Harpreet Kaur Vs. Rajwant Singh - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
- hindu law -- custom: [vijender jain, c.j., m.m. kumar, jasbir singh, rajive bhalla & rajesh bindal, jj] alienation of ancestral property - punjab and haryana - held, in respect of state of punjab by virtue of punjab amendment act, 1973 there is a complete bar to contest any alienation of ancestral or non-ancestral immovable property or appointment of an heir to such property on ground that such alienation or appointment was contrary to custom. in punjab the property in hands of a successor has to be treated as coparcenary property and its alienation has to be governed by hindu law except to the extent it is regulated by sections 6 and 30 of the hindu succession act. in haryana, property in hands of successor has to be treated as coparcenary property as well as ancestral property. parties can fall back upon hindu law in case they fail to establish that rule of decision is custom. therefore, in haryana both under hindu law and the customary law, the alienation would be open to challenge. custom was given precedent over uncodified hindu law presumably for reason that custom has been consistently replacing the hindu law. however, it was soon realized that ancestral immovable property, which ordinarily held to be inalienable amongst jats of punjab by virtue of custom except for necessity, no limitation was placed on degrees of collateral, eligible to contest such alienation. it was, therefore, felt necessary to engraft certain restriction on degrees of collateral, eligible to contest an alienation, which under the custom itself was not limited. accordingly, the punjab custom (power to contest) act, 1920 (act no.2 of 1920) was enacted. the hindu succession act was extended to the state of punjab. act 2 of punjab act defined expression alienation to include any testamentary disposition of property and appointment of an heir was to include any adoption made or purporting to be made according to custom. a further provision was made by section 3 that hindu succession act was to apply only in respect of alienation of immovable property or appointment of heirs made by persons who in regard to such alienation or appointment were governed by custom. whereas section 4 declared that hindu succession act was not to affect any right to contest any alienation or appointment of an heir made before the date on which the succession act was to come into force. in other words, act, no.2 of 1920 was not to affect alienation or appointments of heir made before date on which it came into force. it also preserved the rights of any alienation or appointment of an heir made by a family. after section 7 was inserted in act of 1920 by the punjab amendment act of 1973 right of contest being contrary to custom had been totally effaced and taken away. therefore, no person has any right to contest any alienation of immovable property whether ancestral or non-ancestral on ground of being contrary to custom after january 23, 1973. in haryana, the situation as enunciated by act no.2 of 1920 continued to prevail in respect of alienation because no reforms parallel to punjab as brought by amendment act of 1973, had been enacted although right to pre-emption has been substantially abolished in haryana also. no steps even have been taken in that regard. therefore, situation in haryana have to be regarded as it existed under act no. 2 of 1920. hindu succession act,1956[c.a.no.30/1956] -- sections 6 & 30: [vijender jain, c.j., m.m.kumar, jasbir singh, rajive bhalla & rajesh bindal, jj] alienation of coparcenary property - law laid down by full bench in joginder singh kundha singh v kehar singh dasaundha singh [air 1965 punjab 407] and pritam singh v assistant controller of estate duty, patiala [1976 punj lr 342] -whether there is any conflict? - held, the basic controversy in the full bench decision of joginder singhs case was regarding constitutional validity of section 14 of hindu succession act and as to whether it infringes article 14 of constitution. it was held that the estate held by male and limitation on his power of alienation were in no way removed and the reversioners were not debarred from challenging such alienations. the full bench held that section 14 of hindu succession act postulates that estate held by a hindu female before enforcement of succession act either by inheritance or otherwise, was enlarged and on date of enforcement of succession act, she became a full owner. likewise, if she has inherited any estate after the commencement of the act, she was to be regarded as absolute owner rather than a limited owner. consequently, the limitations on power of alienation automatically vanished. this was the necessary result of the provisions made in section 14 of the act. the full bench further held that in respect of male proprietors, no corresponding provision was made either enlarging their estate in ancestral property or enlarging their power of alienation over property inherited by them. however, it noticed section 30 and observed that it only deals with power of his share in coparcenary property by will, which prior to enforcement of the act, he had no right to do. the only provision made in respect of male proprietor regarding alienation of property was his power of alienation by will. in so far as persons governed by custom are concerned, they continued to be governed by the restriction on the power of alienation of a male holder as existed before enforcement of the act. likewise, other restriction on alienation other than disposal by will also continued. the full bench, thus, recognized the superior right of hindu females by virtue of section 14 and upheld the provision as intra vires. the argument that reversioners have ceased to exist after enactment of provisions of section 14 of succession act, was rejected as there was no provision pointed out to that effect. the proposition laid down by the full bench in pritam singhs case was that the hindu succession act has not abolished joint hindu family with respect to rights of those who were members of mitakshara coparcenary, except in the manner