Laxman Sahu Vs. Industrial Tribunal-cum-labour Court and anr. - Court Judgment

SooperKanoon Citationsooperkanoon.com/632664
SubjectLabour and Industrial
CourtPunjab and Haryana High Court
Decided OnJul-28-2009
Judge K. Kannan, J.
Reported in(2009)156PLR304
AppellantLaxman Sahu
Respondentindustrial Tribunal-cum-labour Court and anr.
Cases ReferredGujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. v. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha
Excerpt:
- k. kannan, j.1. the award of the labour court terminating the services of a workman is challenged by him in the writ petition. the termination by the management resulted after an enquiry constituted for alleged misconduct and on the findings returned by the enquiry officer that the charges had been proved, the disciplinary authority accepted the findings and visited the workman with punishment of removal from service.2. on a reference to the labour court, when the workman assailed the decision of the management, the labour court examined the issue whether the enquiry had been fair and proper. the workman had complained that even the enquiry report had not been furnished to him and there was a very serious prejudice caused by the fact that his 12 years of unblemished service had not been taken note of. he had been given no opportunity to impress on the management that he could not have been justifiably terminated from service. the labour court agreed with the workman's contention that the fact that the enquiry report had not been furnished would have a significant bearing on the consideration regarding quantum of punishment. hence he permitted the parties to adduce evidence from the stage at which the report had not been furnished and the ramification that it might have had on the quantum of punishment.3. the charges were: (i) that the workman, who had posted in the ring section, did not do any work; (ii) that due to his nonworking, there was loss in production; (iii) that he instigated the workers to indulge in indiscipline. to each one of the charges, the workman had an answer. the findings regarding the charges themselves cannot be questioned but the explanation would be relevant at least to appreciate the gravity of the charge and whether the extreme punishment of removal from service would have been justified. as regards the first charge that the workman did not do any work in the ring section, the workman relied on the fact that wages had been paid during the relevant time and pay slips had been produced. according to him, it was possible for an employer to have denied him the wages if he had not worked, as a permissible deduction provided under the payment of wages act. the fact that wages had been paid ought to have meant that labour court simply rejected this explanation as not helping the claimant in question involved. as regards the second charge that due to his non-working, there was loss of production, the workman pointed out that during the relevant period when the loss of production was attributed, there had been a lockout and there was no production at all. if there was a loss of production it was attributable to the conduct of the management itself in locking out the factory and not rooting the cause to the workman's alleged non-working. this explanation by the workman was also rejected by the labour court that once the fact of the factory remained closed is an admitted fact, the loss was a necessary presumption. the observation of the labour court was really non-sequeter, for, if the factory had remained closed and even the loss was an admitted fact, what was required to be noted was whether the workman was responsible for such a loss. on the third charge that he instigated workers to indulge in indiscipline, the workman pointed that there had been no form of complaint against him at any point of time by resort to complaint by police or any other manner showing that he had incited other workers to indiscipline. the labour court dealt with that charge by stating that the court cannot sit as an appellate court over the subjective approach of the enquiry officer.4. the power to the labour court to examine whether the punishment of removal from service was justified or not that is provided under section 11-a of the industrial disputes act is at once a supreme power and an enabling provision to see that justice is done and an extreme penalty is not awarded for the only fact that the misconduct is proved. the nature of misconduct is invariably relevant to accord to the quantum of punishment. if the labour court has failed to exercise the power which the statute vests with it, it shall be definitely a duty on the court exercising jurisdiction under article 226 of constitution to intervene. the hon'ble supreme court in gujarat steel tubes ltd. v. gujarat steel tubes mazdoor sabha : 1980(1) l.l.j. 137 held, article 226, however restrictive in practice, is a power wide enough, in all conscience, to be a friend in need when the summons comes in a crisis from a victim of injustice; and more importantly, this extraordinary reserve power is unsheathed to grant final relief without necessary recourse to a remand. what the tribunal may, in its discretion do, the high court too can, under article 226, if facts compel it to do so. adversting to the scope of section 11-a of the industrial disputes act and how the ameliorative things in the said provision cannot be missed, the judgment further expatiates, 'a study of the lengthy award discloses no mention of section 11-a, and presumably, the authority was unmindful of that provision while rendering the verdict. in a limited sense, even prior to section 11-a, there was jurisdiction for a labour tribunal, including an arbitrator, to go into the punitive aspect of the management's order. this court has, in a catena of cases, held that a mala fide punishment is bad in law and when the punishment is grotesquely condign or perversely harsh or glaringly discriminatory, an easy inference of bad faith, unfair labour practice or victimisation arises. the wider power to examine or prescribe the correct punishment belongs to the tribunal/arbitrator even under section 11 if no enquiry (or a directive enquiry which is bad, and, therefore, can be equated with a 'no enquiry' situation, has been held by the management. for, then, there is no extent order of guilt or punishment and the tribunal determines it afresh. in such a virgin situation both culpability and qualification of punishment are within the jurisdiction of the tribunal/arbitrator. the present is such a case.'5. i am of the opinion that a case of removal from service for the charges attributed to the workman is too harsh. the interest of justice would be appropriately met if the workman, who was dismissed on 28.08.1993 and the award was passed on 02.04.1998, shall not be awarded any wages during the above period.6. the award of the labour court upholding the punishment if. set aside and the workman is directed to be reinstated with continuity of service and backwages except the period between the date of the order passed by the management to the date of the award. the writ petition is ordered as above. no costs.
Judgment:

K. Kannan, J.

1. The award of the Labour Court terminating the services of a workman is challenged by him in the writ petition. The termination by the management resulted after an enquiry constituted for alleged misconduct and on the findings returned by the Enquiry Officer that the charges had been proved, the Disciplinary Authority accepted the findings and visited the workman with punishment of removal from service.

