Awadh Bihari and Other Vs. State of Bihar and Others - Court Judgment

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property - acquisition - sections 11, 11a and 17 of land acquisition act, 1894 - whether land acquisition proceedings lapsed on account of non making of award within prescribed period - appellants contended that entire land acquisition proceedings had lapsed as award required to be made within 2 years under section 11 were not complied with - proceedings initiated under section 17 (1) - section 17 (1) applicable in cases of urgency - under section 17 (1) government takes possession of land prior to making award and section 11a not applicable to acquisition under section 17 (1) - land acquisition proceedings did not lapse. - [ a.k. sarkar,; j.r. mudholkar,; k. subbarao,; n. rajgopala ayyangar and; raghubar dayal, jj.] under a. 413 of the calcutta municipal act, 1951, no person shall without a licence granted by the corporation of calcutta, keep open any cinema house for public amusement in calcutta. under s. 548(2), for every licence under the act, a fee may be charged at such rate as may from time to time be fixed by the corporation. in 1948, the appellant (corporation) fixed fees on the basis of annual valuation of the cinema house. the respondent, who was the owner and licensee of a cinema theatre, had been paying a licence fee of rs. 400 per year on that basis. in 1958, the appellant, by a resolution, changed the basis of assessment of the fee. under the new method the fee was to be assessed at rates prescribed per show according to the sanctioned seating capacity of the cinema house; and the respondent had to pay a fee of rs. 6,000 per year. the respondent, therefore moved the high court for the issue of a writ quashing the resolution and the application was allowed. in the appeal to the supreme court the appellant contended that (i) the levy was a tax and not a fee in return for services and (ii) s. 548(2) does not suffer from the vice of excessive delegation; while the respondent contended that (i) the levy was a fee in return for services to be rendered and not a tax, and as it was not commensurate with the costs incurred by the corporation in providing the services, the levy was invalid; (ii) if s. 548 authorised the levy of a tax, as distinct from a fee in return for service rendered, it was invalid, as it amounted to an illegal delegation of legislative functions to the appellant to fix the amount of a tax without any guidance for the purpose and (iii) the levy was invalid as violating art. 19(1) (f) and (g) of the constitute. held (per sarkar, raghubar dayal and mudholkar jj) : (i) the was not a fee but a tax. [490 f] the act does not intend to use the word "fee" as referring only to a levy in return for services, for, the levies authorised by some other sections of the act are really "taxes", though called "fees". besides, the words used are "fee for the licence" and these words do not necessarily mean a "fee in return for services" as is apparent from arts. 110(2) and 199(2) of the constitution, where both expressions are used indicating that they are not the same. [483 g-h] the word "fee" in s. 548 must be read as referring to a tax as any other reading would make the section invalid, and in interpreting a statute, it ought to be made valid if possible. [484 b-c] the decisions of this court establish that in order to make a levy a fee for services rendered, the levy must confer special benefit on the persons on whom it is imposed. the levy under s. 548 (2) is not a "fee in return for services" as the act does not provide for any services of a special kind being rendered, resulting in benefits to the person on whom it is imposed. s. 527(43) permits by laws to be framed for regulating the inspection, supervision and control, among others, of cinema houses; but it is not obligatory to make such by laws and therefore, there may be no services to render. even the by law made provides only for inspection, and the work of inspection done by the appellant was only to see that the terms of the licence were observed by the licensee. it was not a service to him, and so, no question arises of correlating the amount of levy to the costs of any service. the levy therefore is not a fee and must be tax. [485 b-c, f; 488 e; 490 e-f] the commissioner, hindu religious endowments, madras v. shri lakshmindra thirtha swamiar of sirur mutt, [1954] s.c.r. 1005, h. h. sudhindra thirtha swamiar v. commissioner for hindu religious and charitable endowments, [1963] supp. 2 s.c.r. 302 and the hingir rampur coal co. ltd. v. the state of orissa and ors. [1961] 2 s.c.r. 537, referred to. whether a particular levy is a fee or a tax has to be decided only by reference to the terms of the section. its position in the act cannot determine its nature ; an imposition which is by its terms a tax and not a fee, cannot become a fee by reason of its having been placed in a certain part of the statute. [489 b] it is not right to say that s. 443 does not impose any duty on the appellant and that therefore, the licence fee leviable under s. 548, should be fixed only with reference to rendering of services. the corporation has been set up only to perform municipal duties and its powers are for enabling it to perform those duties. but, since there is no provision for service being rendered, the levy cannot be a fee and would indisputably be a tax. [490 b, c, d] (ii) the fixing of the rate of a tax is not of the essence of legislative power and the fixing of rates may be left to a non legislative body. when it is so left to another body the legislature must provide guidance for such fixation. since there is sufficient guidance in the act as to how the rate of the levy under s. 548 is to be fixed, the section is valid. [492 d, f; 493 g-h; 497 b] the appellant is an autonomous body. it has to perform various statutory functions. it is given power to decide when and in what manner the functions are to be performed. for all this it needs money and its needs will vary from time to time with the prevailing exigencies. its power to collect tax is necessarily limited by the expenses required to discharge the functions. it has, therefore, where rates have not been specified in the statute, to fix such rates as may be necessary to meet its needs, and that would be sufficient guidance to make the exercise of its power to fix the rate, valid. [496 d-f] case law reviewed. (iii) the challenge to the levy on the ground that it amounts to expropriation is wholly unfounded. no doubt the increase in the rate of fee was large but considering the available seating capacity of the respondent, it cannot be said to be unreasonably high. [482 e-f] the contention of the appellant that even if no guidance for taxation has been prescribed the section would still be valid, because, the act may be said to have been passed under entry 5 of list ii of the seventh schedule to the constitution and that entry authorises the passing of a law concerning the powers of a municipal corporation and that such powers must necessarily include the power to levy a tax, was left open. [497 d-e, h] per subba rao and ayyangar, jj (dissenting) (i) if on a proper construction of the act one reached the conclusion that part iv of the act was not exhaustive of the range of levies permitted by the act, and the fees permitted to be levied by s. 548(2) were also taxes, there would be nothing in s. 127(3) or (4) to militate against that construction. but, an examination of the provisions of the act makes three matters abundantly clear; (a) that the act draws a sharp and clear distinction between taxes properly so called and fees; (b) that the division into parts and chapters is logical and clear cut and no matter which properly falls under a subject set out under a part or chanter heading, is dealt with in any other; and (c) that taxes, by whatever designation they might be called, are all comprehended and dealt with by part iv and by part iv alone, and that what is permitted to be imposed by s. 548(2) is only a fee as distinguished from a tax. as admittedly there is no correlation between the fee charged and the service rendered, the impugned levy was not authorised and the high court was right in granting relief to the respondent. [525 b-c; 526 d-g] to say that to enable a fee strictly so called to be levied, an immediate advantage measurable in terms of money should be conferred on the payer is to take too narrow a view of the concept of a fee. the word "services" in the context has to be understood in a wide sense, as including supervision and control over the activities for the excess of which the fee is charged. the judgements