jacket of a cast-iron formula. Rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. Hence not possible to make an exhaustive catalogue of such rules. Two fundamental maxims of natural justice have now become deeply and indelibly ingrained in the common consciousness of mankind as pre-eminently necessary to ensure that the law is applied impartially objectively and fairly. These twin principles are (i) audi alteram partem and (ii) nemo judex in re sua. Audi alteram partem is a highly effective rule devised by the Courts to ensure that a statutory authority arrives at a just decision and it is calculated to act as a healthy check on the abuse or misuse of power. Its reach should not be narrowed and its applicability circumscribed.[554C-G] The rules of natural justice can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. If a statutory provision either specifically or by inevitable implication excludes the application of the rules of natural justice then the Court cannot ignore the mandate of the Legislature. Whether or not the application of the principles of natural justice in a given case has been excluded in the exercise of statutory power depends upon the language and basic scheme of the provision conferring the power, the nature of the power the purpose for which it is conferred and the effect of that power. [556A-B] The maxim audi alteram partem has many facets. Two of them are (a) notice of the case to be met, and (b) opportunity to explain. The rule cannot be sacrificed at the altar of administrative convenience or celerity; for, convenience and justice are often not on speaking terms. Difficulties, however, arise when the statute conferring the power does not expressly exclude this rule but its exclusion is sought by implication due to the presence of certain factors such as urgency where the obligation to give notice and opportunity to be heard would obstruct the taking of prompt action of a preventive or remedial nature. Audi alteram partem rule may be disregarded in an emergent situation where immediate action brooks no delay to prevent some imminent danger or injury or hazard to paramount public interests. Section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure empowers the magistrates specified therein to make an exparte conditional order in emergent cases for removal of dangerous public nuisances. Action under section 17 Land Acquisition Act furnishes another such instance. Similarly action on grounds of public safety public health may justify disregard of the rule of prior hearing. [556C-H] Cases where owing to the compulsion of the fact situation or the necessity of taking speedy action no pre- decisional hearing is given but the action, is followed soon by a full post-decisional hearing to the person affected do not in reality constitute an exception to the audi alteram partem rule. To call such cases as exception is a misnomer because they do not exclude fair play in action but adapt it to the urgency of the situation by balancing the competing claims of hurry and hearing. [560H-561A] The general principle as distinguished from an absolute rule of uniform application seems to be that where a statute does not in terms exclude this rule of prior hearing but contemplates a post-decisional hearing amounting to a full review of the original order on merits then such a statute would be construed as excluding the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage. [561G] If the statute conferring the power is silent with regard to the giving of pre-decisional hearing to the person affected and the administrative decision taken by the authority involves civil consequences of a grave nature and no full review or appeal on merits against that decision is provided courts will be extremely reluctant to construe such a statute as excluding the duty of affording even a minimal hearing shorn of all its formal trappings and dilatory features at the pre-decisional stage, unless viewed pragmatically it would paralyse the administrative process or frustrate the need for utmost promptitude. [561H] 7(i). A comparison of the provisions of Section 18A(1)(b) and Section 18AA(1)(c), bring out two main points of distinction: First, action under Section 18A(1)(b) can be taken only after an investigation had been made under Section 15; while under Section 18AA(1)(a) or (b) action can be taken without such investigation. The language, scheme and setting of Section 18AA read in the light of the Objects and Reasons for enacting this provision make this position clear beyond doubt. Second, before taking action under Section 18A(1)(b), the Central Government has to form an opinion on the basis of the investigation conducted under section 15, in regard to the existence of the objective fact, namely: that the industrial undertaking is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest; while under section 18A(1)(a) the Government has to satisfy itself that the persons incharge of the undertaking have brought about a situation likely to cause fall in production, by committing any of the three kinds of acts specified in that provision. This shows that the preliminary objective fact attributable to the persons in charge of the management or affairs of the undertaking, on the basis of which action may be taken under section 18(A)(1)(b), is of far wider amplitude than the circumstance, the existence of which is a sine qua non for taking action under section 18AA(1). The phrase "highly detrimental to the scheduled industry or public interest" in section 18-A is capable of being construed to cover a large variety of acts or things which may be considered wrong with the manner of running the industry by the management. In contrast with it, action under section 18AA(1)(a) can be taken only if the Central Government is satisfied with regard to the existence of the twin conditions specifically mentioned therein, on the basis of evidence in its possession. [569D-H] An analysis of section 18AA(1)(a), indicates that as a necessary preliminary to the exercise of the power thereunder, the Central Government must be satisfied "from documentary or other evidence in its possession" in regard to the co-existence of two circumstances: (i) that the persons in charge of the industrial undertaking have by committing any of these acts, namely, reckless investments, or creation of incumbrances on the assets of industrial undertaking, or by diversion of funds, brought about a situation which is likely to affect the production of the article manufactured or produced in the industrial undertaking, and (ii) that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation.[570B-D] It cannot be laid down as a general proposition that whenever a statute confers a power on an administrative authority and makes the exercise of that power conditional on the formation of an opinion by that authority in regard to the existence of an immediacy, its opinion in regard to that preliminary fact is not open to judicial scrutiny at all. While it may be conceded that an element of subjectivity is always involved in the formation of such an opinion, the existence of the circumstances from which the inference constituting the opinion, as the sine qua non for action, are to be drawn, must be demonstrable, and the existence of such "circumstances", if questioned, must be proved at least prima facie. [571 E-G] From a plain reading of section 18AA, it is clear that it does not expressly in unmistakable and unequivocal terms exclude the application of the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage. [574B] In the instant case, so far as Kanpur Unit is concerned, it was lying closed for more than three months before the passing of the impugned order. There was no 'immediacy' in relation to that unit, which could absolve the Government from the obligation of complying fully with audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional or pre- takeover stage. [583A] Keshav Mills Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, [1973] 3 S.C.R. 22; Kamla Prasad Khetan v. Union of India,[1957] S.C.R. 1052; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 621; Sukhdev Singh & Ors. v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh, [1975] 3 S.C.R. 619; A. K. Kraipak v. Union of India, [1970] 1 S.C.R. 457; Ridge v. Baldwin, [1964] A.C. 40; 196; Heatley v. Tasmanian Racing & Gaming Commission, 14 Australian Law Reports 519; Nawabkhan Abbaskhan v. State of Gujarat, [1974] 3 S.C.R. 427; State of Orissa v. Dr. Bina Pani Dei, [1962] 2 S.C.R. 625; Ambalal M. Shah v. Hathi Singh Manufacturing Co. Ltd. [1962] 3 S.C.R. 171; and S. L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan & Ors., [1981] 1 S.C.R. 746, referred to. (Per Chinnappa Reddy, J. dissenting) The principles of natural justice are not attracted to the situations contemplated by section 18AA of Industries (Development and Regulation) Act. Natural justice like Ultra Vires and Public Policy is a branch of the public law and is a formidable weapon which can be wielded to secure justice to the citizen. While it may be used to protect certain fundamental liberties, civil and political rights, it may be used as indeed it is used more often than not, to protect vested interests and to obstruct the path of progressive change. The time has come to make an appropriate distinction between natural justice in its application to fundamental liberties, civil and political rights and natural justice in its application to vested interests. [590A-B] Our constitution as befits the Constitution of a Socialist Secular Democratic Republic, recognises the paramountcy of the public weal over the private interest. Natural justice, ultra vires, public policy, or any other rule of interpretation must, therefore, conform, grow and be tailored to serve the public interest and respond to the demands of an evolving society. [590C] The principles of natural justice have taken deep root in the judicial conscience of our people. They are now considered so fundamental as to be implicit in every decision making function, judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative. Where authority functions under a statute and the statute provides for the observance of the principles of natural justice in a particular manner, natural justice will have to be observed in that manner and in no other. Where the statute is silent about the observance of the principles of natural justice, such statutory silence is taken to imply compliance with the principles of natural justice. Where the conflict is between the public interest and the private interest the presumption must necessarily be weak and may, therefore, be readily displaced. The presumption is also weak, where what are involved are mere property rights. In cases of urgency, particularly where the public interest is involved, preemptive action may be a strategic necessity. Even in cases of preemptive action, if the statute so provides or if the Courts so deem fit in appropriate cases, a postponed hearing may be substituted for natural justice. [590A-C; 591F-G] 3(ii). Where natural justice is implied, the extent of the implication and the nature of the hearing must vary with the statute, the subject and the situation. [592B] The absence of the expression 'immediate action' in section 18AA(1)(b) does not make any difference. Section 18AA(1)(a) refers to a situation where immediate preventive action may avert a disaster, whereas section 18AA contemplates a situation where the disaster has occurred and action is necessary to restore normalcy. Restoration of production where production has stopped in a key industry or industrial undertaking is as important and urgent in the public interest as prevention of a situation where production may be affected. Immediate action is, therefore, as necessary in the situation contemplated by section 18AA(1)(b) as in the situation contemplated by section 18AA(1)(a). [596 F-G] The marginal note refers to the power to take over without investigation but there is no sufficient reason to suppose that the word immediate is used only to contra- distinguish it from the investigation contemplated by section 15 of the Act, though of course a consequence of immediate action under section 18AA may be to dispense with the enquiry under section 15. In fact, facts which come to light during the course of an investigation under section 15 may form the basis of action under section 18AA(1)(a). Where in the course of an investigation under section 15 it is discovered that the management have, by reckless investments or creation of encumbrances on the assets of the industrial undertaking or by diversion of funds brought about a situation which is likely to affect the production of the articles manufactured or produced in the industrial undertaking, if the Government is satisfied that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation, there is no reason why the Central Government may not straightaway take action under section 18AA(1)(a) without waiting for completion of investigation under section 15. [597A-B] Where there is a provision in the statute itself for revocation of the order by the very authority making the decision, it appears to be unnecessary to insist upon a pre- decisional observance of natural justice. [598A] The likelihood of production being jeopardized or the stoppage of production in a key industrial undertaking is a matter of grave concern affecting the public interest. Parliament has taken so serious a view of the matter that it has authorised the Central Government to take over the management of the industrial undertaking if immediate action may prevent jeopardy to production or restore production where it has already stopped. The necessity for immediate action by the Central Government contemplated by Parliament is definitely indicative of the exclusion of natural justice. It is not as if the owner of the industrial undertaking is left with no remedy. He may move the Central Government under section 18-F to cancel the order made under section 18AA. [598C-D] Neither section 18-F of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act nor section 21 of the General Clauses Act by itself excludes natural justice. The exclusion of natural justice where such exclusion is not express has to be implied by reference to the subject, the statute and the statutory situation. Where an express provision in the statute itself provides for a post decisional hearing the other provisions of the Statute will have to be read in the light of such provision and the provision for post- decisional hearing may then clinch the issue where pre- decisional natural justice appears to be excluded on the other terms of the statute. That a post-decisional hearing may also be had by the terms of section 21 of the General Clauses Act may not necessarily help in the interpretation of the provisions of the statute concerned. [599 A-C] Ridge v. Baldwin, 1964 A.C. p. 40; Annie G. Phillip v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 75 L.E.d. 1289; John H. Fahey v. Paul Mallonee, 91 L.E.d. 2030; Margarita Fuentes v. Robert L. Shevin, Attorney General of Florida, 32 L.E.d. 2d 556 and Lawrence Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 40 L.E.d. 2d 406, referred to. - Rama Rao, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh as well as the President of the Telugu Desam Party as well as respondent No. 3. The advertisements very shortly stated, refer to the auspicious gifts made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to the poor people on the eve of New Year and Sankranti. In the said advertisements, it is stated that the said Government which was formed by the Telugu Desam Party was giving to the poor people whose income was below Rs. and the said advertisements referred to a new scheme of selling sarees and dhoties at half prices to the poor people in the State of Andhra Pradesh having Green-cards. Moreover, the offer in the advertisements for the sale of dhoties and sarees at discount rates was in the nature of a benefit offered to poor persons in that State. When a Government announces the measures which are intended for the benefit of any of the classes for whose the Government can normally be expected to work like the poor or the economical backward classes, it is only in rare circumstances that such a promise can be said to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) even though such a promise might be made on the eve of elections. 8. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => '', 'counseldef' => '', 'court' => 'Supreme Court of India', 'court_type' => 'SC', 'decidedon' => '1989-09-29', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' K.N. Saikia,; M.H. Kania and; S. Ranganathan, JJ.', 'judgement' => '</p><p>Kania, J.</p><p>1. These two appeals arise out of the judgments in two Election Petitions in the Andhra Pradesh High Court questioning the election of respondent No. 1 as a Member of Parliament from Srikakulam No. Parliamentary Constituency in the 8th General Election to the House of the People. The points raised in these appeals are common and so are the relevant facts; and, hence, they are being disposed of by this common judgment. We propose to take note of only the few facts which are necessary for the appreciation of the controversy before us.</p><p>2. The polling date for the said election along with other parliamentary elections in the State of Andhra Pradesh was December 27, 1984 but in Srikakulam No. 1 Parliamentary Constituency the polling was countermanded and the date of polling was later fixed on January 28, 1985. In both the Election Petitions the election of respondent No. 1 was questioned mainly on the ground that Shri N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh as well as the President of the Telugu Desam Party as well as respondent No. 1 gave certain speeches and certain advertisements were got published by Shri N.T. Rama Rao through the Publicity Department of the Government of Andhra Pradesh in the newspapers containing certain statements which are alleged to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A) of the <a>Representation of the People Act, 1951</a> (hereinafter referred to as 'the said Act'). The main question canvassed before us is whether the statements contained in these aforesaid advertisements amount to a corrupt practice under Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act. Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act runs as follows :</p><p>123. Corrupt practices</p><p>The following shall be deemed to be corrupt practises for the purposes of this Act :</p><p>(1) 'Bribery', that is to say.</p><p>(A) any gift, offer or promise by a candidate or his agent or by any other person with the consent of a candidate or his election agent of any gratification, to any person whomsover, with the object, directly or indirectly of inducing.</p><p>(a) x x x</p><p>(b) an elector to vote or refrain from voting at an election, or as a reward to.</p><p>(i) a person for having so stood or not stood, or for having withdrawn or not having withdrawn his candidature; or</p><p>(ii) an elector for having voted or refrained from voting.</p><p>3. The advertisements very shortly stated, refer to the auspicious gifts made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to the poor people on the eve of New Year and Sankranti. In the said advertisements, it is stated that the said Government which was formed by the Telugu Desam Party was giving to the poor people whose income was below Rs. 6,000 per year, a kilo of rice at Rs. 2 per Kg. and the said advertisements referred to a new scheme of selling sarees and dhoties at half prices to the poor people in the State of Andhra Pradesh having Green-cards. Green-cards were directed to be issued to all the persons whose annual income was below Rs. 6,000. The supply of the rice at subsidised rates as aforesaid was also to be made to the Green-card holders only. The scheme to sell sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was to be operative from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985.</p><p>4. In considering the question whether the said advertisement and the said speeches amount to a corrupt practice, we are of the view that the provisions of Section 123 of the said Act which deal with corrupt practices have to be interpreted, keeping in mind that dictates of commonsense require that they never could have been intended to treat normal election promises made in election manifestoes or usual election speeches by members of various political parties aspiring to power and by different candidates aspiring to get elected to legislative bodies concerned as corrupt practices. We are of the view that these advertisements and speeches amount to nothing more than statements extolling the achievements of the Government of the State of Andhra Pradesh under the Telugu Desam Party headed by N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister, and contain normal election promises and these statements do not amount to corrupt practices falling within the scope of Sub-clause (b) of Clause (A) of Sub-section (1) of Section 123 of the said Act.</p><p>5. It was urged by Mr. Rao, learned Counsel for the appellants that in the impugned judgments, the High Court has incorrectly taken the view that in order to amount to bribery within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A), the transaction must amount to a bargain by the candidate with a view to get votes. It was pointed out by him that the said view has been taken in the impugned judgments, relying upon the decision of a Bench comprising to learned Judges of this Court in Ghasi Ram v. Dal Singh and Ors. :1983 SCR 102 . We have gone through to the relevant portion of that judgment (at page 109 and 110 of the said report). A careful perusal of the said judgment shows that what has been really held in that case is that if the promises given or made amount to a bargain entered into by a candidate for a vote or votes, that would amount to a corrupt practice; but it has not been held there that unless the act alleged amounts to such a bargain, it could not amount to a corrupt practice. In our view, that judgment does not lay down that in order to amount to a corrupt practice, the transaction must amount to a bargain for getting a vote. It was pointed out by Mr. Rao, however, that such a view seems to have been taken in two other decisions rendered by two Benches, each comprising two learned Judges of this Court in Bhanu Kumar Shastri v. Mohan Lal Sukhadia and Ors. : [1971]3SCR522 and Harjit Singh Mann v. S Umrao Singh and Ors. : [1980]2SCR501 . and these judgments need to be overruled. We do not propose to go into the correctness or otherwise of this view because, even on the footing that in order to amount to a corrupt practice under the aforesaid provision the alleged acts need not constitute a bargain, the the acts established in the present case, in our opinion, do not amount to a corrupt practice.</p><p>6. Our attention was drawn by Mr. Rao to the fact that in this case the said advertisements and the speeches had to be viewed in the context of the fact that the advertisements were issued and the speeches were made after respondent No. 1 filed his nomination papers on January 4, 1985, for the election and before the election was held in the aforesaid constituency. It was further pointed out that the offer made for the sale of sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was limited to the period from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985. It cannot be denied that these factors are relevant factOrs. We cannot, however, lose sight of the fact that this offer was made not only in this constituency but throughout the State where the elections to the House of the People were scheduled to be held, and were, in fact, held on December 27, 1984. It was only in case of this constituency that the election to be held on the scheduled date was countermanded and later held on January 28, 1985. We cannot lose sight of the fact that, as far as the said speeches and the said advertisements, which were issued by the Publicity Department of the State, are concerned, they deal in the main with the achievements of the Government of Andhra Pradesh which, of course, was being run by Ministers belonging to Telugu Desam Party to which respondent No. 1 also belonged. Moreover, the offer in the advertisements for the sale of dhoties and sarees at discount rates was in the nature of a benefit offered to poor persons in that State. When a Government announces the measures which are intended for the benefit of any of the classes for whose the Government can normally be expected to work like the poor or the economical backward classes, it is only in rare circumstances that such a promise can be said to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) even though such a promise might be made on the eve of elections. Keeping this in mind, in our opinion, although the offer to sell dhoties and sarees at discount rates was of a limited duration as aforestated, it cannot be regarded as a corrupt practice. Such an offer was bound to have financial repercussions and it is quite possible the duration of the offer was limited to enable the Government to study the financial repercussions rather than from any improper motive. We find support for this view from the decision of this Court in H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh : [1969]3SCR813 . In that case an Ordinance was passed by the Government of Madhya Pradesh as a result of which a large number of agriculturists, namely, those holdings of plots of land of less than 7.5 acres area or paying land revenue not exceeding Rs. 5/- were exempted from the payment of the land revenue. It was held that such a concession does not amount to a gift, offer or promise of any gratification within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) of the said Act nor does the announcement of the declaration made at a meeting shortly before the election or the issue of a pamphlet containing that declaration at that time carry the matter any further. It was held that neither Shri D.P. Misra who was the Chief Minister nor Shri S.K. Dixit who acted as his agent were guilty of any corrupt practice within the meaning of the aforesaid provision.</p><p>7. It was next contended by Mr. Rao, although very faintly, that the High Court was in error as it had not decided all other issues which were raised in the election petition. In this regard we cannot lose sight of the fact that the term of the present Lok Sabha is likely to be over within a few months and fresh elections are likely to be held and it would, therefore, be an exercise in futility to remand the matter to the High Court for deciding the remaining issues.</p><p>8. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.<p></p><p>', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'AIR1990SC1889; JT1989(4)SC186; 1989(2)SCALE891; 1989Supp(2)SCC504', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors.', 'sub' => 'Election', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ) $casename_url = 'b-rajagopala-rao-vs-appayya-hanumanthu' $args = array( (int) 0 => '640942', (int) 1 => 'b-rajagopala-rao-vs-appayya-hanumanthu' ) $url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/640942/b-rajagopala-rao-vs-appayya-hanumanthu' $ctype = '' $caseref = 'H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh<br>' $content = array( (int) 0 => '', (int) 1 => '<p>Kania, J.', (int) 2 => '<p>1. These two appeals arise out of the judgments in two Election Petitions in the Andhra Pradesh High Court questioning the election of respondent No. 1 as a Member of Parliament from Srikakulam No. Parliamentary Constituency in the 8th General Election to the House of the People. The points raised in these appeals are common and so are the relevant facts; and, hence, they are being disposed of by this common judgment. We propose to take note of only the few facts which are necessary for the appreciation of the controversy before us.', (int) 3 => '<p>2. The polling date for the said election along with other parliamentary elections in the State of Andhra Pradesh was December 27, 1984 but in Srikakulam No. 1 Parliamentary Constituency the polling was countermanded and the date of polling was later fixed on January 28, 1985. In both the Election Petitions the election of respondent No. 1 was questioned mainly on the ground that Shri N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh as well as the President of the Telugu Desam Party as well as respondent No. 1 gave certain speeches and certain advertisements were got published by Shri N.T. Rama Rao through the Publicity Department of the Government of Andhra Pradesh in the newspapers containing certain statements which are alleged to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A) of the <a>Representation of the People Act, 1951</a> (hereinafter referred to as 'the said Act'). The main question canvassed before us is whether the statements contained in these aforesaid advertisements amount to a corrupt practice under Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act. Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act runs as follows :', (int) 4 => '<p>123. Corrupt practices', (int) 5 => '<p>The following shall be deemed to be corrupt practises for the purposes of this Act :', (int) 6 => '<p>(1) 'Bribery', that is to say.', (int) 7 => '<p>(A) any gift, offer or promise by a candidate or his agent or by any other person with the consent of a candidate or his election agent of any gratification, to any person whomsover, with the object, directly or indirectly of inducing.', (int) 8 => '<p>(a) x x x', (int) 9 => '<p>(b) an elector to vote or refrain from voting at an election, or as a reward to.', (int) 10 => '<p>(i) a person for having so stood or not stood, or for having withdrawn or not having withdrawn his candidature; or', (int) 11 => '<p>(ii) an elector for having voted or refrained from voting.', (int) 12 => '<p>3. The advertisements very shortly stated, refer to the auspicious gifts made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to the poor people on the eve of New Year and Sankranti. In the said advertisements, it is stated that the said Government which was formed by the Telugu Desam Party was giving to the poor people whose income was below Rs. 6,000 per year, a kilo of rice at Rs. 2 per Kg. and the said advertisements referred to a new scheme of selling sarees and dhoties at half prices to the poor people in the State of Andhra Pradesh having Green-cards. Green-cards were directed to be issued to all the persons whose annual income was below Rs. 6,000. The supply of the rice at subsidised rates as aforesaid was also to be made to the Green-card holders only. The scheme to sell sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was to be operative from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985.', (int) 13 => '<p>4. In considering the question whether the said advertisement and the said speeches amount to a corrupt practice, we are of the view that the provisions of Section 123 of the said Act which deal with corrupt practices have to be interpreted, keeping in mind that dictates of commonsense require that they never could have been intended to treat normal election promises made in election manifestoes or usual election speeches by members of various political parties aspiring to power and by different candidates aspiring to get elected to legislative bodies concerned as corrupt practices. We are of the view that these advertisements and speeches amount to nothing more than statements extolling the achievements of the Government of the State of Andhra Pradesh under the Telugu Desam Party headed by N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister, and contain normal election promises and these statements do not amount to corrupt practices falling within the scope of Sub-clause (b) of Clause (A) of Sub-section (1) of Section 123 of the said Act.', (int) 14 => '<p>5. It was urged by Mr. Rao, learned Counsel for the appellants that in the impugned judgments, the High Court has incorrectly taken the view that in order to amount to bribery within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A), the transaction must amount to a bargain by the candidate with a view to get votes. It was pointed out by him that the said view has been taken in the impugned judgments, relying upon the decision of a Bench comprising to learned Judges of this Court in Ghasi Ram v. Dal Singh and Ors. :1983 SCR 102 . We have gone through to the relevant portion of that judgment (at page 109 and 110 of the said report). A careful perusal of the said judgment shows that what has been really held in that case is that if the promises given or made amount to a bargain entered into by a candidate for a vote or votes, that would amount to a corrupt practice; but it has not been held there that unless the act alleged amounts to such a bargain, it could not amount to a corrupt practice. In our view, that judgment does not lay down that in order to amount to a corrupt practice, the transaction must amount to a bargain for getting a vote. It was pointed out by Mr. Rao, however, that such a view seems to have been taken in two other decisions rendered by two Benches, each comprising two learned Judges of this Court in Bhanu Kumar Shastri v. Mohan Lal Sukhadia and Ors. : [1971]3SCR522 and Harjit Singh Mann v. S Umrao Singh and Ors. : [1980]2SCR501 . and these judgments need to be overruled. We do not propose to go into the correctness or otherwise of this view because, even on the footing that in order to amount to a corrupt practice under the aforesaid provision the alleged acts need not constitute a bargain, the the acts established in the present case, in our opinion, do not amount to a corrupt practice.', (int) 15 => '<p>6. Our attention was drawn by Mr. Rao to the fact that in this case the said advertisements and the speeches had to be viewed in the context of the fact that the advertisements were issued and the speeches were made after respondent No. 1 filed his nomination papers on January 4, 1985, for the election and before the election was held in the aforesaid constituency. It was further pointed out that the offer made for the sale of sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was limited to the period from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985. It cannot be denied that these factors are relevant factOrs. We cannot, however, lose sight of the fact that this offer was made not only in this constituency but throughout the State where the elections to the House of the People were scheduled to be held, and were, in fact, held on December 27, 1984. It was only in case of this constituency that the election to be held on the scheduled date was countermanded and later held on January 28, 1985. We cannot lose sight of the fact that, as far as the said speeches and the said advertisements, which were issued by the Publicity Department of the State, are concerned, they deal in the main with the achievements of the Government of Andhra Pradesh which, of course, was being run by Ministers belonging to Telugu Desam Party to which respondent No. 1 also belonged. Moreover, the offer in the advertisements for the sale of dhoties and sarees at discount rates was in the nature of a benefit offered to poor persons in that State. When a Government announces the measures which are intended for the benefit of any of the classes for whose the Government can normally be expected to work like the poor or the economical backward classes, it is only in rare circumstances that such a promise can be said to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) even though such a promise might be made on the eve of elections. Keeping this in mind, in our opinion, although the offer to sell dhoties and sarees at discount rates was of a limited duration as aforestated, it cannot be regarded as a corrupt practice. Such an offer was bound to have financial repercussions and it is quite possible the duration of the offer was limited to enable the Government to study the financial repercussions rather than from any improper motive. We find support for this view from the decision of this Court in H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh : [1969]3SCR813 . In that case an Ordinance was passed by the Government of Madhya Pradesh as a result of which a large number of agriculturists, namely, those holdings of plots of land of less than 7.5 acres area or paying land revenue not exceeding Rs. 5/- were exempted from the payment of the land revenue. It was held that such a concession does not amount to a gift, offer or promise of any gratification within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) of the said Act nor does the announcement of the declaration made at a meeting shortly before the election or the issue of a pamphlet containing that declaration at that time carry the matter any further. It was held that neither Shri D.P. Misra who was the Chief Minister nor Shri S.K. Dixit who acted as his agent were guilty of any corrupt practice within the meaning of the aforesaid provision.', (int) 16 => '<p>7. It was next contended by Mr. Rao, although very faintly, that the High Court was in error as it had not decided all other issues which were raised in the election petition. In this regard we cannot lose sight of the fact that the term of the present Lok Sabha is likely to be over within a few months and fresh elections are likely to be held and it would, therefore, be an exercise in futility to remand the matter to the High Court for deciding the remaining issues.', (int) 17 => '<p>8. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.<p>', (int) 18 => '<p>' ) $paragraphAfter = (int) 1 $cnt = (int) 19 $i = (int) 11include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144 View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971 View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933 View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473 Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963 Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200 Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167 [main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109
(ii) an elector for having voted or refrained from voting.
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$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp' $dataForView = array( 'title_for_layout' => 'B Rajagopala Rao and anr Vs Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors - Citation 640942 - Court Judgment | ', 'desc' => array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '640942', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/50684/representation-of-the-people-act-1951-complete-act">Representation of the People Act, 1951</a> - Sections 1, 3(1)(A), 123 and 123(1)(A)', 'appealno' => 'Civil Appeal Nos. 484 and 485 of 1987', 'appellant' => 'B. Rajagopala Rao and anr.', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'B. Rajagopala Rao and anr. Vs. Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors.', 'casenote' => 'Election - corrupt practices - Sections 123 and 123 (1) (A) of Representation of the People Act, 1951 - whether advertisements by public department and speeches made by respondent No. 1 to sell dhoti and sarees at discount rates amount to corrupt practices - offer was available for mass and for limited duration - such offer was bound to have financial repercussions and it is quite possible that duration of offer limited to enable Government to study financial repercussions rather than from any improper motive - offer not amounted to corrupt practices. - [ D.A. Desai,; O. Chinnappa Reddy and; R.S. Sarkaria, JJ.] The Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 empowers the Union of India in the public interest to take under its control the industries specified in the First Schedule to the Act. Item 23 of the First Schedule relates to textiles of various categories. Section 15 authorises the Central Government to make or cause to be made a full and complete investigation into the circumstances of the case if the Central Government is of the opinion that (a) in respect of any scheduled industry or industrial undertaking or undertakings (i) there has been, or is likely to be, a substantial fall in the volume of production for which, having regard to the economic conditions prevailing, there is no justification; or (ii) there has been, or is likely to be, a marked deterioration in the quality of any article... which could have been or can be avoided; or (iii) there has been or is likely to be a rise in the price of any article..... for which there is no justification; or (iv) it is necessary to take any such action for the purpose of conserving any resources of national importance; or (b) any industrial undertaking is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest. After the investigation is made under section 15, section 16(1) empowers the Central Government if action is desirable, to issue appropriate directions, and section 16(2) provides for the issue of interim directions by the Central Government pending investigation under section 15. Chapter III-A consisting of Sections 18A, 18-AA, 18-B, 18-C, 18-D, 18-E and 18-F deal with "direct management or control of Industrial Undertakings by Central Government in certain cases". Sec. 18-A empowers the Central Government by notified order, to authorise any person or body of persons to take over the management of the whole or any part of an industrial undertaking or to exercise in respect of the whole, or any part of the undertaking such functions of control as may be specified in the order, if the Central Government is of opinion that: (a) an industrial undertaking to which directions have been issued in pursuance of section 16 has failed to comply with such directions, or (b) an industrial undertaking in respect of which an investigation has been made under section 15 is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest. Section 18AA(5) stipulates that the provisions of Sections 18-B to 18 E shall be applicable to the industrial undertaking in respect of which an order has been made under section 18-AA even as they apply to an industrial undertaking taken over under Section 18-A. Section 18-F empowers the Central Government to cancel the order made under section 18-A if it appears that the purpose of the order has been fulfilled or it is not necessary that the order should remain in force. The appellant M/s. Swadeshi Cotton Mills was taken over by the Government of India by a notification dated April 13, 1978 in exercise of the powers conferred on it under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 18AA of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 on the ground that the company had by creation of encumbrances on the assets of its industrial undertakings, brought about a situation which had affected and is likely to further affect the production of articles manufactured or produced by it and that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation. The Government authorised the National Textile Corporation Limited to take over the management, subject to the conditions that the authorised person shall comply with all the directions issued from time to time by the Central Government and that the authorised person shall hold office for a period of five years. The appellant Mills challenged the aforesaid order in a writ petition in the High Court. The case was heard by a Full Bench of five Judges to consider the question whether in construing section 18AA of the Industries Development and Regulation Act, 1951, compliance with the principle of audi alteram partem is to be implied and whether hearing is to be given to the parties who would be affected by the order to be passed prior to the passing of the order or whether hearing can be given after the order is passed and whether the order passed under the said Section is vitiated by not giving of such hearing and whether such vice can be cured. The Bench by a majority answered the three questions as follows:- (a) Section 18AA(1)(a)(b) excludes the giving of prior hearing to the party who would be affected by order thereunder. (b) Section 18-F expressly provides for a post- decisional hearing to the owner of the industrial undertaking, the management of which is taken over under section 18AA to have the order made under section 18AA cancelled on any relevant ground. (c) As the taking over of management under section 18A is not vitiated by the failure to grant prior hearing the question of any such vice being cured by a grant of a subsequent hearing does not arise. The minority, however, held that in compliance with the principles of natural justice, prior hearing to the owner of the undertaking was required to be given before the passing of an order under section 18AA, that the second question did not arise as the denial of a prior hearing would not cure the vice by the grant of subsequent hearing, but it would be open to the Court to moderate the relief in such a way that the order is kept alive to the extent necessary until the making of the fresh order to subserve public interest and to make appropriate directions. After the decision on the reference the case was reheard on merits by a Full Bench of three Judges and the writ petition was allowed in part. The challenge to the validity of the order being rejected but insofar as the impugned order seeking to take over the corporate entity of the company, the corporate entity of the subsidiary and its assets, the petition was allowed and the respondents, the Union of India and the authorised person were directed to release from its control and custody and/or deliver possession of any assets or property of the company which were not referable to the industrial undertakings. Appeals to this Court were filed on behalf of the Company as well as by the Union of India and the National Textile Corporation. Two propositions were propounded on behalf of the company that: (a) Whether it was necessary to observe the rules of natural justice before issuing a notified order under section 18AA(1)(a) and further whether section 18-F impliedly excludes rules of natural justice relating to prior hearing; and it was contended (1) the mere use of the word 'immediate' in sub-clause (a) of section 18AA does not show a legislative intent to exclude the application of audi alteram partem rule altogether. (2) The word 'immediate' in clause (a) has been used in contra distinction to 'investigate'. It only means that under section 18AA action can be taken without prior investigation under section 15. The use of the word 'immediate' in section 18AA(1)(a) only dispenses with investigation under section 15 and not with the principle of audi alteram partem altogether and this is indicated by the marginal note of section 18A and para 3 of the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Amendment Bill which inserted section 18AA in 1971. (3) The word 'immediate' occurs only in clause (a) and not in clause (b) of section 18AA(1). It would be odd if intention to exclude this principle of natural justice is spelt out in one clause of the sub-section when the other clause does not exclude it. (4) Section 18-F does not exclude a pre-decisional hearing. The so-called post-decisional hearing contemplated by section 18-F cannot be and is not intended to be a substitute for a pre-decisional hearing. (5) Section 18F incorporates only a facet, albeit qualified, of section 21 of the General Clauses Act. The language of the Section implicity prohibits an enquiry into circumstances that led to the passing of the order of take-over and under it the aggrieved person is not entitled to show that on merits the order was void ab initio. (6) 'Immediacy' does not exclude a duty to act fairly because even an emergent situation can co-exist with the canons of natural justice. The only effect of urgency on the application of the principle of fair hearing would be that the width, form and duration of the hearing would be tailored to the situation and reduced to the reasonable minimum so that it does not delay and defeat the purpose of the contemplated action. (7) Where the civil consequences of the administrative action are grave and its effect is highly prejudicial to the rights and interests of the person affected and there is nothing in the language and scheme of the statute which unequivocally excludes a fair pre-decisional hearing and the post-decisional hearing provided therein is not a real remedial hearing equitable to a full right of appeal the Court should be loath to infer a legislative intent to exclude even a minimal fair hearing at the pre-decisional stage merely on ground of urgency. (8) The Central Government appointed four Government Officials including one from the office of the Textile Commissioner to study the affairs of the Company and to make recommendation. This Official Group submitted its report on February 16, 1978. The evidence on the basis of which the impugned order was passed was not disclosed to the appellant company till May 1978, only after it had filed the writ petition in the High Court. If there was anything adverse to the appellants in the survey report there was time enough about six weeks between the submission of the Survey Report and the passing of the impugned order for giving a short, reasonable opportunity to the appellants to explain the adverse findings against them. If there was immediacy situational modifications could be made to meet the requirement of fairness, by reducing the period of notice; that even the manner and form of such notice could be simplified to eliminate delay, that telephonic notice or short opportunity for furnishing their explanation to the Company might have satisfied the requirements of natural justice. Such an opportunity of hearing could have been given after the passing of a conditional tentative order and before its enforcement under section 18AA. For the interregnum suitable interim action such as freezing the assets of the Company or restraining the Company from creating further encumbrances, could be taken under section 16. On behalf of the Union of India and the Authorised Officer it was contended that (1) the presumption in favour of audi alteram partem rule stands impliedly displaced by the language scheme, setting and the purpose of the provision in section 18AA. (2) Section 18AA on its plain terms deals with situations where immediate preventive action is required. The paramount concern is to avoid serious problems which may be caused by fall in production. The purpose of an order under section 18AA is not to condemn the owner but to protect the scheduled industry. The issue under section 18AA is not solely between the Government and the management of the industrial undertaking. The object of taking action under this Section is to protect other outside interests of the community at large and the workers. (3) The rule of natural justice to give a hearing has been incorporated in section 18-F which gives an opportunity of a post-decisional hearing to the owner of the undertaking who if he feels aggrieved can on his application be heard, to show that even the original order under section 18AA was passed on invalid grounds and should be cancelled or rescinded. (4) On a true construction of section 18AA read with section 18-F the requirements of natural justice and fair play can be read into the statute only insofar as conformance to such canons can reasonably and realistically be required of it by the provision for a remedial hearing at a subsequent stage. (5) Under section 18-F the Central Government exercises curial functions and that Section confers on the aggrieved owner a right to apply to the Government to cancel the order of take-over. This section casts an obligation on the Central Government to deal with and dispose of an application filed thereunder with reasonable expedition. Allowing the appeal by the Company,<br />HELD: (Sarkaria & Desai, JJ. per Chinnappa Reddy, J. dissenting.) In the facts and circumstances of the instant case, there has been a noncompliance with the implied requirement of the audi alteram partem rule of natural justice at the pre-decisional stage. The impugned order could be struck down as invalid on that score alone. But in view of the commitment / concession that a hearing would be afforded to the Company, the case is remitted to the Central Government to give a full, fair and effective hearing. [587G-H, 588C] The phrase 'natural justice' is not capable of a static and precise definition. It cannot be imprisoned in the straight-jacket of a cast-iron formula. Rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. Hence not possible to make an exhaustive catalogue of such rules. Two fundamental maxims of natural justice have now become deeply and indelibly ingrained in the common consciousness of mankind as pre-eminently necessary to ensure that the law is applied impartially objectively and fairly. These twin principles are (i) audi alteram partem and (ii) nemo judex in re sua. Audi alteram partem is a highly effective rule devised by the Courts to ensure that a statutory authority arrives at a just decision and it is calculated to act as a healthy check on the abuse or misuse of power. Its reach should not be narrowed and its applicability circumscribed.[554C-G] The rules of natural justice can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. If a statutory provision either specifically or by inevitable implication excludes the application of the rules of natural justice then the Court cannot ignore the mandate of the Legislature. Whether or not the application of the principles of natural justice in a given case has been excluded in the exercise of statutory power depends upon the language and basic scheme of the provision conferring the power, the nature of the power the purpose for which it is conferred and the effect of that power. [556A-B] The maxim audi alteram partem has many facets. Two of them are (a) notice of the case to be met, and (b) opportunity to explain. The rule cannot be sacrificed at the altar of administrative convenience or celerity; for, convenience and justice are often not on speaking terms. Difficulties, however, arise when the statute conferring the power does not expressly exclude this rule but its exclusion is sought by implication due to the presence of certain factors such as urgency where the obligation to give notice and opportunity to be heard would obstruct the taking of prompt action of a preventive or remedial nature. Audi alteram partem rule may be disregarded in an emergent situation where immediate action brooks no delay to prevent some imminent danger or injury or hazard to paramount public interests. Section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure empowers the magistrates specified therein to make an exparte conditional order in emergent cases for removal of dangerous public nuisances. Action under section 17 Land Acquisition Act furnishes another such instance. Similarly action on grounds of public safety public health may justify disregard of the rule of prior hearing. [556C-H] Cases where owing to the compulsion of the fact situation or the necessity of taking speedy action no pre- decisional hearing is given but the action, is followed soon by a full post-decisional hearing to the person affected do not in reality constitute an exception to the audi alteram partem rule. To call such cases as exception is a misnomer because they do not exclude fair play in action but adapt it to the urgency of the situation by balancing the competing claims of hurry and hearing. [560H-561A] The general principle as distinguished from an absolute rule of uniform application seems to be that where a statute does not in terms exclude this rule of prior hearing but contemplates a post-decisional hearing amounting to a full review of the original order on merits then such a statute would be construed as excluding the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage. [561G] If the statute conferring the power is silent with regard to the giving of pre-decisional hearing to the person affected and the administrative decision taken by the authority involves civil consequences of a grave nature and no full review or appeal on merits against that decision is provided courts will be extremely reluctant to construe such a statute as excluding the duty of affording even a minimal hearing shorn of all its formal trappings and dilatory features at the pre-decisional stage, unless viewed pragmatically it would paralyse the administrative process or frustrate the need for utmost promptitude. [561H] 7(i). A comparison of the provisions of Section 18A(1)(b) and Section 18AA(1)(c), bring out two main points of distinction: First, action under Section 18A(1)(b) can be taken only after an investigation had been made under Section 15; while under Section 18AA(1)(a) or (b) action can be taken without such investigation. The language, scheme and setting of Section 18AA read in the light of the Objects and Reasons for enacting this provision make this position clear beyond doubt. Second, before taking action under Section 18A(1)(b), the Central Government has to form an opinion on the basis of the investigation conducted under section 15, in regard to the existence of the objective fact, namely: that the industrial undertaking is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest; while under section 18A(1)(a) the Government has to satisfy itself that the persons incharge of the undertaking have brought about a situation likely to cause fall in production, by committing any of the three kinds of acts specified in that provision. This shows that the preliminary objective fact attributable to the persons in charge of the management or affairs of the undertaking, on the basis of which action may be taken under section 18(A)(1)(b), is of far wider amplitude than the circumstance, the existence of which is a sine qua non for taking action under section 18AA(1). The phrase "highly detrimental to the scheduled industry or public interest" in section 18-A is capable of being construed to cover a large variety of acts or things which may be considered wrong with the manner of running the industry by the management. In contrast with it, action under section 18AA(1)(a) can be taken only if the Central Government is satisfied with regard to the existence of the twin conditions specifically mentioned therein, on the basis of evidence in its possession. [569D-H] An analysis of section 18AA(1)(a), indicates that as a necessary preliminary to the exercise of the power thereunder, the Central Government must be satisfied "from documentary or other evidence in its possession" in regard to the co-existence of two circumstances: (i) that the persons in charge of the industrial undertaking have by committing any of these acts, namely, reckless investments, or creation of incumbrances on the assets of industrial undertaking, or by diversion of funds, brought about a situation which is likely to affect the production of the article manufactured or produced in the industrial undertaking, and (ii) that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation.[570B-D] It cannot be laid down as a general proposition that whenever a statute confers a power on an administrative authority and makes the exercise of that power conditional on the formation of an opinion by that authority in regard to the existence of an immediacy, its opinion in regard to that preliminary fact is not open to judicial scrutiny at all. While it may be conceded that an element of subjectivity is always involved in the formation of such an opinion, the existence of the circumstances from which the inference constituting the opinion, as the sine qua non for action, are to be drawn, must be demonstrable, and the existence of such "circumstances", if questioned, must be proved at least prima facie. [571 E-G] From a plain reading of section 18AA, it is clear that it does not expressly in unmistakable and unequivocal terms exclude the application of the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage. [574B] In the instant case, so far as Kanpur Unit is concerned, it was lying closed for more than three months before the passing of the impugned order. There was no 'immediacy' in relation to that unit, which could absolve the Government from the obligation of complying fully with audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional or pre- takeover stage. [583A] Keshav Mills Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, [1973] 3 S.C.R. 22; Kamla Prasad Khetan v. Union of India,[1957] S.C.R. 1052; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 621; Sukhdev Singh & Ors. v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh, [1975] 3 S.C.R. 619; A. K. Kraipak v. Union of India, [1970] 1 S.C.R. 457; Ridge v. Baldwin, [1964] A.C. 40; 196; Heatley v. Tasmanian Racing & Gaming Commission, 14 Australian Law Reports 519; Nawabkhan Abbaskhan v. State of Gujarat, [1974] 3 S.C.R. 427; State of Orissa v. Dr. Bina Pani Dei, [1962] 2 S.C.R. 625; Ambalal M. Shah v. Hathi Singh Manufacturing Co. Ltd. [1962] 3 S.C.R. 171; and S. L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan & Ors., [1981] 1 S.C.R. 746, referred to. (Per Chinnappa Reddy, J. dissenting) The principles of natural justice are not attracted to the situations contemplated by section 18AA of Industries (Development and Regulation) Act. Natural justice like Ultra Vires and Public Policy is a branch of the public law and is a formidable weapon which can be wielded to secure justice to the citizen. While it may be used to protect certain fundamental liberties, civil and political rights, it may be used as indeed it is used more often than not, to protect vested interests and to obstruct the path of progressive change. The time has come to make an appropriate distinction between natural justice in its application to fundamental liberties, civil and political rights and natural justice in its application to vested interests. [590A-B] Our constitution as befits the Constitution of a Socialist Secular Democratic Republic, recognises the paramountcy of the public weal over the private interest. Natural justice, ultra vires, public policy, or any other rule of interpretation must, therefore, conform, grow and be tailored to serve the public interest and respond to the demands of an evolving society. [590C] The principles of natural justice have taken deep root in the judicial conscience of our people. They are now considered so fundamental as to be implicit in every decision making function, judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative. Where authority functions under a statute and the statute provides for the observance of the principles of natural justice in a particular manner, natural justice will have to be observed in that manner and in no other. Where the statute is silent about the observance of the principles of natural justice, such statutory silence is taken to imply compliance with the principles of natural justice. Where the conflict is between the public interest and the private interest the presumption must necessarily be weak and may, therefore, be readily displaced. The presumption is also weak, where what are involved are mere property rights. In cases of urgency, particularly where the public interest is involved, preemptive action may be a strategic necessity. Even in cases of preemptive action, if the statute so provides or if the Courts so deem fit in appropriate cases, a postponed hearing may be substituted for natural justice. [590A-C; 591F-G] 3(ii). Where natural justice is implied, the extent of the implication and the nature of the hearing must vary with the statute, the subject and the situation. [592B] The absence of the expression 'immediate action' in section 18AA(1)(b) does not make any difference. Section 18AA(1)(a) refers to a situation where immediate preventive action may avert a disaster, whereas section 18AA contemplates a situation where the disaster has occurred and action is necessary to restore normalcy. Restoration of production where production has stopped in a key industry or industrial undertaking is as important and urgent in the public interest as prevention of a situation where production may be affected. Immediate action is, therefore, as necessary in the situation contemplated by section 18AA(1)(b) as in the situation contemplated by section 18AA(1)(a). [596 F-G] The marginal note refers to the power to take over without investigation but there is no sufficient reason to suppose that the word immediate is used only to contra- distinguish it from the investigation contemplated by section 15 of the Act, though of course a consequence of immediate action under section 18AA may be to dispense with the enquiry under section 15. In fact, facts which come to light during the course of an investigation under section 15 may form the basis of action under section 18AA(1)(a). Where in the course of an investigation under section 15 it is discovered that the management have, by reckless investments or creation of encumbrances on the assets of the industrial undertaking or by diversion of funds brought about a situation which is likely to affect the production of the articles manufactured or produced in the industrial undertaking, if the Government is satisfied that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation, there is no reason why the Central Government may not straightaway take action under section 18AA(1)(a) without waiting for completion of investigation under section 15. [597A-B] Where there is a provision in the statute itself for revocation of the order by the very authority making the decision, it appears to be unnecessary to insist upon a pre- decisional observance of natural justice. [598A] The likelihood of production being jeopardized or the stoppage of production in a key industrial undertaking is a matter of grave concern affecting the public interest. Parliament has taken so serious a view of the matter that it has authorised the Central Government to take over the management of the industrial undertaking if immediate action may prevent jeopardy to production or restore production where it has already stopped. The necessity for immediate action by the Central Government contemplated by Parliament is definitely indicative of the exclusion of natural justice. It is not as if the owner of the industrial undertaking is left with no remedy. He may move the Central Government under section 18-F to cancel the order made under section 18AA. [598C-D] Neither section 18-F of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act nor section 21 of the General Clauses Act by itself excludes natural justice. The exclusion of natural justice where such exclusion is not express has to be implied by reference to the subject, the statute and the statutory situation. Where an express provision in the statute itself provides for a post decisional hearing the other provisions of the Statute will have to be read in the light of such provision and the provision for post- decisional hearing may then clinch the issue where pre- decisional natural justice appears to be excluded on the other terms of the statute. That a post-decisional hearing may also be had by the terms of section 21 of the General Clauses Act may not necessarily help in the interpretation of the provisions of the statute concerned. [599 A-C] Ridge v. Baldwin, 1964 A.C. p. 40; Annie G. Phillip v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 75 L.E.d. 1289; John H. Fahey v. Paul Mallonee, 91 L.E.d. 2030; Margarita Fuentes v. Robert L. Shevin, Attorney General of Florida, 32 L.E.d. 2d 556 and Lawrence Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 40 L.E.d. 2d 406, referred to. - Rama Rao, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh as well as the President of the Telugu Desam Party as well as respondent No. 3. The advertisements very shortly stated, refer to the auspicious gifts made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to the poor people on the eve of New Year and Sankranti. In the said advertisements, it is stated that the said Government which was formed by the Telugu Desam Party was giving to the poor people whose income was below Rs. and the said advertisements referred to a new scheme of selling sarees and dhoties at half prices to the poor people in the State of Andhra Pradesh having Green-cards. Moreover, the offer in the advertisements for the sale of dhoties and sarees at discount rates was in the nature of a benefit offered to poor persons in that State. When a Government announces the measures which are intended for the benefit of any of the classes for whose the Government can normally be expected to work like the poor or the economical backward classes, it is only in rare circumstances that such a promise can be said to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) even though such a promise might be made on the eve of elections. 8. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => '', 'counseldef' => '', 'court' => 'Supreme Court of India', 'court_type' => 'SC', 'decidedon' => '1989-09-29', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' K.N. Saikia,; M.H. Kania and; S. Ranganathan, JJ.', 'judgement' => '</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Kania, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. These two appeals arise out of the judgments in two Election Petitions in the Andhra Pradesh High Court questioning the election of respondent No. 1 as a Member of Parliament from Srikakulam No. Parliamentary Constituency in the 8th General Election to the House of the People. The points raised in these appeals are common and so are the relevant facts; and, hence, they are being disposed of by this common judgment. We propose to take note of only the few facts which are necessary for the appreciation of the controversy before us.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The polling date for the said election along with other parliamentary elections in the State of Andhra Pradesh was December 27, 1984 but in Srikakulam No. 1 Parliamentary Constituency the polling was countermanded and the date of polling was later fixed on January 28, 1985. In both the Election Petitions the election of respondent No. 1 was questioned mainly on the ground that Shri N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh as well as the President of the Telugu Desam Party as well as respondent No. 1 gave certain speeches and certain advertisements were got published by Shri N.T. Rama Rao through the Publicity Department of the Government of Andhra Pradesh in the newspapers containing certain statements which are alleged to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A) of the <a href="/act/50684/representation-of-the-people-act-1951-complete-act">Representation of the People Act, 1951</a> (hereinafter referred to as 'the said Act'). The main question canvassed before us is whether the statements contained in these aforesaid advertisements amount to a corrupt practice under Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act. Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act runs as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">123. Corrupt practices</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The following shall be deemed to be corrupt practises for the purposes of this Act :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) 'Bribery', that is to say.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(A) any gift, offer or promise by a candidate or his agent or by any other person with the consent of a candidate or his election agent of any gratification, to any person whomsover, with the object, directly or indirectly of inducing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) x x x</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) an elector to vote or refrain from voting at an election, or as a reward to.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) a person for having so stood or not stood, or for having withdrawn or not having withdrawn his candidature; or</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) an elector for having voted or refrained from voting.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The advertisements very shortly stated, refer to the auspicious gifts made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to the poor people on the eve of New Year and Sankranti. In the said advertisements, it is stated that the said Government which was formed by the Telugu Desam Party was giving to the poor people whose income was below Rs. 6,000 per year, a kilo of rice at Rs. 2 per Kg. and the said advertisements referred to a new scheme of selling sarees and dhoties at half prices to the poor people in the State of Andhra Pradesh having Green-cards. Green-cards were directed to be issued to all the persons whose annual income was below Rs. 6,000. The supply of the rice at subsidised rates as aforesaid was also to be made to the Green-card holders only. The scheme to sell sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was to be operative from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. In considering the question whether the said advertisement and the said speeches amount to a corrupt practice, we are of the view that the provisions of Section 123 of the said Act which deal with corrupt practices have to be interpreted, keeping in mind that dictates of commonsense require that they never could have been intended to treat normal election promises made in election manifestoes or usual election speeches by members of various political parties aspiring to power and by different candidates aspiring to get elected to legislative bodies concerned as corrupt practices. We are of the view that these advertisements and speeches amount to nothing more than statements extolling the achievements of the Government of the State of Andhra Pradesh under the Telugu Desam Party headed by N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister, and contain normal election promises and these statements do not amount to corrupt practices falling within the scope of Sub-clause (b) of Clause (A) of Sub-section (1) of Section 123 of the said Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. It was urged by Mr. Rao, learned Counsel for the appellants that in the impugned judgments, the High Court has incorrectly taken the view that in order to amount to bribery within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A), the transaction must amount to a bargain by the candidate with a view to get votes. It was pointed out by him that the said view has been taken in the impugned judgments, relying upon the decision of a Bench comprising to learned Judges of this Court in Ghasi Ram v. Dal Singh and Ors. :1983 SCR 102 . We have gone through to the relevant portion of that judgment (at page 109 and 110 of the said report). A careful perusal of the said judgment shows that what has been really held in that case is that if the promises given or made amount to a bargain entered into by a candidate for a vote or votes, that would amount to a corrupt practice; but it has not been held there that unless the act alleged amounts to such a bargain, it could not amount to a corrupt practice. In our view, that judgment does not lay down that in order to amount to a corrupt practice, the transaction must amount to a bargain for getting a vote. It was pointed out by Mr. Rao, however, that such a view seems to have been taken in two other decisions rendered by two Benches, each comprising two learned Judges of this Court in Bhanu Kumar Shastri v. Mohan Lal Sukhadia and Ors. : [1971]3SCR522 and Harjit Singh Mann v. S Umrao Singh and Ors. : [1980]2SCR501 . and these judgments need to be overruled. We do not propose to go into the correctness or otherwise of this view because, even on the footing that in order to amount to a corrupt practice under the aforesaid provision the alleged acts need not constitute a bargain, the the acts established in the present case, in our opinion, do not amount to a corrupt practice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Our attention was drawn by Mr. Rao to the fact that in this case the said advertisements and the speeches had to be viewed in the context of the fact that the advertisements were issued and the speeches were made after respondent No. 1 filed his nomination papers on January 4, 1985, for the election and before the election was held in the aforesaid constituency. It was further pointed out that the offer made for the sale of sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was limited to the period from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985. It cannot be denied that these factors are relevant factOrs. We cannot, however, lose sight of the fact that this offer was made not only in this constituency but throughout the State where the elections to the House of the People were scheduled to be held, and were, in fact, held on December 27, 1984. It was only in case of this constituency that the election to be held on the scheduled date was countermanded and later held on January 28, 1985. We cannot lose sight of the fact that, as far as the said speeches and the said advertisements, which were issued by the Publicity Department of the State, are concerned, they deal in the main with the achievements of the Government of Andhra Pradesh which, of course, was being run by Ministers belonging to Telugu Desam Party to which respondent No. 1 also belonged. Moreover, the offer in the advertisements for the sale of dhoties and sarees at discount rates was in the nature of a benefit offered to poor persons in that State. When a Government announces the measures which are intended for the benefit of any of the classes for whose the Government can normally be expected to work like the poor or the economical backward classes, it is only in rare circumstances that such a promise can be said to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) even though such a promise might be made on the eve of elections. Keeping this in mind, in our opinion, although the offer to sell dhoties and sarees at discount rates was of a limited duration as aforestated, it cannot be regarded as a corrupt practice. Such an offer was bound to have financial repercussions and it is quite possible the duration of the offer was limited to enable the Government to study the financial repercussions rather than from any improper motive. We find support for this view from the decision of this Court in H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh : [1969]3SCR813 . In that case an Ordinance was passed by the Government of Madhya Pradesh as a result of which a large number of agriculturists, namely, those holdings of plots of land of less than 7.5 acres area or paying land revenue not exceeding Rs. 5/- were exempted from the payment of the land revenue. It was held that such a concession does not amount to a gift, offer or promise of any gratification within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) of the said Act nor does the announcement of the declaration made at a meeting shortly before the election or the issue of a pamphlet containing that declaration at that time carry the matter any further. It was held that neither Shri D.P. Misra who was the Chief Minister nor Shri S.K. Dixit who acted as his agent were guilty of any corrupt practice within the meaning of the aforesaid provision.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. It was next contended by Mr. Rao, although very faintly, that the High Court was in error as it had not decided all other issues which were raised in the election petition. In this regard we cannot lose sight of the fact that the term of the present Lok Sabha is likely to be over within a few months and fresh elections are likely to be held and it would, therefore, be an exercise in futility to remand the matter to the High Court for deciding the remaining issues.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'AIR1990SC1889; JT1989(4)SC186; 1989(2)SCALE891; 1989Supp(2)SCC504', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors.', 'sub' => 'Election', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ), 'casename_url' => 'b-rajagopala-rao-vs-appayya-hanumanthu', 'args' => array( (int) 0 => '640942', (int) 1 => 'b-rajagopala-rao-vs-appayya-hanumanthu' ) ) $title_for_layout = 'B Rajagopala Rao and anr Vs Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors - Citation 640942 - Court Judgment | ' $desc = array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '640942', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/50684/representation-of-the-people-act-1951-complete-act">Representation of the People Act, 1951</a> - Sections 1, 3(1)(A), 123 and 123(1)(A)', 'appealno' => 'Civil Appeal Nos. 484 and 485 of 1987', 'appellant' => 'B. Rajagopala Rao and anr.', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'B. Rajagopala Rao and anr. Vs. Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors.', 'casenote' => 'Election - corrupt practices - Sections 123 and 123 (1) (A) of Representation of the People Act, 1951 - whether advertisements by public department and speeches made by respondent No. 1 to sell dhoti and sarees at discount rates amount to corrupt practices - offer was available for mass and for limited duration - such offer was bound to have financial repercussions and it is quite possible that duration of offer limited to enable Government to study financial repercussions rather than from any improper motive - offer not amounted to corrupt practices. - [ D.A. Desai,; O. Chinnappa Reddy and; R.S. Sarkaria, JJ.] The Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 empowers the Union of India in the public interest to take under its control the industries specified in the First Schedule to the Act. Item 23 of the First Schedule relates to textiles of various categories. Section 15 authorises the Central Government to make or cause to be made a full and complete investigation into the circumstances of the case if the Central Government is of the opinion that (a) in respect of any scheduled industry or industrial undertaking or undertakings (i) there has been, or is likely to be, a substantial fall in the volume of production for which, having regard to the economic conditions prevailing, there is no justification; or (ii) there has been, or is likely to be, a marked deterioration in the quality of any article... which could have been or can be avoided; or (iii) there has been or is likely to be a rise in the price of any article..... for which there is no justification; or (iv) it is necessary to take any such action for the purpose of conserving any resources of national importance; or (b) any industrial undertaking is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest. After the investigation is made under section 15, section 16(1) empowers the Central Government if action is desirable, to issue appropriate directions, and section 16(2) provides for the issue of interim directions by the Central Government pending investigation under section 15. Chapter III-A consisting of Sections 18A, 18-AA, 18-B, 18-C, 18-D, 18-E and 18-F deal with "direct management or control of Industrial Undertakings by Central Government in certain cases". Sec. 18-A empowers the Central Government by notified order, to authorise any person or body of persons to take over the management of the whole or any part of an industrial undertaking or to exercise in respect of the whole, or any part of the undertaking such functions of control as may be specified in the order, if the Central Government is of opinion that: (a) an industrial undertaking to which directions have been issued in pursuance of section 16 has failed to comply with such directions, or (b) an industrial undertaking in respect of which an investigation has been made under section 15 is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest. Section 18AA(5) stipulates that the provisions of Sections 18-B to 18 E shall be applicable to the industrial undertaking in respect of which an order has been made under section 18-AA even as they apply to an industrial undertaking taken over under Section 18-A. Section 18-F empowers the Central Government to cancel the order made under section 18-A if it appears that the purpose of the order has been fulfilled or it is not necessary that the order should remain in force. The appellant M/s. Swadeshi Cotton Mills was taken over by the Government of India by a notification dated April 13, 1978 in exercise of the powers conferred on it under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 18AA of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 on the ground that the company had by creation of encumbrances on the assets of its industrial undertakings, brought about a situation which had affected and is likely to further affect the production of articles manufactured or produced by it and that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation. The Government authorised the National Textile Corporation Limited to take over the management, subject to the conditions that the authorised person shall comply with all the directions issued from time to time by the Central Government and that the authorised person shall hold office for a period of five years. The appellant Mills challenged the aforesaid order in a writ petition in the High Court. The case was heard by a Full Bench of five Judges to consider the question whether in construing section 18AA of the Industries Development and Regulation Act, 1951, compliance with the principle of audi alteram partem is to be implied and whether hearing is to be given to the parties who would be affected by the order to be passed prior to the passing of the order or whether hearing can be given after the order is passed and whether the order passed under the said Section is vitiated by not giving of such hearing and whether such vice can be cured. The Bench by a majority answered the three questions as follows:- (a) Section 18AA(1)(a)(b) excludes the giving of prior hearing to the party who would be affected by order thereunder. (b) Section 18-F expressly provides for a post- decisional hearing to the owner of the industrial undertaking, the management of which is taken over under section 18AA to have the order made under section 18AA cancelled on any relevant ground. (c) As the taking over of management under section 18A is not vitiated by the failure to grant prior hearing the question of any such vice being cured by a grant of a subsequent hearing does not arise. The minority, however, held that in compliance with the principles of natural justice, prior hearing to the owner of the undertaking was required to be given before the passing of an order under section 18AA, that the second question did not arise as the denial of a prior hearing would not cure the vice by the grant of subsequent hearing, but it would be open to the Court to moderate the relief in such a way that the order is kept alive to the extent necessary until the making of the fresh order to subserve public interest and to make appropriate directions. After the decision on the reference the case was reheard on merits by a Full Bench of three Judges and the writ petition was allowed in part. The challenge to the validity of the order being rejected but insofar as the impugned order seeking to take over the corporate entity of the company, the corporate entity of the subsidiary and its assets, the petition was allowed and the respondents, the Union of India and the authorised person were directed to release from its control and custody and/or deliver possession of any assets or property of the company which were not referable to the industrial undertakings. Appeals to this Court were filed on behalf of the Company as well as by the Union of India and the National Textile Corporation. Two propositions were propounded on behalf of the company that: (a) Whether it was necessary to observe the rules of natural justice before issuing a notified order under section 18AA(1)(a) and further whether section 18-F impliedly excludes rules of natural justice relating to prior hearing; and it was contended (1) the mere use of the word 'immediate' in sub-clause (a) of section 18AA does not show a legislative intent to exclude the application of audi alteram partem rule altogether. (2) The word 'immediate' in clause (a) has been used in contra distinction to 'investigate'. It only means that under section 18AA action can be taken without prior investigation under section 15. The use of the word 'immediate' in section 18AA(1)(a) only dispenses with investigation under section 15 and not with the principle of audi alteram partem altogether and this is indicated by the marginal note of section 18A and para 3 of the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Amendment Bill which inserted section 18AA in 1971. (3) The word 'immediate' occurs only in clause (a) and not in clause (b) of section 18AA(1). It would be odd if intention to exclude this principle of natural justice is spelt out in one clause of the sub-section when the other clause does not exclude it. (4) Section 18-F does not exclude a pre-decisional hearing. The so-called post-decisional hearing contemplated by section 18-F cannot be and is not intended to be a substitute for a pre-decisional hearing. (5) Section 18F incorporates only a facet, albeit qualified, of section 21 of the General Clauses Act. The language of the Section implicity prohibits an enquiry into circumstances that led to the passing of the order of take-over and under it the aggrieved person is not entitled to show that on merits the order was void ab initio. (6) 'Immediacy' does not exclude a duty to act fairly because even an emergent situation can co-exist with the canons of natural justice. The only effect of urgency on the application of the principle of fair hearing would be that the width, form and duration of the hearing would be tailored to the situation and reduced to the reasonable minimum so that it does not delay and defeat the purpose of the contemplated action. (7) Where the civil consequences of the administrative action are grave and its effect is highly prejudicial to the rights and interests of the person affected and there is nothing in the language and scheme of the statute which unequivocally excludes a fair pre-decisional hearing and the post-decisional hearing provided therein is not a real remedial hearing equitable to a full right of appeal the Court should be loath to infer a legislative intent to exclude even a minimal fair hearing at the pre-decisional stage merely on ground of urgency. (8) The Central Government appointed four Government Officials including one from the office of the Textile Commissioner to study the affairs of the Company and to make recommendation. This Official Group submitted its report on February 16, 1978. The evidence on the basis of which the impugned order was passed was not disclosed to the appellant company till May 1978, only after it had filed the writ petition in the High Court. If there was anything adverse to the appellants in the survey report there was time enough about six weeks between the submission of the Survey Report and the passing of the impugned order for giving a short, reasonable opportunity to the appellants to explain the adverse findings against them. If there was immediacy situational modifications could be made to meet the requirement of fairness, by reducing the period of notice; that even the manner and form of such notice could be simplified to eliminate delay, that telephonic notice or short opportunity for furnishing their explanation to the Company might have satisfied the requirements of natural justice. Such an opportunity of hearing could have been given after the passing of a conditional tentative order and before its enforcement under section 18AA. For the interregnum suitable interim action such as freezing the assets of the Company or restraining the Company from creating further encumbrances, could be taken under section 16. On behalf of the Union of India and the Authorised Officer it was contended that (1) the presumption in favour of audi alteram partem rule stands impliedly displaced by the language scheme, setting and the purpose of the provision in section 18AA. (2) Section 18AA on its plain terms deals with situations where immediate preventive action is required. The paramount concern is to avoid serious problems which may be caused by fall in production. The purpose of an order under section 18AA is not to condemn the owner but to protect the scheduled industry. The issue under section 18AA is not solely between the Government and the management of the industrial undertaking. The object of taking action under this Section is to protect other outside interests of the community at large and the workers. (3) The rule of natural justice to give a hearing has been incorporated in section 18-F which gives an opportunity of a post-decisional hearing to the owner of the undertaking who if he feels aggrieved can on his application be heard, to show that even the original order under section 18AA was passed on invalid grounds and should be cancelled or rescinded. (4) On a true construction of section 18AA read with section 18-F the requirements of natural justice and fair play can be read into the statute only insofar as conformance to such canons can reasonably and realistically be required of it by the provision for a remedial hearing at a subsequent stage. (5) Under section 18-F the Central Government exercises curial functions and that Section confers on the aggrieved owner a right to apply to the Government to cancel the order of take-over. This section casts an obligation on the Central Government to deal with and dispose of an application filed thereunder with reasonable expedition. Allowing the appeal by the Company,<br/>HELD: (Sarkaria & Desai, JJ. per Chinnappa Reddy, J. dissenting.) In the facts and circumstances of the instant case, there has been a noncompliance with the implied requirement of the audi alteram partem rule of natural justice at the pre-decisional stage. The impugned order could be struck down as invalid on that score alone. But in view of the commitment / concession that a hearing would be afforded to the Company, the case is remitted to the Central Government to give a full, fair and effective hearing. [587G-H, 588C] The phrase 'natural justice' is not capable of a static and precise definition. It cannot be imprisoned in the straight-jacket of a cast-iron formula. Rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. Hence not possible to make an exhaustive catalogue of such rules. Two fundamental maxims of natural justice have now become deeply and indelibly ingrained in the common consciousness of mankind as pre-eminently necessary to ensure that the law is applied impartially objectively and fairly. These twin principles are (i) audi alteram partem and (ii) nemo judex in re sua. Audi alteram partem is a highly effective rule devised by the Courts to ensure that a statutory authority arrives at a just decision and it is calculated to act as a healthy check on the abuse or misuse of power. Its reach should not be narrowed and its applicability circumscribed.[554C-G] The rules of natural justice can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. If a statutory provision either specifically or by inevitable implication excludes the application of the rules of natural justice then the Court cannot ignore the mandate of the Legislature. Whether or not the application of the principles of natural justice in a given case has been excluded in the exercise of statutory power depends upon the language and basic scheme of the provision conferring the power, the nature of the power the purpose for which it is conferred and the effect of that power. [556A-B] The maxim audi alteram partem has many facets. Two of them are (a) notice of the case to be met, and (b) opportunity to explain. The rule cannot be sacrificed at the altar of administrative convenience or celerity; for, convenience and justice are often not on speaking terms. Difficulties, however, arise when the statute conferring the power does not expressly exclude this rule but its exclusion is sought by implication due to the presence of certain factors such as urgency where the obligation to give notice and opportunity to be heard would obstruct the taking of prompt action of a preventive or remedial nature. Audi alteram partem rule may be disregarded in an emergent situation where immediate action brooks no delay to prevent some imminent danger or injury or hazard to paramount public interests. Section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure empowers the magistrates specified therein to make an exparte conditional order in emergent cases for removal of dangerous public nuisances. Action under section 17 Land Acquisition Act furnishes another such instance. Similarly action on grounds of public safety public health may justify disregard of the rule of prior hearing. [556C-H] Cases where owing to the compulsion of the fact situation or the necessity of taking speedy action no pre- decisional hearing is given but the action, is followed soon by a full post-decisional hearing to the person affected do not in reality constitute an exception to the audi alteram partem rule. To call such cases as exception is a misnomer because they do not exclude fair play in action but adapt it to the urgency of the situation by balancing the competing claims of hurry and hearing. [560H-561A] The general principle as distinguished from an absolute rule of uniform application seems to be that where a statute does not in terms exclude this rule of prior hearing but contemplates a post-decisional hearing amounting to a full review of the original order on merits then such a statute would be construed as excluding the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage. [561G] If the statute conferring the power is silent with regard to the giving of pre-decisional hearing to the person affected and the administrative decision taken by the authority involves civil consequences of a grave nature and no full review or appeal on merits against that decision is provided courts will be extremely reluctant to construe such a statute as excluding the duty of affording even a minimal hearing shorn of all its formal trappings and dilatory features at the pre-decisional stage, unless viewed pragmatically it would paralyse the administrative process or frustrate the need for utmost promptitude. [561H] 7(i). A comparison of the provisions of Section 18A(1)(b) and Section 18AA(1)(c), bring out two main points of distinction: First, action under Section 18A(1)(b) can be taken only after an investigation had been made under Section 15; while under Section 18AA(1)(a) or (b) action can be taken without such investigation. The language, scheme and setting of Section 18AA read in the light of the Objects and Reasons for enacting this provision make this position clear beyond doubt. Second, before taking action under Section 18A(1)(b), the Central Government has to form an opinion on the basis of the investigation conducted under section 15, in regard to the existence of the objective fact, namely: that the industrial undertaking is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest; while under section 18A(1)(a) the Government has to satisfy itself that the persons incharge of the undertaking have brought about a situation likely to cause fall in production, by committing any of the three kinds of acts specified in that provision. This shows that the preliminary objective fact attributable to the persons in charge of the management or affairs of the undertaking, on the basis of which action may be taken under section 18(A)(1)(b), is of far wider amplitude than the circumstance, the existence of which is a sine qua non for taking action under section 18AA(1). The phrase "highly detrimental to the scheduled industry or public interest" in section 18-A is capable of being construed to cover a large variety of acts or things which may be considered wrong with the manner of running the industry by the management. In contrast with it, action under section 18AA(1)(a) can be taken only if the Central Government is satisfied with regard to the existence of the twin conditions specifically mentioned therein, on the basis of evidence in its possession. [569D-H] An analysis of section 18AA(1)(a), indicates that as a necessary preliminary to the exercise of the power thereunder, the Central Government must be satisfied "from documentary or other evidence in its possession" in regard to the co-existence of two circumstances: (i) that the persons in charge of the industrial undertaking have by committing any of these acts, namely, reckless investments, or creation of incumbrances on the assets of industrial undertaking, or by diversion of funds, brought about a situation which is likely to affect the production of the article manufactured or produced in the industrial undertaking, and (ii) that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation.[570B-D] It cannot be laid down as a general proposition that whenever a statute confers a power on an administrative authority and makes the exercise of that power conditional on the formation of an opinion by that authority in regard to the existence of an immediacy, its opinion in regard to that preliminary fact is not open to judicial scrutiny at all. While it may be conceded that an element of subjectivity is always involved in the formation of such an opinion, the existence of the circumstances from which the inference constituting the opinion, as the sine qua non for action, are to be drawn, must be demonstrable, and the existence of such "circumstances", if questioned, must be proved at least prima facie. [571 E-G] From a plain reading of section 18AA, it is clear that it does not expressly in unmistakable and unequivocal terms exclude the application of the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage. [574B] In the instant case, so far as Kanpur Unit is concerned, it was lying closed for more than three months before the passing of the impugned order. There was no 'immediacy' in relation to that unit, which could absolve the Government from the obligation of complying fully with audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional or pre- takeover stage. [583A] Keshav Mills Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, [1973] 3 S.C.R. 22; Kamla Prasad Khetan v. Union of India,[1957] S.C.R. 1052; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 621; Sukhdev Singh & Ors. v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh, [1975] 3 S.C.R. 619; A. K. Kraipak v. Union of India, [1970] 1 S.C.R. 457; Ridge v. Baldwin, [1964] A.C. 40; 196; Heatley v. Tasmanian Racing & Gaming Commission, 14 Australian Law Reports 519; Nawabkhan Abbaskhan v. State of Gujarat, [1974] 3 S.C.R. 427; State of Orissa v. Dr. Bina Pani Dei, [1962] 2 S.C.R. 625; Ambalal M. Shah v. Hathi Singh Manufacturing Co. Ltd. [1962] 3 S.C.R. 171; and S. L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan & Ors., [1981] 1 S.C.R. 746, referred to. (Per Chinnappa Reddy, J. dissenting) The principles of natural justice are not attracted to the situations contemplated by section 18AA of Industries (Development and Regulation) Act. Natural justice like Ultra Vires and Public Policy is a branch of the public law and is a formidable weapon which can be wielded to secure justice to the citizen. While it may be used to protect certain fundamental liberties, civil and political rights, it may be used as indeed it is used more often than not, to protect vested interests and to obstruct the path of progressive change. The time has come to make an appropriate distinction between natural justice in its application to fundamental liberties, civil and political rights and natural justice in its application to vested interests. [590A-B] Our constitution as befits the Constitution of a Socialist Secular Democratic Republic, recognises the paramountcy of the public weal over the private interest. Natural justice, ultra vires, public policy, or any other rule of interpretation must, therefore, conform, grow and be tailored to serve the public interest and respond to the demands of an evolving society. [590C] The principles of natural justice have taken deep root in the judicial conscience of our people. They are now considered so fundamental as to be implicit in every decision making function, judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative. Where authority functions under a statute and the statute provides for the observance of the principles of natural justice in a particular manner, natural justice will have to be observed in that manner and in no other. Where the statute is silent about the observance of the principles of natural justice, such statutory silence is taken to imply compliance with the principles of natural justice. Where the conflict is between the public interest and the private interest the presumption must necessarily be weak and may, therefore, be readily displaced. The presumption is also weak, where what are involved are mere property rights. In cases of urgency, particularly where the public interest is involved, preemptive action may be a strategic necessity. Even in cases of preemptive action, if the statute so provides or if the Courts so deem fit in appropriate cases, a postponed hearing may be substituted for natural justice. [590A-C; 591F-G] 3(ii). Where natural justice is implied, the extent of the implication and the nature of the hearing must vary with the statute, the subject and the situation. [592B] The absence of the expression 'immediate action' in section 18AA(1)(b) does not make any difference. Section 18AA(1)(a) refers to a situation where immediate preventive action may avert a disaster, whereas section 18AA contemplates a situation where the disaster has occurred and action is necessary to restore normalcy. Restoration of production where production has stopped in a key industry or industrial undertaking is as important and urgent in the public interest as prevention of a situation where production may be affected. Immediate action is, therefore, as necessary in the situation contemplated by section 18AA(1)(b) as in the situation contemplated by section 18AA(1)(a). [596 F-G] The marginal note refers to the power to take over without investigation but there is no sufficient reason to suppose that the word immediate is used only to contra- distinguish it from the investigation contemplated by section 15 of the Act, though of course a consequence of immediate action under section 18AA may be to dispense with the enquiry under section 15. In fact, facts which come to light during the course of an investigation under section 15 may form the basis of action under section 18AA(1)(a). Where in the course of an investigation under section 15 it is discovered that the management have, by reckless investments or creation of encumbrances on the assets of the industrial undertaking or by diversion of funds brought about a situation which is likely to affect the production of the articles manufactured or produced in the industrial undertaking, if the Government is satisfied that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation, there is no reason why the Central Government may not straightaway take action under section 18AA(1)(a) without waiting for completion of investigation under section 15. [597A-B] Where there is a provision in the statute itself for revocation of the order by the very authority making the decision, it appears to be unnecessary to insist upon a pre- decisional observance of natural justice. [598A] The likelihood of production being jeopardized or the stoppage of production in a key industrial undertaking is a matter of grave concern affecting the public interest. Parliament has taken so serious a view of the matter that it has authorised the Central Government to take over the management of the industrial undertaking if immediate action may prevent jeopardy to production or restore production where it has already stopped. The necessity for immediate action by the Central Government contemplated by Parliament is definitely indicative of the exclusion of natural justice. It is not as if the owner of the industrial undertaking is left with no remedy. He may move the Central Government under section 18-F to cancel the order made under section 18AA. [598C-D] Neither section 18-F of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act nor section 21 of the General Clauses Act by itself excludes natural justice. The exclusion of natural justice where such exclusion is not express has to be implied by reference to the subject, the statute and the statutory situation. Where an express provision in the statute itself provides for a post decisional hearing the other provisions of the Statute will have to be read in the light of such provision and the provision for post- decisional hearing may then clinch the issue where pre- decisional natural justice appears to be excluded on the other terms of the statute. That a post-decisional hearing may also be had by the terms of section 21 of the General Clauses Act may not necessarily help in the interpretation of the provisions of the statute concerned. [599 A-C] Ridge v. Baldwin, 1964 A.C. p. 40; Annie G. Phillip v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 75 L.E.d. 1289; John H. Fahey v. Paul Mallonee, 91 L.E.d. 2030; Margarita Fuentes v. Robert L. Shevin, Attorney General of Florida, 32 L.E.d. 2d 556 and Lawrence Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 40 L.E.d. 2d 406, referred to. - Rama Rao, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh as well as the President of the Telugu Desam Party as well as respondent No. 3. The advertisements very shortly stated, refer to the auspicious gifts made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to the poor people on the eve of New Year and Sankranti. In the said advertisements, it is stated that the said Government which was formed by the Telugu Desam Party was giving to the poor people whose income was below Rs. and the said advertisements referred to a new scheme of selling sarees and dhoties at half prices to the poor people in the State of Andhra Pradesh having Green-cards. Moreover, the offer in the advertisements for the sale of dhoties and sarees at discount rates was in the nature of a benefit offered to poor persons in that State. When a Government announces the measures which are intended for the benefit of any of the classes for whose the Government can normally be expected to work like the poor or the economical backward classes, it is only in rare circumstances that such a promise can be said to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) even though such a promise might be made on the eve of elections. 8. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => '', 'counseldef' => '', 'court' => 'Supreme Court of India', 'court_type' => 'SC', 'decidedon' => '1989-09-29', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' K.N. Saikia,; M.H. Kania and; S. Ranganathan, JJ.', 'judgement' => '</p><p>Kania, J.</p><p>1. These two appeals arise out of the judgments in two Election Petitions in the Andhra Pradesh High Court questioning the election of respondent No. 1 as a Member of Parliament from Srikakulam No. Parliamentary Constituency in the 8th General Election to the House of the People. The points raised in these appeals are common and so are the relevant facts; and, hence, they are being disposed of by this common judgment. We propose to take note of only the few facts which are necessary for the appreciation of the controversy before us.</p><p>2. The polling date for the said election along with other parliamentary elections in the State of Andhra Pradesh was December 27, 1984 but in Srikakulam No. 1 Parliamentary Constituency the polling was countermanded and the date of polling was later fixed on January 28, 1985. In both the Election Petitions the election of respondent No. 1 was questioned mainly on the ground that Shri N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh as well as the President of the Telugu Desam Party as well as respondent No. 1 gave certain speeches and certain advertisements were got published by Shri N.T. Rama Rao through the Publicity Department of the Government of Andhra Pradesh in the newspapers containing certain statements which are alleged to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A) of the <a>Representation of the People Act, 1951</a> (hereinafter referred to as 'the said Act'). The main question canvassed before us is whether the statements contained in these aforesaid advertisements amount to a corrupt practice under Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act. Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act runs as follows :</p><p>123. Corrupt practices</p><p>The following shall be deemed to be corrupt practises for the purposes of this Act :</p><p>(1) 'Bribery', that is to say.</p><p>(A) any gift, offer or promise by a candidate or his agent or by any other person with the consent of a candidate or his election agent of any gratification, to any person whomsover, with the object, directly or indirectly of inducing.</p><p>(a) x x x</p><p>(b) an elector to vote or refrain from voting at an election, or as a reward to.</p><p>(i) a person for having so stood or not stood, or for having withdrawn or not having withdrawn his candidature; or</p><p>(ii) an elector for having voted or refrained from voting.</p><p>3. The advertisements very shortly stated, refer to the auspicious gifts made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to the poor people on the eve of New Year and Sankranti. In the said advertisements, it is stated that the said Government which was formed by the Telugu Desam Party was giving to the poor people whose income was below Rs. 6,000 per year, a kilo of rice at Rs. 2 per Kg. and the said advertisements referred to a new scheme of selling sarees and dhoties at half prices to the poor people in the State of Andhra Pradesh having Green-cards. Green-cards were directed to be issued to all the persons whose annual income was below Rs. 6,000. The supply of the rice at subsidised rates as aforesaid was also to be made to the Green-card holders only. The scheme to sell sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was to be operative from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985.</p><p>4. In considering the question whether the said advertisement and the said speeches amount to a corrupt practice, we are of the view that the provisions of Section 123 of the said Act which deal with corrupt practices have to be interpreted, keeping in mind that dictates of commonsense require that they never could have been intended to treat normal election promises made in election manifestoes or usual election speeches by members of various political parties aspiring to power and by different candidates aspiring to get elected to legislative bodies concerned as corrupt practices. We are of the view that these advertisements and speeches amount to nothing more than statements extolling the achievements of the Government of the State of Andhra Pradesh under the Telugu Desam Party headed by N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister, and contain normal election promises and these statements do not amount to corrupt practices falling within the scope of Sub-clause (b) of Clause (A) of Sub-section (1) of Section 123 of the said Act.</p><p>5. It was urged by Mr. Rao, learned Counsel for the appellants that in the impugned judgments, the High Court has incorrectly taken the view that in order to amount to bribery within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A), the transaction must amount to a bargain by the candidate with a view to get votes. It was pointed out by him that the said view has been taken in the impugned judgments, relying upon the decision of a Bench comprising to learned Judges of this Court in Ghasi Ram v. Dal Singh and Ors. :1983 SCR 102 . We have gone through to the relevant portion of that judgment (at page 109 and 110 of the said report). A careful perusal of the said judgment shows that what has been really held in that case is that if the promises given or made amount to a bargain entered into by a candidate for a vote or votes, that would amount to a corrupt practice; but it has not been held there that unless the act alleged amounts to such a bargain, it could not amount to a corrupt practice. In our view, that judgment does not lay down that in order to amount to a corrupt practice, the transaction must amount to a bargain for getting a vote. It was pointed out by Mr. Rao, however, that such a view seems to have been taken in two other decisions rendered by two Benches, each comprising two learned Judges of this Court in Bhanu Kumar Shastri v. Mohan Lal Sukhadia and Ors. : [1971]3SCR522 and Harjit Singh Mann v. S Umrao Singh and Ors. : [1980]2SCR501 . and these judgments need to be overruled. We do not propose to go into the correctness or otherwise of this view because, even on the footing that in order to amount to a corrupt practice under the aforesaid provision the alleged acts need not constitute a bargain, the the acts established in the present case, in our opinion, do not amount to a corrupt practice.</p><p>6. Our attention was drawn by Mr. Rao to the fact that in this case the said advertisements and the speeches had to be viewed in the context of the fact that the advertisements were issued and the speeches were made after respondent No. 1 filed his nomination papers on January 4, 1985, for the election and before the election was held in the aforesaid constituency. It was further pointed out that the offer made for the sale of sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was limited to the period from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985. It cannot be denied that these factors are relevant factOrs. We cannot, however, lose sight of the fact that this offer was made not only in this constituency but throughout the State where the elections to the House of the People were scheduled to be held, and were, in fact, held on December 27, 1984. It was only in case of this constituency that the election to be held on the scheduled date was countermanded and later held on January 28, 1985. We cannot lose sight of the fact that, as far as the said speeches and the said advertisements, which were issued by the Publicity Department of the State, are concerned, they deal in the main with the achievements of the Government of Andhra Pradesh which, of course, was being run by Ministers belonging to Telugu Desam Party to which respondent No. 1 also belonged. Moreover, the offer in the advertisements for the sale of dhoties and sarees at discount rates was in the nature of a benefit offered to poor persons in that State. When a Government announces the measures which are intended for the benefit of any of the classes for whose the Government can normally be expected to work like the poor or the economical backward classes, it is only in rare circumstances that such a promise can be said to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) even though such a promise might be made on the eve of elections. Keeping this in mind, in our opinion, although the offer to sell dhoties and sarees at discount rates was of a limited duration as aforestated, it cannot be regarded as a corrupt practice. Such an offer was bound to have financial repercussions and it is quite possible the duration of the offer was limited to enable the Government to study the financial repercussions rather than from any improper motive. We find support for this view from the decision of this Court in H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh : [1969]3SCR813 . In that case an Ordinance was passed by the Government of Madhya Pradesh as a result of which a large number of agriculturists, namely, those holdings of plots of land of less than 7.5 acres area or paying land revenue not exceeding Rs. 5/- were exempted from the payment of the land revenue. It was held that such a concession does not amount to a gift, offer or promise of any gratification within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) of the said Act nor does the announcement of the declaration made at a meeting shortly before the election or the issue of a pamphlet containing that declaration at that time carry the matter any further. It was held that neither Shri D.P. Misra who was the Chief Minister nor Shri S.K. Dixit who acted as his agent were guilty of any corrupt practice within the meaning of the aforesaid provision.</p><p>7. It was next contended by Mr. Rao, although very faintly, that the High Court was in error as it had not decided all other issues which were raised in the election petition. In this regard we cannot lose sight of the fact that the term of the present Lok Sabha is likely to be over within a few months and fresh elections are likely to be held and it would, therefore, be an exercise in futility to remand the matter to the High Court for deciding the remaining issues.</p><p>8. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.<p></p><p>', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'AIR1990SC1889; JT1989(4)SC186; 1989(2)SCALE891; 1989Supp(2)SCC504', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors.', 'sub' => 'Election', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ) $casename_url = 'b-rajagopala-rao-vs-appayya-hanumanthu' $args = array( (int) 0 => '640942', (int) 1 => 'b-rajagopala-rao-vs-appayya-hanumanthu' ) $url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/640942/b-rajagopala-rao-vs-appayya-hanumanthu' $ctype = '' $caseref = 'H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh<br>' $content = array( (int) 0 => '', (int) 1 => '<p>Kania, J.', (int) 2 => '<p>1. These two appeals arise out of the judgments in two Election Petitions in the Andhra Pradesh High Court questioning the election of respondent No. 1 as a Member of Parliament from Srikakulam No. Parliamentary Constituency in the 8th General Election to the House of the People. The points raised in these appeals are common and so are the relevant facts; and, hence, they are being disposed of by this common judgment. We propose to take note of only the few facts which are necessary for the appreciation of the controversy before us.', (int) 3 => '<p>2. The polling date for the said election along with other parliamentary elections in the State of Andhra Pradesh was December 27, 1984 but in Srikakulam No. 1 Parliamentary Constituency the polling was countermanded and the date of polling was later fixed on January 28, 1985. In both the Election Petitions the election of respondent No. 1 was questioned mainly on the ground that Shri N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh as well as the President of the Telugu Desam Party as well as respondent No. 1 gave certain speeches and certain advertisements were got published by Shri N.T. Rama Rao through the Publicity Department of the Government of Andhra Pradesh in the newspapers containing certain statements which are alleged to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A) of the <a>Representation of the People Act, 1951</a> (hereinafter referred to as 'the said Act'). The main question canvassed before us is whether the statements contained in these aforesaid advertisements amount to a corrupt practice under Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act. Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act runs as follows :', (int) 4 => '<p>123. Corrupt practices', (int) 5 => '<p>The following shall be deemed to be corrupt practises for the purposes of this Act :', (int) 6 => '<p>(1) 'Bribery', that is to say.', (int) 7 => '<p>(A) any gift, offer or promise by a candidate or his agent or by any other person with the consent of a candidate or his election agent of any gratification, to any person whomsover, with the object, directly or indirectly of inducing.', (int) 8 => '<p>(a) x x x', (int) 9 => '<p>(b) an elector to vote or refrain from voting at an election, or as a reward to.', (int) 10 => '<p>(i) a person for having so stood or not stood, or for having withdrawn or not having withdrawn his candidature; or', (int) 11 => '<p>(ii) an elector for having voted or refrained from voting.', (int) 12 => '<p>3. The advertisements very shortly stated, refer to the auspicious gifts made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to the poor people on the eve of New Year and Sankranti. In the said advertisements, it is stated that the said Government which was formed by the Telugu Desam Party was giving to the poor people whose income was below Rs. 6,000 per year, a kilo of rice at Rs. 2 per Kg. and the said advertisements referred to a new scheme of selling sarees and dhoties at half prices to the poor people in the State of Andhra Pradesh having Green-cards. Green-cards were directed to be issued to all the persons whose annual income was below Rs. 6,000. The supply of the rice at subsidised rates as aforesaid was also to be made to the Green-card holders only. The scheme to sell sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was to be operative from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985.', (int) 13 => '<p>4. In considering the question whether the said advertisement and the said speeches amount to a corrupt practice, we are of the view that the provisions of Section 123 of the said Act which deal with corrupt practices have to be interpreted, keeping in mind that dictates of commonsense require that they never could have been intended to treat normal election promises made in election manifestoes or usual election speeches by members of various political parties aspiring to power and by different candidates aspiring to get elected to legislative bodies concerned as corrupt practices. We are of the view that these advertisements and speeches amount to nothing more than statements extolling the achievements of the Government of the State of Andhra Pradesh under the Telugu Desam Party headed by N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister, and contain normal election promises and these statements do not amount to corrupt practices falling within the scope of Sub-clause (b) of Clause (A) of Sub-section (1) of Section 123 of the said Act.', (int) 14 => '<p>5. It was urged by Mr. Rao, learned Counsel for the appellants that in the impugned judgments, the High Court has incorrectly taken the view that in order to amount to bribery within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A), the transaction must amount to a bargain by the candidate with a view to get votes. It was pointed out by him that the said view has been taken in the impugned judgments, relying upon the decision of a Bench comprising to learned Judges of this Court in Ghasi Ram v. Dal Singh and Ors. :1983 SCR 102 . We have gone through to the relevant portion of that judgment (at page 109 and 110 of the said report). A careful perusal of the said judgment shows that what has been really held in that case is that if the promises given or made amount to a bargain entered into by a candidate for a vote or votes, that would amount to a corrupt practice; but it has not been held there that unless the act alleged amounts to such a bargain, it could not amount to a corrupt practice. In our view, that judgment does not lay down that in order to amount to a corrupt practice, the transaction must amount to a bargain for getting a vote. It was pointed out by Mr. Rao, however, that such a view seems to have been taken in two other decisions rendered by two Benches, each comprising two learned Judges of this Court in Bhanu Kumar Shastri v. Mohan Lal Sukhadia and Ors. : [1971]3SCR522 and Harjit Singh Mann v. S Umrao Singh and Ors. : [1980]2SCR501 . and these judgments need to be overruled. We do not propose to go into the correctness or otherwise of this view because, even on the footing that in order to amount to a corrupt practice under the aforesaid provision the alleged acts need not constitute a bargain, the the acts established in the present case, in our opinion, do not amount to a corrupt practice.', (int) 15 => '<p>6. Our attention was drawn by Mr. Rao to the fact that in this case the said advertisements and the speeches had to be viewed in the context of the fact that the advertisements were issued and the speeches were made after respondent No. 1 filed his nomination papers on January 4, 1985, for the election and before the election was held in the aforesaid constituency. It was further pointed out that the offer made for the sale of sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was limited to the period from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985. It cannot be denied that these factors are relevant factOrs. We cannot, however, lose sight of the fact that this offer was made not only in this constituency but throughout the State where the elections to the House of the People were scheduled to be held, and were, in fact, held on December 27, 1984. It was only in case of this constituency that the election to be held on the scheduled date was countermanded and later held on January 28, 1985. We cannot lose sight of the fact that, as far as the said speeches and the said advertisements, which were issued by the Publicity Department of the State, are concerned, they deal in the main with the achievements of the Government of Andhra Pradesh which, of course, was being run by Ministers belonging to Telugu Desam Party to which respondent No. 1 also belonged. Moreover, the offer in the advertisements for the sale of dhoties and sarees at discount rates was in the nature of a benefit offered to poor persons in that State. When a Government announces the measures which are intended for the benefit of any of the classes for whose the Government can normally be expected to work like the poor or the economical backward classes, it is only in rare circumstances that such a promise can be said to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) even though such a promise might be made on the eve of elections. Keeping this in mind, in our opinion, although the offer to sell dhoties and sarees at discount rates was of a limited duration as aforestated, it cannot be regarded as a corrupt practice. Such an offer was bound to have financial repercussions and it is quite possible the duration of the offer was limited to enable the Government to study the financial repercussions rather than from any improper motive. We find support for this view from the decision of this Court in H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh : [1969]3SCR813 . In that case an Ordinance was passed by the Government of Madhya Pradesh as a result of which a large number of agriculturists, namely, those holdings of plots of land of less than 7.5 acres area or paying land revenue not exceeding Rs. 5/- were exempted from the payment of the land revenue. It was held that such a concession does not amount to a gift, offer or promise of any gratification within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) of the said Act nor does the announcement of the declaration made at a meeting shortly before the election or the issue of a pamphlet containing that declaration at that time carry the matter any further. It was held that neither Shri D.P. Misra who was the Chief Minister nor Shri S.K. Dixit who acted as his agent were guilty of any corrupt practice within the meaning of the aforesaid provision.', (int) 16 => '<p>7. It was next contended by Mr. Rao, although very faintly, that the High Court was in error as it had not decided all other issues which were raised in the election petition. In this regard we cannot lose sight of the fact that the term of the present Lok Sabha is likely to be over within a few months and fresh elections are likely to be held and it would, therefore, be an exercise in futility to remand the matter to the High Court for deciding the remaining issues.', (int) 17 => '<p>8. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.<p>', (int) 18 => '<p>' ) $paragraphAfter = (int) 1 $cnt = (int) 19 $i = (int) 12include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144 View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971 View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933 View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473 Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963 Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200 Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167 [main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109
3. The advertisements very shortly stated, refer to the auspicious gifts made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to the poor people on the eve of New Year and Sankranti. In the said advertisements, it is stated that the said Government which was formed by the Telugu Desam Party was giving to the poor people whose income was below Rs. 6,000 per year, a kilo of rice at Rs. 2 per Kg. and the said advertisements referred to a new scheme of selling sarees and dhoties at half prices to the poor people in the State of Andhra Pradesh having Green-cards. Green-cards were directed to be issued to all the persons whose annual income was below Rs. 6,000. The supply of the rice at subsidised rates as aforesaid was also to be made to the Green-card holders only. The scheme to sell sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was to be operative from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985.
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$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp' $dataForView = array( 'title_for_layout' => 'B Rajagopala Rao and anr Vs Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors - Citation 640942 - Court Judgment | ', 'desc' => array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '640942', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/50684/representation-of-the-people-act-1951-complete-act">Representation of the People Act, 1951</a> - Sections 1, 3(1)(A), 123 and 123(1)(A)', 'appealno' => 'Civil Appeal Nos. 484 and 485 of 1987', 'appellant' => 'B. Rajagopala Rao and anr.', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'B. Rajagopala Rao and anr. Vs. Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors.', 'casenote' => 'Election - corrupt practices - Sections 123 and 123 (1) (A) of Representation of the People Act, 1951 - whether advertisements by public department and speeches made by respondent No. 1 to sell dhoti and sarees at discount rates amount to corrupt practices - offer was available for mass and for limited duration - such offer was bound to have financial repercussions and it is quite possible that duration of offer limited to enable Government to study financial repercussions rather than from any improper motive - offer not amounted to corrupt practices. - [ D.A. Desai,; O. Chinnappa Reddy and; R.S. Sarkaria, JJ.] The Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 empowers the Union of India in the public interest to take under its control the industries specified in the First Schedule to the Act. Item 23 of the First Schedule relates to textiles of various categories. Section 15 authorises the Central Government to make or cause to be made a full and complete investigation into the circumstances of the case if the Central Government is of the opinion that (a) in respect of any scheduled industry or industrial undertaking or undertakings (i) there has been, or is likely to be, a substantial fall in the volume of production for which, having regard to the economic conditions prevailing, there is no justification; or (ii) there has been, or is likely to be, a marked deterioration in the quality of any article... which could have been or can be avoided; or (iii) there has been or is likely to be a rise in the price of any article..... for which there is no justification; or (iv) it is necessary to take any such action for the purpose of conserving any resources of national importance; or (b) any industrial undertaking is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest. After the investigation is made under section 15, section 16(1) empowers the Central Government if action is desirable, to issue appropriate directions, and section 16(2) provides for the issue of interim directions by the Central Government pending investigation under section 15. Chapter III-A consisting of Sections 18A, 18-AA, 18-B, 18-C, 18-D, 18-E and 18-F deal with "direct management or control of Industrial Undertakings by Central Government in certain cases". Sec. 18-A empowers the Central Government by notified order, to authorise any person or body of persons to take over the management of the whole or any part of an industrial undertaking or to exercise in respect of the whole, or any part of the undertaking such functions of control as may be specified in the order, if the Central Government is of opinion that: (a) an industrial undertaking to which directions have been issued in pursuance of section 16 has failed to comply with such directions, or (b) an industrial undertaking in respect of which an investigation has been made under section 15 is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest. Section 18AA(5) stipulates that the provisions of Sections 18-B to 18 E shall be applicable to the industrial undertaking in respect of which an order has been made under section 18-AA even as they apply to an industrial undertaking taken over under Section 18-A. Section 18-F empowers the Central Government to cancel the order made under section 18-A if it appears that the purpose of the order has been fulfilled or it is not necessary that the order should remain in force. The appellant M/s. Swadeshi Cotton Mills was taken over by the Government of India by a notification dated April 13, 1978 in exercise of the powers conferred on it under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 18AA of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 on the ground that the company had by creation of encumbrances on the assets of its industrial undertakings, brought about a situation which had affected and is likely to further affect the production of articles manufactured or produced by it and that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation. The Government authorised the National Textile Corporation Limited to take over the management, subject to the conditions that the authorised person shall comply with all the directions issued from time to time by the Central Government and that the authorised person shall hold office for a period of five years. The appellant Mills challenged the aforesaid order in a writ petition in the High Court. The case was heard by a Full Bench of five Judges to consider the question whether in construing section 18AA of the Industries Development and Regulation Act, 1951, compliance with the principle of audi alteram partem is to be implied and whether hearing is to be given to the parties who would be affected by the order to be passed prior to the passing of the order or whether hearing can be given after the order is passed and whether the order passed under the said Section is vitiated by not giving of such hearing and whether such vice can be cured. The Bench by a majority answered the three questions as follows:- (a) Section 18AA(1)(a)(b) excludes the giving of prior hearing to the party who would be affected by order thereunder. (b) Section 18-F expressly provides for a post- decisional hearing to the owner of the industrial undertaking, the management of which is taken over under section 18AA to have the order made under section 18AA cancelled on any relevant ground. (c) As the taking over of management under section 18A is not vitiated by the failure to grant prior hearing the question of any such vice being cured by a grant of a subsequent hearing does not arise. The minority, however, held that in compliance with the principles of natural justice, prior hearing to the owner of the undertaking was required to be given before the passing of an order under section 18AA, that the second question did not arise as the denial of a prior hearing would not cure the vice by the grant of subsequent hearing, but it would be open to the Court to moderate the relief in such a way that the order is kept alive to the extent necessary until the making of the fresh order to subserve public interest and to make appropriate directions. After the decision on the reference the case was reheard on merits by a Full Bench of three Judges and the writ petition was allowed in part. The challenge to the validity of the order being rejected but insofar as the impugned order seeking to take over the corporate entity of the company, the corporate entity of the subsidiary and its assets, the petition was allowed and the respondents, the Union of India and the authorised person were directed to release from its control and custody and/or deliver possession of any assets or property of the company which were not referable to the industrial undertakings. Appeals to this Court were filed on behalf of the Company as well as by the Union of India and the National Textile Corporation. Two propositions were propounded on behalf of the company that: (a) Whether it was necessary to observe the rules of natural justice before issuing a notified order under section 18AA(1)(a) and further whether section 18-F impliedly excludes rules of natural justice relating to prior hearing; and it was contended (1) the mere use of the word 'immediate' in sub-clause (a) of section 18AA does not show a legislative intent to exclude the application of audi alteram partem rule altogether. (2) The word 'immediate' in clause (a) has been used in contra distinction to 'investigate'. It only means that under section 18AA action can be taken without prior investigation under section 15. The use of the word 'immediate' in section 18AA(1)(a) only dispenses with investigation under section 15 and not with the principle of audi alteram partem altogether and this is indicated by the marginal note of section 18A and para 3 of the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Amendment Bill which inserted section 18AA in 1971. (3) The word 'immediate' occurs only in clause (a) and not in clause (b) of section 18AA(1). It would be odd if intention to exclude this principle of natural justice is spelt out in one clause of the sub-section when the other clause does not exclude it. (4) Section 18-F does not exclude a pre-decisional hearing. The so-called post-decisional hearing contemplated by section 18-F cannot be and is not intended to be a substitute for a pre-decisional hearing. (5) Section 18F incorporates only a facet, albeit qualified, of section 21 of the General Clauses Act. The language of the Section implicity prohibits an enquiry into circumstances that led to the passing of the order of take-over and under it the aggrieved person is not entitled to show that on merits the order was void ab initio. (6) 'Immediacy' does not exclude a duty to act fairly because even an emergent situation can co-exist with the canons of natural justice. The only effect of urgency on the application of the principle of fair hearing would be that the width, form and duration of the hearing would be tailored to the situation and reduced to the reasonable minimum so that it does not delay and defeat the purpose of the contemplated action. (7) Where the civil consequences of the administrative action are grave and its effect is highly prejudicial to the rights and interests of the person affected and there is nothing in the language and scheme of the statute which unequivocally excludes a fair pre-decisional hearing and the post-decisional hearing provided therein is not a real remedial hearing equitable to a full right of appeal the Court should be loath to infer a legislative intent to exclude even a minimal fair hearing at the pre-decisional stage merely on ground of urgency. (8) The Central Government appointed four Government Officials including one from the office of the Textile Commissioner to study the affairs of the Company and to make recommendation. This Official Group submitted its report on February 16, 1978. The evidence on the basis of which the impugned order was passed was not disclosed to the appellant company till May 1978, only after it had filed the writ petition in the High Court. If there was anything adverse to the appellants in the survey report there was time enough about six weeks between the submission of the Survey Report and the passing of the impugned order for giving a short, reasonable opportunity to the appellants to explain the adverse findings against them. If there was immediacy situational modifications could be made to meet the requirement of fairness, by reducing the period of notice; that even the manner and form of such notice could be simplified to eliminate delay, that telephonic notice or short opportunity for furnishing their explanation to the Company might have satisfied the requirements of natural justice. Such an opportunity of hearing could have been given after the passing of a conditional tentative order and before its enforcement under section 18AA. For the interregnum suitable interim action such as freezing the assets of the Company or restraining the Company from creating further encumbrances, could be taken under section 16. On behalf of the Union of India and the Authorised Officer it was contended that (1) the presumption in favour of audi alteram partem rule stands impliedly displaced by the language scheme, setting and the purpose of the provision in section 18AA. (2) Section 18AA on its plain terms deals with situations where immediate preventive action is required. The paramount concern is to avoid serious problems which may be caused by fall in production. The purpose of an order under section 18AA is not to condemn the owner but to protect the scheduled industry. The issue under section 18AA is not solely between the Government and the management of the industrial undertaking. The object of taking action under this Section is to protect other outside interests of the community at large and the workers. (3) The rule of natural justice to give a hearing has been incorporated in section 18-F which gives an opportunity of a post-decisional hearing to the owner of the undertaking who if he feels aggrieved can on his application be heard, to show that even the original order under section 18AA was passed on invalid grounds and should be cancelled or rescinded. (4) On a true construction of section 18AA read with section 18-F the requirements of natural justice and fair play can be read into the statute only insofar as conformance to such canons can reasonably and realistically be required of it by the provision for a remedial hearing at a subsequent stage. (5) Under section 18-F the Central Government exercises curial functions and that Section confers on the aggrieved owner a right to apply to the Government to cancel the order of take-over. This section casts an obligation on the Central Government to deal with and dispose of an application filed thereunder with reasonable expedition. Allowing the appeal by the Company,<br />HELD: (Sarkaria & Desai, JJ. per Chinnappa Reddy, J. dissenting.) In the facts and circumstances of the instant case, there has been a noncompliance with the implied requirement of the audi alteram partem rule of natural justice at the pre-decisional stage. The impugned order could be struck down as invalid on that score alone. But in view of the commitment / concession that a hearing would be afforded to the Company, the case is remitted to the Central Government to give a full, fair and effective hearing. [587G-H, 588C] The phrase 'natural justice' is not capable of a static and precise definition. It cannot be imprisoned in the straight-jacket of a cast-iron formula. Rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. Hence not possible to make an exhaustive catalogue of such rules. Two fundamental maxims of natural justice have now become deeply and indelibly ingrained in the common consciousness of mankind as pre-eminently necessary to ensure that the law is applied impartially objectively and fairly. These twin principles are (i) audi alteram partem and (ii) nemo judex in re sua. Audi alteram partem is a highly effective rule devised by the Courts to ensure that a statutory authority arrives at a just decision and it is calculated to act as a healthy check on the abuse or misuse of power. Its reach should not be narrowed and its applicability circumscribed.[554C-G] The rules of natural justice can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. If a statutory provision either specifically or by inevitable implication excludes the application of the rules of natural justice then the Court cannot ignore the mandate of the Legislature. Whether or not the application of the principles of natural justice in a given case has been excluded in the exercise of statutory power depends upon the language and basic scheme of the provision conferring the power, the nature of the power the purpose for which it is conferred and the effect of that power. [556A-B] The maxim audi alteram partem has many facets. Two of them are (a) notice of the case to be met, and (b) opportunity to explain. The rule cannot be sacrificed at the altar of administrative convenience or celerity; for, convenience and justice are often not on speaking terms. Difficulties, however, arise when the statute conferring the power does not expressly exclude this rule but its exclusion is sought by implication due to the presence of certain factors such as urgency where the obligation to give notice and opportunity to be heard would obstruct the taking of prompt action of a preventive or remedial nature. Audi alteram partem rule may be disregarded in an emergent situation where immediate action brooks no delay to prevent some imminent danger or injury or hazard to paramount public interests. Section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure empowers the magistrates specified therein to make an exparte conditional order in emergent cases for removal of dangerous public nuisances. Action under section 17 Land Acquisition Act furnishes another such instance. Similarly action on grounds of public safety public health may justify disregard of the rule of prior hearing. [556C-H] Cases where owing to the compulsion of the fact situation or the necessity of taking speedy action no pre- decisional hearing is given but the action, is followed soon by a full post-decisional hearing to the person affected do not in reality constitute an exception to the audi alteram partem rule. To call such cases as exception is a misnomer because they do not exclude fair play in action but adapt it to the urgency of the situation by balancing the competing claims of hurry and hearing. [560H-561A] The general principle as distinguished from an absolute rule of uniform application seems to be that where a statute does not in terms exclude this rule of prior hearing but contemplates a post-decisional hearing amounting to a full review of the original order on merits then such a statute would be construed as excluding the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage. [561G] If the statute conferring the power is silent with regard to the giving of pre-decisional hearing to the person affected and the administrative decision taken by the authority involves civil consequences of a grave nature and no full review or appeal on merits against that decision is provided courts will be extremely reluctant to construe such a statute as excluding the duty of affording even a minimal hearing shorn of all its formal trappings and dilatory features at the pre-decisional stage, unless viewed pragmatically it would paralyse the administrative process or frustrate the need for utmost promptitude. [561H] 7(i). A comparison of the provisions of Section 18A(1)(b) and Section 18AA(1)(c), bring out two main points of distinction: First, action under Section 18A(1)(b) can be taken only after an investigation had been made under Section 15; while under Section 18AA(1)(a) or (b) action can be taken without such investigation. The language, scheme and setting of Section 18AA read in the light of the Objects and Reasons for enacting this provision make this position clear beyond doubt. Second, before taking action under Section 18A(1)(b), the Central Government has to form an opinion on the basis of the investigation conducted under section 15, in regard to the existence of the objective fact, namely: that the industrial undertaking is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest; while under section 18A(1)(a) the Government has to satisfy itself that the persons incharge of the undertaking have brought about a situation likely to cause fall in production, by committing any of the three kinds of acts specified in that provision. This shows that the preliminary objective fact attributable to the persons in charge of the management or affairs of the undertaking, on the basis of which action may be taken under section 18(A)(1)(b), is of far wider amplitude than the circumstance, the existence of which is a sine qua non for taking action under section 18AA(1). The phrase "highly detrimental to the scheduled industry or public interest" in section 18-A is capable of being construed to cover a large variety of acts or things which may be considered wrong with the manner of running the industry by the management. In contrast with it, action under section 18AA(1)(a) can be taken only if the Central Government is satisfied with regard to the existence of the twin conditions specifically mentioned therein, on the basis of evidence in its possession. [569D-H] An analysis of section 18AA(1)(a), indicates that as a necessary preliminary to the exercise of the power thereunder, the Central Government must be satisfied "from documentary or other evidence in its possession" in regard to the co-existence of two circumstances: (i) that the persons in charge of the industrial undertaking have by committing any of these acts, namely, reckless investments, or creation of incumbrances on the assets of industrial undertaking, or by diversion of funds, brought about a situation which is likely to affect the production of the article manufactured or produced in the industrial undertaking, and (ii) that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation.[570B-D] It cannot be laid down as a general proposition that whenever a statute confers a power on an administrative authority and makes the exercise of that power conditional on the formation of an opinion by that authority in regard to the existence of an immediacy, its opinion in regard to that preliminary fact is not open to judicial scrutiny at all. While it may be conceded that an element of subjectivity is always involved in the formation of such an opinion, the existence of the circumstances from which the inference constituting the opinion, as the sine qua non for action, are to be drawn, must be demonstrable, and the existence of such "circumstances", if questioned, must be proved at least prima facie. [571 E-G] From a plain reading of section 18AA, it is clear that it does not expressly in unmistakable and unequivocal terms exclude the application of the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage. [574B] In the instant case, so far as Kanpur Unit is concerned, it was lying closed for more than three months before the passing of the impugned order. There was no 'immediacy' in relation to that unit, which could absolve the Government from the obligation of complying fully with audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional or pre- takeover stage. [583A] Keshav Mills Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, [1973] 3 S.C.R. 22; Kamla Prasad Khetan v. Union of India,[1957] S.C.R. 1052; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 621; Sukhdev Singh & Ors. v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh, [1975] 3 S.C.R. 619; A. K. Kraipak v. Union of India, [1970] 1 S.C.R. 457; Ridge v. Baldwin, [1964] A.C. 40; 196; Heatley v. Tasmanian Racing & Gaming Commission, 14 Australian Law Reports 519; Nawabkhan Abbaskhan v. State of Gujarat, [1974] 3 S.C.R. 427; State of Orissa v. Dr. Bina Pani Dei, [1962] 2 S.C.R. 625; Ambalal M. Shah v. Hathi Singh Manufacturing Co. Ltd. [1962] 3 S.C.R. 171; and S. L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan & Ors., [1981] 1 S.C.R. 746, referred to. (Per Chinnappa Reddy, J. dissenting) The principles of natural justice are not attracted to the situations contemplated by section 18AA of Industries (Development and Regulation) Act. Natural justice like Ultra Vires and Public Policy is a branch of the public law and is a formidable weapon which can be wielded to secure justice to the citizen. While it may be used to protect certain fundamental liberties, civil and political rights, it may be used as indeed it is used more often than not, to protect vested interests and to obstruct the path of progressive change. The time has come to make an appropriate distinction between natural justice in its application to fundamental liberties, civil and political rights and natural justice in its application to vested interests. [590A-B] Our constitution as befits the Constitution of a Socialist Secular Democratic Republic, recognises the paramountcy of the public weal over the private interest. Natural justice, ultra vires, public policy, or any other rule of interpretation must, therefore, conform, grow and be tailored to serve the public interest and respond to the demands of an evolving society. [590C] The principles of natural justice have taken deep root in the judicial conscience of our people. They are now considered so fundamental as to be implicit in every decision making function, judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative. Where authority functions under a statute and the statute provides for the observance of the principles of natural justice in a particular manner, natural justice will have to be observed in that manner and in no other. Where the statute is silent about the observance of the principles of natural justice, such statutory silence is taken to imply compliance with the principles of natural justice. Where the conflict is between the public interest and the private interest the presumption must necessarily be weak and may, therefore, be readily displaced. The presumption is also weak, where what are involved are mere property rights. In cases of urgency, particularly where the public interest is involved, preemptive action may be a strategic necessity. Even in cases of preemptive action, if the statute so provides or if the Courts so deem fit in appropriate cases, a postponed hearing may be substituted for natural justice. [590A-C; 591F-G] 3(ii). Where natural justice is implied, the extent of the implication and the nature of the hearing must vary with the statute, the subject and the situation. [592B] The absence of the expression 'immediate action' in section 18AA(1)(b) does not make any difference. Section 18AA(1)(a) refers to a situation where immediate preventive action may avert a disaster, whereas section 18AA contemplates a situation where the disaster has occurred and action is necessary to restore normalcy. Restoration of production where production has stopped in a key industry or industrial undertaking is as important and urgent in the public interest as prevention of a situation where production may be affected. Immediate action is, therefore, as necessary in the situation contemplated by section 18AA(1)(b) as in the situation contemplated by section 18AA(1)(a). [596 F-G] The marginal note refers to the power to take over without investigation but there is no sufficient reason to suppose that the word immediate is used only to contra- distinguish it from the investigation contemplated by section 15 of the Act, though of course a consequence of immediate action under section 18AA may be to dispense with the enquiry under section 15. In fact, facts which come to light during the course of an investigation under section 15 may form the basis of action under section 18AA(1)(a). Where in the course of an investigation under section 15 it is discovered that the management have, by reckless investments or creation of encumbrances on the assets of the industrial undertaking or by diversion of funds brought about a situation which is likely to affect the production of the articles manufactured or produced in the industrial undertaking, if the Government is satisfied that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation, there is no reason why the Central Government may not straightaway take action under section 18AA(1)(a) without waiting for completion of investigation under section 15. [597A-B] Where there is a provision in the statute itself for revocation of the order by the very authority making the decision, it appears to be unnecessary to insist upon a pre- decisional observance of natural justice. [598A] The likelihood of production being jeopardized or the stoppage of production in a key industrial undertaking is a matter of grave concern affecting the public interest. Parliament has taken so serious a view of the matter that it has authorised the Central Government to take over the management of the industrial undertaking if immediate action may prevent jeopardy to production or restore production where it has already stopped. The necessity for immediate action by the Central Government contemplated by Parliament is definitely indicative of the exclusion of natural justice. It is not as if the owner of the industrial undertaking is left with no remedy. He may move the Central Government under section 18-F to cancel the order made under section 18AA. [598C-D] Neither section 18-F of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act nor section 21 of the General Clauses Act by itself excludes natural justice. The exclusion of natural justice where such exclusion is not express has to be implied by reference to the subject, the statute and the statutory situation. Where an express provision in the statute itself provides for a post decisional hearing the other provisions of the Statute will have to be read in the light of such provision and the provision for post- decisional hearing may then clinch the issue where pre- decisional natural justice appears to be excluded on the other terms of the statute. That a post-decisional hearing may also be had by the terms of section 21 of the General Clauses Act may not necessarily help in the interpretation of the provisions of the statute concerned. [599 A-C] Ridge v. Baldwin, 1964 A.C. p. 40; Annie G. Phillip v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 75 L.E.d. 1289; John H. Fahey v. Paul Mallonee, 91 L.E.d. 2030; Margarita Fuentes v. Robert L. Shevin, Attorney General of Florida, 32 L.E.d. 2d 556 and Lawrence Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 40 L.E.d. 2d 406, referred to. - Rama Rao, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh as well as the President of the Telugu Desam Party as well as respondent No. 3. The advertisements very shortly stated, refer to the auspicious gifts made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to the poor people on the eve of New Year and Sankranti. In the said advertisements, it is stated that the said Government which was formed by the Telugu Desam Party was giving to the poor people whose income was below Rs. and the said advertisements referred to a new scheme of selling sarees and dhoties at half prices to the poor people in the State of Andhra Pradesh having Green-cards. Moreover, the offer in the advertisements for the sale of dhoties and sarees at discount rates was in the nature of a benefit offered to poor persons in that State. When a Government announces the measures which are intended for the benefit of any of the classes for whose the Government can normally be expected to work like the poor or the economical backward classes, it is only in rare circumstances that such a promise can be said to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) even though such a promise might be made on the eve of elections. 8. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => '', 'counseldef' => '', 'court' => 'Supreme Court of India', 'court_type' => 'SC', 'decidedon' => '1989-09-29', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' K.N. Saikia,; M.H. Kania and; S. Ranganathan, JJ.', 'judgement' => '</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Kania, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. These two appeals arise out of the judgments in two Election Petitions in the Andhra Pradesh High Court questioning the election of respondent No. 1 as a Member of Parliament from Srikakulam No. Parliamentary Constituency in the 8th General Election to the House of the People. The points raised in these appeals are common and so are the relevant facts; and, hence, they are being disposed of by this common judgment. We propose to take note of only the few facts which are necessary for the appreciation of the controversy before us.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The polling date for the said election along with other parliamentary elections in the State of Andhra Pradesh was December 27, 1984 but in Srikakulam No. 1 Parliamentary Constituency the polling was countermanded and the date of polling was later fixed on January 28, 1985. In both the Election Petitions the election of respondent No. 1 was questioned mainly on the ground that Shri N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh as well as the President of the Telugu Desam Party as well as respondent No. 1 gave certain speeches and certain advertisements were got published by Shri N.T. Rama Rao through the Publicity Department of the Government of Andhra Pradesh in the newspapers containing certain statements which are alleged to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A) of the <a href="/act/50684/representation-of-the-people-act-1951-complete-act">Representation of the People Act, 1951</a> (hereinafter referred to as 'the said Act'). The main question canvassed before us is whether the statements contained in these aforesaid advertisements amount to a corrupt practice under Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act. Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act runs as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">123. Corrupt practices</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The following shall be deemed to be corrupt practises for the purposes of this Act :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) 'Bribery', that is to say.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(A) any gift, offer or promise by a candidate or his agent or by any other person with the consent of a candidate or his election agent of any gratification, to any person whomsover, with the object, directly or indirectly of inducing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) x x x</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) an elector to vote or refrain from voting at an election, or as a reward to.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) a person for having so stood or not stood, or for having withdrawn or not having withdrawn his candidature; or</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) an elector for having voted or refrained from voting.