Rai Jasbir Singh and anr. Vs. Balwant Singh and ors. - Court Judgment

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			'id' => '629369',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/136769/the-punjab-land-revenue-act-1887-complete-act">Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887</a> - Sections 13, 20, 20(3) and 158; Indian Post Office Act, 1886; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) - Sections 100',
			'appealno' => 'Regular Second Appeal No. 615 of 1982 (O and M)',
			'appellant' => 'Rai Jasbir Singh and anr.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Rai Jasbir Singh and anr. Vs. Balwant Singh and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' - HINDU LAW -- Custom: [Vijender Jain, C.J., M.M. Kumar, Jasbir Singh, Rajive Bhalla & Rajesh Bindal, JJ] Alienation of ancestral property - Punjab and Haryana -  Held, In respect of State of Punjab by virtue of Punjab Amendment Act, 1973 there is a complete bar to contest any alienation of ancestral or non-ancestral immovable property or appointment of an heir to such property on ground that such alienation or appointment was contrary to custom. In Punjab the property in hands of a successor has to be treated as coparcenary property and its alienation has to be governed by Hindu Law except to the extent it is regulated by Sections 6 and 30 of the Hindu Succession Act. In Haryana, property  in hands of successor has to be treated as coparcenary property as well as ancestral property. Parties can fall back upon Hindu Law in case they fail to establish that rule of decision is custom. Therefore, in Haryana both under Hindu law and the Customary Law, the alienation would be open to challenge. Custom was given precedent over uncodified Hindu Law presumably for reason that custom has been consistently replacing the Hindu Law. However, it was soon realized that ancestral immovable property, which ordinarily held to be inalienable amongst Jats of Punjab by virtue of custom except for necessity, no limitation was placed on degrees of collateral, eligible to contest such alienation. It was, therefore, felt necessary to engraft certain restriction on degrees of collateral, eligible to contest an alienation, which under the custom itself was not limited. Accordingly, the Punjab Custom (Power to Contest) Act, 1920 (Act No.2 of 1920) was enacted. The Hindu Succession Act was extended to the State of Punjab.  Act 2 of Punjab Act defined expression alienation to include any testamentary disposition of property and appointment of an heir was to include any adoption made or purporting to be made according to custom. A further provision was made by Section 3 that Hindu Succession Act was to apply only in respect of alienation of immovable property or appointment of heirs made by persons who in regard to such alienation or appointment were governed by custom. Whereas  Section 4 declared that Hindu Succession Act was not to affect any right to contest any alienation or appointment of an heir made before the date on which the Succession Act was to come into force. In other words, Act, No.2 of 1920 was not to affect alienation or appointments of heir made before date on which it came into force. It also preserved the rights of any alienation or appointment of an heir made by a family. After Section 7 was inserted in Act of 1920 by the Punjab Amendment Act of 1973 right of contest being contrary to custom had been totally effaced and taken away. Therefore, no person has any right to contest any alienation of immovable property whether ancestral or non-ancestral on ground of being contrary to custom after January 23, 1973. In Haryana, the situation as enunciated by Act No.2 of 1920 continued to prevail in respect of alienation because no reforms parallel to Punjab as brought by Amendment Act of 1973, had been enacted although right to pre-emption has been substantially abolished in Haryana also. No steps even have been taken in that regard. Therefore, situation in Haryana have to be regarded as it existed under Act No. 2 of 1920.
HINDU SUCCESSION ACT,1956[C.A.No.30/1956] --  Sections 6 & 30: [Vijender Jain, C.J., M.M.Kumar, Jasbir Singh, Rajive Bhalla & Rajesh Bindal, JJ]  Alienation of coparcenary property - Law laid down by Full Bench in Joginder Singh Kundha Singh v Kehar Singh Dasaundha Singh [AIR 1965 Punjab 407] and Pritam Singh v Assistant Controller of Estate Duty, Patiala [1976 Punj LR 342] -Whether there is any conflict? - Held, The basic controversy in the Full Bench decision of Joginder Singhs case was regarding constitutional validity of Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act and as to whether it infringes Article 14 of Constitution. It was held that the estate held by male and limitation on his power of alienation were in no way removed and the reversioners were not debarred from challenging such alienations. The Full Bench held that Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act postulates that estate held by a Hindu female before enforcement of Succession Act either by inheritance or otherwise, was enlarged and on date of enforcement of Succession Act, she became a full owner. Likewise, if she has inherited any estate after the commencement of the Act,  she was to be regarded as absolute owner rather than a limited owner. Consequently, the limitations on power of alienation automatically vanished. This was the necessary result of the provisions made in Section 14 of the Act. The Full Bench further held that in respect of male proprietors, no corresponding provision was made either enlarging their estate in ancestral property or enlarging their power of alienation over property inherited by them. However, it noticed Section 30 and observed that it only deals with power of his share in coparcenary property by Will, which prior to enforcement of the Act, he had no right to do. The only provision made in respect of male proprietor regarding alienation of property was his power of alienation by Will. In so far as persons governed by custom are concerned, they continued to be governed by the restriction on the power of alienation of a male holder as existed before enforcement of the Act. Likewise, other restriction on alienation other than disposal by Will also continued. The Full Bench, thus, recognized the superior right of Hindu females by virtue of Section 14 and upheld the provision as intra vires. The argument that reversioners have ceased to exist after enactment of provisions of Section 14 of Succession Act, was rejected as there was no provision pointed out to that effect. The proposition laid down by the full Bench in Pritam Singhs case was that the Hindu Succession Act has not abolished joint Hindu family with respect to rights of those who were members of Mitakshara coparcenary, except in the manner and to the extent mentioned in Sections 6 and 30 of the Act, This Statement should also imply, though it does not say so expressly, the Succession Act to this extent does not affect the rights of the members governed by Dayabhaga coparcenary. The Full Bench in Pritam Singh;s case expressly noticed the judgment of earlier Full Bench in Joginder Singhs case but construed the same as irrelevant by observing that it dealt with the power of alienation of a person governed by Customary law and constitutional validity of Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act. Thus there is no real conflict between the two Full Bench judgments. Both the Full Bench judgments have been delivered on the assumption that Joginder Singhs case dealt with question of alienation whereas Pritam Singhs case had decided the question concerning succession. Even on fact in Joginder Singhs case the issue was validity of alienation by consent decree by a father to his two sons, which was challenged by third son, whereas in Pritam Singhs case the question of nature of property in hands of sons on death of their father had arisen  for purposes of assessment of estate duty. In Pritam  Singhs case the property in the hands of the sons was held to be coparcenary property and only 1/3rd of  property belonging to deceased father was considered eligible for estate duty. Therefore, there was no question of alienation in Pritam Singhs case. -  I do not find any infirmity in the well-reasoned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Hari Kishan and Ors. v. Administrator Municipal Committee;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal, Sr. Adv. and; Sudhir Mittal, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' M.L Sarin, Sr. Adv.,; Ashish Handa,; H.N. Mehtani an',
			'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2005-05-25',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' Ashutosh Mohunta, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Ashutosh Mohunta, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The vendee-plaintiffs have filed this appeal to challenge the judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below whereby their suit and the appeal against the partition of the land ordered by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Guhla, vide order dated 16.7.1975, were dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. In brief the facts giving rise to this appeal are that defendant-respondent Nos. 1 to 5 filed an application for partition of the suit land against Smt.Kirpal Kaur (Plaintiff No. 1) and defendant Nos. 6 to 15 in the court of Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Guhla. In that application Smt. Kirpal Kaur was proceeded against ex parte. The partition was confirmed on 16.6.1975 and the case was fixed for instrument of partition for 16.7.1975. Rai Jasbir Singh, plaintiff No. 2 purchased land measuring 80 Kanals from Smt. Kirpal Kaur (plaintiff No. 1) vide sale deed dated 27.5.1975 during the pendency of the partition proceedings and plaintiff No. 2 and 3, i.e., Rai Jasbir Singh and Swaran Singh were in actual physical possession of 228 Kanals 8 Marias and 77 Kanals 8 Marias, respectively. The plaintiffs challenged the order dated 16.7.1975 passed by the Assistant Grade, 1st Class, Guhla, by filing the present suit for declaration, which was dismissed by the Sub Judge, 1st Class, Kaithal, vide judgment and decree dated 29.1.1980 on the ground that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The plaintiffs then filed appeal to challenge the judgment and decree dated 29.1.1980 passed by the trial Court. During the pendency of the appeal, Smt. Kirpal Kaur withdrew herself from being the appellant. Consequently, vide order dated 17.1.1980 the appeal qua Kirpal Kaur was ordered to be dismissed as withdrawn. The appeal qua the remaining two appellants, i.e., Rai Jasbir Singh and Swaran Singh (present appellants) was dismissed by the Additional District Judge, Kurukshetra, vide judgment and decree dated 4.12.1981 and the decision of the trial Court with regard to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was upheld. Now Rai Jasbir Singh arid Swaran Singh have filed the present appeal wherein challenge has been made to the findings of both the Courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. It has been contended by Mr. R.S. Mittal, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the appellants, that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not duly served and, thus,the ex parte order dated 16.6.1975/16.7.1975 passed by the Assistant Collector,1st Grade, Guhla, was a nullity. It has further been argued by the learned counsel for the appellants that the Courts below erred in holding that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit against partition ordered by the Revenue Officer in view of the provisions of the <a href="/act/136769/the-punjab-land-revenue-act-1887-complete-act">Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887</a> (for short 'the Act'), despite the fact that the order for partition of the suit land was passed ex parte without serving Smt.Kirpal Kaur according to the prescribed legal procedure.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellants have been controverted by Mr. M.L.Sarin, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the respondents. It has been contended by him that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to go into the validity of the partition proceedings. The appellants have approached the Civil Court without exhausting the remedy available to them under Section 13 of the Act. It has further been contended by him that Smt. Kirpal Kaur had duly been served in the partition proceedings by sending notice to her by registered post.The counsel has also contended that she had withdrawn her appeal before the lower appellate court and in this view of the matter, the present appellants, who had purchased the land from her during the pendency of the partition proceedings, had no locus standi to challenge the order of partition passed by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. 1 have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the evidence adduced on record.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The only question that arises for consideration in the present appeal is to the following effect:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether or not the Civil Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the suit wherein the order of partition passed by a Revenue Officer has been challenged and Smt. Kirpal Kaur was properly served in the partition proceedings</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The first objection raised on behalf of the appellants is that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not served in the partition proceedings before the Assistant Collector 1st Grade, Guhla, as per the provisions contained in Section 20 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. I do not find any merit in this contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants. It is not the case of the appellants that Smt.Kirpal Kaur was not served at all. The bald statement of the plaintiffs was rebutted by the statement on oath of defendant Balwant Singh and also by documentary evidence adduced on record which shows that a registered notice was issued to her and acknowledgement due (Ex.DIO) was received in the office of the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade. Sub-section (3) of Section 20 of the Act gives discretion to the Revenue Officer to serve the concerned person 'either in addition to, or in substitution for, any other mode of service, by forwarding the summons by post in a-letter addressed' to him and registered under Part II of the Indian Post Office Act, 1886. In this view of the matter, it cannot be said that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not served as per the procedure prescribed under the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The next contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants is that the Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain the ex parte order passed by the Revenue Officer.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. This contention is also without any merit. Section 158 of the Act specifically excludes the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts in matters within the jurisdiction of the Revenue Officers. In order to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector, a provision for filing of appeals before the higher Revenue Authorities has been made in Section 13 of the Act. The plaintiffs without exhausting the remedies available to them under Section 13, approached the Civil Court to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Moreover, it has come on record that Smt. Kirpal Kaur, from whom the present appellants had purchased the land during the pendency of the partition proceedings, had withdrawn from the appeal before the lower appellate Court. As the present appellants had purchased the suit land during the pendency of the partition proceedings, they have, therefore, no locus standi to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector 1st Grade and pursue the appeal. It is not the case of the plaintiff-appellants that the ex parte decree was obtained by the defendant-respondents by fraud or misrepresentation. In A.C. Ananthaswamy and Ors. v. Boraiah (D) by Lrs. (2004-3)138 Punjab Law Reporter 557, it has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that in the absence of any fraud or misrepresentation, an ex parte order on the bare plea of non-service cannot be set aside. In the present case it is an undisputed fact that registered notice (Ex.DIO) was issued to Smt. Kirpal Kaur and she had even filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order passed by the Assistant Collector. The ratio of the authority Firm Seth Radha Kishun (deceased) represented by Hari Kishan and Ors. v. Administrator Municipal Committee, Ludhiana : [1964]2SCR273 , that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not specifically ousted where a statute created a liability and provided a remedy, is not applicable to the facts appearing in the present case. In the present case, as already mentioned above, registered A.D. notice was issued to and served on Smt. Kirpal Kaur, who had thereafter, filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Both the courts below have given concurrent findings of fact which cannot be interfered with in the second appeal in view of the provisions of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as no substantial question of law has either been pleaded in the memorandum of appeal or arises for consideration in the present appeal. I do not find any infirmity in the well-reasoned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Consequently, there is no merit in this appeal. It is, accordingly, dismissed. However, I do no make any order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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			'pubs' => '(2006)142PLR339',