of this court in the shirur mutt case, [1954] s.c.r. 1005, and the cases following it, do not lay down that where an activity is regulated by licenses, the imposition of charges for the inspection, supervision and control of the activity to ensure compliance with the regulation is not a benefit conferred on the licensee, so as to render the amount charged for such a licence not a fee in the real sense, but a tax, whose constitutional validity could be sustained by reference to the taxation entries in lists i and ii. [508 a; 515 f-g; 517 h; 518 a] case law considered. also, art. 110(2) of the constitution far from supporting the appellant's contention, negatives it. if pure taxation measures, employing the machinery of licences and fees, would be money-bills, then the fees for licences which are outside the definition, would be those fees which are imposed to meet the cost of regulation and supervision of an activity which is controlled by the requirements of a licence and compliance with its terms. besides, if the levy of such licence fees on various activities which form the subject of legislative control or regulation under the various non-taxation entries in the lists were treated as tax, entries 96 and 66 in the respective lists would have to be read as taxation entries, because, such a levy is permitted only by those entries. this however would be con- trary to the entire scheme on which the several entries in the lists are made, namely, setting out the exclusive general legislative powers the enumeration of taxes which could be imposed and finally the power to, impose fees in respect of any of the matters in the list. [502 c; 519 b-c, e, g] (ii) viewed as a tax the delegation in s. 548(2) is unconstitutional, as essential legislative functions are parted with to the municipality, a subordinate law making body, and therefore the provision is unconstitutional. [546 b] essential legislative functions cannot be delegated but where the law lays down the principles and affords guidance to the subordinate lawmaking authority details may be left for being filled up by the executive or by other authorities vested with quasi-legislative power. the power to fix a rate of tax is an essential legislative function and therefore, unless the subordinate law-making authority is afforded guidance by the policies being formulated, principles enunciated and standards laid down, the legislation will suffer from the vice of excessive delegation and would be void as arbitrary and unconstitutional. the _provisions of the act do not afford any guidance to the municipal corporation to fix the rate of levy. no doubt, the municipal government of calcutta was vested in the corporation under s. 24 of the act, but the expression "government" does not gather within its fold all powers necessary for administration nor does it create an independent sovereign body entitled to legislate in any manner it likes for the purpose of carrying on civic government. the corporation is still a subordinate body which is the creation of the legislature and can only function within the framework of the powers conferred upon it by the act. no assistance is derived in this regard from the powers of supervision which the state government has over the municipal affairs under a. 42 and 47. if no standards have been laid down by the act for the corporation to afford it a guidance for the fixation of a rate, the fact that supervisory power is conferred upon the executive would not obviate that objection, for the government itself would have no guidance from the legislature as to the policy to be adopted in exercising the supervision. [541 e--g; 542 c-g; 545 a] it cannot be said that as a result of as. 115, 117 and 126 no taxes could be raised except such as were needed for the expenditure for which provision had been made in the budget and the rate of tax was, therefore, determined by the needs of the corporation. if the amount of money which a municipality needs for discharging its functions, affords any guidance, then the need of a state or the union ought to afford sufficient guidance to sustain the validity of any skeleton legislation. [545 a-c] the orissa ceramic industries ltd. v. executive officer, jharsuguda municipality a.l.r, 1963 orissa 171 disapproved. the quantum of power which a law could bestow upon an institution or body of its creation is determined, first, by the view of the legislature to what are necessary for achieving the purposes for which the institution or body is created and, secondly, by the overall limitations imposed by the constitution by the distribution of legislative power. nothing therefore turns on the use of the word "powers" in entry 5 of the list 11 which deals with the constitution and powers of municipal corporations for the purpose of local self-government. the state legislature cannot, therefore, authorise a municipal body which it creates, even though, it be for the purpose of local self-govemment, to exercise a power higher than what it itself possesses. any legislative practice prevailing before 1st april, 1937 when india was under a unitary form of government or prevailing before the constitution, does not serve as a guide for interpreting the legislative entries in the constitution and any such legislative practise cannot prevail over the limitations imposed by the distribution of legislative power in respect of post-constitution legislation. [527 f-g;530 d, g; 532 f-g ; 533 e-f; 534 c] the analogy of american decisions also cannot afford any guidance for the application of a different rule as to what constitutes excessive delegation in the case of legislation creating municipal bodies. the rule to limits of delegation by the legislatures constituted in india, by the consti- tution, has been the subject of elaborate consideration by this court and the decisions have not laid down that a different rule applies when the delegation of legislative power is in favour of a municipal corporation. [535 c-d, e] case law considered.   - (1) subject to the provisions of part vii of this act, when the appropriate government is satisfied, after considering the report, if any, made under section 5-a, sub-section (2), that any particular land is needed for a public purpose, or for a company, a declaration shall be made to that effect under the signature of a secretary to such government or of some officer duly authorized to certify its orders, and different declarations may be made from time to time in respect of different parcels of any land covered by the same notification under section 4, sub-section (1), irrespective of whether one report or different reports has or have been made (wherever required) under section 5-a, sub-section (2); provided that no declaration in respect of any particular land covered by a notification under section 4, sub-section (1): (1) published after the commencement of the land acquisition (amendment and validation) ordinance 1967 (1 of 1967), but before the commencement of the (2). notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), if at any stage of the proceedings, the collector is satisfied that all the persons interested in the land who appeared before him have agreed in writing on the matters to be included in the award of the collector in the form prescribed by rules made by the appropriate government he may, without making further enquiry, make an award according to the terms of such agreement. clearly, section 11-a can have no application to cases of acquisition under section 17, because the lands have already vested in the government and there is no provision in the said act by which land statutorily vested in the government can revert to the owner. jai singh's case is clearly distinguishable. 3241/82, which were not interfered with, by this court in special leave petition, by order dated 21 -3-1984, should be fully and effectively implemented. sanyal, senior counsel feebly raised the plea that the government authorities did not take possession of a small portion of the land, about 7 acres; possession was taken of the entire land and the plea that possession of a small portion of the land was not taken in against the record (see air1974sc1886 ). 12. all the contentions urged on behalf of the appellants fail.orderparipoornan, j.1. leave granted. 