Gram Panchayat Vs. Smt. Lokesh Devi and ors. - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
- swatanter kumar, j.1. the challenge in this revision petition is to the order passed by learned additional civil judge (senior division) mahendergarh, dated 14.11.1998.2. the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that once art order of injunction is issued by the court, it has no inherent jurisdiction to direct police help and the only remedy left with the party in whose favour injunction has been issued, is to invoke the provisions pf order 39 rule 2a of the code of civil procedure. in other words, existence of provisions of order 39 rule 2a ousts the inherent jurisdiction of court to pass the orders like the one impugned in this revision.3. it is a settled principle of law that in the administration of justice, civil courts, as a necessary corollary to its very existence, must be deemed to possess inherent powers and jurisdiction. this more so where the power is exercised by the court to achieve the ends of justice or to undo the wrongs during the pendency of proceedings before the court. the inherent powers also do not confer on the court any additional jurisdiction to amplify the powers specified in the code. these are the powers which are in addition to complementary powers expressly conferred upon the court under the provisions of the code. it is also an equally settled principle of the law that if express provisions are provided for directing a particular act in a particular manner, inherent powers cannot be used to frustrate such limitations of the court. the jurisdiction vested in the court under the provisions of section 151 of the code of civil procedure and a jurisdiction ex debito justitiae are certainly not ousted merely on the existence of another remedy (see a.i.r. 1997 s.c 1348, a.i.r. 1966 s.c. 1899, a.i.r. 1987 bombay 182, a.i.r, 1944 lahore 165 and 1946 punjab law reporter 111).4. in view of the above well enunciated principle of law governing the subject, reference to the facts would be necessary. plaintiff had filed a suit for injunction based on an earlier decree in relation to the same land and alongwith the suit an application under order 39 rule 1 & 2 of the code of civil procedure was also filed. the learned sub judge on 9.12.1994 passed an interim order granting injunction in favour of the plaintiff and defendants were restrained from dispossessing the plaintiff till the disposal of the suit. the order dated 9.12.1994 was assailed in appeal before the learned district judge, narnaul who dismissed the appeal vide order 17,5.1996. the order of the learned 1st appellate court was not assailed before the high court and the same has become final. as per the allegations made in the application, the applicant prayed for police help as the defendants were trying to forcibly dispossess the plaintiffs. having considered the matter at some length and relying upon the judgment of the high court in the case of sher singh v. jangir kaur and ors., 1990 p.l.j. 254, the learned trial court directed the sho concerned to provide necessary police help to the plaintiff for implementation of the order dated 9.12.1994. it is this order which has been assailed in this revision.5. it is true that provisions of order 39 rule 2a would come into play once an order of injunction is flouted by any person but that certainly do not divest the court of its inherent powers and inherent jurisdiction. the legislature while granting inherent powers to the civil courts under section 151 of the code, have without ambiguity worded the section in a very wide language. the pervasive intent behind the provisions cannot be restricted as it would amount to acting contrary to the legislative intent. it would be a total mis-construction of the code to say that a court in case where injunction order is passed in favour of the party, must wait till the time the order is flouted and then adopt the procedure provided under order 39 rule 2a upon an application of the party. in other words, the court must sit and watch violation of its orders first and take no recourse to its inherent powers to see that the orders passed are implemented in their true spirit and substance.6. the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is devoid of any merit for another reason. there is a clear and definite distinction between a punitive action resulting from breach of order of the court on one hand or enforcement of an order or protection available to a party under the order of the court on the other. in other words, the concept of punitive action cannot be termed as a panacea to the various problems and situations which are likely to arise before the civil courts during the course from the date of institution of the suit till its decision. the provisions of order 39 rule 2a, therefore, would riot have the effect of frustrating or controlling the jurisdiction vested in the court in exercise of inherent powers under section 151 of the code of civil procedure and would prevent the abuse of process of courts to meet the ends of justice. leaving parties to multifarious actions in the suit where interim orders are passed, cannot be treated as a solution to a threatened violation of the orders of the court, nor could that be the intent of the legislation. in this regard reference in detail to a judgment of the division bench of the calcutta high court in the case of 'sujit pal v. prabir kumar sain and ors., a.i.r. 1986 calcutta 220, would be appropriate, where a person had been dispossessed in violation of the interim injunction and the court had directed mandatory injunction status quo ante:'.... .... .... ....8. it may be that order 39 rule 2a is in the nature of an execution proceedings, but the question before us is whether the court has inherent power to grant a temporary mandatory injunction for the purpose of granting relief to a person who has been dispossessed despite an order of interim injunction... .... .... ....11. thus it is apparent from the said observation of the supreme court that no technically can prevent the court from doing justice in exercise of its inherent power. order 39 rule 2a lays down a punitive measure for the purpose of compelling a party to comply with the order of injunction. the process as contemplated by the said provision may or may not be ultimately effective but, in any event, the procedure laid down in order 39 rule 2a is incapable of granting an immediate relief to a party who has been forcibly dispossessed in violation of an order of injunction. we do not think that in such a case the court is powerless to grant relief to the aggrieved party in exercise of its inherent power... .... .... ....further, it has been observed that the object of such an order is to safeguard the rights of a party against a threatened invasion by the other party and that if in disobedience of the order of injunction such rights are invaded during the pendency of the suit relief can only be granted to the aggrieved party by invoking the inherent power of the court under section 151 of the civil p.c.'7. every person is under a legal duty and obligation to comply and/or ensure compliance of the orders of the court unless they are varied or altered. furthermore, no person can be permitted to take the law in his own hands and to flout the orders of the court. inherent powers must come to the rescue of the person who inspite of an order of injunction is being threatened forcible dispossession in violation of the said order. in the case of 'cotton corpn. of india ltd., v. united industrial bank ltd., and ors., a.i.r. 1983 sc 1272, the hon'ble apex court held that in appropriate cases which are not covered within the provisions of order 39, court can grant even temporary injunction in exercise of its inherent powers, of course, being fully conscious of the facts of the case. such grant of injunction does not violate the specific provision of section 41(b) of the specific relief act. the learned counsel for the petitioner to support his argument relied upon a.lr. 1918 allahabad 152, titled as 'gordhanlalji and ors. v. maksudan ballabh' and a full bench judgment of the delhi high court in the case of 'sarup singh v. daryodhan singh', a.i.r. 1972 delhi 142. both these cases have no application to the facts of the present case. they are the cases where the decrees were passed and the court observed that warrants of possession could not be issued in a situation where the suit was decreed for injunction and not for possession. thus, the bench observed that provisions of order 21 rule 35 which are specific in regard to execution of a decree for injunction could not take within its cover issuance of warrants of possession because no such relief was granted to the decree holder, by the court which passed decree.8. i am unable to see any error or jurisdiction in the impugned order though the same has been worded with a specific direction. infact, all that the order meant is that the sho concerned should ensure compliance of the orders of the court which has become final between the parties. the direction of the court is certainly to be understood in its correct perspective and surely does not mean posting of the police at the site in question. this apprehension is totally ill based and is of no consequence.9. thus, this revision is dismissed in limine and the sho shall ensure compliance of the order passed by the learned trial court dated 9.12.1994.10. petition dismissed in limine.