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The advertisements very shortly stated, refer to the auspicious gifts made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to the poor people on the eve of New Year and Sankranti. In the said advertisements, it is stated that the said Government which was formed by the Telugu Desam Party was giving to the poor people whose income was below Rs. 6,000 per year, a kilo of rice at Rs. 2 per Kg. and the said advertisements referred to a new scheme of selling sarees and dhoties at half prices to the poor people in the State of Andhra Pradesh having Green-cards. Green-cards were directed to be issued to all the persons whose annual income was below Rs. 6,000. The supply of the rice at subsidised rates as aforesaid was also to be made to the Green-card holders only. The scheme to sell sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was to be operative from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. In considering the question whether the said advertisement and the said speeches amount to a corrupt practice, we are of the view that the provisions of Section 123 of the said Act which deal with corrupt practices have to be interpreted, keeping in mind that dictates of commonsense require that they never could have been intended to treat normal election promises made in election manifestoes or usual election speeches by members of various political parties aspiring to power and by different candidates aspiring to get elected to legislative bodies concerned as corrupt practices. We are of the view that these advertisements and speeches amount to nothing more than statements extolling the achievements of the Government of the State of Andhra Pradesh under the Telugu Desam Party headed by N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister, and contain normal election promises and these statements do not amount to corrupt practices falling within the scope of Sub-clause (b) of Clause (A) of Sub-section (1) of Section 123 of the said Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. It was urged by Mr. Rao, learned Counsel for the appellants that in the impugned judgments, the High Court has incorrectly taken the view that in order to amount to bribery within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A), the transaction must amount to a bargain by the candidate with a view to get votes. It was pointed out by him that the said view has been taken in the impugned judgments, relying upon the decision of a Bench comprising to learned Judges of this Court in Ghasi Ram v. Dal Singh and Ors. :1983 SCR 102 . We have gone through to the relevant portion of that judgment (at page 109 and 110 of the said report). A careful perusal of the said judgment shows that what has been really held in that case is that if the promises given or made amount to a bargain entered into by a candidate for a vote or votes, that would amount to a corrupt practice; but it has not been held there that unless the act alleged amounts to such a bargain, it could not amount to a corrupt practice. In our view, that judgment does not lay down that in order to amount to a corrupt practice, the transaction must amount to a bargain for getting a vote. It was pointed out by Mr. Rao, however, that such a view seems to have been taken in two other decisions rendered by two Benches, each comprising two learned Judges of this Court in Bhanu Kumar Shastri v. Mohan Lal Sukhadia and Ors. : [1971]3SCR522 and Harjit Singh Mann v. S Umrao Singh and Ors. : [1980]2SCR501 . and these judgments need to be overruled. We do not propose to go into the correctness or otherwise of this view because, even on the footing that in order to amount to a corrupt practice under the aforesaid provision the alleged acts need not constitute a bargain, the the acts established in the present case, in our opinion, do not amount to a corrupt practice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Our attention was drawn by Mr. Rao to the fact that in this case the said advertisements and the speeches had to be viewed in the context of the fact that the advertisements were issued and the speeches were made after respondent No. 1 filed his nomination papers on January 4, 1985, for the election and before the election was held in the aforesaid constituency. It was further pointed out that the offer made for the sale of sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was limited to the period from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985. It cannot be denied that these factors are relevant factOrs. We cannot, however, lose sight of the fact that this offer was made not only in this constituency but throughout the State where the elections to the House of the People were scheduled to be held, and were, in fact, held on December 27, 1984. It was only in case of this constituency that the election to be held on the scheduled date was countermanded and later held on January 28, 1985. We cannot lose sight of the fact that, as far as the said speeches and the said advertisements, which were issued by the Publicity Department of the State, are concerned, they deal in the main with the achievements of the Government of Andhra Pradesh which, of course, was being run by Ministers belonging to Telugu Desam Party to which respondent No. 1 also belonged. Moreover, the offer in the advertisements for the sale of dhoties and sarees at discount rates was in the nature of a benefit offered to poor persons in that State. When a Government announces the measures which are intended for the benefit of any of the classes for whose the Government can normally be expected to work like the poor or the economical backward classes, it is only in rare circumstances that such a promise can be said to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) even though such a promise might be made on the eve of elections. Keeping this in mind, in our opinion, although the offer to sell dhoties and sarees at discount rates was of a limited duration as aforestated, it cannot be regarded as a corrupt practice. Such an offer was bound to have financial repercussions and it is quite possible the duration of the offer was limited to enable the Government to study the financial repercussions rather than from any improper motive. We find support for this view from the decision of this Court in H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh : [1969]3SCR813 . In that case an Ordinance was passed by the Government of Madhya Pradesh as a result of which a large number of agriculturists, namely, those holdings of plots of land of less than 7.5 acres area or paying land revenue not exceeding Rs. 5/- were exempted from the payment of the land revenue. It was held that such a concession does not amount to a gift, offer or promise of any gratification within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) of the said Act nor does the announcement of the declaration made at a meeting shortly before the election or the issue of a pamphlet containing that declaration at that time carry the matter any further. It was held that neither Shri D.P. Misra who was the Chief Minister nor Shri S.K. Dixit who acted as his agent were guilty of any corrupt practice within the meaning of the aforesaid provision.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. It was next contended by Mr. Rao, although very faintly, that the High Court was in error as it had not decided all other issues which were raised in the election petition. In this regard we cannot lose sight of the fact that the term of the present Lok Sabha is likely to be over within a few months and fresh elections are likely to be held and it would, therefore, be an exercise in futility to remand the matter to the High Court for deciding the remaining issues.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'AIR1990SC1889; JT1989(4)SC186; 1989(2)SCALE891; 1989Supp(2)SCC504', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors.', 'sub' => 'Election', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ), 'casename_url' => 'b-rajagopala-rao-vs-appayya-hanumanthu', 'args' => array( (int) 0 => '640942', (int) 1 => 'b-rajagopala-rao-vs-appayya-hanumanthu' ) ) $title_for_layout = 'B Rajagopala Rao and anr Vs Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors - Citation 640942 - Court Judgment | ' $desc = array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '640942', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/50684/representation-of-the-people-act-1951-complete-act">Representation of the People Act, 1951</a> - Sections 1, 3(1)(A), 123 and 123(1)(A)', 'appealno' => 'Civil Appeal Nos. 484 and 485 of 1987', 'appellant' => 'B. Rajagopala Rao and anr.', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'B. Rajagopala Rao and anr. Vs. Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors.', 'casenote' => 'Election - corrupt practices - Sections 123 and 123 (1) (A) of Representation of the People Act, 1951 - whether advertisements by public department and speeches made by respondent No. 1 to sell dhoti and sarees at discount rates amount to corrupt practices - offer was available for mass and for limited duration - such offer was bound to have financial repercussions and it is quite possible that duration of offer limited to enable Government to study financial repercussions rather than from any improper motive - offer not amounted to corrupt practices. - [ D.A. Desai,; O. Chinnappa Reddy and; R.S. Sarkaria, JJ.] The Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 empowers the Union of India in the public interest to take under its control the industries specified in the First Schedule to the Act. Item 23 of the First Schedule relates to textiles of various categories. Section 15 authorises the Central Government to make or cause to be made a full and complete investigation into the circumstances of the case if the Central Government is of the opinion that (a) in respect of any scheduled industry or industrial undertaking or undertakings (i) there has been, or is likely to be, a substantial fall in the volume of production for which, having regard to the economic conditions prevailing, there is no justification; or (ii) there has been, or is likely to be, a marked deterioration in the quality of any article... which could have been or can be avoided; or (iii) there has been or is likely to be a rise in the price of any article..... for which there is no justification; or (iv) it is necessary to take any such action for the purpose of conserving any resources of national importance; or (b) any industrial undertaking is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest. After the investigation is made under section 15, section 16(1) empowers the Central Government if action is desirable, to issue appropriate directions, and section 16(2) provides for the issue of interim directions by the Central Government pending investigation under section 15. Chapter III-A consisting of Sections 18A, 18-AA, 18-B, 18-C, 18-D, 18-E and 18-F deal with "direct management or control of Industrial Undertakings by Central Government in certain cases". Sec. 18-A empowers the Central Government by notified order, to authorise any person or body of persons to take over the management of the whole or any part of an industrial undertaking or to exercise in respect of the whole, or any part of the undertaking such functions of control as may be specified in the order, if the Central Government is of opinion that: (a) an industrial undertaking to which directions have been issued in pursuance of section 16 has failed to comply with such directions, or (b) an industrial undertaking in respect of which an investigation has been made under section 15 is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest. Section 18AA(5) stipulates that the provisions of Sections 18-B to 18 E shall be applicable to the industrial undertaking in respect of which an order has been made under section 18-AA even as they apply to an industrial undertaking taken over under Section 18-A. Section 18-F empowers the Central Government to cancel the order made under section 18-A if it appears that the purpose of the order has been fulfilled or it is not necessary that the order should remain in force. The appellant M/s. Swadeshi Cotton Mills was taken over by the Government of India by a notification dated April 13, 1978 in exercise of the powers conferred on it under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 18AA of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 on the ground that the company had by creation of encumbrances on the assets of its industrial undertakings, brought about a situation which had affected and is likely to further affect the production of articles manufactured or produced by it and that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation. The Government authorised the National Textile Corporation Limited to take over the management, subject to the conditions that the authorised person shall comply with all the directions issued from time to time by the Central Government and that the authorised person shall hold office for a period of five years. The appellant Mills challenged the aforesaid order in a writ petition in the High Court. The case was heard by a Full Bench of five Judges to consider the question whether in construing section 18AA of the Industries Development and Regulation Act, 1951, compliance with the principle of audi alteram partem is to be implied and whether hearing is to be given to the parties who would be affected by the order to be passed prior to the passing of the order or whether hearing can be given after the order is passed and whether the order passed under the said Section is vitiated by not giving of such hearing and whether such vice can be cured. The Bench by a majority answered the three questions as follows:- (a) Section 18AA(1)(a)(b) excludes the giving of prior hearing to the party who would be affected by order thereunder. (b) Section 18-F expressly provides for a post- decisional hearing to the owner of the industrial undertaking, the management of which is taken over under section 18AA to have the order made under section 18AA cancelled on any relevant ground. (c) As the taking over of management under section 18A is not vitiated by the failure to grant prior hearing the question of any such vice being cured by a grant of a subsequent hearing does not arise. The minority, however, held that in compliance with the principles of natural justice, prior hearing to the owner of the undertaking was required to be given before the passing of an order under section 18AA, that the second question did not arise as the denial of a prior hearing would not cure the vice by the grant of subsequent hearing, but it would be open to the Court to moderate the relief in such a way that the order is kept alive to the extent necessary until the making of the fresh order to subserve public interest and to make appropriate directions. After the decision on the reference the case was reheard on merits by a Full Bench of three Judges and the writ petition was allowed in part. The challenge to the validity of the order being rejected but insofar as the impugned order seeking to take over the corporate entity of the company, the corporate entity of the subsidiary and its assets, the petition was allowed and the respondents, the Union of India and the authorised person were directed to release from its control and custody and/or deliver possession of any assets or property of the company which were not referable to the industrial undertakings. Appeals to this Court were filed on behalf of the Company as well as by the Union of India and the National Textile Corporation. Two propositions were propounded on behalf of the company that: (a) Whether it was necessary to observe the rules of natural justice before issuing a notified order under section 18AA(1)(a) and further whether section 18-F impliedly excludes rules of natural justice relating to prior hearing; and it was contended (1) the mere use of the word 'immediate' in sub-clause (a) of section 18AA does not show a legislative intent to exclude the application of audi alteram partem rule altogether. (2) The word 'immediate' in clause (a) has been used in contra distinction to 'investigate'. It only means that under section 18AA action can be taken without prior investigation under section 15. The use of the word 'immediate' in section 18AA(1)(a) only dispenses with investigation under section 15 and not with the principle of audi alteram partem altogether and this is indicated by the marginal note of section 18A and para 3 of the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Amendment Bill which inserted section 18AA in 1971. (3) The word 'immediate' occurs only in clause (a) and not in clause (b) of section 18AA(1). It would be odd if intention to exclude this principle of natural justice is spelt out in one clause of the sub-section when the other clause does not exclude it. (4) Section 18-F does not exclude a pre-decisional hearing. The so-called post-decisional hearing contemplated by section 18-F cannot be and is not intended to be a substitute for a pre-decisional hearing. (5) Section 18F incorporates only a facet, albeit qualified, of section 21 of the General Clauses Act. The language of the Section implicity prohibits an enquiry into circumstances that led to the passing of the order of take-over and under it the aggrieved person is not entitled to show that on merits the order was void ab initio. (6) 'Immediacy' does not exclude a duty to act fairly because even an emergent situation can co-exist with the canons of natural justice. The only effect of urgency on the application of the principle of fair hearing would be that the width, form and duration of the hearing would be tailored to the situation and reduced to the reasonable minimum so that it does not delay and defeat the purpose of the contemplated action. (7) Where the civil consequences of the administrative action are grave and its effect is highly prejudicial to the rights and interests of the person affected and there is nothing in the language and scheme of the statute which unequivocally excludes a fair pre-decisional hearing and the post-decisional hearing provided therein is not a real remedial hearing equitable to a full right of appeal the Court should be loath to infer a legislative intent to exclude even a minimal fair hearing at the pre-decisional stage merely on ground of urgency. (8) The Central Government appointed four Government Officials including one from the office of the Textile Commissioner to study the affairs of the Company and to make recommendation. This Official Group submitted its report on February 16, 1978. The evidence on the basis of which the impugned order was passed was not disclosed to the appellant company till May 1978, only after it had filed the writ petition in the High Court. If there was anything adverse to the appellants in the survey report there was time enough about six weeks between the submission of the Survey Report and the passing of the impugned order for giving a short, reasonable opportunity to the appellants to explain the adverse findings against them. If there was immediacy situational modifications could be made to meet the requirement of fairness, by reducing the period of notice; that even the manner and form of such notice could be simplified to eliminate delay, that telephonic notice or short opportunity for furnishing their explanation to the Company might have satisfied the requirements of natural justice. Such an opportunity of hearing could have been given after the passing of a conditional tentative order and before its enforcement under section 18AA. For the interregnum suitable interim action such as freezing the assets of the Company or restraining the Company from creating further encumbrances, could be taken under section 16. On behalf of the Union of India and the Authorised Officer it was contended that (1) the presumption in favour of audi alteram partem rule stands impliedly displaced by the language scheme, setting and the purpose of the provision in section 18AA. (2) Section 18AA on its plain terms deals with situations where immediate preventive action is required. The paramount concern is to avoid serious problems which may be caused by fall in production. The purpose of an order under section 18AA is not to condemn the owner but to protect the scheduled industry. The issue under section 18AA is not solely between the Government and the management of the industrial undertaking. The object of taking action under this Section is to protect other outside interests of the community at large and the workers. (3) The rule of natural justice to give a hearing has been incorporated in section 18-F which gives an opportunity of a post-decisional hearing to the owner of the undertaking who if he feels aggrieved can on his application be heard, to show that even the original order under section 18AA was passed on invalid grounds and should be cancelled or rescinded. (4) On a true construction of section 18AA read with section 18-F the requirements of natural justice and fair play can be read into the statute only insofar as conformance to such canons can reasonably and realistically be required of it by the provision for a remedial hearing at a subsequent stage. (5) Under section 18-F the Central Government exercises curial functions and that Section confers on the aggrieved owner a right to apply to the Government to cancel the order of take-over. This section casts an obligation on the Central Government to deal with and dispose of an application filed thereunder with reasonable expedition. Allowing the appeal by the Company,<br/>HELD: (Sarkaria & Desai, JJ. per Chinnappa Reddy, J. dissenting.) In the facts and circumstances of the instant case, there has been a noncompliance with the implied requirement of the audi alteram partem rule of natural justice at the pre-decisional stage. The impugned order could be struck down as invalid on that score alone. But in view of the commitment / concession that a hearing would be afforded to the Company, the case is remitted to the Central Government to give a full, fair and effective hearing. [587G-H, 588C] The phrase 'natural justice' is not capable of a static and precise definition. It cannot be imprisoned in the straight-jacket of a cast-iron formula. Rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. Hence not possible to make an exhaustive catalogue of such rules. Two fundamental maxims of natural justice have now become deeply and indelibly ingrained in the common consciousness of mankind as pre-eminently necessary to ensure that the law is applied impartially objectively and fairly. These twin principles are (i) audi alteram partem and (ii) nemo judex in re sua. Audi alteram partem is a highly effective rule devised by the Courts to ensure that a statutory authority arrives at a just decision and it is calculated to act as a healthy check on the abuse or misuse of power. Its reach should not be narrowed and its applicability circumscribed.[554C-G] The rules of natural justice can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. If a statutory provision either specifically or by inevitable implication excludes the application of the rules of natural justice then the Court cannot ignore the mandate of the Legislature. Whether or not the application of the principles of natural justice in a given case has been excluded in the exercise of statutory power depends upon the language and basic scheme of the provision conferring the power, the nature of the power the purpose for which it is conferred and the effect of that power. [556A-B] The maxim audi alteram partem has many facets. Two of them are (a) notice of the case to be met, and (b) opportunity to explain. The rule cannot be sacrificed at the altar of administrative convenience or celerity; for, convenience and justice are often not on speaking terms. Difficulties, however, arise when the statute conferring the power does not expressly exclude this rule but its exclusion is sought by implication due to the presence of certain factors such as urgency where the obligation to give notice and opportunity to be heard would obstruct the taking of prompt action of a preventive or remedial nature. Audi alteram partem rule may be disregarded in an emergent situation where immediate action brooks no delay to prevent some imminent danger or injury or hazard to paramount public interests. Section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure empowers the magistrates specified therein to make an exparte conditional order in emergent cases for removal of dangerous public nuisances. Action under section 17 Land Acquisition Act furnishes another such instance. Similarly action on grounds of public safety public health may justify disregard of the rule of prior hearing. [556C-H] Cases where owing to the compulsion of the fact situation or the necessity of taking speedy action no pre- decisional hearing is given but the action, is followed soon by a full post-decisional hearing to the person affected do not in reality constitute an exception to the audi alteram partem rule. To call such cases as exception is a misnomer because they do not exclude fair play in action but adapt it to the urgency of the situation by balancing the competing claims of hurry and hearing. [560H-561A] The general principle as distinguished from an absolute rule of uniform application seems to be that where a statute does not in terms exclude this rule of prior hearing but contemplates a post-decisional hearing amounting to a full review of the original order on merits then such a statute would be construed as excluding the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage. [561G] If the statute conferring the power is silent with regard to the giving of pre-decisional hearing to the person affected and the administrative decision taken by the authority involves civil consequences of a grave nature and no full review or appeal on merits against that decision is provided courts will be extremely reluctant to construe such a statute as excluding the duty of affording even a minimal hearing shorn of all its formal trappings and dilatory features at the pre-decisional stage, unless viewed pragmatically it would paralyse the administrative process or frustrate the need for utmost promptitude. [561H] 7(i). A comparison of the provisions of Section 18A(1)(b) and Section 18AA(1)(c), bring out two main points of distinction: First, action under Section 18A(1)(b) can be taken only after an investigation had been made under Section 15; while under Section 18AA(1)(a) or (b) action can be taken without such investigation. The language, scheme and setting of Section 18AA read in the light of the Objects and Reasons for enacting this provision make this position clear beyond doubt. Second, before taking action under Section 18A(1)(b), the Central Government has to form an opinion on the basis of the investigation conducted under section 15, in regard to the existence of the objective fact, namely: that the industrial undertaking is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest; while under section 18A(1)(a) the Government has to satisfy itself that the persons incharge of the undertaking have brought about a situation likely to cause fall in production, by committing any of the three kinds of acts specified in that provision. This shows that the preliminary objective fact attributable to the persons in charge of the management or affairs of the undertaking, on the basis of which action may be taken under section 18(A)(1)(b), is of far wider amplitude than the circumstance, the existence of which is a sine qua non for taking action under section 18AA(1). The phrase "highly detrimental to the scheduled industry or public interest" in section 18-A is capable of being construed to cover a large variety of acts or things which may be considered wrong with the manner of running the industry by the management. In contrast with it, action under section 18AA(1)(a) can be taken only if the Central Government is satisfied with regard to the existence of the twin conditions specifically mentioned therein, on the basis of evidence in its possession. [569D-H] An analysis of section 18AA(1)(a), indicates that as a necessary preliminary to the exercise of the power thereunder, the Central Government must be satisfied "from documentary or other evidence in its possession" in regard to the co-existence of two circumstances: (i) that the persons in charge of the industrial undertaking have by committing any of these acts, namely, reckless investments, or creation of incumbrances on the assets of industrial undertaking, or by diversion of funds, brought about a situation which is likely to affect the production of the article manufactured or produced in the industrial undertaking, and (ii) that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation.[570B-D] It cannot be laid down as a general proposition that whenever a statute confers a power on an administrative authority and makes the exercise of that power conditional on the formation of an opinion by that authority in regard to the existence of an immediacy, its opinion in regard to that preliminary fact is not open to judicial scrutiny at all. While it may be conceded that an element of subjectivity is always involved in the formation of such an opinion, the existence of the circumstances from which the inference constituting the opinion, as the sine qua non for action, are to be drawn, must be demonstrable, and the existence of such "circumstances", if questioned, must be proved at least prima facie. [571 E-G] From a plain reading of section 18AA, it is clear that it does not expressly in unmistakable and unequivocal terms exclude the application of the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage. [574B] In the instant case, so far as Kanpur Unit is concerned, it was lying closed for more than three months before the passing of the impugned order. There was no 'immediacy' in relation to that unit, which could absolve the Government from the obligation of complying fully with audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional or pre- takeover stage. [583A] Keshav Mills Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, [1973] 3 S.C.R. 22; Kamla Prasad Khetan v. Union of India,[1957] S.C.R. 1052; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 621; Sukhdev Singh & Ors. v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh, [1975] 3 S.C.R. 619; A. K. Kraipak v. Union of India, [1970] 1 S.C.R. 457; Ridge v. Baldwin, [1964] A.C. 40; 196; Heatley v. Tasmanian Racing & Gaming Commission, 14 Australian Law Reports 519; Nawabkhan Abbaskhan v. State of Gujarat, [1974] 3 S.C.R. 427; State of Orissa v. Dr. Bina Pani Dei, [1962] 2 S.C.R. 625; Ambalal M. Shah v. Hathi Singh Manufacturing Co. Ltd. [1962] 3 S.C.R. 171; and S. L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan & Ors., [1981] 1 S.C.R. 746, referred to. (Per Chinnappa Reddy, J. dissenting) The principles of natural justice are not attracted to the situations contemplated by section 18AA of Industries (Development and Regulation) Act. Natural justice like Ultra Vires and Public Policy is a branch of the public law and is a formidable weapon which can be wielded to secure justice to the citizen. While it may be used to protect certain fundamental liberties, civil and political rights, it may be used as indeed it is used more often than not, to protect vested interests and to obstruct the path of progressive change. The time has come to make an appropriate distinction between natural justice in its application to fundamental liberties, civil and political rights and natural justice in its application to vested interests. [590A-B] Our constitution as befits the Constitution of a Socialist Secular Democratic Republic, recognises the paramountcy of the public weal over the private interest. Natural justice, ultra vires, public policy, or any other rule of interpretation must, therefore, conform, grow and be tailored to serve the public interest and respond to the demands of an evolving society. [590C] The principles of natural justice have taken deep root in the judicial conscience of our people. They are now considered so fundamental as to be implicit in every decision making function, judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative. Where authority functions under a statute and the statute provides for the observance of the principles of natural justice in a particular manner, natural justice will have to be observed in that manner and in no other. Where the statute is silent about the observance of the principles of natural justice, such statutory silence is taken to imply compliance with the principles of natural justice. Where the conflict is between the public interest and the private interest the presumption must necessarily be weak and may, therefore, be readily displaced. The presumption is also weak, where what are involved are mere property rights. In cases of urgency, particularly where the public interest is involved, preemptive action may be a strategic necessity. Even in cases of preemptive action, if the statute so provides or if the Courts so deem fit in appropriate cases, a postponed hearing may be substituted for natural justice. [590A-C; 591F-G] 3(ii). Where natural justice is implied, the extent of the implication and the nature of the hearing must vary with the statute, the subject and the situation. [592B] The absence of the expression 'immediate action' in section 18AA(1)(b) does not make any difference. Section 18AA(1)(a) refers to a situation where immediate preventive action may avert a disaster, whereas section 18AA contemplates a situation where the disaster has occurred and action is necessary to restore normalcy. Restoration of production where production has stopped in a key industry or industrial undertaking is as important and urgent in the public interest as prevention of a situation where production may be affected. Immediate action is, therefore, as necessary in the situation contemplated by section 18AA(1)(b) as in the situation contemplated by section 18AA(1)(a). [596 F-G] The marginal note refers to the power to take over without investigation but there is no sufficient reason to suppose that the word immediate is used only to contra- distinguish it from the investigation contemplated by section 15 of the Act, though of course a consequence of immediate action under section 18AA may be to dispense with the enquiry under section 15. In fact, facts which come to light during the course of an investigation under section 15 may form the basis of action under section 18AA(1)(a). Where in the course of an investigation under section 15 it is discovered that the management have, by reckless investments or creation of encumbrances on the assets of the industrial undertaking or by diversion of funds brought about a situation which is likely to affect the production of the articles manufactured or produced in the industrial undertaking, if the Government is satisfied that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation, there is no reason why the Central Government may not straightaway take action under section 18AA(1)(a) without waiting for completion of investigation under section 15. [597A-B] Where there is a provision in the statute itself for revocation of the order by the very authority making the decision, it appears to be unnecessary to insist upon a pre- decisional observance of natural justice. [598A] The likelihood of production being jeopardized or the stoppage of production in a key industrial undertaking is a matter of grave concern affecting the public interest. Parliament has taken so serious a view of the matter that it has authorised the Central Government to take over the management of the industrial undertaking if immediate action may prevent jeopardy to production or restore production where it has already stopped. The necessity for immediate action by the Central Government contemplated by Parliament is definitely indicative of the exclusion of natural justice. It is not as if the owner of the industrial undertaking is left with no remedy. He may move the Central Government under section 18-F to cancel the order made under section 18AA. [598C-D] Neither section 18-F of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act nor section 21 of the General Clauses Act by itself excludes natural justice. The exclusion of natural justice where such exclusion is not express has to be implied by reference to the subject, the statute and the statutory situation. Where an express provision in the statute itself provides for a post decisional hearing the other provisions of the Statute will have to be read in the light of such provision and the provision for post- decisional hearing may then clinch the issue where pre- decisional natural justice appears to be excluded on the other terms of the statute. That a post-decisional hearing may also be had by the terms of section 21 of the General Clauses Act may not necessarily help in the interpretation of the provisions of the statute concerned. [599 A-C] Ridge v. Baldwin, 1964 A.C. p. 40; Annie G. Phillip v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 75 L.E.d. 1289; John H. Fahey v. Paul Mallonee, 91 L.E.d. 2030; Margarita Fuentes v. Robert L. Shevin, Attorney General of Florida, 32 L.E.d. 2d 556 and Lawrence Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 40 L.E.d. 2d 406, referred to. - Rama Rao, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh as well as the President of the Telugu Desam Party as well as respondent No. 3. The advertisements very shortly stated, refer to the auspicious gifts made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to the poor people on the eve of New Year and Sankranti. In the said advertisements, it is stated that the said Government which was formed by the Telugu Desam Party was giving to the poor people whose income was below Rs. and the said advertisements referred to a new scheme of selling sarees and dhoties at half prices to the poor people in the State of Andhra Pradesh having Green-cards. Moreover, the offer in the advertisements for the sale of dhoties and sarees at discount rates was in the nature of a benefit offered to poor persons in that State. When a Government announces the measures which are intended for the benefit of any of the classes for whose the Government can normally be expected to work like the poor or the economical backward classes, it is only in rare circumstances that such a promise can be said to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) even though such a promise might be made on the eve of elections. 8. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => '', 'counseldef' => '', 'court' => 'Supreme Court of India', 'court_type' => 'SC', 'decidedon' => '1989-09-29', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' K.N. Saikia,; M.H. Kania and; S. Ranganathan, JJ.', 'judgement' => '</p><p>Kania, J.</p><p>1. These two appeals arise out of the judgments in two Election Petitions in the Andhra Pradesh High Court questioning the election of respondent No. 1 as a Member of Parliament from Srikakulam No. Parliamentary Constituency in the 8th General Election to the House of the People. The points raised in these appeals are common and so are the relevant facts; and, hence, they are being disposed of by this common judgment. We propose to take note of only the few facts which are necessary for the appreciation of the controversy before us.</p><p>2. The polling date for the said election along with other parliamentary elections in the State of Andhra Pradesh was December 27, 1984 but in Srikakulam No. 1 Parliamentary Constituency the polling was countermanded and the date of polling was later fixed on January 28, 1985. In both the Election Petitions the election of respondent No. 1 was questioned mainly on the ground that Shri N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh as well as the President of the Telugu Desam Party as well as respondent No. 1 gave certain speeches and certain advertisements were got published by Shri N.T. Rama Rao through the Publicity Department of the Government of Andhra Pradesh in the newspapers containing certain statements which are alleged to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A) of the <a>Representation of the People Act, 1951</a> (hereinafter referred to as 'the said Act'). The main question canvassed before us is whether the statements contained in these aforesaid advertisements amount to a corrupt practice under Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act. Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act runs as follows :</p><p>123. Corrupt practices</p><p>The following shall be deemed to be corrupt practises for the purposes of this Act :</p><p>(1) 'Bribery', that is to say.</p><p>(A) any gift, offer or promise by a candidate or his agent or by any other person with the consent of a candidate or his election agent of any gratification, to any person whomsover, with the object, directly or indirectly of inducing.</p><p>(a) x x x</p><p>(b) an elector to vote or refrain from voting at an election, or as a reward to.</p><p>(i) a person for having so stood or not stood, or for having withdrawn or not having withdrawn his candidature; or</p><p>(ii) an elector for having voted or refrained from voting.</p><p>3. The advertisements very shortly stated, refer to the auspicious gifts made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to the poor people on the eve of New Year and Sankranti. In the said advertisements, it is stated that the said Government which was formed by the Telugu Desam Party was giving to the poor people whose income was below Rs. 6,000 per year, a kilo of rice at Rs. 2 per Kg. and the said advertisements referred to a new scheme of selling sarees and dhoties at half prices to the poor people in the State of Andhra Pradesh having Green-cards. Green-cards were directed to be issued to all the persons whose annual income was below Rs. 6,000. The supply of the rice at subsidised rates as aforesaid was also to be made to the Green-card holders only. The scheme to sell sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was to be operative from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985.</p><p>4. In considering the question whether the said advertisement and the said speeches amount to a corrupt practice, we are of the view that the provisions of Section 123 of the said Act which deal with corrupt practices have to be interpreted, keeping in mind that dictates of commonsense require that they never could have been intended to treat normal election promises made in election manifestoes or usual election speeches by members of various political parties aspiring to power and by different candidates aspiring to get elected to legislative bodies concerned as corrupt practices. We are of the view that these advertisements and speeches amount to nothing more than statements extolling the achievements of the Government of the State of Andhra Pradesh under the Telugu Desam Party headed by N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister, and contain normal election promises and these statements do not amount to corrupt practices falling within the scope of Sub-clause (b) of Clause (A) of Sub-section (1) of Section 123 of the said Act.</p><p>5. It was urged by Mr. Rao, learned Counsel for the appellants that in the impugned judgments, the High Court has incorrectly taken the view that in order to amount to bribery within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A), the transaction must amount to a bargain by the candidate with a view to get votes. It was pointed out by him that the said view has been taken in the impugned judgments, relying upon the decision of a Bench comprising to learned Judges of this Court in Ghasi Ram v. Dal Singh and Ors. :1983 SCR 102 . We have gone through to the relevant portion of that judgment (at page 109 and 110 of the said report). A careful perusal of the said judgment shows that what has been really held in that case is that if the promises given or made amount to a bargain entered into by a candidate for a vote or votes, that would amount to a corrupt practice; but it has not been held there that unless the act alleged amounts to such a bargain, it could not amount to a corrupt practice. In our view, that judgment does not lay down that in order to amount to a corrupt practice, the transaction must amount to a bargain for getting a vote. It was pointed out by Mr. Rao, however, that such a view seems to have been taken in two other decisions rendered by two Benches, each comprising two learned Judges of this Court in Bhanu Kumar Shastri v. Mohan Lal Sukhadia and Ors. : [1971]3SCR522 and Harjit Singh Mann v. S Umrao Singh and Ors. : [1980]2SCR501 . and these judgments need to be overruled. We do not propose to go into the correctness or otherwise of this view because, even on the footing that in order to amount to a corrupt practice under the aforesaid provision the alleged acts need not constitute a bargain, the the acts established in the present case, in our opinion, do not amount to a corrupt practice.</p><p>6. Our attention was drawn by Mr. Rao to the fact that in this case the said advertisements and the speeches had to be viewed in the context of the fact that the advertisements were issued and the speeches were made after respondent No. 1 filed his nomination papers on January 4, 1985, for the election and before the election was held in the aforesaid constituency. It was further pointed out that the offer made for the sale of sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was limited to the period from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985. It cannot be denied that these factors are relevant factOrs. We cannot, however, lose sight of the fact that this offer was made not only in this constituency but throughout the State where the elections to the House of the People were scheduled to be held, and were, in fact, held on December 27, 1984. It was only in case of this constituency that the election to be held on the scheduled date was countermanded and later held on January 28, 1985. We cannot lose sight of the fact that, as far as the said speeches and the said advertisements, which were issued by the Publicity Department of the State, are concerned, they deal in the main with the achievements of the Government of Andhra Pradesh which, of course, was being run by Ministers belonging to Telugu Desam Party to which respondent No. 1 also belonged. Moreover, the offer in the advertisements for the sale of dhoties and sarees at discount rates was in the nature of a benefit offered to poor persons in that State. When a Government announces the measures which are intended for the benefit of any of the classes for whose the Government can normally be expected to work like the poor or the economical backward classes, it is only in rare circumstances that such a promise can be said to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) even though such a promise might be made on the eve of elections. Keeping this in mind, in our opinion, although the offer to sell dhoties and sarees at discount rates was of a limited duration as aforestated, it cannot be regarded as a corrupt practice. Such an offer was bound to have financial repercussions and it is quite possible the duration of the offer was limited to enable the Government to study the financial repercussions rather than from any improper motive. We find support for this view from the decision of this Court in H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh : [1969]3SCR813 . In that case an Ordinance was passed by the Government of Madhya Pradesh as a result of which a large number of agriculturists, namely, those holdings of plots of land of less than 7.5 acres area or paying land revenue not exceeding Rs. 5/- were exempted from the payment of the land revenue. It was held that such a concession does not amount to a gift, offer or promise of any gratification within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) of the said Act nor does the announcement of the declaration made at a meeting shortly before the election or the issue of a pamphlet containing that declaration at that time carry the matter any further. It was held that neither Shri D.P. Misra who was the Chief Minister nor Shri S.K. Dixit who acted as his agent were guilty of any corrupt practice within the meaning of the aforesaid provision.</p><p>7. It was next contended by Mr. Rao, although very faintly, that the High Court was in error as it had not decided all other issues which were raised in the election petition. In this regard we cannot lose sight of the fact that the term of the present Lok Sabha is likely to be over within a few months and fresh elections are likely to be held and it would, therefore, be an exercise in futility to remand the matter to the High Court for deciding the remaining issues.</p><p>8. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.<p></p><p>', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'AIR1990SC1889; JT1989(4)SC186; 1989(2)SCALE891; 1989Supp(2)SCC504', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors.', 'sub' => 'Election', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ) $casename_url = 'b-rajagopala-rao-vs-appayya-hanumanthu' $args = array( (int) 0 => '640942', (int) 1 => 'b-rajagopala-rao-vs-appayya-hanumanthu' ) $url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/640942/b-rajagopala-rao-vs-appayya-hanumanthu' $ctype = '' $caseref = 'H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh<br>' $content = array( (int) 0 => '', (int) 1 => '<p>Kania, J.', (int) 2 => '<p>1. These two appeals arise out of the judgments in two Election Petitions in the Andhra Pradesh High Court questioning the election of respondent No. 1 as a Member of Parliament from Srikakulam No. Parliamentary Constituency in the 8th General Election to the House of the People. The points raised in these appeals are common and so are the relevant facts; and, hence, they are being disposed of by this common judgment. We propose to take note of only the few facts which are necessary for the appreciation of the controversy before us.', (int) 3 => '<p>2. The polling date for the said election along with other parliamentary elections in the State of Andhra Pradesh was December 27, 1984 but in Srikakulam No. 1 Parliamentary Constituency the polling was countermanded and the date of polling was later fixed on January 28, 1985. In both the Election Petitions the election of respondent No. 1 was questioned mainly on the ground that Shri N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh as well as the President of the Telugu Desam Party as well as respondent No. 1 gave certain speeches and certain advertisements were got published by Shri N.T. Rama Rao through the Publicity Department of the Government of Andhra Pradesh in the newspapers containing certain statements which are alleged to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A) of the <a>Representation of the People Act, 1951</a> (hereinafter referred to as 'the said Act'). The main question canvassed before us is whether the statements contained in these aforesaid advertisements amount to a corrupt practice under Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act. Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act runs as follows :', (int) 4 => '<p>123. Corrupt practices', (int) 5 => '<p>The following shall be deemed to be corrupt practises for the purposes of this Act :', (int) 6 => '<p>(1) 'Bribery', that is to say.', (int) 7 => '<p>(A) any gift, offer or promise by a candidate or his agent or by any other person with the consent of a candidate or his election agent of any gratification, to any person whomsover, with the object, directly or indirectly of inducing.', (int) 8 => '<p>(a) x x x', (int) 9 => '<p>(b) an elector to vote or refrain from voting at an election, or as a reward to.', (int) 10 => '<p>(i) a person for having so stood or not stood, or for having withdrawn or not having withdrawn his candidature; or', (int) 11 => '<p>(ii) an elector for having voted or refrained from voting.', (int) 12 => '<p>3. The advertisements very shortly stated, refer to the auspicious gifts made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to the poor people on the eve of New Year and Sankranti. In the said advertisements, it is stated that the said Government which was formed by the Telugu Desam Party was giving to the poor people whose income was below Rs. 6,000 per year, a kilo of rice at Rs. 2 per Kg. and the said advertisements referred to a new scheme of selling sarees and dhoties at half prices to the poor people in the State of Andhra Pradesh having Green-cards. Green-cards were directed to be issued to all the persons whose annual income was below Rs. 6,000. The supply of the rice at subsidised rates as aforesaid was also to be made to the Green-card holders only. The scheme to sell sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was to be operative from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985.', (int) 13 => '<p>4. In considering the question whether the said advertisement and the said speeches amount to a corrupt practice, we are of the view that the provisions of Section 123 of the said Act which deal with corrupt practices have to be interpreted, keeping in mind that dictates of commonsense require that they never could have been intended to treat normal election promises made in election manifestoes or usual election speeches by members of various political parties aspiring to power and by different candidates aspiring to get elected to legislative bodies concerned as corrupt practices. We are of the view that these advertisements and speeches amount to nothing more than statements extolling the achievements of the Government of the State of Andhra Pradesh under the Telugu Desam Party headed by N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister, and contain normal election promises and these statements do not amount to corrupt practices falling within the scope of Sub-clause (b) of Clause (A) of Sub-section (1) of Section 123 of the said Act.', (int) 14 => '<p>5. It was urged by Mr. Rao, learned Counsel for the appellants that in the impugned judgments, the High Court has incorrectly taken the view that in order to amount to bribery within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A), the transaction must amount to a bargain by the candidate with a view to get votes. It was pointed out by him that the said view has been taken in the impugned judgments, relying upon the decision of a Bench comprising to learned Judges of this Court in Ghasi Ram v. Dal Singh and Ors. :1983 SCR 102 . We have gone through to the relevant portion of that judgment (at page 109 and 110 of the said report). A careful perusal of the said judgment shows that what has been really held in that case is that if the promises given or made amount to a bargain entered into by a candidate for a vote or votes, that would amount to a corrupt practice; but it has not been held there that unless the act alleged amounts to such a bargain, it could not amount to a corrupt practice. In our view, that judgment does not lay down that in order to amount to a corrupt practice, the transaction must amount to a bargain for getting a vote. It was pointed out by Mr. Rao, however, that such a view seems to have been taken in two other decisions rendered by two Benches, each comprising two learned Judges of this Court in Bhanu Kumar Shastri v. Mohan Lal Sukhadia and Ors. : [1971]3SCR522 and Harjit Singh Mann v. S Umrao Singh and Ors. : [1980]2SCR501 . and these judgments need to be overruled. We do not propose to go into the correctness or otherwise of this view because, even on the footing that in order to amount to a corrupt practice under the aforesaid provision the alleged acts need not constitute a bargain, the the acts established in the present case, in our opinion, do not amount to a corrupt practice.', (int) 15 => '<p>6. Our attention was drawn by Mr. Rao to the fact that in this case the said advertisements and the speeches had to be viewed in the context of the fact that the advertisements were issued and the speeches were made after respondent No. 1 filed his nomination papers on January 4, 1985, for the election and before the election was held in the aforesaid constituency. It was further pointed out that the offer made for the sale of sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was limited to the period from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985. It cannot be denied that these factors are relevant factOrs. We cannot, however, lose sight of the fact that this offer was made not only in this constituency but throughout the State where the elections to the House of the People were scheduled to be held, and were, in fact, held on December 27, 1984. It was only in case of this constituency that the election to be held on the scheduled date was countermanded and later held on January 28, 1985. We cannot lose sight of the fact that, as far as the said speeches and the said advertisements, which were issued by the Publicity Department of the State, are concerned, they deal in the main with the achievements of the Government of Andhra Pradesh which, of course, was being run by Ministers belonging to Telugu Desam Party to which respondent No. 1 also belonged. Moreover, the offer in the advertisements for the sale of dhoties and sarees at discount rates was in the nature of a benefit offered to poor persons in that State. When a Government announces the measures which are intended for the benefit of any of the classes for whose the Government can normally be expected to work like the poor or the economical backward classes, it is only in rare circumstances that such a promise can be said to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) even though such a promise might be made on the eve of elections. Keeping this in mind, in our opinion, although the offer to sell dhoties and sarees at discount rates was of a limited duration as aforestated, it cannot be regarded as a corrupt practice. Such an offer was bound to have financial repercussions and it is quite possible the duration of the offer was limited to enable the Government to study the financial repercussions rather than from any improper motive. We find support for this view from the decision of this Court in H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh : [1969]3SCR813 . In that case an Ordinance was passed by the Government of Madhya Pradesh as a result of which a large number of agriculturists, namely, those holdings of plots of land of less than 7.5 acres area or paying land revenue not exceeding Rs. 5/- were exempted from the payment of the land revenue. It was held that such a concession does not amount to a gift, offer or promise of any gratification within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) of the said Act nor does the announcement of the declaration made at a meeting shortly before the election or the issue of a pamphlet containing that declaration at that time carry the matter any further. It was held that neither Shri D.P. Misra who was the Chief Minister nor Shri S.K. Dixit who acted as his agent were guilty of any corrupt practice within the meaning of the aforesaid provision.', (int) 16 => '<p>7. It was next contended by Mr. Rao, although very faintly, that the High Court was in error as it had not decided all other issues which were raised in the election petition. In this regard we cannot lose sight of the fact that the term of the present Lok Sabha is likely to be over within a few months and fresh elections are likely to be held and it would, therefore, be an exercise in futility to remand the matter to the High Court for deciding the remaining issues.', (int) 17 => '<p>8. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.<p>', (int) 18 => '<p>' ) $paragraphAfter = (int) 1 $cnt = (int) 19 $i = (int) 13include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144 View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971 View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933 View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473 Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963 Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200 Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167 [main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109
4. In considering the question whether the said advertisement and the said speeches amount to a corrupt practice, we are of the view that the provisions of Section 123 of the said Act which deal with corrupt practices have to be interpreted, keeping in mind that dictates of commonsense require that they never could have been intended to treat normal election promises made in election manifestoes or usual election speeches by members of various political parties aspiring to power and by different candidates aspiring to get elected to legislative bodies concerned as corrupt practices. We are of the view that these advertisements and speeches amount to nothing more than statements extolling the achievements of the Government of the State of Andhra Pradesh under the Telugu Desam Party headed by N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister, and contain normal election promises and these statements do not amount to corrupt practices falling within the scope of Sub-clause (b) of Clause (A) of Sub-section (1) of Section 123 of the said Act.
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$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp' $dataForView = array( 'title_for_layout' => 'B Rajagopala Rao and anr Vs Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors - Citation 640942 - Court Judgment | ', 'desc' => array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '640942', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/50684/representation-of-the-people-act-1951-complete-act">Representation of the People Act, 1951</a> - Sections 1, 3(1)(A), 123 and 123(1)(A)', 'appealno' => 'Civil Appeal Nos. 484 and 485 of 1987', 'appellant' => 'B. Rajagopala Rao and anr.', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'B. Rajagopala Rao and anr. Vs. Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors.', 'casenote' => 'Election - corrupt practices - Sections 123 and 123 (1) (A) of Representation of the People Act, 1951 - whether advertisements by public department and speeches made by respondent No. 1 to sell dhoti and sarees at discount rates amount to corrupt practices - offer was available for mass and for limited duration - such offer was bound to have financial repercussions and it is quite possible that duration of offer limited to enable Government to study financial repercussions rather than from any improper motive - offer not amounted to corrupt practices. - [ D.A. Desai,; O. Chinnappa Reddy and; R.S. Sarkaria, JJ.] The Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 empowers the Union of India in the public interest to take under its control the industries specified in the First Schedule to the Act. Item 23 of the First Schedule relates to textiles of various categories. Section 15 authorises the Central Government to make or cause to be made a full and complete investigation into the circumstances of the case if the Central Government is of the opinion that (a) in respect of any scheduled industry or industrial undertaking or undertakings (i) there has been, or is likely to be, a substantial fall in the volume of production for which, having regard to the economic conditions prevailing, there is no justification; or (ii) there has been, or is likely to be, a marked deterioration in the quality of any article... which could have been or can be avoided; or (iii) there has been or is likely to be a rise in the price of any article..... for which there is no justification; or (iv) it is necessary to take any such action for the purpose of conserving any resources of national importance; or (b) any industrial undertaking is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest. After the investigation is made under section 15, section 16(1) empowers the Central Government if action is desirable, to issue appropriate directions, and section 16(2) provides for the issue of interim directions by the Central Government pending investigation under section 15. Chapter III-A consisting of Sections 18A, 18-AA, 18-B, 18-C, 18-D, 18-E and 18-F deal with "direct management or control of Industrial Undertakings by Central Government in certain cases". Sec. 18-A empowers the Central Government by notified order, to authorise any person or body of persons to take over the management of the whole or any part of an industrial undertaking or to exercise in respect of the whole, or any part of the undertaking such functions of control as may be specified in the order, if the Central Government is of opinion that: (a) an industrial undertaking to which directions have been issued in pursuance of section 16 has failed to comply with such directions, or (b) an industrial undertaking in respect of which an investigation has been made under section 15 is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest. Section 18AA(5) stipulates that the provisions of Sections 18-B to 18 E shall be applicable to the industrial undertaking in respect of which an order has been made under section 18-AA even as they apply to an industrial undertaking taken over under Section 18-A. Section 18-F empowers the Central Government to cancel the order made under section 18-A if it appears that the purpose of the order has been fulfilled or it is not necessary that the order should remain in force. The appellant M/s. Swadeshi Cotton Mills was taken over by the Government of India by a notification dated April 13, 1978 in exercise of the powers conferred on it under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 18AA of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 on the ground that the company had by creation of encumbrances on the assets of its industrial undertakings, brought about a situation which had affected and is likely to further affect the production of articles manufactured or produced by it and that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation. The Government authorised the National Textile Corporation Limited to take over the management, subject to the conditions that the authorised person shall comply with all the directions issued from time to time by the Central Government and that the authorised person shall hold office for a period of five years. The appellant Mills challenged the aforesaid order in a writ petition in the High Court. The case was heard by a Full Bench of five Judges to consider the question whether in construing section 18AA of the Industries Development and Regulation Act, 1951, compliance with the principle of audi alteram partem is to be implied and whether hearing is to be given to the parties who would be affected by the order to be passed prior to the passing of the order or whether hearing can be given after the order is passed and whether the order passed under the said Section is vitiated by not giving of such hearing and whether such vice can be cured. The Bench by a majority answered the three questions as follows:- (a) Section 18AA(1)(a)(b) excludes the giving of prior hearing to the party who would be affected by order thereunder. (b) Section 18-F expressly provides for a post- decisional hearing to the owner of the industrial undertaking, the management of which is taken over under section 18AA to have the order made under section 18AA cancelled on any relevant ground. (c) As the taking over of management under section 18A is not vitiated by the failure to grant prior hearing the question of any such vice being cured by a grant of a subsequent hearing does not arise. The minority, however, held that in compliance with the principles of natural justice, prior hearing to the owner of the undertaking was required to be given before the passing of an order under section 18AA, that the second question did not arise as the denial of a prior hearing would not cure the vice by the grant of subsequent hearing, but it would be open to the Court to moderate the relief in such a way that the order is kept alive to the extent necessary until the making of the fresh order to subserve public interest and to make appropriate directions. After the decision on the reference the case was reheard on merits by a Full Bench of three Judges and the writ petition was allowed in part. The challenge to the validity of the order being rejected but insofar as the impugned order seeking to take over the corporate entity of the company, the corporate entity of the subsidiary and its assets, the petition was allowed and the respondents, the Union of India and the authorised person were directed to release from its control and custody and/or deliver possession of any assets or property of the company which were not referable to the industrial undertakings. Appeals to this Court were filed on behalf of the Company as well as by the Union of India and the National Textile Corporation. Two propositions were propounded on behalf of the company that: (a) Whether it was necessary to observe the rules of natural justice before issuing a notified order under section 18AA(1)(a) and further whether section 18-F impliedly excludes rules of natural justice relating to prior hearing; and it was contended (1) the mere use of the word 'immediate' in sub-clause (a) of section 18AA does not show a legislative intent to exclude the application of audi alteram partem rule altogether. (2) The word 'immediate' in clause (a) has been used in contra distinction to 'investigate'. It only means that under section 18AA action can be taken without prior investigation under section 15. The use of the word 'immediate' in section 18AA(1)(a) only dispenses with investigation under section 15 and not with the principle of audi alteram partem altogether and this is indicated by the marginal note of section 18A and para 3 of the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Amendment Bill which inserted section 18AA in 1971. (3) The word 'immediate' occurs only in clause (a) and not in clause (b) of section 18AA(1). It would be odd if intention to exclude this principle of natural justice is spelt out in one clause of the sub-section when the other clause does not exclude it. (4) Section 18-F does not exclude a pre-decisional hearing. The so-called post-decisional hearing contemplated by section 18-F cannot be and is not intended to be a substitute for a pre-decisional hearing. (5) Section 18F incorporates only a facet, albeit qualified, of section 21 of the General Clauses Act. The language of the Section implicity prohibits an enquiry into circumstances that led to the passing of the order of take-over and under it the aggrieved person is not entitled to show that on merits the order was void ab initio. (6) 'Immediacy' does not exclude a duty to act fairly because even an emergent situation can co-exist with the canons of natural justice. The only effect of urgency on the application of the principle of fair hearing would be that the width, form and duration of the hearing would be tailored to the situation and reduced to the reasonable minimum so that it does not delay and defeat the purpose of the contemplated action. (7) Where the civil consequences of the administrative action are grave and its effect is highly prejudicial to the rights and interests of the person affected and there is nothing in the language and scheme of the statute which unequivocally excludes a fair pre-decisional hearing and the post-decisional hearing provided therein is not a real remedial hearing equitable to a full right of appeal the Court should be loath to infer a legislative intent to exclude even a minimal fair hearing at the pre-decisional stage merely on ground of urgency. (8) The Central Government appointed four Government Officials including one from the office of the Textile Commissioner to study the affairs of the Company and to make recommendation. This Official Group submitted its report on February 16, 1978. The evidence on the basis of which the impugned order was passed was not disclosed to the appellant company till May 1978, only after it had filed the writ petition in the High Court. If there was anything adverse to the appellants in the survey report there was time enough about six weeks between the submission of the Survey Report and the passing of the impugned order for giving a short, reasonable opportunity to the appellants to explain the adverse findings against them. If there was immediacy situational modifications could be made to meet the requirement of fairness, by reducing the period of notice; that even the manner and form of such notice could be simplified to eliminate delay, that telephonic notice or short opportunity for furnishing their explanation to the Company might have satisfied the requirements of natural justice. Such an opportunity of hearing could have been given after the passing of a conditional tentative order and before its enforcement under section 18AA. For the interregnum suitable interim action such as freezing the assets of the Company or restraining the Company from creating further encumbrances, could be taken under section 16. On behalf of the Union of India and the Authorised Officer it was contended that (1) the presumption in favour of audi alteram partem rule stands impliedly displaced by the language scheme, setting and the purpose of the provision in section 18AA. (2) Section 18AA on its plain terms deals with situations where immediate preventive action is required. The paramount concern is to avoid serious problems which may be caused by fall in production. The purpose of an order under section 18AA is not to condemn the owner but to protect the scheduled industry. The issue under section 18AA is not solely between the Government and the management of the industrial undertaking. The object of taking action under this Section is to protect other outside interests of the community at large and the workers. (3) The rule of natural justice to give a hearing has been incorporated in section 18-F which gives an opportunity of a post-decisional hearing to the owner of the undertaking who if he feels aggrieved can on his application be heard, to show that even the original order under section 18AA was passed on invalid grounds and should be cancelled or rescinded. (4) On a true construction of section 18AA read with section 18-F the requirements of natural justice and fair play can be read into the statute only insofar as conformance to such canons can reasonably and realistically be required of it by the provision for a remedial hearing at a subsequent stage. (5) Under section 18-F the Central Government exercises curial functions and that Section confers on the aggrieved owner a right to apply to the Government to cancel the order of take-over. This section casts an obligation on the Central Government to deal with and dispose of an application filed thereunder with reasonable expedition. Allowing the appeal by the Company,<br />HELD: (Sarkaria & Desai, JJ. per Chinnappa Reddy, J. dissenting.) In the facts and circumstances of the instant case, there has been a noncompliance with the implied requirement of the audi alteram partem rule of natural justice at the pre-decisional stage. The impugned order could be struck down as invalid on that score alone. But in view of the commitment / concession that a hearing would be afforded to the Company, the case is remitted to the Central Government to give a full, fair and effective hearing. [587G-H, 588C] The phrase 'natural justice' is not capable of a static and precise definition. It cannot be imprisoned in the straight-jacket of a cast-iron formula. Rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. Hence not possible to make an exhaustive catalogue of such rules. Two fundamental maxims of natural justice have now become deeply and indelibly ingrained in the common consciousness of mankind as pre-eminently necessary to ensure that the law is applied impartially objectively and fairly. These twin principles are (i) audi alteram partem and (ii) nemo judex in re sua. Audi alteram partem is a highly effective rule devised by the Courts to ensure that a statutory authority arrives at a just decision and it is calculated to act as a healthy check on the abuse or misuse of power. Its reach should not be narrowed and its applicability circumscribed.[554C-G] The rules of natural justice can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. If a statutory provision either specifically or by inevitable implication excludes the application of the rules of natural justice then the Court cannot ignore the mandate of the Legislature. Whether or not the application of the principles of natural justice in a given case has been excluded in the exercise of statutory power depends upon the language and basic scheme of the provision conferring the power, the nature of the power the purpose for which it is conferred and the effect of that power. [556A-B] The maxim audi alteram partem has many facets. Two of them are (a) notice of the case to be met, and (b) opportunity to explain. The rule cannot be sacrificed at the altar of administrative convenience or celerity; for, convenience and justice are often not on speaking terms. Difficulties, however, arise when the statute conferring the power does not expressly exclude this rule but its exclusion is sought by implication due to the presence of certain factors such as urgency where the obligation to give notice and opportunity to be heard would obstruct the taking of prompt action of a preventive or remedial nature. Audi alteram partem rule may be disregarded in an emergent situation where immediate action brooks no delay to prevent some imminent danger or injury or hazard to paramount public interests. Section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure empowers the magistrates specified therein to make an exparte conditional order in emergent cases for removal of dangerous public nuisances. Action under section 17 Land Acquisition Act furnishes another such instance. Similarly action on grounds of public safety public health may justify disregard of the rule of prior hearing. [556C-H] Cases where owing to the compulsion of the fact situation or the necessity of taking speedy action no pre- decisional hearing is given but the action, is followed soon by a full post-decisional hearing to the person affected do not in reality constitute an exception to the audi alteram partem rule. To call such cases as exception is a misnomer because they do not exclude fair play in action but adapt it to the urgency of the situation by balancing the competing claims of hurry and hearing. [560H-561A] The general principle as distinguished from an absolute rule of uniform application seems to be that where a statute does not in terms exclude this rule of prior hearing but contemplates a post-decisional hearing amounting to a full review of the original order on merits then such a statute would be construed as excluding the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage. [561G] If the statute conferring the power is silent with regard to the giving of pre-decisional hearing to the person affected and the administrative decision taken by the authority involves civil consequences of a grave nature and no full review or appeal on merits against that decision is provided courts will be extremely reluctant to construe such a statute as excluding the duty of affording even a minimal hearing shorn of all its formal trappings and dilatory features at the pre-decisional stage, unless viewed pragmatically it would paralyse the administrative process or frustrate the need for utmost promptitude. [561H] 7(i). A comparison of the provisions of Section 18A(1)(b) and Section 18AA(1)(c), bring out two main points of distinction: First, action under Section 18A(1)(b) can be taken only after an investigation had been made under Section 15; while under Section 18AA(1)(a) or (b) action can be taken without such investigation. The language, scheme and setting of Section 18AA read in the light of the Objects and Reasons for enacting this provision make this position clear beyond doubt. Second, before taking action under Section 18A(1)(b), the Central Government has to form an opinion on the basis of the investigation conducted under section 15, in regard to the existence of the objective fact, namely: that the industrial undertaking is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest; while under section 18A(1)(a) the Government has to satisfy itself that the persons incharge of the undertaking have brought about a situation likely to cause fall in production, by committing any of the three kinds of acts specified in that provision. This shows that the preliminary objective fact attributable to the persons in charge of the management or affairs of the undertaking, on the basis of which action may be taken under section 18(A)(1)(b), is of far wider amplitude than the circumstance, the existence of which is a sine qua non for taking action under section 18AA(1). The phrase "highly detrimental to the scheduled industry or public interest" in section 18-A is capable of being construed to cover a large variety of acts or things which may be considered wrong with the manner of running the industry by the management. In contrast with it, action under section 18AA(1)(a) can be taken only if the Central Government is satisfied with regard to the existence of the twin conditions specifically mentioned therein, on the basis of evidence in its possession. [569D-H] An analysis of section 18AA(1)(a), indicates that as a necessary preliminary to the exercise of the power thereunder, the Central Government must be satisfied "from documentary or other evidence in its possession" in regard to the co-existence of two circumstances: (i) that the persons in charge of the industrial undertaking have by committing any of these acts, namely, reckless investments, or creation of incumbrances on the assets of industrial undertaking, or by diversion of funds, brought about a situation which is likely to affect the production of the article manufactured or produced in the industrial undertaking, and (ii) that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation.[570B-D] It cannot be laid down as a general proposition that whenever a statute confers a power on an administrative authority and makes the exercise of that power conditional on the formation of an opinion by that authority in regard to the existence of an immediacy, its opinion in regard to that preliminary fact is not open to judicial scrutiny at all. While it may be conceded that an element of subjectivity is always involved in the formation of such an opinion, the existence of the circumstances from which the inference constituting the opinion, as the sine qua non for action, are to be drawn, must be demonstrable, and the existence of such "circumstances", if questioned, must be proved at least prima facie. [571 E-G] From a plain reading of section 18AA, it is clear that it does not expressly in unmistakable and unequivocal terms exclude the application of the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage. [574B] In the instant case, so far as Kanpur Unit is concerned, it was lying closed for more than three months before the passing of the impugned order. There was no 'immediacy' in relation to that unit, which could absolve the Government from the obligation of complying fully with audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional or pre- takeover stage. [583A] Keshav Mills Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, [1973] 3 S.C.R. 22; Kamla Prasad Khetan v. Union of India,[1957] S.C.R. 1052; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 621; Sukhdev Singh & Ors. v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh, [1975] 3 S.C.R. 619; A. K. Kraipak v. Union of India, [1970] 1 S.C.R. 457; Ridge v. Baldwin, [1964] A.C. 40; 196; Heatley v. Tasmanian Racing & Gaming Commission, 14 Australian Law Reports 519; Nawabkhan Abbaskhan v. State of Gujarat, [1974] 3 S.C.R. 427; State of Orissa v. Dr. Bina Pani Dei, [1962] 2 S.C.R. 625; Ambalal M. Shah v. Hathi Singh Manufacturing Co. Ltd. [1962] 3 S.C.R. 171; and S. L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan & Ors., [1981] 1 S.C.R. 746, referred to. (Per Chinnappa Reddy, J. dissenting) The principles of natural justice are not attracted to the situations contemplated by section 18AA of Industries (Development and Regulation) Act. Natural justice like Ultra Vires and Public Policy is a branch of the public law and is a formidable weapon which can be wielded to secure justice to the citizen. While it may be used to protect certain fundamental liberties, civil and political rights, it may be used as indeed it is used more often than not, to protect vested interests and to obstruct the path of progressive change. The time has come to make an appropriate distinction between natural justice in its application to fundamental liberties, civil and political rights and natural justice in its application to vested interests. [590A-B] Our constitution as befits the Constitution of a Socialist Secular Democratic Republic, recognises the paramountcy of the public weal over the private interest. Natural justice, ultra vires, public policy, or any other rule of interpretation must, therefore, conform, grow and be tailored to serve the public interest and respond to the demands of an evolving society. [590C] The principles of natural justice have taken deep root in the judicial conscience of our people. They are now considered so fundamental as to be implicit in every decision making function, judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative. Where authority functions under a statute and the statute provides for the observance of the principles of natural justice in a particular manner, natural justice will have to be observed in that manner and in no other. Where the statute is silent about the observance of the principles of natural justice, such statutory silence is taken to imply compliance with the principles of natural justice. Where the conflict is between the public interest and the private interest the presumption must necessarily be weak and may, therefore, be readily displaced. The presumption is also weak, where what are involved are mere property rights. In cases of urgency, particularly where the public interest is involved, preemptive action may be a strategic necessity. Even in cases of preemptive action, if the statute so provides or if the Courts so deem fit in appropriate cases, a postponed hearing may be substituted for natural justice. [590A-C; 591F-G] 3(ii). Where natural justice is implied, the extent of the implication and the nature of the hearing must vary with the statute, the subject and the situation. [592B] The absence of the expression 'immediate action' in section 18AA(1)(b) does not make any difference. Section 18AA(1)(a) refers to a situation where immediate preventive action may avert a disaster, whereas section 18AA contemplates a situation where the disaster has occurred and action is necessary to restore normalcy. Restoration of production where production has stopped in a key industry or industrial undertaking is as important and urgent in the public interest as prevention of a situation where production may be affected. Immediate action is, therefore, as necessary in the situation contemplated by section 18AA(1)(b) as in the situation contemplated by section 18AA(1)(a). [596 F-G] The marginal note refers to the power to take over without investigation but there is no sufficient reason to suppose that the word immediate is used only to contra- distinguish it from the investigation contemplated by section 15 of the Act, though of course a consequence of immediate action under section 18AA may be to dispense with the enquiry under section 15. In fact, facts which come to light during the course of an investigation under section 15 may form the basis of action under section 18AA(1)(a). Where in the course of an investigation under section 15 it is discovered that the management have, by reckless investments or creation of encumbrances on the assets of the industrial undertaking or by diversion of funds brought about a situation which is likely to affect the production of the articles manufactured or produced in the industrial undertaking, if the Government is satisfied that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation, there is no reason why the Central Government may not straightaway take action under section 18AA(1)(a) without waiting for completion of investigation under section 15. [597A-B] Where there is a provision in the statute itself for revocation of the order by the very authority making the decision, it appears to be unnecessary to insist upon a pre- decisional observance of natural justice. [598A] The likelihood of production being jeopardized or the stoppage of production in a key industrial undertaking is a matter of grave concern affecting the public interest. Parliament has taken so serious a view of the matter that it has authorised the Central Government to take over the management of the industrial undertaking if immediate action may prevent jeopardy to production or restore production where it has already stopped. The necessity for immediate action by the Central Government contemplated by Parliament is definitely indicative of the exclusion of natural justice. It is not as if the owner of the industrial undertaking is left with no remedy. He may move the Central Government under section 18-F to cancel the order made under section 18AA. [598C-D] Neither section 18-F of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act nor section 21 of the General Clauses Act by itself excludes natural justice. The exclusion of natural justice where such exclusion is not express has to be implied by reference to the subject, the statute and the statutory situation. Where an express provision in the statute itself provides for a post decisional hearing the other provisions of the Statute will have to be read in the light of such provision and the provision for post- decisional hearing may then clinch the issue where pre- decisional natural justice appears to be excluded on the other terms of the statute. That a post-decisional hearing may also be had by the terms of section 21 of the General Clauses Act may not necessarily help in the interpretation of the provisions of the statute concerned. [599 A-C] Ridge v. Baldwin, 1964 A.C. p. 40; Annie G. Phillip v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 75 L.E.d. 1289; John H. Fahey v. Paul Mallonee, 91 L.E.d. 2030; Margarita Fuentes v. Robert L. Shevin, Attorney General of Florida, 32 L.E.d. 2d 556 and Lawrence Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 40 L.E.d. 2d 406, referred to. - Rama Rao, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh as well as the President of the Telugu Desam Party as well as respondent No. 3. The advertisements very shortly stated, refer to the auspicious gifts made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to the poor people on the eve of New Year and Sankranti. In the said advertisements, it is stated that the said Government which was formed by the Telugu Desam Party was giving to the poor people whose income was below Rs. and the said advertisements referred to a new scheme of selling sarees and dhoties at half prices to the poor people in the State of Andhra Pradesh having Green-cards. Moreover, the offer in the advertisements for the sale of dhoties and sarees at discount rates was in the nature of a benefit offered to poor persons in that State. When a Government announces the measures which are intended for the benefit of any of the classes for whose the Government can normally be expected to work like the poor or the economical backward classes, it is only in rare circumstances that such a promise can be said to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) even though such a promise might be made on the eve of elections. 8. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => '', 'counseldef' => '', 'court' => 'Supreme Court of India', 'court_type' => 'SC', 'decidedon' => '1989-09-29', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' K.N. Saikia,; M.H. Kania and; S. Ranganathan, JJ.', 'judgement' => '</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Kania, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. These two appeals arise out of the judgments in two Election Petitions in the Andhra Pradesh High Court questioning the election of respondent No. 1 as a Member of Parliament from Srikakulam No. Parliamentary Constituency in the 8th General Election to the House of the People. The points raised in these appeals are common and so are the relevant facts; and, hence, they are being disposed of by this common judgment. We propose to take note of only the few facts which are necessary for the appreciation of the controversy before us.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The polling date for the said election along with other parliamentary elections in the State of Andhra Pradesh was December 27, 1984 but in Srikakulam No. 1 Parliamentary Constituency the polling was countermanded and the date of polling was later fixed on January 28, 1985. In both the Election Petitions the election of respondent No. 1 was questioned mainly on the ground that Shri N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh as well as the President of the Telugu Desam Party as well as respondent No. 1 gave certain speeches and certain advertisements were got published by Shri N.T. Rama Rao through the Publicity Department of the Government of Andhra Pradesh in the newspapers containing certain statements which are alleged to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A) of the <a href="/act/50684/representation-of-the-people-act-1951-complete-act">Representation of the People Act, 1951</a> (hereinafter referred to as 'the said Act'). The main question canvassed before us is whether the statements contained in these aforesaid advertisements amount to a corrupt practice under Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act. Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act runs as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">123. Corrupt practices</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The following shall be deemed to be corrupt practises for the purposes of this Act :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) 'Bribery', that is to say.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(A) any gift, offer or promise by a candidate or his agent or by any other person with the consent of a candidate or his election agent of any gratification, to any person whomsover, with the object, directly or indirectly of inducing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) x x x</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) an elector to vote or refrain from voting at an election, or as a reward to.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) a person for having so stood or not stood, or for having withdrawn or not having withdrawn his candidature; or</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) an elector for having voted or refrained from voting.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The advertisements very shortly stated, refer to the auspicious gifts made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to the poor people on the eve of New Year and Sankranti. In the said advertisements, it is stated that the said Government which was formed by the Telugu Desam Party was giving to the poor people whose income was below Rs. 6,000 per year, a kilo of rice at Rs. 2 per Kg. and the said advertisements referred to a new scheme of selling sarees and dhoties at half prices to the poor people in the State of Andhra Pradesh having Green-cards. Green-cards were directed to be issued to all the persons whose annual income was below Rs. 6,000. The supply of the rice at subsidised rates as aforesaid was also to be made to the Green-card holders only. The scheme to sell sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was to be operative from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. In considering the question whether the said advertisement and the said speeches amount to a corrupt practice, we are of the view that the provisions of Section 123 of the said Act which deal with corrupt practices have to be interpreted, keeping in mind that dictates of commonsense require that they never could have been intended to treat normal election promises made in election manifestoes or usual election speeches by members of various political parties aspiring to power and by different candidates aspiring to get elected to legislative bodies concerned as corrupt practices. We are of the view that these advertisements and speeches amount to nothing more than statements extolling the achievements of the Government of the State of Andhra Pradesh under the Telugu Desam Party headed by N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister, and contain normal election promises and these statements do not amount to corrupt practices falling within the scope of Sub-clause (b) of Clause (A) of Sub-section (1) of Section 123 of the said Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. It was urged by Mr. Rao, learned Counsel for the appellants that in the impugned judgments, the High Court has incorrectly taken the view that in order to amount to bribery within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A), the transaction must amount to a bargain by the candidate with a view to get votes. It was pointed out by him that the said view has been taken in the impugned judgments, relying upon the decision of a Bench comprising to learned Judges of this Court in Ghasi Ram v. Dal Singh and Ors. :1983 SCR 102 . We have gone through to the relevant portion of that judgment (at page 109 and 110 of the said report). A careful perusal of the said judgment shows that what has been really held in that case is that if the promises given or made amount to a bargain entered into by a candidate for a vote or votes, that would amount to a corrupt practice; but it has not been held there that unless the act alleged amounts to such a bargain, it could not amount to a corrupt practice. In our view, that judgment does not lay down that in order to amount to a corrupt practice, the transaction must amount to a bargain for getting a vote. It was pointed out by Mr. Rao, however, that such a view seems to have been taken in two other decisions rendered by two Benches, each comprising two learned Judges of this Court in Bhanu Kumar Shastri v. Mohan Lal Sukhadia and Ors. : [1971]3SCR522 and Harjit Singh Mann v. S Umrao Singh and Ors. : [1980]2SCR501 . and these judgments need to be overruled. We do not propose to go into the correctness or otherwise of this view because, even on the footing that in order to amount to a corrupt practice under the aforesaid provision the alleged acts need not constitute a bargain, the the acts established in the present case, in our opinion, do not amount to a corrupt practice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Our attention was drawn by Mr. Rao to the fact that in this case the said advertisements and the speeches had to be viewed in the context of the fact that the advertisements were issued and the speeches were made after respondent No. 1 filed his nomination papers on January 4, 1985, for the election and before the election was held in the aforesaid constituency. It was further pointed out that the offer made for the sale of sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was limited to the period from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985. It cannot be denied that these factors are relevant factOrs. We cannot, however, lose sight of the fact that this offer was made not only in this constituency but throughout the State where the elections to the House of the People were scheduled to be held, and were, in fact, held on December 27, 1984. It was only in case of this constituency that the election to be held on the scheduled date was countermanded and later held on January 28, 1985. We cannot lose sight of the fact that, as far as the said speeches and the said advertisements, which were issued by the Publicity Department of the State, are concerned, they deal in the main with the achievements of the Government of Andhra Pradesh which, of course, was being run by Ministers belonging to Telugu Desam Party to which respondent No. 1 also belonged. Moreover, the offer in the advertisements for the sale of dhoties and sarees at discount rates was in the nature of a benefit offered to poor persons in that State. When a Government announces the measures which are intended for the benefit of any of the classes for whose the Government can normally be expected to work like the poor or the economical backward classes, it is only in rare circumstances that such a promise can be said to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) even though such a promise might be made on the eve of elections. Keeping this in mind, in our opinion, although the offer to sell dhoties and sarees at discount rates was of a limited duration as aforestated, it cannot be regarded as a corrupt practice. Such an offer was bound to have financial repercussions and it is quite possible the duration of the offer was limited to enable the Government to study the financial repercussions rather than from any improper motive. We find support for this view from the decision of this Court in H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh : [1969]3SCR813 . In that case an Ordinance was passed by the Government of Madhya Pradesh as a result of which a large number of agriculturists, namely, those holdings of plots of land of less than 7.5 acres area or paying land revenue not exceeding Rs. 5/- were exempted from the payment of the land revenue. It was held that such a concession does not amount to a gift, offer or promise of any gratification within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) of the said Act nor does the announcement of the declaration made at a meeting shortly before the election or the issue of a pamphlet containing that declaration at that time carry the matter any further. It was held that neither Shri D.P. Misra who was the Chief Minister nor Shri S.K. Dixit who acted as his agent were guilty of any corrupt practice within the meaning of the aforesaid provision.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. It was next contended by Mr. Rao, although very faintly, that the High Court was in error as it had not decided all other issues which were raised in the election petition. In this regard we cannot lose sight of the fact that the term of the present Lok Sabha is likely to be over within a few months and fresh elections are likely to be held and it would, therefore, be an exercise in futility to remand the matter to the High Court for deciding the remaining issues.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'AIR1990SC1889; JT1989(4)SC186; 1989(2)SCALE891; 1989Supp(2)SCC504', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors.', 'sub' => 'Election', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ), 'casename_url' => 'b-rajagopala-rao-vs-appayya-hanumanthu', 'args' => array( (int) 0 => '640942', (int) 1 => 'b-rajagopala-rao-vs-appayya-hanumanthu' ) ) $title_for_layout = 'B Rajagopala Rao and anr Vs Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors - Citation 640942 - Court Judgment | ' $desc = array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '640942', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/50684/representation-of-the-people-act-1951-complete-act">Representation of the People Act, 1951</a> - Sections 1, 3(1)(A), 123 and 123(1)(A)', 'appealno' => 'Civil Appeal Nos. 484 and 485 of 1987', 'appellant' => 'B. Rajagopala Rao and anr.', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'B. Rajagopala Rao and anr. Vs. Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors.', 'casenote' => 'Election - corrupt practices - Sections 123 and 123 (1) (A) of Representation of the People Act, 1951 - whether advertisements by public department and speeches made by respondent No. 1 to sell dhoti and sarees at discount rates amount to corrupt practices - offer was available for mass and for limited duration - such offer was bound to have financial repercussions and it is quite possible that duration of offer limited to enable Government to study financial repercussions rather than from any improper motive - offer not amounted to corrupt practices. - [ D.A. Desai,; O. Chinnappa Reddy and; R.S. Sarkaria, JJ.] The Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 empowers the Union of India in the public interest to take under its control the industries specified in the First Schedule to the Act. Item 23 of the First Schedule relates to textiles of various categories. Section 15 authorises the Central Government to make or cause to be made a full and complete investigation into the circumstances of the case if the Central Government is of the opinion that (a) in respect of any scheduled industry or industrial undertaking or undertakings (i) there has been, or is likely to be, a substantial fall in the volume of production for which, having regard to the economic conditions prevailing, there is no justification; or (ii) there has been, or is likely to be, a marked deterioration in the quality of any article... which could have been or can be avoided; or (iii) there has been or is likely to be a rise in the price of any article..... for which there is no justification; or (iv) it is necessary to take any such action for the purpose of conserving any resources of national importance; or (b) any industrial undertaking is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest. After the investigation is made under section 15, section 16(1) empowers the Central Government if action is desirable, to issue appropriate directions, and section 16(2) provides for the issue of interim directions by the Central Government pending investigation under section 15. Chapter III-A consisting of Sections 18A, 18-AA, 18-B, 18-C, 18-D, 18-E and 18-F deal with "direct management or control of Industrial Undertakings by Central Government in certain cases". Sec. 18-A empowers the Central Government by notified order, to authorise any person or body of persons to take over the management of the whole or any part of an industrial undertaking or to exercise in respect of the whole, or any part of the undertaking such functions of control as may be specified in the order, if the Central Government is of opinion that: (a) an industrial undertaking to which directions have been issued in pursuance of section 16 has failed to comply with such directions, or (b) an industrial undertaking in respect of which an investigation has been made under section 15 is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest. Section 18AA(5) stipulates that the provisions of Sections 18-B to 18 E shall be applicable to the industrial undertaking in respect of which an order has been made under section 18-AA even as they apply to an industrial undertaking taken over under Section 18-A. Section 18-F empowers the Central Government to cancel the order made under section 18-A if it appears that the purpose of the order has been fulfilled or it is not necessary that the order should remain in force. The appellant M/s. Swadeshi Cotton Mills was taken over by the Government of India by a notification dated April 13, 1978 in exercise of the powers conferred on it under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 18AA of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 on the ground that the company had by creation of encumbrances on the assets of its industrial undertakings, brought about a situation which had affected and is likely to further affect the production of articles manufactured or produced by it and that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation. The Government authorised the National Textile Corporation Limited to take over the management, subject to the conditions that the authorised person shall comply with all the directions issued from time to time by the Central Government and that the authorised person shall hold office for a period of five years. The appellant Mills challenged the aforesaid order in a writ petition in the High Court. The case was heard by a Full Bench of five Judges to consider the question whether in construing section 18AA of the Industries Development and Regulation Act, 1951, compliance with the principle of audi alteram partem is to be implied and whether hearing is to be given to the parties who would be affected by the order to be passed prior to the passing of the order or whether hearing can be given after the order is passed and whether the order passed under the said Section is vitiated by not giving of such hearing and whether such vice can be cured. The Bench by a majority answered the three questions as follows:- (a) Section 18AA(1)(a)(b) excludes the giving of prior hearing to the party who would be affected by order thereunder. (b) Section 18-F expressly provides for a post- decisional hearing to the owner of the industrial undertaking, the management of which is taken over under section 18AA to have the order made under section 18AA cancelled on any relevant ground. (c) As the taking over of management under section 18A is not vitiated by the failure to grant prior hearing the question of any such vice being cured by a grant of a subsequent hearing does not arise. The minority, however, held that in compliance with the principles of natural justice, prior hearing to the owner of the undertaking was required to be given before the passing of an order under section 18AA, that the second question did not arise as the denial of a prior hearing would not cure the vice by the grant of subsequent hearing, but it would be open to the Court to moderate the relief in such a way that the order is kept alive to the extent necessary until the making of the fresh order to subserve public interest and to make appropriate directions. After the decision on the reference the case was reheard on merits by a Full Bench of three Judges and the writ petition was allowed in part. The challenge to the validity of the order being rejected but insofar as the impugned order seeking to take over the corporate entity of the company, the corporate entity of the subsidiary and its assets, the petition was allowed and the respondents, the Union of India and the authorised person were directed to release from its control and custody and/or deliver possession of any assets or property of the company which were not referable to the industrial undertakings. Appeals to this Court were filed on behalf of the Company as well as by the Union of India and the National Textile Corporation. Two propositions were propounded on behalf of the company that: (a) Whether it was necessary to observe the rules of natural justice before issuing a notified order under section 18AA(1)(a) and further whether section 18-F impliedly excludes rules of natural justice relating to prior hearing; and it was contended (1) the mere use of the word 'immediate' in sub-clause (a) of section 18AA does not show a legislative intent to exclude the application of audi alteram partem rule altogether. (2) The word 'immediate' in clause (a) has been used in contra distinction to 'investigate'. It only means that under section 18AA action can be taken without prior investigation under section 15. The use of the word 'immediate' in section 18AA(1)(a) only dispenses with investigation under section 15 and not with the principle of audi alteram partem altogether and this is indicated by the marginal note of section 18A and para 3 of the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Amendment Bill which inserted section 18AA in 1971. (3) The word 'immediate' occurs only in clause (a) and not in clause (b) of section 18AA(1). It would be odd if intention to exclude this principle of natural justice is spelt out in one clause of the sub-section when the other clause does not exclude it. (4) Section 18-F does not exclude a pre-decisional hearing. The so-called post-decisional hearing contemplated by section 18-F cannot be and is not intended to be a substitute for a pre-decisional hearing. (5) Section 18F incorporates only a facet, albeit qualified, of section 21 of the General Clauses Act. The language of the Section implicity prohibits an enquiry into circumstances that led to the passing of the order of take-over and under it the aggrieved person is not entitled to show that on merits the order was void ab initio. (6) 'Immediacy' does not exclude a duty to act fairly because even an emergent situation can co-exist with the canons of natural justice. The only effect of urgency on the application of the principle of fair hearing would be that the width, form and duration of the hearing would be tailored to the situation and reduced to the reasonable minimum so that it does not delay and defeat the purpose of the contemplated action. (7) Where the civil consequences of the administrative action are grave and its effect is highly prejudicial to the rights and interests of the person affected and there is nothing in the language and scheme of the statute which unequivocally excludes a fair pre-decisional hearing and the post-decisional hearing provided therein is not a real remedial hearing equitable to a full right of appeal the Court should be loath to infer a legislative intent to exclude even a minimal fair hearing at the pre-decisional stage merely on ground of urgency. (8) The Central Government appointed four Government Officials including one from the office of the Textile Commissioner to study the affairs of the Company and to make recommendation. This Official Group submitted its report on February 16, 1978. The evidence on the basis of which the impugned order was passed was not disclosed to the appellant company till May 1978, only after it had filed the writ petition in the High Court. If there was anything adverse to the appellants in the survey report there was time enough about six weeks between the submission of the Survey Report and the passing of the impugned order for giving a short, reasonable opportunity to the appellants to explain the adverse findings against them. If there was immediacy situational modifications could be made to meet the requirement of fairness, by reducing the period of notice; that even the manner and form of such notice could be simplified to eliminate delay, that telephonic notice or short opportunity for furnishing their explanation to the Company might have satisfied the requirements of natural justice. Such an opportunity of hearing could have been given after the passing of a conditional tentative order and before its enforcement under section 18AA. For the interregnum suitable interim action such as freezing the assets of the Company or restraining the Company from creating further encumbrances, could be taken under section 16. On behalf of the Union of India and the Authorised Officer it was contended that (1) the presumption in favour of audi alteram partem rule stands impliedly displaced by the language scheme, setting and the purpose of the provision in section 18AA. (2) Section 18AA on its plain terms deals with situations where immediate preventive action is required. The paramount concern is to avoid serious problems which may be caused by fall in production. The purpose of an order under section 18AA is not to condemn the owner but to protect the scheduled industry. The issue under section 18AA is not solely between the Government and the management of the industrial undertaking. The object of taking action under this Section is to protect other outside interests of the community at large and the workers. (3) The rule of natural justice to give a hearing has been incorporated in section 18-F which gives an opportunity of a post-decisional hearing to the owner of the undertaking who if he feels aggrieved can on his application be heard, to show that even the original order under section 18AA was passed on invalid grounds and should be cancelled or rescinded. (4) On a true construction of section 18AA read with section 18-F the requirements of natural justice and fair play can be read into the statute only insofar as conformance to such canons can reasonably and realistically be required of it by the provision for a remedial hearing at a subsequent stage. (5) Under section 18-F the Central Government exercises curial functions and that Section confers on the aggrieved owner a right to apply to the Government to cancel the order of take-over. This section casts an obligation on the Central Government to deal with and dispose of an application filed thereunder with reasonable expedition. Allowing the appeal by the Company,<br/>HELD: (Sarkaria & Desai, JJ. per Chinnappa Reddy, J. dissenting.) In the facts and circumstances of the instant case, there has been a noncompliance with the implied requirement of the audi alteram partem rule of natural justice at the pre-decisional stage. The impugned order could be struck down as invalid on that score alone. But in view of the commitment / concession that a hearing would be afforded to the Company, the case is remitted to the Central Government to give a full, fair and effective hearing. [587G-H, 588C] The phrase 'natural justice' is not capable of a static and precise definition. It cannot be imprisoned in the straight-jacket of a cast-iron formula. Rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. Hence not possible to make an exhaustive catalogue of such rules. Two fundamental maxims of natural justice have now become deeply and indelibly ingrained in the common consciousness of mankind as pre-eminently necessary to ensure that the law is applied impartially objectively and fairly. These twin principles are (i) audi alteram partem and (ii) nemo judex in re sua. Audi alteram partem is a highly effective rule devised by the Courts to ensure that a statutory authority arrives at a just decision and it is calculated to act as a healthy check on the abuse or misuse of power. Its reach should not be narrowed and its applicability circumscribed.[554C-G] The rules of natural justice can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. If a statutory provision either specifically or by inevitable implication excludes the application of the rules of natural justice then the Court cannot ignore the mandate of the Legislature. Whether or not the application of the principles of natural justice in a given case has been excluded in the exercise of statutory power depends upon the language and basic scheme of the provision conferring the power, the nature of the power the purpose for which it is conferred and the effect of that power. [556A-B] The maxim audi alteram partem has many facets. Two of them are (a) notice of the case to be met, and (b) opportunity to explain. The rule cannot be sacrificed at the altar of administrative convenience or celerity; for, convenience and justice are often not on speaking terms. Difficulties, however, arise when the statute conferring the power does not expressly exclude this rule but its exclusion is sought by implication due to the presence of certain factors such as urgency where the obligation to give notice and opportunity to be heard would obstruct the taking of prompt action of a preventive or remedial nature. Audi alteram partem rule may be disregarded in an emergent situation where immediate action brooks no delay to prevent some imminent danger or injury or hazard to paramount public interests. Section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure empowers the magistrates specified therein to make an exparte conditional order in emergent cases for removal of dangerous public nuisances. Action under section 17 Land Acquisition Act furnishes another such instance. Similarly action on grounds of public safety public health may justify disregard of the rule of prior hearing. [556C-H] Cases where owing to the compulsion of the fact situation or the necessity of taking speedy action no pre- decisional hearing is given but the action, is followed soon by a full post-decisional hearing to the person affected do not in reality constitute an exception to the audi alteram partem rule. To call such cases as exception is a misnomer because they do not exclude fair play in action but adapt it to the urgency of the situation by balancing the competing claims of hurry and hearing. [560H-561A] The general principle as distinguished from an absolute rule of uniform application seems to be that where a statute does not in terms exclude this rule of prior hearing but contemplates a post-decisional hearing amounting to a full review of the original order on merits then such a statute would be construed as excluding the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage. [561G] If the statute conferring the power is silent with regard to the giving of pre-decisional hearing to the person affected and the administrative decision taken by the authority involves civil consequences of a grave nature and no full review or appeal on merits against that decision is provided courts will be extremely reluctant to construe such a statute as excluding the duty of affording even a minimal hearing shorn of all its formal trappings and dilatory features at the pre-decisional stage, unless viewed pragmatically it would paralyse the administrative process or frustrate the need for utmost promptitude. [561H] 7(i). A comparison of the provisions of Section 18A(1)(b) and Section 18AA(1)(c), bring out two main points of distinction: First, action under Section 18A(1)(b) can be taken only after an investigation had been made under Section 15; while under Section 18AA(1)(a) or (b) action can be taken without such investigation. The language, scheme and setting of Section 18AA read in the light of the Objects and Reasons for enacting this provision make this position clear beyond doubt. Second, before taking action under Section 18A(1)(b), the Central Government has to form an opinion on the basis of the investigation conducted under section 15, in regard to the existence of the objective fact, namely: that the industrial undertaking is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest; while under section 18A(1)(a) the Government has to satisfy itself that the persons incharge of the undertaking have brought about a situation likely to cause fall in production, by committing any of the three kinds of acts specified in that provision. This shows that the preliminary objective fact attributable to the persons in charge of the management or affairs of the undertaking, on the basis of which action may be taken under section 18(A)(1)(b), is of far wider amplitude than the circumstance, the existence of which is a sine qua non for taking action under section 18AA(1). The phrase "highly detrimental to the scheduled industry or public interest" in section 18-A is capable of being construed to cover a large variety of acts or things which may be considered wrong with the manner of running the industry by the management. In contrast with it, action under section 18AA(1)(a) can be taken only if the Central Government is satisfied with regard to the existence of the twin conditions specifically mentioned therein, on the basis of evidence in its possession. [569D-H] An analysis of section 18AA(1)(a), indicates that as a necessary preliminary to the exercise of the power thereunder, the Central Government must be satisfied "from documentary or other evidence in its possession" in regard to the co-existence of two circumstances: (i) that the persons in charge of the industrial undertaking have by committing any of these acts, namely, reckless investments, or creation of incumbrances on the assets of industrial undertaking, or by diversion of funds, brought about a situation which is likely to affect the production of the article manufactured or produced in the industrial undertaking, and (ii) that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation.[570B-D] It cannot be laid down as a general proposition that whenever a statute confers a power on an administrative authority and makes the exercise of that power conditional on the formation of an opinion by that authority in regard to the existence of an immediacy, its opinion in regard to that preliminary fact is not open to judicial scrutiny at all. While it may be conceded that an element of subjectivity is always involved in the formation of such an opinion, the existence of the circumstances from which the inference constituting the opinion, as the sine qua non for action, are to be drawn, must be demonstrable, and the existence of such "circumstances", if questioned, must be proved at least prima facie. [571 E-G] From a plain reading of section 18AA, it is clear that it does not expressly in unmistakable and unequivocal terms exclude the application of the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage. [574B] In the instant case, so far as Kanpur Unit is concerned, it was lying closed for more than three months before the passing of the impugned order. There was no 'immediacy' in relation to that unit, which could absolve the Government from the obligation of complying fully with audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional or pre- takeover stage. [583A] Keshav Mills Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, [1973] 3 S.C.R. 22; Kamla Prasad Khetan v. Union of India,[1957] S.C.R. 1052; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 621; Sukhdev Singh & Ors. v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh, [1975] 3 S.C.R. 619; A. K. Kraipak v. Union of India, [1970] 1 S.C.R. 457; Ridge v. Baldwin, [1964] A.C. 40; 196; Heatley v. Tasmanian Racing & Gaming Commission, 14 Australian Law Reports 519; Nawabkhan Abbaskhan v. State of Gujarat, [1974] 3 S.C.R. 427; State of Orissa v. Dr. Bina Pani Dei, [1962] 2 S.C.R. 625; Ambalal M. Shah v. Hathi Singh Manufacturing Co. Ltd. [1962] 3 S.C.R. 171; and S. L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan & Ors., [1981] 1 S.C.R. 746, referred to. (Per Chinnappa Reddy, J. dissenting) The principles of natural justice are not attracted to the situations contemplated by section 18AA of Industries (Development and Regulation) Act. Natural justice like Ultra Vires and Public Policy is a branch of the public law and is a formidable weapon which can be wielded to secure justice to the citizen. While it may be used to protect certain fundamental liberties, civil and political rights, it may be used as indeed it is used more often than not, to protect vested interests and to obstruct the path of progressive change. The time has come to make an appropriate distinction between natural justice in its application to fundamental liberties, civil and political rights and natural justice in its application to vested interests. [590A-B] Our constitution as befits the Constitution of a Socialist Secular Democratic Republic, recognises the paramountcy of the public weal over the private interest. Natural justice, ultra vires, public policy, or any other rule of interpretation must, therefore, conform, grow and be tailored to serve the public interest and respond to the demands of an evolving society. [590C] The principles of natural justice have taken deep root in the judicial conscience of our people. They are now considered so fundamental as to be implicit in every decision making function, judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative. Where authority functions under a statute and the statute provides for the observance of the principles of natural justice in a particular manner, natural justice will have to be observed in that manner and in no other. Where the statute is silent about the observance of the principles of natural justice, such statutory silence is taken to imply compliance with the principles of natural justice. Where the conflict is between the public interest and the private interest the presumption must necessarily be weak and may, therefore, be readily displaced. The presumption is also weak, where what are involved are mere property rights. In cases of urgency, particularly where the public interest is involved, preemptive action may be a strategic necessity. Even in cases of preemptive action, if the statute so provides or if the Courts so deem fit in appropriate cases, a postponed hearing may be substituted for natural justice. [590A-C; 591F-G] 3(ii). Where natural justice is implied, the extent of the implication and the nature of the hearing must vary with the statute, the subject and the situation. [592B] The absence of the expression 'immediate action' in section 18AA(1)(b) does not make any difference. Section 18AA(1)(a) refers to a situation where immediate preventive action may avert a disaster, whereas section 18AA contemplates a situation where the disaster has occurred and action is necessary to restore normalcy. Restoration of production where production has stopped in a key industry or industrial undertaking is as important and urgent in the public interest as prevention of a situation where production may be affected. Immediate action is, therefore, as necessary in the situation contemplated by section 18AA(1)(b) as in the situation contemplated by section 18AA(1)(a). [596 F-G] The marginal note refers to the power to take over without investigation but there is no sufficient reason to suppose that the word immediate is used only to contra- distinguish it from the investigation contemplated by section 15 of the Act, though of course a consequence of immediate action under section 18AA may be to dispense with the enquiry under section 15. In fact, facts which come to light during the course of an investigation under section 15 may form the basis of action under section 18AA(1)(a). Where in the course of an investigation under section 15 it is discovered that the management have, by reckless investments or creation of encumbrances on the assets of the industrial undertaking or by diversion of funds brought about a situation which is likely to affect the production of the articles manufactured or produced in the industrial undertaking, if the Government is satisfied that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation, there is no reason why the Central Government may not straightaway take action under section 18AA(1)(a) without waiting for completion of investigation under section 15. [597A-B] Where there is a provision in the statute itself for revocation of the order by the very authority making the decision, it appears to be unnecessary to insist upon a pre- decisional observance of natural justice. [598A] The likelihood of production being jeopardized or the stoppage of production in a key industrial undertaking is a matter of grave concern affecting the public interest. Parliament has taken so serious a view of the matter that it has authorised the Central Government to take over the management of the industrial undertaking if immediate action may prevent jeopardy to production or restore production where it has already stopped. The necessity for immediate action by the Central Government contemplated by Parliament is definitely indicative of the exclusion of natural justice. It is not as if the owner of the industrial undertaking is left with no remedy. He may move the Central Government under section 18-F to cancel the order made under section 18AA. [598C-D] Neither section 18-F of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act nor section 21 of the General Clauses Act by itself excludes natural justice. The exclusion of natural justice where such exclusion is not express has to be implied by reference to the subject, the statute and the statutory situation. Where an express provision in the statute itself provides for a post decisional hearing the other provisions of the Statute will have to be read in the light of such provision and the provision for post- decisional hearing may then clinch the issue where pre- decisional natural justice appears to be excluded on the other terms of the statute. That a post-decisional hearing may also be had by the terms of section 21 of the General Clauses Act may not necessarily help in the interpretation of the provisions of the statute concerned. [599 A-C] Ridge v. Baldwin, 1964 A.C. p. 40; Annie G. Phillip v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 75 L.E.d. 1289; John H. Fahey v. Paul Mallonee, 91 L.E.d. 2030; Margarita Fuentes v. Robert L. Shevin, Attorney General of Florida, 32 L.E.d. 2d 556 and Lawrence Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 40 L.E.d. 2d 406, referred to. - Rama Rao, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh as well as the President of the Telugu Desam Party as well as respondent No. 3. The advertisements very shortly stated, refer to the auspicious gifts made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to the poor people on the eve of New Year and Sankranti. In the said advertisements, it is stated that the said Government which was formed by the Telugu Desam Party was giving to the poor people whose income was below Rs. and the said advertisements referred to a new scheme of selling sarees and dhoties at half prices to the poor people in the State of Andhra Pradesh having Green-cards. Moreover, the offer in the advertisements for the sale of dhoties and sarees at discount rates was in the nature of a benefit offered to poor persons in that State. When a Government announces the measures which are intended for the benefit of any of the classes for whose the Government can normally be expected to work like the poor or the economical backward classes, it is only in rare circumstances that such a promise can be said to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) even though such a promise might be made on the eve of elections. 8. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => '', 'counseldef' => '', 'court' => 'Supreme Court of India', 'court_type' => 'SC', 'decidedon' => '1989-09-29', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' K.N. Saikia,; M.H. Kania and; S. Ranganathan, JJ.', 'judgement' => '</p><p>Kania, J.</p><p>1. These two appeals arise out of the judgments in two Election Petitions in the Andhra Pradesh High Court questioning the election of respondent No. 1 as a Member of Parliament from Srikakulam No. Parliamentary Constituency in the 8th General Election to the House of the People. The points raised in these appeals are common and so are the relevant facts; and, hence, they are being disposed of by this common judgment. We propose to take note of only the few facts which are necessary for the appreciation of the controversy before us.</p><p>2. The polling date for the said election along with other parliamentary elections in the State of Andhra Pradesh was December 27, 1984 but in Srikakulam No. 1 Parliamentary Constituency the polling was countermanded and the date of polling was later fixed on January 28, 1985. In both the Election Petitions the election of respondent No. 1 was questioned mainly on the ground that Shri N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh as well as the President of the Telugu Desam Party as well as respondent No. 1 gave certain speeches and certain advertisements were got published by Shri N.T. Rama Rao through the Publicity Department of the Government of Andhra Pradesh in the newspapers containing certain statements which are alleged to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A) of the <a>Representation of the People Act, 1951</a> (hereinafter referred to as 'the said Act'). The main question canvassed before us is whether the statements contained in these aforesaid advertisements amount to a corrupt practice under Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act. Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act runs as follows :</p><p>123. Corrupt practices</p><p>The following shall be deemed to be corrupt practises for the purposes of this Act :</p><p>(1) 'Bribery', that is to say.</p><p>(A) any gift, offer or promise by a candidate or his agent or by any other person with the consent of a candidate or his election agent of any gratification, to any person whomsover, with the object, directly or indirectly of inducing.</p><p>(a) x x x</p><p>(b) an elector to vote or refrain from voting at an election, or as a reward to.</p><p>(i) a person for having so stood or not stood, or for having withdrawn or not having withdrawn his candidature; or</p><p>(ii) an elector for having voted or refrained from voting.</p><p>3. The advertisements very shortly stated, refer to the auspicious gifts made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to the poor people on the eve of New Year and Sankranti. In the said advertisements, it is stated that the said Government which was formed by the Telugu Desam Party was giving to the poor people whose income was below Rs. 6,000 per year, a kilo of rice at Rs. 2 per Kg. and the said advertisements referred to a new scheme of selling sarees and dhoties at half prices to the poor people in the State of Andhra Pradesh having Green-cards. Green-cards were directed to be issued to all the persons whose annual income was below Rs. 6,000. The supply of the rice at subsidised rates as aforesaid was also to be made to the Green-card holders only. The scheme to sell sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was to be operative from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985.</p><p>4. In considering the question whether the said advertisement and the said speeches amount to a corrupt practice, we are of the view that the provisions of Section 123 of the said Act which deal with corrupt practices have to be interpreted, keeping in mind that dictates of commonsense require that they never could have been intended to treat normal election promises made in election manifestoes or usual election speeches by members of various political parties aspiring to power and by different candidates aspiring to get elected to legislative bodies concerned as corrupt practices. We are of the view that these advertisements and speeches amount to nothing more than statements extolling the achievements of the Government of the State of Andhra Pradesh under the Telugu Desam Party headed by N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister, and contain normal election promises and these statements do not amount to corrupt practices falling within the scope of Sub-clause (b) of Clause (A) of Sub-section (1) of Section 123 of the said Act.</p><p>5. It was urged by Mr. Rao, learned Counsel for the appellants that in the impugned judgments, the High Court has incorrectly taken the view that in order to amount to bribery within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A), the transaction must amount to a bargain by the candidate with a view to get votes. It was pointed out by him that the said view has been taken in the impugned judgments, relying upon the decision of a Bench comprising to learned Judges of this Court in Ghasi Ram v. Dal Singh and Ors. :1983 SCR 102 . We have gone through to the relevant portion of that judgment (at page 109 and 110 of the said report). A careful perusal of the said judgment shows that what has been really held in that case is that if the promises given or made amount to a bargain entered into by a candidate for a vote or votes, that would amount to a corrupt practice; but it has not been held there that unless the act alleged amounts to such a bargain, it could not amount to a corrupt practice. In our view, that judgment does not lay down that in order to amount to a corrupt practice, the transaction must amount to a bargain for getting a vote. It was pointed out by Mr. Rao, however, that such a view seems to have been taken in two other decisions rendered by two Benches, each comprising two learned Judges of this Court in Bhanu Kumar Shastri v. Mohan Lal Sukhadia and Ors. : [1971]3SCR522 and Harjit Singh Mann v. S Umrao Singh and Ors. : [1980]2SCR501 . and these judgments need to be overruled. We do not propose to go into the correctness or otherwise of this view because, even on the footing that in order to amount to a corrupt practice under the aforesaid provision the alleged acts need not constitute a bargain, the the acts established in the present case, in our opinion, do not amount to a corrupt practice.</p><p>6. Our attention was drawn by Mr. Rao to the fact that in this case the said advertisements and the speeches had to be viewed in the context of the fact that the advertisements were issued and the speeches were made after respondent No. 1 filed his nomination papers on January 4, 1985, for the election and before the election was held in the aforesaid constituency. It was further pointed out that the offer made for the sale of sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was limited to the period from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985. It cannot be denied that these factors are relevant factOrs. We cannot, however, lose sight of the fact that this offer was made not only in this constituency but throughout the State where the elections to the House of the People were scheduled to be held, and were, in fact, held on December 27, 1984. It was only in case of this constituency that the election to be held on the scheduled date was countermanded and later held on January 28, 1985. We cannot lose sight of the fact that, as far as the said speeches and the said advertisements, which were issued by the Publicity Department of the State, are concerned, they deal in the main with the achievements of the Government of Andhra Pradesh which, of course, was being run by Ministers belonging to Telugu Desam Party to which respondent No. 1 also belonged. Moreover, the offer in the advertisements for the sale of dhoties and sarees at discount rates was in the nature of a benefit offered to poor persons in that State. When a Government announces the measures which are intended for the benefit of any of the classes for whose the Government can normally be expected to work like the poor or the economical backward classes, it is only in rare circumstances that such a promise can be said to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) even though such a promise might be made on the eve of elections. Keeping this in mind, in our opinion, although the offer to sell dhoties and sarees at discount rates was of a limited duration as aforestated, it cannot be regarded as a corrupt practice. Such an offer was bound to have financial repercussions and it is quite possible the duration of the offer was limited to enable the Government to study the financial repercussions rather than from any improper motive. We find support for this view from the decision of this Court in H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh : [1969]3SCR813 . In that case an Ordinance was passed by the Government of Madhya Pradesh as a result of which a large number of agriculturists, namely, those holdings of plots of land of less than 7.5 acres area or paying land revenue not exceeding Rs. 5/- were exempted from the payment of the land revenue. It was held that such a concession does not amount to a gift, offer or promise of any gratification within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) of the said Act nor does the announcement of the declaration made at a meeting shortly before the election or the issue of a pamphlet containing that declaration at that time carry the matter any further. It was held that neither Shri D.P. Misra who was the Chief Minister nor Shri S.K. Dixit who acted as his agent were guilty of any corrupt practice within the meaning of the aforesaid provision.</p><p>7. It was next contended by Mr. Rao, although very faintly, that the High Court was in error as it had not decided all other issues which were raised in the election petition. In this regard we cannot lose sight of the fact that the term of the present Lok Sabha is likely to be over within a few months and fresh elections are likely to be held and it would, therefore, be an exercise in futility to remand the matter to the High Court for deciding the remaining issues.</p><p>8. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.<p></p><p>', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'AIR1990SC1889; JT1989(4)SC186; 1989(2)SCALE891; 1989Supp(2)SCC504', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors.', 'sub' => 'Election', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ) $casename_url = 'b-rajagopala-rao-vs-appayya-hanumanthu' $args = array( (int) 0 => '640942', (int) 1 => 'b-rajagopala-rao-vs-appayya-hanumanthu' ) $url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/640942/b-rajagopala-rao-vs-appayya-hanumanthu' $ctype = '' $caseref = 'H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh<br>' $content = array( (int) 0 => '', (int) 1 => '<p>Kania, J.', (int) 2 => '<p>1. These two appeals arise out of the judgments in two Election Petitions in the Andhra Pradesh High Court questioning the election of respondent No. 1 as a Member of Parliament from Srikakulam No. Parliamentary Constituency in the 8th General Election to the House of the People. The points raised in these appeals are common and so are the relevant facts; and, hence, they are being disposed of by this common judgment. We propose to take note of only the few facts which are necessary for the appreciation of the controversy before us.', (int) 3 => '<p>2. The polling date for the said election along with other parliamentary elections in the State of Andhra Pradesh was December 27, 1984 but in Srikakulam No. 1 Parliamentary Constituency the polling was countermanded and the date of polling was later fixed on January 28, 1985. In both the Election Petitions the election of respondent No. 1 was questioned mainly on the ground that Shri N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh as well as the President of the Telugu Desam Party as well as respondent No. 1 gave certain speeches and certain advertisements were got published by Shri N.T. Rama Rao through the Publicity Department of the Government of Andhra Pradesh in the newspapers containing certain statements which are alleged to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A) of the <a>Representation of the People Act, 1951</a> (hereinafter referred to as 'the said Act'). The main question canvassed before us is whether the statements contained in these aforesaid advertisements amount to a corrupt practice under Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act. Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act runs as follows :', (int) 4 => '<p>123. Corrupt practices', (int) 5 => '<p>The following shall be deemed to be corrupt practises for the purposes of this Act :', (int) 6 => '<p>(1) 'Bribery', that is to say.', (int) 7 => '<p>(A) any gift, offer or promise by a candidate or his agent or by any other person with the consent of a candidate or his election agent of any gratification, to any person whomsover, with the object, directly or indirectly of inducing.', (int) 8 => '<p>(a) x x x', (int) 9 => '<p>(b) an elector to vote or refrain from voting at an election, or as a reward to.', (int) 10 => '<p>(i) a person for having so stood or not stood, or for having withdrawn or not having withdrawn his candidature; or', (int) 11 => '<p>(ii) an elector for having voted or refrained from voting.', (int) 12 => '<p>3. The advertisements very shortly stated, refer to the auspicious gifts made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to the poor people on the eve of New Year and Sankranti. In the said advertisements, it is stated that the said Government which was formed by the Telugu Desam Party was giving to the poor people whose income was below Rs. 6,000 per year, a kilo of rice at Rs. 2 per Kg. and the said advertisements referred to a new scheme of selling sarees and dhoties at half prices to the poor people in the State of Andhra Pradesh having Green-cards. Green-cards were directed to be issued to all the persons whose annual income was below Rs. 6,000. The supply of the rice at subsidised rates as aforesaid was also to be made to the Green-card holders only. The scheme to sell sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was to be operative from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985.', (int) 13 => '<p>4. In considering the question whether the said advertisement and the said speeches amount to a corrupt practice, we are of the view that the provisions of Section 123 of the said Act which deal with corrupt practices have to be interpreted, keeping in mind that dictates of commonsense require that they never could have been intended to treat normal election promises made in election manifestoes or usual election speeches by members of various political parties aspiring to power and by different candidates aspiring to get elected to legislative bodies concerned as corrupt practices. We are of the view that these advertisements and speeches amount to nothing more than statements extolling the achievements of the Government of the State of Andhra Pradesh under the Telugu Desam Party headed by N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister, and contain normal election promises and these statements do not amount to corrupt practices falling within the scope of Sub-clause (b) of Clause (A) of Sub-section (1) of Section 123 of the said Act.', (int) 14 => '<p>5. It was urged by Mr. Rao, learned Counsel for the appellants that in the impugned judgments, the High Court has incorrectly taken the view that in order to amount to bribery within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A), the transaction must amount to a bargain by the candidate with a view to get votes. It was pointed out by him that the said view has been taken in the impugned judgments, relying upon the decision of a Bench comprising to learned Judges of this Court in Ghasi Ram v. Dal Singh and Ors. :1983 SCR 102 . We have gone through to the relevant portion of that judgment (at page 109 and 110 of the said report). A careful perusal of the said judgment shows that what has been really held in that case is that if the promises given or made amount to a bargain entered into by a candidate for a vote or votes, that would amount to a corrupt practice; but it has not been held there that unless the act alleged amounts to such a bargain, it could not amount to a corrupt practice. In our view, that judgment does not lay down that in order to amount to a corrupt practice, the transaction must amount to a bargain for getting a vote. It was pointed out by Mr. Rao, however, that such a view seems to have been taken in two other decisions rendered by two Benches, each comprising two learned Judges of this Court in Bhanu Kumar Shastri v. Mohan Lal Sukhadia and Ors. : [1971]3SCR522 and Harjit Singh Mann v. S Umrao Singh and Ors. : [1980]2SCR501 . and these judgments need to be overruled. We do not propose to go into the correctness or otherwise of this view because, even on the footing that in order to amount to a corrupt practice under the aforesaid provision the alleged acts need not constitute a bargain, the the acts established in the present case, in our opinion, do not amount to a corrupt practice.', (int) 15 => '<p>6. Our attention was drawn by Mr. Rao to the fact that in this case the said advertisements and the speeches had to be viewed in the context of the fact that the advertisements were issued and the speeches were made after respondent No. 1 filed his nomination papers on January 4, 1985, for the election and before the election was held in the aforesaid constituency. It was further pointed out that the offer made for the sale of sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was limited to the period from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985. It cannot be denied that these factors are relevant factOrs. We cannot, however, lose sight of the fact that this offer was made not only in this constituency but throughout the State where the elections to the House of the People were scheduled to be held, and were, in fact, held on December 27, 1984. It was only in case of this constituency that the election to be held on the scheduled date was countermanded and later held on January 28, 1985. We cannot lose sight of the fact that, as far as the said speeches and the said advertisements, which were issued by the Publicity Department of the State, are concerned, they deal in the main with the achievements of the Government of Andhra Pradesh which, of course, was being run by Ministers belonging to Telugu Desam Party to which respondent No. 1 also belonged. Moreover, the offer in the advertisements for the sale of dhoties and sarees at discount rates was in the nature of a benefit offered to poor persons in that State. When a Government announces the measures which are intended for the benefit of any of the classes for whose the Government can normally be expected to work like the poor or the economical backward classes, it is only in rare circumstances that such a promise can be said to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) even though such a promise might be made on the eve of elections. Keeping this in mind, in our opinion, although the offer to sell dhoties and sarees at discount rates was of a limited duration as aforestated, it cannot be regarded as a corrupt practice. Such an offer was bound to have financial repercussions and it is quite possible the duration of the offer was limited to enable the Government to study the financial repercussions rather than from any improper motive. We find support for this view from the decision of this Court in H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh : [1969]3SCR813 . In that case an Ordinance was passed by the Government of Madhya Pradesh as a result of which a large number of agriculturists, namely, those holdings of plots of land of less than 7.5 acres area or paying land revenue not exceeding Rs. 5/- were exempted from the payment of the land revenue. It was held that such a concession does not amount to a gift, offer or promise of any gratification within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) of the said Act nor does the announcement of the declaration made at a meeting shortly before the election or the issue of a pamphlet containing that declaration at that time carry the matter any further. It was held that neither Shri D.P. Misra who was the Chief Minister nor Shri S.K. Dixit who acted as his agent were guilty of any corrupt practice within the meaning of the aforesaid provision.', (int) 16 => '<p>7. It was next contended by Mr. Rao, although very faintly, that the High Court was in error as it had not decided all other issues which were raised in the election petition. In this regard we cannot lose sight of the fact that the term of the present Lok Sabha is likely to be over within a few months and fresh elections are likely to be held and it would, therefore, be an exercise in futility to remand the matter to the High Court for deciding the remaining issues.', (int) 17 => '<p>8. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.<p>', (int) 18 => '<p>' ) $paragraphAfter = (int) 1 $cnt = (int) 19 $i = (int) 14include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144 View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971 View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933 View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473 Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963 Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200 Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167 [main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109
5. It was urged by Mr. Rao, learned Counsel for the appellants that in the impugned judgments, the High Court has incorrectly taken the view that in order to amount to bribery within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A), the transaction must amount to a bargain by the candidate with a view to get votes. It was pointed out by him that the said view has been taken in the impugned judgments, relying upon the decision of a Bench comprising to learned Judges of this Court in Ghasi Ram v. Dal Singh and Ors. :1983 SCR 102 . We have gone through to the relevant portion of that judgment (at page 109 and 110 of the said report). A careful perusal of the said judgment shows that what has been really held in that case is that if the promises given or made amount to a bargain entered into by a candidate for a vote or votes, that would amount to a corrupt practice; but it has not been held there that unless the act alleged amounts to such a bargain, it could not amount to a corrupt practice. In our view, that judgment does not lay down that in order to amount to a corrupt practice, the transaction must amount to a bargain for getting a vote. It was pointed out by Mr. Rao, however, that such a view seems to have been taken in two other decisions rendered by two Benches, each comprising two learned Judges of this Court in Bhanu Kumar Shastri v. Mohan Lal Sukhadia and Ors. : [1971]3SCR522 and Harjit Singh Mann v. S Umrao Singh and Ors. : [1980]2SCR501 . and these judgments need to be overruled. We do not propose to go into the correctness or otherwise of this view because, even on the footing that in order to amount to a corrupt practice under the aforesaid provision the alleged acts need not constitute a bargain, the the acts established in the present case, in our opinion, do not amount to a corrupt practice.
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$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp' $dataForView = array( 'title_for_layout' => 'B Rajagopala Rao and anr Vs Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors - Citation 640942 - Court Judgment | ', 'desc' => array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '640942', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/50684/representation-of-the-people-act-1951-complete-act">Representation of the People Act, 1951</a> - Sections 1, 3(1)(A), 123 and 123(1)(A)', 'appealno' => 'Civil Appeal Nos. 484 and 485 of 1987', 'appellant' => 'B. Rajagopala Rao and anr.', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'B. Rajagopala Rao and anr. Vs. Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors.', 'casenote' => 'Election - corrupt practices - Sections 123 and 123 (1) (A) of Representation of the People Act, 1951 - whether advertisements by public department and speeches made by respondent No. 1 to sell dhoti and sarees at discount rates amount to corrupt practices - offer was available for mass and for limited duration - such offer was bound to have financial repercussions and it is quite possible that duration of offer limited to enable Government to study financial repercussions rather than from any improper motive - offer not amounted to corrupt practices. - [ D.A. Desai,; O. Chinnappa Reddy and; R.S. Sarkaria, JJ.] The Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 empowers the Union of India in the public interest to take under its control the industries specified in the First Schedule to the Act. Item 23 of the First Schedule relates to textiles of various categories. Section 15 authorises the Central Government to make or cause to be made a full and complete investigation into the circumstances of the case if the Central Government is of the opinion that (a) in respect of any scheduled industry or industrial undertaking or undertakings (i) there has been, or is likely to be, a substantial fall in the volume of production for which, having regard to the economic conditions prevailing, there is no justification; or (ii) there has been, or is likely to be, a marked deterioration in the quality of any article... which could have been or can be avoided; or (iii) there has been or is likely to be a rise in the price of any article..... for which there is no justification; or (iv) it is necessary to take any such action for the purpose of conserving any resources of national importance; or (b) any industrial undertaking is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest. After the investigation is made under section 15, section 16(1) empowers the Central Government if action is desirable, to issue appropriate directions, and section 16(2) provides for the issue of interim directions by the Central Government pending investigation under section 15. Chapter III-A consisting of Sections 18A, 18-AA, 18-B, 18-C, 18-D, 18-E and 18-F deal with "direct management or control of Industrial Undertakings by Central Government in certain cases". Sec. 18-A empowers the Central Government by notified order, to authorise any person or body of persons to take over the management of the whole or any part of an industrial undertaking or to exercise in respect of the whole, or any part of the undertaking such functions of control as may be specified in the order, if the Central Government is of opinion that: (a) an industrial undertaking to which directions have been issued in pursuance of section 16 has failed to comply with such directions, or (b) an industrial undertaking in respect of which an investigation has been made under section 15 is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest. Section 18AA(5) stipulates that the provisions of Sections 18-B to 18 E shall be applicable to the industrial undertaking in respect of which an order has been made under section 18-AA even as they apply to an industrial undertaking taken over under Section 18-A. Section 18-F empowers the Central Government to cancel the order made under section 18-A if it appears that the purpose of the order has been fulfilled or it is not necessary that the order should remain in force. The appellant M/s. Swadeshi Cotton Mills was taken over by the Government of India by a notification dated April 13, 1978 in exercise of the powers conferred on it under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 18AA of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 on the ground that the company had by creation of encumbrances on the assets of its industrial undertakings, brought about a situation which had affected and is likely to further affect the production of articles manufactured or produced by it and that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation. The Government authorised the National Textile Corporation Limited to take over the management, subject to the conditions that the authorised person shall comply with all the directions issued from time to time by the Central Government and that the authorised person shall hold office for a period of five years. The appellant Mills challenged the aforesaid order in a writ petition in the High Court. The case was heard by a Full Bench of five Judges to consider the question whether in construing section 18AA of the Industries Development and Regulation Act, 1951, compliance with the principle of audi alteram partem is to be implied and whether hearing is to be given to the parties who would be affected by the order to be passed prior to the passing of the order or whether hearing can be given after the order is passed and whether the order passed under the said Section is vitiated by not giving of such hearing and whether such vice can be cured. The Bench by a majority answered the three questions as follows:- (a) Section 18AA(1)(a)(b) excludes the giving of prior hearing to the party who would be affected by order thereunder. (b) Section 18-F expressly provides for a post- decisional hearing to the owner of the industrial undertaking, the management of which is taken over under section 18AA to have the order made under section 18AA cancelled on any relevant ground. (c) As the taking over of management under section 18A is not vitiated by the failure to grant prior hearing the question of any such vice being cured by a grant of a subsequent hearing does not arise. The minority, however, held that in compliance with the principles of natural justice, prior hearing to the owner of the undertaking was required to be given before the passing of an order under section 18AA, that the second question did not arise as the denial of a prior hearing would not cure the vice by the grant of subsequent hearing, but it would be open to the Court to moderate the relief in such a way that the order is kept alive to the extent necessary until the making of the fresh order to subserve public interest and to make appropriate directions. After the decision on the reference the case was reheard on merits by a Full Bench of three Judges and the writ petition was allowed in part. The challenge to the validity of the order being rejected but insofar as the impugned order seeking to take over the corporate entity of the company, the corporate entity of the subsidiary and its assets, the petition was allowed and the respondents, the Union of India and the authorised person were directed to release from its control and custody and/or deliver possession of any assets or property of the company which were not referable to the industrial undertakings. Appeals to this Court were filed on behalf of the Company as well as by the Union of India and the National Textile Corporation. Two propositions were propounded on behalf of the company that: (a) Whether it was necessary to observe the rules of natural justice before issuing a notified order under section 18AA(1)(a) and further whether section 18-F impliedly excludes rules of natural justice relating to prior hearing; and it was contended (1) the mere use of the word 'immediate' in sub-clause (a) of section 18AA does not show a legislative intent to exclude the application of audi alteram partem rule altogether. (2) The word 'immediate' in clause (a) has been used in contra distinction to 'investigate'. It only means that under section 18AA action can be taken without prior investigation under section 15. The use of the word 'immediate' in section 18AA(1)(a) only dispenses with investigation under section 15 and not with the principle of audi alteram partem altogether and this is indicated by the marginal note of section 18A and para 3 of the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Amendment Bill which inserted section 18AA in 1971. (3) The word 'immediate' occurs only in clause (a) and not in clause (b) of section 18AA(1). It would be odd if intention to exclude this principle of natural justice is spelt out in one clause of the sub-section when the other clause does not exclude it. (4) Section 18-F does not exclude a pre-decisional hearing. The so-called post-decisional hearing contemplated by section 18-F cannot be and is not intended to be a substitute for a pre-decisional hearing. (5) Section 18F incorporates only a facet, albeit qualified, of section 21 of the General Clauses Act. The language of the Section implicity prohibits an enquiry into circumstances that led to the passing of the order of take-over and under it the aggrieved person is not entitled to show that on merits the order was void ab initio. (6) 'Immediacy' does not exclude a duty to act fairly because even an emergent situation can co-exist with the canons of natural justice. The only effect of urgency on the application of the principle of fair hearing would be that the width, form and duration of the hearing would be tailored to the situation and reduced to the reasonable minimum so that it does not delay and defeat the purpose of the contemplated action. (7) Where the civil consequences of the administrative action are grave and its effect is highly prejudicial to the rights and interests of the person affected and there is nothing in the language and scheme of the statute which unequivocally excludes a fair pre-decisional hearing and the post-decisional hearing provided therein is not a real remedial hearing equitable to a full right of appeal the Court should be loath to infer a legislative intent to exclude even a minimal fair hearing at the pre-decisional stage merely on ground of urgency. (8) The Central Government appointed four Government Officials including one from the office of the Textile Commissioner to study the affairs of the Company and to make recommendation. This Official Group submitted its report on February 16, 1978. The evidence on the basis of which the impugned order was passed was not disclosed to the appellant company till May 1978, only after it had filed the writ petition in the High Court. If there was anything adverse to the appellants in the survey report there was time enough about six weeks between the submission of the Survey Report and the passing of the impugned order for giving a short, reasonable opportunity to the appellants to explain the adverse findings against them. If there was immediacy situational modifications could be made to meet the requirement of fairness, by reducing the period of notice; that even the manner and form of such notice could be simplified to eliminate delay, that telephonic notice or short opportunity for furnishing their explanation to the Company might have satisfied the requirements of natural justice. Such an opportunity of hearing could have been given after the passing of a conditional tentative order and before its enforcement under section 18AA. For the interregnum suitable interim action such as freezing the assets of the Company or restraining the Company from creating further encumbrances, could be taken under section 16. On behalf of the Union of India and the Authorised Officer it was contended that (1) the presumption in favour of audi alteram partem rule stands impliedly displaced by the language scheme, setting and the purpose of the provision in section 18AA. (2) Section 18AA on its plain terms deals with situations where immediate preventive action is required. The paramount concern is to avoid serious problems which may be caused by fall in production. The purpose of an order under section 18AA is not to condemn the owner but to protect the scheduled industry. The issue under section 18AA is not solely between the Government and the management of the industrial undertaking. The object of taking action under this Section is to protect other outside interests of the community at large and the workers. (3) The rule of natural justice to give a hearing has been incorporated in section 18-F which gives an opportunity of a post-decisional hearing to the owner of the undertaking who if he feels aggrieved can on his application be heard, to show that even the original order under section 18AA was passed on invalid grounds and should be cancelled or rescinded. (4) On a true construction of section 18AA read with section 18-F the requirements of natural justice and fair play can be read into the statute only insofar as conformance to such canons can reasonably and realistically be required of it by the provision for a remedial hearing at a subsequent stage. (5) Under section 18-F the Central Government exercises curial functions and that Section confers on the aggrieved owner a right to apply to the Government to cancel the order of take-over. This section casts an obligation on the Central Government to deal with and dispose of an application filed thereunder with reasonable expedition. Allowing the appeal by the Company,<br />HELD: (Sarkaria & Desai, JJ. per Chinnappa Reddy, J. dissenting.) In the facts and circumstances of the instant case, there has been a noncompliance with the implied requirement of the audi alteram partem rule of natural justice at the pre-decisional stage. The impugned order could be struck down as invalid on that score alone. But in view of the commitment / concession that a hearing would be afforded to the Company, the case is remitted to the Central Government to give a full, fair and effective hearing. [587G-H, 588C] The phrase 'natural justice' is not capable of a static and precise definition. It cannot be imprisoned in the straight-jacket of a cast-iron formula. Rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. Hence not possible to make an exhaustive catalogue of such rules. Two fundamental maxims of natural justice have now become deeply and indelibly ingrained in the common consciousness of mankind as pre-eminently necessary to ensure that the law is applied impartially objectively and fairly. These twin principles are (i) audi alteram partem and (ii) nemo judex in re sua. Audi alteram partem is a highly effective rule devised by the Courts to ensure that a statutory authority arrives at a just decision and it is calculated to act as a healthy check on the abuse or misuse of power. Its reach should not be narrowed and its applicability circumscribed.