2. a batch of four writ petitions: cwjc no. 8426/88, cwjc no. 6373/88, cwjc no. 3720/90 and cwjc no. 9000/89, was heard and disposed of by the high court of patna by a common judgment dated 30-7-1993. the appellants who obtained leave in s. ii. p. (c) no. '20490 of 1993, are the petitioners in cwjc no. 84263. the main contesting respondents in the above appeals are-the state of bihar, the patna regional development authority, and the buddha griha nirman sahyog samiti ltd. cwjc no. 6373/88 was a writ petition filed by the buddha griha nirman sahyog samiti ltd., praying that appropriate directions may be given to the respondents therein (the state of bihar and its officials, patna municipal corporation, patna regional development author ity and the district land acquisition officer) to give effect to the directions given by the high court in cwjc no. 3241/82 in the judgment dated 23-5-84, and for other consequential and incidental reliefs, including directions to the respondents to remove the encroachments or unauthorised constructions from the vacant lands which formed the subject matter of the notification. the four writ petitions were disposed of by a common judgment dated 30-7-1993, by a division bench of the patna high court (s.b. sinha and d. sinha, jj). by the aforesaid judgment the learned judges directed the land acquisition officer to sign and complete the award in terms of the earlier order of the court dated 31-7-1984, in form 15 and to take further steps in terms of section 12 of the land acquisition act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the 'act'). cwjc no. 6373/88 was allowed to the above extent. in view of the above directions, the other writ petitions were dismissed. the learned judges also observed that the office will start preparing separate records relating to the contempt of court matters so as to pass necessary orders, and that the authorities before whom a suit and other encroachment proceedings relating to the land under acquisition were pending, shall expedite them. aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment, the petitioners in cwjc no. 8426/88, the respondents and intervenors in cwjc no. 6373/88 and the petitioners in cwjc no. 3720/90, after obtaining special leave have filed the aforesaid appeals. 4. we heard mr. raja ram agarwal and mr. s.b. sanyal, senior counsel who appeared on behalf of the appellants and mr. p.n. lekhi, senior counsel, mr. b. b. singh, advocate and mr. a. sharan, advocate, who appeared on behalf of the respon dents. the subject matter in the appeals relates to land acquisition proceedings, covering an extent of about 32.48 acres in the villages of rajapur no. 3 and dujra no. 4, perganna phulwari, thana phulwari, district patna, initiated under section 4(1) read with section 17(4) of the act as amended by bihar act no. 18 of 1964. 5. buddha griha nirman sahyog samiti ltd., a society registered under the societies registration act on 4-3-1958, (hereinafter called the 'society'), and its officials are the petitioners in cwjc no. 6373/88. the society requested the state government to acquire land for the purpose of providing it to doctors, lawyers, government servants and journalists for building purpose. an extent of 25.09 acres of land was acquired under the normal procedure and the acquisition was completed on 11-7-1962. possession of the land was taken and compensation was also paid. there is no controversy about this part of the acquisition. 6. the society wanted to acquire another block of 32.48 acres, the land adjacent to the aforesaid 25.09 acres. the entire controversy in this batch of appeals is regarding this acquisition, initiated under section 4 read with section 17(4) of the act ('emergency' acquisition). the notification relating thereto is dated 4-2-1959. the declaration under section 6 was made on 4-5-1969. a writ petition filed in the high court assailing the above proceedings was allowed with liberty to the authorities to initiate proceedings afresh on 2-4-1960. while so, the patna improvement trust (patna development authority), (hereinafter referred to as the 'authority'), requested the government to acquire 64.48 acres of land in dujra and rajapur villages for its boaring road development scheme, phase -1. the extent of 32.48 acres of land which the society wanted1 to acquire and for which proceedings were initiated (under section 4(1) read with section 17(4)) fell within the area, which the authority wanted the government to acquire. a fresh notification under section 4 read with section 17(4) of the act, proposing to acquire 64.48 acres of land was promulgated on 6-8-1961. there was an understanding that upon acquisition, out of the above land, 32.48 acres would be transferred to the society. a declaration under section 6 of the act dated 5-10-1961, appeared in the gazette on 7-10-1961. as stated, the possession of 25.08 acres acquired under the ordinary procedure was handed over to the society on 11-7-1962. it appears that possession of an area of 57.71 acres . covered by the later notification, was delivered to the authority on 6-8-1962. later, the authority handed over possession of 32.48 acres to the society. while so, in m. j. c. no. 65/62, the high court of patna stayed the land acquisition proceedings. the stay was in force from 23-1-1962 to 1-7-1964 and the m. j. c. was finally withdrawn. it appears that the society deposited with the authority a sum of rs. 1 million on 7-4-1965. by letter no. 254, dated 18-1-1972 the government directed the collector not to make the award till full payment of compensation was deposited by the authority. the acquisition was questioned in c. w. j. c. no. 812/67 in the high court of patna. the said petition was dismissed. the matter was taken in appeal to this court. the appeal was also dismissed. the decision of this court is reported in ajodhya bhagat v. state of bihar, : air 1974 sc1886 . the authority did not deposit the entire compensation amount despite reminders. while so, on 14-8-1981 the authority passed a resolution not to acquire the entire lands sought, except those portions which were required for construction of the road. it is stated that two awards were passed on 13-3-1982 for an extent of 4.47 acres and 3.32 acres only and the amount of compensation due thereunder were also paid. no award was passed in respect of the remaining lands. it is in these state of affairs, on 22-8-1982 the society filed the writ petition, c. w. j. c. no. 3241/82, and assailed the resolution of the authority dated 14-8-1981 and also prayed for a direction to the respondents therein to release the lands. the high court of patna by its judgment dated 23-5-1984, quashed the resolution of the authority dated 14-8-1981, and also directed the district collector to prepare the award. in the said judgment, it was noticed that the society was given possession of lands acquired under the normal procedure-25.08 acres, and also lands acquired under the emergent procedure-32.48 acres. the court further found that since possession of the land had been taken, the government cannot withdraw from the acquisition. the validity of acquisition was upheld by the high court which was affirmed by this court and it was observed that the acquisition cannot be nullified, for not passing an award. the court also noticed that there was unauthorised construction and encroachments, but since the land vested in the government and possession was taken over, no rights will accrue by such unauthorised construction and encroachments. it is seen that the special leave petition filed against the judgment of the high court in c. w. j. c. no. 3240/ 82. was dismissed by this court on 23-9-1984. pursuant to the aforesaid judgment an award dated 31-7-1984 was passed. the appellants contend that the proceeding dated 31-7-1984 is only a valuation statement and not an award. according to the respondents, the proceeding dated 31-7-1984 is in substance an award. the society filed an application before the collector under the bihar public encroachment land act, 1976 against 207 persons. the society also filed title suit no. 32/87 in the sub-court i, patna against 357 persons for restoration of possession by evicting the encroachers. 7. the above events led to the filing of c. w. j. c. no. 6373/88 by the society against the state of bihar, the authority and the land acquisition officer to give effect to the judgment rendered in c. w. j. c. no. 3241 /82 and for other reliefs and complete the acquisition proceedings. the appellants herein filed c. w. j. c. no. 8426/88 and 3720/90, in effect contending that the entire land acquisition proceedings had lapsed in view of section 11-a of the act. they are also intervenors in c. w. j. c. no. 6373/88. before us, as also before the high court, the objections of the appellants and intervenors against the land acquisition proceedings are three-fold: (i) the land acquisition proceedings have lapsed in view of section 11-a of the act.(ii) the proceedings dated 31-7-1984 is not an award since it is not in form 15 and is unsigned.