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			'respondent' => 'Balwant Singh and ors.',
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$title_for_layout = 'Rai Jasbir Singh and anr Vs Balwant Singh and ors - Citation 629369 - Court Judgment | '
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		'id' => '629369',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/136769/the-punjab-land-revenue-act-1887-complete-act">Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887</a> - Sections 13, 20, 20(3) and 158; Indian Post Office Act, 1886; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) - Sections 100',
		'appealno' => 'Regular Second Appeal No. 615 of 1982 (O and M)',
		'appellant' => 'Rai Jasbir Singh and anr.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Rai Jasbir Singh and anr. Vs. Balwant Singh and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' - HINDU LAW -- Custom: [Vijender Jain, C.J., M.M. Kumar, Jasbir Singh, Rajive Bhalla & Rajesh Bindal, JJ] Alienation of ancestral property - Punjab and Haryana -  Held, In respect of State of Punjab by virtue of Punjab Amendment Act, 1973 there is a complete bar to contest any alienation of ancestral or non-ancestral immovable property or appointment of an heir to such property on ground that such alienation or appointment was contrary to custom. In Punjab the property in hands of a successor has to be treated as coparcenary property and its alienation has to be governed by Hindu Law except to the extent it is regulated by Sections 6 and 30 of the Hindu Succession Act. In Haryana, property  in hands of successor has to be treated as coparcenary property as well as ancestral property. Parties can fall back upon Hindu Law in case they fail to establish that rule of decision is custom. Therefore, in Haryana both under Hindu law and the Customary Law, the alienation would be open to challenge. Custom was given precedent over uncodified Hindu Law presumably for reason that custom has been consistently replacing the Hindu Law. However, it was soon realized that ancestral immovable property, which ordinarily held to be inalienable amongst Jats of Punjab by virtue of custom except for necessity, no limitation was placed on degrees of collateral, eligible to contest such alienation. It was, therefore, felt necessary to engraft certain restriction on degrees of collateral, eligible to contest an alienation, which under the custom itself was not limited. Accordingly, the Punjab Custom (Power to Contest) Act, 1920 (Act No.2 of 1920) was enacted. The Hindu Succession Act was extended to the State of Punjab.  Act 2 of Punjab Act defined expression alienation to include any testamentary disposition of property and appointment of an heir was to include any adoption made or purporting to be made according to custom. A further provision was made by Section 3 that Hindu Succession Act was to apply only in respect of alienation of immovable property or appointment of heirs made by persons who in regard to such alienation or appointment were governed by custom. Whereas  Section 4 declared that Hindu Succession Act was not to affect any right to contest any alienation or appointment of an heir made before the date on which the Succession Act was to come into force. In other words, Act, No.2 of 1920 was not to affect alienation or appointments of heir made before date on which it came into force. It also preserved the rights of any alienation or appointment of an heir made by a family. After Section 7 was inserted in Act of 1920 by the Punjab Amendment Act of 1973 right of contest being contrary to custom had been totally effaced and taken away. Therefore, no person has any right to contest any alienation of immovable property whether ancestral or non-ancestral on ground of being contrary to custom after January 23, 1973. In Haryana, the situation as enunciated by Act No.2 of 1920 continued to prevail in respect of alienation because no reforms parallel to Punjab as brought by Amendment Act of 1973, had been enacted although right to pre-emption has been substantially abolished in Haryana also. No steps even have been taken in that regard. Therefore, situation in Haryana have to be regarded as it existed under Act No. 2 of 1920.
HINDU SUCCESSION ACT,1956[C.A.No.30/1956] --  Sections 6 & 30: [Vijender Jain, C.J., M.M.Kumar, Jasbir Singh, Rajive Bhalla & Rajesh Bindal, JJ]  Alienation of coparcenary property - Law laid down by Full Bench in Joginder Singh Kundha Singh v Kehar Singh Dasaundha Singh [AIR 1965 Punjab 407] and Pritam Singh v Assistant Controller of Estate Duty, Patiala [1976 Punj LR 342] -Whether there is any conflict? - Held, The basic controversy in the Full Bench decision of Joginder Singhs case was regarding constitutional validity of Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act and as to whether it infringes Article 14 of Constitution. It was held that the estate held by male and limitation on his power of alienation were in no way removed and the reversioners were not debarred from challenging such alienations. The Full Bench held that Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act postulates that estate held by a Hindu female before enforcement of Succession Act either by inheritance or otherwise, was enlarged and on date of enforcement of Succession Act, she became a full owner. Likewise, if she has inherited any estate after the commencement of the Act,  she was to be regarded as absolute owner rather than a limited owner. Consequently, the limitations on power of alienation automatically vanished. This was the necessary result of the provisions made in Section 14 of the Act. The Full Bench further held that in respect of male proprietors, no corresponding provision was made either enlarging their estate in ancestral property or enlarging their power of alienation over property inherited by them. However, it noticed Section 30 and observed that it only deals with power of his share in coparcenary property by Will, which prior to enforcement of the Act, he had no right to do. The only provision made in respect of male proprietor regarding alienation of property was his power of alienation by Will. In so far as persons governed by custom are concerned, they continued to be governed by the restriction on the power of alienation of a male holder as existed before enforcement of the Act. Likewise, other restriction on alienation other than disposal by Will also continued. The Full Bench, thus, recognized the superior right of Hindu females by virtue of Section 14 and upheld the provision as intra vires. The argument that reversioners have ceased to exist after enactment of provisions of Section 14 of Succession Act, was rejected as there was no provision pointed out to that effect. The proposition laid down by the full Bench in Pritam Singhs case was that the Hindu Succession Act has not abolished joint Hindu family with respect to rights of those who were members of Mitakshara coparcenary, except in the manner and to the extent mentioned in Sections 6 and 30 of the Act, This Statement should also imply, though it does not say so expressly, the Succession Act to this extent does not affect the rights of the members governed by Dayabhaga coparcenary. The Full Bench in Pritam Singh;s case expressly noticed the judgment of earlier Full Bench in Joginder Singhs case but construed the same as irrelevant by observing that it dealt with the power of alienation of a person governed by Customary law and constitutional validity of Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act. Thus there is no real conflict between the two Full Bench judgments. Both the Full Bench judgments have been delivered on the assumption that Joginder Singhs case dealt with question of alienation whereas Pritam Singhs case had decided the question concerning succession. Even on fact in Joginder Singhs case the issue was validity of alienation by consent decree by a father to his two sons, which was challenged by third son, whereas in Pritam Singhs case the question of nature of property in hands of sons on death of their father had arisen  for purposes of assessment of estate duty. In Pritam  Singhs case the property in the hands of the sons was held to be coparcenary property and only 1/3rd of  property belonging to deceased father was considered eligible for estate duty. Therefore, there was no question of alienation in Pritam Singhs case. -  I do not find any infirmity in the well-reasoned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Hari Kishan and Ors. v. Administrator Municipal Committee;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal, Sr. Adv. and; Sudhir Mittal, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' M.L Sarin, Sr. Adv.,; Ashish Handa,; H.N. Mehtani an',
		'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2005-05-25',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Ashutosh Mohunta, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Ashutosh Mohunta, J.</p><p>1. The vendee-plaintiffs have filed this appeal to challenge the judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below whereby their suit and the appeal against the partition of the land ordered by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Guhla, vide order dated 16.7.1975, were dismissed.</p><p>2. In brief the facts giving rise to this appeal are that defendant-respondent Nos. 1 to 5 filed an application for partition of the suit land against Smt.Kirpal Kaur (Plaintiff No. 1) and defendant Nos. 6 to 15 in the court of Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Guhla. In that application Smt. Kirpal Kaur was proceeded against ex parte. The partition was confirmed on 16.6.1975 and the case was fixed for instrument of partition for 16.7.1975. Rai Jasbir Singh, plaintiff No. 2 purchased land measuring 80 Kanals from Smt. Kirpal Kaur (plaintiff No. 1) vide sale deed dated 27.5.1975 during the pendency of the partition proceedings and plaintiff No. 2 and 3, i.e., Rai Jasbir Singh and Swaran Singh were in actual physical possession of 228 Kanals 8 Marias and 77 Kanals 8 Marias, respectively. The plaintiffs challenged the order dated 16.7.1975 passed by the Assistant Grade, 1st Class, Guhla, by filing the present suit for declaration, which was dismissed by the Sub Judge, 1st Class, Kaithal, vide judgment and decree dated 29.1.1980 on the ground that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The plaintiffs then filed appeal to challenge the judgment and decree dated 29.1.1980 passed by the trial Court. During the pendency of the appeal, Smt. Kirpal Kaur withdrew herself from being the appellant. Consequently, vide order dated 17.1.1980 the appeal qua Kirpal Kaur was ordered to be dismissed as withdrawn. The appeal qua the remaining two appellants, i.e., Rai Jasbir Singh and Swaran Singh (present appellants) was dismissed by the Additional District Judge, Kurukshetra, vide judgment and decree dated 4.12.1981 and the decision of the trial Court with regard to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was upheld. Now Rai Jasbir Singh arid Swaran Singh have filed the present appeal wherein challenge has been made to the findings of both the Courts below.</p><p>3. It has been contended by Mr. R.S. Mittal, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the appellants, that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not duly served and, thus,the ex parte order dated 16.6.1975/16.7.1975 passed by the Assistant Collector,1st Grade, Guhla, was a nullity. It has further been argued by the learned counsel for the appellants that the Courts below erred in holding that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit against partition ordered by the Revenue Officer in view of the provisions of the <a>Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887</a> (for short 'the Act'), despite the fact that the order for partition of the suit land was passed ex parte without serving Smt.Kirpal Kaur according to the prescribed legal procedure.</p><p>4. The contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellants have been controverted by Mr. M.L.Sarin, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the respondents. It has been contended by him that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to go into the validity of the partition proceedings. The appellants have approached the Civil Court without exhausting the remedy available to them under Section 13 of the Act. It has further been contended by him that Smt. Kirpal Kaur had duly been served in the partition proceedings by sending notice to her by registered post.The counsel has also contended that she had withdrawn her appeal before the lower appellate court and in this view of the matter, the present appellants, who had purchased the land from her during the pendency of the partition proceedings, had no locus standi to challenge the order of partition passed by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade.</p><p>5. 1 have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the evidence adduced on record.</p><p>6. The only question that arises for consideration in the present appeal is to the following effect:-</p><p>Whether or not the Civil Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the suit wherein the order of partition passed by a Revenue Officer has been challenged and Smt. Kirpal Kaur was properly served in the partition proceedings</p><p>7. The first objection raised on behalf of the appellants is that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not served in the partition proceedings before the Assistant Collector 1st Grade, Guhla, as per the provisions contained in Section 20 of the Act.</p><p>8. I do not find any merit in this contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants. It is not the case of the appellants that Smt.Kirpal Kaur was not served at all. The bald statement of the plaintiffs was rebutted by the statement on oath of defendant Balwant Singh and also by documentary evidence adduced on record which shows that a registered notice was issued to her and acknowledgement due (Ex.DIO) was received in the office of the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade. Sub-section (3) of Section 20 of the Act gives discretion to the Revenue Officer to serve the concerned person 'either in addition to, or in substitution for, any other mode of service, by forwarding the summons by post in a-letter addressed' to him and registered under Part II of the Indian Post Office Act, 1886. In this view of the matter, it cannot be said that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not served as per the procedure prescribed under the Act.</p><p>9. The next contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants is that the Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain the ex parte order passed by the Revenue Officer.</p><p>10. This contention is also without any merit. Section 158 of the Act specifically excludes the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts in matters within the jurisdiction of the Revenue Officers. In order to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector, a provision for filing of appeals before the higher Revenue Authorities has been made in Section 13 of the Act. The plaintiffs without exhausting the remedies available to them under Section 13, approached the Civil Court to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector.</p><p>11. Moreover, it has come on record that Smt. Kirpal Kaur, from whom the present appellants had purchased the land during the pendency of the partition proceedings, had withdrawn from the appeal before the lower appellate Court. As the present appellants had purchased the suit land during the pendency of the partition proceedings, they have, therefore, no locus standi to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector 1st Grade and pursue the appeal. It is not the case of the plaintiff-appellants that the ex parte decree was obtained by the defendant-respondents by fraud or misrepresentation. In A.C. Ananthaswamy and Ors. v. Boraiah (D) by Lrs. (2004-3)138 Punjab Law Reporter 557, it has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that in the absence of any fraud or misrepresentation, an ex parte order on the bare plea of non-service cannot be set aside. In the present case it is an undisputed fact that registered notice (Ex.DIO) was issued to Smt. Kirpal Kaur and she had even filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order passed by the Assistant Collector. The ratio of the authority Firm Seth Radha Kishun (deceased) represented by Hari Kishan and Ors. v. Administrator Municipal Committee, Ludhiana : [1964]2SCR273 , that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not specifically ousted where a statute created a liability and provided a remedy, is not applicable to the facts appearing in the present case. In the present case, as already mentioned above, registered A.D. notice was issued to and served on Smt. Kirpal Kaur, who had thereafter, filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order.</p><p>12. Both the courts below have given concurrent findings of fact which cannot be interfered with in the second appeal in view of the provisions of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as no substantial question of law has either been pleaded in the memorandum of appeal or arises for consideration in the present appeal. I do not find any infirmity in the well-reasoned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below.</p><p>13. Consequently, there is no merit in this appeal. It is, accordingly, dismissed. However, I do no make any order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