[554C-G] The rules of natural justice can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. If a statutory provision either specifically or by inevitable implication excludes the application of the rules of natural justice then the Court cannot ignore the mandate of the Legislature. Whether or not the application of the principles of natural justice in a given case has been excluded in the exercise of statutory power depends upon the language and basic scheme of the provision conferring the power, the nature of the power the purpose for which it is conferred and the effect of that power. [556A-B] The maxim audi alteram partem has many facets. Two of them are (a) notice of the case to be met, and (b) opportunity to explain. The rule cannot be sacrificed at the altar of administrative convenience or celerity; for, convenience and justice are often not on speaking terms. Difficulties, however, arise when the statute conferring the power does not expressly exclude this rule but its exclusion is sought by implication due to the presence of certain factors such as urgency where the obligation to give notice and opportunity to be heard would obstruct the taking of prompt action of a preventive or remedial nature. Audi alteram partem rule may be disregarded in an emergent situation where immediate action brooks no delay to prevent some imminent danger or injury or hazard to paramount public interests. Section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure empowers the magistrates specified therein to make an exparte conditional order in emergent cases for removal of dangerous public nuisances. Action under section 17 Land Acquisition Act furnishes another such instance. Similarly action on grounds of public safety public health may justify disregard of the rule of prior hearing. [556C-H] Cases where owing to the compulsion of the fact situation or the necessity of taking speedy action no pre- decisional hearing is given but the action, is followed soon by a full post-decisional hearing to the person affected do not in reality constitute an exception to the audi alteram partem rule. To call such cases as exception is a misnomer because they do not exclude fair play in action but adapt it to the urgency of the situation by balancing the competing claims of hurry and hearing. [560H-561A] The general principle as distinguished from an absolute rule of uniform application seems to be that where a statute does not in terms exclude this rule of prior hearing but contemplates a post-decisional hearing amounting to a full review of the original order on merits then such a statute would be construed as excluding the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage. [561G] If the statute conferring the power is silent with regard to the giving of pre-decisional hearing to the person affected and the administrative decision taken by the authority involves civil consequences of a grave nature and no full review or appeal on merits against that decision is provided courts will be extremely reluctant to construe such a statute as excluding the duty of affording even a minimal hearing shorn of all its formal trappings and dilatory features at the pre-decisional stage, unless viewed pragmatically it would paralyse the administrative process or frustrate the need for utmost promptitude. [561H] 7(i). A comparison of the provisions of Section 18A(1)(b) and Section 18AA(1)(c), bring out two main points of distinction: First, action under Section 18A(1)(b) can be taken only after an investigation had been made under Section 15; while under Section 18AA(1)(a) or (b) action can be taken without such investigation. The language, scheme and setting of Section 18AA read in the light of the Objects and Reasons for enacting this provision make this position clear beyond doubt. Second, before taking action under Section 18A(1)(b), the Central Government has to form an opinion on the basis of the investigation conducted under section 15, in regard to the existence of the objective fact, namely: that the industrial undertaking is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest; while under section 18A(1)(a) the Government has to satisfy itself that the persons incharge of the undertaking have brought about a situation likely to cause fall in production, by committing any of the three kinds of acts specified in that provision. This shows that the preliminary objective fact attributable to the persons in charge of the management or affairs of the undertaking, on the basis of which action may be taken under section 18(A)(1)(b), is of far wider amplitude than the circumstance, the existence of which is a sine qua non for taking action under section 18AA(1). The phrase "highly detrimental to the scheduled industry or public interest" in section 18-A is capable of being construed to cover a large variety of acts or things which may be considered wrong with the manner of running the industry by the management. In contrast with it, action under section 18AA(1)(a) can be taken only if the Central Government is satisfied with regard to the existence of the twin conditions specifically mentioned therein, on the basis of evidence in its possession. [569D-H] An analysis of section 18AA(1)(a), indicates that as a necessary preliminary to the exercise of the power thereunder, the Central Government must be satisfied "from documentary or other evidence in its possession" in regard to the co-existence of two circumstances: (i) that the persons in charge of the industrial undertaking have by committing any of these acts, namely, reckless investments, or creation of incumbrances on the assets of industrial undertaking, or by diversion of funds, brought about a situation which is likely to affect the production of the article manufactured or produced in the industrial undertaking, and (ii) that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation.[570B-D] It cannot be laid down as a general proposition that whenever a statute confers a power on an administrative authority and makes the exercise of that power conditional on the formation of an opinion by that authority in regard to the existence of an immediacy, its opinion in regard to that preliminary fact is not open to judicial scrutiny at all. While it may be conceded that an element of subjectivity is always involved in the formation of such an opinion, the existence of the circumstances from which the inference constituting the opinion, as the sine qua non for action, are to be drawn, must be demonstrable, and the existence of such "circumstances", if questioned, must be proved at least prima facie. [571 E-G] From a plain reading of section 18AA, it is clear that it does not expressly in unmistakable and unequivocal terms exclude the application of the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage. [574B] In the instant case, so far as Kanpur Unit is concerned, it was lying closed for more than three months before the passing of the impugned order. There was no 'immediacy' in relation to that unit, which could absolve the Government from the obligation of complying fully with audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional or pre- takeover stage. [583A] Keshav Mills Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, [1973] 3 S.C.R. 22; Kamla Prasad Khetan v. Union of India,[1957] S.C.R. 1052; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 621; Sukhdev Singh & Ors. v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh, [1975] 3 S.C.R. 619; A. K. Kraipak v. Union of India, [1970] 1 S.C.R. 457; Ridge v. Baldwin, [1964] A.C. 40; 196; Heatley v. Tasmanian Racing & Gaming Commission, 14 Australian Law Reports 519; Nawabkhan Abbaskhan v. State of Gujarat, [1974] 3 S.C.R. 427; State of Orissa v. Dr. Bina Pani Dei, [1962] 2 S.C.R. 625; Ambalal M. Shah v. Hathi Singh Manufacturing Co. Ltd. [1962] 3 S.C.R. 171; and S. L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan & Ors., [1981] 1 S.C.R. 746, referred to. (Per Chinnappa Reddy, J. dissenting) The principles of natural justice are not attracted to the situations contemplated by section 18AA of Industries (Development and Regulation) Act. Natural justice like Ultra Vires and Public Policy is a branch of the public law and is a formidable weapon which can be wielded to secure justice to the citizen. While it may be used to protect certain fundamental liberties, civil and political rights, it may be used as indeed it is used more often than not, to protect vested interests and to obstruct the path of progressive change. The time has come to make an appropriate distinction between natural justice in its application to fundamental liberties, civil and political rights and natural justice in its application to vested interests. [590A-B] Our constitution as befits the Constitution of a Socialist Secular Democratic Republic, recognises the paramountcy of the public weal over the private interest. Natural justice, ultra vires, public policy, or any other rule of interpretation must, therefore, conform, grow and be tailored to serve the public interest and respond to the demands of an evolving society. [590C] The principles of natural justice have taken deep root in the judicial conscience of our people. They are now considered so fundamental as to be implicit in every decision making function, judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative. Where authority functions under a statute and the statute provides for the observance of the principles of natural justice in a particular manner, natural justice will have to be observed in that manner and in no other. Where the statute is silent about the observance of the principles of natural justice, such statutory silence is taken to imply compliance with the principles of natural justice. Where the conflict is between the public interest and the private interest the presumption must necessarily be weak and may, therefore, be readily displaced. The presumption is also weak, where what are involved are mere property rights. In cases of urgency, particularly where the public interest is involved, preemptive action may be a strategic necessity. Even in cases of preemptive action, if the statute so provides or if the Courts so deem fit in appropriate cases, a postponed hearing may be substituted for natural justice. [590A-C; 591F-G] 3(ii). Where natural justice is implied, the extent of the implication and the nature of the hearing must vary with the statute, the subject and the situation. [592B] The absence of the expression 'immediate action' in section 18AA(1)(b) does not make any difference. Section 18AA(1)(a) refers to a situation where immediate preventive action may avert a disaster, whereas section 18AA contemplates a situation where the disaster has occurred and action is necessary to restore normalcy. Restoration of production where production has stopped in a key industry or industrial undertaking is as important and urgent in the public interest as prevention of a situation where production may be affected. Immediate action is, therefore, as necessary in the situation contemplated by section 18AA(1)(b) as in the situation contemplated by section 18AA(1)(a). [596 F-G] The marginal note refers to the power to take over without investigation but there is no sufficient reason to suppose that the word immediate is used only to contra- distinguish it from the investigation contemplated by section 15 of the Act, though of course a consequence of immediate action under section 18AA may be to dispense with the enquiry under section 15. In fact, facts which come to light during the course of an investigation under section 15 may form the basis of action under section 18AA(1)(a). Where in the course of an investigation under section 15 it is discovered that the management have, by reckless investments or creation of encumbrances on the assets of the industrial undertaking or by diversion of funds brought about a situation which is likely to affect the production of the articles manufactured or produced in the industrial undertaking, if the Government is satisfied that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation, there is no reason why the Central Government may not straightaway take action under section 18AA(1)(a) without waiting for completion of investigation under section 15. [597A-B] Where there is a provision in the statute itself for revocation of the order by the very authority making the decision, it appears to be unnecessary to insist upon a pre- decisional observance of natural justice. [598A] The likelihood of production being jeopardized or the stoppage of production in a key industrial undertaking is a matter of grave concern affecting the public interest. Parliament has taken so serious a view of the matter that it has authorised the Central Government to take over the management of the industrial undertaking if immediate action may prevent jeopardy to production or restore production where it has already stopped. The necessity for immediate action by the Central Government contemplated by Parliament is definitely indicative of the exclusion of natural justice. It is not as if the owner of the industrial undertaking is left with no remedy. He may move the Central Government under section 18-F to cancel the order made under section 18AA. [598C-D] Neither section 18-F of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act nor section 21 of the General Clauses Act by itself excludes natural justice. The exclusion of natural justice where such exclusion is not express has to be implied by reference to the subject, the statute and the statutory situation. Where an express provision in the statute itself provides for a post decisional hearing the other provisions of the Statute will have to be read in the light of such provision and the provision for post- decisional hearing may then clinch the issue where pre- decisional natural justice appears to be excluded on the other terms of the statute. That a post-decisional hearing may also be had by the terms of section 21 of the General Clauses Act may not necessarily help in the interpretation of the provisions of the statute concerned. [599 A-C] Ridge v. Baldwin, 1964 A.C. p. 40; Annie G. Phillip v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 75 L.E.d. 1289; John H. Fahey v. Paul Mallonee, 91 L.E.d. 2030; Margarita Fuentes v. Robert L. Shevin, Attorney General of Florida, 32 L.E.d. 2d 556 and Lawrence Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 40 L.E.d. 2d 406, referred to. - Rama Rao, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh as well as the President of the Telugu Desam Party as well as respondent No. 3. The advertisements very shortly stated, refer to the auspicious gifts made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to the poor people on the eve of New Year and Sankranti. In the said advertisements, it is stated that the said Government which was formed by the Telugu Desam Party was giving to the poor people whose income was below Rs. and the said advertisements referred to a new scheme of selling sarees and dhoties at half prices to the poor people in the State of Andhra Pradesh having Green-cards. Moreover, the offer in the advertisements for the sale of dhoties and sarees at discount rates was in the nature of a benefit offered to poor persons in that State. When a Government announces the measures which are intended for the benefit of any of the classes for whose the Government can normally be expected to work like the poor or the economical backward classes, it is only in rare circumstances that such a promise can be said to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) even though such a promise might be made on the eve of elections. 8. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => '', 'counseldef' => '', 'court' => 'Supreme Court of India', 'court_type' => 'SC', 'decidedon' => '1989-09-29', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' K.N. Saikia,; M.H. Kania and; S. Ranganathan, JJ.', 'judgement' => '</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Kania, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. These two appeals arise out of the judgments in two Election Petitions in the Andhra Pradesh High Court questioning the election of respondent No. 1 as a Member of Parliament from Srikakulam No. Parliamentary Constituency in the 8th General Election to the House of the People. The points raised in these appeals are common and so are the relevant facts; and, hence, they are being disposed of by this common judgment. We propose to take note of only the few facts which are necessary for the appreciation of the controversy before us.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The polling date for the said election along with other parliamentary elections in the State of Andhra Pradesh was December 27, 1984 but in Srikakulam No. 1 Parliamentary Constituency the polling was countermanded and the date of polling was later fixed on January 28, 1985. In both the Election Petitions the election of respondent No. 1 was questioned mainly on the ground that Shri N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh as well as the President of the Telugu Desam Party as well as respondent No. 1 gave certain speeches and certain advertisements were got published by Shri N.T. Rama Rao through the Publicity Department of the Government of Andhra Pradesh in the newspapers containing certain statements which are alleged to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A) of the <a href="/act/50684/representation-of-the-people-act-1951-complete-act">Representation of the People Act, 1951</a> (hereinafter referred to as 'the said Act'). The main question canvassed before us is whether the statements contained in these aforesaid advertisements amount to a corrupt practice under Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act. Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act runs as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">123. Corrupt practices</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The following shall be deemed to be corrupt practises for the purposes of this Act :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) 'Bribery', that is to say.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(A) any gift, offer or promise by a candidate or his agent or by any other person with the consent of a candidate or his election agent of any gratification, to any person whomsover, with the object, directly or indirectly of inducing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) x x x</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) an elector to vote or refrain from voting at an election, or as a reward to.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) a person for having so stood or not stood, or for having withdrawn or not having withdrawn his candidature; or</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) an elector for having voted or refrained from voting.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The advertisements very shortly stated, refer to the auspicious gifts made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to the poor people on the eve of New Year and Sankranti. In the said advertisements, it is stated that the said Government which was formed by the Telugu Desam Party was giving to the poor people whose income was below Rs. 6,000 per year, a kilo of rice at Rs. 2 per Kg. and the said advertisements referred to a new scheme of selling sarees and dhoties at half prices to the poor people in the State of Andhra Pradesh having Green-cards. Green-cards were directed to be issued to all the persons whose annual income was below Rs. 6,000. The supply of the rice at subsidised rates as aforesaid was also to be made to the Green-card holders only. The scheme to sell sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was to be operative from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. In considering the question whether the said advertisement and the said speeches amount to a corrupt practice, we are of the view that the provisions of Section 123 of the said Act which deal with corrupt practices have to be interpreted, keeping in mind that dictates of commonsense require that they never could have been intended to treat normal election promises made in election manifestoes or usual election speeches by members of various political parties aspiring to power and by different candidates aspiring to get elected to legislative bodies concerned as corrupt practices. We are of the view that these advertisements and speeches amount to nothing more than statements extolling the achievements of the Government of the State of Andhra Pradesh under the Telugu Desam Party headed by N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister, and contain normal election promises and these statements do not amount to corrupt practices falling within the scope of Sub-clause (b) of Clause (A) of Sub-section (1) of Section 123 of the said Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. It was urged by Mr. Rao, learned Counsel for the appellants that in the impugned judgments, the High Court has incorrectly taken the view that in order to amount to bribery within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A), the transaction must amount to a bargain by the candidate with a view to get votes. It was pointed out by him that the said view has been taken in the impugned judgments, relying upon the decision of a Bench comprising to learned Judges of this Court in Ghasi Ram v. Dal Singh and Ors. :1983 SCR 102 . We have gone through to the relevant portion of that judgment (at page 109 and 110 of the said report). A careful perusal of the said judgment shows that what has been really held in that case is that if the promises given or made amount to a bargain entered into by a candidate for a vote or votes, that would amount to a corrupt practice; but it has not been held there that unless the act alleged amounts to such a bargain, it could not amount to a corrupt practice. In our view, that judgment does not lay down that in order to amount to a corrupt practice, the transaction must amount to a bargain for getting a vote. It was pointed out by Mr. Rao, however, that such a view seems to have been taken in two other decisions rendered by two Benches, each comprising two learned Judges of this Court in Bhanu Kumar Shastri v. Mohan Lal Sukhadia and Ors. : [1971]3SCR522 and Harjit Singh Mann v. S Umrao Singh and Ors. : [1980]2SCR501 . and these judgments need to be overruled. We do not propose to go into the correctness or otherwise of this view because, even on the footing that in order to amount to a corrupt practice under the aforesaid provision the alleged acts need not constitute a bargain, the the acts established in the present case, in our opinion, do not amount to a corrupt practice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Our attention was drawn by Mr. Rao to the fact that in this case the said advertisements and the speeches had to be viewed in the context of the fact that the advertisements were issued and the speeches were made after respondent No. 1 filed his nomination papers on January 4, 1985, for the election and before the election was held in the aforesaid constituency. It was further pointed out that the offer made for the sale of sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was limited to the period from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985. It cannot be denied that these factors are relevant factOrs. We cannot, however, lose sight of the fact that this offer was made not only in this constituency but throughout the State where the elections to the House of the People were scheduled to be held, and were, in fact, held on December 27, 1984. It was only in case of this constituency that the election to be held on the scheduled date was countermanded and later held on January 28, 1985. We cannot lose sight of the fact that, as far as the said speeches and the said advertisements, which were issued by the Publicity Department of the State, are concerned, they deal in the main with the achievements of the Government of Andhra Pradesh which, of course, was being run by Ministers belonging to Telugu Desam Party to which respondent No. 1 also belonged. Moreover, the offer in the advertisements for the sale of dhoties and sarees at discount rates was in the nature of a benefit offered to poor persons in that State. When a Government announces the measures which are intended for the benefit of any of the classes for whose the Government can normally be expected to work like the poor or the economical backward classes, it is only in rare circumstances that such a promise can be said to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) even though such a promise might be made on the eve of elections. Keeping this in mind, in our opinion, although the offer to sell dhoties and sarees at discount rates was of a limited duration as aforestated, it cannot be regarded as a corrupt practice. Such an offer was bound to have financial repercussions and it is quite possible the duration of the offer was limited to enable the Government to study the financial repercussions rather than from any improper motive. We find support for this view from the decision of this Court in H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh : [1969]3SCR813 . In that case an Ordinance was passed by the Government of Madhya Pradesh as a result of which a large number of agriculturists, namely, those holdings of plots of land of less than 7.5 acres area or paying land revenue not exceeding Rs. 5/- were exempted from the payment of the land revenue. It was held that such a concession does not amount to a gift, offer or promise of any gratification within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) of the said Act nor does the announcement of the declaration made at a meeting shortly before the election or the issue of a pamphlet containing that declaration at that time carry the matter any further. It was held that neither Shri D.P. Misra who was the Chief Minister nor Shri S.K. Dixit who acted as his agent were guilty of any corrupt practice within the meaning of the aforesaid provision.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. It was next contended by Mr. Rao, although very faintly, that the High Court was in error as it had not decided all other issues which were raised in the election petition. In this regard we cannot lose sight of the fact that the term of the present Lok Sabha is likely to be over within a few months and fresh elections are likely to be held and it would, therefore, be an exercise in futility to remand the matter to the High Court for deciding the remaining issues.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'AIR1990SC1889; JT1989(4)SC186; 1989(2)SCALE891; 1989Supp(2)SCC504', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors.', 'sub' => 'Election', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ), 'casename_url' => 'b-rajagopala-rao-vs-appayya-hanumanthu', 'args' => array( (int) 0 => '640942', (int) 1 => 'b-rajagopala-rao-vs-appayya-hanumanthu' ) ) $title_for_layout = 'B Rajagopala Rao and anr Vs Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors - Citation 640942 - Court Judgment | ' $desc = array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '640942', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/50684/representation-of-the-people-act-1951-complete-act">Representation of the People Act, 1951</a> - Sections 1, 3(1)(A), 123 and 123(1)(A)', 'appealno' => 'Civil Appeal Nos. 484 and 485 of 1987', 'appellant' => 'B. Rajagopala Rao and anr.', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'B. Rajagopala Rao and anr. Vs. Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors.', 'casenote' => 'Election - corrupt practices - Sections 123 and 123 (1) (A) of Representation of the People Act, 1951 - whether advertisements by public department and speeches made by respondent No. 1 to sell dhoti and sarees at discount rates amount to corrupt practices - offer was available for mass and for limited duration - such offer was bound to have financial repercussions and it is quite possible that duration of offer limited to enable Government to study financial repercussions rather than from any improper motive - offer not amounted to corrupt practices. - [ D.A. Desai,; O. Chinnappa Reddy and; R.S. Sarkaria, JJ.] The Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 empowers the Union of India in the public interest to take under its control the industries specified in the First Schedule to the Act. Item 23 of the First Schedule relates to textiles of various categories. Section 15 authorises the Central Government to make or cause to be made a full and complete investigation into the circumstances of the case if the Central Government is of the opinion that (a) in respect of any scheduled industry or industrial undertaking or undertakings (i) there has been, or is likely to be, a substantial fall in the volume of production for which, having regard to the economic conditions prevailing, there is no justification; or (ii) there has been, or is likely to be, a marked deterioration in the quality of any article... which could have been or can be avoided; or (iii) there has been or is likely to be a rise in the price of any article..... for which there is no justification; or (iv) it is necessary to take any such action for the purpose of conserving any resources of national importance; or (b) any industrial undertaking is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest. After the investigation is made under section 15, section 16(1) empowers the Central Government if action is desirable, to issue appropriate directions, and section 16(2) provides for the issue of interim directions by the Central Government pending investigation under section 15. Chapter III-A consisting of Sections 18A, 18-AA, 18-B, 18-C, 18-D, 18-E and 18-F deal with "direct management or control of Industrial Undertakings by Central Government in certain cases". Sec. 18-A empowers the Central Government by notified order, to authorise any person or body of persons to take over the management of the whole or any part of an industrial undertaking or to exercise in respect of the whole, or any part of the undertaking such functions of control as may be specified in the order, if the Central Government is of opinion that: (a) an industrial undertaking to which directions have been issued in pursuance of section 16 has failed to comply with such directions, or (b) an industrial undertaking in respect of which an investigation has been made under section 15 is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest. Section 18AA(5) stipulates that the provisions of Sections 18-B to 18 E shall be applicable to the industrial undertaking in respect of which an order has been made under section 18-AA even as they apply to an industrial undertaking taken over under Section 18-A. Section 18-F empowers the Central Government to cancel the order made under section 18-A if it appears that the purpose of the order has been fulfilled or it is not necessary that the order should remain in force. The appellant M/s. Swadeshi Cotton Mills was taken over by the Government of India by a notification dated April 13, 1978 in exercise of the powers conferred on it under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 18AA of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 on the ground that the company had by creation of encumbrances on the assets of its industrial undertakings, brought about a situation which had affected and is likely to further affect the production of articles manufactured or produced by it and that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation. The Government authorised the National Textile Corporation Limited to take over the management, subject to the conditions that the authorised person shall comply with all the directions issued from time to time by the Central Government and that the authorised person shall hold office for a period of five years. The appellant Mills challenged the aforesaid order in a writ petition in the High Court. The case was heard by a Full Bench of five Judges to consider the question whether in construing section 18AA of the Industries Development and Regulation Act, 1951, compliance with the principle of audi alteram partem is to be implied and whether hearing is to be given to the parties who would be affected by the order to be passed prior to the passing of the order or whether hearing can be given after the order is passed and whether the order passed under the said Section is vitiated by not giving of such hearing and whether such vice can be cured. The Bench by a majority answered the three questions as follows:- (a) Section 18AA(1)(a)(b) excludes the giving of prior hearing to the party who would be affected by order thereunder. (b) Section 18-F expressly provides for a post- decisional hearing to the owner of the industrial undertaking, the management of which is taken over under section 18AA to have the order made under section 18AA cancelled on any relevant ground. (c) As the taking over of management under section 18A is not vitiated by the failure to grant prior hearing the question of any such vice being cured by a grant of a subsequent hearing does not arise. The minority, however, held that in compliance with the principles of natural justice, prior hearing to the owner of the undertaking was required to be given before the passing of an order under section 18AA, that the second question did not arise as the denial of a prior hearing would not cure the vice by the grant of subsequent hearing, but it would be open to the Court to moderate the relief in such a way that the order is kept alive to the extent necessary until the making of the fresh order to subserve public interest and to make appropriate directions. After the decision on the reference the case was reheard on merits by a Full Bench of three Judges and the writ petition was allowed in part. The challenge to the validity of the order being rejected but insofar as the impugned order seeking to take over the corporate entity of the company, the corporate entity of the subsidiary and its assets, the petition was allowed and the respondents, the Union of India and the authorised person were directed to release from its control and custody and/or deliver possession of any assets or property of the company which were not referable to the industrial undertakings. Appeals to this Court were filed on behalf of the Company as well as by the Union of India and the National Textile Corporation. Two propositions were propounded on behalf of the company that: (a) Whether it was necessary to observe the rules of natural justice before issuing a notified order under section 18AA(1)(a) and further whether section 18-F impliedly excludes rules of natural justice relating to prior hearing; and it was contended (1) the mere use of the word 'immediate' in sub-clause (a) of section 18AA does not show a legislative intent to exclude the application of audi alteram partem rule altogether. (2) The word 'immediate' in clause (a) has been used in contra distinction to 'investigate'. It only means that under section 18AA action can be taken without prior investigation under section 15. The use of the word 'immediate' in section 18AA(1)(a) only dispenses with investigation under section 15 and not with the principle of audi alteram partem altogether and this is indicated by the marginal note of section 18A and para 3 of the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Amendment Bill which inserted section 18AA in 1971. (3) The word 'immediate' occurs only in clause (a) and not in clause (b) of section 18AA(1). It would be odd if intention to exclude this principle of natural justice is spelt out in one clause of the sub-section when the other clause does not exclude it. (4) Section 18-F does not exclude a pre-decisional hearing. The so-called post-decisional hearing contemplated by section 18-F cannot be and is not intended to be a substitute for a pre-decisional hearing. (5) Section 18F incorporates only a facet, albeit qualified, of section 21 of the General Clauses Act. The language of the Section implicity prohibits an enquiry into circumstances that led to the passing of the order of take-over and under it the aggrieved person is not entitled to show that on merits the order was void ab initio. (6) 'Immediacy' does not exclude a duty to act fairly because even an emergent situation can co-exist with the canons of natural justice. The only effect of urgency on the application of the principle of fair hearing would be that the width, form and duration of the hearing would be tailored to the situation and reduced to the reasonable minimum so that it does not delay and defeat the purpose of the contemplated action. (7) Where the civil consequences of the administrative action are grave and its effect is highly prejudicial to the rights and interests of the person affected and there is nothing in the language and scheme of the statute which unequivocally excludes a fair pre-decisional hearing and the post-decisional hearing provided therein is not a real remedial hearing equitable to a full right of appeal the Court should be loath to infer a legislative intent to exclude even a minimal fair hearing at the pre-decisional stage merely on ground of urgency. (8) The Central Government appointed four Government Officials including one from the office of the Textile Commissioner to study the affairs of the Company and to make recommendation. This Official Group submitted its report on February 16, 1978. The evidence on the basis of which the impugned order was passed was not disclosed to the appellant company till May 1978, only after it had filed the writ petition in the High Court. If there was anything adverse to the appellants in the survey report there was time enough about six weeks between the submission of the Survey Report and the passing of the impugned order for giving a short, reasonable opportunity to the appellants to explain the adverse findings against them. If there was immediacy situational modifications could be made to meet the requirement of fairness, by reducing the period of notice; that even the manner and form of such notice could be simplified to eliminate delay, that telephonic notice or short opportunity for furnishing their explanation to the Company might have satisfied the requirements of natural justice. Such an opportunity of hearing could have been given after the passing of a conditional tentative order and before its enforcement under section 18AA. For the interregnum suitable interim action such as freezing the assets of the Company or restraining the Company from creating further encumbrances, could be taken under section 16. On behalf of the Union of India and the Authorised Officer it was contended that (1) the presumption in favour of audi alteram partem rule stands impliedly displaced by the language scheme, setting and the purpose of the provision in section 18AA. (2) Section 18AA on its plain terms deals with situations where immediate preventive action is required. The paramount concern is to avoid serious problems which may be caused by fall in production. The purpose of an order under section 18AA is not to condemn the owner but to protect the scheduled industry. The issue under section 18AA is not solely between the Government and the management of the industrial undertaking. The object of taking action under this Section is to protect other outside interests of the community at large and the workers. (3) The rule of natural justice to give a hearing has been incorporated in section 18-F which gives an opportunity of a post-decisional hearing to the owner of the undertaking who if he feels aggrieved can on his application be heard, to show that even the original order under section 18AA was passed on invalid grounds and should be cancelled or rescinded. (4) On a true construction of section 18AA read with section 18-F the requirements of natural justice and fair play can be read into the statute only insofar as conformance to such canons can reasonably and realistically be required of it by the provision for a remedial hearing at a subsequent stage. (5) Under section 18-F the Central Government exercises curial functions and that Section confers on the aggrieved owner a right to apply to the Government to cancel the order of take-over. This section casts an obligation on the Central Government to deal with and dispose of an application filed thereunder with reasonable expedition. Allowing the appeal by the Company,<br/>HELD: (Sarkaria & Desai, JJ. per Chinnappa Reddy, J. dissenting.) In the facts and circumstances of the instant case, there has been a noncompliance with the implied requirement of the audi alteram partem rule of natural justice at the pre-decisional stage. The impugned order could be struck down as invalid on that score alone. But in view of the commitment / concession that a hearing would be afforded to the Company, the case is remitted to the Central Government to give a full, fair and effective hearing. [587G-H, 588C] The phrase 'natural justice' is not capable of a static and precise definition. It cannot be imprisoned in the straight-jacket of a cast-iron formula. Rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. Hence not possible to make an exhaustive catalogue of such rules. Two fundamental maxims of natural justice have now become deeply and indelibly ingrained in the common consciousness of mankind as pre-eminently necessary to ensure that the law is applied impartially objectively and fairly. These twin principles are (i) audi alteram partem and (ii) nemo judex in re sua. Audi alteram partem is a highly effective rule devised by the Courts to ensure that a statutory authority arrives at a just decision and it is calculated to act as a healthy check on the abuse or misuse of power. Its reach should not be narrowed and its applicability circumscribed.[554C-G] The rules of natural justice can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. If a statutory provision either specifically or by inevitable implication excludes the application of the rules of natural justice then the Court cannot ignore the mandate of the Legislature. Whether or not the application of the principles of natural justice in a given case has been excluded in the exercise of statutory power depends upon the language and basic scheme of the provision conferring the power, the nature of the power the purpose for which it is conferred and the effect of that power. [556A-B] The maxim audi alteram partem has many facets. Two of them are (a) notice of the case to be met, and (b) opportunity to explain. The rule cannot be sacrificed at the altar of administrative convenience or celerity; for, convenience and justice are often not on speaking terms. Difficulties, however, arise when the statute conferring the power does not expressly exclude this rule but its exclusion is sought by implication due to the presence of certain factors such as urgency where the obligation to give notice and opportunity to be heard would obstruct the taking of prompt action of a preventive or remedial nature. Audi alteram partem rule may be disregarded in an emergent situation where immediate action brooks no delay to prevent some imminent danger or injury or hazard to paramount public interests. Section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure empowers the magistrates specified therein to make an exparte conditional order in emergent cases for removal of dangerous public nuisances. Action under section 17 Land Acquisition Act furnishes another such instance. Similarly action on grounds of public safety public health may justify disregard of the rule of prior hearing. [556C-H] Cases where owing to the compulsion of the fact situation or the necessity of taking speedy action no pre- decisional hearing is given but the action, is followed soon by a full post-decisional hearing to the person affected do not in reality constitute an exception to the audi alteram partem rule. To call such cases as exception is a misnomer because they do not exclude fair play in action but adapt it to the urgency of the situation by balancing the competing claims of hurry and hearing. [560H-561A] The general principle as distinguished from an absolute rule of uniform application seems to be that where a statute does not in terms exclude this rule of prior hearing but contemplates a post-decisional hearing amounting to a full review of the original order on merits then such a statute would be construed as excluding the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage. [561G] If the statute conferring the power is silent with regard to the giving of pre-decisional hearing to the person affected and the administrative decision taken by the authority involves civil consequences of a grave nature and no full review or appeal on merits against that decision is provided courts will be extremely reluctant to construe such a statute as excluding the duty of affording even a minimal hearing shorn of all its formal trappings and dilatory features at the pre-decisional stage, unless viewed pragmatically it would paralyse the administrative process or frustrate the need for utmost promptitude. [561H] 7(i). A comparison of the provisions of Section 18A(1)(b) and Section 18AA(1)(c), bring out two main points of distinction: First, action under Section 18A(1)(b) can be taken only after an investigation had been made under Section 15; while under Section 18AA(1)(a) or (b) action can be taken without such investigation. The language, scheme and setting of Section 18AA read in the light of the Objects and Reasons for enacting this provision make this position clear beyond doubt. Second, before taking action under Section 18A(1)(b), the Central Government has to form an opinion on the basis of the investigation conducted under section 15, in regard to the existence of the objective fact, namely: that the industrial undertaking is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest; while under section 18A(1)(a) the Government has to satisfy itself that the persons incharge of the undertaking have brought about a situation likely to cause fall in production, by committing any of the three kinds of acts specified in that provision. This shows that the preliminary objective fact attributable to the persons in charge of the management or affairs of the undertaking, on the basis of which action may be taken under section 18(A)(1)(b), is of far wider amplitude than the circumstance, the existence of which is a sine qua non for taking action under section 18AA(1). The phrase "highly detrimental to the scheduled industry or public interest" in section 18-A is capable of being construed to cover a large variety of acts or things which may be considered wrong with the manner of running the industry by the management. In contrast with it, action under section 18AA(1)(a) can be taken only if the Central Government is satisfied with regard to the existence of the twin conditions specifically mentioned therein, on the basis of evidence in its possession. [569D-H] An analysis of section 18AA(1)(a), indicates that as a necessary preliminary to the exercise of the power thereunder, the Central Government must be satisfied "from documentary or other evidence in its possession" in regard to the co-existence of two circumstances: (i) that the persons in charge of the industrial undertaking have by committing any of these acts, namely, reckless investments, or creation of incumbrances on the assets of industrial undertaking, or by diversion of funds, brought about a situation which is likely to affect the production of the article manufactured or produced in the industrial undertaking, and (ii) that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation.[570B-D] It cannot be laid down as a general proposition that whenever a statute confers a power on an administrative authority and makes the exercise of that power conditional on the formation of an opinion by that authority in regard to the existence of an immediacy, its opinion in regard to that preliminary fact is not open to judicial scrutiny at all. While it may be conceded that an element of subjectivity is always involved in the formation of such an opinion, the existence of the circumstances from which the inference constituting the opinion, as the sine qua non for action, are to be drawn, must be demonstrable, and the existence of such "circumstances", if questioned, must be proved at least prima facie. [571 E-G] From a plain reading of section 18AA, it is clear that it does not expressly in unmistakable and unequivocal terms exclude the application of the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage. [574B] In the instant case, so far as Kanpur Unit is concerned, it was lying closed for more than three months before the passing of the impugned order. There was no 'immediacy' in relation to that unit, which could absolve the Government from the obligation of complying fully with audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional or pre- takeover stage. [583A] Keshav Mills Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, [1973] 3 S.C.R. 22; Kamla Prasad Khetan v. Union of India,[1957] S.C.R. 1052; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 621; Sukhdev Singh & Ors. v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh, [1975] 3 S.C.R. 619; A. K. Kraipak v. Union of India, [1970] 1 S.C.R. 457; Ridge v. Baldwin, [1964] A.C. 40; 196; Heatley v. Tasmanian Racing & Gaming Commission, 14 Australian Law Reports 519; Nawabkhan Abbaskhan v. State of Gujarat, [1974] 3 S.C.R. 427; State of Orissa v. Dr. Bina Pani Dei, [1962] 2 S.C.R. 625; Ambalal M. Shah v. Hathi Singh Manufacturing Co. Ltd. [1962] 3 S.C.R. 171; and S. L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan & Ors., [1981] 1 S.C.R. 746, referred to. (Per Chinnappa Reddy, J. dissenting) The principles of natural justice are not attracted to the situations contemplated by section 18AA of Industries (Development and Regulation) Act. Natural justice like Ultra Vires and Public Policy is a branch of the public law and is a formidable weapon which can be wielded to secure justice to the citizen. While it may be used to protect certain fundamental liberties, civil and political rights, it may be used as indeed it is used more often than not, to protect vested interests and to obstruct the path of progressive change. The time has come to make an appropriate distinction between natural justice in its application to fundamental liberties, civil and political rights and natural justice in its application to vested interests. [590A-B] Our constitution as befits the Constitution of a Socialist Secular Democratic Republic, recognises the paramountcy of the public weal over the private interest. Natural justice, ultra vires, public policy, or any other rule of interpretation must, therefore, conform, grow and be tailored to serve the public interest and respond to the demands of an evolving society. [590C] The principles of natural justice have taken deep root in the judicial conscience of our people. They are now considered so fundamental as to be implicit in every decision making function, judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative. Where authority functions under a statute and the statute provides for the observance of the principles of natural justice in a particular manner, natural justice will have to be observed in that manner and in no other. Where the statute is silent about the observance of the principles of natural justice, such statutory silence is taken to imply compliance with the principles of natural justice. Where the conflict is between the public interest and the private interest the presumption must necessarily be weak and may, therefore, be readily displaced. The presumption is also weak, where what are involved are mere property rights. In cases of urgency, particularly where the public interest is involved, preemptive action may be a strategic necessity. Even in cases of preemptive action, if the statute so provides or if the Courts so deem fit in appropriate cases, a postponed hearing may be substituted for natural justice. [590A-C; 591F-G] 3(ii). Where natural justice is implied, the extent of the implication and the nature of the hearing must vary with the statute, the subject and the situation. [592B] The absence of the expression 'immediate action' in section 18AA(1)(b) does not make any difference. Section 18AA(1)(a) refers to a situation where immediate preventive action may avert a disaster, whereas section 18AA contemplates a situation where the disaster has occurred and action is necessary to restore normalcy. Restoration of production where production has stopped in a key industry or industrial undertaking is as important and urgent in the public interest as prevention of a situation where production may be affected. Immediate action is, therefore, as necessary in the situation contemplated by section 18AA(1)(b) as in the situation contemplated by section 18AA(1)(a). [596 F-G] The marginal note refers to the power to take over without investigation but there is no sufficient reason to suppose that the word immediate is used only to contra- distinguish it from the investigation contemplated by section 15 of the Act, though of course a consequence of immediate action under section 18AA may be to dispense with the enquiry under section 15. In fact, facts which come to light during the course of an investigation under section 15 may form the basis of action under section 18AA(1)(a). Where in the course of an investigation under section 15 it is discovered that the management have, by reckless investments or creation of encumbrances on the assets of the industrial undertaking or by diversion of funds brought about a situation which is likely to affect the production of the articles manufactured or produced in the industrial undertaking, if the Government is satisfied that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation, there is no reason why the Central Government may not straightaway take action under section 18AA(1)(a) without waiting for completion of investigation under section 15. [597A-B] Where there is a provision in the statute itself for revocation of the order by the very authority making the decision, it appears to be unnecessary to insist upon a pre- decisional observance of natural justice. [598A] The likelihood of production being jeopardized or the stoppage of production in a key industrial undertaking is a matter of grave concern affecting the public interest. Parliament has taken so serious a view of the matter that it has authorised the Central Government to take over the management of the industrial undertaking if immediate action may prevent jeopardy to production or restore production where it has already stopped. The necessity for immediate action by the Central Government contemplated by Parliament is definitely indicative of the exclusion of natural justice. It is not as if the owner of the industrial undertaking is left with no remedy. He may move the Central Government under section 18-F to cancel the order made under section 18AA. [598C-D] Neither section 18-F of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act nor section 21 of the General Clauses Act by itself excludes natural justice. The exclusion of natural justice where such exclusion is not express has to be implied by reference to the subject, the statute and the statutory situation. Where an express provision in the statute itself provides for a post decisional hearing the other provisions of the Statute will have to be read in the light of such provision and the provision for post- decisional hearing may then clinch the issue where pre- decisional natural justice appears to be excluded on the other terms of the statute. That a post-decisional hearing may also be had by the terms of section 21 of the General Clauses Act may not necessarily help in the interpretation of the provisions of the statute concerned. [599 A-C] Ridge v. Baldwin, 1964 A.C. p. 40; Annie G. Phillip v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 75 L.E.d. 1289; John H. Fahey v. Paul Mallonee, 91 L.E.d. 2030; Margarita Fuentes v. Robert L. Shevin, Attorney General of Florida, 32 L.E.d. 2d 556 and Lawrence Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 40 L.E.d. 2d 406, referred to. - Rama Rao, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh as well as the President of the Telugu Desam Party as well as respondent No. 3. The advertisements very shortly stated, refer to the auspicious gifts made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to the poor people on the eve of New Year and Sankranti. In the said advertisements, it is stated that the said Government which was formed by the Telugu Desam Party was giving to the poor people whose income was below Rs. and the said advertisements referred to a new scheme of selling sarees and dhoties at half prices to the poor people in the State of Andhra Pradesh having Green-cards. Moreover, the offer in the advertisements for the sale of dhoties and sarees at discount rates was in the nature of a benefit offered to poor persons in that State. When a Government announces the measures which are intended for the benefit of any of the classes for whose the Government can normally be expected to work like the poor or the economical backward classes, it is only in rare circumstances that such a promise can be said to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) even though such a promise might be made on the eve of elections. 8. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => '', 'counseldef' => '', 'court' => 'Supreme Court of India', 'court_type' => 'SC', 'decidedon' => '1989-09-29', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' K.N. Saikia,; M.H. Kania and; S. Ranganathan, JJ.', 'judgement' => '</p><p>Kania, J.</p><p>1. These two appeals arise out of the judgments in two Election Petitions in the Andhra Pradesh High Court questioning the election of respondent No. 1 as a Member of Parliament from Srikakulam No. Parliamentary Constituency in the 8th General Election to the House of the People. The points raised in these appeals are common and so are the relevant facts; and, hence, they are being disposed of by this common judgment. We propose to take note of only the few facts which are necessary for the appreciation of the controversy before us.</p><p>2. The polling date for the said election along with other parliamentary elections in the State of Andhra Pradesh was December 27, 1984 but in Srikakulam No. 1 Parliamentary Constituency the polling was countermanded and the date of polling was later fixed on January 28, 1985. In both the Election Petitions the election of respondent No. 1 was questioned mainly on the ground that Shri N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh as well as the President of the Telugu Desam Party as well as respondent No. 1 gave certain speeches and certain advertisements were got published by Shri N.T. Rama Rao through the Publicity Department of the Government of Andhra Pradesh in the newspapers containing certain statements which are alleged to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A) of the <a>Representation of the People Act, 1951</a> (hereinafter referred to as 'the said Act'). The main question canvassed before us is whether the statements contained in these aforesaid advertisements amount to a corrupt practice under Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act. Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act runs as follows :</p><p>123. Corrupt practices</p><p>The following shall be deemed to be corrupt practises for the purposes of this Act :</p><p>(1) 'Bribery', that is to say.</p><p>(A) any gift, offer or promise by a candidate or his agent or by any other person with the consent of a candidate or his election agent of any gratification, to any person whomsover, with the object, directly or indirectly of inducing.</p><p>(a) x x x</p><p>(b) an elector to vote or refrain from voting at an election, or as a reward to.</p><p>(i) a person for having so stood or not stood, or for having withdrawn or not having withdrawn his candidature; or</p><p>(ii) an elector for having voted or refrained from voting.</p><p>3. The advertisements very shortly stated, refer to the auspicious gifts made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to the poor people on the eve of New Year and Sankranti. In the said advertisements, it is stated that the said Government which was formed by the Telugu Desam Party was giving to the poor people whose income was below Rs. 6,000 per year, a kilo of rice at Rs. 2 per Kg. and the said advertisements referred to a new scheme of selling sarees and dhoties at half prices to the poor people in the State of Andhra Pradesh having Green-cards. Green-cards were directed to be issued to all the persons whose annual income was below Rs. 6,000. The supply of the rice at subsidised rates as aforesaid was also to be made to the Green-card holders only. The scheme to sell sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was to be operative from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985.</p><p>4. In considering the question whether the said advertisement and the said speeches amount to a corrupt practice, we are of the view that the provisions of Section 123 of the said Act which deal with corrupt practices have to be interpreted, keeping in mind that dictates of commonsense require that they never could have been intended to treat normal election promises made in election manifestoes or usual election speeches by members of various political parties aspiring to power and by different candidates aspiring to get elected to legislative bodies concerned as corrupt practices. We are of the view that these advertisements and speeches amount to nothing more than statements extolling the achievements of the Government of the State of Andhra Pradesh under the Telugu Desam Party headed by N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister, and contain normal election promises and these statements do not amount to corrupt practices falling within the scope of Sub-clause (b) of Clause (A) of Sub-section (1) of Section 123 of the said Act.</p><p>5. It was urged by Mr. Rao, learned Counsel for the appellants that in the impugned judgments, the High Court has incorrectly taken the view that in order to amount to bribery within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A), the transaction must amount to a bargain by the candidate with a view to get votes. It was pointed out by him that the said view has been taken in the impugned judgments, relying upon the decision of a Bench comprising to learned Judges of this Court in Ghasi Ram v. Dal Singh and Ors. :1983 SCR 102 . We have gone through to the relevant portion of that judgment (at page 109 and 110 of the said report). A careful perusal of the said judgment shows that what has been really held in that case is that if the promises given or made amount to a bargain entered into by a candidate for a vote or votes, that would amount to a corrupt practice; but it has not been held there that unless the act alleged amounts to such a bargain, it could not amount to a corrupt practice. In our view, that judgment does not lay down that in order to amount to a corrupt practice, the transaction must amount to a bargain for getting a vote. It was pointed out by Mr. Rao, however, that such a view seems to have been taken in two other decisions rendered by two Benches, each comprising two learned Judges of this Court in Bhanu Kumar Shastri v. Mohan Lal Sukhadia and Ors. : [1971]3SCR522 and Harjit Singh Mann v. S Umrao Singh and Ors. : [1980]2SCR501 . and these judgments need to be overruled. We do not propose to go into the correctness or otherwise of this view because, even on the footing that in order to amount to a corrupt practice under the aforesaid provision the alleged acts need not constitute a bargain, the the acts established in the present case, in our opinion, do not amount to a corrupt practice.</p><p>6. Our attention was drawn by Mr. Rao to the fact that in this case the said advertisements and the speeches had to be viewed in the context of the fact that the advertisements were issued and the speeches were made after respondent No. 1 filed his nomination papers on January 4, 1985, for the election and before the election was held in the aforesaid constituency. It was further pointed out that the offer made for the sale of sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was limited to the period from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985. It cannot be denied that these factors are relevant factOrs. We cannot, however, lose sight of the fact that this offer was made not only in this constituency but throughout the State where the elections to the House of the People were scheduled to be held, and were, in fact, held on December 27, 1984. It was only in case of this constituency that the election to be held on the scheduled date was countermanded and later held on January 28, 1985. We cannot lose sight of the fact that, as far as the said speeches and the said advertisements, which were issued by the Publicity Department of the State, are concerned, they deal in the main with the achievements of the Government of Andhra Pradesh which, of course, was being run by Ministers belonging to Telugu Desam Party to which respondent No. 1 also belonged. Moreover, the offer in the advertisements for the sale of dhoties and sarees at discount rates was in the nature of a benefit offered to poor persons in that State. When a Government announces the measures which are intended for the benefit of any of the classes for whose the Government can normally be expected to work like the poor or the economical backward classes, it is only in rare circumstances that such a promise can be said to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) even though such a promise might be made on the eve of elections. Keeping this in mind, in our opinion, although the offer to sell dhoties and sarees at discount rates was of a limited duration as aforestated, it cannot be regarded as a corrupt practice. Such an offer was bound to have financial repercussions and it is quite possible the duration of the offer was limited to enable the Government to study the financial repercussions rather than from any improper motive. We find support for this view from the decision of this Court in H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh : [1969]3SCR813 . In that case an Ordinance was passed by the Government of Madhya Pradesh as a result of which a large number of agriculturists, namely, those holdings of plots of land of less than 7.5 acres area or paying land revenue not exceeding Rs. 5/- were exempted from the payment of the land revenue. It was held that such a concession does not amount to a gift, offer or promise of any gratification within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) of the said Act nor does the announcement of the declaration made at a meeting shortly before the election or the issue of a pamphlet containing that declaration at that time carry the matter any further. It was held that neither Shri D.P. Misra who was the Chief Minister nor Shri S.K. Dixit who acted as his agent were guilty of any corrupt practice within the meaning of the aforesaid provision.</p><p>7. It was next contended by Mr. Rao, although very faintly, that the High Court was in error as it had not decided all other issues which were raised in the election petition. In this regard we cannot lose sight of the fact that the term of the present Lok Sabha is likely to be over within a few months and fresh elections are likely to be held and it would, therefore, be an exercise in futility to remand the matter to the High Court for deciding the remaining issues.</p><p>8. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.<p></p><p>', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'AIR1990SC1889; JT1989(4)SC186; 1989(2)SCALE891; 1989Supp(2)SCC504', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors.', 'sub' => 'Election', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ) $casename_url = 'b-rajagopala-rao-vs-appayya-hanumanthu' $args = array( (int) 0 => '640942', (int) 1 => 'b-rajagopala-rao-vs-appayya-hanumanthu' ) $url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/640942/b-rajagopala-rao-vs-appayya-hanumanthu' $ctype = '' $caseref = 'H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh<br>' $content = array( (int) 0 => '', (int) 1 => '<p>Kania, J.', (int) 2 => '<p>1. These two appeals arise out of the judgments in two Election Petitions in the Andhra Pradesh High Court questioning the election of respondent No. 1 as a Member of Parliament from Srikakulam No. Parliamentary Constituency in the 8th General Election to the House of the People. The points raised in these appeals are common and so are the relevant facts; and, hence, they are being disposed of by this common judgment. We propose to take note of only the few facts which are necessary for the appreciation of the controversy before us.', (int) 3 => '<p>2. The polling date for the said election along with other parliamentary elections in the State of Andhra Pradesh was December 27, 1984 but in Srikakulam No. 1 Parliamentary Constituency the polling was countermanded and the date of polling was later fixed on January 28, 1985. In both the Election Petitions the election of respondent No. 1 was questioned mainly on the ground that Shri N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh as well as the President of the Telugu Desam Party as well as respondent No. 1 gave certain speeches and certain advertisements were got published by Shri N.T. Rama Rao through the Publicity Department of the Government of Andhra Pradesh in the newspapers containing certain statements which are alleged to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A) of the <a>Representation of the People Act, 1951</a> (hereinafter referred to as 'the said Act'). The main question canvassed before us is whether the statements contained in these aforesaid advertisements amount to a corrupt practice under Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act. Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act runs as follows :', (int) 4 => '<p>123. Corrupt practices', (int) 5 => '<p>The following shall be deemed to be corrupt practises for the purposes of this Act :', (int) 6 => '<p>(1) 'Bribery', that is to say.', (int) 7 => '<p>(A) any gift, offer or promise by a candidate or his agent or by any other person with the consent of a candidate or his election agent of any gratification, to any person whomsover, with the object, directly or indirectly of inducing.', (int) 8 => '<p>(a) x x x', (int) 9 => '<p>(b) an elector to vote or refrain from voting at an election, or as a reward to.', (int) 10 => '<p>(i) a person for having so stood or not stood, or for having withdrawn or not having withdrawn his candidature; or', (int) 11 => '<p>(ii) an elector for having voted or refrained from voting.', (int) 12 => '<p>3. The advertisements very shortly stated, refer to the auspicious gifts made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to the poor people on the eve of New Year and Sankranti. In the said advertisements, it is stated that the said Government which was formed by the Telugu Desam Party was giving to the poor people whose income was below Rs. 6,000 per year, a kilo of rice at Rs. 2 per Kg. and the said advertisements referred to a new scheme of selling sarees and dhoties at half prices to the poor people in the State of Andhra Pradesh having Green-cards. Green-cards were directed to be issued to all the persons whose annual income was below Rs. 6,000. The supply of the rice at subsidised rates as aforesaid was also to be made to the Green-card holders only. The scheme to sell sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was to be operative from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985.', (int) 13 => '<p>4. In considering the question whether the said advertisement and the said speeches amount to a corrupt practice, we are of the view that the provisions of Section 123 of the said Act which deal with corrupt practices have to be interpreted, keeping in mind that dictates of commonsense require that they never could have been intended to treat normal election promises made in election manifestoes or usual election speeches by members of various political parties aspiring to power and by different candidates aspiring to get elected to legislative bodies concerned as corrupt practices. We are of the view that these advertisements and speeches amount to nothing more than statements extolling the achievements of the Government of the State of Andhra Pradesh under the Telugu Desam Party headed by N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister, and contain normal election promises and these statements do not amount to corrupt practices falling within the scope of Sub-clause (b) of Clause (A) of Sub-section (1) of Section 123 of the said Act.', (int) 14 => '<p>5. It was urged by Mr. Rao, learned Counsel for the appellants that in the impugned judgments, the High Court has incorrectly taken the view that in order to amount to bribery within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A), the transaction must amount to a bargain by the candidate with a view to get votes. It was pointed out by him that the said view has been taken in the impugned judgments, relying upon the decision of a Bench comprising to learned Judges of this Court in Ghasi Ram v. Dal Singh and Ors. :1983 SCR 102 . We have gone through to the relevant portion of that judgment (at page 109 and 110 of the said report). A careful perusal of the said judgment shows that what has been really held in that case is that if the promises given or made amount to a bargain entered into by a candidate for a vote or votes, that would amount to a corrupt practice; but it has not been held there that unless the act alleged amounts to such a bargain, it could not amount to a corrupt practice. In our view, that judgment does not lay down that in order to amount to a corrupt practice, the transaction must amount to a bargain for getting a vote. It was pointed out by Mr. Rao, however, that such a view seems to have been taken in two other decisions rendered by two Benches, each comprising two learned Judges of this Court in Bhanu Kumar Shastri v. Mohan Lal Sukhadia and Ors. : [1971]3SCR522 and Harjit Singh Mann v. S Umrao Singh and Ors. : [1980]2SCR501 . and these judgments need to be overruled. We do not propose to go into the correctness or otherwise of this view because, even on the footing that in order to amount to a corrupt practice under the aforesaid provision the alleged acts need not constitute a bargain, the the acts established in the present case, in our opinion, do not amount to a corrupt practice.', (int) 15 => '<p>6. Our attention was drawn by Mr. Rao to the fact that in this case the said advertisements and the speeches had to be viewed in the context of the fact that the advertisements were issued and the speeches were made after respondent No. 1 filed his nomination papers on January 4, 1985, for the election and before the election was held in the aforesaid constituency. It was further pointed out that the offer made for the sale of sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was limited to the period from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985. It cannot be denied that these factors are relevant factOrs. We cannot, however, lose sight of the fact that this offer was made not only in this constituency but throughout the State where the elections to the House of the People were scheduled to be held, and were, in fact, held on December 27, 1984. It was only in case of this constituency that the election to be held on the scheduled date was countermanded and later held on January 28, 1985. We cannot lose sight of the fact that, as far as the said speeches and the said advertisements, which were issued by the Publicity Department of the State, are concerned, they deal in the main with the achievements of the Government of Andhra Pradesh which, of course, was being run by Ministers belonging to Telugu Desam Party to which respondent No. 1 also belonged. Moreover, the offer in the advertisements for the sale of dhoties and sarees at discount rates was in the nature of a benefit offered to poor persons in that State. When a Government announces the measures which are intended for the benefit of any of the classes for whose the Government can normally be expected to work like the poor or the economical backward classes, it is only in rare circumstances that such a promise can be said to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) even though such a promise might be made on the eve of elections. Keeping this in mind, in our opinion, although the offer to sell dhoties and sarees at discount rates was of a limited duration as aforestated, it cannot be regarded as a corrupt practice. Such an offer was bound to have financial repercussions and it is quite possible the duration of the offer was limited to enable the Government to study the financial repercussions rather than from any improper motive. We find support for this view from the decision of this Court in H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh : [1969]3SCR813 . In that case an Ordinance was passed by the Government of Madhya Pradesh as a result of which a large number of agriculturists, namely, those holdings of plots of land of less than 7.5 acres area or paying land revenue not exceeding Rs. 5/- were exempted from the payment of the land revenue. It was held that such a concession does not amount to a gift, offer or promise of any gratification within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) of the said Act nor does the announcement of the declaration made at a meeting shortly before the election or the issue of a pamphlet containing that declaration at that time carry the matter any further. It was held that neither Shri D.P. Misra who was the Chief Minister nor Shri S.K. Dixit who acted as his agent were guilty of any corrupt practice within the meaning of the aforesaid provision.', (int) 16 => '<p>7. It was next contended by Mr. Rao, although very faintly, that the High Court was in error as it had not decided all other issues which were raised in the election petition. In this regard we cannot lose sight of the fact that the term of the present Lok Sabha is likely to be over within a few months and fresh elections are likely to be held and it would, therefore, be an exercise in futility to remand the matter to the High Court for deciding the remaining issues.', (int) 17 => '<p>8. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.<p>', (int) 18 => '<p>' ) $paragraphAfter = (int) 1 $cnt = (int) 19 $i = (int) 15include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144 View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971 View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933 View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473 Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963 Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200 Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167 [main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109
6. Our attention was drawn by Mr. Rao to the fact that in this case the said advertisements and the speeches had to be viewed in the context of the fact that the advertisements were issued and the speeches were made after respondent No. 1 filed his nomination papers on January 4, 1985, for the election and before the election was held in the aforesaid constituency. It was further pointed out that the offer made for the sale of sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was limited to the period from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985. It cannot be denied that these factors are relevant factOrs. We cannot, however, lose sight of the fact that this offer was made not only in this constituency but throughout the State where the elections to the House of the People were scheduled to be held, and were, in fact, held on December 27, 1984. It was only in case of this constituency that the election to be held on the scheduled date was countermanded and later held on January 28, 1985. We cannot lose sight of the fact that, as far as the said speeches and the said advertisements, which were issued by the Publicity Department of the State, are concerned, they deal in the main with the achievements of the Government of Andhra Pradesh which, of course, was being run by Ministers belonging to Telugu Desam Party to which respondent No. 1 also belonged. Moreover, the offer in the advertisements for the sale of dhoties and sarees at discount rates was in the nature of a benefit offered to poor persons in that State. When a Government announces the measures which are intended for the benefit of any of the classes for whose the Government can normally be expected to work like the poor or the economical backward classes, it is only in rare circumstances that such a promise can be said to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) even though such a promise might be made on the eve of elections. Keeping this in mind, in our opinion, although the offer to sell dhoties and sarees at discount rates was of a limited duration as aforestated, it cannot be regarded as a corrupt practice. Such an offer was bound to have financial repercussions and it is quite possible the duration of the offer was limited to enable the Government to study the financial repercussions rather than from any improper motive. We find support for this view from the decision of this Court in H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh : [1969]3SCR813 . In that case an Ordinance was passed by the Government of Madhya Pradesh as a result of which a large number of agriculturists, namely, those holdings of plots of land of less than 7.5 acres area or paying land revenue not exceeding Rs. 5/- were exempted from the payment of the land revenue. It was held that such a concession does not amount to a gift, offer or promise of any gratification within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) of the said Act nor does the announcement of the declaration made at a meeting shortly before the election or the issue of a pamphlet containing that declaration at that time carry the matter any further. It was held that neither Shri D.P. Misra who was the Chief Minister nor Shri S.K. Dixit who acted as his agent were guilty of any corrupt practice within the meaning of the aforesaid provision.