(iii) the society is not entitled to any relief as prayed for in c. w. j. c. no. 6373/88, since it has initiated alternate proceedings by way of title suit and application under the bihar public land encroachment act, 1956. 8. the sheet-anchor of the appellant's plea is that the land acquisition proceedings have lapsed in view of section 11-a of the act. in order to understand the scope of the plea it will be useful to extract the relevant provisions of the act (section 6, section 11, section 11-a, section 17 and section 48(1)). 6. declaration that land is required for a public purpose: (1) subject to the provisions of part vii of this act, when the appropriate government is satisfied, after considering the report, if any, made under section 5-a, sub-section (2), that any particular land is needed for a public purpose, or for a company, a declaration shall be made to that effect under the signature of a secretary to such government or of some officer duly authorized to certify its orders, and different declarations may be made from time to time in respect of different parcels of any land covered by the same notification under section 4, sub-section (1), irrespective of whether one report or different reports has or have been made (wherever required) under section 5-a, sub-section (2); provided that no declaration in respect of any particular land covered by a notification under section 4, sub-section (1): (1) published after the commencement of the land acquisition (amendment and validation) ordinance 1967 (1 of 1967), but before the commencement of the land acquisition (amendment) act, 1.984, shall be made after the expiry of three years from the date of the publication of the notification; or(ii) published after the commencement of the land acquisition (amendment) act, 1984, shall be made after the expiry of one year from the date of the publication of the notification:provided further that no such declaration shall be made unless the compensation to be awarded for such property is to be paid by a company, or wholly or partly out of public revenues or some fund controlled or managed by a local authority. 11. enquiry and award by collector: (1) on the day so fixed, or on any other day to which the enquiry has been adjourned, the collector shall proceed to enquire into the objections (if any) which any person interested has stated pursuant to a notice given under section 9 to the measurements made under section 8, and into the value of the land at the date of the publication of the notifications under section 4, sub-section (l), and into the respective interests of the persons claiming the compensation and shall make an award under his hand of: (i) the true area of the land; (ii) the compensation which in his opinion should be allowed for the land; and(iii) the apportionment of the said compensation among all the persons known or believed to be interested in the land, of whom, or of whose claims, he had information, whether or not they have respectively appeared before him:provided that no award shall be made by the collector under this sub-section without the previous approval of the appropriate government or of such officer as the appropriate government may authorise in this behalf: (1). provided further that it shall be competent for the appropriate government to direct that the collector may make such award without such approval in such class of cases as the appropriate government may specify in this behalf. (2). notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), if at any stage of the proceedings, the collector is satisfied that all the persons interested in the land who appeared before him have agreed in writing on the matters to be included in the award of the collector in the form prescribed by rules made by the appropriate government he may, without making further enquiry, make an award according to the terms of such agreement. (3). the determination of compensation for any land under sub-section (2) shall not in any way affect the determination of compensation in respect of other lands in the same locality or elsewhere in accordance with the other provisions of this act. (4). notwithstanding anything contained in the registration act, 1908, (16 of 1908), no agreement made under sub-section (2) shall be liable to registration under that act.11-a. period within which an award shall be made :- the collector shall make an award under section 11 within a period of two years from the date of the publication of the declaration and if no award is made within that period, the entire proceedings for the acquisition of the land shall lapse. provided that in a case where the said declaration has been published before the commencement of the land acquisition (amendment) act, 1984, the award shall be made within a period of two years from such commencement. explanation : in computing the period of two, years referred to in this section, the period during which any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the said declaration is stayed by an order of a court shall be excluded. 17. special powers in cases of urgency : (1) in cases of urgency, whenever the appropriate government so directs, the collector, though no such award has been made, may, on the expiration of fifteen days from the publication of the notice mentioned in section 9, sub-section (1), take possession of any land needed for public purpose. such land shall thereupon vest absolutely in the government, free from all encumbrances. xxx xxx xxx xxx (4) in the case of any land to which, in the opinion of the appropriate government, the provisions of sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) are applicable, the appropriate government may direct that the provisions of section 5-a shall not apply and, if it does so direct, a declaration may be made under section 6 in respect of the land at any time:' after the date of the publication of the notification under section 4, sub-section (1). 48. completion of acquisition not compulsory, but compensation to be awarded when not completed: (1) except in the case provided for in section 36, the government shall be at liberty to withdraw from the acquisition of any land of which possession has not been taken. it was contended that in view of section 11-a of the act the entire land acquisition proceedings lapsed as no award under section 11 had been made within 2 years from the date of commencement of the land acquisition amendment act, 1984. we are of the view that the above plea has no force. in this case, the government had taken possession of the land in question under section 17(1) of the act. it is not open to the government to withdraw from the acquisition (section 48 of the act). in such a case, section 11-a of the act is not attracted and the acquisition proceedings would not lapse even if it is assumed that no award was made within the period prescribed by section 11-a of the act. delivering the judgment of a three member bench of this court, in stander prasad jain v. state of u. p. : air 1993 sc2517 , s.p. bharucha, j., at page 374, paragraph 15, (of scc) : at p. 3189 , para 14 of air, stated the law thus: ordinarily, the government can take possession of the land proposed to be acquired only after an award of compensation in respect thereof has been made under section 11. upon the taking of possession, the land vests in the government, that is to say, the owner of the land loses to the government the title to it. this is what section 16 states. the provisions of section 11-a are intended to benefit the landowner and ensure that the award is made within a period of two years from the dale of the section 6 declaration. in the ordinary case, therefore, when government fails to make an award within two years of the declaration under section 6, the land has still not vested in the government and its title remains with the owner, the acquisition proceedings are still pending, and by virtue of the provisions of section 11-a, lapse. when section 17(1) is applied by reason of urgency, government takes possession of the land prior to the making of the award under section 11 and thereupon the owner is divested of the title to the land which is vested in the government. section 17(1) states so in unmistakable terms. clearly, section 11-a can have no application to cases of acquisition under section 17, because the lands have already vested in the government and there is no provision in the said act by which land statutorily vested in the government can revert to the owner.we, therefore, hold that the land acquisition proceedings in the instant case did not lapse. 