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			'id' => '629369',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/136769/the-punjab-land-revenue-act-1887-complete-act">Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887</a> - Sections 13, 20, 20(3) and 158; Indian Post Office Act, 1886; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) - Sections 100',
			'appealno' => 'Regular Second Appeal No. 615 of 1982 (O and M)',
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			'casenote' => ' - HINDU LAW -- Custom: [Vijender Jain, C.J., M.M. Kumar, Jasbir Singh, Rajive Bhalla & Rajesh Bindal, JJ] Alienation of ancestral property - Punjab and Haryana -  Held, In respect of State of Punjab by virtue of Punjab Amendment Act, 1973 there is a complete bar to contest any alienation of ancestral or non-ancestral immovable property or appointment of an heir to such property on ground that such alienation or appointment was contrary to custom. In Punjab the property in hands of a successor has to be treated as coparcenary property and its alienation has to be governed by Hindu Law except to the extent it is regulated by Sections 6 and 30 of the Hindu Succession Act. In Haryana, property  in hands of successor has to be treated as coparcenary property as well as ancestral property. Parties can fall back upon Hindu Law in case they fail to establish that rule of decision is custom. Therefore, in Haryana both under Hindu law and the Customary Law, the alienation would be open to challenge. Custom was given precedent over uncodified Hindu Law presumably for reason that custom has been consistently replacing the Hindu Law. However, it was soon realized that ancestral immovable property, which ordinarily held to be inalienable amongst Jats of Punjab by virtue of custom except for necessity, no limitation was placed on degrees of collateral, eligible to contest such alienation. It was, therefore, felt necessary to engraft certain restriction on degrees of collateral, eligible to contest an alienation, which under the custom itself was not limited. Accordingly, the Punjab Custom (Power to Contest) Act, 1920 (Act No.2 of 1920) was enacted. The Hindu Succession Act was extended to the State of Punjab.  Act 2 of Punjab Act defined expression alienation to include any testamentary disposition of property and appointment of an heir was to include any adoption made or purporting to be made according to custom. A further provision was made by Section 3 that Hindu Succession Act was to apply only in respect of alienation of immovable property or appointment of heirs made by persons who in regard to such alienation or appointment were governed by custom. Whereas  Section 4 declared that Hindu Succession Act was not to affect any right to contest any alienation or appointment of an heir made before the date on which the Succession Act was to come into force. In other words, Act, No.2 of 1920 was not to affect alienation or appointments of heir made before date on which it came into force. It also preserved the rights of any alienation or appointment of an heir made by a family. After Section 7 was inserted in Act of 1920 by the Punjab Amendment Act of 1973 right of contest being contrary to custom had been totally effaced and taken away. Therefore, no person has any right to contest any alienation of immovable property whether ancestral or non-ancestral on ground of being contrary to custom after January 23, 1973. In Haryana, the situation as enunciated by Act No.2 of 1920 continued to prevail in respect of alienation because no reforms parallel to Punjab as brought by Amendment Act of 1973, had been enacted although right to pre-emption has been substantially abolished in Haryana also. No steps even have been taken in that regard. Therefore, situation in Haryana have to be regarded as it existed under Act No. 2 of 1920.
HINDU SUCCESSION ACT,1956[C.A.No.30/1956] --  Sections 6 & 30: [Vijender Jain, C.J., M.M.Kumar, Jasbir Singh, Rajive Bhalla & Rajesh Bindal, JJ]  Alienation of coparcenary property - Law laid down by Full Bench in Joginder Singh Kundha Singh v Kehar Singh Dasaundha Singh [AIR 1965 Punjab 407] and Pritam Singh v Assistant Controller of Estate Duty, Patiala [1976 Punj LR 342] -Whether there is any conflict? - Held, The basic controversy in the Full Bench decision of Joginder Singhs case was regarding constitutional validity of Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act and as to whether it infringes Article 14 of Constitution. It was held that the estate held by male and limitation on his power of alienation were in no way removed and the reversioners were not debarred from challenging such alienations. The Full Bench held that Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act postulates that estate held by a Hindu female before enforcement of Succession Act either by inheritance or otherwise, was enlarged and on date of enforcement of Succession Act, she became a full owner. Likewise, if she has inherited any estate after the commencement of the Act,  she was to be regarded as absolute owner rather than a limited owner. Consequently, the limitations on power of alienation automatically vanished. This was the necessary result of the provisions made in Section 14 of the Act. The Full Bench further held that in respect of male proprietors, no corresponding provision was made either enlarging their estate in ancestral property or enlarging their power of alienation over property inherited by them. However, it noticed Section 30 and observed that it only deals with power of his share in coparcenary property by Will, which prior to enforcement of the Act, he had no right to do. The only provision made in respect of male proprietor regarding alienation of property was his power of alienation by Will. In so far as persons governed by custom are concerned, they continued to be governed by the restriction on the power of alienation of a male holder as existed before enforcement of the Act. Likewise, other restriction on alienation other than disposal by Will also continued. The Full Bench, thus, recognized the superior right of Hindu females by virtue of Section 14 and upheld the provision as intra vires. The argument that reversioners have ceased to exist after enactment of provisions of Section 14 of Succession Act, was rejected as there was no provision pointed out to that effect. The proposition laid down by the full Bench in Pritam Singhs case was that the Hindu Succession Act has not abolished joint Hindu family with respect to rights of those who were members of Mitakshara coparcenary, except in the manner and to the extent mentioned in Sections 6 and 30 of the Act, This Statement should also imply, though it does not say so expressly, the Succession Act to this extent does not affect the rights of the members governed by Dayabhaga coparcenary. The Full Bench in Pritam Singh;s case expressly noticed the judgment of earlier Full Bench in Joginder Singhs case but construed the same as irrelevant by observing that it dealt with the power of alienation of a person governed by Customary law and constitutional validity of Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act. Thus there is no real conflict between the two Full Bench judgments. Both the Full Bench judgments have been delivered on the assumption that Joginder Singhs case dealt with question of alienation whereas Pritam Singhs case had decided the question concerning succession. Even on fact in Joginder Singhs case the issue was validity of alienation by consent decree by a father to his two sons, which was challenged by third son, whereas in Pritam Singhs case the question of nature of property in hands of sons on death of their father had arisen  for purposes of assessment of estate duty. In Pritam  Singhs case the property in the hands of the sons was held to be coparcenary property and only 1/3rd of  property belonging to deceased father was considered eligible for estate duty. Therefore, there was no question of alienation in Pritam Singhs case. -  I do not find any infirmity in the well-reasoned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Hari Kishan and Ors. v. Administrator Municipal Committee;',
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			'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal, Sr. Adv. and; Sudhir Mittal, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' M.L Sarin, Sr. Adv.,; Ashish Handa,; H.N. Mehtani an',
			'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2005-05-25',
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			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Ashutosh Mohunta, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The vendee-plaintiffs have filed this appeal to challenge the judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below whereby their suit and the appeal against the partition of the land ordered by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Guhla, vide order dated 16.7.1975, were dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. In brief the facts giving rise to this appeal are that defendant-respondent Nos. 1 to 5 filed an application for partition of the suit land against Smt.Kirpal Kaur (Plaintiff No. 1) and defendant Nos. 6 to 15 in the court of Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Guhla. In that application Smt. Kirpal Kaur was proceeded against ex parte. The partition was confirmed on 16.6.1975 and the case was fixed for instrument of partition for 16.7.1975. Rai Jasbir Singh, plaintiff No. 2 purchased land measuring 80 Kanals from Smt. Kirpal Kaur (plaintiff No. 1) vide sale deed dated 27.5.1975 during the pendency of the partition proceedings and plaintiff No. 2 and 3, i.e., Rai Jasbir Singh and Swaran Singh were in actual physical possession of 228 Kanals 8 Marias and 77 Kanals 8 Marias, respectively. The plaintiffs challenged the order dated 16.7.1975 passed by the Assistant Grade, 1st Class, Guhla, by filing the present suit for declaration, which was dismissed by the Sub Judge, 1st Class, Kaithal, vide judgment and decree dated 29.1.1980 on the ground that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The plaintiffs then filed appeal to challenge the judgment and decree dated 29.1.1980 passed by the trial Court. During the pendency of the appeal, Smt. Kirpal Kaur withdrew herself from being the appellant. Consequently, vide order dated 17.1.1980 the appeal qua Kirpal Kaur was ordered to be dismissed as withdrawn. The appeal qua the remaining two appellants, i.e., Rai Jasbir Singh and Swaran Singh (present appellants) was dismissed by the Additional District Judge, Kurukshetra, vide judgment and decree dated 4.12.1981 and the decision of the trial Court with regard to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was upheld. Now Rai Jasbir Singh arid Swaran Singh have filed the present appeal wherein challenge has been made to the findings of both the Courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. It has been contended by Mr. R.S. Mittal, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the appellants, that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not duly served and, thus,the ex parte order dated 16.6.1975/16.7.1975 passed by the Assistant Collector,1st Grade, Guhla, was a nullity. It has further been argued by the learned counsel for the appellants that the Courts below erred in holding that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit against partition ordered by the Revenue Officer in view of the provisions of the <a href="/act/136769/the-punjab-land-revenue-act-1887-complete-act">Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887</a> (for short 'the Act'), despite the fact that the order for partition of the suit land was passed ex parte without serving Smt.Kirpal Kaur according to the prescribed legal procedure.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellants have been controverted by Mr. M.L.Sarin, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the respondents. It has been contended by him that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to go into the validity of the partition proceedings. The appellants have approached the Civil Court without exhausting the remedy available to them under Section 13 of the Act. It has further been contended by him that Smt. Kirpal Kaur had duly been served in the partition proceedings by sending notice to her by registered post.The counsel has also contended that she had withdrawn her appeal before the lower appellate court and in this view of the matter, the present appellants, who had purchased the land from her during the pendency of the partition proceedings, had no locus standi to challenge the order of partition passed by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. 1 have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the evidence adduced on record.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The only question that arises for consideration in the present appeal is to the following effect:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether or not the Civil Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the suit wherein the order of partition passed by a Revenue Officer has been challenged and Smt. Kirpal Kaur was properly served in the partition proceedings</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The first objection raised on behalf of the appellants is that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not served in the partition proceedings before the Assistant Collector 1st Grade, Guhla, as per the provisions contained in Section 20 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. I do not find any merit in this contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants. It is not the case of the appellants that Smt.Kirpal Kaur was not served at all. The bald statement of the plaintiffs was rebutted by the statement on oath of defendant Balwant Singh and also by documentary evidence adduced on record which shows that a registered notice was issued to her and acknowledgement due (Ex.DIO) was received in the office of the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade. Sub-section (3) of Section 20 of the Act gives discretion to the Revenue Officer to serve the concerned person 'either in addition to, or in substitution for, any other mode of service, by forwarding the summons by post in a-letter addressed' to him and registered under Part II of the Indian Post Office Act, 1886. In this view of the matter, it cannot be said that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not served as per the procedure prescribed under the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The next contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants is that the Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain the ex parte order passed by the Revenue Officer.