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$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp' $dataForView = array( 'title_for_layout' => 'B Rajagopala Rao and anr Vs Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors - Citation 640942 - Court Judgment | ', 'desc' => array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '640942', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/50684/representation-of-the-people-act-1951-complete-act">Representation of the People Act, 1951</a> - Sections 1, 3(1)(A), 123 and 123(1)(A)', 'appealno' => 'Civil Appeal Nos. 484 and 485 of 1987', 'appellant' => 'B. Rajagopala Rao and anr.', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'B. Rajagopala Rao and anr. Vs. Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors.', 'casenote' => 'Election - corrupt practices - Sections 123 and 123 (1) (A) of Representation of the People Act, 1951 - whether advertisements by public department and speeches made by respondent No. 1 to sell dhoti and sarees at discount rates amount to corrupt practices - offer was available for mass and for limited duration - such offer was bound to have financial repercussions and it is quite possible that duration of offer limited to enable Government to study financial repercussions rather than from any improper motive - offer not amounted to corrupt practices. - [ D.A. Desai,; O. Chinnappa Reddy and; R.S. Sarkaria, JJ.] The Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 empowers the Union of India in the public interest to take under its control the industries specified in the First Schedule to the Act. Item 23 of the First Schedule relates to textiles of various categories. Section 15 authorises the Central Government to make or cause to be made a full and complete investigation into the circumstances of the case if the Central Government is of the opinion that (a) in respect of any scheduled industry or industrial undertaking or undertakings (i) there has been, or is likely to be, a substantial fall in the volume of production for which, having regard to the economic conditions prevailing, there is no justification; or (ii) there has been, or is likely to be, a marked deterioration in the quality of any article... which could have been or can be avoided; or (iii) there has been or is likely to be a rise in the price of any article..... for which there is no justification; or (iv) it is necessary to take any such action for the purpose of conserving any resources of national importance; or (b) any industrial undertaking is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest. After the investigation is made under section 15, section 16(1) empowers the Central Government if action is desirable, to issue appropriate directions, and section 16(2) provides for the issue of interim directions by the Central Government pending investigation under section 15. Chapter III-A consisting of Sections 18A, 18-AA, 18-B, 18-C, 18-D, 18-E and 18-F deal with "direct management or control of Industrial Undertakings by Central Government in certain cases". Sec. 18-A empowers the Central Government by notified order, to authorise any person or body of persons to take over the management of the whole or any part of an industrial undertaking or to exercise in respect of the whole, or any part of the undertaking such functions of control as may be specified in the order, if the Central Government is of opinion that: (a) an industrial undertaking to which directions have been issued in pursuance of section 16 has failed to comply with such directions, or (b) an industrial undertaking in respect of which an investigation has been made under section 15 is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest. Section 18AA(5) stipulates that the provisions of Sections 18-B to 18 E shall be applicable to the industrial undertaking in respect of which an order has been made under section 18-AA even as they apply to an industrial undertaking taken over under Section 18-A. Section 18-F empowers the Central Government to cancel the order made under section 18-A if it appears that the purpose of the order has been fulfilled or it is not necessary that the order should remain in force. The appellant M/s. Swadeshi Cotton Mills was taken over by the Government of India by a notification dated April 13, 1978 in exercise of the powers conferred on it under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 18AA of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 on the ground that the company had by creation of encumbrances on the assets of its industrial undertakings, brought about a situation which had affected and is likely to further affect the production of articles manufactured or produced by it and that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation. The Government authorised the National Textile Corporation Limited to take over the management, subject to the conditions that the authorised person shall comply with all the directions issued from time to time by the Central Government and that the authorised person shall hold office for a period of five years. The appellant Mills challenged the aforesaid order in a writ petition in the High Court. The case was heard by a Full Bench of five Judges to consider the question whether in construing section 18AA of the Industries Development and Regulation Act, 1951, compliance with the principle of audi alteram partem is to be implied and whether hearing is to be given to the parties who would be affected by the order to be passed prior to the passing of the order or whether hearing can be given after the order is passed and whether the order passed under the said Section is vitiated by not giving of such hearing and whether such vice can be cured. The Bench by a majority answered the three questions as follows:- (a) Section 18AA(1)(a)(b) excludes the giving of prior hearing to the party who would be affected by order thereunder. (b) Section 18-F expressly provides for a post- decisional hearing to the owner of the industrial undertaking, the management of which is taken over under section 18AA to have the order made under section 18AA cancelled on any relevant ground. (c) As the taking over of management under section 18A is not vitiated by the failure to grant prior hearing the question of any such vice being cured by a grant of a subsequent hearing does not arise. The minority, however, held that in compliance with the principles of natural justice, prior hearing to the owner of the undertaking was required to be given before the passing of an order under section 18AA, that the second question did not arise as the denial of a prior hearing would not cure the vice by the grant of subsequent hearing, but it would be open to the Court to moderate the relief in such a way that the order is kept alive to the extent necessary until the making of the fresh order to subserve public interest and to make appropriate directions. After the decision on the reference the case was reheard on merits by a Full Bench of three Judges and the writ petition was allowed in part. The challenge to the validity of the order being rejected but insofar as the impugned order seeking to take over the corporate entity of the company, the corporate entity of the subsidiary and its assets, the petition was allowed and the respondents, the Union of India and the authorised person were directed to release from its control and custody and/or deliver possession of any assets or property of the company which were not referable to the industrial undertakings. Appeals to this Court were filed on behalf of the Company as well as by the Union of India and the National Textile Corporation. Two propositions were propounded on behalf of the company that: (a) Whether it was necessary to observe the rules of natural justice before issuing a notified order under section 18AA(1)(a) and further whether section 18-F impliedly excludes rules of natural justice relating to prior hearing; and it was contended (1) the mere use of the word 'immediate' in sub-clause (a) of section 18AA does not show a legislative intent to exclude the application of audi alteram partem rule altogether. (2) The word 'immediate' in clause (a) has been used in contra distinction to 'investigate'. It only means that under section 18AA action can be taken without prior investigation under section 15. The use of the word 'immediate' in section 18AA(1)(a) only dispenses with investigation under section 15 and not with the principle of audi alteram partem altogether and this is indicated by the marginal note of section 18A and para 3 of the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Amendment Bill which inserted section 18AA in 1971. (3) The word 'immediate' occurs only in clause (a) and not in clause (b) of section 18AA(1). It would be odd if intention to exclude this principle of natural justice is spelt out in one clause of the sub-section when the other clause does not exclude it. (4) Section 18-F does not exclude a pre-decisional hearing. The so-called post-decisional hearing contemplated by section 18-F cannot be and is not intended to be a substitute for a pre-decisional hearing. (5) Section 18F incorporates only a facet, albeit qualified, of section 21 of the General Clauses Act. The language of the Section implicity prohibits an enquiry into circumstances that led to the passing of the order of take-over and under it the aggrieved person is not entitled to show that on merits the order was void ab initio. (6) 'Immediacy' does not exclude a duty to act fairly because even an emergent situation can co-exist with the canons of natural justice. The only effect of urgency on the application of the principle of fair hearing would be that the width, form and duration of the hearing would be tailored to the situation and reduced to the reasonable minimum so that it does not delay and defeat the purpose of the contemplated action. (7) Where the civil consequences of the administrative action are grave and its effect is highly prejudicial to the rights and interests of the person affected and there is nothing in the language and scheme of the statute which unequivocally excludes a fair pre-decisional hearing and the post-decisional hearing provided therein is not a real remedial hearing equitable to a full right of appeal the Court should be loath to infer a legislative intent to exclude even a minimal fair hearing at the pre-decisional stage merely on ground of urgency. (8) The Central Government appointed four Government Officials including one from the office of the Textile Commissioner to study the affairs of the Company and to make recommendation. This Official Group submitted its report on February 16, 1978. The evidence on the basis of which the impugned order was passed was not disclosed to the appellant company till May 1978, only after it had filed the writ petition in the High Court. If there was anything adverse to the appellants in the survey report there was time enough about six weeks between the submission of the Survey Report and the passing of the impugned order for giving a short, reasonable opportunity to the appellants to explain the adverse findings against them. If there was immediacy situational modifications could be made to meet the requirement of fairness, by reducing the period of notice; that even the manner and form of such notice could be simplified to eliminate delay, that telephonic notice or short opportunity for furnishing their explanation to the Company might have satisfied the requirements of natural justice. Such an opportunity of hearing could have been given after the passing of a conditional tentative order and before its enforcement under section 18AA. For the interregnum suitable interim action such as freezing the assets of the Company or restraining the Company from creating further encumbrances, could be taken under section 16. On behalf of the Union of India and the Authorised Officer it was contended that (1) the presumption in favour of audi alteram partem rule stands impliedly displaced by the language scheme, setting and the purpose of the provision in section 18AA. (2) Section 18AA on its plain terms deals with situations where immediate preventive action is required. The paramount concern is to avoid serious problems which may be caused by fall in production. The purpose of an order under section 18AA is not to condemn the owner but to protect the scheduled industry. The issue under section 18AA is not solely between the Government and the management of the industrial undertaking. The object of taking action under this Section is to protect other outside interests of the community at large and the workers. (3) The rule of natural justice to give a hearing has been incorporated in section 18-F which gives an opportunity of a post-decisional hearing to the owner of the undertaking who if he feels aggrieved can on his application be heard, to show that even the original order under section 18AA was passed on invalid grounds and should be cancelled or rescinded. (4) On a true construction of section 18AA read with section 18-F the requirements of natural justice and fair play can be read into the statute only insofar as conformance to such canons can reasonably and realistically be required of it by the provision for a remedial hearing at a subsequent stage. (5) Under section 18-F the Central Government exercises curial functions and that Section confers on the aggrieved owner a right to apply to the Government to cancel the order of take-over. This section casts an obligation on the Central Government to deal with and dispose of an application filed thereunder with reasonable expedition. Allowing the appeal by the Company,<br />HELD: (Sarkaria & Desai, JJ. per Chinnappa Reddy, J. dissenting.) In the facts and circumstances of the instant case, there has been a noncompliance with the implied requirement of the audi alteram partem rule of natural justice at the pre-decisional stage. The impugned order could be struck down as invalid on that score alone. But in view of the commitment / concession that a hearing would be afforded to the Company, the case is remitted to the Central Government to give a full, fair and effective hearing. [587G-H, 588C] The phrase 'natural justice' is not capable of a static and precise definition. It cannot be imprisoned in the straight-jacket of a cast-iron formula. Rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. Hence not possible to make an exhaustive catalogue of such rules. Two fundamental maxims of natural justice have now become deeply and indelibly ingrained in the common consciousness of mankind as pre-eminently necessary to ensure that the law is applied impartially objectively and fairly. These twin principles are (i) audi alteram partem and (ii) nemo judex in re sua. Audi alteram partem is a highly effective rule devised by the Courts to ensure that a statutory authority arrives at a just decision and it is calculated to act as a healthy check on the abuse or misuse of power. Its reach should not be narrowed and its applicability circumscribed.[554C-G] The rules of natural justice can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. If a statutory provision either specifically or by inevitable implication excludes the application of the rules of natural justice then the Court cannot ignore the mandate of the Legislature. Whether or not the application of the principles of natural justice in a given case has been excluded in the exercise of statutory power depends upon the language and basic scheme of the provision conferring the power, the nature of the power the purpose for which it is conferred and the effect of that power. [556A-B] The maxim audi alteram partem has many facets. Two of them are (a) notice of the case to be met, and (b) opportunity to explain. The rule cannot be sacrificed at the altar of administrative convenience or celerity; for, convenience and justice are often not on speaking terms. Difficulties, however, arise when the statute conferring the power does not expressly exclude this rule but its exclusion is sought by implication due to the presence of certain factors such as urgency where the obligation to give notice and opportunity to be heard would obstruct the taking of prompt action of a preventive or remedial nature. Audi alteram partem rule may be disregarded in an emergent situation where immediate action brooks no delay to prevent some imminent danger or injury or hazard to paramount public interests. Section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure empowers the magistrates specified therein to make an exparte conditional order in emergent cases for removal of dangerous public nuisances. Action under section 17 Land Acquisition Act furnishes another such instance. Similarly action on grounds of public safety public health may justify disregard of the rule of prior hearing. [556C-H] Cases where owing to the compulsion of the fact situation or the necessity of taking speedy action no pre- decisional hearing is given but the action, is followed soon by a full post-decisional hearing to the person affected do not in reality constitute an exception to the audi alteram partem rule. To call such cases as exception is a misnomer because they do not exclude fair play in action but adapt it to the urgency of the situation by balancing the competing claims of hurry and hearing. [560H-561A] The general principle as distinguished from an absolute rule of uniform application seems to be that where a statute does not in terms exclude this rule of prior hearing but contemplates a post-decisional hearing amounting to a full review of the original order on merits then such a statute would be construed as excluding the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage. [561G] If the statute conferring the power is silent with regard to the giving of pre-decisional hearing to the person affected and the administrative decision taken by the authority involves civil consequences of a grave nature and no full review or appeal on merits against that decision is provided courts will be extremely reluctant to construe such a statute as excluding the duty of affording even a minimal hearing shorn of all its formal trappings and dilatory features at the pre-decisional stage, unless viewed pragmatically it would paralyse the administrative process or frustrate the need for utmost promptitude. [561H] 7(i). A comparison of the provisions of Section 18A(1)(b) and Section 18AA(1)(c), bring out two main points of distinction: First, action under Section 18A(1)(b) can be taken only after an investigation had been made under Section 15; while under Section 18AA(1)(a) or (b) action can be taken without such investigation. The language, scheme and setting of Section 18AA read in the light of the Objects and Reasons for enacting this provision make this position clear beyond doubt. Second, before taking action under Section 18A(1)(b), the Central Government has to form an opinion on the basis of the investigation conducted under section 15, in regard to the existence of the objective fact, namely: that the industrial undertaking is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest; while under section 18A(1)(a) the Government has to satisfy itself that the persons incharge of the undertaking have brought about a situation likely to cause fall in production, by committing any of the three kinds of acts specified in that provision. This shows that the preliminary objective fact attributable to the persons in charge of the management or affairs of the undertaking, on the basis of which action may be taken under section 18(A)(1)(b), is of far wider amplitude than the circumstance, the existence of which is a sine qua non for taking action under section 18AA(1). The phrase "highly detrimental to the scheduled industry or public interest" in section 18-A is capable of being construed to cover a large variety of acts or things which may be considered wrong with the manner of running the industry by the management. In contrast with it, action under section 18AA(1)(a) can be taken only if the Central Government is satisfied with regard to the existence of the twin conditions specifically mentioned therein, on the basis of evidence in its possession. [569D-H] An analysis of section 18AA(1)(a), indicates that as a necessary preliminary to the exercise of the power thereunder, the Central Government must be satisfied "from documentary or other evidence in its possession" in regard to the co-existence of two circumstances: (i) that the persons in charge of the industrial undertaking have by committing any of these acts, namely, reckless investments, or creation of incumbrances on the assets of industrial undertaking, or by diversion of funds, brought about a situation which is likely to affect the production of the article manufactured or produced in the industrial undertaking, and (ii) that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation.[570B-D] It cannot be laid down as a general proposition that whenever a statute confers a power on an administrative authority and makes the exercise of that power conditional on the formation of an opinion by that authority in regard to the existence of an immediacy, its opinion in regard to that preliminary fact is not open to judicial scrutiny at all. While it may be conceded that an element of subjectivity is always involved in the formation of such an opinion, the existence of the circumstances from which the inference constituting the opinion, as the sine qua non for action, are to be drawn, must be demonstrable, and the existence of such "circumstances", if questioned, must be proved at least prima facie. [571 E-G] From a plain reading of section 18AA, it is clear that it does not expressly in unmistakable and unequivocal terms exclude the application of the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage. [574B] In the instant case, so far as Kanpur Unit is concerned, it was lying closed for more than three months before the passing of the impugned order. There was no 'immediacy' in relation to that unit, which could absolve the Government from the obligation of complying fully with audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional or pre- takeover stage. [583A] Keshav Mills Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, [1973] 3 S.C.R. 22; Kamla Prasad Khetan v. Union of India,[1957] S.C.R. 1052; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 621; Sukhdev Singh & Ors. v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh, [1975] 3 S.C.R. 619; A. K. Kraipak v. Union of India, [1970] 1 S.C.R. 457; Ridge v. Baldwin, [1964] A.C. 40; 196; Heatley v. Tasmanian Racing & Gaming Commission, 14 Australian Law Reports 519; Nawabkhan Abbaskhan v. State of Gujarat, [1974] 3 S.C.R. 427; State of Orissa v. Dr. Bina Pani Dei, [1962] 2 S.C.R. 625; Ambalal M. Shah v. Hathi Singh Manufacturing Co. Ltd. [1962] 3 S.C.R. 171; and S. L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan & Ors., [1981] 1 S.C.R. 746, referred to. (Per Chinnappa Reddy, J. dissenting) The principles of natural justice are not attracted to the situations contemplated by section 18AA of Industries (Development and Regulation) Act. Natural justice like Ultra Vires and Public Policy is a branch of the public law and is a formidable weapon which can be wielded to secure justice to the citizen. While it may be used to protect certain fundamental liberties, civil and political rights, it may be used as indeed it is used more often than not, to protect vested interests and to obstruct the path of progressive change. The time has come to make an appropriate distinction between natural justice in its application to fundamental liberties, civil and political rights and natural justice in its application to vested interests. [590A-B] Our constitution as befits the Constitution of a Socialist Secular Democratic Republic, recognises the paramountcy of the public weal over the private interest. Natural justice, ultra vires, public policy, or any other rule of interpretation must, therefore, conform, grow and be tailored to serve the public interest and respond to the demands of an evolving society. [590C] The principles of natural justice have taken deep root in the judicial conscience of our people. They are now considered so fundamental as to be implicit in every decision making function, judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative. Where authority functions under a statute and the statute provides for the observance of the principles of natural justice in a particular manner, natural justice will have to be observed in that manner and in no other. Where the statute is silent about the observance of the principles of natural justice, such statutory silence is taken to imply compliance with the principles of natural justice. Where the conflict is between the public interest and the private interest the presumption must necessarily be weak and may, therefore, be readily displaced. The presumption is also weak, where what are involved are mere property rights. In cases of urgency, particularly where the public interest is involved, preemptive action may be a strategic necessity. Even in cases of preemptive action, if the statute so provides or if the Courts so deem fit in appropriate cases, a postponed hearing may be substituted for natural justice. [590A-C; 591F-G] 3(ii). Where natural justice is implied, the extent of the implication and the nature of the hearing must vary with the statute, the subject and the situation. [592B] The absence of the expression 'immediate action' in section 18AA(1)(b) does not make any difference. Section 18AA(1)(a) refers to a situation where immediate preventive action may avert a disaster, whereas section 18AA contemplates a situation where the disaster has occurred and action is necessary to restore normalcy. Restoration of production where production has stopped in a key industry or industrial undertaking is as important and urgent in the public interest as prevention of a situation where production may be affected. Immediate action is, therefore, as necessary in the situation contemplated by section 18AA(1)(b) as in the situation contemplated by section 18AA(1)(a). [596 F-G] The marginal note refers to the power to take over without investigation but there is no sufficient reason to suppose that the word immediate is used only to contra- distinguish it from the investigation contemplated by section 15 of the Act, though of course a consequence of immediate action under section 18AA may be to dispense with the enquiry under section 15. In fact, facts which come to light during the course of an investigation under section 15 may form the basis of action under section 18AA(1)(a). Where in the course of an investigation under section 15 it is discovered that the management have, by reckless investments or creation of encumbrances on the assets of the industrial undertaking or by diversion of funds brought about a situation which is likely to affect the production of the articles manufactured or produced in the industrial undertaking, if the Government is satisfied that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation, there is no reason why the Central Government may not straightaway take action under section 18AA(1)(a) without waiting for completion of investigation under section 15. [597A-B] Where there is a provision in the statute itself for revocation of the order by the very authority making the decision, it appears to be unnecessary to insist upon a pre- decisional observance of natural justice. [598A] The likelihood of production being jeopardized or the stoppage of production in a key industrial undertaking is a matter of grave concern affecting the public interest. Parliament has taken so serious a view of the matter that it has authorised the Central Government to take over the management of the industrial undertaking if immediate action may prevent jeopardy to production or restore production where it has already stopped. The necessity for immediate action by the Central Government contemplated by Parliament is definitely indicative of the exclusion of natural justice. It is not as if the owner of the industrial undertaking is left with no remedy. He may move the Central Government under section 18-F to cancel the order made under section 18AA. [598C-D] Neither section 18-F of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act nor section 21 of the General Clauses Act by itself excludes natural justice. The exclusion of natural justice where such exclusion is not express has to be implied by reference to the subject, the statute and the statutory situation. Where an express provision in the statute itself provides for a post decisional hearing the other provisions of the Statute will have to be read in the light of such provision and the provision for post- decisional hearing may then clinch the issue where pre- decisional natural justice appears to be excluded on the other terms of the statute. That a post-decisional hearing may also be had by the terms of section 21 of the General Clauses Act may not necessarily help in the interpretation of the provisions of the statute concerned. [599 A-C] Ridge v. Baldwin, 1964 A.C. p. 40; Annie G. Phillip v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 75 L.E.d. 1289; John H. Fahey v. Paul Mallonee, 91 L.E.d. 2030; Margarita Fuentes v. Robert L. Shevin, Attorney General of Florida, 32 L.E.d. 2d 556 and Lawrence Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 40 L.E.d. 2d 406, referred to. - Rama Rao, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh as well as the President of the Telugu Desam Party as well as respondent No. 3. The advertisements very shortly stated, refer to the auspicious gifts made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to the poor people on the eve of New Year and Sankranti. In the said advertisements, it is stated that the said Government which was formed by the Telugu Desam Party was giving to the poor people whose income was below Rs. and the said advertisements referred to a new scheme of selling sarees and dhoties at half prices to the poor people in the State of Andhra Pradesh having Green-cards. Moreover, the offer in the advertisements for the sale of dhoties and sarees at discount rates was in the nature of a benefit offered to poor persons in that State. When a Government announces the measures which are intended for the benefit of any of the classes for whose the Government can normally be expected to work like the poor or the economical backward classes, it is only in rare circumstances that such a promise can be said to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) even though such a promise might be made on the eve of elections. 8. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => '', 'counseldef' => '', 'court' => 'Supreme Court of India', 'court_type' => 'SC', 'decidedon' => '1989-09-29', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' K.N. Saikia,; M.H. Kania and; S. Ranganathan, JJ.', 'judgement' => '</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Kania, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. These two appeals arise out of the judgments in two Election Petitions in the Andhra Pradesh High Court questioning the election of respondent No. 1 as a Member of Parliament from Srikakulam No. Parliamentary Constituency in the 8th General Election to the House of the People. The points raised in these appeals are common and so are the relevant facts; and, hence, they are being disposed of by this common judgment. We propose to take note of only the few facts which are necessary for the appreciation of the controversy before us.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The polling date for the said election along with other parliamentary elections in the State of Andhra Pradesh was December 27, 1984 but in Srikakulam No. 1 Parliamentary Constituency the polling was countermanded and the date of polling was later fixed on January 28, 1985. In both the Election Petitions the election of respondent No. 1 was questioned mainly on the ground that Shri N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh as well as the President of the Telugu Desam Party as well as respondent No. 1 gave certain speeches and certain advertisements were got published by Shri N.T. Rama Rao through the Publicity Department of the Government of Andhra Pradesh in the newspapers containing certain statements which are alleged to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A) of the <a href="/act/50684/representation-of-the-people-act-1951-complete-act">Representation of the People Act, 1951</a> (hereinafter referred to as 'the said Act'). The main question canvassed before us is whether the statements contained in these aforesaid advertisements amount to a corrupt practice under Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act. Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act runs as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">123. Corrupt practices</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The following shall be deemed to be corrupt practises for the purposes of this Act :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) 'Bribery', that is to say.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(A) any gift, offer or promise by a candidate or his agent or by any other person with the consent of a candidate or his election agent of any gratification, to any person whomsover, with the object, directly or indirectly of inducing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) x x x</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) an elector to vote or refrain from voting at an election, or as a reward to.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) a person for having so stood or not stood, or for having withdrawn or not having withdrawn his candidature; or</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) an elector for having voted or refrained from voting.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The advertisements very shortly stated, refer to the auspicious gifts made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to the poor people on the eve of New Year and Sankranti. In the said advertisements, it is stated that the said Government which was formed by the Telugu Desam Party was giving to the poor people whose income was below Rs. 6,000 per year, a kilo of rice at Rs. 2 per Kg. and the said advertisements referred to a new scheme of selling sarees and dhoties at half prices to the poor people in the State of Andhra Pradesh having Green-cards. Green-cards were directed to be issued to all the persons whose annual income was below Rs. 6,000. The supply of the rice at subsidised rates as aforesaid was also to be made to the Green-card holders only. The scheme to sell sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was to be operative from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. In considering the question whether the said advertisement and the said speeches amount to a corrupt practice, we are of the view that the provisions of Section 123 of the said Act which deal with corrupt practices have to be interpreted, keeping in mind that dictates of commonsense require that they never could have been intended to treat normal election promises made in election manifestoes or usual election speeches by members of various political parties aspiring to power and by different candidates aspiring to get elected to legislative bodies concerned as corrupt practices. We are of the view that these advertisements and speeches amount to nothing more than statements extolling the achievements of the Government of the State of Andhra Pradesh under the Telugu Desam Party headed by N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister, and contain normal election promises and these statements do not amount to corrupt practices falling within the scope of Sub-clause (b) of Clause (A) of Sub-section (1) of Section 123 of the said Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. It was urged by Mr. Rao, learned Counsel for the appellants that in the impugned judgments, the High Court has incorrectly taken the view that in order to amount to bribery within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A), the transaction must amount to a bargain by the candidate with a view to get votes. It was pointed out by him that the said view has been taken in the impugned judgments, relying upon the decision of a Bench comprising to learned Judges of this Court in Ghasi Ram v. Dal Singh and Ors. :1983 SCR 102 . We have gone through to the relevant portion of that judgment (at page 109 and 110 of the said report). A careful perusal of the said judgment shows that what has been really held in that case is that if the promises given or made amount to a bargain entered into by a candidate for a vote or votes, that would amount to a corrupt practice; but it has not been held there that unless the act alleged amounts to such a bargain, it could not amount to a corrupt practice. In our view, that judgment does not lay down that in order to amount to a corrupt practice, the transaction must amount to a bargain for getting a vote. It was pointed out by Mr. Rao, however, that such a view seems to have been taken in two other decisions rendered by two Benches, each comprising two learned Judges of this Court in Bhanu Kumar Shastri v. Mohan Lal Sukhadia and Ors. : [1971]3SCR522 and Harjit Singh Mann v. S Umrao Singh and Ors. : [1980]2SCR501 . and these judgments need to be overruled. We do not propose to go into the correctness or otherwise of this view because, even on the footing that in order to amount to a corrupt practice under the aforesaid provision the alleged acts need not constitute a bargain, the the acts established in the present case, in our opinion, do not amount to a corrupt practice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Our attention was drawn by Mr. Rao to the fact that in this case the said advertisements and the speeches had to be viewed in the context of the fact that the advertisements were issued and the speeches were made after respondent No. 1 filed his nomination papers on January 4, 1985, for the election and before the election was held in the aforesaid constituency. It was further pointed out that the offer made for the sale of sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was limited to the period from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985. It cannot be denied that these factors are relevant factOrs. We cannot, however, lose sight of the fact that this offer was made not only in this constituency but throughout the State where the elections to the House of the People were scheduled to be held, and were, in fact, held on December 27, 1984. It was only in case of this constituency that the election to be held on the scheduled date was countermanded and later held on January 28, 1985. We cannot lose sight of the fact that, as far as the said speeches and the said advertisements, which were issued by the Publicity Department of the State, are concerned, they deal in the main with the achievements of the Government of Andhra Pradesh which, of course, was being run by Ministers belonging to Telugu Desam Party to which respondent No. 1 also belonged. Moreover, the offer in the advertisements for the sale of dhoties and sarees at discount rates was in the nature of a benefit offered to poor persons in that State. When a Government announces the measures which are intended for the benefit of any of the classes for whose the Government can normally be expected to work like the poor or the economical backward classes, it is only in rare circumstances that such a promise can be said to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) even though such a promise might be made on the eve of elections. Keeping this in mind, in our opinion, although the offer to sell dhoties and sarees at discount rates was of a limited duration as aforestated, it cannot be regarded as a corrupt practice. Such an offer was bound to have financial repercussions and it is quite possible the duration of the offer was limited to enable the Government to study the financial repercussions rather than from any improper motive. We find support for this view from the decision of this Court in H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh : [1969]3SCR813 . In that case an Ordinance was passed by the Government of Madhya Pradesh as a result of which a large number of agriculturists, namely, those holdings of plots of land of less than 7.5 acres area or paying land revenue not exceeding Rs. 5/- were exempted from the payment of the land revenue. It was held that such a concession does not amount to a gift, offer or promise of any gratification within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) of the said Act nor does the announcement of the declaration made at a meeting shortly before the election or the issue of a pamphlet containing that declaration at that time carry the matter any further. It was held that neither Shri D.P. Misra who was the Chief Minister nor Shri S.K. Dixit who acted as his agent were guilty of any corrupt practice within the meaning of the aforesaid provision.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. It was next contended by Mr. Rao, although very faintly, that the High Court was in error as it had not decided all other issues which were raised in the election petition. In this regard we cannot lose sight of the fact that the term of the present Lok Sabha is likely to be over within a few months and fresh elections are likely to be held and it would, therefore, be an exercise in futility to remand the matter to the High Court for deciding the remaining issues.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'AIR1990SC1889; JT1989(4)SC186; 1989(2)SCALE891; 1989Supp(2)SCC504', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors.', 'sub' => 'Election', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ), 'casename_url' => 'b-rajagopala-rao-vs-appayya-hanumanthu', 'args' => array( (int) 0 => '640942', (int) 1 => 'b-rajagopala-rao-vs-appayya-hanumanthu' ) ) $title_for_layout = 'B Rajagopala Rao and anr Vs Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors - Citation 640942 - Court Judgment | ' $desc = array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '640942', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/50684/representation-of-the-people-act-1951-complete-act">Representation of the People Act, 1951</a> - Sections 1, 3(1)(A), 123 and 123(1)(A)', 'appealno' => 'Civil Appeal Nos. 484 and 485 of 1987', 'appellant' => 'B. Rajagopala Rao and anr.', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'B. Rajagopala Rao and anr. Vs. Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors.', 'casenote' => 'Election - corrupt practices - Sections 123 and 123 (1) (A) of Representation of the People Act, 1951 - whether advertisements by public department and speeches made by respondent No. 1 to sell dhoti and sarees at discount rates amount to corrupt practices - offer was available for mass and for limited duration - such offer was bound to have financial repercussions and it is quite possible that duration of offer limited to enable Government to study financial repercussions rather than from any improper motive - offer not amounted to corrupt practices. - [ D.A. Desai,; O. Chinnappa Reddy and; R.S. Sarkaria, JJ.] The Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 empowers the Union of India in the public interest to take under its control the industries specified in the First Schedule to the Act. Item 23 of the First Schedule relates to textiles of various categories. Section 15 authorises the Central Government to make or cause to be made a full and complete investigation into the circumstances of the case if the Central Government is of the opinion that (a) in respect of any scheduled industry or industrial undertaking or undertakings (i) there has been, or is likely to be, a substantial fall in the volume of production for which, having regard to the economic conditions prevailing, there is no justification; or (ii) there has been, or is likely to be, a marked deterioration in the quality of any article... which could have been or can be avoided; or (iii) there has been or is likely to be a rise in the price of any article..... for which there is no justification; or (iv) it is necessary to take any such action for the purpose of conserving any resources of national importance; or (b) any industrial undertaking is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest. After the investigation is made under section 15, section 16(1) empowers the Central Government if action is desirable, to issue appropriate directions, and section 16(2) provides for the issue of interim directions by the Central Government pending investigation under section 15. Chapter III-A consisting of Sections 18A, 18-AA, 18-B, 18-C, 18-D, 18-E and 18-F deal with "direct management or control of Industrial Undertakings by Central Government in certain cases". Sec. 18-A empowers the Central Government by notified order, to authorise any person or body of persons to take over the management of the whole or any part of an industrial undertaking or to exercise in respect of the whole, or any part of the undertaking such functions of control as may be specified in the order, if the Central Government is of opinion that: (a) an industrial undertaking to which directions have been issued in pursuance of section 16 has failed to comply with such directions, or (b) an industrial undertaking in respect of which an investigation has been made under section 15 is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest. Section 18AA(5) stipulates that the provisions of Sections 18-B to 18 E shall be applicable to the industrial undertaking in respect of which an order has been made under section 18-AA even as they apply to an industrial undertaking taken over under Section 18-A. Section 18-F empowers the Central Government to cancel the order made under section 18-A if it appears that the purpose of the order has been fulfilled or it is not necessary that the order should remain in force. The appellant M/s. Swadeshi Cotton Mills was taken over by the Government of India by a notification dated April 13, 1978 in exercise of the powers conferred on it under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 18AA of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 on the ground that the company had by creation of encumbrances on the assets of its industrial undertakings, brought about a situation which had affected and is likely to further affect the production of articles manufactured or produced by it and that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation. The Government authorised the National Textile Corporation Limited to take over the management, subject to the conditions that the authorised person shall comply with all the directions issued from time to time by the Central Government and that the authorised person shall hold office for a period of five years. The appellant Mills challenged the aforesaid order in a writ petition in the High Court. The case was heard by a Full Bench of five Judges to consider the question whether in construing section 18AA of the Industries Development and Regulation Act, 1951, compliance with the principle of audi alteram partem is to be implied and whether hearing is to be given to the parties who would be affected by the order to be passed prior to the passing of the order or whether hearing can be given after the order is passed and whether the order passed under the said Section is vitiated by not giving of such hearing and whether such vice can be cured. The Bench by a majority answered the three questions as follows:- (a) Section 18AA(1)(a)(b) excludes the giving of prior hearing to the party who would be affected by order thereunder. (b) Section 18-F expressly provides for a post- decisional hearing to the owner of the industrial undertaking, the management of which is taken over under section 18AA to have the order made under section 18AA cancelled on any relevant ground. (c) As the taking over of management under section 18A is not vitiated by the failure to grant prior hearing the question of any such vice being cured by a grant of a subsequent hearing does not arise. The minority, however, held that in compliance with the principles of natural justice, prior hearing to the owner of the undertaking was required to be given before the passing of an order under section 18AA, that the second question did not arise as the denial of a prior hearing would not cure the vice by the grant of subsequent hearing, but it would be open to the Court to moderate the relief in such a way that the order is kept alive to the extent necessary until the making of the fresh order to subserve public interest and to make appropriate directions. After the decision on the reference the case was reheard on merits by a Full Bench of three Judges and the writ petition was allowed in part. The challenge to the validity of the order being rejected but insofar as the impugned order seeking to take over the corporate entity of the company, the corporate entity of the subsidiary and its assets, the petition was allowed and the respondents, the Union of India and the authorised person were directed to release from its control and custody and/or deliver possession of any assets or property of the company which were not referable to the industrial undertakings. Appeals to this Court were filed on behalf of the Company as well as by the Union of India and the National Textile Corporation. Two propositions were propounded on behalf of the company that: (a) Whether it was necessary to observe the rules of natural justice before issuing a notified order under section 18AA(1)(a) and further whether section 18-F impliedly excludes rules of natural justice relating to prior hearing; and it was contended (1) the mere use of the word 'immediate' in sub-clause (a) of section 18AA does not show a legislative intent to exclude the application of audi alteram partem rule altogether. (2) The word 'immediate' in clause (a) has been used in contra distinction to 'investigate'. It only means that under section 18AA action can be taken without prior investigation under section 15. The use of the word 'immediate' in section 18AA(1)(a) only dispenses with investigation under section 15 and not with the principle of audi alteram partem altogether and this is indicated by the marginal note of section 18A and para 3 of the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Amendment Bill which inserted section 18AA in 1971. (3) The word 'immediate' occurs only in clause (a) and not in clause (b) of section 18AA(1). It would be odd if intention to exclude this principle of natural justice is spelt out in one clause of the sub-section when the other clause does not exclude it. (4) Section 18-F does not exclude a pre-decisional hearing. The so-called post-decisional hearing contemplated by section 18-F cannot be and is not intended to be a substitute for a pre-decisional hearing. (5) Section 18F incorporates only a facet, albeit qualified, of section 21 of the General Clauses Act. The language of the Section implicity prohibits an enquiry into circumstances that led to the passing of the order of take-over and under it the aggrieved person is not entitled to show that on merits the order was void ab initio. (6) 'Immediacy' does not exclude a duty to act fairly because even an emergent situation can co-exist with the canons of natural justice. The only effect of urgency on the application of the principle of fair hearing would be that the width, form and duration of the hearing would be tailored to the situation and reduced to the reasonable minimum so that it does not delay and defeat the purpose of the contemplated action. (7) Where the civil consequences of the administrative action are grave and its effect is highly prejudicial to the rights and interests of the person affected and there is nothing in the language and scheme of the statute which unequivocally excludes a fair pre-decisional hearing and the post-decisional hearing provided therein is not a real remedial hearing equitable to a full right of appeal the Court should be loath to infer a legislative intent to exclude even a minimal fair hearing at the pre-decisional stage merely on ground of urgency. (8) The Central Government appointed four Government Officials including one from the office of the Textile Commissioner to study the affairs of the Company and to make recommendation. This Official Group submitted its report on February 16, 1978. The evidence on the basis of which the impugned order was passed was not disclosed to the appellant company till May 1978, only after it had filed the writ petition in the High Court. If there was anything adverse to the appellants in the survey report there was time enough about six weeks between the submission of the Survey Report and the passing of the impugned order for giving a short, reasonable opportunity to the appellants to explain the adverse findings against them. If there was immediacy situational modifications could be made to meet the requirement of fairness, by reducing the period of notice; that even the manner and form of such notice could be simplified to eliminate delay, that telephonic notice or short opportunity for furnishing their explanation to the Company might have satisfied the requirements of natural justice. Such an opportunity of hearing could have been given after the passing of a conditional tentative order and before its enforcement under section 18AA. For the interregnum suitable interim action such as freezing the assets of the Company or restraining the Company from creating further encumbrances, could be taken under section 16. On behalf of the Union of India and the Authorised Officer it was contended that (1) the presumption in favour of audi alteram partem rule stands impliedly displaced by the language scheme, setting and the purpose of the provision in section 18AA. (2) Section 18AA on its plain terms deals with situations where immediate preventive action is required. The paramount concern is to avoid serious problems which may be caused by fall in production. The purpose of an order under section 18AA is not to condemn the owner but to protect the scheduled industry. The issue under section 18AA is not solely between the Government and the management of the industrial undertaking. The object of taking action under this Section is to protect other outside interests of the community at large and the workers. (3) The rule of natural justice to give a hearing has been incorporated in section 18-F which gives an opportunity of a post-decisional hearing to the owner of the undertaking who if he feels aggrieved can on his application be heard, to show that even the original order under section 18AA was passed on invalid grounds and should be cancelled or rescinded. (4) On a true construction of section 18AA read with section 18-F the requirements of natural justice and fair play can be read into the statute only insofar as conformance to such canons can reasonably and realistically be required of it by the provision for a remedial hearing at a subsequent stage. (5) Under section 18-F the Central Government exercises curial functions and that Section confers on the aggrieved owner a right to apply to the Government to cancel the order of take-over. This section casts an obligation on the Central Government to deal with and dispose of an application filed thereunder with reasonable expedition. Allowing the appeal by the Company,<br/>HELD: (Sarkaria & Desai, JJ. per Chinnappa Reddy, J. dissenting.) In the facts and circumstances of the instant case, there has been a noncompliance with the implied requirement of the audi alteram partem rule of natural justice at the pre-decisional stage. The impugned order could be struck down as invalid on that score alone. But in view of the commitment / concession that a hearing would be afforded to the Company, the case is remitted to the Central Government to give a full, fair and effective hearing. [587G-H, 588C] The phrase 'natural justice' is not capable of a static and precise definition. It cannot be imprisoned in the straight-jacket of a cast-iron formula. Rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. Hence not possible to make an exhaustive catalogue of such rules. Two fundamental maxims of natural justice have now become deeply and indelibly ingrained in the common consciousness of mankind as pre-eminently necessary to ensure that the law is applied impartially objectively and fairly. These twin principles are (i) audi alteram partem and (ii) nemo judex in re sua. Audi alteram partem is a highly effective rule devised by the Courts to ensure that a statutory authority arrives at a just decision and it is calculated to act as a healthy check on the abuse or misuse of power. Its reach should not be narrowed and its applicability circumscribed.[554C-G] The rules of natural justice can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. If a statutory provision either specifically or by inevitable implication excludes the application of the rules of natural justice then the Court cannot ignore the mandate of the Legislature. Whether or not the application of the principles of natural justice in a given case has been excluded in the exercise of statutory power depends upon the language and basic scheme of the provision conferring the power, the nature of the power the purpose for which it is conferred and the effect of that power. [556A-B] The maxim audi alteram partem has many facets. Two of them are (a) notice of the case to be met, and (b) opportunity to explain. The rule cannot be sacrificed at the altar of administrative convenience or celerity; for, convenience and justice are often not on speaking terms. Difficulties, however, arise when the statute conferring the power does not expressly exclude this rule but its exclusion is sought by implication due to the presence of certain factors such as urgency where the obligation to give notice and opportunity to be heard would obstruct the taking of prompt action of a preventive or remedial nature. Audi alteram partem rule may be disregarded in an emergent situation where immediate action brooks no delay to prevent some imminent danger or injury or hazard to paramount public interests. Section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure empowers the magistrates specified therein to make an exparte conditional order in emergent cases for removal of dangerous public nuisances. Action under section 17 Land Acquisition Act furnishes another such instance. Similarly action on grounds of public safety public health may justify disregard of the rule of prior hearing. [556C-H] Cases where owing to the compulsion of the fact situation or the necessity of taking speedy action no pre- decisional hearing is given but the action, is followed soon by a full post-decisional hearing to the person affected do not in reality constitute an exception to the audi alteram partem rule. To call such cases as exception is a misnomer because they do not exclude fair play in action but adapt it to the urgency of the situation by balancing the competing claims of hurry and hearing. [560H-561A] The general principle as distinguished from an absolute rule of uniform application seems to be that where a statute does not in terms exclude this rule of prior hearing but contemplates a post-decisional hearing amounting to a full review of the original order on merits then such a statute would be construed as excluding the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage. [561G] If the statute conferring the power is silent with regard to the giving of pre-decisional hearing to the person affected and the administrative decision taken by the authority involves civil consequences of a grave nature and no full review or appeal on merits against that decision is provided courts will be extremely reluctant to construe such a statute as excluding the duty of affording even a minimal hearing shorn of all its formal trappings and dilatory features at the pre-decisional stage, unless viewed pragmatically it would paralyse the administrative process or frustrate the need for utmost promptitude. [561H] 7(i). A comparison of the provisions of Section 18A(1)(b) and Section 18AA(1)(c), bring out two main points of distinction: First, action under Section 18A(1)(b) can be taken only after an investigation had been made under Section 15; while under Section 18AA(1)(a) or (b) action can be taken without such investigation. The language, scheme and setting of Section 18AA read in the light of the Objects and Reasons for enacting this provision make this position clear beyond doubt. Second, before taking action under Section 18A(1)(b), the Central Government has to form an opinion on the basis of the investigation conducted under section 15, in regard to the existence of the objective fact, namely: that the industrial undertaking is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest; while under section 18A(1)(a) the Government has to satisfy itself that the persons incharge of the undertaking have brought about a situation likely to cause fall in production, by committing any of the three kinds of acts specified in that provision. This shows that the preliminary objective fact attributable to the persons in charge of the management or affairs of the undertaking, on the basis of which action may be taken under section 18(A)(1)(b), is of far wider amplitude than the circumstance, the existence of which is a sine qua non for taking action under section 18AA(1). The phrase "highly detrimental to the scheduled industry or public interest" in section 18-A is capable of being construed to cover a large variety of acts or things which may be considered wrong with the manner of running the industry by the management. In contrast with it, action under section 18AA(1)(a) can be taken only if the Central Government is satisfied with regard to the existence of the twin conditions specifically mentioned therein, on the basis of evidence in its possession. [569D-H] An analysis of section 18AA(1)(a), indicates that as a necessary preliminary to the exercise of the power thereunder, the Central Government must be satisfied "from documentary or other evidence in its possession" in regard to the co-existence of two circumstances: (i) that the persons in charge of the industrial undertaking have by committing any of these acts, namely, reckless investments, or creation of incumbrances on the assets of industrial undertaking, or by diversion of funds, brought about a situation which is likely to affect the production of the article manufactured or produced in the industrial undertaking, and (ii) that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation.[570B-D] It cannot be laid down as a general proposition that whenever a statute confers a power on an administrative authority and makes the exercise of that power conditional on the formation of an opinion by that authority in regard to the existence of an immediacy, its opinion in regard to that preliminary fact is not open to judicial scrutiny at all. While it may be conceded that an element of subjectivity is always involved in the formation of such an opinion, the existence of the circumstances from which the inference constituting the opinion, as the sine qua non for action, are to be drawn, must be demonstrable, and the existence of such "circumstances", if questioned, must be proved at least prima facie. [571 E-G] From a plain reading of section 18AA, it is clear that it does not expressly in unmistakable and unequivocal terms exclude the application of the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage. [574B] In the instant case, so far as Kanpur Unit is concerned, it was lying closed for more than three months before the passing of the impugned order. There was no 'immediacy' in relation to that unit, which could absolve the Government from the obligation of complying fully with audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional or pre- takeover stage. [583A] Keshav Mills Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, [1973] 3 S.C.R. 22; Kamla Prasad Khetan v. Union of India,[1957] S.C.R. 1052; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 621; Sukhdev Singh & Ors. v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh, [1975] 3 S.C.R. 619; A. K. Kraipak v. Union of India, [1970] 1 S.C.R. 457; Ridge v. Baldwin, [1964] A.C. 40; 196; Heatley v. Tasmanian Racing & Gaming Commission, 14 Australian Law Reports 519; Nawabkhan Abbaskhan v. State of Gujarat, [1974] 3 S.C.R. 427; State of Orissa v. Dr. Bina Pani Dei, [1962] 2 S.C.R. 625; Ambalal M. Shah v. Hathi Singh Manufacturing Co. Ltd. [1962] 3 S.C.R. 171; and S. L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan & Ors., [1981] 1 S.C.R. 746, referred to. (Per Chinnappa Reddy, J. dissenting) The principles of natural justice are not attracted to the situations contemplated by section 18AA of Industries (Development and Regulation) Act. Natural justice like Ultra Vires and Public Policy is a branch of the public law and is a formidable weapon which can be wielded to secure justice to the citizen. While it may be used to protect certain fundamental liberties, civil and political rights, it may be used as indeed it is used more often than not, to protect vested interests and to obstruct the path of progressive change. The time has come to make an appropriate distinction between natural justice in its application to fundamental liberties, civil and political rights and natural justice in its application to vested interests. [590A-B] Our constitution as befits the Constitution of a Socialist Secular Democratic Republic, recognises the paramountcy of the public weal over the private interest. Natural justice, ultra vires, public policy, or any other rule of interpretation must, therefore, conform, grow and be tailored to serve the public interest and respond to the demands of an evolving society. [590C] The principles of natural justice have taken deep root in the judicial conscience of our people. They are now considered so fundamental as to be implicit in every decision making function, judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative. Where authority functions under a statute and the statute provides for the observance of the principles of natural justice in a particular manner, natural justice will have to be observed in that manner and in no other. Where the statute is silent about the observance of the principles of natural justice, such statutory silence is taken to imply compliance with the principles of natural justice. Where the conflict is between the public interest and the private interest the presumption must necessarily be weak and may, therefore, be readily displaced. The presumption is also weak, where what are involved are mere property rights. In cases of urgency, particularly where the public interest is involved, preemptive action may be a strategic necessity. Even in cases of preemptive action, if the statute so provides or if the Courts so deem fit in appropriate cases, a postponed hearing may be substituted for natural justice. [590A-C; 591F-G] 3(ii). Where natural justice is implied, the extent of the implication and the nature of the hearing must vary with the statute, the subject and the situation. [592B] The absence of the expression 'immediate action' in section 18AA(1)(b) does not make any difference. Section 18AA(1)(a) refers to a situation where immediate preventive action may avert a disaster, whereas section 18AA contemplates a situation where the disaster has occurred and action is necessary to restore normalcy. Restoration of production where production has stopped in a key industry or industrial undertaking is as important and urgent in the public interest as prevention of a situation where production may be affected. Immediate action is, therefore, as necessary in the situation contemplated by section 18AA(1)(b) as in the situation contemplated by section 18AA(1)(a). [596 F-G] The marginal note refers to the power to take over without investigation but there is no sufficient reason to suppose that the word immediate is used only to contra- distinguish it from the investigation contemplated by section 15 of the Act, though of course a consequence of immediate action under section 18AA may be to dispense with the enquiry under section 15. In fact, facts which come to light during the course of an investigation under section 15 may form the basis of action under section 18AA(1)(a). Where in the course of an investigation under section 15 it is discovered that the management have, by reckless investments or creation of encumbrances on the assets of the industrial undertaking or by diversion of funds brought about a situation which is likely to affect the production of the articles manufactured or produced in the industrial undertaking, if the Government is satisfied that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation, there is no reason why the Central Government may not straightaway take action under section 18AA(1)(a) without waiting for completion of investigation under section 15. [597A-B] Where there is a provision in the statute itself for revocation of the order by the very authority making the decision, it appears to be unnecessary to insist upon a pre- decisional observance of natural justice. [598A] The likelihood of production being jeopardized or the stoppage of production in a key industrial undertaking is a matter of grave concern affecting the public interest. Parliament has taken so serious a view of the matter that it has authorised the Central Government to take over the management of the industrial undertaking if immediate action may prevent jeopardy to production or restore production where it has already stopped. The necessity for immediate action by the Central Government contemplated by Parliament is definitely indicative of the exclusion of natural justice. It is not as if the owner of the industrial undertaking is left with no remedy. He may move the Central Government under section 18-F to cancel the order made under section 18AA. [598C-D] Neither section 18-F of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act nor section 21 of the General Clauses Act by itself excludes natural justice. The exclusion of natural justice where such exclusion is not express has to be implied by reference to the subject, the statute and the statutory situation. Where an express provision in the statute itself provides for a post decisional hearing the other provisions of the Statute will have to be read in the light of such provision and the provision for post- decisional hearing may then clinch the issue where pre- decisional natural justice appears to be excluded on the other terms of the statute. That a post-decisional hearing may also be had by the terms of section 21 of the General Clauses Act may not necessarily help in the interpretation of the provisions of the statute concerned. [599 A-C] Ridge v. Baldwin, 1964 A.C. p. 40; Annie G. Phillip v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 75 L.E.d. 1289; John H. Fahey v. Paul Mallonee, 91 L.E.d. 2030; Margarita Fuentes v. Robert L. Shevin, Attorney General of Florida, 32 L.E.d. 2d 556 and Lawrence Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 40 L.E.d. 2d 406, referred to. - Rama Rao, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh as well as the President of the Telugu Desam Party as well as respondent No. 3. The advertisements very shortly stated, refer to the auspicious gifts made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to the poor people on the eve of New Year and Sankranti. In the said advertisements, it is stated that the said Government which was formed by the Telugu Desam Party was giving to the poor people whose income was below Rs. and the said advertisements referred to a new scheme of selling sarees and dhoties at half prices to the poor people in the State of Andhra Pradesh having Green-cards. Moreover, the offer in the advertisements for the sale of dhoties and sarees at discount rates was in the nature of a benefit offered to poor persons in that State. When a Government announces the measures which are intended for the benefit of any of the classes for whose the Government can normally be expected to work like the poor or the economical backward classes, it is only in rare circumstances that such a promise can be said to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) even though such a promise might be made on the eve of elections. 8. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => '', 'counseldef' => '', 'court' => 'Supreme Court of India', 'court_type' => 'SC', 'decidedon' => '1989-09-29', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' K.N. Saikia,; M.H. Kania and; S. Ranganathan, JJ.', 'judgement' => '</p><p>Kania, J.</p><p>1. These two appeals arise out of the judgments in two Election Petitions in the Andhra Pradesh High Court questioning the election of respondent No. 1 as a Member of Parliament from Srikakulam No. Parliamentary Constituency in the 8th General Election to the House of the People. The points raised in these appeals are common and so are the relevant facts; and, hence, they are being disposed of by this common judgment. We propose to take note of only the few facts which are necessary for the appreciation of the controversy before us.</p><p>2. The polling date for the said election along with other parliamentary elections in the State of Andhra Pradesh was December 27, 1984 but in Srikakulam No. 1 Parliamentary Constituency the polling was countermanded and the date of polling was later fixed on January 28, 1985. In both the Election Petitions the election of respondent No. 1 was questioned mainly on the ground that Shri N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh as well as the President of the Telugu Desam Party as well as respondent No. 1 gave certain speeches and certain advertisements were got published by Shri N.T. Rama Rao through the Publicity Department of the Government of Andhra Pradesh in the newspapers containing certain statements which are alleged to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A) of the <a>Representation of the People Act, 1951</a> (hereinafter referred to as 'the said Act'). The main question canvassed before us is whether the statements contained in these aforesaid advertisements amount to a corrupt practice under Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act. Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act runs as follows :</p><p>123. Corrupt practices</p><p>The following shall be deemed to be corrupt practises for the purposes of this Act :</p><p>(1) 'Bribery', that is to say.</p><p>(A) any gift, offer or promise by a candidate or his agent or by any other person with the consent of a candidate or his election agent of any gratification, to any person whomsover, with the object, directly or indirectly of inducing.</p><p>(a) x x x</p><p>(b) an elector to vote or refrain from voting at an election, or as a reward to.</p><p>(i) a person for having so stood or not stood, or for having withdrawn or not having withdrawn his candidature; or</p><p>(ii) an elector for having voted or refrained from voting.</p><p>3. The advertisements very shortly stated, refer to the auspicious gifts made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to the poor people on the eve of New Year and Sankranti. In the said advertisements, it is stated that the said Government which was formed by the Telugu Desam Party was giving to the poor people whose income was below Rs. 6,000 per year, a kilo of rice at Rs. 2 per Kg. and the said advertisements referred to a new scheme of selling sarees and dhoties at half prices to the poor people in the State of Andhra Pradesh having Green-cards. Green-cards were directed to be issued to all the persons whose annual income was below Rs. 6,000. The supply of the rice at subsidised rates as aforesaid was also to be made to the Green-card holders only. The scheme to sell sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was to be operative from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985.</p><p>4. In considering the question whether the said advertisement and the said speeches amount to a corrupt practice, we are of the view that the provisions of Section 123 of the said Act which deal with corrupt practices have to be interpreted, keeping in mind that dictates of commonsense require that they never could have been intended to treat normal election promises made in election manifestoes or usual election speeches by members of various political parties aspiring to power and by different candidates aspiring to get elected to legislative bodies concerned as corrupt practices. We are of the view that these advertisements and speeches amount to nothing more than statements extolling the achievements of the Government of the State of Andhra Pradesh under the Telugu Desam Party headed by N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister, and contain normal election promises and these statements do not amount to corrupt practices falling within the scope of Sub-clause (b) of Clause (A) of Sub-section (1) of Section 123 of the said Act.</p><p>5. It was urged by Mr. Rao, learned Counsel for the appellants that in the impugned judgments, the High Court has incorrectly taken the view that in order to amount to bribery within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A), the transaction must amount to a bargain by the candidate with a view to get votes. It was pointed out by him that the said view has been taken in the impugned judgments, relying upon the decision of a Bench comprising to learned Judges of this Court in Ghasi Ram v. Dal Singh and Ors. :1983 SCR 102 . We have gone through to the relevant portion of that judgment (at page 109 and 110 of the said report). A careful perusal of the said judgment shows that what has been really held in that case is that if the promises given or made amount to a bargain entered into by a candidate for a vote or votes, that would amount to a corrupt practice; but it has not been held there that unless the act alleged amounts to such a bargain, it could not amount to a corrupt practice. In our view, that judgment does not lay down that in order to amount to a corrupt practice, the transaction must amount to a bargain for getting a vote. It was pointed out by Mr. Rao, however, that such a view seems to have been taken in two other decisions rendered by two Benches, each comprising two learned Judges of this Court in Bhanu Kumar Shastri v. Mohan Lal Sukhadia and Ors. : [1971]3SCR522 and Harjit Singh Mann v. S Umrao Singh and Ors. : [1980]2SCR501 . and these judgments need to be overruled. We do not propose to go into the correctness or otherwise of this view because, even on the footing that in order to amount to a corrupt practice under the aforesaid provision the alleged acts need not constitute a bargain, the the acts established in the present case, in our opinion, do not amount to a corrupt practice.</p><p>6. Our attention was drawn by Mr. Rao to the fact that in this case the said advertisements and the speeches had to be viewed in the context of the fact that the advertisements were issued and the speeches were made after respondent No. 1 filed his nomination papers on January 4, 1985, for the election and before the election was held in the aforesaid constituency. It was further pointed out that the offer made for the sale of sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was limited to the period from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985. It cannot be denied that these factors are relevant factOrs. We cannot, however, lose sight of the fact that this offer was made not only in this constituency but throughout the State where the elections to the House of the People were scheduled to be held, and were, in fact, held on December 27, 1984. It was only in case of this constituency that the election to be held on the scheduled date was countermanded and later held on January 28, 1985. We cannot lose sight of the fact that, as far as the said speeches and the said advertisements, which were issued by the Publicity Department of the State, are concerned, they deal in the main with the achievements of the Government of Andhra Pradesh which, of course, was being run by Ministers belonging to Telugu Desam Party to which respondent No. 1 also belonged. Moreover, the offer in the advertisements for the sale of dhoties and sarees at discount rates was in the nature of a benefit offered to poor persons in that State. When a Government announces the measures which are intended for the benefit of any of the classes for whose the Government can normally be expected to work like the poor or the economical backward classes, it is only in rare circumstances that such a promise can be said to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) even though such a promise might be made on the eve of elections. Keeping this in mind, in our opinion, although the offer to sell dhoties and sarees at discount rates was of a limited duration as aforestated, it cannot be regarded as a corrupt practice. Such an offer was bound to have financial repercussions and it is quite possible the duration of the offer was limited to enable the Government to study the financial repercussions rather than from any improper motive. We find support for this view from the decision of this Court in H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh : [1969]3SCR813 . In that case an Ordinance was passed by the Government of Madhya Pradesh as a result of which a large number of agriculturists, namely, those holdings of plots of land of less than 7.5 acres area or paying land revenue not exceeding Rs. 5/- were exempted from the payment of the land revenue. It was held that such a concession does not amount to a gift, offer or promise of any gratification within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) of the said Act nor does the announcement of the declaration made at a meeting shortly before the election or the issue of a pamphlet containing that declaration at that time carry the matter any further. It was held that neither Shri D.P. Misra who was the Chief Minister nor Shri S.K. Dixit who acted as his agent were guilty of any corrupt practice within the meaning of the aforesaid provision.</p><p>7. It was next contended by Mr. Rao, although very faintly, that the High Court was in error as it had not decided all other issues which were raised in the election petition. In this regard we cannot lose sight of the fact that the term of the present Lok Sabha is likely to be over within a few months and fresh elections are likely to be held and it would, therefore, be an exercise in futility to remand the matter to the High Court for deciding the remaining issues.</p><p>8. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.<p></p><p>', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'AIR1990SC1889; JT1989(4)SC186; 1989(2)SCALE891; 1989Supp(2)SCC504', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors.', 'sub' => 'Election', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ) $casename_url = 'b-rajagopala-rao-vs-appayya-hanumanthu' $args = array( (int) 0 => '640942', (int) 1 => 'b-rajagopala-rao-vs-appayya-hanumanthu' ) $url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/640942/b-rajagopala-rao-vs-appayya-hanumanthu' $ctype = '' $caseref = 'H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh<br>' $content = array( (int) 0 => '', (int) 1 => '<p>Kania, J.', (int) 2 => '<p>1. These two appeals arise out of the judgments in two Election Petitions in the Andhra Pradesh High Court questioning the election of respondent No. 1 as a Member of Parliament from Srikakulam No. Parliamentary Constituency in the 8th General Election to the House of the People. The points raised in these appeals are common and so are the relevant facts; and, hence, they are being disposed of by this common judgment. We propose to take note of only the few facts which are necessary for the appreciation of the controversy before us.', (int) 3 => '<p>2. The polling date for the said election along with other parliamentary elections in the State of Andhra Pradesh was December 27, 1984 but in Srikakulam No. 1 Parliamentary Constituency the polling was countermanded and the date of polling was later fixed on January 28, 1985. In both the Election Petitions the election of respondent No. 1 was questioned mainly on the ground that Shri N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh as well as the President of the Telugu Desam Party as well as respondent No. 1 gave certain speeches and certain advertisements were got published by Shri N.T. Rama Rao through the Publicity Department of the Government of Andhra Pradesh in the newspapers containing certain statements which are alleged to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A) of the <a>Representation of the People Act, 1951</a> (hereinafter referred to as 'the said Act'). The main question canvassed before us is whether the statements contained in these aforesaid advertisements amount to a corrupt practice under Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act. Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act runs as follows :', (int) 4 => '<p>123. Corrupt practices', (int) 5 => '<p>The following shall be deemed to be corrupt practises for the purposes of this Act :', (int) 6 => '<p>(1) 'Bribery', that is to say.', (int) 7 => '<p>(A) any gift, offer or promise by a candidate or his agent or by any other person with the consent of a candidate or his election agent of any gratification, to any person whomsover, with the object, directly or indirectly of inducing.', (int) 8 => '<p>(a) x x x', (int) 9 => '<p>(b) an elector to vote or refrain from voting at an election, or as a reward to.', (int) 10 => '<p>(i) a person for having so stood or not stood, or for having withdrawn or not having withdrawn his candidature; or', (int) 11 => '<p>(ii) an elector for having voted or refrained from voting.', (int) 12 => '<p>3. The advertisements very shortly stated, refer to the auspicious gifts made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to the poor people on the eve of New Year and Sankranti. In the said advertisements, it is stated that the said Government which was formed by the Telugu Desam Party was giving to the poor people whose income was below Rs. 6,000 per year, a kilo of rice at Rs. 2 per Kg. and the said advertisements referred to a new scheme of selling sarees and dhoties at half prices to the poor people in the State of Andhra Pradesh having Green-cards. Green-cards were directed to be issued to all the persons whose annual income was below Rs. 6,000. The supply of the rice at subsidised rates as aforesaid was also to be made to the Green-card holders only. The scheme to sell sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was to be operative from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985.', (int) 13 => '<p>4. In considering the question whether the said advertisement and the said speeches amount to a corrupt practice, we are of the view that the provisions of Section 123 of the said Act which deal with corrupt practices have to be interpreted, keeping in mind that dictates of commonsense require that they never could have been intended to treat normal election promises made in election manifestoes or usual election speeches by members of various political parties aspiring to power and by different candidates aspiring to get elected to legislative bodies concerned as corrupt practices. We are of the view that these advertisements and speeches amount to nothing more than statements extolling the achievements of the Government of the State of Andhra Pradesh under the Telugu Desam Party headed by N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister, and contain normal election promises and these statements do not amount to corrupt practices falling within the scope of Sub-clause (b) of Clause (A) of Sub-section (1) of Section 123 of the said Act.', (int) 14 => '<p>5. It was urged by Mr. Rao, learned Counsel for the appellants that in the impugned judgments, the High Court has incorrectly taken the view that in order to amount to bribery within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A), the transaction must amount to a bargain by the candidate with a view to get votes. It was pointed out by him that the said view has been taken in the impugned judgments, relying upon the decision of a Bench comprising to learned Judges of this Court in Ghasi Ram v. Dal Singh and Ors. :1983 SCR 102 . We have gone through to the relevant portion of that judgment (at page 109 and 110 of the said report). A careful perusal of the said judgment shows that what has been really held in that case is that if the promises given or made amount to a bargain entered into by a candidate for a vote or votes, that would amount to a corrupt practice; but it has not been held there that unless the act alleged amounts to such a bargain, it could not amount to a corrupt practice. In our view, that judgment does not lay down that in order to amount to a corrupt practice, the transaction must amount to a bargain for getting a vote. It was pointed out by Mr. Rao, however, that such a view seems to have been taken in two other decisions rendered by two Benches, each comprising two learned Judges of this Court in Bhanu Kumar Shastri v. Mohan Lal Sukhadia and Ors. : [1971]3SCR522 and Harjit Singh Mann v. S Umrao Singh and Ors. : [1980]2SCR501 . and these judgments need to be overruled. We do not propose to go into the correctness or otherwise of this view because, even on the footing that in order to amount to a corrupt practice under the aforesaid provision the alleged acts need not constitute a bargain, the the acts established in the present case, in our opinion, do not amount to a corrupt practice.', (int) 15 => '<p>6. Our attention was drawn by Mr. Rao to the fact that in this case the said advertisements and the speeches had to be viewed in the context of the fact that the advertisements were issued and the speeches were made after respondent No. 1 filed his nomination papers on January 4, 1985, for the election and before the election was held in the aforesaid constituency. It was further pointed out that the offer made for the sale of sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was limited to the period from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985. It cannot be denied that these factors are relevant factOrs. We cannot, however, lose sight of the fact that this offer was made not only in this constituency but throughout the State where the elections to the House of the People were scheduled to be held, and were, in fact, held on December 27, 1984. It was only in case of this constituency that the election to be held on the scheduled date was countermanded and later held on January 28, 1985. We cannot lose sight of the fact that, as far as the said speeches and the said advertisements, which were issued by the Publicity Department of the State, are concerned, they deal in the main with the achievements of the Government of Andhra Pradesh which, of course, was being run by Ministers belonging to Telugu Desam Party to which respondent No. 1 also belonged. Moreover, the offer in the advertisements for the sale of dhoties and sarees at discount rates was in the nature of a benefit offered to poor persons in that State. When a Government announces the measures which are intended for the benefit of any of the classes for whose the Government can normally be expected to work like the poor or the economical backward classes, it is only in rare circumstances that such a promise can be said to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) even though such a promise might be made on the eve of elections. Keeping this in mind, in our opinion, although the offer to sell dhoties and sarees at discount rates was of a limited duration as aforestated, it cannot be regarded as a corrupt practice. Such an offer was bound to have financial repercussions and it is quite possible the duration of the offer was limited to enable the Government to study the financial repercussions rather than from any improper motive. We find support for this view from the decision of this Court in H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh : [1969]3SCR813 . In that case an Ordinance was passed by the Government of Madhya Pradesh as a result of which a large number of agriculturists, namely, those holdings of plots of land of less than 7.5 acres area or paying land revenue not exceeding Rs. 5/- were exempted from the payment of the land revenue. It was held that such a concession does not amount to a gift, offer or promise of any gratification within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) of the said Act nor does the announcement of the declaration made at a meeting shortly before the election or the issue of a pamphlet containing that declaration at that time carry the matter any further. It was held that neither Shri D.P. Misra who was the Chief Minister nor Shri S.K. Dixit who acted as his agent were guilty of any corrupt practice within the meaning of the aforesaid provision.', (int) 16 => '<p>7. It was next contended by Mr. Rao, although very faintly, that the High Court was in error as it had not decided all other issues which were raised in the election petition. In this regard we cannot lose sight of the fact that the term of the present Lok Sabha is likely to be over within a few months and fresh elections are likely to be held and it would, therefore, be an exercise in futility to remand the matter to the High Court for deciding the remaining issues.', (int) 17 => '<p>8. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.<p>', (int) 18 => '<p>' ) $paragraphAfter = (int) 1 $cnt = (int) 19 $i = (int) 16include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144 View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971 View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933 View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473 Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963 Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200 Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167 [main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109
7. It was next contended by Mr. Rao, although very faintly, that the High Court was in error as it had not decided all other issues which were raised in the election petition. In this regard we cannot lose sight of the fact that the term of the present Lok Sabha is likely to be over within a few months and fresh elections are likely to be held and it would, therefore, be an exercise in futility to remand the matter to the High Court for deciding the remaining issues.