9. we are also of the view that the proceedings dated 31-7-1984 (appearing at pages 82 to 84 of paper book, vol. i, and at pages 203 to 206 of paper book, vol. ii), is in substance an award as contemplated by section 12 of the act. it is signed by the district land acquisition officer (collector) under the act, though the signature appears to be illegible. after perusing the aforesaid proceedings dated 31-7-1984, the high court observed that the state is bound by the directions given by the court earlier in c. w. j. c. no. 3142/82, that in the light of the aforesaid order of the high court, proceedings dated 31-7-1984 was passed, that all requisites of an award are mentioned in the said order, and since there is substantial compliance, it should be treated as an award. the high court was also of the view that even a defective award which has complied with the directions of the court and the provisions of law will not invite 'the wrath' of section 11-a of the act, we are in general agreement with the reasoning and conclusion of the high court in holding that the proceedings dated 31-7-1984, in the facts and circumstances of the case, is an award passed by the collector under the act, though not in form 15. it is only a matter of procedure which should be complied with. since the direction given by the high court in c. w. j. c. no. 3241/82 should be effectuated, the high court was justified in directing the authority concerned to sign and complete the award in terms of the earlier order dated 31-7-1984. the reasoning of the high court that it has power to issue such directions under article 215, in a case where otherwise the conduct of the persons called for punishment in contempt, appears to be justified. we hold that the proceedings dated 31-7-1984, is in substance, an award, though it is not in form 15. 10. mr. sanyal, senior counsel, very strongly contended that since the society filed an application before the collector under the bihar public land encroachment act, 1956, and also title suit no. 32/ 87, in the sub court, patna for removing the encroachments, the high court was in error in not dismissing the writ petition filed by the society. in other words, the plea was that since the society has availed of the alternate remedy, the writ petition should have been dismissed and the high court should not have exercised the discretionary jurisdiction under article 226 of the constitution of india. counsel pressed into service the decision of this court in jai singh v. union of india, : [1977]2scr137 , to substantiate the plea. we are of the view that. jai singh's case is clearly distinguishable. in that case, the appellant before this court prayed for quashing the demand made against him in respect of royalty. his case was that gypsum ore was less than the particular percentage of purity. whereas according to the revenue, it was not so established and the substance contained a higher percentage of purity. the plea of the appellant was not accepted by the statutory authorities. the writ petition filed by the appellant in the high court was dismissed on the ground that it involved determination of disputed questions of fact and the appellant had an alternate remedy. against the dismissal of the writ petition the appellant filed an appeal in this court on a certificate granted by the high court. he also filed a suit wherein the same question was agitated which was the subject matter of the writ petition. in these circumstances, this court held that the appellant, in the said case, cannot pursue two parallel remedies in respect of the same matter at the same time. we are also of the view that ordinarily the above rule should prevail. there may be extraordinary situations or circumstances, which may even warrant, a different approach, where the orders passed by the court are sought to be violated or thwarted with impunity. the court cannot be a silent spectator in such extraordinary situations. the position obtaining herein is rather a different and unusual one. the writ petition was, filed by the society (c. w. j. c. no. 6373/88), praying for a direction to the respondents to give effect to the directions contained in the earlier judgment of this court in c. w. j. c. no. 3241/82, dated 23-9-1984, and for other consequential or incidental reliefs. so, it cannot be said that in the instant case, the relief sought, was to remove the encroachments from the lands or to remove the unauthorised constructions, which are covered by the encroachment case or the title suit. they may be incidental or consequential to the main relief, in giving effect to, the earlier directions or orders of court. but such relief cannot be withheld or denied. in the judgment dated 23-9-1984, rendered in c.w. j. c. no. 3241/ 82, the court categorically held that non-passing of the award will not nullify the acquisition, the validity of the acquisition was upheld by the high court and the supreme court, and the encroachments or the unauthorised structures were put up by persons in the property at their own risk, and it was further observed that once possession of the land was taken by the government the fact that the owner of the land entered upon the land, will not obliterate the consequence of vesting, and allowed the writ petition filed by the society, and quashed the steps taken for derequisitioning of the land requested by the authority and issued a writ of mandamus directing the collector of patna to prepare the award as expeditiously as possible. the plea of the respondents that the project itself was rendered an impossibility on account of excessive encroachments or unauthorised constructions, was repelled, and relying upon the decision of this court in balwant narayan bhagde v. m. d. bhagwat, : air 1975 sc1767 , it was held that once possession of the land was taken by the government, even if the owner of the land entered upon the land and resumed possession of it the very next moment, such act does not have the effect of obliterating the consequences of vesting. in allowing the prayer of the society in c. w. j. c.no. 6373/855, by a common judgment dated 30-7i-1993, the high court was only implementing its earlier order and directions in c. w. j. c. no. 3241/82 which it was bound to do in the circumstances. we hold that the directions and orders contained in c. w. j. c. no. 3241/82, which were not interfered with, by this court in special leave petition, by order dated 21 -3-1984, should be fully and effectively implemented. we hold so. 11. mr. sanyal, senior counsel feebly raised the plea that the government authorities did not take possession of a small portion of the land, about 7 acres; and there is no award relating thereto, and the proceedings regarding that portion of the land 'had lapsed. this plea is without substance. in our view the proceedings dated 31-7-1984 is in substance an award passed in pursuance of the directions given by this court in c. w. j. c. no. 3421/82. the entire land, for which request for acquisition was made by the authority, was delivered over to the authority. possession was taken of the entire land and the plea that possession of a small portion of the land was not taken in against the record (see : air 1974 sc1886 ). 12. all the contentions urged on behalf of the appellants fail. the appeals are wholly without merit and we dismiss them with costs. it is distressing to note that the land acquisition proceeding which was initiated for a very laudable purpose, more than 37 years ago, is not yet complete. at one point of time it was brought to the notice of the court that even the files relating to the acquisition of land are not trace able. the high court was constrained to hold, on an earlier occasion, that non-traceability of the files must be attributed to deliberate destruction of the relevant files by the 'interested parties', and 'but for the intervention of influential persons', the govern ment would not have stayed the entire proceedings as it did on 3-5-1965. we are constrained to observe that the hands of the interested parties seem to be still active, and the intervention of such influential per sons has not disappeared : air 1974 sc1886 . a laudable and noble cause is delayed for more than 3 decades, under one pretext or the other. we ex press our anguish in the entire episode. we, therefore, direct the state of bihar, its officials, the authorities and other persons concerned who are seized of the subject matter of the instant land acquisition proceedings, to complete the proceedings in the quickest possible time. we further direct the appellants in these appeals to pay costs of rs. 10,000/- in each of these appeals, towards the advocate's fees for the society. 13. the appeals are dismissed with costs as aforesaid.