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. This contention is also without any merit. Section 158 of the Act specifically excludes the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts in matters within the jurisdiction of the Revenue Officers. In order to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector, a provision for filing of appeals before the higher Revenue Authorities has been made in Section 13 of the Act. The plaintiffs without exhausting the remedies available to them under Section 13, approached the Civil Court to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Moreover, it has come on record that Smt. Kirpal Kaur, from whom the present appellants had purchased the land during the pendency of the partition proceedings, had withdrawn from the appeal before the lower appellate Court. As the present appellants had purchased the suit land during the pendency of the partition proceedings, they have, therefore, no locus standi to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector 1st Grade and pursue the appeal. It is not the case of the plaintiff-appellants that the ex parte decree was obtained by the defendant-respondents by fraud or misrepresentation. In A.C. Ananthaswamy and Ors. v. Boraiah (D) by Lrs. (2004-3)138 Punjab Law Reporter 557, it has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that in the absence of any fraud or misrepresentation, an ex parte order on the bare plea of non-service cannot be set aside. In the present case it is an undisputed fact that registered notice (Ex.DIO) was issued to Smt. Kirpal Kaur and she had even filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order passed by the Assistant Collector. The ratio of the authority Firm Seth Radha Kishun (deceased) represented by Hari Kishan and Ors. v. Administrator Municipal Committee, Ludhiana : [1964]2SCR273 , that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not specifically ousted where a statute created a liability and provided a remedy, is not applicable to the facts appearing in the present case. In the present case, as already mentioned above, registered A.D. notice was issued to and served on Smt. Kirpal Kaur, who had thereafter, filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Both the courts below have given concurrent findings of fact which cannot be interfered with in the second appeal in view of the provisions of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as no substantial question of law has either been pleaded in the memorandum of appeal or arises for consideration in the present appeal. I do not find any infirmity in the well-reasoned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Consequently, there is no merit in this appeal. It is, accordingly, dismissed. However, I do no make any order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'appealno' => 'Regular Second Appeal No. 615 of 1982 (O and M)',
		'appellant' => 'Rai Jasbir Singh and anr.',
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		'casename' => 'Rai Jasbir Singh and anr. Vs. Balwant Singh and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' - HINDU LAW -- Custom: [Vijender Jain, C.J., M.M. Kumar, Jasbir Singh, Rajive Bhalla & Rajesh Bindal, JJ] Alienation of ancestral property - Punjab and Haryana -  Held, In respect of State of Punjab by virtue of Punjab Amendment Act, 1973 there is a complete bar to contest any alienation of ancestral or non-ancestral immovable property or appointment of an heir to such property on ground that such alienation or appointment was contrary to custom. In Punjab the property in hands of a successor has to be treated as coparcenary property and its alienation has to be governed by Hindu Law except to the extent it is regulated by Sections 6 and 30 of the Hindu Succession Act. In Haryana, property  in hands of successor has to be treated as coparcenary property as well as ancestral property. Parties can fall back upon Hindu Law in case they fail to establish that rule of decision is custom. Therefore, in Haryana both under Hindu law and the Customary Law, the alienation would be open to challenge. Custom was given precedent over uncodified Hindu Law presumably for reason that custom has been consistently replacing the Hindu Law. However, it was soon realized that ancestral immovable property, which ordinarily held to be inalienable amongst Jats of Punjab by virtue of custom except for necessity, no limitation was placed on degrees of collateral, eligible to contest such alienation. It was, therefore, felt necessary to engraft certain restriction on degrees of collateral, eligible to contest an alienation, which under the custom itself was not limited. Accordingly, the Punjab Custom (Power to Contest) Act, 1920 (Act No.2 of 1920) was enacted. The Hindu Succession Act was extended to the State of Punjab.  Act 2 of Punjab Act defined expression alienation to include any testamentary disposition of property and appointment of an heir was to include any adoption made or purporting to be made according to custom. A further provision was made by Section 3 that Hindu Succession Act was to apply only in respect of alienation of immovable property or appointment of heirs made by persons who in regard to such alienation or appointment were governed by custom. Whereas  Section 4 declared that Hindu Succession Act was not to affect any right to contest any alienation or appointment of an heir made before the date on which the Succession Act was to come into force. In other words, Act, No.2 of 1920 was not to affect alienation or appointments of heir made before date on which it came into force. It also preserved the rights of any alienation or appointment of an heir made by a family. After Section 7 was inserted in Act of 1920 by the Punjab Amendment Act of 1973 right of contest being contrary to custom had been totally effaced and taken away. Therefore, no person has any right to contest any alienation of immovable property whether ancestral or non-ancestral on ground of being contrary to custom after January 23, 1973. In Haryana, the situation as enunciated by Act No.2 of 1920 continued to prevail in respect of alienation because no reforms parallel to Punjab as brought by Amendment Act of 1973, had been enacted although right to pre-emption has been substantially abolished in Haryana also. No steps even have been taken in that regard. Therefore, situation in Haryana have to be regarded as it existed under Act No. 2 of 1920.
HINDU SUCCESSION ACT,1956[C.A.No.30/1956] --  Sections 6 & 30: [Vijender Jain, C.J., M.M.Kumar, Jasbir Singh, Rajive Bhalla & Rajesh Bindal, JJ]  Alienation of coparcenary property - Law laid down by Full Bench in Joginder Singh Kundha Singh v Kehar Singh Dasaundha Singh [AIR 1965 Punjab 407] and Pritam Singh v Assistant Controller of Estate Duty, Patiala [1976 Punj LR 342] -Whether there is any conflict? - Held, The basic controversy in the Full Bench decision of Joginder Singhs case was regarding constitutional validity of Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act and as to whether it infringes Article 14 of Constitution. It was held that the estate held by male and limitation on his power of alienation were in no way removed and the reversioners were not debarred from challenging such alienations. The Full Bench held that Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act postulates that estate held by a Hindu female before enforcement of Succession Act either by inheritance or otherwise, was enlarged and on date of enforcement of Succession Act, she became a full owner. Likewise, if she has inherited any estate after the commencement of the Act,  she was to be regarded as absolute owner rather than a limited owner. Consequently, the limitations on power of alienation automatically vanished. This was the necessary result of the provisions made in Section 14 of the Act. The Full Bench further held that in respect of male proprietors, no corresponding provision was made either enlarging their estate in ancestral property or enlarging their power of alienation over property inherited by them. However, it noticed Section 30 and observed that it only deals with power of his share in coparcenary property by Will, which prior to enforcement of the Act, he had no right to do. The only provision made in respect of male proprietor regarding alienation of property was his power of alienation by Will. In so far as persons governed by custom are concerned, they continued to be governed by the restriction on the power of alienation of a male holder as existed before enforcement of the Act. Likewise, other restriction on alienation other than disposal by Will also continued. The Full Bench, thus, recognized the superior right of Hindu females by virtue of Section 14 and upheld the provision as intra vires. The argument that reversioners have ceased to exist after enactment of provisions of Section 14 of Succession Act, was rejected as there was no provision pointed out to that effect. The proposition laid down by the full Bench in Pritam Singhs case was that the Hindu Succession Act has not abolished joint Hindu family with respect to rights of those who were members of Mitakshara coparcenary, except in the manner and to the extent mentioned in Sections 6 and 30 of the Act, This Statement should also imply, though it does not say so expressly, the Succession Act to this extent does not affect the rights of the members governed by Dayabhaga coparcenary. The Full Bench in Pritam Singh;s case expressly noticed the judgment of earlier Full Bench in Joginder Singhs case but construed the same as irrelevant by observing that it dealt with the power of alienation of a person governed by Customary law and constitutional validity of Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act. Thus there is no real conflict between the two Full Bench judgments. Both the Full Bench judgments have been delivered on the assumption that Joginder Singhs case dealt with question of alienation whereas Pritam Singhs case had decided the question concerning succession. Even on fact in Joginder Singhs case the issue was validity of alienation by consent decree by a father to his two sons, which was challenged by third son, whereas in Pritam Singhs case the question of nature of property in hands of sons on death of their father had arisen  for purposes of assessment of estate duty. In Pritam  Singhs case the property in the hands of the sons was held to be coparcenary property and only 1/3rd of  property belonging to deceased father was considered eligible for estate duty. Therefore, there was no question of alienation in Pritam Singhs case. -  I do not find any infirmity in the well-reasoned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Hari Kishan and Ors. v. Administrator Municipal Committee;',
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		'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal, Sr. Adv. and; Sudhir Mittal, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' M.L Sarin, Sr. Adv.,; Ashish Handa,; H.N. Mehtani an',
		'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
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		'decidedon' => '2005-05-25',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
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		'judge' => ' Ashutosh Mohunta, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Ashutosh Mohunta, J.</p><p>1. The vendee-plaintiffs have filed this appeal to challenge the judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below whereby their suit and the appeal against the partition of the land ordered by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Guhla, vide order dated 16.7.1975, were dismissed.</p><p>2. In brief the facts giving rise to this appeal are that defendant-respondent Nos. 1 to 5 filed an application for partition of the suit land against Smt.Kirpal Kaur (Plaintiff No. 1) and defendant Nos. 6 to 15 in the court of Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Guhla. In that application Smt. Kirpal Kaur was proceeded against ex parte. The partition was confirmed on 16.6.1975 and the case was fixed for instrument of partition for 16.7.1975. Rai Jasbir Singh, plaintiff No. 2 purchased land measuring 80 Kanals from Smt. Kirpal Kaur (plaintiff No. 1) vide sale deed dated 27.5.1975 during the pendency of the partition proceedings and plaintiff No. 2 and 3, i.e., Rai Jasbir Singh and Swaran Singh were in actual physical possession of 228 Kanals 8 Marias and 77 Kanals 8 Marias, respectively. The plaintiffs challenged the order dated 16.7.1975 passed by the Assistant Grade, 1st Class, Guhla, by filing the present suit for declaration, which was dismissed by the Sub Judge, 1st Class, Kaithal, vide judgment and decree dated 29.1.1980 on the ground that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The plaintiffs then filed appeal to challenge the judgment and decree dated 29.1.1980 passed by the trial Court. During the pendency of the appeal, Smt. Kirpal Kaur withdrew herself from being the appellant. Consequently, vide order dated 17.1.1980 the appeal qua Kirpal Kaur was ordered to be dismissed as withdrawn. The appeal qua the remaining two appellants, i.e., Rai Jasbir Singh and Swaran Singh (present appellants) was dismissed by the Additional District Judge, Kurukshetra, vide judgment and decree dated 4.12.1981 and the decision of the trial Court with regard to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was upheld. Now Rai Jasbir Singh arid Swaran Singh have filed the present appeal wherein challenge has been made to the findings of both the Courts below.</p><p>3. It has been contended by Mr. R.S. Mittal, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the appellants, that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not duly served and, thus,the ex parte order dated 16.6.1975/16.7.1975 passed by the Assistant Collector,1st Grade, Guhla, was a nullity. It has further been argued by the learned counsel for the appellants that the Courts below erred in holding that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit against partition ordered by the Revenue Officer in view of the provisions of the <a>Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887</a> (for short 'the Act'), despite the fact that the order for partition of the suit land was passed ex parte without serving Smt.Kirpal Kaur according to the prescribed legal procedure.</p><p>4. The contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellants have been controverted by Mr. M.L.Sarin, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the respondents. It has been contended by him that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to go into the validity of the partition proceedings. The appellants have approached the Civil Court without exhausting the remedy available to them under Section 13 of the Act. It has further been contended by him that Smt. Kirpal Kaur had duly been served in the partition proceedings by sending notice to her by registered post.The counsel has also contended that she had withdrawn her appeal before the lower appellate court and in this view of the matter, the present appellants, who had purchased the land from her during the pendency of the partition proceedings, had no locus standi to challenge the order of partition passed by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade.</p><p>5. 1 have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the evidence adduced on record.</p><p>6. The only question that arises for consideration in the present appeal is to the following effect:-</p><p>Whether or not the Civil Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the suit wherein the order of partition passed by a Revenue Officer has been challenged and Smt. Kirpal Kaur was properly served in the partition proceedings</p><p>7. The first objection raised on behalf of the appellants is that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not served in the partition proceedings before the Assistant Collector 1st Grade, Guhla, as per the provisions contained in Section 20 of the Act.