Bhai Shamsher Singh (Died) and ors. Vs. Punjab State Through G.M. Punjab Roadways - Court Judgment

Harjit Singh Bedi, J.

1. The present Letters Patent Appeal is directed against the judgment of the learned Single Judge (reported in 1985 ACJ 360 (P&H;), whereby the appeals filed by the present appellants had been accepted. The facts of the case are given hereunder:

On 3rd December, 1974, an accident between a bus belonging to the respondent and an Ambassador car took place in which occupants of the car, Rajinder Singh, aged 27 years, his wife Ravinder Kaur, aged 20 years and their servant, Sukhdev Singh, were killed. The Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal held the accident to be a case of contributory negligence with the bus driver as also the car driver Rajinder Singh equally liable for it. After considering the evidence on record, the parents of Ranjinder Singh and Ravinder Kaur deceased were awarded a sum of Rs. 36,000/- and Rs. 4,000/- respectively whereas the brothers and sisters of Sukhdev Singh were awarded a sum of Rs. 6,750/- as compensation. Aggrieved by the award of the Tribunal, the First Appeal was filed which was allowed only to the limited extent with regard to the award of interest to the claimants but was dismissed in so far as the question of the quantum of compensation was concerned. Aggrieved by the order of the learned Single Judge, the present Letters Patent Appeal has been filed.

2. The first argument raised by Mr. R.S. Bindra, learned Counsel for the appellants, that the case was not one of contributory negligence and the accident had taken place exclusively due to the rash and negligent driving of the bus driver. He has also urged that the loss of the estate as determined and the multiplier utilised was very low and that the finding of the learned Single Judge that as the appellants had succeeded to 30 acres of land and also to 25 per cent share in the partnership concern, this was a factor to be considered in determining the quantum of compensation to them as beneficiaries and heirs of Rajinder Singh was erroneous in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Gobald Motor Service Ltd. v. R.M.K. Veluswami 1958-65 ACJ 179 (SC).

3. Mr. H.S. Riar, the learned Additional Advocate General, appearing on behalf of the respondent has, however, argued that the findings of fact recorded by the Tribunal, as also by the learned Single Judge with regard to the contributory negligence did not warrant interference. He has also stated that the quantum of compensation on the basis of the dependency was determined and the multiplier utilised was perfectly justified as the claimants were more than 50 years old at the time when the accident took place and that in any eventuality, the learned Single Judge was right in holding that as the appellant had succeeded to the property of the deceased Rajinder Singh which was fairly substantial, this factor too was to be taken into account for the purpose of determining the compensation to be awarded. For this proposition, he has referred to Jokhi Ram v. Naresh Kanta 1978 ACJ 80 (P&H) Lachman Singh v. Gurmit Kaur 1979 ACJ 170 (P&H) and Bhagat Singh Sohan Singh v. Om Sharma 1983 ACJ 203 (P&H;).

4. After hearing the learned Counsel for the parties, we find that the finding of fact with regard to the contributory negligence of both the drivers does not warrant any interference. We have ourselves perused the evidence and seen the photographs of the accident, which clearly indicate that it was a head-on collision in the middle of the road with neither the bus nor the car giving way to each other. We are also impressed with argument of the learned Counsel for the respondent that as the appellant had succeeded to the estate of the deceased, Rajinder Singh, this factor too was to be taken into account while determining the compensation that was to be awarded. In Lachman Singh's case, 1979 ACJ 170 (P&H;), the Full Bench considered the matter and held that in determining the compensation to be given to a claimant, various factors had to be taken into account including the pecuniary benefits which might accrue to the dependants on account of the death of the persons concerned. In Bhagat Singh Sohan Singh's Case, 1983 ACJ 203 (P&H;), it was observed thus:

Again one must recall the well-known principle of the assessment of damages generally and equally for the dependants of the victim of an automobile accident. The heart of the matter herein is to evenly balance, as if in a golden scale, the financial loss to the dependants on one side and financial gain or benefit directly arising from the death of the victim on the other. However, the somewhat ticklish question is as to what are the financial gains arising on account of the death which alone can be put in the balance. In this balancing operation the Court has to be on its guard that on one hand the dependants should not be put to any financial loss whatsoever and on the other that the death of the victim and the resultant grant of damages should not serve as a windfall to them. This was so observed by the Full Bench in Lachman Singh's case, 1979 ACJ 170 (P&H;). Particularly, in India where as yet the family bonds are strong the death of the bread-winner is a catastrophe which is both irreparable and irremediable. It is true that solatium is alien to the concept of compensation and perhaps one of the reasons therefor is that damages in this field would be wholly speculative in nature. However, can it on the other extreme be possibly said that the exclusion of the financial benefits, like insurance, provident fund, family pension or gratuity for computing compensation would amount to a windfall for the dependants. I do not think so. As has been shown earlier these financial benefits are in essence the deferred earning of the victim of the accident or the result of his savings, his thrift or foresight. The dependants, even otherwise, would have had the benefit of these sums in due course. To take these away from the rightful claimants and to enure them only for the benefit of the tortfeasor is something which rightly shocks the judicial conscience. I would, therefore, hold that in the light of the true principles underlying the grant of just compensation, benefits like provident fund, family pension or gratuity cannot go in mitigation of damages payable by the tortfeasor and are, therefore, not deductible.

5. It will thus be seen that gains such as insurance policies, family pension, provident fund and gratuity are not to be taken into account while computing the compensation, but other benefits that enure to the estate cannot be excluded. The finding of the learned Single Judge that as the appellants has succeeded to the property of the deceased Rajinder Singh, this factor was to be taken into account cannot be said to be erroneous. The judgment in Gobald Motor Service Ltd. v. R.M.K. Veluswami 1958-65 ACJ 179 (SC) cited by the appellants' Counsel, as a matter of fact, supports the case of the respondent.

6. We also affirm the finding of the Courts below that the loss to appellant No. 1 was Rs. 300/- per month, but in our view the multiplier of 10 which has been utilised was wholly insufficient. It is the conceded case of the parties that appellant No. 1 died in the year 1992 whereas appellant No. 2 had died way back in 1982. We are, therefore, of the opinion that multiplier in the present case should be 18. The compensation is accordingly enhanced on that score and is accordingly increased to Rs. 64,800/- which is rounded off to Rs. 65,000/- along with interest that flows from this increase.

7. We have also considered the arguments of Mr Bindra, learned Counsel for the appellants, that the compensation of Rs. 4,000/- with respect to the death of Ravinder Kaur was positively low. It has come in evidence that families of both the deceased were very prosperous and forward looking and as such the award of compensation of Rs. 4,000/-with respect to the death of a young girl of 20 years is exceedingly low. We accordingly enhance the compensation on this account to Rs. 20,000/-. The appellants will also be entitled to interest on the enhanced amount.

8. The present appeal is, therefore, allowed in the terms mentioned above. There will, however, be no order as to costs.