Judgment:
ORDER

Paripoornan, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. A batch of four Writ Petitions: CWJC No. 8426/88, CWJC No. 6373/88, CWJC No. 3720/90 and CWJC No. 9000/89, was heard and disposed of by the High Court of Patna by a common Judgment dated 30-7-1993. The appellants who obtained leave in S. II. P. (C) No. '20490 of 1993, are the petitioners in CWJC No. 8426

3. The main contesting respondents in the above appeals are-the State of Bihar, the Patna Regional Development Authority, and the Buddha Griha Nirman Sahyog Samiti Ltd. CWJC No. 6373/88 was a writ petition filed by the Buddha Griha Nirman Sahyog Samiti Ltd., praying that appropriate directions may be given to the respondents therein (the State of Bihar and its officials, Patna Municipal Corporation, Patna Regional Development Author ity and the District Land Acquisition Officer) to give effect to the directions given by the High Court in CWJC No. 3241/82 in the Judgment dated 23-5-84, and for other consequential and incidental reliefs, including directions to the respondents to remove the encroachments or unauthorised constructions from the vacant lands which formed the subject matter of the notification. The four writ petitions were disposed of by a common Judgment dated 30-7-1993, by a Division Bench of the Patna High Court (S.B. Sinha and D. Sinha, JJ). By the aforesaid Judgment the learned Judges directed the land acquisition officer to sign and complete the award in terms of the earlier order of the Court dated 31-7-1984, in Form 15 and to take further steps in terms of Section 12 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act'). CWJC No. 6373/88 was allowed to the above extent. In view of the above directions, the other writ petitions were dismissed. The learned Judges also observed that the office will start preparing separate records relating to the contempt of Court matters So as to pass necessary orders, and that the authorities before whom a suit and other encroachment proceedings relating to the land under acquisition were pending, shall expedite them. Aggrieved by the aforesaid Judgment, the petitioners in CWJC No. 8426/88, the respondents and intervenors in CWJC No. 6373/88 and the petitioners in CWJC No. 3720/90, after obtaining special leave have filed the aforesaid appeals.

4. We heard Mr. Raja Ram Agarwal and Mr. S.B. Sanyal, Senior counsel who appeared on behalf of the appellants and Mr. P.N. Lekhi, Senior counsel, Mr. B. B. Singh, Advocate and Mr. A. Sharan, Advocate, who appeared on behalf of the respon dents. The subject matter in the appeals relates to land acquisition proceedings, covering an extent of about 32.48 acres in the villages of Rajapur No. 3 and Dujra No. 4, Perganna Phulwari, Thana Phulwari, District Patna, initiated under Section 4(1) read with Section 17(4) of the Act as amended by Bihar Act No. 18 of 1964.

5. Buddha Griha Nirman Sahyog Samiti Ltd., a society registered under the Societies Registration Act on 4-3-1958, (hereinafter called the 'Society'), and its officials are the petitioners in CWJC No. 6373/88. The Society requested the State Government to acquire land for the purpose of providing it to doctors, lawyers, Government servants and journalists for building purpose. An extent of 25.09 acres of land was acquired under the normal procedure and the acquisition was completed on 11-7-1962. Possession of the land was taken and compensation was also paid. There is no controversy about this part of the acquisition.

6. The Society wanted to acquire another block of 32.48 acres, the land adjacent to the aforesaid 25.09 acres. The entire controversy in this batch of appeals is regarding this acquisition, initiated under Section 4 read with Section 17(4) of the Act ('emergency' acquisition). The Notification relating thereto is dated 4-2-1959. The declaration under Section 6 was made on 4-5-1969. A writ petition filed in the High Court assailing the above proceedings was allowed with liberty to the authorities to initiate proceedings afresh on 2-4-1960. While so, the Patna Improvement Trust (Patna Development Authority), (hereinafter referred to as the 'Authority'), requested the Government to acquire 64.48 acres of land in Dujra and Rajapur villages for its Boaring Road Development Scheme, Phase -1. The extent of 32.48 acres of land which the Society wanted1 to acquire and for which proceedings were initiated (under Section 4(1) read with Section 17(4)) fell within the area, which the Authority wanted the Government to acquire. A fresh Notification under Section 4 read with Section 17(4) of the Act, proposing to acquire 64.48 acres of land was promulgated on 6-8-1961. There was an understanding that upon acquisition, out of the above land, 32.48 acres would be transferred to the Society. A declaration under Section 6 of the Act dated 5-10-1961, appeared in the Gazette on 7-10-1961. As stated, the possession of 25.08 acres acquired under the ordinary procedure was handed over to the Society on 11-7-1962. It appears that possession of an area of 57.71 acres . covered by the later notification, was delivered to the Authority on 6-8-1962. Later, the Authority handed over possession of 32.48 acres to the Society. While so, in M. J. C. No. 65/62, the High Court of Patna stayed the land acquisition proceedings. The stay was in force from 23-1-1962 to 1-7-1964 and the M. J. C. was finally withdrawn. It appears that the Society deposited with the Authority a sum of Rs. 1 million on 7-4-1965. By letter No. 254, dated 18-1-1972 the Government directed the Collector not to make the award till full payment of compensation was deposited by the Authority. The acquisition was questioned in C. W. J. C. No. 812/67 in the High Court of Patna. The said petition was dismissed. The matter was taken in appeal to this Court. The appeal was also dismissed. The decision of this Court is reported in Ajodhya Bhagat v. State of Bihar, : AIR 1974 SC1886 . The Authority did not deposit the entire compensation amount despite reminders. While so, on 14-8-1981 the Authority passed a resolution not to acquire the entire lands sought, except those portions which were required for construction of the road. It is stated that two awards were passed on 13-3-1982 for an extent of 4.47 acres and 3.32 acres only and the amount of compensation due thereunder were also paid. No award was passed in respect of the remaining lands. It is in these state of affairs, on 22-8-1982 the Society filed the writ petition, C. W. J. C. No. 3241/82, and assailed the resolution of the Authority dated 14-8-1981 and also prayed for a direction to the respondents therein to release the lands. The High Court of Patna by its Judgment dated 23-5-1984, quashed the resolution of the Authority dated 14-8-1981, and also directed the District Collector to prepare the award. In the said Judgment, it was noticed that the Society was given possession of lands acquired under the normal procedure-25.08 acres, and also lands acquired under the emergent procedure-32.48 acres. The Court further found that since possession of the land had been taken, the Government cannot withdraw from the acquisition. The validity of acquisition was upheld by the High Court which was affirmed by this Court and it was observed that the acquisition cannot be nullified, for not passing an award. The Court also noticed that there was unauthorised construction and encroachments, but since the land vested in the Government and possession was taken over, no rights will accrue by such unauthorised construction and encroachments. It is seen that the special leave petition filed against the Judgment of the High Court in C. W. J. C. No. 3240/ 82. was dismissed by this Court on 23-9-1984. Pursuant to the aforesaid Judgment an award dated 31-7-1984 was passed. The appellants contend that the proceeding dated 31-7-1984 is only a valuation statement and not an award. According to the respondents, the proceeding dated 31-7-1984 is in substance an award. The Society filed an application before the Collector under the Bihar Public Encroachment Land Act, 1976 against 207 persons. The Society also filed Title Suit No. 32/87 in the Sub-Court I, Patna against 357 persons for restoration of possession by evicting the encroachers.

7. The above events led to the filing of C. W. J. C. No. 6373/88 by the Society against the State of Bihar, the Authority and the Land Acquisition Officer to give effect to the Judgment rendered in C. W. J. C. No. 3241 /82 and for other reliefs and complete the acquisition proceedings. The appellants herein filed C. W. J. C. No. 8426/88 and 3720/90, in effect contending that the entire land acquisition proceedings had lapsed in view of Section 11-A of the Act. They are also intervenors in C. W. J. C. No. 6373/88. Before us, as also before the High Court, the objections of the appellants and intervenors against the land acquisition proceedings are three-fold:

(i) The land acquisition proceedings have lapsed in view of Section 11-A of the Act.