</p><p>8. I do not find any merit in this contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants. It is not the case of the appellants that Smt.Kirpal Kaur was not served at all. The bald statement of the plaintiffs was rebutted by the statement on oath of defendant Balwant Singh and also by documentary evidence adduced on record which shows that a registered notice was issued to her and acknowledgement due (Ex.DIO) was received in the office of the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade. Sub-section (3) of Section 20 of the Act gives discretion to the Revenue Officer to serve the concerned person 'either in addition to, or in substitution for, any other mode of service, by forwarding the summons by post in a-letter addressed' to him and registered under Part II of the Indian Post Office Act, 1886. In this view of the matter, it cannot be said that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not served as per the procedure prescribed under the Act.</p><p>9. The next contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants is that the Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain the ex parte order passed by the Revenue Officer.</p><p>10. This contention is also without any merit. Section 158 of the Act specifically excludes the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts in matters within the jurisdiction of the Revenue Officers. In order to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector, a provision for filing of appeals before the higher Revenue Authorities has been made in Section 13 of the Act. The plaintiffs without exhausting the remedies available to them under Section 13, approached the Civil Court to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector.</p><p>11. Moreover, it has come on record that Smt. Kirpal Kaur, from whom the present appellants had purchased the land during the pendency of the partition proceedings, had withdrawn from the appeal before the lower appellate Court. As the present appellants had purchased the suit land during the pendency of the partition proceedings, they have, therefore, no locus standi to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector 1st Grade and pursue the appeal. It is not the case of the plaintiff-appellants that the ex parte decree was obtained by the defendant-respondents by fraud or misrepresentation. In A.C. Ananthaswamy and Ors. v. Boraiah (D) by Lrs. (2004-3)138 Punjab Law Reporter 557, it has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that in the absence of any fraud or misrepresentation, an ex parte order on the bare plea of non-service cannot be set aside. In the present case it is an undisputed fact that registered notice (Ex.DIO) was issued to Smt. Kirpal Kaur and she had even filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order passed by the Assistant Collector. The ratio of the authority Firm Seth Radha Kishun (deceased) represented by Hari Kishan and Ors. v. Administrator Municipal Committee, Ludhiana : [1964]2SCR273 , that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not specifically ousted where a statute created a liability and provided a remedy, is not applicable to the facts appearing in the present case. In the present case, as already mentioned above, registered A.D. notice was issued to and served on Smt. Kirpal Kaur, who had thereafter, filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order.</p><p>12. Both the courts below have given concurrent findings of fact which cannot be interfered with in the second appeal in view of the provisions of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as no substantial question of law has either been pleaded in the memorandum of appeal or arises for consideration in the present appeal. I do not find any infirmity in the well-reasoned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below.</p><p>13. Consequently, there is no merit in this appeal. It is, accordingly, dismissed. However, I do no make any order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
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			'id' => '629369',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/136769/the-punjab-land-revenue-act-1887-complete-act">Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887</a> - Sections 13, 20, 20(3) and 158; Indian Post Office Act, 1886; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) - Sections 100',
			'appealno' => 'Regular Second Appeal No. 615 of 1982 (O and M)',
			'appellant' => 'Rai Jasbir Singh and anr.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Rai Jasbir Singh and anr. Vs. Balwant Singh and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' - HINDU LAW -- Custom: [Vijender Jain, C.J., M.M. Kumar, Jasbir Singh, Rajive Bhalla & Rajesh Bindal, JJ] Alienation of ancestral property - Punjab and Haryana -  Held, In respect of State of Punjab by virtue of Punjab Amendment Act, 1973 there is a complete bar to contest any alienation of ancestral or non-ancestral immovable property or appointment of an heir to such property on ground that such alienation or appointment was contrary to custom. In Punjab the property in hands of a successor has to be treated as coparcenary property and its alienation has to be governed by Hindu Law except to the extent it is regulated by Sections 6 and 30 of the Hindu Succession Act. In Haryana, property  in hands of successor has to be treated as coparcenary property as well as ancestral property. Parties can fall back upon Hindu Law in case they fail to establish that rule of decision is custom. Therefore, in Haryana both under Hindu law and the Customary Law, the alienation would be open to challenge. Custom was given precedent over uncodified Hindu Law presumably for reason that custom has been consistently replacing the Hindu Law. However, it was soon realized that ancestral immovable property, which ordinarily held to be inalienable amongst Jats of Punjab by virtue of custom except for necessity, no limitation was placed on degrees of collateral, eligible to contest such alienation. It was, therefore, felt necessary to engraft certain restriction on degrees of collateral, eligible to contest an alienation, which under the custom itself was not limited. Accordingly, the Punjab Custom (Power to Contest) Act, 1920 (Act No.2 of 1920) was enacted. The Hindu Succession Act was extended to the State of Punjab.  Act 2 of Punjab Act defined expression alienation to include any testamentary disposition of property and appointment of an heir was to include any adoption made or purporting to be made according to custom. A further provision was made by Section 3 that Hindu Succession Act was to apply only in respect of alienation of immovable property or appointment of heirs made by persons who in regard to such alienation or appointment were governed by custom. Whereas  Section 4 declared that Hindu Succession Act was not to affect any right to contest any alienation or appointment of an heir made before the date on which the Succession Act was to come into force. In other words, Act, No.2 of 1920 was not to affect alienation or appointments of heir made before date on which it came into force. It also preserved the rights of any alienation or appointment of an heir made by a family. After Section 7 was inserted in Act of 1920 by the Punjab Amendment Act of 1973 right of contest being contrary to custom had been totally effaced and taken away. Therefore, no person has any right to contest any alienation of immovable property whether ancestral or non-ancestral on ground of being contrary to custom after January 23, 1973. In Haryana, the situation as enunciated by Act No.2 of 1920 continued to prevail in respect of alienation because no reforms parallel to Punjab as brought by Amendment Act of 1973, had been enacted although right to pre-emption has been substantially abolished in Haryana also. No steps even have been taken in that regard. Therefore, situation in Haryana have to be regarded as it existed under Act No. 2 of 1920.
HINDU SUCCESSION ACT,1956[C.A.No.30/1956] --  Sections 6 & 30: [Vijender Jain, C.J., M.M.Kumar, Jasbir Singh, Rajive Bhalla & Rajesh Bindal, JJ]  Alienation of coparcenary property - Law laid down by Full Bench in Joginder Singh Kundha Singh v Kehar Singh Dasaundha Singh [AIR 1965 Punjab 407] and Pritam Singh v Assistant Controller of Estate Duty, Patiala [1976 Punj LR 342] -Whether there is any conflict? - Held, The basic controversy in the Full Bench decision of Joginder Singhs case was regarding constitutional validity of Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act and as to whether it infringes Article 14 of Constitution. It was held that the estate held by male and limitation on his power of alienation were in no way removed and the reversioners were not debarred from challenging such alienations. The Full Bench held that Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act postulates that estate held by a Hindu female before enforcement of Succession Act either by inheritance or otherwise, was enlarged and on date of enforcement of Succession Act, she became a full owner. Likewise, if she has inherited any estate after the commencement of the Act,  she was to be regarded as absolute owner rather than a limited owner. Consequently, the limitations on power of alienation automatically vanished. This was the necessary result of the provisions made in Section 14 of the Act. The Full Bench further held that in respect of male proprietors, no corresponding provision was made either enlarging their estate in ancestral property or enlarging their power of alienation over property inherited by them. However, it noticed Section 30 and observed that it only deals with power of his share in coparcenary property by Will, which prior to enforcement of the Act, he had no right to do. The only provision made in respect of male proprietor regarding alienation of property was his power of alienation by Will. In so far as persons governed by custom are concerned, they continued to be governed by the restriction on the power of alienation of a male holder as existed before enforcement of the Act. Likewise, other restriction on alienation other than disposal by Will also continued. The Full Bench, thus, recognized the superior right of Hindu females by virtue of Section 14 and upheld the provision as intra vires. The argument that reversioners have ceased to exist after enactment of provisions of Section 14 of Succession Act, was rejected as there was no provision pointed out to that effect. The proposition laid down by the full Bench in Pritam Singhs case was that the Hindu Succession Act has not abolished joint Hindu family with respect to rights of those who were members of Mitakshara coparcenary, except in the manner and to the extent mentioned in Sections 6 and 30 of the Act, This Statement should also imply, though it does not say so expressly, the Succession Act to this extent does not affect the rights of the members governed by Dayabhaga coparcenary. The Full Bench in Pritam Singh;s case expressly noticed the judgment of earlier Full Bench in Joginder Singhs case but construed the same as irrelevant by observing that it dealt with the power of alienation of a person governed by Customary law and constitutional validity of Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act. Thus there is no real conflict between the two Full Bench judgments. Both the Full Bench judgments have been delivered on the assumption that Joginder Singhs case dealt with question of alienation whereas Pritam Singhs case had decided the question concerning succession. Even on fact in Joginder Singhs case the issue was validity of alienation by consent decree by a father to his two sons, which was challenged by third son, whereas in Pritam Singhs case the question of nature of property in hands of sons on death of their father had arisen  for purposes of assessment of estate duty. In Pritam  Singhs case the property in the hands of the sons was held to be coparcenary property and only 1/3rd of  property belonging to deceased father was considered eligible for estate duty. Therefore, there was no question of alienation in Pritam Singhs case. -  I do not find any infirmity in the well-reasoned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Hari Kishan and Ors. v. Administrator Municipal Committee;',
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			'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal, Sr. Adv. and; Sudhir Mittal, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' M.L Sarin, Sr. Adv.,; Ashish Handa,; H.N. Mehtani an',
			'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2005-05-25',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
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			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' Ashutosh Mohunta, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Ashutosh Mohunta, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The vendee-plaintiffs have filed this appeal to challenge the judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below whereby their suit and the appeal against the partition of the land ordered by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Guhla, vide order dated 16.7.1975, were dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. In brief the facts giving rise to this appeal are that defendant-respondent Nos. 1 to 5 filed an application for partition of the suit land against Smt.Kirpal Kaur (Plaintiff No. 1) and defendant Nos. 6 to 15 in the court of Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Guhla. In that application Smt. Kirpal Kaur was proceeded against ex parte. The partition was confirmed on 16.6.1975 and the case was fixed for instrument of partition for 16.7.1975. Rai Jasbir Singh, plaintiff No. 2 purchased land measuring 80 Kanals from Smt. Kirpal Kaur (plaintiff No. 1) vide sale deed dated 27.5.1975 during the pendency of the partition proceedings and plaintiff No. 2 and 3, i.e., Rai Jasbir Singh and Swaran Singh were in actual physical possession of 228 Kanals 8 Marias and 77 Kanals 8 Marias, respectively. The plaintiffs challenged the order dated 16.7.1975 passed by the Assistant Grade, 1st Class, Guhla, by filing the present suit for declaration, which was dismissed by the Sub Judge, 1st Class, Kaithal, vide judgment and decree dated 29.1.1980 on the ground that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The plaintiffs then filed appeal to challenge the judgment and decree dated 29.1.1980 passed by the trial Court. During the pendency of the appeal, Smt. Kirpal Kaur withdrew herself from being the appellant. Consequently, vide order dated 17.1.1980 the appeal qua Kirpal Kaur was ordered to be dismissed as withdrawn. The appeal qua the remaining two appellants, i.e., Rai Jasbir Singh and Swaran Singh (present appellants) was dismissed by the Additional District Judge, Kurukshetra, vide judgment and decree dated 4.12.1981 and the decision of the trial Court with regard to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was upheld. Now Rai Jasbir Singh arid Swaran Singh have filed the present appeal wherein challenge has been made to the findings of both the Courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. It has been contended by Mr. R.S. Mittal, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the appellants, that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not duly served and, thus,the ex parte order dated 16.6.1975/16.7.1975 passed by the Assistant Collector,1st Grade, Guhla, was a nullity. It has further been argued by the learned counsel for the appellants that the Courts below erred in holding that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit against partition ordered by the Revenue Officer in view of the provisions of the <a href="/act/136769/the-punjab-land-revenue-act-1887-complete-act">Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887</a> (for short 'the Act'), despite the fact that the order for partition of the suit land was passed ex parte without serving Smt.Kirpal Kaur according to the prescribed legal procedure.