2. On a reference to the Labour Court, when the workman assailed the decision of the management, the Labour Court examined the issue whether the enquiry had been fair and proper. The workman had complained that even the enquiry report had not been furnished to him and there was a very serious prejudice caused by the fact that his 12 years of unblemished service had not been taken note of. He had been given no opportunity to impress on the management that he could not have been justifiably terminated from service. The Labour Court agreed with the workman's contention that the fact that the enquiry report had not been furnished would have a significant bearing on the consideration regarding quantum of punishment. Hence he permitted the parties to adduce evidence from the stage at which the report had not been furnished and the ramification that it might have had on the quantum of punishment.

3. The charges were: (i) that the workman, who had posted in the Ring Section, did not do any work; (ii) that due to his nonworking, there was loss in production; (iii) that he instigated the workers to indulge in indiscipline. To each one of the charges, the workman had an answer. The findings regarding the charges themselves cannot be questioned but the explanation would be relevant at least to appreciate the gravity of the charge and whether the extreme punishment of removal from service would have been justified. As regards the first charge that the workman did not do any work in the Ring Section, the workman relied on the fact that wages had been paid during the relevant time and pay slips had been produced. According to him, it was possible for an employer to have denied him the wages if he had not worked, as a permissible deduction provided under the Payment of Wages Act. The fact that wages had been paid ought to have meant that Labour Court simply rejected this explanation as not helping the claimant in question involved. As regards the second charge that due to his non-working, there was loss of production, the workman pointed out that during the relevant period when the loss of production was attributed, there had been a lockout and there was no production at all. If there was a loss of production it was attributable to the conduct of the management itself in locking out the factory and not rooting the cause to the workman's alleged non-working. This explanation by the workman was also rejected by the Labour Court that once the fact of the factory remained closed is an admitted fact, the loss was a necessary presumption. The observation of the Labour Court was really non-sequeter, for, if the factory had remained closed and even the loss was an admitted fact, what was required to be noted was whether the workman was responsible for such a loss. On the third charge that he instigated workers to indulge in indiscipline, the workman pointed that there had been no form of complaint against him at any point of time by resort to complaint by police or any other manner showing that he had incited other workers to indiscipline. The Labour Court dealt with that charge by stating that the Court cannot sit as an Appellate Court over the subjective approach of the Enquiry Officer.

4. The power to the Labour Court to examine whether the punishment of removal from service was justified or not that is provided under Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act is at once a supreme power and an enabling provision to see that justice is done and an extreme penalty is not awarded for the only fact that the misconduct is proved. The nature of misconduct is invariably relevant to accord to the quantum of punishment. If the Labour Court has failed to exercise the power which the statute vests with it, it shall be definitely a duty on the Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of Constitution to intervene. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. v. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha : 1980(1) L.L.J. 137 held, Article 226, however restrictive in practice, is a power wide enough, in all conscience, to be a friend in need when the summons comes in a crisis from a victim of injustice; and more importantly, this extraordinary reserve power is unsheathed to grant final relief without necessary recourse to a remand. What the Tribunal may, in its discretion do, the High Court too can, under Article 226, if facts compel it to do so. Adversting to the scope of Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act and how the ameliorative things in the said provision cannot be missed, the judgment further expatiates, 'A study of the lengthy award discloses no mention of Section 11-A, and presumably, the authority was unmindful of that provision while rendering the verdict. In a limited sense, even prior to Section 11-A, there was jurisdiction for a Labour Tribunal, including an Arbitrator, to go into the punitive aspect of the Management's order. This Court has, in a catena of cases, held that a mala fide punishment is bad in law and when the punishment is grotesquely condign or perversely harsh or glaringly discriminatory, an easy inference of bad faith, unfair labour practice or victimisation arises. The wider power to examine or prescribe the correct punishment belongs to the Tribunal/Arbitrator even under Section 11 if no enquiry (or a directive enquiry which is bad, and, therefore, can be equated with a 'no enquiry' situation, has been held by the management. For, then, there is no extent order of guilt or punishment and the Tribunal determines it afresh. In such a virgin situation both culpability and qualification of punishment are within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal/Arbitrator. The present is such a case.'

5. I am of the opinion that a case of removal from service for the charges attributed to the workman is too harsh. The interest of justice would be appropriately met if the workman, who was dismissed on 28.08.1993 and the award was passed on 02.04.1998, shall not be awarded any wages during the above period.

6. The award of the Labour Court upholding the punishment if. set aside and the workman is directed to be reinstated with continuity of service and backwages except the period between the date of the order passed by the management to the date of the award. The writ petition is ordered as above. No costs.