(ii) The proceedings dated 31-7-1984 is not an award since it is not in Form 15 and is unsigned.

(iii) The Society is not entitled to any relief as prayed for in C. W. J. C. No. 6373/88, since it has initiated alternate proceedings by way of title suit and application under the Bihar Public Land Encroachment Act, 1956.

8. The sheet-anchor of the appellant's plea is that the land acquisition proceedings have lapsed in view of Section 11-A of the Act. In order to understand the scope of the plea it will be useful to extract the relevant provisions of the Act (Section 6, Section 11, Section 11-A, Section 17 and Section 48(1)).

6. Declaration that land is required for a public purpose:

(1) Subject to the provisions of Part VII of this Act, when the appropriate Government is satisfied, after considering the report, if any, made under Section 5-A, Sub-section (2), that any particular land is needed for a public purpose, or for a Company, a declaration shall be made to that effect under the signature of a Secretary to such Government or of some officer duly authorized to certify its orders, and different declarations may be made from time to time in respect of different parcels of any land covered by the same notification under Section 4, Sub-section (1), irrespective of whether one report or different reports has or have been made (wherever required) under Section 5-A, Sub-section (2);

Provided that no declaration in respect of any particular land covered by a notification under Section 4, Sub-section (1):

(1) published after the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Ordinance 1967 (1 of 1967), but before the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1.984, shall be made after the expiry of three years from the date of the publication of the notification; or

(ii) published after the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, shall be made after the expiry of one year from the date of the publication of the notification:

Provided further that no such declaration shall be made unless the compensation to be awarded for such property is to be paid by a Company, or wholly or partly out of public revenues or some fund controlled or managed by a local authority.

11. Enquiry and award by Collector: (1) On the day so fixed, or on any other day to which the enquiry has been adjourned, the Collector shall proceed to enquire into the objections (if any) which any person interested has stated pursuant to a notice given under Section 9 to the measurements made under Section 8, and into the value of the land at the date of the publication of the notifications under Section 4, Sub-section (l), and into the respective interests of the persons claiming the compensation and shall make an award under his hand of:

(i) the true area of the land;

(ii) the compensation which in his opinion should be allowed for the land; and

(iii) the apportionment of the said compensation among all the persons known or believed to be interested in the land, of whom, or of whose claims, he had information, whether or not they have respectively appeared before him:

Provided that no award shall be made by the Collector under this Sub-section without the previous approval of the appropriate Government or of such officer as the appropriate Government may authorise in this behalf:

(1). Provided further that it shall be competent for the appropriate Government to direct that the Collector may make such award without such approval in such class of cases as the appropriate Government may specify in this behalf.

(2). Notwithstanding anything contained in Sub-section (1), if at any stage of the proceedings, the Collector is satisfied that all the persons interested in the land who appeared before him have agreed in writing on the matters to be included in the award of the Collector in the form prescribed by rules made by the appropriate Government he may, without making further enquiry, make an award according to the terms of such agreement.

(3). The determination of compensation for any land under Sub-section (2) shall not in any way affect the determination of compensation in respect of other lands in the same locality or elsewhere in accordance with the other provisions of this Act.

(4). Notwithstanding anything contained in the Registration Act, 1908, (16 of 1908), no agreement made under Sub-section (2) shall be liable to registration under that Act.

11-A. Period within which an award shall be made :- The Collector shall make an award under Section 11 within a period of two years from the date of the publication of the declaration and if no award is made within that period, the entire proceedings for the acquisition of the land shall lapse.

Provided that in a case where the said declaration has been published before the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, the award shall be made within a period of two years from such commencement.

Explanation : In computing the period of two, years referred to in this section, the period during which any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the said declaration is stayed by an order of a Court shall be excluded.

17. Special powers in cases of urgency :

(1) In cases of urgency, whenever the appropriate Government so directs, the Collector, though no such award has been made, may, on the expiration of fifteen days from the publication of the notice mentioned in Section 9, Sub-section (1), take possession of any land needed for public purpose. Such land shall thereupon vest absolutely in the Government, free from all encumbrances.

XXX XXX XXX XXX (4) In the case of any land to which, in the opinion of the appropriate Government, the provisions of Sub-section (1) or Sub-section (2) are applicable, the appropriate Government may direct that the provisions of Section 5-A shall not apply and, if it does so direct, a declaration may be made under Section 6 in respect of the land at any time:' after the date of the publication of the notification under Section 4, Sub-section (1).

48. Completion of acquisition not compulsory, but compensation to be awarded when not completed:

(1) Except in the case provided for in Section 36, the Government shall be at liberty to withdraw from the acquisition of any land of which possession has not been taken.

It was contended that in view of Section 11-A of the Act the entire land acquisition proceedings lapsed as no award under Section 11 had been made within 2 years from the date of commencement of the Land Acquisition Amendment Act, 1984. We are of the view that the above plea has no force. In this case, the Government had taken possession of the land in question under Section 17(1) of the Act. It is not open to the Government to withdraw from the acquisition (Section 48 of the Act). In such a case, Section 11-A of the Act is not attracted and the acquisition proceedings would not lapse even if it is assumed that no award was made within the period prescribed by Section 11-A of the Act. Delivering the Judgment of a Three Member Bench of this Court, in Stander Prasad Jain v. State of U. P. : AIR 1993 SC2517 , S.P. Bharucha, J., at page 374, paragraph 15, (of SCC) : At P. 3189 , para 14 of AIR, stated the law thus:

Ordinarily, the Government can take possession of the land proposed to be acquired only after an award of compensation in respect thereof has been made under Section 11. Upon the taking of possession, the land vests in the Government, that is to say, the owner of the land loses to the Government the title to it. This is what Section 16 states. The provisions of Section 11-A are intended to benefit the landowner and ensure that the award is made within a period of two years from the dale of the Section 6 declaration. In the ordinary case, therefore, when Government fails to make an award within two years of the declaration under Section 6, the land has still not vested in the Government and its title remains with the owner, the acquisition proceedings are still pending, and by virtue of the provisions of Section 11-A, lapse. When Section 17(1) is applied by reason of urgency, Government takes possession of the land prior to the making of the award under Section 11 and thereupon the owner is divested of the title to the land which is vested in the Government. Section 17(1) states so in unmistakable terms. Clearly, Section 11-A can have no application to cases of acquisition under Section 17, because the lands have already vested in the Government and there is no provision in the said Act by which land statutorily vested in the Government can revert to the owner.

We, therefore, hold that the land acquisition proceedings in the instant case did not lapse.