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellants have been controverted by Mr. M.L.Sarin, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the respondents. It has been contended by him that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to go into the validity of the partition proceedings. The appellants have approached the Civil Court without exhausting the remedy available to them under Section 13 of the Act. It has further been contended by him that Smt. Kirpal Kaur had duly been served in the partition proceedings by sending notice to her by registered post.The counsel has also contended that she had withdrawn her appeal before the lower appellate court and in this view of the matter, the present appellants, who had purchased the land from her during the pendency of the partition proceedings, had no locus standi to challenge the order of partition passed by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. 1 have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the evidence adduced on record.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The only question that arises for consideration in the present appeal is to the following effect:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether or not the Civil Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the suit wherein the order of partition passed by a Revenue Officer has been challenged and Smt. Kirpal Kaur was properly served in the partition proceedings</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The first objection raised on behalf of the appellants is that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not served in the partition proceedings before the Assistant Collector 1st Grade, Guhla, as per the provisions contained in Section 20 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. I do not find any merit in this contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants. It is not the case of the appellants that Smt.Kirpal Kaur was not served at all. The bald statement of the plaintiffs was rebutted by the statement on oath of defendant Balwant Singh and also by documentary evidence adduced on record which shows that a registered notice was issued to her and acknowledgement due (Ex.DIO) was received in the office of the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade. Sub-section (3) of Section 20 of the Act gives discretion to the Revenue Officer to serve the concerned person 'either in addition to, or in substitution for, any other mode of service, by forwarding the summons by post in a-letter addressed' to him and registered under Part II of the Indian Post Office Act, 1886. In this view of the matter, it cannot be said that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not served as per the procedure prescribed under the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The next contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants is that the Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain the ex parte order passed by the Revenue Officer.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. This contention is also without any merit. Section 158 of the Act specifically excludes the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts in matters within the jurisdiction of the Revenue Officers. In order to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector, a provision for filing of appeals before the higher Revenue Authorities has been made in Section 13 of the Act. The plaintiffs without exhausting the remedies available to them under Section 13, approached the Civil Court to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Moreover, it has come on record that Smt. Kirpal Kaur, from whom the present appellants had purchased the land during the pendency of the partition proceedings, had withdrawn from the appeal before the lower appellate Court. As the present appellants had purchased the suit land during the pendency of the partition proceedings, they have, therefore, no locus standi to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector 1st Grade and pursue the appeal. It is not the case of the plaintiff-appellants that the ex parte decree was obtained by the defendant-respondents by fraud or misrepresentation. In A.C. Ananthaswamy and Ors. v. Boraiah (D) by Lrs. (2004-3)138 Punjab Law Reporter 557, it has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that in the absence of any fraud or misrepresentation, an ex parte order on the bare plea of non-service cannot be set aside. In the present case it is an undisputed fact that registered notice (Ex.DIO) was issued to Smt. Kirpal Kaur and she had even filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order passed by the Assistant Collector. The ratio of the authority Firm Seth Radha Kishun (deceased) represented by Hari Kishan and Ors. v. Administrator Municipal Committee, Ludhiana : [1964]2SCR273 , that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not specifically ousted where a statute created a liability and provided a remedy, is not applicable to the facts appearing in the present case. In the present case, as already mentioned above, registered A.D. notice was issued to and served on Smt. Kirpal Kaur, who had thereafter, filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Both the courts below have given concurrent findings of fact which cannot be interfered with in the second appeal in view of the provisions of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as no substantial question of law has either been pleaded in the memorandum of appeal or arises for consideration in the present appeal. I do not find any infirmity in the well-reasoned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Consequently, there is no merit in this appeal. It is, accordingly, dismissed. However, I do no make any order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'casename' => 'Rai Jasbir Singh and anr. Vs. Balwant Singh and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' - HINDU LAW -- Custom: [Vijender Jain, C.J., M.M. Kumar, Jasbir Singh, Rajive Bhalla & Rajesh Bindal, JJ] Alienation of ancestral property - Punjab and Haryana -  Held, In respect of State of Punjab by virtue of Punjab Amendment Act, 1973 there is a complete bar to contest any alienation of ancestral or non-ancestral immovable property or appointment of an heir to such property on ground that such alienation or appointment was contrary to custom. In Punjab the property in hands of a successor has to be treated as coparcenary property and its alienation has to be governed by Hindu Law except to the extent it is regulated by Sections 6 and 30 of the Hindu Succession Act. In Haryana, property  in hands of successor has to be treated as coparcenary property as well as ancestral property. Parties can fall back upon Hindu Law in case they fail to establish that rule of decision is custom. Therefore, in Haryana both under Hindu law and the Customary Law, the alienation would be open to challenge. Custom was given precedent over uncodified Hindu Law presumably for reason that custom has been consistently replacing the Hindu Law. However, it was soon realized that ancestral immovable property, which ordinarily held to be inalienable amongst Jats of Punjab by virtue of custom except for necessity, no limitation was placed on degrees of collateral, eligible to contest such alienation. It was, therefore, felt necessary to engraft certain restriction on degrees of collateral, eligible to contest an alienation, which under the custom itself was not limited. Accordingly, the Punjab Custom (Power to Contest) Act, 1920 (Act No.2 of 1920) was enacted. The Hindu Succession Act was extended to the State of Punjab.  Act 2 of Punjab Act defined expression alienation to include any testamentary disposition of property and appointment of an heir was to include any adoption made or purporting to be made according to custom. A further provision was made by Section 3 that Hindu Succession Act was to apply only in respect of alienation of immovable property or appointment of heirs made by persons who in regard to such alienation or appointment were governed by custom. Whereas  Section 4 declared that Hindu Succession Act was not to affect any right to contest any alienation or appointment of an heir made before the date on which the Succession Act was to come into force. In other words, Act, No.2 of 1920 was not to affect alienation or appointments of heir made before date on which it came into force. It also preserved the rights of any alienation or appointment of an heir made by a family. After Section 7 was inserted in Act of 1920 by the Punjab Amendment Act of 1973 right of contest being contrary to custom had been totally effaced and taken away. Therefore, no person has any right to contest any alienation of immovable property whether ancestral or non-ancestral on ground of being contrary to custom after January 23, 1973. In Haryana, the situation as enunciated by Act No.2 of 1920 continued to prevail in respect of alienation because no reforms parallel to Punjab as brought by Amendment Act of 1973, had been enacted although right to pre-emption has been substantially abolished in Haryana also. No steps even have been taken in that regard. Therefore, situation in Haryana have to be regarded as it existed under Act No. 2 of 1920.
HINDU SUCCESSION ACT,1956[C.A.No.30/1956] --  Sections 6 & 30: [Vijender Jain, C.J., M.M.Kumar, Jasbir Singh, Rajive Bhalla & Rajesh Bindal, JJ]  Alienation of coparcenary property - Law laid down by Full Bench in Joginder Singh Kundha Singh v Kehar Singh Dasaundha Singh [AIR 1965 Punjab 407] and Pritam Singh v Assistant Controller of Estate Duty, Patiala [1976 Punj LR 342] -Whether there is any conflict? - Held, The basic controversy in the Full Bench decision of Joginder Singhs case was regarding constitutional validity of Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act and as to whether it infringes Article 14 of Constitution. It was held that the estate held by male and limitation on his power of alienation were in no way removed and the reversioners were not debarred from challenging such alienations. The Full Bench held that Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act postulates that estate held by a Hindu female before enforcement of Succession Act either by inheritance or otherwise, was enlarged and on date of enforcement of Succession Act, she became a full owner. Likewise, if she has inherited any estate after the commencement of the Act,  she was to be regarded as absolute owner rather than a limited owner. Consequently, the limitations on power of alienation automatically vanished. This was the necessary result of the provisions made in Section 14 of the Act. The Full Bench further held that in respect of male proprietors, no corresponding provision was made either enlarging their estate in ancestral property or enlarging their power of alienation over property inherited by them. However, it noticed Section 30 and observed that it only deals with power of his share in coparcenary property by Will, which prior to enforcement of the Act, he had no right to do. The only provision made in respect of male proprietor regarding alienation of property was his power of alienation by Will. In so far as persons governed by custom are concerned, they continued to be governed by the restriction on the power of alienation of a male holder as existed before enforcement of the Act. Likewise, other restriction on alienation other than disposal by Will also continued. The Full Bench, thus, recognized the superior right of Hindu females by virtue of Section 14 and upheld the provision as intra vires. The argument that reversioners have ceased to exist after enactment of provisions of Section 14 of Succession Act, was rejected as there was no provision pointed out to that effect. The proposition laid down by the full Bench in Pritam Singhs case was that the Hindu Succession Act has not abolished joint Hindu family with respect to rights of those who were members of Mitakshara coparcenary, except in the manner and to the extent mentioned in Sections 6 and 30 of the Act, This Statement should also imply, though it does not say so expressly, the Succession Act to this extent does not affect the rights of the members governed by Dayabhaga coparcenary. The Full Bench in Pritam Singh;s case expressly noticed the judgment of earlier Full Bench in Joginder Singhs case but construed the same as irrelevant by observing that it dealt with the power of alienation of a person governed by Customary law and constitutional validity of Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act. Thus there is no real conflict between the two Full Bench judgments. Both the Full Bench judgments have been delivered on the assumption that Joginder Singhs case dealt with question of alienation whereas Pritam Singhs case had decided the question concerning succession. Even on fact in Joginder Singhs case the issue was validity of alienation by consent decree by a father to his two sons, which was challenged by third son, whereas in Pritam Singhs case the question of nature of property in hands of sons on death of their father had arisen  for purposes of assessment of estate duty. In Pritam  Singhs case the property in the hands of the sons was held to be coparcenary property and only 1/3rd of  property belonging to deceased father was considered eligible for estate duty. Therefore, there was no question of alienation in Pritam Singhs case. -  I do not find any infirmity in the well-reasoned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Hari Kishan and Ors. v. Administrator Municipal Committee;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal, Sr. Adv. and; Sudhir Mittal, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' M.L Sarin, Sr. Adv.,; Ashish Handa,; H.N. Mehtani an',
		'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2005-05-25',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Ashutosh Mohunta, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Ashutosh Mohunta, J.</p><p>1. The vendee-plaintiffs have filed this appeal to challenge the judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below whereby their suit and the appeal against the partition of the land ordered by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Guhla, vide order dated 16.7.1975, were dismissed.</p><p>2. In brief the facts giving rise to this appeal are that defendant-respondent Nos. 1 to 5 filed an application for partition of the suit land against Smt.Kirpal Kaur (Plaintiff No. 1) and defendant Nos. 6 to 15 in the court of Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Guhla. In that application Smt. Kirpal Kaur was proceeded against ex parte. The partition was confirmed on 16.6.1975 and the case was fixed for instrument of partition for 16.7.1975. Rai Jasbir Singh, plaintiff No. 2 purchased land measuring 80 Kanals from Smt. Kirpal Kaur (plaintiff No. 1) vide sale deed dated 27.5.1975 during the pendency of the partition proceedings and plaintiff No. 2 and 3, i.e., Rai Jasbir Singh and Swaran Singh were in actual physical possession of 228 Kanals 8 Marias and 77 Kanals 8 Marias, respectively. The plaintiffs challenged the order dated 16.7.1975 passed by the Assistant Grade, 1st Class, Guhla, by filing the present suit for declaration, which was dismissed by the Sub Judge, 1st Class, Kaithal, vide judgment and decree dated 29.1.1980 on the ground that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The plaintiffs then filed appeal to challenge the judgment and decree dated 29.1.1980 passed by the trial Court. During the pendency of the appeal, Smt. Kirpal Kaur withdrew herself from being the appellant. Consequently, vide order dated 17.1.1980 the appeal qua Kirpal Kaur was ordered to be dismissed as withdrawn. The appeal qua the remaining two appellants, i.e., Rai Jasbir Singh and Swaran Singh (present appellants) was dismissed by the Additional District Judge, Kurukshetra, vide judgment and decree dated 4.12.1981 and the decision of the trial Court with regard to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was upheld. Now Rai Jasbir Singh arid Swaran Singh have filed the present appeal wherein challenge has been made to the findings of both the Courts below.</p><p>3. It has been contended by Mr. R.S. Mittal, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the appellants, that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not duly served and, thus,the ex parte order dated 16.6.1975/16.7.1975 passed by the Assistant Collector,1st Grade, Guhla, was a nullity. It has further been argued by the learned counsel for the appellants that the Courts below erred in holding that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit against partition ordered by the Revenue Officer in view of the provisions of the <a>Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887</a> (for short 'the Act'), despite the fact that the order for partition of the suit land was passed ex parte without serving Smt.Kirpal Kaur according to the prescribed legal procedure.