Gram Panchayat Vs. Additional Director, Consolidation and anr. - Court Judgment

SooperKanoon Citationsooperkanoon.com/629942
SubjectCivil;Constitution
CourtPunjab and Haryana High Court
Decided OnMar-03-1997
Case NumberCivil Writ Petition No. 5294 of 1982
Judge T.H.B. Chalapathi, J.
Reported in(1997)116PLR627
ActsEast Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Invention of Fragmentation) Act, 1947 - Sections 42
AppellantGram Panchayat
RespondentAdditional Director, Consolidation and anr.
Appellant Advocate J.S. Khaira, Adv.
Respondent AdvocateNone
DispositionPetition allowed
Excerpt:
- hindu law -- custom: [vijender jain, c.j., m.m. kumar, jasbir singh, rajive bhalla & rajesh bindal, jj] alienation of ancestral property - punjab and haryana - held, in respect of state of punjab by virtue of punjab amendment act, 1973 there is a complete bar to contest any alienation of ancestral or non-ancestral immovable property or appointment of an heir to such property on ground that such alienation or appointment was contrary to custom. in punjab the property in hands of a successor has to be treated as coparcenary property and its alienation has to be governed by hindu law except to the extent it is regulated by sections 6 and 30 of the hindu succession act. in haryana, property in hands of successor has to be treated as coparcenary property as well as ancestral property. parties can fall back upon hindu law in case they fail to establish that rule of decision is custom. therefore, in haryana both under hindu law and the customary law, the alienation would be open to challenge. custom was given precedent over uncodified hindu law presumably for reason that custom has been consistently replacing the hindu law. however, it was soon realized that ancestral immovable property, which ordinarily held to be inalienable amongst jats of punjab by virtue of custom except for necessity, no limitation was placed on degrees of collateral, eligible to contest such alienation. it was, therefore, felt necessary to engraft certain restriction on degrees of collateral, eligible to contest an alienation, which under the custom itself was not limited. accordingly, the punjab custom (power to contest) act, 1920 (act no.2 of 1920) was enacted. the hindu succession act was extended to the state of punjab. act 2 of punjab act defined expression alienation to include any testamentary disposition of property and appointment of an heir was to include any adoption made or purporting to be made according to custom. a further provision was made by section 3 that hindu succession act was to apply only in respect of alienation of immovable property or appointment of heirs made by persons who in regard to such alienation or appointment were governed by custom. whereas section 4 declared that hindu succession act was not to affect any right to contest any alienation or appointment of an heir made before the date on which the succession act was to come into force. in other words, act, no.2 of 1920 was not to affect alienation or appointments of heir made before date on which it came into force. it also preserved the rights of any alienation or appointment of an heir made by a family. after section 7 was inserted in act of 1920 by the punjab amendment act of 1973 right of contest being contrary to custom had been totally effaced and taken away. therefore, no person has any right to contest any alienation of immovable property whether ancestral or non-ancestral on ground of being contrary to custom after january 23, 1973. in haryana, the situation as enunciated by act no.2 of 1920 continued to prevail in respect of alienation because no reforms parallel to punjab as brought by amendment act of 1973, had been enacted although right to pre-emption has been substantially abolished in haryana also. no steps even have been taken in that regard. therefore, situation in haryana have to be regarded as it existed under act no. 2 of 1920. hindu succession act,1956[c.a.no.30/1956] -- sections 6 & 30: [vijender jain, c.j., m.m.kumar, jasbir singh, rajive bhalla & rajesh bindal, jj] alienation of coparcenary property - law laid down by full bench in joginder singh kundha singh v kehar singh dasaundha singh [air 1965 punjab 407] and pritam singh v assistant controller of estate duty, patiala [1976 punj lr 342] -whether there is any conflict? - held, the basic controversy in the full bench decision of joginder singhs case was regarding constitutional validity of section 14 of hindu succession act and as to whether it infringes article 14 of constitution. it was held that the estate held by male and limitation on his power of alienation were in no way removed and the reversioners were not debarred from challenging such alienations. the full bench held that section 14 of hindu succession act postulates that estate held by a hindu female before enforcement of succession act either by inheritance or otherwise, was enlarged and on date of enforcement of succession act, she became a full owner. likewise, if she has inherited any estate after the commencement of the act, she was to be regarded as absolute owner rather than a limited owner. consequently, the limitations on power of alienation automatically vanished. this was the necessary result of the provisions made in section 14 of the act. the full bench further held that in respect of male proprietors, no corresponding provision was made either enlarging their estate in ancestral property or enlarging their power of alienation over property inherited by them. however, it noticed section 30 and observed that it only deals with power of his share in coparcenary property by will, which prior to enforcement of the act, he had no right to do. the only provision made in respect of male proprietor regarding alienation of property was his power of alienation by will. in so far as persons governed by custom are concerned, they continued to be governed by the restriction on the power of alienation of a male holder as existed before enforcement of the act. likewise, other restriction on alienation other than disposal by will also continued. the full bench, thus, recognized the superior right of hindu females by virtue of section 14 and upheld the provision as intra vires. the argument that reversioners have ceased to exist after enactment of provisions of section 14 of succession act, was rejected as there was no provision pointed out to that effect. the proposition laid down by the full bench in pritam singhs case was that the hindu succession act has not abolished joint hindu family with respect to rights of those who were members of mitakshara coparcenary, except in the manner and to the extent mentioned in sections 6 and 30 of the act, this statement should also imply, though it does not say so expressly, the succession act to this extent does not affect the rights of the members governed by dayabhaga coparcenary. the full bench in pritam singh;s case expressly noticed the judgment of earlier full bench in joginder singhs case but construed the same as irrelevant by observing that it dealt with the power of alienation of a person governed by customary law and constitutional validity of section 14 of hindu succession act. thus there is no real conflict between the two full bench judgments. both the full bench judgments have been delivered on the assumption that joginder singhs case dealt with question of alienation whereas pritam singhs case had decided the question concerning succession. even on fact in joginder singhs case the issue was validity of alienation by consent decree by a father to his two sons, which was challenged by third son, whereas in pritam singhs case the question of nature of property in hands of sons on death of their father had arisen for purposes of assessment of estate duty. in pritam singhs case the property in the hands of the sons was held to be coparcenary property and only 1/3rd of property belonging to deceased father was considered eligible for estate duty. therefore, there was no question of alienation in pritam singhs case.t.h.b. chalapathi, j.1. the gram panchayat, khairpur, filed this writ petition to quash the order of the additional director, consolidation, punjab dated 24.9.1982.2. the second respondent filed an application before the additional director under section 42 of the east punjab holdings (consolidation and prevention of fragmentation) act, 1948 (hereinafter called the 'act') for repartition of the land. to that application filed by the second respondent, sahi ram and hari ram were parties. the consolidation officer came to the conclusion that a repartition took place earlier in march, 1964 and the possession of the disputed land was with the respondent named in the petition and the petitioner had no case vis-a-vis the respondents in the application, but curiously the additional director, consolidation, in his order observed as follows:-'however the gram panchayat of the village has no objection to the grant of land to the petitioner from the land of the panchayat deh. the petition can be accommodated by giving land from the gram panchayat and thereby his grievance can be mitigated. the gram panchayat was impleaded as a party by the petitioner and devi lal, member panchayat of that panchayat was duly served. his thumb impression exists on the back of the summons. however, he has not turned up. hence ex-parte proceedings were taken against the gram panchayat. i feel that the ends of justice would be met if the petitioner is accommodated in the land of the gram panchayat.'3. thus, it is clear that the gram panchayat was not properly served with the application. the gram panchayat has to be served through the sarpanch only. a member of the gram panchayat cannot represent the whole body of the panchayat. in the absence of any notice served on the sarpanch of the gram panchayat, no order adverse to the gram panchayat could have been passed by the additional director. when admittedly, the gram panchayat was not served and devi lal, a member of the panchayat on whom the notice was alleged to have been served did not appear before the additional director, it is not known as to how the additional director came to the conclusion that the gram panchayat of the village has no objection to the grant of land to the petitioner from the land of the panchayat deh. thus it is evident that there is no consent given by the gram panchayat to give any of its land to the 2nd respondent. the order of the additional director is contrary to the facts and law and, therefore, is liable to be set aside.4. the writ petition is, accordingly, allowed and the order of the additional director, consolidation, punjab, dated 24.9.1982 is hereby set aside. however, there will be no order as to costs.
Judgment:

T.H.B. Chalapathi, J.

1. The Gram Panchayat, Khairpur, filed this writ petition to quash the order of the Additional Director, Consolidation, Punjab dated 24.9.1982.

2. The second respondent filed an application before the Additional Director Under Section 42 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948 (hereinafter called the 'Act') for repartition of the land. To that application filed by the second respondent, Sahi Ram and Hari Ram were parties. The Consolidation Officer came to the conclusion that a repartition took place earlier in March, 1964 and the possession of the disputed land was with the respondent named in the petition and the petitioner had no case vis-a-vis the respondents in the application, but curiously the Additional Director, Consolidation, in his order observed as follows:-

'However the Gram Panchayat of the village has no objection to the grant of land to the petitioner from the land of the Panchayat deh. The petition can be accommodated by giving land from the Gram Panchayat and thereby his grievance can be mitigated. The Gram Panchayat was impleaded as a party by the petitioner and Devi Lal, member Panchayat of that Panchayat was duly served. His thumb impression exists on the back of the summons. However, he has not turned up. Hence ex-parte proceedings were taken against the Gram Panchayat. I feel that the ends of justice would be met if the petitioner is accommodated in the land of the Gram Panchayat.'

3. Thus, it is clear that the Gram Panchayat was not properly served with the application. The Gram Panchayat has to be served through the Sarpanch only. A member of the Gram Panchayat cannot represent the whole body of the Panchayat. In the absence of any notice served on the Sarpanch of the Gram Panchayat, no order adverse to the Gram Panchayat could have been passed by the Additional Director. When admittedly, the Gram Panchayat was not served and Devi Lal, a member of the Panchayat on whom the notice was alleged to have been served did not appear before the Additional Director, it is not known as to how the Additional Director came to the conclusion that the Gram Panchayat of the Village has no objection to the grant of land to the petitioner from the land of the Panchayat deh. Thus it is evident that there is no consent given by the Gram Panchayat to give any of its land to the 2nd respondent. The order of the Additional Director is contrary to the facts and law and, therefore, is liable to be set aside.

4. The writ petition is, accordingly, allowed and the order of the Additional Director, Consolidation, Punjab, dated 24.9.1982 is hereby set aside. However, there will be no order as to costs.