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$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp' $dataForView = array( 'title_for_layout' => 'B Rajagopala Rao and anr Vs Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors - Citation 640942 - Court Judgment | ', 'desc' => array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '640942', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/50684/representation-of-the-people-act-1951-complete-act">Representation of the People Act, 1951</a> - Sections 1, 3(1)(A), 123 and 123(1)(A)', 'appealno' => 'Civil Appeal Nos. 484 and 485 of 1987', 'appellant' => 'B. Rajagopala Rao and anr.', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'B. Rajagopala Rao and anr. Vs. Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors.', 'casenote' => 'Election - corrupt practices - Sections 123 and 123 (1) (A) of Representation of the People Act, 1951 - whether advertisements by public department and speeches made by respondent No. 1 to sell dhoti and sarees at discount rates amount to corrupt practices - offer was available for mass and for limited duration - such offer was bound to have financial repercussions and it is quite possible that duration of offer limited to enable Government to study financial repercussions rather than from any improper motive - offer not amounted to corrupt practices. - [ D.A. Desai,; O. Chinnappa Reddy and; R.S. Sarkaria, JJ.] The Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 empowers the Union of India in the public interest to take under its control the industries specified in the First Schedule to the Act. Item 23 of the First Schedule relates to textiles of various categories. Section 15 authorises the Central Government to make or cause to be made a full and complete investigation into the circumstances of the case if the Central Government is of the opinion that (a) in respect of any scheduled industry or industrial undertaking or undertakings (i) there has been, or is likely to be, a substantial fall in the volume of production for which, having regard to the economic conditions prevailing, there is no justification; or (ii) there has been, or is likely to be, a marked deterioration in the quality of any article... which could have been or can be avoided; or (iii) there has been or is likely to be a rise in the price of any article..... for which there is no justification; or (iv) it is necessary to take any such action for the purpose of conserving any resources of national importance; or (b) any industrial undertaking is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest. After the investigation is made under section 15, section 16(1) empowers the Central Government if action is desirable, to issue appropriate directions, and section 16(2) provides for the issue of interim directions by the Central Government pending investigation under section 15. Chapter III-A consisting of Sections 18A, 18-AA, 18-B, 18-C, 18-D, 18-E and 18-F deal with "direct management or control of Industrial Undertakings by Central Government in certain cases". Sec. 18-A empowers the Central Government by notified order, to authorise any person or body of persons to take over the management of the whole or any part of an industrial undertaking or to exercise in respect of the whole, or any part of the undertaking such functions of control as may be specified in the order, if the Central Government is of opinion that: (a) an industrial undertaking to which directions have been issued in pursuance of section 16 has failed to comply with such directions, or (b) an industrial undertaking in respect of which an investigation has been made under section 15 is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest. Section 18AA(5) stipulates that the provisions of Sections 18-B to 18 E shall be applicable to the industrial undertaking in respect of which an order has been made under section 18-AA even as they apply to an industrial undertaking taken over under Section 18-A. Section 18-F empowers the Central Government to cancel the order made under section 18-A if it appears that the purpose of the order has been fulfilled or it is not necessary that the order should remain in force. The appellant M/s. Swadeshi Cotton Mills was taken over by the Government of India by a notification dated April 13, 1978 in exercise of the powers conferred on it under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 18AA of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 on the ground that the company had by creation of encumbrances on the assets of its industrial undertakings, brought about a situation which had affected and is likely to further affect the production of articles manufactured or produced by it and that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation. The Government authorised the National Textile Corporation Limited to take over the management, subject to the conditions that the authorised person shall comply with all the directions issued from time to time by the Central Government and that the authorised person shall hold office for a period of five years. The appellant Mills challenged the aforesaid order in a writ petition in the High Court. The case was heard by a Full Bench of five Judges to consider the question whether in construing section 18AA of the Industries Development and Regulation Act, 1951, compliance with the principle of audi alteram partem is to be implied and whether hearing is to be given to the parties who would be affected by the order to be passed prior to the passing of the order or whether hearing can be given after the order is passed and whether the order passed under the said Section is vitiated by not giving of such hearing and whether such vice can be cured. The Bench by a majority answered the three questions as follows:- (a) Section 18AA(1)(a)(b) excludes the giving of prior hearing to the party who would be affected by order thereunder. (b) Section 18-F expressly provides for a post- decisional hearing to the owner of the industrial undertaking, the management of which is taken over under section 18AA to have the order made under section 18AA cancelled on any relevant ground. (c) As the taking over of management under section 18A is not vitiated by the failure to grant prior hearing the question of any such vice being cured by a grant of a subsequent hearing does not arise. The minority, however, held that in compliance with the principles of natural justice, prior hearing to the owner of the undertaking was required to be given before the passing of an order under section 18AA, that the second question did not arise as the denial of a prior hearing would not cure the vice by the grant of subsequent hearing, but it would be open to the Court to moderate the relief in such a way that the order is kept alive to the extent necessary until the making of the fresh order to subserve public interest and to make appropriate directions. After the decision on the reference the case was reheard on merits by a Full Bench of three Judges and the writ petition was allowed in part. The challenge to the validity of the order being rejected but insofar as the impugned order seeking to take over the corporate entity of the company, the corporate entity of the subsidiary and its assets, the petition was allowed and the respondents, the Union of India and the authorised person were directed to release from its control and custody and/or deliver possession of any assets or property of the company which were not referable to the industrial undertakings. Appeals to this Court were filed on behalf of the Company as well as by the Union of India and the National Textile Corporation. Two propositions were propounded on behalf of the company that: (a) Whether it was necessary to observe the rules of natural justice before issuing a notified order under section 18AA(1)(a) and further whether section 18-F impliedly excludes rules of natural justice relating to prior hearing; and it was contended (1) the mere use of the word 'immediate' in sub-clause (a) of section 18AA does not show a legislative intent to exclude the application of audi alteram partem rule altogether. (2) The word 'immediate' in clause (a) has been used in contra distinction to 'investigate'. It only means that under section 18AA action can be taken without prior investigation under section 15. The use of the word 'immediate' in section 18AA(1)(a) only dispenses with investigation under section 15 and not with the principle of audi alteram partem altogether and this is indicated by the marginal note of section 18A and para 3 of the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Amendment Bill which inserted section 18AA in 1971. (3) The word 'immediate' occurs only in clause (a) and not in clause (b) of section 18AA(1). It would be odd if intention to exclude this principle of natural justice is spelt out in one clause of the sub-section when the other clause does not exclude it. (4) Section 18-F does not exclude a pre-decisional hearing. The so-called post-decisional hearing contemplated by section 18-F cannot be and is not intended to be a substitute for a pre-decisional hearing. (5) Section 18F incorporates only a facet, albeit qualified, of section 21 of the General Clauses Act. The language of the Section implicity prohibits an enquiry into circumstances that led to the passing of the order of take-over and under it the aggrieved person is not entitled to show that on merits the order was void ab initio. (6) 'Immediacy' does not exclude a duty to act fairly because even an emergent situation can co-exist with the canons of natural justice. The only effect of urgency on the application of the principle of fair hearing would be that the width, form and duration of the hearing would be tailored to the situation and reduced to the reasonable minimum so that it does not delay and defeat the purpose of the contemplated action. (7) Where the civil consequences of the administrative action are grave and its effect is highly prejudicial to the rights and interests of the person affected and there is nothing in the language and scheme of the statute which unequivocally excludes a fair pre-decisional hearing and the post-decisional hearing provided therein is not a real remedial hearing equitable to a full right of appeal the Court should be loath to infer a legislative intent to exclude even a minimal fair hearing at the pre-decisional stage merely on ground of urgency. (8) The Central Government appointed four Government Officials including one from the office of the Textile Commissioner to study the affairs of the Company and to make recommendation. This Official Group submitted its report on February 16, 1978. The evidence on the basis of which the impugned order was passed was not disclosed to the appellant company till May 1978, only after it had filed the writ petition in the High Court. If there was anything adverse to the appellants in the survey report there was time enough about six weeks between the submission of the Survey Report and the passing of the impugned order for giving a short, reasonable opportunity to the appellants to explain the adverse findings against them. If there was immediacy situational modifications could be made to meet the requirement of fairness, by reducing the period of notice; that even the manner and form of such notice could be simplified to eliminate delay, that telephonic notice or short opportunity for furnishing their explanation to the Company might have satisfied the requirements of natural justice. Such an opportunity of hearing could have been given after the passing of a conditional tentative order and before its enforcement under section 18AA. For the interregnum suitable interim action such as freezing the assets of the Company or restraining the Company from creating further encumbrances, could be taken under section 16. On behalf of the Union of India and the Authorised Officer it was contended that (1) the presumption in favour of audi alteram partem rule stands impliedly displaced by the language scheme, setting and the purpose of the provision in section 18AA. (2) Section 18AA on its plain terms deals with situations where immediate preventive action is required. The paramount concern is to avoid serious problems which may be caused by fall in production. The purpose of an order under section 18AA is not to condemn the owner but to protect the scheduled industry. The issue under section 18AA is not solely between the Government and the management of the industrial undertaking. The object of taking action under this Section is to protect other outside interests of the community at large and the workers. (3) The rule of natural justice to give a hearing has been incorporated in section 18-F which gives an opportunity of a post-decisional hearing to the owner of the undertaking who if he feels aggrieved can on his application be heard, to show that even the original order under section 18AA was passed on invalid grounds and should be cancelled or rescinded. (4) On a true construction of section 18AA read with section 18-F the requirements of natural justice and fair play can be read into the statute only insofar as conformance to such canons can reasonably and realistically be required of it by the provision for a remedial hearing at a subsequent stage. (5) Under section 18-F the Central Government exercises curial functions and that Section confers on the aggrieved owner a right to apply to the Government to cancel the order of take-over. This section casts an obligation on the Central Government to deal with and dispose of an application filed thereunder with reasonable expedition. Allowing the appeal by the Company,<br />HELD: (Sarkaria & Desai, JJ. per Chinnappa Reddy, J. dissenting.) In the facts and circumstances of the instant case, there has been a noncompliance with the implied requirement of the audi alteram partem rule of natural justice at the pre-decisional stage. The impugned order could be struck down as invalid on that score alone. But in view of the commitment / concession that a hearing would be afforded to the Company, the case is remitted to the Central Government to give a full, fair and effective hearing. [587G-H, 588C] The phrase 'natural justice' is not capable of a static and precise definition. It cannot be imprisoned in the straight-jacket of a cast-iron formula. Rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. Hence not possible to make an exhaustive catalogue of such rules. Two fundamental maxims of natural justice have now become deeply and indelibly ingrained in the common consciousness of mankind as pre-eminently necessary to ensure that the law is applied impartially objectively and fairly. These twin principles are (i) audi alteram partem and (ii) nemo judex in re sua. Audi alteram partem is a highly effective rule devised by the Courts to ensure that a statutory authority arrives at a just decision and it is calculated to act as a healthy check on the abuse or misuse of power. Its reach should not be narrowed and its applicability circumscribed.[554C-G] The rules of natural justice can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. If a statutory provision either specifically or by inevitable implication excludes the application of the rules of natural justice then the Court cannot ignore the mandate of the Legislature. Whether or not the application of the principles of natural justice in a given case has been excluded in the exercise of statutory power depends upon the language and basic scheme of the provision conferring the power, the nature of the power the purpose for which it is conferred and the effect of that power. [556A-B] The maxim audi alteram partem has many facets. Two of them are (a) notice of the case to be met, and (b) opportunity to explain. The rule cannot be sacrificed at the altar of administrative convenience or celerity; for, convenience and justice are often not on speaking terms. Difficulties, however, arise when the statute conferring the power does not expressly exclude this rule but its exclusion is sought by implication due to the presence of certain factors such as urgency where the obligation to give notice and opportunity to be heard would obstruct the taking of prompt action of a preventive or remedial nature. Audi alteram partem rule may be disregarded in an emergent situation where immediate action brooks no delay to prevent some imminent danger or injury or hazard to paramount public interests. Section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure empowers the magistrates specified therein to make an exparte conditional order in emergent cases for removal of dangerous public nuisances. Action under section 17 Land Acquisition Act furnishes another such instance. Similarly action on grounds of public safety public health may justify disregard of the rule of prior hearing. [556C-H] Cases where owing to the compulsion of the fact situation or the necessity of taking speedy action no pre- decisional hearing is given but the action, is followed soon by a full post-decisional hearing to the person affected do not in reality constitute an exception to the audi alteram partem rule. To call such cases as exception is a misnomer because they do not exclude fair play in action but adapt it to the urgency of the situation by balancing the competing claims of hurry and hearing. [560H-561A] The general principle as distinguished from an absolute rule of uniform application seems to be that where a statute does not in terms exclude this rule of prior hearing but contemplates a post-decisional hearing amounting to a full review of the original order on merits then such a statute would be construed as excluding the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage. [561G] If the statute conferring the power is silent with regard to the giving of pre-decisional hearing to the person affected and the administrative decision taken by the authority involves civil consequences of a grave nature and no full review or appeal on merits against that decision is provided courts will be extremely reluctant to construe such a statute as excluding the duty of affording even a minimal hearing shorn of all its formal trappings and dilatory features at the pre-decisional stage, unless viewed pragmatically it would paralyse the administrative process or frustrate the need for utmost promptitude. [561H] 7(i). A comparison of the provisions of Section 18A(1)(b) and Section 18AA(1)(c), bring out two main points of distinction: First, action under Section 18A(1)(b) can be taken only after an investigation had been made under Section 15; while under Section 18AA(1)(a) or (b) action can be taken without such investigation. The language, scheme and setting of Section 18AA read in the light of the Objects and Reasons for enacting this provision make this position clear beyond doubt. Second, before taking action under Section 18A(1)(b), the Central Government has to form an opinion on the basis of the investigation conducted under section 15, in regard to the existence of the objective fact, namely: that the industrial undertaking is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest; while under section 18A(1)(a) the Government has to satisfy itself that the persons incharge of the undertaking have brought about a situation likely to cause fall in production, by committing any of the three kinds of acts specified in that provision. This shows that the preliminary objective fact attributable to the persons in charge of the management or affairs of the undertaking, on the basis of which action may be taken under section 18(A)(1)(b), is of far wider amplitude than the circumstance, the existence of which is a sine qua non for taking action under section 18AA(1). The phrase "highly detrimental to the scheduled industry or public interest" in section 18-A is capable of being construed to cover a large variety of acts or things which may be considered wrong with the manner of running the industry by the management. In contrast with it, action under section 18AA(1)(a) can be taken only if the Central Government is satisfied with regard to the existence of the twin conditions specifically mentioned therein, on the basis of evidence in its possession. [569D-H] An analysis of section 18AA(1)(a), indicates that as a necessary preliminary to the exercise of the power thereunder, the Central Government must be satisfied "from documentary or other evidence in its possession" in regard to the co-existence of two circumstances: (i) that the persons in charge of the industrial undertaking have by committing any of these acts, namely, reckless investments, or creation of incumbrances on the assets of industrial undertaking, or by diversion of funds, brought about a situation which is likely to affect the production of the article manufactured or produced in the industrial undertaking, and (ii) that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation.[570B-D] It cannot be laid down as a general proposition that whenever a statute confers a power on an administrative authority and makes the exercise of that power conditional on the formation of an opinion by that authority in regard to the existence of an immediacy, its opinion in regard to that preliminary fact is not open to judicial scrutiny at all. While it may be conceded that an element of subjectivity is always involved in the formation of such an opinion, the existence of the circumstances from which the inference constituting the opinion, as the sine qua non for action, are to be drawn, must be demonstrable, and the existence of such "circumstances", if questioned, must be proved at least prima facie. [571 E-G] From a plain reading of section 18AA, it is clear that it does not expressly in unmistakable and unequivocal terms exclude the application of the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage. [574B] In the instant case, so far as Kanpur Unit is concerned, it was lying closed for more than three months before the passing of the impugned order. There was no 'immediacy' in relation to that unit, which could absolve the Government from the obligation of complying fully with audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional or pre- takeover stage. [583A] Keshav Mills Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, [1973] 3 S.C.R. 22; Kamla Prasad Khetan v. Union of India,[1957] S.C.R. 1052; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 621; Sukhdev Singh & Ors. v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh, [1975] 3 S.C.R. 619; A. K. Kraipak v. Union of India, [1970] 1 S.C.R. 457; Ridge v. Baldwin, [1964] A.C. 40; 196; Heatley v. Tasmanian Racing & Gaming Commission, 14 Australian Law Reports 519; Nawabkhan Abbaskhan v. State of Gujarat, [1974] 3 S.C.R. 427; State of Orissa v. Dr. Bina Pani Dei, [1962] 2 S.C.R. 625; Ambalal M. Shah v. Hathi Singh Manufacturing Co. Ltd. [1962] 3 S.C.R. 171; and S. L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan & Ors., [1981] 1 S.C.R. 746, referred to. (Per Chinnappa Reddy, J. dissenting) The principles of natural justice are not attracted to the situations contemplated by section 18AA of Industries (Development and Regulation) Act. Natural justice like Ultra Vires and Public Policy is a branch of the public law and is a formidable weapon which can be wielded to secure justice to the citizen. While it may be used to protect certain fundamental liberties, civil and political rights, it may be used as indeed it is used more often than not, to protect vested interests and to obstruct the path of progressive change. The time has come to make an appropriate distinction between natural justice in its application to fundamental liberties, civil and political rights and natural justice in its application to vested interests. [590A-B] Our constitution as befits the Constitution of a Socialist Secular Democratic Republic, recognises the paramountcy of the public weal over the private interest. Natural justice, ultra vires, public policy, or any other rule of interpretation must, therefore, conform, grow and be tailored to serve the public interest and respond to the demands of an evolving society. [590C] The principles of natural justice have taken deep root in the judicial conscience of our people. They are now considered so fundamental as to be implicit in every decision making function, judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative. Where authority functions under a statute and the statute provides for the observance of the principles of natural justice in a particular manner, natural justice will have to be observed in that manner and in no other. Where the statute is silent about the observance of the principles of natural justice, such statutory silence is taken to imply compliance with the principles of natural justice. Where the conflict is between the public interest and the private interest the presumption must necessarily be weak and may, therefore, be readily displaced. The presumption is also weak, where what are involved are mere property rights. In cases of urgency, particularly where the public interest is involved, preemptive action may be a strategic necessity. Even in cases of preemptive action, if the statute so provides or if the Courts so deem fit in appropriate cases, a postponed hearing may be substituted for natural justice. [590A-C; 591F-G] 3(ii). Where natural justice is implied, the extent of the implication and the nature of the hearing must vary with the statute, the subject and the situation. [592B] The absence of the expression 'immediate action' in section 18AA(1)(b) does not make any difference. Section 18AA(1)(a) refers to a situation where immediate preventive action may avert a disaster, whereas section 18AA contemplates a situation where the disaster has occurred and action is necessary to restore normalcy. Restoration of production where production has stopped in a key industry or industrial undertaking is as important and urgent in the public interest as prevention of a situation where production may be affected. Immediate action is, therefore, as necessary in the situation contemplated by section 18AA(1)(b) as in the situation contemplated by section 18AA(1)(a). [596 F-G] The marginal note refers to the power to take over without investigation but there is no sufficient reason to suppose that the word immediate is used only to contra- distinguish it from the investigation contemplated by section 15 of the Act, though of course a consequence of immediate action under section 18AA may be to dispense with the enquiry under section 15. In fact, facts which come to light during the course of an investigation under section 15 may form the basis of action under section 18AA(1)(a). Where in the course of an investigation under section 15 it is discovered that the management have, by reckless investments or creation of encumbrances on the assets of the industrial undertaking or by diversion of funds brought about a situation which is likely to affect the production of the articles manufactured or produced in the industrial undertaking, if the Government is satisfied that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation, there is no reason why the Central Government may not straightaway take action under section 18AA(1)(a) without waiting for completion of investigation under section 15. [597A-B] Where there is a provision in the statute itself for revocation of the order by the very authority making the decision, it appears to be unnecessary to insist upon a pre- decisional observance of natural justice. [598A] The likelihood of production being jeopardized or the stoppage of production in a key industrial undertaking is a matter of grave concern affecting the public interest. Parliament has taken so serious a view of the matter that it has authorised the Central Government to take over the management of the industrial undertaking if immediate action may prevent jeopardy to production or restore production where it has already stopped. The necessity for immediate action by the Central Government contemplated by Parliament is definitely indicative of the exclusion of natural justice. It is not as if the owner of the industrial undertaking is left with no remedy. He may move the Central Government under section 18-F to cancel the order made under section 18AA. [598C-D] Neither section 18-F of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act nor section 21 of the General Clauses Act by itself excludes natural justice. The exclusion of natural justice where such exclusion is not express has to be implied by reference to the subject, the statute and the statutory situation. Where an express provision in the statute itself provides for a post decisional hearing the other provisions of the Statute will have to be read in the light of such provision and the provision for post- decisional hearing may then clinch the issue where pre- decisional natural justice appears to be excluded on the other terms of the statute. That a post-decisional hearing may also be had by the terms of section 21 of the General Clauses Act may not necessarily help in the interpretation of the provisions of the statute concerned. [599 A-C] Ridge v. Baldwin, 1964 A.C. p. 40; Annie G. Phillip v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 75 L.E.d. 1289; John H. Fahey v. Paul Mallonee, 91 L.E.d. 2030; Margarita Fuentes v. Robert L. Shevin, Attorney General of Florida, 32 L.E.d. 2d 556 and Lawrence Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 40 L.E.d. 2d 406, referred to. - Rama Rao, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh as well as the President of the Telugu Desam Party as well as respondent No. 3. The advertisements very shortly stated, refer to the auspicious gifts made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to the poor people on the eve of New Year and Sankranti. In the said advertisements, it is stated that the said Government which was formed by the Telugu Desam Party was giving to the poor people whose income was below Rs. and the said advertisements referred to a new scheme of selling sarees and dhoties at half prices to the poor people in the State of Andhra Pradesh having Green-cards. Moreover, the offer in the advertisements for the sale of dhoties and sarees at discount rates was in the nature of a benefit offered to poor persons in that State. When a Government announces the measures which are intended for the benefit of any of the classes for whose the Government can normally be expected to work like the poor or the economical backward classes, it is only in rare circumstances that such a promise can be said to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) even though such a promise might be made on the eve of elections. 8. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => '', 'counseldef' => '', 'court' => 'Supreme Court of India', 'court_type' => 'SC', 'decidedon' => '1989-09-29', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' K.N. Saikia,; M.H. Kania and; S. Ranganathan, JJ.', 'judgement' => '</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Kania, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. These two appeals arise out of the judgments in two Election Petitions in the Andhra Pradesh High Court questioning the election of respondent No. 1 as a Member of Parliament from Srikakulam No. Parliamentary Constituency in the 8th General Election to the House of the People. The points raised in these appeals are common and so are the relevant facts; and, hence, they are being disposed of by this common judgment. We propose to take note of only the few facts which are necessary for the appreciation of the controversy before us.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The polling date for the said election along with other parliamentary elections in the State of Andhra Pradesh was December 27, 1984 but in Srikakulam No. 1 Parliamentary Constituency the polling was countermanded and the date of polling was later fixed on January 28, 1985. In both the Election Petitions the election of respondent No. 1 was questioned mainly on the ground that Shri N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh as well as the President of the Telugu Desam Party as well as respondent No. 1 gave certain speeches and certain advertisements were got published by Shri N.T. Rama Rao through the Publicity Department of the Government of Andhra Pradesh in the newspapers containing certain statements which are alleged to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A) of the <a href="/act/50684/representation-of-the-people-act-1951-complete-act">Representation of the People Act, 1951</a> (hereinafter referred to as 'the said Act'). The main question canvassed before us is whether the statements contained in these aforesaid advertisements amount to a corrupt practice under Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act. Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act runs as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">123. Corrupt practices</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The following shall be deemed to be corrupt practises for the purposes of this Act :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) 'Bribery', that is to say.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(A) any gift, offer or promise by a candidate or his agent or by any other person with the consent of a candidate or his election agent of any gratification, to any person whomsover, with the object, directly or indirectly of inducing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) x x x</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) an elector to vote or refrain from voting at an election, or as a reward to.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) a person for having so stood or not stood, or for having withdrawn or not having withdrawn his candidature; or</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) an elector for having voted or refrained from voting.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The advertisements very shortly stated, refer to the auspicious gifts made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to the poor people on the eve of New Year and Sankranti. In the said advertisements, it is stated that the said Government which was formed by the Telugu Desam Party was giving to the poor people whose income was below Rs. 6,000 per year, a kilo of rice at Rs. 2 per Kg. and the said advertisements referred to a new scheme of selling sarees and dhoties at half prices to the poor people in the State of Andhra Pradesh having Green-cards. Green-cards were directed to be issued to all the persons whose annual income was below Rs. 6,000. The supply of the rice at subsidised rates as aforesaid was also to be made to the Green-card holders only. The scheme to sell sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was to be operative from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. In considering the question whether the said advertisement and the said speeches amount to a corrupt practice, we are of the view that the provisions of Section 123 of the said Act which deal with corrupt practices have to be interpreted, keeping in mind that dictates of commonsense require that they never could have been intended to treat normal election promises made in election manifestoes or usual election speeches by members of various political parties aspiring to power and by different candidates aspiring to get elected to legislative bodies concerned as corrupt practices. We are of the view that these advertisements and speeches amount to nothing more than statements extolling the achievements of the Government of the State of Andhra Pradesh under the Telugu Desam Party headed by N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister, and contain normal election promises and these statements do not amount to corrupt practices falling within the scope of Sub-clause (b) of Clause (A) of Sub-section (1) of Section 123 of the said Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. It was urged by Mr. Rao, learned Counsel for the appellants that in the impugned judgments, the High Court has incorrectly taken the view that in order to amount to bribery within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A), the transaction must amount to a bargain by the candidate with a view to get votes. It was pointed out by him that the said view has been taken in the impugned judgments, relying upon the decision of a Bench comprising to learned Judges of this Court in Ghasi Ram v. Dal Singh and Ors. :1983 SCR 102 . We have gone through to the relevant portion of that judgment (at page 109 and 110 of the said report). A careful perusal of the said judgment shows that what has been really held in that case is that if the promises given or made amount to a bargain entered into by a candidate for a vote or votes, that would amount to a corrupt practice; but it has not been held there that unless the act alleged amounts to such a bargain, it could not amount to a corrupt practice. In our view, that judgment does not lay down that in order to amount to a corrupt practice, the transaction must amount to a bargain for getting a vote. It was pointed out by Mr. Rao, however, that such a view seems to have been taken in two other decisions rendered by two Benches, each comprising two learned Judges of this Court in Bhanu Kumar Shastri v. Mohan Lal Sukhadia and Ors. : [1971]3SCR522 and Harjit Singh Mann v. S Umrao Singh and Ors. : [1980]2SCR501 . and these judgments need to be overruled. We do not propose to go into the correctness or otherwise of this view because, even on the footing that in order to amount to a corrupt practice under the aforesaid provision the alleged acts need not constitute a bargain, the the acts established in the present case, in our opinion, do not amount to a corrupt practice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Our attention was drawn by Mr. Rao to the fact that in this case the said advertisements and the speeches had to be viewed in the context of the fact that the advertisements were issued and the speeches were made after respondent No. 1 filed his nomination papers on January 4, 1985, for the election and before the election was held in the aforesaid constituency. It was further pointed out that the offer made for the sale of sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was limited to the period from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985. It cannot be denied that these factors are relevant factOrs. We cannot, however, lose sight of the fact that this offer was made not only in this constituency but throughout the State where the elections to the House of the People were scheduled to be held, and were, in fact, held on December 27, 1984. It was only in case of this constituency that the election to be held on the scheduled date was countermanded and later held on January 28, 1985. We cannot lose sight of the fact that, as far as the said speeches and the said advertisements, which were issued by the Publicity Department of the State, are concerned, they deal in the main with the achievements of the Government of Andhra Pradesh which, of course, was being run by Ministers belonging to Telugu Desam Party to which respondent No. 1 also belonged. Moreover, the offer in the advertisements for the sale of dhoties and sarees at discount rates was in the nature of a benefit offered to poor persons in that State. When a Government announces the measures which are intended for the benefit of any of the classes for whose the Government can normally be expected to work like the poor or the economical backward classes, it is only in rare circumstances that such a promise can be said to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) even though such a promise might be made on the eve of elections. Keeping this in mind, in our opinion, although the offer to sell dhoties and sarees at discount rates was of a limited duration as aforestated, it cannot be regarded as a corrupt practice. Such an offer was bound to have financial repercussions and it is quite possible the duration of the offer was limited to enable the Government to study the financial repercussions rather than from any improper motive. We find support for this view from the decision of this Court in H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh : [1969]3SCR813 . In that case an Ordinance was passed by the Government of Madhya Pradesh as a result of which a large number of agriculturists, namely, those holdings of plots of land of less than 7.5 acres area or paying land revenue not exceeding Rs. 5/- were exempted from the payment of the land revenue. It was held that such a concession does not amount to a gift, offer or promise of any gratification within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) of the said Act nor does the announcement of the declaration made at a meeting shortly before the election or the issue of a pamphlet containing that declaration at that time carry the matter any further. It was held that neither Shri D.P. Misra who was the Chief Minister nor Shri S.K. Dixit who acted as his agent were guilty of any corrupt practice within the meaning of the aforesaid provision.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. It was next contended by Mr. Rao, although very faintly, that the High Court was in error as it had not decided all other issues which were raised in the election petition. In this regard we cannot lose sight of the fact that the term of the present Lok Sabha is likely to be over within a few months and fresh elections are likely to be held and it would, therefore, be an exercise in futility to remand the matter to the High Court for deciding the remaining issues.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'AIR1990SC1889; JT1989(4)SC186; 1989(2)SCALE891; 1989Supp(2)SCC504', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors.', 'sub' => 'Election', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ), 'casename_url' => 'b-rajagopala-rao-vs-appayya-hanumanthu', 'args' => array( (int) 0 => '640942', (int) 1 => 'b-rajagopala-rao-vs-appayya-hanumanthu' ) ) $title_for_layout = 'B Rajagopala Rao and anr Vs Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors - Citation 640942 - Court Judgment | ' $desc = array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '640942', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/50684/representation-of-the-people-act-1951-complete-act">Representation of the People Act, 1951</a> - Sections 1, 3(1)(A), 123 and 123(1)(A)', 'appealno' => 'Civil Appeal Nos. 484 and 485 of 1987', 'appellant' => 'B. Rajagopala Rao and anr.', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'B. Rajagopala Rao and anr. Vs. Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors.', 'casenote' => 'Election - corrupt practices - Sections 123 and 123 (1) (A) of Representation of the People Act, 1951 - whether advertisements by public department and speeches made by respondent No. 1 to sell dhoti and sarees at discount rates amount to corrupt practices - offer was available for mass and for limited duration - such offer was bound to have financial repercussions and it is quite possible that duration of offer limited to enable Government to study financial repercussions rather than from any improper motive - offer not amounted to corrupt practices. - [ D.A. Desai,; O. Chinnappa Reddy and; R.S. Sarkaria, JJ.] The Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 empowers the Union of India in the public interest to take under its control the industries specified in the First Schedule to the Act. Item 23 of the First Schedule relates to textiles of various categories. Section 15 authorises the Central Government to make or cause to be made a full and complete investigation into the circumstances of the case if the Central Government is of the opinion that (a) in respect of any scheduled industry or industrial undertaking or undertakings (i) there has been, or is likely to be, a substantial fall in the volume of production for which, having regard to the economic conditions prevailing, there is no justification; or (ii) there has been, or is likely to be, a marked deterioration in the quality of any article... which could have been or can be avoided; or (iii) there has been or is likely to be a rise in the price of any article..... for which there is no justification; or (iv) it is necessary to take any such action for the purpose of conserving any resources of national importance; or (b) any industrial undertaking is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest. After the investigation is made under section 15, section 16(1) empowers the Central Government if action is desirable, to issue appropriate directions, and section 16(2) provides for the issue of interim directions by the Central Government pending investigation under section 15. Chapter III-A consisting of Sections 18A, 18-AA, 18-B, 18-C, 18-D, 18-E and 18-F deal with "direct management or control of Industrial Undertakings by Central Government in certain cases". Sec. 18-A empowers the Central Government by notified order, to authorise any person or body of persons to take over the management of the whole or any part of an industrial undertaking or to exercise in respect of the whole, or any part of the undertaking such functions of control as may be specified in the order, if the Central Government is of opinion that: (a) an industrial undertaking to which directions have been issued in pursuance of section 16 has failed to comply with such directions, or (b) an industrial undertaking in respect of which an investigation has been made under section 15 is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest. Section 18AA(5) stipulates that the provisions of Sections 18-B to 18 E shall be applicable to the industrial undertaking in respect of which an order has been made under section 18-AA even as they apply to an industrial undertaking taken over under Section 18-A. Section 18-F empowers the Central Government to cancel the order made under section 18-A if it appears that the purpose of the order has been fulfilled or it is not necessary that the order should remain in force. The appellant M/s. Swadeshi Cotton Mills was taken over by the Government of India by a notification dated April 13, 1978 in exercise of the powers conferred on it under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 18AA of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 on the ground that the company had by creation of encumbrances on the assets of its industrial undertakings, brought about a situation which had affected and is likely to further affect the production of articles manufactured or produced by it and that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation. The Government authorised the National Textile Corporation Limited to take over the management, subject to the conditions that the authorised person shall comply with all the directions issued from time to time by the Central Government and that the authorised person shall hold office for a period of five years. The appellant Mills challenged the aforesaid order in a writ petition in the High Court. The case was heard by a Full Bench of five Judges to consider the question whether in construing section 18AA of the Industries Development and Regulation Act, 1951, compliance with the principle of audi alteram partem is to be implied and whether hearing is to be given to the parties who would be affected by the order to be passed prior to the passing of the order or whether hearing can be given after the order is passed and whether the order passed under the said Section is vitiated by not giving of such hearing and whether such vice can be cured. The Bench by a majority answered the three questions as follows:- (a) Section 18AA(1)(a)(b) excludes the giving of prior hearing to the party who would be affected by order thereunder. (b) Section 18-F expressly provides for a post- decisional hearing to the owner of the industrial undertaking, the management of which is taken over under section 18AA to have the order made under section 18AA cancelled on any relevant ground. (c) As the taking over of management under section 18A is not vitiated by the failure to grant prior hearing the question of any such vice being cured by a grant of a subsequent hearing does not arise. The minority, however, held that in compliance with the principles of natural justice, prior hearing to the owner of the undertaking was required to be given before the passing of an order under section 18AA, that the second question did not arise as the denial of a prior hearing would not cure the vice by the grant of subsequent hearing, but it would be open to the Court to moderate the relief in such a way that the order is kept alive to the extent necessary until the making of the fresh order to subserve public interest and to make appropriate directions. After the decision on the reference the case was reheard on merits by a Full Bench of three Judges and the writ petition was allowed in part. The challenge to the validity of the order being rejected but insofar as the impugned order seeking to take over the corporate entity of the company, the corporate entity of the subsidiary and its assets, the petition was allowed and the respondents, the Union of India and the authorised person were directed to release from its control and custody and/or deliver possession of any assets or property of the company which were not referable to the industrial undertakings. Appeals to this Court were filed on behalf of the Company as well as by the Union of India and the National Textile Corporation. Two propositions were propounded on behalf of the company that: (a) Whether it was necessary to observe the rules of natural justice before issuing a notified order under section 18AA(1)(a) and further whether section 18-F impliedly excludes rules of natural justice relating to prior hearing; and it was contended (1) the mere use of the word 'immediate' in sub-clause (a) of section 18AA does not show a legislative intent to exclude the application of audi alteram partem rule altogether. (2) The word 'immediate' in clause (a) has been used in contra distinction to 'investigate'. It only means that under section 18AA action can be taken without prior investigation under section 15. The use of the word 'immediate' in section 18AA(1)(a) only dispenses with investigation under section 15 and not with the principle of audi alteram partem altogether and this is indicated by the marginal note of section 18A and para 3 of the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Amendment Bill which inserted section 18AA in 1971. (3) The word 'immediate' occurs only in clause (a) and not in clause (b) of section 18AA(1). It would be odd if intention to exclude this principle of natural justice is spelt out in one clause of the sub-section when the other clause does not exclude it. (4) Section 18-F does not exclude a pre-decisional hearing. The so-called post-decisional hearing contemplated by section 18-F cannot be and is not intended to be a substitute for a pre-decisional hearing. (5) Section 18F incorporates only a facet, albeit qualified, of section 21 of the General Clauses Act. The language of the Section implicity prohibits an enquiry into circumstances that led to the passing of the order of take-over and under it the aggrieved person is not entitled to show that on merits the order was void ab initio. (6) 'Immediacy' does not exclude a duty to act fairly because even an emergent situation can co-exist with the canons of natural justice. The only effect of urgency on the application of the principle of fair hearing would be that the width, form and duration of the hearing would be tailored to the situation and reduced to the reasonable minimum so that it does not delay and defeat the purpose of the contemplated action. (7) Where the civil consequences of the administrative action are grave and its effect is highly prejudicial to the rights and interests of the person affected and there is nothing in the language and scheme of the statute which unequivocally excludes a fair pre-decisional hearing and the post-decisional hearing provided therein is not a real remedial hearing equitable to a full right of appeal the Court should be loath to infer a legislative intent to exclude even a minimal fair hearing at the pre-decisional stage merely on ground of urgency. (8) The Central Government appointed four Government Officials including one from the office of the Textile Commissioner to study the affairs of the Company and to make recommendation. This Official Group submitted its report on February 16, 1978. The evidence on the basis of which the impugned order was passed was not disclosed to the appellant company till May 1978, only after it had filed the writ petition in the High Court. If there was anything adverse to the appellants in the survey report there was time enough about six weeks between the submission of the Survey Report and the passing of the impugned order for giving a short, reasonable opportunity to the appellants to explain the adverse findings against them. If there was immediacy situational modifications could be made to meet the requirement of fairness, by reducing the period of notice; that even the manner and form of such notice could be simplified to eliminate delay, that telephonic notice or short opportunity for furnishing their explanation to the Company might have satisfied the requirements of natural justice. Such an opportunity of hearing could have been given after the passing of a conditional tentative order and before its enforcement under section 18AA. For the interregnum suitable interim action such as freezing the assets of the Company or restraining the Company from creating further encumbrances, could be taken under section 16. On behalf of the Union of India and the Authorised Officer it was contended that (1) the presumption in favour of audi alteram partem rule stands impliedly displaced by the language scheme, setting and the purpose of the provision in section 18AA. (2) Section 18AA on its plain terms deals with situations where immediate preventive action is required. The paramount concern is to avoid serious problems which may be caused by fall in production. The purpose of an order under section 18AA is not to condemn the owner but to protect the scheduled industry. The issue under section 18AA is not solely between the Government and the management of the industrial undertaking. The object of taking action under this Section is to protect other outside interests of the community at large and the workers. (3) The rule of natural justice to give a hearing has been incorporated in section 18-F which gives an opportunity of a post-decisional hearing to the owner of the undertaking who if he feels aggrieved can on his application be heard, to show that even the original order under section 18AA was passed on invalid grounds and should be cancelled or rescinded. (4) On a true construction of section 18AA read with section 18-F the requirements of natural justice and fair play can be read into the statute only insofar as conformance to such canons can reasonably and realistically be required of it by the provision for a remedial hearing at a subsequent stage. (5) Under section 18-F the Central Government exercises curial functions and that Section confers on the aggrieved owner a right to apply to the Government to cancel the order of take-over. This section casts an obligation on the Central Government to deal with and dispose of an application filed thereunder with reasonable expedition. Allowing the appeal by the Company,<br/>HELD: (Sarkaria & Desai, JJ. per Chinnappa Reddy, J. dissenting.) In the facts and circumstances of the instant case, there has been a noncompliance with the implied requirement of the audi alteram partem rule of natural justice at the pre-decisional stage. The impugned order could be struck down as invalid on that score alone. But in view of the commitment / concession that a hearing would be afforded to the Company, the case is remitted to the Central Government to give a full, fair and effective hearing. [587G-H, 588C] The phrase 'natural justice' is not capable of a static and precise definition. It cannot be imprisoned in the straight-jacket of a cast-iron formula. Rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. Hence not possible to make an exhaustive catalogue of such rules. Two fundamental maxims of natural justice have now become deeply and indelibly ingrained in the common consciousness of mankind as pre-eminently necessary to ensure that the law is applied impartially objectively and fairly. These twin principles are (i) audi alteram partem and (ii) nemo judex in re sua. Audi alteram partem is a highly effective rule devised by the Courts to ensure that a statutory authority arrives at a just decision and it is calculated to act as a healthy check on the abuse or misuse of power. Its reach should not be narrowed and its applicability circumscribed.[554C-G] The rules of natural justice can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. If a statutory provision either specifically or by inevitable implication excludes the application of the rules of natural justice then the Court cannot ignore the mandate of the Legislature. Whether or not the application of the principles of natural justice in a given case has been excluded in the exercise of statutory power depends upon the language and basic scheme of the provision conferring the power, the nature of the power the purpose for which it is conferred and the effect of that power. [556A-B] The maxim audi alteram partem has many facets. Two of them are (a) notice of the case to be met, and (b) opportunity to explain. The rule cannot be sacrificed at the altar of administrative convenience or celerity; for, convenience and justice are often not on speaking terms. Difficulties, however, arise when the statute conferring the power does not expressly exclude this rule but its exclusion is sought by implication due to the presence of certain factors such as urgency where the obligation to give notice and opportunity to be heard would obstruct the taking of prompt action of a preventive or remedial nature. Audi alteram partem rule may be disregarded in an emergent situation where immediate action brooks no delay to prevent some imminent danger or injury or hazard to paramount public interests. Section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure empowers the magistrates specified therein to make an exparte conditional order in emergent cases for removal of dangerous public nuisances. Action under section 17 Land Acquisition Act furnishes another such instance. Similarly action on grounds of public safety public health may justify disregard of the rule of prior hearing. [556C-H] Cases where owing to the compulsion of the fact situation or the necessity of taking speedy action no pre- decisional hearing is given but the action, is followed soon by a full post-decisional hearing to the person affected do not in reality constitute an exception to the audi alteram partem rule. To call such cases as exception is a misnomer because they do not exclude fair play in action but adapt it to the urgency of the situation by balancing the competing claims of hurry and hearing. [560H-561A] The general principle as distinguished from an absolute rule of uniform application seems to be that where a statute does not in terms exclude this rule of prior hearing but contemplates a post-decisional hearing amounting to a full review of the original order on merits then such a statute would be construed as excluding the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage. [561G] If the statute conferring the power is silent with regard to the giving of pre-decisional hearing to the person affected and the administrative decision taken by the authority involves civil consequences of a grave nature and no full review or appeal on merits against that decision is provided courts will be extremely reluctant to construe such a statute as excluding the duty of affording even a minimal hearing shorn of all its formal trappings and dilatory features at the pre-decisional stage, unless viewed pragmatically it would paralyse the administrative process or frustrate the need for utmost promptitude. [561H] 7(i). A comparison of the provisions of Section 18A(1)(b) and Section 18AA(1)(c), bring out two main points of distinction: First, action under Section 18A(1)(b) can be taken only after an investigation had been made under Section 15; while under Section 18AA(1)(a) or (b) action can be taken without such investigation. The language, scheme and setting of Section 18AA read in the light of the Objects and Reasons for enacting this provision make this position clear beyond doubt. Second, before taking action under Section 18A(1)(b), the Central Government has to form an opinion on the basis of the investigation conducted under section 15, in regard to the existence of the objective fact, namely: that the industrial undertaking is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest; while under section 18A(1)(a) the Government has to satisfy itself that the persons incharge of the undertaking have brought about a situation likely to cause fall in production, by committing any of the three kinds of acts specified in that provision. This shows that the preliminary objective fact attributable to the persons in charge of the management or affairs of the undertaking, on the basis of which action may be taken under section 18(A)(1)(b), is of far wider amplitude than the circumstance, the existence of which is a sine qua non for taking action under section 18AA(1). The phrase "highly detrimental to the scheduled industry or public interest" in section 18-A is capable of being construed to cover a large variety of acts or things which may be considered wrong with the manner of running the industry by the management. In contrast with it, action under section 18AA(1)(a) can be taken only if the Central Government is satisfied with regard to the existence of the twin conditions specifically mentioned therein, on the basis of evidence in its possession. [569D-H] An analysis of section 18AA(1)(a), indicates that as a necessary preliminary to the exercise of the power thereunder, the Central Government must be satisfied "from documentary or other evidence in its possession" in regard to the co-existence of two circumstances: (i) that the persons in charge of the industrial undertaking have by committing any of these acts, namely, reckless investments, or creation of incumbrances on the assets of industrial undertaking, or by diversion of funds, brought about a situation which is likely to affect the production of the article manufactured or produced in the industrial undertaking, and (ii) that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation.[570B-D] It cannot be laid down as a general proposition that whenever a statute confers a power on an administrative authority and makes the exercise of that power conditional on the formation of an opinion by that authority in regard to the existence of an immediacy, its opinion in regard to that preliminary fact is not open to judicial scrutiny at all. While it may be conceded that an element of subjectivity is always involved in the formation of such an opinion, the existence of the circumstances from which the inference constituting the opinion, as the sine qua non for action, are to be drawn, must be demonstrable, and the existence of such "circumstances", if questioned, must be proved at least prima facie. [571 E-G] From a plain reading of section 18AA, it is clear that it does not expressly in unmistakable and unequivocal terms exclude the application of the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage. [574B] In the instant case, so far as Kanpur Unit is concerned, it was lying closed for more than three months before the passing of the impugned order. There was no 'immediacy' in relation to that unit, which could absolve the Government from the obligation of complying fully with audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional or pre- takeover stage. [583A] Keshav Mills Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, [1973] 3 S.C.R. 22; Kamla Prasad Khetan v. Union of India,[1957] S.C.R. 1052; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 621; Sukhdev Singh & Ors. v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh, [1975] 3 S.C.R. 619; A. K. Kraipak v. Union of India, [1970] 1 S.C.R. 457; Ridge v. Baldwin, [1964] A.C. 40; 196; Heatley v. Tasmanian Racing & Gaming Commission, 14 Australian Law Reports 519; Nawabkhan Abbaskhan v. State of Gujarat, [1974] 3 S.C.R. 427; State of Orissa v. Dr. Bina Pani Dei, [1962] 2 S.C.R. 625; Ambalal M. Shah v. Hathi Singh Manufacturing Co. Ltd. [1962] 3 S.C.R. 171; and S. L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan & Ors., [1981] 1 S.C.R. 746, referred to. (Per Chinnappa Reddy, J. dissenting) The principles of natural justice are not attracted to the situations contemplated by section 18AA of Industries (Development and Regulation) Act. Natural justice like Ultra Vires and Public Policy is a branch of the public law and is a formidable weapon which can be wielded to secure justice to the citizen. While it may be used to protect certain fundamental liberties, civil and political rights, it may be used as indeed it is used more often than not, to protect vested interests and to obstruct the path of progressive change. The time has come to make an appropriate distinction between natural justice in its application to fundamental liberties, civil and political rights and natural justice in its application to vested interests. [590A-B] Our constitution as befits the Constitution of a Socialist Secular Democratic Republic, recognises the paramountcy of the public weal over the private interest. Natural justice, ultra vires, public policy, or any other rule of interpretation must, therefore, conform, grow and be tailored to serve the public interest and respond to the demands of an evolving society. [590C] The principles of natural justice have taken deep root in the judicial conscience of our people. They are now considered so fundamental as to be implicit in every decision making function, judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative. Where authority functions under a statute and the statute provides for the observance of the principles of natural justice in a particular manner, natural justice will have to be observed in that manner and in no other. Where the statute is silent about the observance of the principles of natural justice, such statutory silence is taken to imply compliance with the principles of natural justice. Where the conflict is between the public interest and the private interest the presumption must necessarily be weak and may, therefore, be readily displaced. The presumption is also weak, where what are involved are mere property rights. In cases of urgency, particularly where the public interest is involved, preemptive action may be a strategic necessity. Even in cases of preemptive action, if the statute so provides or if the Courts so deem fit in appropriate cases, a postponed hearing may be substituted for natural justice. [590A-C; 591F-G] 3(ii). Where natural justice is implied, the extent of the implication and the nature of the hearing must vary with the statute, the subject and the situation. [592B] The absence of the expression 'immediate action' in section 18AA(1)(b) does not make any difference. Section 18AA(1)(a) refers to a situation where immediate preventive action may avert a disaster, whereas section 18AA contemplates a situation where the disaster has occurred and action is necessary to restore normalcy. Restoration of production where production has stopped in a key industry or industrial undertaking is as important and urgent in the public interest as prevention of a situation where production may be affected. Immediate action is, therefore, as necessary in the situation contemplated by section 18AA(1)(b) as in the situation contemplated by section 18AA(1)(a). [596 F-G] The marginal note refers to the power to take over without investigation but there is no sufficient reason to suppose that the word immediate is used only to contra- distinguish it from the investigation contemplated by section 15 of the Act, though of course a consequence of immediate action under section 18AA may be to dispense with the enquiry under section 15. In fact, facts which come to light during the course of an investigation under section 15 may form the basis of action under section 18AA(1)(a). Where in the course of an investigation under section 15 it is discovered that the management have, by reckless investments or creation of encumbrances on the assets of the industrial undertaking or by diversion of funds brought about a situation which is likely to affect the production of the articles manufactured or produced in the industrial undertaking, if the Government is satisfied that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation, there is no reason why the Central Government may not straightaway take action under section 18AA(1)(a) without waiting for completion of investigation under section 15. [597A-B] Where there is a provision in the statute itself for revocation of the order by the very authority making the decision, it appears to be unnecessary to insist upon a pre- decisional observance of natural justice. [598A] The likelihood of production being jeopardized or the stoppage of production in a key industrial undertaking is a matter of grave concern affecting the public interest. Parliament has taken so serious a view of the matter that it has authorised the Central Government to take over the management of the industrial undertaking if immediate action may prevent jeopardy to production or restore production where it has already stopped. The necessity for immediate action by the Central Government contemplated by Parliament is definitely indicative of the exclusion of natural justice. It is not as if the owner of the industrial undertaking is left with no remedy. He may move the Central Government under section 18-F to cancel the order made under section 18AA. [598C-D] Neither section 18-F of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act nor section 21 of the General Clauses Act by itself excludes natural justice. The exclusion of natural justice where such exclusion is not express has to be implied by reference to the subject, the statute and the statutory situation. Where an express provision in the statute itself provides for a post decisional hearing the other provisions of the Statute will have to be read in the light of such provision and the provision for post- decisional hearing may then clinch the issue where pre- decisional natural justice appears to be excluded on the other terms of the statute. That a post-decisional hearing may also be had by the terms of section 21 of the General Clauses Act may not necessarily help in the interpretation of the provisions of the statute concerned. [599 A-C] Ridge v. Baldwin, 1964 A.C. p. 40; Annie G. Phillip v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 75 L.E.d. 1289; John H. Fahey v. Paul Mallonee, 91 L.E.d. 2030; Margarita Fuentes v. Robert L. Shevin, Attorney General of Florida, 32 L.E.d. 2d 556 and Lawrence Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 40 L.E.d. 2d 406, referred to. - Rama Rao, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh as well as the President of the Telugu Desam Party as well as respondent No. 3. The advertisements very shortly stated, refer to the auspicious gifts made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to the poor people on the eve of New Year and Sankranti. In the said advertisements, it is stated that the said Government which was formed by the Telugu Desam Party was giving to the poor people whose income was below Rs. and the said advertisements referred to a new scheme of selling sarees and dhoties at half prices to the poor people in the State of Andhra Pradesh having Green-cards. Moreover, the offer in the advertisements for the sale of dhoties and sarees at discount rates was in the nature of a benefit offered to poor persons in that State. When a Government announces the measures which are intended for the benefit of any of the classes for whose the Government can normally be expected to work like the poor or the economical backward classes, it is only in rare circumstances that such a promise can be said to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) even though such a promise might be made on the eve of elections. 8. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => '', 'counseldef' => '', 'court' => 'Supreme Court of India', 'court_type' => 'SC', 'decidedon' => '1989-09-29', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' K.N. Saikia,; M.H. Kania and; S. Ranganathan, JJ.', 'judgement' => '</p><p>Kania, J.</p><p>1. These two appeals arise out of the judgments in two Election Petitions in the Andhra Pradesh High Court questioning the election of respondent No. 1 as a Member of Parliament from Srikakulam No. Parliamentary Constituency in the 8th General Election to the House of the People. The points raised in these appeals are common and so are the relevant facts; and, hence, they are being disposed of by this common judgment. We propose to take note of only the few facts which are necessary for the appreciation of the controversy before us.</p><p>2. The polling date for the said election along with other parliamentary elections in the State of Andhra Pradesh was December 27, 1984 but in Srikakulam No. 1 Parliamentary Constituency the polling was countermanded and the date of polling was later fixed on January 28, 1985. In both the Election Petitions the election of respondent No. 1 was questioned mainly on the ground that Shri N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh as well as the President of the Telugu Desam Party as well as respondent No. 1 gave certain speeches and certain advertisements were got published by Shri N.T. Rama Rao through the Publicity Department of the Government of Andhra Pradesh in the newspapers containing certain statements which are alleged to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A) of the <a>Representation of the People Act, 1951</a> (hereinafter referred to as 'the said Act'). The main question canvassed before us is whether the statements contained in these aforesaid advertisements amount to a corrupt practice under Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act. Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act runs as follows :</p><p>123. Corrupt practices</p><p>The following shall be deemed to be corrupt practises for the purposes of this Act :</p><p>(1) 'Bribery', that is to say.</p><p>(A) any gift, offer or promise by a candidate or his agent or by any other person with the consent of a candidate or his election agent of any gratification, to any person whomsover, with the object, directly or indirectly of inducing.</p><p>(a) x x x</p><p>(b) an elector to vote or refrain from voting at an election, or as a reward to.</p><p>(i) a person for having so stood or not stood, or for having withdrawn or not having withdrawn his candidature; or</p><p>(ii) an elector for having voted or refrained from voting.</p><p>3. The advertisements very shortly stated, refer to the auspicious gifts made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to the poor people on the eve of New Year and Sankranti. In the said advertisements, it is stated that the said Government which was formed by the Telugu Desam Party was giving to the poor people whose income was below Rs. 6,000 per year, a kilo of rice at Rs. 2 per Kg. and the said advertisements referred to a new scheme of selling sarees and dhoties at half prices to the poor people in the State of Andhra Pradesh having Green-cards. Green-cards were directed to be issued to all the persons whose annual income was below Rs. 6,000. The supply of the rice at subsidised rates as aforesaid was also to be made to the Green-card holders only. The scheme to sell sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was to be operative from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985.</p><p>4. In considering the question whether the said advertisement and the said speeches amount to a corrupt practice, we are of the view that the provisions of Section 123 of the said Act which deal with corrupt practices have to be interpreted, keeping in mind that dictates of commonsense require that they never could have been intended to treat normal election promises made in election manifestoes or usual election speeches by members of various political parties aspiring to power and by different candidates aspiring to get elected to legislative bodies concerned as corrupt practices. We are of the view that these advertisements and speeches amount to nothing more than statements extolling the achievements of the Government of the State of Andhra Pradesh under the Telugu Desam Party headed by N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister, and contain normal election promises and these statements do not amount to corrupt practices falling within the scope of Sub-clause (b) of Clause (A) of Sub-section (1) of Section 123 of the said Act.</p><p>5. It was urged by Mr. Rao, learned Counsel for the appellants that in the impugned judgments, the High Court has incorrectly taken the view that in order to amount to bribery within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A), the transaction must amount to a bargain by the candidate with a view to get votes. It was pointed out by him that the said view has been taken in the impugned judgments, relying upon the decision of a Bench comprising to learned Judges of this Court in Ghasi Ram v. Dal Singh and Ors. :1983 SCR 102 . We have gone through to the relevant portion of that judgment (at page 109 and 110 of the said report). A careful perusal of the said judgment shows that what has been really held in that case is that if the promises given or made amount to a bargain entered into by a candidate for a vote or votes, that would amount to a corrupt practice; but it has not been held there that unless the act alleged amounts to such a bargain, it could not amount to a corrupt practice. In our view, that judgment does not lay down that in order to amount to a corrupt practice, the transaction must amount to a bargain for getting a vote. It was pointed out by Mr. Rao, however, that such a view seems to have been taken in two other decisions rendered by two Benches, each comprising two learned Judges of this Court in Bhanu Kumar Shastri v. Mohan Lal Sukhadia and Ors. : [1971]3SCR522 and Harjit Singh Mann v. S Umrao Singh and Ors. : [1980]2SCR501 . and these judgments need to be overruled. We do not propose to go into the correctness or otherwise of this view because, even on the footing that in order to amount to a corrupt practice under the aforesaid provision the alleged acts need not constitute a bargain, the the acts established in the present case, in our opinion, do not amount to a corrupt practice.</p><p>6. Our attention was drawn by Mr. Rao to the fact that in this case the said advertisements and the speeches had to be viewed in the context of the fact that the advertisements were issued and the speeches were made after respondent No. 1 filed his nomination papers on January 4, 1985, for the election and before the election was held in the aforesaid constituency. It was further pointed out that the offer made for the sale of sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was limited to the period from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985. It cannot be denied that these factors are relevant factOrs. We cannot, however, lose sight of the fact that this offer was made not only in this constituency but throughout the State where the elections to the House of the People were scheduled to be held, and were, in fact, held on December 27, 1984. It was only in case of this constituency that the election to be held on the scheduled date was countermanded and later held on January 28, 1985. We cannot lose sight of the fact that, as far as the said speeches and the said advertisements, which were issued by the Publicity Department of the State, are concerned, they deal in the main with the achievements of the Government of Andhra Pradesh which, of course, was being run by Ministers belonging to Telugu Desam Party to which respondent No. 1 also belonged. Moreover, the offer in the advertisements for the sale of dhoties and sarees at discount rates was in the nature of a benefit offered to poor persons in that State. When a Government announces the measures which are intended for the benefit of any of the classes for whose the Government can normally be expected to work like the poor or the economical backward classes, it is only in rare circumstances that such a promise can be said to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) even though such a promise might be made on the eve of elections. Keeping this in mind, in our opinion, although the offer to sell dhoties and sarees at discount rates was of a limited duration as aforestated, it cannot be regarded as a corrupt practice. Such an offer was bound to have financial repercussions and it is quite possible the duration of the offer was limited to enable the Government to study the financial repercussions rather than from any improper motive. We find support for this view from the decision of this Court in H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh : [1969]3SCR813 . In that case an Ordinance was passed by the Government of Madhya Pradesh as a result of which a large number of agriculturists, namely, those holdings of plots of land of less than 7.5 acres area or paying land revenue not exceeding Rs. 5/- were exempted from the payment of the land revenue. It was held that such a concession does not amount to a gift, offer or promise of any gratification within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) of the said Act nor does the announcement of the declaration made at a meeting shortly before the election or the issue of a pamphlet containing that declaration at that time carry the matter any further. It was held that neither Shri D.P. Misra who was the Chief Minister nor Shri S.K. Dixit who acted as his agent were guilty of any corrupt practice within the meaning of the aforesaid provision.</p><p>7. It was next contended by Mr. Rao, although very faintly, that the High Court was in error as it had not decided all other issues which were raised in the election petition. In this regard we cannot lose sight of the fact that the term of the present Lok Sabha is likely to be over within a few months and fresh elections are likely to be held and it would, therefore, be an exercise in futility to remand the matter to the High Court for deciding the remaining issues.</p><p>8. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.<p></p><p>', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'AIR1990SC1889; JT1989(4)SC186; 1989(2)SCALE891; 1989Supp(2)SCC504', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors.', 'sub' => 'Election', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ) $casename_url = 'b-rajagopala-rao-vs-appayya-hanumanthu' $args = array( (int) 0 => '640942', (int) 1 => 'b-rajagopala-rao-vs-appayya-hanumanthu' ) $url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/640942/b-rajagopala-rao-vs-appayya-hanumanthu' $ctype = '' $caseref = 'H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh<br>' $content = array( (int) 0 => '', (int) 1 => '<p>Kania, J.', (int) 2 => '<p>1. These two appeals arise out of the judgments in two Election Petitions in the Andhra Pradesh High Court questioning the election of respondent No. 1 as a Member of Parliament from Srikakulam No. Parliamentary Constituency in the 8th General Election to the House of the People. The points raised in these appeals are common and so are the relevant facts; and, hence, they are being disposed of by this common judgment. We propose to take note of only the few facts which are necessary for the appreciation of the controversy before us.', (int) 3 => '<p>2. The polling date for the said election along with other parliamentary elections in the State of Andhra Pradesh was December 27, 1984 but in Srikakulam No. 1 Parliamentary Constituency the polling was countermanded and the date of polling was later fixed on January 28, 1985. In both the Election Petitions the election of respondent No. 1 was questioned mainly on the ground that Shri N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh as well as the President of the Telugu Desam Party as well as respondent No. 1 gave certain speeches and certain advertisements were got published by Shri N.T. Rama Rao through the Publicity Department of the Government of Andhra Pradesh in the newspapers containing certain statements which are alleged to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A) of the <a>Representation of the People Act, 1951</a> (hereinafter referred to as 'the said Act'). The main question canvassed before us is whether the statements contained in these aforesaid advertisements amount to a corrupt practice under Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act. Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act runs as follows :', (int) 4 => '<p>123. Corrupt practices', (int) 5 => '<p>The following shall be deemed to be corrupt practises for the purposes of this Act :', (int) 6 => '<p>(1) 'Bribery', that is to say.', (int) 7 => '<p>(A) any gift, offer or promise by a candidate or his agent or by any other person with the consent of a candidate or his election agent of any gratification, to any person whomsover, with the object, directly or indirectly of inducing.', (int) 8 => '<p>(a) x x x', (int) 9 => '<p>(b) an elector to vote or refrain from voting at an election, or as a reward to.', (int) 10 => '<p>(i) a person for having so stood or not stood, or for having withdrawn or not having withdrawn his candidature; or', (int) 11 => '<p>(ii) an elector for having voted or refrained from voting.', (int) 12 => '<p>3. The advertisements very shortly stated, refer to the auspicious gifts made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to the poor people on the eve of New Year and Sankranti. In the said advertisements, it is stated that the said Government which was formed by the Telugu Desam Party was giving to the poor people whose income was below Rs. 6,000 per year, a kilo of rice at Rs. 2 per Kg. and the said advertisements referred to a new scheme of selling sarees and dhoties at half prices to the poor people in the State of Andhra Pradesh having Green-cards. Green-cards were directed to be issued to all the persons whose annual income was below Rs. 6,000. The supply of the rice at subsidised rates as aforesaid was also to be made to the Green-card holders only. The scheme to sell sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was to be operative from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985.', (int) 13 => '<p>4. In considering the question whether the said advertisement and the said speeches amount to a corrupt practice, we are of the view that the provisions of Section 123 of the said Act which deal with corrupt practices have to be interpreted, keeping in mind that dictates of commonsense require that they never could have been intended to treat normal election promises made in election manifestoes or usual election speeches by members of various political parties aspiring to power and by different candidates aspiring to get elected to legislative bodies concerned as corrupt practices. We are of the view that these advertisements and speeches amount to nothing more than statements extolling the achievements of the Government of the State of Andhra Pradesh under the Telugu Desam Party headed by N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister, and contain normal election promises and these statements do not amount to corrupt practices falling within the scope of Sub-clause (b) of Clause (A) of Sub-section (1) of Section 123 of the said Act.', (int) 14 => '<p>5. It was urged by Mr. Rao, learned Counsel for the appellants that in the impugned judgments, the High Court has incorrectly taken the view that in order to amount to bribery within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A), the transaction must amount to a bargain by the candidate with a view to get votes. It was pointed out by him that the said view has been taken in the impugned judgments, relying upon the decision of a Bench comprising to learned Judges of this Court in Ghasi Ram v. Dal Singh and Ors. :1983 SCR 102 . We have gone through to the relevant portion of that judgment (at page 109 and 110 of the said report). A careful perusal of the said judgment shows that what has been really held in that case is that if the promises given or made amount to a bargain entered into by a candidate for a vote or votes, that would amount to a corrupt practice; but it has not been held there that unless the act alleged amounts to such a bargain, it could not amount to a corrupt practice. In our view, that judgment does not lay down that in order to amount to a corrupt practice, the transaction must amount to a bargain for getting a vote. It was pointed out by Mr. Rao, however, that such a view seems to have been taken in two other decisions rendered by two Benches, each comprising two learned Judges of this Court in Bhanu Kumar Shastri v. Mohan Lal Sukhadia and Ors. : [1971]3SCR522 and Harjit Singh Mann v. S Umrao Singh and Ors. : [1980]2SCR501 . and these judgments need to be overruled. We do not propose to go into the correctness or otherwise of this view because, even on the footing that in order to amount to a corrupt practice under the aforesaid provision the alleged acts need not constitute a bargain, the the acts established in the present case, in our opinion, do not amount to a corrupt practice.', (int) 15 => '<p>6. Our attention was drawn by Mr. Rao to the fact that in this case the said advertisements and the speeches had to be viewed in the context of the fact that the advertisements were issued and the speeches were made after respondent No. 1 filed his nomination papers on January 4, 1985, for the election and before the election was held in the aforesaid constituency. It was further pointed out that the offer made for the sale of sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was limited to the period from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985. It cannot be denied that these factors are relevant factOrs. We cannot, however, lose sight of the fact that this offer was made not only in this constituency but throughout the State where the elections to the House of the People were scheduled to be held, and were, in fact, held on December 27, 1984. It was only in case of this constituency that the election to be held on the scheduled date was countermanded and later held on January 28, 1985. We cannot lose sight of the fact that, as far as the said speeches and the said advertisements, which were issued by the Publicity Department of the State, are concerned, they deal in the main with the achievements of the Government of Andhra Pradesh which, of course, was being run by Ministers belonging to Telugu Desam Party to which respondent No. 1 also belonged. Moreover, the offer in the advertisements for the sale of dhoties and sarees at discount rates was in the nature of a benefit offered to poor persons in that State. When a Government announces the measures which are intended for the benefit of any of the classes for whose the Government can normally be expected to work like the poor or the economical backward classes, it is only in rare circumstances that such a promise can be said to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) even though such a promise might be made on the eve of elections. Keeping this in mind, in our opinion, although the offer to sell dhoties and sarees at discount rates was of a limited duration as aforestated, it cannot be regarded as a corrupt practice. Such an offer was bound to have financial repercussions and it is quite possible the duration of the offer was limited to enable the Government to study the financial repercussions rather than from any improper motive. We find support for this view from the decision of this Court in H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh : [1969]3SCR813 . In that case an Ordinance was passed by the Government of Madhya Pradesh as a result of which a large number of agriculturists, namely, those holdings of plots of land of less than 7.5 acres area or paying land revenue not exceeding Rs. 5/- were exempted from the payment of the land revenue. It was held that such a concession does not amount to a gift, offer or promise of any gratification within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) of the said Act nor does the announcement of the declaration made at a meeting shortly before the election or the issue of a pamphlet containing that declaration at that time carry the matter any further. It was held that neither Shri D.P. Misra who was the Chief Minister nor Shri S.K. Dixit who acted as his agent were guilty of any corrupt practice within the meaning of the aforesaid provision.', (int) 16 => '<p>7. It was next contended by Mr. Rao, although very faintly, that the High Court was in error as it had not decided all other issues which were raised in the election petition. In this regard we cannot lose sight of the fact that the term of the present Lok Sabha is likely to be over within a few months and fresh elections are likely to be held and it would, therefore, be an exercise in futility to remand the matter to the High Court for deciding the remaining issues.', (int) 17 => '<p>8. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.<p>', (int) 18 => '<p>' ) $paragraphAfter = (int) 1 $cnt = (int) 19 $i = (int) 17include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144 View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971 View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933 View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473 Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963 Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200 Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167 [main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109
8. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.