</p><p>4. The contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellants have been controverted by Mr. M.L.Sarin, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the respondents. It has been contended by him that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to go into the validity of the partition proceedings. The appellants have approached the Civil Court without exhausting the remedy available to them under Section 13 of the Act. It has further been contended by him that Smt. Kirpal Kaur had duly been served in the partition proceedings by sending notice to her by registered post.The counsel has also contended that she had withdrawn her appeal before the lower appellate court and in this view of the matter, the present appellants, who had purchased the land from her during the pendency of the partition proceedings, had no locus standi to challenge the order of partition passed by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade.</p><p>5. 1 have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the evidence adduced on record.</p><p>6. The only question that arises for consideration in the present appeal is to the following effect:-</p><p>Whether or not the Civil Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the suit wherein the order of partition passed by a Revenue Officer has been challenged and Smt. Kirpal Kaur was properly served in the partition proceedings</p><p>7. The first objection raised on behalf of the appellants is that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not served in the partition proceedings before the Assistant Collector 1st Grade, Guhla, as per the provisions contained in Section 20 of the Act.</p><p>8. I do not find any merit in this contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants. It is not the case of the appellants that Smt.Kirpal Kaur was not served at all. The bald statement of the plaintiffs was rebutted by the statement on oath of defendant Balwant Singh and also by documentary evidence adduced on record which shows that a registered notice was issued to her and acknowledgement due (Ex.DIO) was received in the office of the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade. Sub-section (3) of Section 20 of the Act gives discretion to the Revenue Officer to serve the concerned person 'either in addition to, or in substitution for, any other mode of service, by forwarding the summons by post in a-letter addressed' to him and registered under Part II of the Indian Post Office Act, 1886. In this view of the matter, it cannot be said that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not served as per the procedure prescribed under the Act.</p><p>9. The next contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants is that the Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain the ex parte order passed by the Revenue Officer.</p><p>10. This contention is also without any merit. Section 158 of the Act specifically excludes the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts in matters within the jurisdiction of the Revenue Officers. In order to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector, a provision for filing of appeals before the higher Revenue Authorities has been made in Section 13 of the Act. The plaintiffs without exhausting the remedies available to them under Section 13, approached the Civil Court to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector.</p><p>11. Moreover, it has come on record that Smt. Kirpal Kaur, from whom the present appellants had purchased the land during the pendency of the partition proceedings, had withdrawn from the appeal before the lower appellate Court. As the present appellants had purchased the suit land during the pendency of the partition proceedings, they have, therefore, no locus standi to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector 1st Grade and pursue the appeal. It is not the case of the plaintiff-appellants that the ex parte decree was obtained by the defendant-respondents by fraud or misrepresentation. In A.C. Ananthaswamy and Ors. v. Boraiah (D) by Lrs. (2004-3)138 Punjab Law Reporter 557, it has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that in the absence of any fraud or misrepresentation, an ex parte order on the bare plea of non-service cannot be set aside. In the present case it is an undisputed fact that registered notice (Ex.DIO) was issued to Smt. Kirpal Kaur and she had even filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order passed by the Assistant Collector. The ratio of the authority Firm Seth Radha Kishun (deceased) represented by Hari Kishan and Ors. v. Administrator Municipal Committee, Ludhiana : [1964]2SCR273 , that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not specifically ousted where a statute created a liability and provided a remedy, is not applicable to the facts appearing in the present case. In the present case, as already mentioned above, registered A.D. notice was issued to and served on Smt. Kirpal Kaur, who had thereafter, filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order.</p><p>12. Both the courts below have given concurrent findings of fact which cannot be interfered with in the second appeal in view of the provisions of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as no substantial question of law has either been pleaded in the memorandum of appeal or arises for consideration in the present appeal. I do not find any infirmity in the well-reasoned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below.</p><p>13. Consequently, there is no merit in this appeal. It is, accordingly, dismissed. However, I do no make any order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '(2006)142PLR339',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Balwant Singh and ors.',
		'sub' => 'Property',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
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$ctype = ' High Court'
$caseref = 'Hari Kishan and Ors. v. Administrator Municipal Committee<br>'
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	'title_for_layout' => 'Rai Jasbir Singh and anr Vs Balwant Singh and ors - Citation 629369 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '629369',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/136769/the-punjab-land-revenue-act-1887-complete-act">Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887</a> - Sections 13, 20, 20(3) and 158; Indian Post Office Act, 1886; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) - Sections 100',
			'appealno' => 'Regular Second Appeal No. 615 of 1982 (O and M)',
			'appellant' => 'Rai Jasbir Singh and anr.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Rai Jasbir Singh and anr. Vs. Balwant Singh and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' - HINDU LAW -- Custom: [Vijender Jain, C.J., M.M. Kumar, Jasbir Singh, Rajive Bhalla & Rajesh Bindal, JJ] Alienation of ancestral property - Punjab and Haryana -  Held, In respect of State of Punjab by virtue of Punjab Amendment Act, 1973 there is a complete bar to contest any alienation of ancestral or non-ancestral immovable property or appointment of an heir to such property on ground that such alienation or appointment was contrary to custom. In Punjab the property in hands of a successor has to be treated as coparcenary property and its alienation has to be governed by Hindu Law except to the extent it is regulated by Sections 6 and 30 of the Hindu Succession Act. In Haryana, property  in hands of successor has to be treated as coparcenary property as well as ancestral property. Parties can fall back upon Hindu Law in case they fail to establish that rule of decision is custom. Therefore, in Haryana both under Hindu law and the Customary Law, the alienation would be open to challenge. Custom was given precedent over uncodified Hindu Law presumably for reason that custom has been consistently replacing the Hindu Law. However, it was soon realized that ancestral immovable property, which ordinarily held to be inalienable amongst Jats of Punjab by virtue of custom except for necessity, no limitation was placed on degrees of collateral, eligible to contest such alienation. It was, therefore, felt necessary to engraft certain restriction on degrees of collateral, eligible to contest an alienation, which under the custom itself was not limited. Accordingly, the Punjab Custom (Power to Contest) Act, 1920 (Act No.2 of 1920) was enacted. The Hindu Succession Act was extended to the State of Punjab.  Act 2 of Punjab Act defined expression alienation to include any testamentary disposition of property and appointment of an heir was to include any adoption made or purporting to be made according to custom. A further provision was made by Section 3 that Hindu Succession Act was to apply only in respect of alienation of immovable property or appointment of heirs made by persons who in regard to such alienation or appointment were governed by custom. Whereas  Section 4 declared that Hindu Succession Act was not to affect any right to contest any alienation or appointment of an heir made before the date on which the Succession Act was to come into force. In other words, Act, No.2 of 1920 was not to affect alienation or appointments of heir made before date on which it came into force. It also preserved the rights of any alienation or appointment of an heir made by a family. After Section 7 was inserted in Act of 1920 by the Punjab Amendment Act of 1973 right of contest being contrary to custom had been totally effaced and taken away. Therefore, no person has any right to contest any alienation of immovable property whether ancestral or non-ancestral on ground of being contrary to custom after January 23, 1973. In Haryana, the situation as enunciated by Act No.2 of 1920 continued to prevail in respect of alienation because no reforms parallel to Punjab as brought by Amendment Act of 1973, had been enacted although right to pre-emption has been substantially abolished in Haryana also. No steps even have been taken in that regard. Therefore, situation in Haryana have to be regarded as it existed under Act No. 2 of 1920.
HINDU SUCCESSION ACT,1956[C.A.No.30/1956] --  Sections 6 & 30: [Vijender Jain, C.J., M.M.Kumar, Jasbir Singh, Rajive Bhalla & Rajesh Bindal, JJ]  Alienation of coparcenary property - Law laid down by Full Bench in Joginder Singh Kundha Singh v Kehar Singh Dasaundha Singh [AIR 1965 Punjab 407] and Pritam Singh v Assistant Controller of Estate Duty, Patiala [1976 Punj LR 342] -Whether there is any conflict? - Held, The basic controversy in the Full Bench decision of Joginder Singhs case was regarding constitutional validity of Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act and as to whether it infringes Article 14 of Constitution. It was held that the estate held by male and limitation on his power of alienation were in no way removed and the reversioners were not debarred from challenging such alienations. The Full Bench held that Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act postulates that estate held by a Hindu female before enforcement of Succession Act either by inheritance or otherwise, was enlarged and on date of enforcement of Succession Act, she became a full owner. Likewise, if she has inherited any estate after the commencement of the Act,  she was to be regarded as absolute owner rather than a limited owner. Consequently, the limitations on power of alienation automatically vanished. This was the necessary result of the provisions made in Section 14 of the Act. The Full Bench further held that in respect of male proprietors, no corresponding provision was made either enlarging their estate in ancestral property or enlarging their power of alienation over property inherited by them. However, it noticed Section 30 and observed that it only deals with power of his share in coparcenary property by Will, which prior to enforcement of the Act, he had no right to do. The only provision made in respect of male proprietor regarding alienation of property was his power of alienation by Will. In so far as persons governed by custom are concerned, they continued to be governed by the restriction on the power of alienation of a male holder as existed before enforcement of the Act. Likewise, other restriction on alienation other than disposal by Will also continued. The Full Bench, thus, recognized the superior right of Hindu females by virtue of Section 14 and upheld the provision as intra vires. The argument that reversioners have ceased to exist after enactment of provisions of Section 14 of Succession Act, was rejected as there was no provision pointed out to that effect. The proposition laid down by the full Bench in Pritam Singhs case was that the Hindu Succession Act has not abolished joint Hindu family with respect to rights of those who were members of Mitakshara coparcenary, except in the manner and to the extent mentioned in Sections 6 and 30 of the Act, This Statement should also imply, though it does not say so expressly, the Succession Act to this extent does not affect the rights of the members governed by Dayabhaga coparcenary. The Full Bench in Pritam Singh;s case expressly noticed the judgment of earlier Full Bench in Joginder Singhs case but construed the same as irrelevant by observing that it dealt with the power of alienation of a person governed by Customary law and constitutional validity of Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act. Thus there is no real conflict between the two Full Bench judgments. Both the Full Bench judgments have been delivered on the assumption that Joginder Singhs case dealt with question of alienation whereas Pritam Singhs case had decided the question concerning succession. Even on fact in Joginder Singhs case the issue was validity of alienation by consent decree by a father to his two sons, which was challenged by third son, whereas in Pritam Singhs case the question of nature of property in hands of sons on death of their father had arisen  for purposes of assessment of estate duty. In Pritam  Singhs case the property in the hands of the sons was held to be coparcenary property and only 1/3rd of  property belonging to deceased father was considered eligible for estate duty. Therefore, there was no question of alienation in Pritam Singhs case. -  I do not find any infirmity in the well-reasoned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Hari Kishan and Ors. v. Administrator Municipal Committee;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal, Sr. Adv. and; Sudhir Mittal, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' M.L Sarin, Sr. Adv.,; Ashish Handa,; H.N. Mehtani an',