and to the extent mentioned in sections 6 and 30 of the act, this statement should also imply, though it does not say so expressly, the succession act to this extent does not affect the rights of the members governed by dayabhaga coparcenary. the full bench in pritam singh;s case expressly noticed the judgment of earlier full bench in joginder singhs case but construed the same as irrelevant by observing that it dealt with the power of alienation of a person governed by customary law and constitutional validity of section 14 of hindu succession act. thus there is no real conflict between the two full bench judgments. both the full bench judgments have been delivered on the assumption that joginder singhs case dealt with question of alienation whereas pritam singhs case had decided the question concerning succession. even on fact in joginder singhs case the issue was validity of alienation by consent decree by a father to his two sons, which was challenged by third son, whereas in pritam singhs case the question of nature of property in hands of sons on death of their father had arisen for purposes of assessment of estate duty. in pritam singhs case the property in the hands of the sons was held to be coparcenary property and only 1/3rd of property belonging to deceased father was considered eligible for estate duty. therefore, there was no question of alienation in pritam singhs case. - it is stated that when her husband has to appear at amritsar in connection with the aforesaid case under sections 406/498a of the indian penal code, he can very well appear in this case at amritsar also if this case is transferred to amritsar. further, she is poor, unable to meet the expense of travelling to ambala from amritsar. he has opposed this prayer urging that she can leave her child at amritsar with her parents and can very well attend the courts at ambala. he can very well attend this case at amritsar if this case is transfered to amritsar. she is directed to appear before the learned district judge, amritsar on 1.3.2001. learned additional district judge, ambala will send the file complete in all respects to the court of learned district judge, amritsar well before the date fixed.m.l. singhal, j.1. through this cm, smt. harpreet kaur has prayed for the transfer of case titled 'rajwant singh (husband) v. harpreet kaur (wife)' under section 13 of the hindu marriage act pending in the court of additional district judge, ambala, to any court of competent jurisdiction at amritsar. it is stated that she was married to the respondent on 23.11.1997. unfortunately their marriage ran into rough weather. she was turned out of the matrimonial home in july, 1998, when she was in advanced stage of pregnancy. on 16.4.1999, she filed a complaint under sections 406/498a of the indian penal code in which her husband and her in-laws were summoned by the chief judicial magistrate, amritsar vide order dated 20.7.2000. it is stated that as a counter-blast, her husband filed this petition under section 13 of the hindu marriage act for divorce at ambala in which she has been summoned. it is difficult for her to travel to ambala with her child aged one year and nine months. child cannot be left at amritsar because of his tender age. it is stated that when her husband has to appear at amritsar in connection with the aforesaid case under sections 406/498a of the indian penal code, he can very well appear in this case at amritsar also if this case is transferred to amritsar. it is stated that her father is dealing in general merchandise articles on small scale and is aged about 65 years. he is unable to accompany her to ambala. further, she is poor, unable to meet the expense of travelling to ambala from amritsar. 2. respondent has put in reply. he has opposed this prayer urging that she can leave her child at amritsar with her parents and can very well attend the courts at ambala. if she is unable to look after the child, he is ready to keep the child with him. if she goes to amritsar, physical harm can be caused to him by her and members of her family. 3. i have heard the learned counsel for the parties. 4. respondent-husband is attending the complaint case at amritsar. he can very well attend this case at amritsar if this case is transfered to amritsar. there is a distance of about 300 kilometres between ambala and amritsar. she is a lady. it will be inconvenient for her to travel from amritsar to ambala to attend the hearings of this case. there may be inconvenience to the respondent-husband also if he has to travel to amritsar for attending the hearings of this case on his travel to amritsar but the court has to weigh their comparative convenience. 5. the hon'ble supreme court has held in case neelam kanwar v. devinder singh kanwar, 2000(4) all instant judgments 129 (sc) that 'we are mindful of the fact that the petitioner is a lady and first respondent is a male and, therefore, convenience-wise, a transfer of the place where the lady is residing would be preferred by this court unless it is shown that there are special reasons. no such special reason is shown.' 6. the hon'ble supreme court transferred the case from the court of chief judicial magistrate, chandigarh to the court of chief judicial magistrate, mum-bai. the divorce case titled 'rajwant singh v. harpreet kaur' pending in the court of learned additional district judge, ambala should in my opinion be transferred from ambala court to some court at amritsar. so, this cm is allowed and the divorce case between the parties, pending at ambala is transferred from the court of learned additional district judge, ambala to the court of learned district judge, amritsar. parties shall appear in the court of learned district judge, amritsar on 1.3.2001. sh. k.s. dhaliwal, advocate for the respondent/husband says that she (her wife) has not appeared at ambala in the divorce case. she is directed to appear before the learned district judge, amritsar on 1.3.2001. learned additional district judge, ambala will send the file complete in all respects to the court of learned district judge, amritsar well before the date fixed. 7. petition allowed.