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$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp' $dataForView = array( 'title_for_layout' => 'B Rajagopala Rao and anr Vs Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors - Citation 640942 - Court Judgment | ', 'desc' => array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '640942', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/50684/representation-of-the-people-act-1951-complete-act">Representation of the People Act, 1951</a> - Sections 1, 3(1)(A), 123 and 123(1)(A)', 'appealno' => 'Civil Appeal Nos. 484 and 485 of 1987', 'appellant' => 'B. Rajagopala Rao and anr.', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'B. Rajagopala Rao and anr. Vs. Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors.', 'casenote' => 'Election - corrupt practices - Sections 123 and 123 (1) (A) of Representation of the People Act, 1951 - whether advertisements by public department and speeches made by respondent No. 1 to sell dhoti and sarees at discount rates amount to corrupt practices - offer was available for mass and for limited duration - such offer was bound to have financial repercussions and it is quite possible that duration of offer limited to enable Government to study financial repercussions rather than from any improper motive - offer not amounted to corrupt practices. - [ D.A. Desai,; O. Chinnappa Reddy and; R.S. Sarkaria, JJ.] The Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 empowers the Union of India in the public interest to take under its control the industries specified in the First Schedule to the Act. Item 23 of the First Schedule relates to textiles of various categories. Section 15 authorises the Central Government to make or cause to be made a full and complete investigation into the circumstances of the case if the Central Government is of the opinion that (a) in respect of any scheduled industry or industrial undertaking or undertakings (i) there has been, or is likely to be, a substantial fall in the volume of production for which, having regard to the economic conditions prevailing, there is no justification; or (ii) there has been, or is likely to be, a marked deterioration in the quality of any article... which could have been or can be avoided; or (iii) there has been or is likely to be a rise in the price of any article..... for which there is no justification; or (iv) it is necessary to take any such action for the purpose of conserving any resources of national importance; or (b) any industrial undertaking is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest. After the investigation is made under section 15, section 16(1) empowers the Central Government if action is desirable, to issue appropriate directions, and section 16(2) provides for the issue of interim directions by the Central Government pending investigation under section 15. Chapter III-A consisting of Sections 18A, 18-AA, 18-B, 18-C, 18-D, 18-E and 18-F deal with "direct management or control of Industrial Undertakings by Central Government in certain cases". Sec. 18-A empowers the Central Government by notified order, to authorise any person or body of persons to take over the management of the whole or any part of an industrial undertaking or to exercise in respect of the whole, or any part of the undertaking such functions of control as may be specified in the order, if the Central Government is of opinion that: (a) an industrial undertaking to which directions have been issued in pursuance of section 16 has failed to comply with such directions, or (b) an industrial undertaking in respect of which an investigation has been made under section 15 is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest. Section 18AA(5) stipulates that the provisions of Sections 18-B to 18 E shall be applicable to the industrial undertaking in respect of which an order has been made under section 18-AA even as they apply to an industrial undertaking taken over under Section 18-A. Section 18-F empowers the Central Government to cancel the order made under section 18-A if it appears that the purpose of the order has been fulfilled or it is not necessary that the order should remain in force. The appellant M/s. Swadeshi Cotton Mills was taken over by the Government of India by a notification dated April 13, 1978 in exercise of the powers conferred on it under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 18AA of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 on the ground that the company had by creation of encumbrances on the assets of its industrial undertakings, brought about a situation which had affected and is likely to further affect the production of articles manufactured or produced by it and that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation. The Government authorised the National Textile Corporation Limited to take over the management, subject to the conditions that the authorised person shall comply with all the directions issued from time to time by the Central Government and that the authorised person shall hold office for a period of five years. The appellant Mills challenged the aforesaid order in a writ petition in the High Court. The case was heard by a Full Bench of five Judges to consider the question whether in construing section 18AA of the Industries Development and Regulation Act, 1951, compliance with the principle of audi alteram partem is to be implied and whether hearing is to be given to the parties who would be affected by the order to be passed prior to the passing of the order or whether hearing can be given after the order is passed and whether the order passed under the said Section is vitiated by not giving of such hearing and whether such vice can be cured. The Bench by a majority answered the three questions as follows:- (a) Section 18AA(1)(a)(b) excludes the giving of prior hearing to the party who would be affected by order thereunder. (b) Section 18-F expressly provides for a post- decisional hearing to the owner of the industrial undertaking, the management of which is taken over under section 18AA to have the order made under section 18AA cancelled on any relevant ground. (c) As the taking over of management under section 18A is not vitiated by the failure to grant prior hearing the question of any such vice being cured by a grant of a subsequent hearing does not arise. The minority, however, held that in compliance with the principles of natural justice, prior hearing to the owner of the undertaking was required to be given before the passing of an order under section 18AA, that the second question did not arise as the denial of a prior hearing would not cure the vice by the grant of subsequent hearing, but it would be open to the Court to moderate the relief in such a way that the order is kept alive to the extent necessary until the making of the fresh order to subserve public interest and to make appropriate directions. After the decision on the reference the case was reheard on merits by a Full Bench of three Judges and the writ petition was allowed in part. The challenge to the validity of the order being rejected but insofar as the impugned order seeking to take over the corporate entity of the company, the corporate entity of the subsidiary and its assets, the petition was allowed and the respondents, the Union of India and the authorised person were directed to release from its control and custody and/or deliver possession of any assets or property of the company which were not referable to the industrial undertakings. Appeals to this Court were filed on behalf of the Company as well as by the Union of India and the National Textile Corporation. Two propositions were propounded on behalf of the company that: (a) Whether it was necessary to observe the rules of natural justice before issuing a notified order under section 18AA(1)(a) and further whether section 18-F impliedly excludes rules of natural justice relating to prior hearing; and it was contended (1) the mere use of the word 'immediate' in sub-clause (a) of section 18AA does not show a legislative intent to exclude the application of audi alteram partem rule altogether. (2) The word 'immediate' in clause (a) has been used in contra distinction to 'investigate'. It only means that under section 18AA action can be taken without prior investigation under section 15. The use of the word 'immediate' in section 18AA(1)(a) only dispenses with investigation under section 15 and not with the principle of audi alteram partem altogether and this is indicated by the marginal note of section 18A and para 3 of the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Amendment Bill which inserted section 18AA in 1971. (3) The word 'immediate' occurs only in clause (a) and not in clause (b) of section 18AA(1). It would be odd if intention to exclude this principle of natural justice is spelt out in one clause of the sub-section when the other clause does not exclude it. (4) Section 18-F does not exclude a pre-decisional hearing. The so-called post-decisional hearing contemplated by section 18-F cannot be and is not intended to be a substitute for a pre-decisional hearing. (5) Section 18F incorporates only a facet, albeit qualified, of section 21 of the General Clauses Act. The language of the Section implicity prohibits an enquiry into circumstances that led to the passing of the order of take-over and under it the aggrieved person is not entitled to show that on merits the order was void ab initio. (6) 'Immediacy' does not exclude a duty to act fairly because even an emergent situation can co-exist with the canons of natural justice. The only effect of urgency on the application of the principle of fair hearing would be that the width, form and duration of the hearing would be tailored to the situation and reduced to the reasonable minimum so that it does not delay and defeat the purpose of the contemplated action. (7) Where the civil consequences of the administrative action are grave and its effect is highly prejudicial to the rights and interests of the person affected and there is nothing in the language and scheme of the statute which unequivocally excludes a fair pre-decisional hearing and the post-decisional hearing provided therein is not a real remedial hearing equitable to a full right of appeal the Court should be loath to infer a legislative intent to exclude even a minimal fair hearing at the pre-decisional stage merely on ground of urgency. (8) The Central Government appointed four Government Officials including one from the office of the Textile Commissioner to study the affairs of the Company and to make recommendation. This Official Group submitted its report on February 16, 1978. The evidence on the basis of which the impugned order was passed was not disclosed to the appellant company till May 1978, only after it had filed the writ petition in the High Court. If there was anything adverse to the appellants in the survey report there was time enough about six weeks between the submission of the Survey Report and the passing of the impugned order for giving a short, reasonable opportunity to the appellants to explain the adverse findings against them. If there was immediacy situational modifications could be made to meet the requirement of fairness, by reducing the period of notice; that even the manner and form of such notice could be simplified to eliminate delay, that telephonic notice or short opportunity for furnishing their explanation to the Company might have satisfied the requirements of natural justice. Such an opportunity of hearing could have been given after the passing of a conditional tentative order and before its enforcement under section 18AA. For the interregnum suitable interim action such as freezing the assets of the Company or restraining the Company from creating further encumbrances, could be taken under section 16. On behalf of the Union of India and the Authorised Officer it was contended that (1) the presumption in favour of audi alteram partem rule stands impliedly displaced by the language scheme, setting and the purpose of the provision in section 18AA. (2) Section 18AA on its plain terms deals with situations where immediate preventive action is required. The paramount concern is to avoid serious problems which may be caused by fall in production. The purpose of an order under section 18AA is not to condemn the owner but to protect the scheduled industry. The issue under section 18AA is not solely between the Government and the management of the industrial undertaking. The object of taking action under this Section is to protect other outside interests of the community at large and the workers. (3) The rule of natural justice to give a hearing has been incorporated in section 18-F which gives an opportunity of a post-decisional hearing to the owner of the undertaking who if he feels aggrieved can on his application be heard, to show that even the original order under section 18AA was passed on invalid grounds and should be cancelled or rescinded. (4) On a true construction of section 18AA read with section 18-F the requirements of natural justice and fair play can be read into the statute only insofar as conformance to such canons can reasonably and realistically be required of it by the provision for a remedial hearing at a subsequent stage. (5) Under section 18-F the Central Government exercises curial functions and that Section confers on the aggrieved owner a right to apply to the Government to cancel the order of take-over. This section casts an obligation on the Central Government to deal with and dispose of an application filed thereunder with reasonable expedition. Allowing the appeal by the Company,<br />HELD: (Sarkaria & Desai, JJ. per Chinnappa Reddy, J. dissenting.) In the facts and circumstances of the instant case, there has been a noncompliance with the implied requirement of the audi alteram partem rule of natural justice at the pre-decisional stage. The impugned order could be struck down as invalid on that score alone. But in view of the commitment / concession that a hearing would be afforded to the Company, the case is remitted to the Central Government to give a full, fair and effective hearing. [587G-H, 588C] The phrase 'natural justice' is not capable of a static and precise definition. It cannot be imprisoned in the straight-jacket of a cast-iron formula. Rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. Hence not possible to make an exhaustive catalogue of such rules. Two fundamental maxims of natural justice have now become deeply and indelibly ingrained in the common consciousness of mankind as pre-eminently necessary to ensure that the law is applied impartially objectively and fairly. These twin principles are (i) audi alteram partem and (ii) nemo judex in re sua. Audi alteram partem is a highly effective rule devised by the Courts to ensure that a statutory authority arrives at a just decision and it is calculated to act as a healthy check on the abuse or misuse of power. Its reach should not be narrowed and its applicability circumscribed.[554C-G] The rules of natural justice can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. If a statutory provision either specifically or by inevitable implication excludes the application of the rules of natural justice then the Court cannot ignore the mandate of the Legislature. Whether or not the application of the principles of natural justice in a given case has been excluded in the exercise of statutory power depends upon the language and basic scheme of the provision conferring the power, the nature of the power the purpose for which it is conferred and the effect of that power. [556A-B] The maxim audi alteram partem has many facets. Two of them are (a) notice of the case to be met, and (b) opportunity to explain. The rule cannot be sacrificed at the altar of administrative convenience or celerity; for, convenience and justice are often not on speaking terms. Difficulties, however, arise when the statute conferring the power does not expressly exclude this rule but its exclusion is sought by implication due to the presence of certain factors such as urgency where the obligation to give notice and opportunity to be heard would obstruct the taking of prompt action of a preventive or remedial nature. Audi alteram partem rule may be disregarded in an emergent situation where immediate action brooks no delay to prevent some imminent danger or injury or hazard to paramount public interests. Section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure empowers the magistrates specified therein to make an exparte conditional order in emergent cases for removal of dangerous public nuisances. Action under section 17 Land Acquisition Act furnishes another such instance. Similarly action on grounds of public safety public health may justify disregard of the rule of prior hearing. [556C-H] Cases where owing to the compulsion of the fact situation or the necessity of taking speedy action no pre- decisional hearing is given but the action, is followed soon by a full post-decisional hearing to the person affected do not in reality constitute an exception to the audi alteram partem rule. To call such cases as exception is a misnomer because they do not exclude fair play in action but adapt it to the urgency of the situation by balancing the competing claims of hurry and hearing. [560H-561A] The general principle as distinguished from an absolute rule of uniform application seems to be that where a statute does not in terms exclude this rule of prior hearing but contemplates a post-decisional hearing amounting to a full review of the original order on merits then such a statute would be construed as excluding the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage. [561G] If the statute conferring the power is silent with regard to the giving of pre-decisional hearing to the person affected and the administrative decision taken by the authority involves civil consequences of a grave nature and no full review or appeal on merits against that decision is provided courts will be extremely reluctant to construe such a statute as excluding the duty of affording even a minimal hearing shorn of all its formal trappings and dilatory features at the pre-decisional stage, unless viewed pragmatically it would paralyse the administrative process or frustrate the need for utmost promptitude. [561H] 7(i). A comparison of the provisions of Section 18A(1)(b) and Section 18AA(1)(c), bring out two main points of distinction: First, action under Section 18A(1)(b) can be taken only after an investigation had been made under Section 15; while under Section 18AA(1)(a) or (b) action can be taken without such investigation. The language, scheme and setting of Section 18AA read in the light of the Objects and Reasons for enacting this provision make this position clear beyond doubt. Second, before taking action under Section 18A(1)(b), the Central Government has to form an opinion on the basis of the investigation conducted under section 15, in regard to the existence of the objective fact, namely: that the industrial undertaking is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest; while under section 18A(1)(a) the Government has to satisfy itself that the persons incharge of the undertaking have brought about a situation likely to cause fall in production, by committing any of the three kinds of acts specified in that provision. This shows that the preliminary objective fact attributable to the persons in charge of the management or affairs of the undertaking, on the basis of which action may be taken under section 18(A)(1)(b), is of far wider amplitude than the circumstance, the existence of which is a sine qua non for taking action under section 18AA(1). The phrase "highly detrimental to the scheduled industry or public interest" in section 18-A is capable of being construed to cover a large variety of acts or things which may be considered wrong with the manner of running the industry by the management. In contrast with it, action under section 18AA(1)(a) can be taken only if the Central Government is satisfied with regard to the existence of the twin conditions specifically mentioned therein, on the basis of evidence in its possession. [569D-H] An analysis of section 18AA(1)(a), indicates that as a necessary preliminary to the exercise of the power thereunder, the Central Government must be satisfied "from documentary or other evidence in its possession" in regard to the co-existence of two circumstances: (i) that the persons in charge of the industrial undertaking have by committing any of these acts, namely, reckless investments, or creation of incumbrances on the assets of industrial undertaking, or by diversion of funds, brought about a situation which is likely to affect the production of the article manufactured or produced in the industrial undertaking, and (ii) that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation.[570B-D] It cannot be laid down as a general proposition that whenever a statute confers a power on an administrative authority and makes the exercise of that power conditional on the formation of an opinion by that authority in regard to the existence of an immediacy, its opinion in regard to that preliminary fact is not open to judicial scrutiny at all. While it may be conceded that an element of subjectivity is always involved in the formation of such an opinion, the existence of the circumstances from which the inference constituting the opinion, as the sine qua non for action, are to be drawn, must be demonstrable, and the existence of such "circumstances", if questioned, must be proved at least prima facie. [571 E-G] From a plain reading of section 18AA, it is clear that it does not expressly in unmistakable and unequivocal terms exclude the application of the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage. [574B] In the instant case, so far as Kanpur Unit is concerned, it was lying closed for more than three months before the passing of the impugned order. There was no 'immediacy' in relation to that unit, which could absolve the Government from the obligation of complying fully with audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional or pre- takeover stage. [583A] Keshav Mills Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, [1973] 3 S.C.R. 22; Kamla Prasad Khetan v. Union of India,[1957] S.C.R. 1052; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 621; Sukhdev Singh & Ors. v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh, [1975] 3 S.C.R. 619; A. K. Kraipak v. Union of India, [1970] 1 S.C.R. 457; Ridge v. Baldwin, [1964] A.C. 40; 196; Heatley v. Tasmanian Racing & Gaming Commission, 14 Australian Law Reports 519; Nawabkhan Abbaskhan v. State of Gujarat, [1974] 3 S.C.R. 427; State of Orissa v. Dr. Bina Pani Dei, [1962] 2 S.C.R. 625; Ambalal M. Shah v. Hathi Singh Manufacturing Co. Ltd. [1962] 3 S.C.R. 171; and S. L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan & Ors., [1981] 1 S.C.R. 746, referred to. (Per Chinnappa Reddy, J. dissenting) The principles of natural justice are not attracted to the situations contemplated by section 18AA of Industries (Development and Regulation) Act. Natural justice like Ultra Vires and Public Policy is a branch of the public law and is a formidable weapon which can be wielded to secure justice to the citizen. While it may be used to protect certain fundamental liberties, civil and political rights, it may be used as indeed it is used more often than not, to protect vested interests and to obstruct the path of progressive change. The time has come to make an appropriate distinction between natural justice in its application to fundamental liberties, civil and political rights and natural justice in its application to vested interests. [590A-B] Our constitution as befits the Constitution of a Socialist Secular Democratic Republic, recognises the paramountcy of the public weal over the private interest. Natural justice, ultra vires, public policy, or any other rule of interpretation must, therefore, conform, grow and be tailored to serve the public interest and respond to the demands of an evolving society. [590C] The principles of natural justice have taken deep root in the judicial conscience of our people. They are now considered so fundamental as to be implicit in every decision making function, judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative. Where authority functions under a statute and the statute provides for the observance of the principles of natural justice in a particular manner, natural justice will have to be observed in that manner and in no other. Where the statute is silent about the observance of the principles of natural justice, such statutory silence is taken to imply compliance with the principles of natural justice. Where the conflict is between the public interest and the private interest the presumption must necessarily be weak and may, therefore, be readily displaced. The presumption is also weak, where what are involved are mere property rights. In cases of urgency, particularly where the public interest is involved, preemptive action may be a strategic necessity. Even in cases of preemptive action, if the statute so provides or if the Courts so deem fit in appropriate cases, a postponed hearing may be substituted for natural justice. [590A-C; 591F-G] 3(ii). Where natural justice is implied, the extent of the implication and the nature of the hearing must vary with the statute, the subject and the situation. [592B] The absence of the expression 'immediate action' in section 18AA(1)(b) does not make any difference. Section 18AA(1)(a) refers to a situation where immediate preventive action may avert a disaster, whereas section 18AA contemplates a situation where the disaster has occurred and action is necessary to restore normalcy. Restoration of production where production has stopped in a key industry or industrial undertaking is as important and urgent in the public interest as prevention of a situation where production may be affected. Immediate action is, therefore, as necessary in the situation contemplated by section 18AA(1)(b) as in the situation contemplated by section 18AA(1)(a). [596 F-G] The marginal note refers to the power to take over without investigation but there is no sufficient reason to suppose that the word immediate is used only to contra- distinguish it from the investigation contemplated by section 15 of the Act, though of course a consequence of immediate action under section 18AA may be to dispense with the enquiry under section 15. In fact, facts which come to light during the course of an investigation under section 15 may form the basis of action under section 18AA(1)(a). Where in the course of an investigation under section 15 it is discovered that the management have, by reckless investments or creation of encumbrances on the assets of the industrial undertaking or by diversion of funds brought about a situation which is likely to affect the production of the articles manufactured or produced in the industrial undertaking, if the Government is satisfied that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation, there is no reason why the Central Government may not straightaway take action under section 18AA(1)(a) without waiting for completion of investigation under section 15. [597A-B] Where there is a provision in the statute itself for revocation of the order by the very authority making the decision, it appears to be unnecessary to insist upon a pre- decisional observance of natural justice. [598A] The likelihood of production being jeopardized or the stoppage of production in a key industrial undertaking is a matter of grave concern affecting the public interest. Parliament has taken so serious a view of the matter that it has authorised the Central Government to take over the management of the industrial undertaking if immediate action may prevent jeopardy to production or restore production where it has already stopped. The necessity for immediate action by the Central Government contemplated by Parliament is definitely indicative of the exclusion of natural justice. It is not as if the owner of the industrial undertaking is left with no remedy. He may move the Central Government under section 18-F to cancel the order made under section 18AA. [598C-D] Neither section 18-F of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act nor section 21 of the General Clauses Act by itself excludes natural justice. The exclusion of natural justice where such exclusion is not express has to be implied by reference to the subject, the statute and the statutory situation. Where an express provision in the statute itself provides for a post decisional hearing the other provisions of the Statute will have to be read in the light of such provision and the provision for post- decisional hearing may then clinch the issue where pre- decisional natural justice appears to be excluded on the other terms of the statute. That a post-decisional hearing may also be had by the terms of section 21 of the General Clauses Act may not necessarily help in the interpretation of the provisions of the statute concerned. [599 A-C] Ridge v. Baldwin, 1964 A.C. p. 40; Annie G. Phillip v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 75 L.E.d. 1289; John H. Fahey v. Paul Mallonee, 91 L.E.d. 2030; Margarita Fuentes v. Robert L. Shevin, Attorney General of Florida, 32 L.E.d. 2d 556 and Lawrence Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 40 L.E.d. 2d 406, referred to. - Rama Rao, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh as well as the President of the Telugu Desam Party as well as respondent No. 3. The advertisements very shortly stated, refer to the auspicious gifts made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to the poor people on the eve of New Year and Sankranti. In the said advertisements, it is stated that the said Government which was formed by the Telugu Desam Party was giving to the poor people whose income was below Rs. and the said advertisements referred to a new scheme of selling sarees and dhoties at half prices to the poor people in the State of Andhra Pradesh having Green-cards. Moreover, the offer in the advertisements for the sale of dhoties and sarees at discount rates was in the nature of a benefit offered to poor persons in that State. When a Government announces the measures which are intended for the benefit of any of the classes for whose the Government can normally be expected to work like the poor or the economical backward classes, it is only in rare circumstances that such a promise can be said to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) even though such a promise might be made on the eve of elections. 8. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => '', 'counseldef' => '', 'court' => 'Supreme Court of India', 'court_type' => 'SC', 'decidedon' => '1989-09-29', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' K.N. Saikia,; M.H. Kania and; S. Ranganathan, JJ.', 'judgement' => '</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Kania, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. These two appeals arise out of the judgments in two Election Petitions in the Andhra Pradesh High Court questioning the election of respondent No. 1 as a Member of Parliament from Srikakulam No. Parliamentary Constituency in the 8th General Election to the House of the People. The points raised in these appeals are common and so are the relevant facts; and, hence, they are being disposed of by this common judgment. We propose to take note of only the few facts which are necessary for the appreciation of the controversy before us.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The polling date for the said election along with other parliamentary elections in the State of Andhra Pradesh was December 27, 1984 but in Srikakulam No. 1 Parliamentary Constituency the polling was countermanded and the date of polling was later fixed on January 28, 1985. In both the Election Petitions the election of respondent No. 1 was questioned mainly on the ground that Shri N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh as well as the President of the Telugu Desam Party as well as respondent No. 1 gave certain speeches and certain advertisements were got published by Shri N.T. Rama Rao through the Publicity Department of the Government of Andhra Pradesh in the newspapers containing certain statements which are alleged to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A) of the <a href="/act/50684/representation-of-the-people-act-1951-complete-act">Representation of the People Act, 1951</a> (hereinafter referred to as 'the said Act'). The main question canvassed before us is whether the statements contained in these aforesaid advertisements amount to a corrupt practice under Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act. Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act runs as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">123. Corrupt practices</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The following shall be deemed to be corrupt practises for the purposes of this Act :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) 'Bribery', that is to say.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(A) any gift, offer or promise by a candidate or his agent or by any other person with the consent of a candidate or his election agent of any gratification, to any person whomsover, with the object, directly or indirectly of inducing.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) x x x</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) an elector to vote or refrain from voting at an election, or as a reward to.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) a person for having so stood or not stood, or for having withdrawn or not having withdrawn his candidature; or</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) an elector for having voted or refrained from voting.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The advertisements very shortly stated, refer to the auspicious gifts made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to the poor people on the eve of New Year and Sankranti. In the said advertisements, it is stated that the said Government which was formed by the Telugu Desam Party was giving to the poor people whose income was below Rs. 6,000 per year, a kilo of rice at Rs. 2 per Kg. and the said advertisements referred to a new scheme of selling sarees and dhoties at half prices to the poor people in the State of Andhra Pradesh having Green-cards. Green-cards were directed to be issued to all the persons whose annual income was below Rs. 6,000. The supply of the rice at subsidised rates as aforesaid was also to be made to the Green-card holders only. The scheme to sell sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was to be operative from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. In considering the question whether the said advertisement and the said speeches amount to a corrupt practice, we are of the view that the provisions of Section 123 of the said Act which deal with corrupt practices have to be interpreted, keeping in mind that dictates of commonsense require that they never could have been intended to treat normal election promises made in election manifestoes or usual election speeches by members of various political parties aspiring to power and by different candidates aspiring to get elected to legislative bodies concerned as corrupt practices. We are of the view that these advertisements and speeches amount to nothing more than statements extolling the achievements of the Government of the State of Andhra Pradesh under the Telugu Desam Party headed by N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister, and contain normal election promises and these statements do not amount to corrupt practices falling within the scope of Sub-clause (b) of Clause (A) of Sub-section (1) of Section 123 of the said Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. It was urged by Mr. Rao, learned Counsel for the appellants that in the impugned judgments, the High Court has incorrectly taken the view that in order to amount to bribery within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A), the transaction must amount to a bargain by the candidate with a view to get votes. It was pointed out by him that the said view has been taken in the impugned judgments, relying upon the decision of a Bench comprising to learned Judges of this Court in Ghasi Ram v. Dal Singh and Ors. :1983 SCR 102 . We have gone through to the relevant portion of that judgment (at page 109 and 110 of the said report). A careful perusal of the said judgment shows that what has been really held in that case is that if the promises given or made amount to a bargain entered into by a candidate for a vote or votes, that would amount to a corrupt practice; but it has not been held there that unless the act alleged amounts to such a bargain, it could not amount to a corrupt practice. In our view, that judgment does not lay down that in order to amount to a corrupt practice, the transaction must amount to a bargain for getting a vote. It was pointed out by Mr. Rao, however, that such a view seems to have been taken in two other decisions rendered by two Benches, each comprising two learned Judges of this Court in Bhanu Kumar Shastri v. Mohan Lal Sukhadia and Ors. : [1971]3SCR522 and Harjit Singh Mann v. S Umrao Singh and Ors. : [1980]2SCR501 . and these judgments need to be overruled. We do not propose to go into the correctness or otherwise of this view because, even on the footing that in order to amount to a corrupt practice under the aforesaid provision the alleged acts need not constitute a bargain, the the acts established in the present case, in our opinion, do not amount to a corrupt practice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Our attention was drawn by Mr. Rao to the fact that in this case the said advertisements and the speeches had to be viewed in the context of the fact that the advertisements were issued and the speeches were made after respondent No. 1 filed his nomination papers on January 4, 1985, for the election and before the election was held in the aforesaid constituency. It was further pointed out that the offer made for the sale of sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was limited to the period from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985. It cannot be denied that these factors are relevant factOrs. We cannot, however, lose sight of the fact that this offer was made not only in this constituency but throughout the State where the elections to the House of the People were scheduled to be held, and were, in fact, held on December 27, 1984. It was only in case of this constituency that the election to be held on the scheduled date was countermanded and later held on January 28, 1985. We cannot lose sight of the fact that, as far as the said speeches and the said advertisements, which were issued by the Publicity Department of the State, are concerned, they deal in the main with the achievements of the Government of Andhra Pradesh which, of course, was being run by Ministers belonging to Telugu Desam Party to which respondent No. 1 also belonged. Moreover, the offer in the advertisements for the sale of dhoties and sarees at discount rates was in the nature of a benefit offered to poor persons in that State. When a Government announces the measures which are intended for the benefit of any of the classes for whose the Government can normally be expected to work like the poor or the economical backward classes, it is only in rare circumstances that such a promise can be said to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) even though such a promise might be made on the eve of elections. Keeping this in mind, in our opinion, although the offer to sell dhoties and sarees at discount rates was of a limited duration as aforestated, it cannot be regarded as a corrupt practice. Such an offer was bound to have financial repercussions and it is quite possible the duration of the offer was limited to enable the Government to study the financial repercussions rather than from any improper motive. We find support for this view from the decision of this Court in H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh : [1969]3SCR813 . In that case an Ordinance was passed by the Government of Madhya Pradesh as a result of which a large number of agriculturists, namely, those holdings of plots of land of less than 7.5 acres area or paying land revenue not exceeding Rs. 5/- were exempted from the payment of the land revenue. It was held that such a concession does not amount to a gift, offer or promise of any gratification within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) of the said Act nor does the announcement of the declaration made at a meeting shortly before the election or the issue of a pamphlet containing that declaration at that time carry the matter any further. It was held that neither Shri D.P. Misra who was the Chief Minister nor Shri S.K. Dixit who acted as his agent were guilty of any corrupt practice within the meaning of the aforesaid provision.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. It was next contended by Mr. Rao, although very faintly, that the High Court was in error as it had not decided all other issues which were raised in the election petition. In this regard we cannot lose sight of the fact that the term of the present Lok Sabha is likely to be over within a few months and fresh elections are likely to be held and it would, therefore, be an exercise in futility to remand the matter to the High Court for deciding the remaining issues.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'AIR1990SC1889; JT1989(4)SC186; 1989(2)SCALE891; 1989Supp(2)SCC504', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors.', 'sub' => 'Election', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ), 'casename_url' => 'b-rajagopala-rao-vs-appayya-hanumanthu', 'args' => array( (int) 0 => '640942', (int) 1 => 'b-rajagopala-rao-vs-appayya-hanumanthu' ) ) $title_for_layout = 'B Rajagopala Rao and anr Vs Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors - Citation 640942 - Court Judgment | ' $desc = array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '640942', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/50684/representation-of-the-people-act-1951-complete-act">Representation of the People Act, 1951</a> - Sections 1, 3(1)(A), 123 and 123(1)(A)', 'appealno' => 'Civil Appeal Nos. 484 and 485 of 1987', 'appellant' => 'B. Rajagopala Rao and anr.', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'B. Rajagopala Rao and anr. Vs. Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors.', 'casenote' => 'Election - corrupt practices - Sections 123 and 123 (1) (A) of Representation of the People Act, 1951 - whether advertisements by public department and speeches made by respondent No. 1 to sell dhoti and sarees at discount rates amount to corrupt practices - offer was available for mass and for limited duration - such offer was bound to have financial repercussions and it is quite possible that duration of offer limited to enable Government to study financial repercussions rather than from any improper motive - offer not amounted to corrupt practices. - [ D.A. Desai,; O. Chinnappa Reddy and; R.S. Sarkaria, JJ.] The Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 empowers the Union of India in the public interest to take under its control the industries specified in the First Schedule to the Act. Item 23 of the First Schedule relates to textiles of various categories. Section 15 authorises the Central Government to make or cause to be made a full and complete investigation into the circumstances of the case if the Central Government is of the opinion that (a) in respect of any scheduled industry or industrial undertaking or undertakings (i) there has been, or is likely to be, a substantial fall in the volume of production for which, having regard to the economic conditions prevailing, there is no justification; or (ii) there has been, or is likely to be, a marked deterioration in the quality of any article... which could have been or can be avoided; or (iii) there has been or is likely to be a rise in the price of any article..... for which there is no justification; or (iv) it is necessary to take any such action for the purpose of conserving any resources of national importance; or (b) any industrial undertaking is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest. After the investigation is made under section 15, section 16(1) empowers the Central Government if action is desirable, to issue appropriate directions, and section 16(2) provides for the issue of interim directions by the Central Government pending investigation under section 15. Chapter III-A consisting of Sections 18A, 18-AA, 18-B, 18-C, 18-D, 18-E and 18-F deal with "direct management or control of Industrial Undertakings by Central Government in certain cases". Sec. 18-A empowers the Central Government by notified order, to authorise any person or body of persons to take over the management of the whole or any part of an industrial undertaking or to exercise in respect of the whole, or any part of the undertaking such functions of control as may be specified in the order, if the Central Government is of opinion that: (a) an industrial undertaking to which directions have been issued in pursuance of section 16 has failed to comply with such directions, or (b) an industrial undertaking in respect of which an investigation has been made under section 15 is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest. Section 18AA(5) stipulates that the provisions of Sections 18-B to 18 E shall be applicable to the industrial undertaking in respect of which an order has been made under section 18-AA even as they apply to an industrial undertaking taken over under Section 18-A. Section 18-F empowers the Central Government to cancel the order made under section 18-A if it appears that the purpose of the order has been fulfilled or it is not necessary that the order should remain in force. The appellant M/s. Swadeshi Cotton Mills was taken over by the Government of India by a notification dated April 13, 1978 in exercise of the powers conferred on it under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 18AA of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 on the ground that the company had by creation of encumbrances on the assets of its industrial undertakings, brought about a situation which had affected and is likely to further affect the production of articles manufactured or produced by it and that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation. The Government authorised the National Textile Corporation Limited to take over the management, subject to the conditions that the authorised person shall comply with all the directions issued from time to time by the Central Government and that the authorised person shall hold office for a period of five years. The appellant Mills challenged the aforesaid order in a writ petition in the High Court. The case was heard by a Full Bench of five Judges to consider the question whether in construing section 18AA of the Industries Development and Regulation Act, 1951, compliance with the principle of audi alteram partem is to be implied and whether hearing is to be given to the parties who would be affected by the order to be passed prior to the passing of the order or whether hearing can be given after the order is passed and whether the order passed under the said Section is vitiated by not giving of such hearing and whether such vice can be cured. The Bench by a majority answered the three questions as follows:- (a) Section 18AA(1)(a)(b) excludes the giving of prior hearing to the party who would be affected by order thereunder. (b) Section 18-F expressly provides for a post- decisional hearing to the owner of the industrial undertaking, the management of which is taken over under section 18AA to have the order made under section 18AA cancelled on any relevant ground. (c) As the taking over of management under section 18A is not vitiated by the failure to grant prior hearing the question of any such vice being cured by a grant of a subsequent hearing does not arise. The minority, however, held that in compliance with the principles of natural justice, prior hearing to the owner of the undertaking was required to be given before the passing of an order under section 18AA, that the second question did not arise as the denial of a prior hearing would not cure the vice by the grant of subsequent hearing, but it would be open to the Court to moderate the relief in such a way that the order is kept alive to the extent necessary until the making of the fresh order to subserve public interest and to make appropriate directions. After the decision on the reference the case was reheard on merits by a Full Bench of three Judges and the writ petition was allowed in part. The challenge to the validity of the order being rejected but insofar as the impugned order seeking to take over the corporate entity of the company, the corporate entity of the subsidiary and its assets, the petition was allowed and the respondents, the Union of India and the authorised person were directed to release from its control and custody and/or deliver possession of any assets or property of the company which were not referable to the industrial undertakings. Appeals to this Court were filed on behalf of the Company as well as by the Union of India and the National Textile Corporation. Two propositions were propounded on behalf of the company that: (a) Whether it was necessary to observe the rules of natural justice before issuing a notified order under section 18AA(1)(a) and further whether section 18-F impliedly excludes rules of natural justice relating to prior hearing; and it was contended (1) the mere use of the word 'immediate' in sub-clause (a) of section 18AA does not show a legislative intent to exclude the application of audi alteram partem rule altogether. (2) The word 'immediate' in clause (a) has been used in contra distinction to 'investigate'. It only means that under section 18AA action can be taken without prior investigation under section 15. The use of the word 'immediate' in section 18AA(1)(a) only dispenses with investigation under section 15 and not with the principle of audi alteram partem altogether and this is indicated by the marginal note of section 18A and para 3 of the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Amendment Bill which inserted section 18AA in 1971. (3) The word 'immediate' occurs only in clause (a) and not in clause (b) of section 18AA(1). It would be odd if intention to exclude this principle of natural justice is spelt out in one clause of the sub-section when the other clause does not exclude it. (4) Section 18-F does not exclude a pre-decisional hearing. The so-called post-decisional hearing contemplated by section 18-F cannot be and is not intended to be a substitute for a pre-decisional hearing. (5) Section 18F incorporates only a facet, albeit qualified, of section 21 of the General Clauses Act. The language of the Section implicity prohibits an enquiry into circumstances that led to the passing of the order of take-over and under it the aggrieved person is not entitled to show that on merits the order was void ab initio. (6) 'Immediacy' does not exclude a duty to act fairly because even an emergent situation can co-exist with the canons of natural justice. The only effect of urgency on the application of the principle of fair hearing would be that the width, form and duration of the hearing would be tailored to the situation and reduced to the reasonable minimum so that it does not delay and defeat the purpose of the contemplated action. (7) Where the civil consequences of the administrative action are grave and its effect is highly prejudicial to the rights and interests of the person affected and there is nothing in the language and scheme of the statute which unequivocally excludes a fair pre-decisional hearing and the post-decisional hearing provided therein is not a real remedial hearing equitable to a full right of appeal the Court should be loath to infer a legislative intent to exclude even a minimal fair hearing at the pre-decisional stage merely on ground of urgency. (8) The Central Government appointed four Government Officials including one from the office of the Textile Commissioner to study the affairs of the Company and to make recommendation. This Official Group submitted its report on February 16, 1978. The evidence on the basis of which the impugned order was passed was not disclosed to the appellant company till May 1978, only after it had filed the writ petition in the High Court. If there was anything adverse to the appellants in the survey report there was time enough about six weeks between the submission of the Survey Report and the passing of the impugned order for giving a short, reasonable opportunity to the appellants to explain the adverse findings against them. If there was immediacy situational modifications could be made to meet the requirement of fairness, by reducing the period of notice; that even the manner and form of such notice could be simplified to eliminate delay, that telephonic notice or short opportunity for furnishing their explanation to the Company might have satisfied the requirements of natural justice. Such an opportunity of hearing could have been given after the passing of a conditional tentative order and before its enforcement under section 18AA. For the interregnum suitable interim action such as freezing the assets of the Company or restraining the Company from creating further encumbrances, could be taken under section 16. On behalf of the Union of India and the Authorised Officer it was contended that (1) the presumption in favour of audi alteram partem rule stands impliedly displaced by the language scheme, setting and the purpose of the provision in section 18AA. (2) Section 18AA on its plain terms deals with situations where immediate preventive action is required. The paramount concern is to avoid serious problems which may be caused by fall in production. The purpose of an order under section 18AA is not to condemn the owner but to protect the scheduled industry. The issue under section 18AA is not solely between the Government and the management of the industrial undertaking. The object of taking action under this Section is to protect other outside interests of the community at large and the workers. (3) The rule of natural justice to give a hearing has been incorporated in section 18-F which gives an opportunity of a post-decisional hearing to the owner of the undertaking who if he feels aggrieved can on his application be heard, to show that even the original order under section 18AA was passed on invalid grounds and should be cancelled or rescinded. (4) On a true construction of section 18AA read with section 18-F the requirements of natural justice and fair play can be read into the statute only insofar as conformance to such canons can reasonably and realistically be required of it by the provision for a remedial hearing at a subsequent stage. (5) Under section 18-F the Central Government exercises curial functions and that Section confers on the aggrieved owner a right to apply to the Government to cancel the order of take-over. This section casts an obligation on the Central Government to deal with and dispose of an application filed thereunder with reasonable expedition. Allowing the appeal by the Company,<br/>HELD: (Sarkaria & Desai, JJ. per Chinnappa Reddy, J. dissenting.) In the facts and circumstances of the instant case, there has been a noncompliance with the implied requirement of the audi alteram partem rule of natural justice at the pre-decisional stage. The impugned order could be struck down as invalid on that score alone. But in view of the commitment / concession that a hearing would be afforded to the Company, the case is remitted to the Central Government to give a full, fair and effective hearing. [587G-H, 588C] The phrase 'natural justice' is not capable of a static and precise definition. It cannot be imprisoned in the straight-jacket of a cast-iron formula. Rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. Hence not possible to make an exhaustive catalogue of such rules. Two fundamental maxims of natural justice have now become deeply and indelibly ingrained in the common consciousness of mankind as pre-eminently necessary to ensure that the law is applied impartially objectively and fairly. These twin principles are (i) audi alteram partem and (ii) nemo judex in re sua. Audi alteram partem is a highly effective rule devised by the Courts to ensure that a statutory authority arrives at a just decision and it is calculated to act as a healthy check on the abuse or misuse of power. Its reach should not be narrowed and its applicability circumscribed.[554C-G] The rules of natural justice can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. If a statutory provision either specifically or by inevitable implication excludes the application of the rules of natural justice then the Court cannot ignore the mandate of the Legislature. Whether or not the application of the principles of natural justice in a given case has been excluded in the exercise of statutory power depends upon the language and basic scheme of the provision conferring the power, the nature of the power the purpose for which it is conferred and the effect of that power. [556A-B] The maxim audi alteram partem has many facets. Two of them are (a) notice of the case to be met, and (b) opportunity to explain. The rule cannot be sacrificed at the altar of administrative convenience or celerity; for, convenience and justice are often not on speaking terms. Difficulties, however, arise when the statute conferring the power does not expressly exclude this rule but its exclusion is sought by implication due to the presence of certain factors such as urgency where the obligation to give notice and opportunity to be heard would obstruct the taking of prompt action of a preventive or remedial nature. Audi alteram partem rule may be disregarded in an emergent situation where immediate action brooks no delay to prevent some imminent danger or injury or hazard to paramount public interests. Section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure empowers the magistrates specified therein to make an exparte conditional order in emergent cases for removal of dangerous public nuisances. Action under section 17 Land Acquisition Act furnishes another such instance. Similarly action on grounds of public safety public health may justify disregard of the rule of prior hearing. [556C-H] Cases where owing to the compulsion of the fact situation or the necessity of taking speedy action no pre- decisional hearing is given but the action, is followed soon by a full post-decisional hearing to the person affected do not in reality constitute an exception to the audi alteram partem rule. To call such cases as exception is a misnomer because they do not exclude fair play in action but adapt it to the urgency of the situation by balancing the competing claims of hurry and hearing. [560H-561A] The general principle as distinguished from an absolute rule of uniform application seems to be that where a statute does not in terms exclude this rule of prior hearing but contemplates a post-decisional hearing amounting to a full review of the original order on merits then such a statute would be construed as excluding the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage. [561G] If the statute conferring the power is silent with regard to the giving of pre-decisional hearing to the person affected and the administrative decision taken by the authority involves civil consequences of a grave nature and no full review or appeal on merits against that decision is provided courts will be extremely reluctant to construe such a statute as excluding the duty of affording even a minimal hearing shorn of all its formal trappings and dilatory features at the pre-decisional stage, unless viewed pragmatically it would paralyse the administrative process or frustrate the need for utmost promptitude. [561H] 7(i). A comparison of the provisions of Section 18A(1)(b) and Section 18AA(1)(c), bring out two main points of distinction: First, action under Section 18A(1)(b) can be taken only after an investigation had been made under Section 15; while under Section 18AA(1)(a) or (b) action can be taken without such investigation. The language, scheme and setting of Section 18AA read in the light of the Objects and Reasons for enacting this provision make this position clear beyond doubt. Second, before taking action under Section 18A(1)(b), the Central Government has to form an opinion on the basis of the investigation conducted under section 15, in regard to the existence of the objective fact, namely: that the industrial undertaking is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest; while under section 18A(1)(a) the Government has to satisfy itself that the persons incharge of the undertaking have brought about a situation likely to cause fall in production, by committing any of the three kinds of acts specified in that provision. This shows that the preliminary objective fact attributable to the persons in charge of the management or affairs of the undertaking, on the basis of which action may be taken under section 18(A)(1)(b), is of far wider amplitude than the circumstance, the existence of which is a sine qua non for taking action under section 18AA(1). The phrase "highly detrimental to the scheduled industry or public interest" in section 18-A is capable of being construed to cover a large variety of acts or things which may be considered wrong with the manner of running the industry by the management. In contrast with it, action under section 18AA(1)(a) can be taken only if the Central Government is satisfied with regard to the existence of the twin conditions specifically mentioned therein, on the basis of evidence in its possession. [569D-H] An analysis of section 18AA(1)(a), indicates that as a necessary preliminary to the exercise of the power thereunder, the Central Government must be satisfied "from documentary or other evidence in its possession" in regard to the co-existence of two circumstances: (i) that the persons in charge of the industrial undertaking have by committing any of these acts, namely, reckless investments, or creation of incumbrances on the assets of industrial undertaking, or by diversion of funds, brought about a situation which is likely to affect the production of the article manufactured or produced in the industrial undertaking, and (ii) that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation.[570B-D] It cannot be laid down as a general proposition that whenever a statute confers a power on an administrative authority and makes the exercise of that power conditional on the formation of an opinion by that authority in regard to the existence of an immediacy, its opinion in regard to that preliminary fact is not open to judicial scrutiny at all. While it may be conceded that an element of subjectivity is always involved in the formation of such an opinion, the existence of the circumstances from which the inference constituting the opinion, as the sine qua non for action, are to be drawn, must be demonstrable, and the existence of such "circumstances", if questioned, must be proved at least prima facie. [571 E-G] From a plain reading of section 18AA, it is clear that it does not expressly in unmistakable and unequivocal terms exclude the application of the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage. [574B] In the instant case, so far as Kanpur Unit is concerned, it was lying closed for more than three months before the passing of the impugned order. There was no 'immediacy' in relation to that unit, which could absolve the Government from the obligation of complying fully with audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional or pre- takeover stage. [583A] Keshav Mills Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, [1973] 3 S.C.R. 22; Kamla Prasad Khetan v. Union of India,[1957] S.C.R. 1052; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 621; Sukhdev Singh & Ors. v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh, [1975] 3 S.C.R. 619; A. K. Kraipak v. Union of India, [1970] 1 S.C.R. 457; Ridge v. Baldwin, [1964] A.C. 40; 196; Heatley v. Tasmanian Racing & Gaming Commission, 14 Australian Law Reports 519; Nawabkhan Abbaskhan v. State of Gujarat, [1974] 3 S.C.R. 427; State of Orissa v. Dr. Bina Pani Dei, [1962] 2 S.C.R. 625; Ambalal M. Shah v. Hathi Singh Manufacturing Co. Ltd. [1962] 3 S.C.R. 171; and S. L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan & Ors., [1981] 1 S.C.R. 746, referred to. (Per Chinnappa Reddy, J. dissenting) The principles of natural justice are not attracted to the situations contemplated by section 18AA of Industries (Development and Regulation) Act. Natural justice like Ultra Vires and Public Policy is a branch of the public law and is a formidable weapon which can be wielded to secure justice to the citizen. While it may be used to protect certain fundamental liberties, civil and political rights, it may be used as indeed it is used more often than not, to protect vested interests and to obstruct the path of progressive change. The time has come to make an appropriate distinction between natural justice in its application to fundamental liberties, civil and political rights and natural justice in its application to vested interests. [590A-B] Our constitution as befits the Constitution of a Socialist Secular Democratic Republic, recognises the paramountcy of the public weal over the private interest. Natural justice, ultra vires, public policy, or any other rule of interpretation must, therefore, conform, grow and be tailored to serve the public interest and respond to the demands of an evolving society. [590C] The principles of natural justice have taken deep root in the judicial conscience of our people. They are now considered so fundamental as to be implicit in every decision making function, judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative. Where authority functions under a statute and the statute provides for the observance of the principles of natural justice in a particular manner, natural justice will have to be observed in that manner and in no other. Where the statute is silent about the observance of the principles of natural justice, such statutory silence is taken to imply compliance with the principles of natural justice. Where the conflict is between the public interest and the private interest the presumption must necessarily be weak and may, therefore, be readily displaced. The presumption is also weak, where what are involved are mere property rights. In cases of urgency, particularly where the public interest is involved, preemptive action may be a strategic necessity. Even in cases of preemptive action, if the statute so provides or if the Courts so deem fit in appropriate cases, a postponed hearing may be substituted for natural justice. [590A-C; 591F-G] 3(ii). Where natural justice is implied, the extent of the implication and the nature of the hearing must vary with the statute, the subject and the situation. [592B] The absence of the expression 'immediate action' in section 18AA(1)(b) does not make any difference. Section 18AA(1)(a) refers to a situation where immediate preventive action may avert a disaster, whereas section 18AA contemplates a situation where the disaster has occurred and action is necessary to restore normalcy. Restoration of production where production has stopped in a key industry or industrial undertaking is as important and urgent in the public interest as prevention of a situation where production may be affected. Immediate action is, therefore, as necessary in the situation contemplated by section 18AA(1)(b) as in the situation contemplated by section 18AA(1)(a). [596 F-G] The marginal note refers to the power to take over without investigation but there is no sufficient reason to suppose that the word immediate is used only to contra- distinguish it from the investigation contemplated by section 15 of the Act, though of course a consequence of immediate action under section 18AA may be to dispense with the enquiry under section 15. In fact, facts which come to light during the course of an investigation under section 15 may form the basis of action under section 18AA(1)(a). Where in the course of an investigation under section 15 it is discovered that the management have, by reckless investments or creation of encumbrances on the assets of the industrial undertaking or by diversion of funds brought about a situation which is likely to affect the production of the articles manufactured or produced in the industrial undertaking, if the Government is satisfied that immediate action is necessary to prevent such a situation, there is no reason why the Central Government may not straightaway take action under section 18AA(1)(a) without waiting for completion of investigation under section 15. [597A-B] Where there is a provision in the statute itself for revocation of the order by the very authority making the decision, it appears to be unnecessary to insist upon a pre- decisional observance of natural justice. [598A] The likelihood of production being jeopardized or the stoppage of production in a key industrial undertaking is a matter of grave concern affecting the public interest. Parliament has taken so serious a view of the matter that it has authorised the Central Government to take over the management of the industrial undertaking if immediate action may prevent jeopardy to production or restore production where it has already stopped. The necessity for immediate action by the Central Government contemplated by Parliament is definitely indicative of the exclusion of natural justice. It is not as if the owner of the industrial undertaking is left with no remedy. He may move the Central Government under section 18-F to cancel the order made under section 18AA. [598C-D] Neither section 18-F of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act nor section 21 of the General Clauses Act by itself excludes natural justice. The exclusion of natural justice where such exclusion is not express has to be implied by reference to the subject, the statute and the statutory situation. Where an express provision in the statute itself provides for a post decisional hearing the other provisions of the Statute will have to be read in the light of such provision and the provision for post- decisional hearing may then clinch the issue where pre- decisional natural justice appears to be excluded on the other terms of the statute. That a post-decisional hearing may also be had by the terms of section 21 of the General Clauses Act may not necessarily help in the interpretation of the provisions of the statute concerned. [599 A-C] Ridge v. Baldwin, 1964 A.C. p. 40; Annie G. Phillip v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 75 L.E.d. 1289; John H. Fahey v. Paul Mallonee, 91 L.E.d. 2030; Margarita Fuentes v. Robert L. Shevin, Attorney General of Florida, 32 L.E.d. 2d 556 and Lawrence Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 40 L.E.d. 2d 406, referred to. - Rama Rao, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh as well as the President of the Telugu Desam Party as well as respondent No. 3. The advertisements very shortly stated, refer to the auspicious gifts made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to the poor people on the eve of New Year and Sankranti. In the said advertisements, it is stated that the said Government which was formed by the Telugu Desam Party was giving to the poor people whose income was below Rs. and the said advertisements referred to a new scheme of selling sarees and dhoties at half prices to the poor people in the State of Andhra Pradesh having Green-cards. Moreover, the offer in the advertisements for the sale of dhoties and sarees at discount rates was in the nature of a benefit offered to poor persons in that State. When a Government announces the measures which are intended for the benefit of any of the classes for whose the Government can normally be expected to work like the poor or the economical backward classes, it is only in rare circumstances that such a promise can be said to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) even though such a promise might be made on the eve of elections. 8. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => '', 'counseldef' => '', 'court' => 'Supreme Court of India', 'court_type' => 'SC', 'decidedon' => '1989-09-29', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' K.N. Saikia,; M.H. Kania and; S. Ranganathan, JJ.', 'judgement' => '</p><p>Kania, J.</p><p>1. These two appeals arise out of the judgments in two Election Petitions in the Andhra Pradesh High Court questioning the election of respondent No. 1 as a Member of Parliament from Srikakulam No. Parliamentary Constituency in the 8th General Election to the House of the People. The points raised in these appeals are common and so are the relevant facts; and, hence, they are being disposed of by this common judgment. We propose to take note of only the few facts which are necessary for the appreciation of the controversy before us.</p><p>2. The polling date for the said election along with other parliamentary elections in the State of Andhra Pradesh was December 27, 1984 but in Srikakulam No. 1 Parliamentary Constituency the polling was countermanded and the date of polling was later fixed on January 28, 1985. In both the Election Petitions the election of respondent No. 1 was questioned mainly on the ground that Shri N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh as well as the President of the Telugu Desam Party as well as respondent No. 1 gave certain speeches and certain advertisements were got published by Shri N.T. Rama Rao through the Publicity Department of the Government of Andhra Pradesh in the newspapers containing certain statements which are alleged to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A) of the <a>Representation of the People Act, 1951</a> (hereinafter referred to as 'the said Act'). The main question canvassed before us is whether the statements contained in these aforesaid advertisements amount to a corrupt practice under Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act. Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act runs as follows :</p><p>123. Corrupt practices</p><p>The following shall be deemed to be corrupt practises for the purposes of this Act :</p><p>(1) 'Bribery', that is to say.</p><p>(A) any gift, offer or promise by a candidate or his agent or by any other person with the consent of a candidate or his election agent of any gratification, to any person whomsover, with the object, directly or indirectly of inducing.</p><p>(a) x x x</p><p>(b) an elector to vote or refrain from voting at an election, or as a reward to.</p><p>(i) a person for having so stood or not stood, or for having withdrawn or not having withdrawn his candidature; or</p><p>(ii) an elector for having voted or refrained from voting.</p><p>3. The advertisements very shortly stated, refer to the auspicious gifts made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to the poor people on the eve of New Year and Sankranti. In the said advertisements, it is stated that the said Government which was formed by the Telugu Desam Party was giving to the poor people whose income was below Rs. 6,000 per year, a kilo of rice at Rs. 2 per Kg. and the said advertisements referred to a new scheme of selling sarees and dhoties at half prices to the poor people in the State of Andhra Pradesh having Green-cards. Green-cards were directed to be issued to all the persons whose annual income was below Rs. 6,000. The supply of the rice at subsidised rates as aforesaid was also to be made to the Green-card holders only. The scheme to sell sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was to be operative from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985.</p><p>4. In considering the question whether the said advertisement and the said speeches amount to a corrupt practice, we are of the view that the provisions of Section 123 of the said Act which deal with corrupt practices have to be interpreted, keeping in mind that dictates of commonsense require that they never could have been intended to treat normal election promises made in election manifestoes or usual election speeches by members of various political parties aspiring to power and by different candidates aspiring to get elected to legislative bodies concerned as corrupt practices. We are of the view that these advertisements and speeches amount to nothing more than statements extolling the achievements of the Government of the State of Andhra Pradesh under the Telugu Desam Party headed by N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister, and contain normal election promises and these statements do not amount to corrupt practices falling within the scope of Sub-clause (b) of Clause (A) of Sub-section (1) of Section 123 of the said Act.</p><p>5. It was urged by Mr. Rao, learned Counsel for the appellants that in the impugned judgments, the High Court has incorrectly taken the view that in order to amount to bribery within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A), the transaction must amount to a bargain by the candidate with a view to get votes. It was pointed out by him that the said view has been taken in the impugned judgments, relying upon the decision of a Bench comprising to learned Judges of this Court in Ghasi Ram v. Dal Singh and Ors. :1983 SCR 102 . We have gone through to the relevant portion of that judgment (at page 109 and 110 of the said report). A careful perusal of the said judgment shows that what has been really held in that case is that if the promises given or made amount to a bargain entered into by a candidate for a vote or votes, that would amount to a corrupt practice; but it has not been held there that unless the act alleged amounts to such a bargain, it could not amount to a corrupt practice. In our view, that judgment does not lay down that in order to amount to a corrupt practice, the transaction must amount to a bargain for getting a vote. It was pointed out by Mr. Rao, however, that such a view seems to have been taken in two other decisions rendered by two Benches, each comprising two learned Judges of this Court in Bhanu Kumar Shastri v. Mohan Lal Sukhadia and Ors. : [1971]3SCR522 and Harjit Singh Mann v. S Umrao Singh and Ors. : [1980]2SCR501 . and these judgments need to be overruled. We do not propose to go into the correctness or otherwise of this view because, even on the footing that in order to amount to a corrupt practice under the aforesaid provision the alleged acts need not constitute a bargain, the the acts established in the present case, in our opinion, do not amount to a corrupt practice.</p><p>6. Our attention was drawn by Mr. Rao to the fact that in this case the said advertisements and the speeches had to be viewed in the context of the fact that the advertisements were issued and the speeches were made after respondent No. 1 filed his nomination papers on January 4, 1985, for the election and before the election was held in the aforesaid constituency. It was further pointed out that the offer made for the sale of sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was limited to the period from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985. It cannot be denied that these factors are relevant factOrs. We cannot, however, lose sight of the fact that this offer was made not only in this constituency but throughout the State where the elections to the House of the People were scheduled to be held, and were, in fact, held on December 27, 1984. It was only in case of this constituency that the election to be held on the scheduled date was countermanded and later held on January 28, 1985. We cannot lose sight of the fact that, as far as the said speeches and the said advertisements, which were issued by the Publicity Department of the State, are concerned, they deal in the main with the achievements of the Government of Andhra Pradesh which, of course, was being run by Ministers belonging to Telugu Desam Party to which respondent No. 1 also belonged. Moreover, the offer in the advertisements for the sale of dhoties and sarees at discount rates was in the nature of a benefit offered to poor persons in that State. When a Government announces the measures which are intended for the benefit of any of the classes for whose the Government can normally be expected to work like the poor or the economical backward classes, it is only in rare circumstances that such a promise can be said to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) even though such a promise might be made on the eve of elections. Keeping this in mind, in our opinion, although the offer to sell dhoties and sarees at discount rates was of a limited duration as aforestated, it cannot be regarded as a corrupt practice. Such an offer was bound to have financial repercussions and it is quite possible the duration of the offer was limited to enable the Government to study the financial repercussions rather than from any improper motive. We find support for this view from the decision of this Court in H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh : [1969]3SCR813 . In that case an Ordinance was passed by the Government of Madhya Pradesh as a result of which a large number of agriculturists, namely, those holdings of plots of land of less than 7.5 acres area or paying land revenue not exceeding Rs. 5/- were exempted from the payment of the land revenue. It was held that such a concession does not amount to a gift, offer or promise of any gratification within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) of the said Act nor does the announcement of the declaration made at a meeting shortly before the election or the issue of a pamphlet containing that declaration at that time carry the matter any further. It was held that neither Shri D.P. Misra who was the Chief Minister nor Shri S.K. Dixit who acted as his agent were guilty of any corrupt practice within the meaning of the aforesaid provision.</p><p>7. It was next contended by Mr. Rao, although very faintly, that the High Court was in error as it had not decided all other issues which were raised in the election petition. In this regard we cannot lose sight of the fact that the term of the present Lok Sabha is likely to be over within a few months and fresh elections are likely to be held and it would, therefore, be an exercise in futility to remand the matter to the High Court for deciding the remaining issues.</p><p>8. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.<p></p><p>', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'AIR1990SC1889; JT1989(4)SC186; 1989(2)SCALE891; 1989Supp(2)SCC504', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Appayya Dora Hanumanthu and ors.', 'sub' => 'Election', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ) $casename_url = 'b-rajagopala-rao-vs-appayya-hanumanthu' $args = array( (int) 0 => '640942', (int) 1 => 'b-rajagopala-rao-vs-appayya-hanumanthu' ) $url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/640942/b-rajagopala-rao-vs-appayya-hanumanthu' $ctype = '' $caseref = 'H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh<br>' $content = array( (int) 0 => '', (int) 1 => '<p>Kania, J.', (int) 2 => '<p>1. These two appeals arise out of the judgments in two Election Petitions in the Andhra Pradesh High Court questioning the election of respondent No. 1 as a Member of Parliament from Srikakulam No. Parliamentary Constituency in the 8th General Election to the House of the People. The points raised in these appeals are common and so are the relevant facts; and, hence, they are being disposed of by this common judgment. We propose to take note of only the few facts which are necessary for the appreciation of the controversy before us.', (int) 3 => '<p>2. The polling date for the said election along with other parliamentary elections in the State of Andhra Pradesh was December 27, 1984 but in Srikakulam No. 1 Parliamentary Constituency the polling was countermanded and the date of polling was later fixed on January 28, 1985. In both the Election Petitions the election of respondent No. 1 was questioned mainly on the ground that Shri N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh as well as the President of the Telugu Desam Party as well as respondent No. 1 gave certain speeches and certain advertisements were got published by Shri N.T. Rama Rao through the Publicity Department of the Government of Andhra Pradesh in the newspapers containing certain statements which are alleged to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A) of the <a>Representation of the People Act, 1951</a> (hereinafter referred to as 'the said Act'). The main question canvassed before us is whether the statements contained in these aforesaid advertisements amount to a corrupt practice under Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act. Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the said Act runs as follows :', (int) 4 => '<p>123. Corrupt practices', (int) 5 => '<p>The following shall be deemed to be corrupt practises for the purposes of this Act :', (int) 6 => '<p>(1) 'Bribery', that is to say.', (int) 7 => '<p>(A) any gift, offer or promise by a candidate or his agent or by any other person with the consent of a candidate or his election agent of any gratification, to any person whomsover, with the object, directly or indirectly of inducing.', (int) 8 => '<p>(a) x x x', (int) 9 => '<p>(b) an elector to vote or refrain from voting at an election, or as a reward to.', (int) 10 => '<p>(i) a person for having so stood or not stood, or for having withdrawn or not having withdrawn his candidature; or', (int) 11 => '<p>(ii) an elector for having voted or refrained from voting.', (int) 12 => '<p>3. The advertisements very shortly stated, refer to the auspicious gifts made by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to the poor people on the eve of New Year and Sankranti. In the said advertisements, it is stated that the said Government which was formed by the Telugu Desam Party was giving to the poor people whose income was below Rs. 6,000 per year, a kilo of rice at Rs. 2 per Kg. and the said advertisements referred to a new scheme of selling sarees and dhoties at half prices to the poor people in the State of Andhra Pradesh having Green-cards. Green-cards were directed to be issued to all the persons whose annual income was below Rs. 6,000. The supply of the rice at subsidised rates as aforesaid was also to be made to the Green-card holders only. The scheme to sell sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was to be operative from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985.', (int) 13 => '<p>4. In considering the question whether the said advertisement and the said speeches amount to a corrupt practice, we are of the view that the provisions of Section 123 of the said Act which deal with corrupt practices have to be interpreted, keeping in mind that dictates of commonsense require that they never could have been intended to treat normal election promises made in election manifestoes or usual election speeches by members of various political parties aspiring to power and by different candidates aspiring to get elected to legislative bodies concerned as corrupt practices. We are of the view that these advertisements and speeches amount to nothing more than statements extolling the achievements of the Government of the State of Andhra Pradesh under the Telugu Desam Party headed by N.T. Rama Rao, the Chief Minister, and contain normal election promises and these statements do not amount to corrupt practices falling within the scope of Sub-clause (b) of Clause (A) of Sub-section (1) of Section 123 of the said Act.', (int) 14 => '<p>5. It was urged by Mr. Rao, learned Counsel for the appellants that in the impugned judgments, the High Court has incorrectly taken the view that in order to amount to bribery within the meaning of the said term in Section 123(1)(A), the transaction must amount to a bargain by the candidate with a view to get votes. It was pointed out by him that the said view has been taken in the impugned judgments, relying upon the decision of a Bench comprising to learned Judges of this Court in Ghasi Ram v. Dal Singh and Ors. :1983 SCR 102 . We have gone through to the relevant portion of that judgment (at page 109 and 110 of the said report). A careful perusal of the said judgment shows that what has been really held in that case is that if the promises given or made amount to a bargain entered into by a candidate for a vote or votes, that would amount to a corrupt practice; but it has not been held there that unless the act alleged amounts to such a bargain, it could not amount to a corrupt practice. In our view, that judgment does not lay down that in order to amount to a corrupt practice, the transaction must amount to a bargain for getting a vote. It was pointed out by Mr. Rao, however, that such a view seems to have been taken in two other decisions rendered by two Benches, each comprising two learned Judges of this Court in Bhanu Kumar Shastri v. Mohan Lal Sukhadia and Ors. : [1971]3SCR522 and Harjit Singh Mann v. S Umrao Singh and Ors. : [1980]2SCR501 . and these judgments need to be overruled. We do not propose to go into the correctness or otherwise of this view because, even on the footing that in order to amount to a corrupt practice under the aforesaid provision the alleged acts need not constitute a bargain, the the acts established in the present case, in our opinion, do not amount to a corrupt practice.', (int) 15 => '<p>6. Our attention was drawn by Mr. Rao to the fact that in this case the said advertisements and the speeches had to be viewed in the context of the fact that the advertisements were issued and the speeches were made after respondent No. 1 filed his nomination papers on January 4, 1985, for the election and before the election was held in the aforesaid constituency. It was further pointed out that the offer made for the sale of sarees and dhoties at subsidised rates was limited to the period from January 26, 1985 to March 31, 1985. It cannot be denied that these factors are relevant factOrs. We cannot, however, lose sight of the fact that this offer was made not only in this constituency but throughout the State where the elections to the House of the People were scheduled to be held, and were, in fact, held on December 27, 1984. It was only in case of this constituency that the election to be held on the scheduled date was countermanded and later held on January 28, 1985. We cannot lose sight of the fact that, as far as the said speeches and the said advertisements, which were issued by the Publicity Department of the State, are concerned, they deal in the main with the achievements of the Government of Andhra Pradesh which, of course, was being run by Ministers belonging to Telugu Desam Party to which respondent No. 1 also belonged. Moreover, the offer in the advertisements for the sale of dhoties and sarees at discount rates was in the nature of a benefit offered to poor persons in that State. When a Government announces the measures which are intended for the benefit of any of the classes for whose the Government can normally be expected to work like the poor or the economical backward classes, it is only in rare circumstances that such a promise can be said to amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) even though such a promise might be made on the eve of elections. Keeping this in mind, in our opinion, although the offer to sell dhoties and sarees at discount rates was of a limited duration as aforestated, it cannot be regarded as a corrupt practice. Such an offer was bound to have financial repercussions and it is quite possible the duration of the offer was limited to enable the Government to study the financial repercussions rather than from any improper motive. We find support for this view from the decision of this Court in H.V. Kamath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh : [1969]3SCR813 . In that case an Ordinance was passed by the Government of Madhya Pradesh as a result of which a large number of agriculturists, namely, those holdings of plots of land of less than 7.5 acres area or paying land revenue not exceeding Rs. 5/- were exempted from the payment of the land revenue. It was held that such a concession does not amount to a gift, offer or promise of any gratification within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A) of the said Act nor does the announcement of the declaration made at a meeting shortly before the election or the issue of a pamphlet containing that declaration at that time carry the matter any further. It was held that neither Shri D.P. Misra who was the Chief Minister nor Shri S.K. Dixit who acted as his agent were guilty of any corrupt practice within the meaning of the aforesaid provision.', (int) 16 => '<p>7. It was next contended by Mr. Rao, although very faintly, that the High Court was in error as it had not decided all other issues which were raised in the election petition. In this regard we cannot lose sight of the fact that the term of the present Lok Sabha is likely to be over within a few months and fresh elections are likely to be held and it would, therefore, be an exercise in futility to remand the matter to the High Court for deciding the remaining issues.', (int) 17 => '<p>8. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.<p>', (int) 18 => '<p>' ) $paragraphAfter = (int) 1 $cnt = (int) 19 $i = (int) 18include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144 View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971 View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933 View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473 Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963 Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200 Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167 [main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109