9. We are also of the view that the proceedings dated 31-7-1984 (appearing at pages 82 to 84 of Paper Book, Vol. I, and at pages 203 to 206 of Paper Book, Vol. II), is in substance an award as contemplated by Section 12 of the Act. It is signed by the District Land Acquisition Officer (Collector) under the Act, though the signature appears to be illegible. After perusing the aforesaid proceedings dated 31-7-1984, the High Court observed that the State is bound by the directions given by the Court earlier in C. W. J. C. No. 3142/82, that in the light of the aforesaid order of the High Court, proceedings dated 31-7-1984 was passed, that all requisites of an award are mentioned in the said order, and since there is substantial compliance, it should be treated as an award. The High Court was also of the view that even a defective award which has complied with the directions of the Court and the provisions of law will not invite 'the Wrath' of Section 11-A of the Act, We are in general agreement with the reasoning and conclusion of the High Court in holding that the proceedings dated 31-7-1984, in the facts and circumstances of the case, is an award passed by the Collector under the Act, though not in Form 15. It is only a matter of procedure which should be complied with. Since the direction given by the High Court in C. W. J. C. No. 3241/82 should be effectuated, the High Court was justified in directing the authority concerned to sign and complete the award in terms of the earlier order dated 31-7-1984. The reasoning of the High Court that it has power to issue such directions under Article 215, in a case where otherwise the conduct of the persons called for punishment in contempt, appears to be justified. We hold that the proceedings dated 31-7-1984, is in substance, an award, though it is not in Form 15.

10. Mr. Sanyal, senior counsel, very strongly contended that since the Society filed an application before the Collector under the Bihar Public Land Encroachment Act, 1956, and also title Suit No. 32/ 87, in the Sub Court, Patna for removing the encroachments, the High Court was in error in not dismissing the writ petition filed by the Society. In other words, the plea was that since the Society has availed of the alternate remedy, the writ petition should have been dismissed and the High Court should not have exercised the discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Counsel pressed into service the decision of this Court in Jai Singh v. Union of India, : [1977]2SCR137 , to substantiate the plea. We are of the view that. Jai Singh's case is clearly distinguishable. In that case, the appellant before this Court prayed for quashing the demand made against him in respect of royalty. His case was that gypsum ore was less than the particular percentage of purity. Whereas according to the revenue, it was not so established and the substance contained a higher percentage of purity. The plea of the appellant was not accepted by the statutory authorities. The writ petition filed by the appellant in the High Court was dismissed on the ground that it involved determination of disputed questions of fact and the appellant had an alternate remedy. Against the dismissal of the writ petition the appellant filed an appeal in this Court on a certificate granted by the High Court. He also filed a suit wherein the same question was agitated which was the subject matter of the writ petition. In these circumstances, this Court held that the appellant, in the said case, cannot pursue two parallel remedies in respect of the same matter at the same time. We are also of the view that ordinarily the above rule should prevail. There may be extraordinary situations or circumstances, which may even warrant, a different approach, where the orders passed by the Court are sought to be violated or thwarted with impunity. The Court cannot be a silent spectator in such extraordinary situations. The position obtaining herein is rather a different and unusual one. The writ petition was, filed by the Society (C. W. J. C. No. 6373/88), praying for a direction to the respondents to give effect to the directions contained in the earlier Judgment of this Court in C. W. J. C. No. 3241/82, dated 23-9-1984, and for other consequential or incidental reliefs. So, it cannot be said that in the instant case, the relief sought, was to remove the encroachments from the lands or to remove the unauthorised constructions, which are covered by the encroachment case or the title suit. They may be incidental or consequential to the main relief, in giving effect to, the earlier directions or orders of Court. But such relief cannot be withheld or denied. In the Judgment dated 23-9-1984, rendered in C.W. J. C. No. 3241/ 82, the Court categorically held that non-passing of the award will not nullify the acquisition, the validity of the acquisition was upheld by the High Court and the Supreme Court, and the encroachments or the unauthorised structures were put up by persons in the property at their own risk, and it was further observed that once possession of the land was taken by the Government the fact that the owner of the land entered upon the land, will not Obliterate the consequence of vesting, and allowed the writ petition filed by the Society, and quashed the steps taken for derequisitioning of the land requested by the Authority and issued a writ of mandamus directing the Collector of Patna to prepare the award as expeditiously as possible. The plea of the respondents that the project itself was rendered an impossibility on account of excessive encroachments or unauthorised constructions, was repelled, and relying upon the decision of this Court in Balwant Narayan Bhagde v. M. D. Bhagwat, : AIR 1975 SC1767 , it was held that once possession of the land was taken by the Government, even if the owner of the land entered upon the land and resumed possession of it the very next moment, such act does not have the effect of obliterating the consequences of vesting. In allowing the prayer of the Society in C. W. J. C.No. 6373/855, by a common Judgment dated 30-7i-1993, the High Court was only implementing its earlier order and directions in C. W. J. C. No. 3241/82 which it was bound to do in the circumstances. We hold that the directions and orders contained in C. W. J. C. No. 3241/82, which were not interfered with, by this Court in special leave petition, by order dated 21 -3-1984, should be fully and effectively implemented. We hold so.

11. Mr. Sanyal, senior counsel feebly raised the plea that the Government authorities did not take possession of a small portion of the land, about 7 acres; and there is no award relating thereto, and the proceedings regarding that portion of the land 'had lapsed. This plea is without substance. In our view the proceedings dated 31-7-1984 is in substance an award passed in pursuance of the directions given by this Court in C. W. J. C. No. 3421/82. The entire land, for which request for acquisition was made by the Authority, was delivered over to the Authority. Possession was taken of the entire land and the plea that possession of a small portion of the land was not taken in against the record (See : AIR 1974 SC1886 ).

12. All the contentions urged on behalf of the appellants fail. The appeals are wholly without merit and we dismiss them with costs. It is distressing to note that the land acquisition proceeding which was initiated for a very laudable purpose, more than 37 years ago, is not yet complete. At one point of time it was brought to the notice of the Court that even the files relating to the acquisition of land are not trace able. The High Court was constrained to hold, on an earlier occasion, that non-traceability of the files must be attributed to deliberate destruction of the relevant files by the 'interested parties', and 'but for the intervention of influential persons', the Govern ment would not have stayed the entire proceedings as it did on 3-5-1965. We are constrained to observe that the hands of the interested parties seem to be still active, and the intervention of such influential per sons has not disappeared : AIR 1974 SC1886 . A laudable and noble cause is delayed for more than 3 decades, under one pretext or the other. We ex press our anguish in the entire episode. We, therefore, direct the State of Bihar, its officials, the authorities and other persons concerned who are seized of the subject matter of the instant land acquisition proceedings, to complete the proceedings in the quickest possible time. We further direct the appellants in these appeals to pay costs of Rs. 10,000/- in each of these appeals, towards the Advocate's fees for the Society.

13. The appeals are dismissed with costs as aforesaid.