			'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2005-05-25',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' Ashutosh Mohunta, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Ashutosh Mohunta, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The vendee-plaintiffs have filed this appeal to challenge the judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below whereby their suit and the appeal against the partition of the land ordered by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Guhla, vide order dated 16.7.1975, were dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. In brief the facts giving rise to this appeal are that defendant-respondent Nos. 1 to 5 filed an application for partition of the suit land against Smt.Kirpal Kaur (Plaintiff No. 1) and defendant Nos. 6 to 15 in the court of Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Guhla. In that application Smt. Kirpal Kaur was proceeded against ex parte. The partition was confirmed on 16.6.1975 and the case was fixed for instrument of partition for 16.7.1975. Rai Jasbir Singh, plaintiff No. 2 purchased land measuring 80 Kanals from Smt. Kirpal Kaur (plaintiff No. 1) vide sale deed dated 27.5.1975 during the pendency of the partition proceedings and plaintiff No. 2 and 3, i.e., Rai Jasbir Singh and Swaran Singh were in actual physical possession of 228 Kanals 8 Marias and 77 Kanals 8 Marias, respectively. The plaintiffs challenged the order dated 16.7.1975 passed by the Assistant Grade, 1st Class, Guhla, by filing the present suit for declaration, which was dismissed by the Sub Judge, 1st Class, Kaithal, vide judgment and decree dated 29.1.1980 on the ground that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The plaintiffs then filed appeal to challenge the judgment and decree dated 29.1.1980 passed by the trial Court. During the pendency of the appeal, Smt. Kirpal Kaur withdrew herself from being the appellant. Consequently, vide order dated 17.1.1980 the appeal qua Kirpal Kaur was ordered to be dismissed as withdrawn. The appeal qua the remaining two appellants, i.e., Rai Jasbir Singh and Swaran Singh (present appellants) was dismissed by the Additional District Judge, Kurukshetra, vide judgment and decree dated 4.12.1981 and the decision of the trial Court with regard to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was upheld. Now Rai Jasbir Singh arid Swaran Singh have filed the present appeal wherein challenge has been made to the findings of both the Courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. It has been contended by Mr. R.S. Mittal, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the appellants, that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not duly served and, thus,the ex parte order dated 16.6.1975/16.7.1975 passed by the Assistant Collector,1st Grade, Guhla, was a nullity. It has further been argued by the learned counsel for the appellants that the Courts below erred in holding that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit against partition ordered by the Revenue Officer in view of the provisions of the <a href="/act/136769/the-punjab-land-revenue-act-1887-complete-act">Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887</a> (for short 'the Act'), despite the fact that the order for partition of the suit land was passed ex parte without serving Smt.Kirpal Kaur according to the prescribed legal procedure.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellants have been controverted by Mr. M.L.Sarin, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the respondents. It has been contended by him that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to go into the validity of the partition proceedings. The appellants have approached the Civil Court without exhausting the remedy available to them under Section 13 of the Act. It has further been contended by him that Smt. Kirpal Kaur had duly been served in the partition proceedings by sending notice to her by registered post.The counsel has also contended that she had withdrawn her appeal before the lower appellate court and in this view of the matter, the present appellants, who had purchased the land from her during the pendency of the partition proceedings, had no locus standi to challenge the order of partition passed by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. 1 have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the evidence adduced on record.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The only question that arises for consideration in the present appeal is to the following effect:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether or not the Civil Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the suit wherein the order of partition passed by a Revenue Officer has been challenged and Smt. Kirpal Kaur was properly served in the partition proceedings</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The first objection raised on behalf of the appellants is that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not served in the partition proceedings before the Assistant Collector 1st Grade, Guhla, as per the provisions contained in Section 20 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. I do not find any merit in this contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants. It is not the case of the appellants that Smt.Kirpal Kaur was not served at all. The bald statement of the plaintiffs was rebutted by the statement on oath of defendant Balwant Singh and also by documentary evidence adduced on record which shows that a registered notice was issued to her and acknowledgement due (Ex.DIO) was received in the office of the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade. Sub-section (3) of Section 20 of the Act gives discretion to the Revenue Officer to serve the concerned person 'either in addition to, or in substitution for, any other mode of service, by forwarding the summons by post in a-letter addressed' to him and registered under Part II of the Indian Post Office Act, 1886. In this view of the matter, it cannot be said that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not served as per the procedure prescribed under the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The next contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants is that the Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain the ex parte order passed by the Revenue Officer.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. This contention is also without any merit. Section 158 of the Act specifically excludes the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts in matters within the jurisdiction of the Revenue Officers. In order to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector, a provision for filing of appeals before the higher Revenue Authorities has been made in Section 13 of the Act. The plaintiffs without exhausting the remedies available to them under Section 13, approached the Civil Court to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Moreover, it has come on record that Smt. Kirpal Kaur, from whom the present appellants had purchased the land during the pendency of the partition proceedings, had withdrawn from the appeal before the lower appellate Court. As the present appellants had purchased the suit land during the pendency of the partition proceedings, they have, therefore, no locus standi to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector 1st Grade and pursue the appeal. It is not the case of the plaintiff-appellants that the ex parte decree was obtained by the defendant-respondents by fraud or misrepresentation. In A.C. Ananthaswamy and Ors. v. Boraiah (D) by Lrs. (2004-3)138 Punjab Law Reporter 557, it has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that in the absence of any fraud or misrepresentation, an ex parte order on the bare plea of non-service cannot be set aside. In the present case it is an undisputed fact that registered notice (Ex.DIO) was issued to Smt. Kirpal Kaur and she had even filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order passed by the Assistant Collector. The ratio of the authority Firm Seth Radha Kishun (deceased) represented by Hari Kishan and Ors. v. Administrator Municipal Committee, Ludhiana : [1964]2SCR273 , that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not specifically ousted where a statute created a liability and provided a remedy, is not applicable to the facts appearing in the present case. In the present case, as already mentioned above, registered A.D. notice was issued to and served on Smt. Kirpal Kaur, who had thereafter, filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Both the courts below have given concurrent findings of fact which cannot be interfered with in the second appeal in view of the provisions of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as no substantial question of law has either been pleaded in the memorandum of appeal or arises for consideration in the present appeal. I do not find any infirmity in the well-reasoned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Consequently, there is no merit in this appeal. It is, accordingly, dismissed. However, I do no make any order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'id' => '629369',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/136769/the-punjab-land-revenue-act-1887-complete-act">Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887</a> - Sections 13, 20, 20(3) and 158; Indian Post Office Act, 1886; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) - Sections 100',
		'appealno' => 'Regular Second Appeal No. 615 of 1982 (O and M)',
		'appellant' => 'Rai Jasbir Singh and anr.',
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		'casename' => 'Rai Jasbir Singh and anr. Vs. Balwant Singh and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' - HINDU LAW -- Custom: [Vijender Jain, C.J., M.M. Kumar, Jasbir Singh, Rajive Bhalla & Rajesh Bindal, JJ] Alienation of ancestral property - Punjab and Haryana -  Held, In respect of State of Punjab by virtue of Punjab Amendment Act, 1973 there is a complete bar to contest any alienation of ancestral or non-ancestral immovable property or appointment of an heir to such property on ground that such alienation or appointment was contrary to custom. In Punjab the property in hands of a successor has to be treated as coparcenary property and its alienation has to be governed by Hindu Law except to the extent it is regulated by Sections 6 and 30 of the Hindu Succession Act. In Haryana, property  in hands of successor has to be treated as coparcenary property as well as ancestral property. Parties can fall back upon Hindu Law in case they fail to establish that rule of decision is custom. Therefore, in Haryana both under Hindu law and the Customary Law, the alienation would be open to challenge. Custom was given precedent over uncodified Hindu Law presumably for reason that custom has been consistently replacing the Hindu Law. However, it was soon realized that ancestral immovable property, which ordinarily held to be inalienable amongst Jats of Punjab by virtue of custom except for necessity, no limitation was placed on degrees of collateral, eligible to contest such alienation. It was, therefore, felt necessary to engraft certain restriction on degrees of collateral, eligible to contest an alienation, which under the custom itself was not limited. Accordingly, the Punjab Custom (Power to Contest) Act, 1920 (Act No.2 of 1920) was enacted. The Hindu Succession Act was extended to the State of Punjab.  Act 2 of Punjab Act defined expression alienation to include any testamentary disposition of property and appointment of an heir was to include any adoption made or purporting to be made according to custom. A further provision was made by Section 3 that Hindu Succession Act was to apply only in respect of alienation of immovable property or appointment of heirs made by persons who in regard to such alienation or appointment were governed by custom. Whereas  Section 4 declared that Hindu Succession Act was not to affect any right to contest any alienation or appointment of an heir made before the date on which the Succession Act was to come into force. In other words, Act, No.2 of 1920 was not to affect alienation or appointments of heir made before date on which it came into force. It also preserved the rights of any alienation or appointment of an heir made by a family. After Section 7 was inserted in Act of 1920 by the Punjab Amendment Act of 1973 right of contest being contrary to custom had been totally effaced and taken away. Therefore, no person has any right to contest any alienation of immovable property whether ancestral or non-ancestral on ground of being contrary to custom after January 23, 1973. In Haryana, the situation as enunciated by Act No.2 of 1920 continued to prevail in respect of alienation because no reforms parallel to Punjab as brought by Amendment Act of 1973, had been enacted although right to pre-emption has been substantially abolished in Haryana also. No steps even have been taken in that regard. Therefore, situation in Haryana have to be regarded as it existed under Act No. 2 of 1920.
HINDU SUCCESSION ACT,1956[C.A.No.30/1956] --  Sections 6 & 30: [Vijender Jain, C.J., M.M.Kumar, Jasbir Singh, Rajive Bhalla & Rajesh Bindal, JJ]  Alienation of coparcenary property - Law laid down by Full Bench in Joginder Singh Kundha Singh v Kehar Singh Dasaundha Singh [AIR 1965 Punjab 407] and Pritam Singh v Assistant Controller of Estate Duty, Patiala [1976 Punj LR 342] -Whether there is any conflict? - Held, The basic controversy in the Full Bench decision of Joginder Singhs case was regarding constitutional validity of Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act and as to whether it infringes Article 14 of Constitution. It was held that the estate held by male and limitation on his power of alienation were in no way removed and the reversioners were not debarred from challenging such alienations. The Full Bench held that Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act postulates that estate held by a Hindu female before enforcement of Succession Act either by inheritance or otherwise, was enlarged and on date of enforcement of Succession Act, she became a full owner. Likewise, if she has inherited any estate after the commencement of the Act,  she was to be regarded as absolute owner rather than a limited owner. Consequently, the limitations on power of alienation automatically vanished. This was the necessary result of the provisions made in Section 14 of the Act. The Full Bench further held that in respect of male proprietors, no corresponding provision was made either enlarging their estate in ancestral property or enlarging their power of alienation over property inherited by them. However, it noticed Section 30 and observed that it only deals with power of his share in coparcenary property by Will, which prior to enforcement of the Act, he had no right to do. The only provision made in respect of male proprietor regarding alienation of property was his power of alienation by Will. In so far as persons governed by custom are concerned, they continued to be governed by the restriction on the power of alienation of a male holder as existed before enforcement of the Act. Likewise, other restriction on alienation other than disposal by Will also continued. The Full Bench, thus, recognized the superior right of Hindu females by virtue of Section 14 and upheld the provision as intra vires. The argument that reversioners have ceased to exist after enactment of provisions of Section 14 of Succession Act, was rejected as there was no provision pointed out to that effect. The proposition laid down by the full Bench in Pritam Singhs case was that the Hindu Succession Act has not abolished joint Hindu family with respect to rights of those who were members of Mitakshara coparcenary, except in the manner and to the extent mentioned in Sections 6 and 30 of the Act, This Statement should also imply, though it does not say so expressly, the Succession Act to this extent does not affect the rights of the members governed by Dayabhaga coparcenary. The Full Bench in Pritam Singh;s case expressly noticed the judgment of earlier Full Bench in Joginder Singhs case but construed the same as irrelevant by observing that it dealt with the power of alienation of a person governed by Customary law and constitutional validity of Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act. Thus there is no real conflict between the two Full Bench judgments. Both the Full Bench judgments have been delivered on the assumption that Joginder Singhs case dealt with question of alienation whereas Pritam Singhs case had decided the question concerning succession. Even on fact in Joginder Singhs case the issue was validity of alienation by consent decree by a father to his two sons, which was challenged by third son, whereas in Pritam Singhs case the question of nature of property in hands of sons on death of their father had arisen  for purposes of assessment of estate duty. In Pritam  Singhs case the property in the hands of the sons was held to be coparcenary property and only 1/3rd of  property belonging to deceased father was considered eligible for estate duty. Therefore, there was no question of alienation in Pritam Singhs case. -  I do not find any infirmity in the well-reasoned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Hari Kishan and Ors. v. Administrator Municipal Committee;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal, Sr. Adv. and; Sudhir Mittal, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' M.L Sarin, Sr. Adv.,; Ashish Handa,; H.N. Mehtani an',
		'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2005-05-25',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Ashutosh Mohunta, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Ashutosh Mohunta, J.</p><p>1. The vendee-plaintiffs have filed this appeal to challenge the judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below whereby their suit and the appeal against the partition of the land ordered by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Guhla, vide order dated 16.7.1975, were dismissed.</p><p>2. In brief the facts giving rise to this appeal are that defendant-respondent Nos. 1 to 5 filed an application for partition of the suit land against Smt.Kirpal Kaur (Plaintiff No. 1) and defendant Nos. 6 to 15 in the court of Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Guhla. In that application Smt. Kirpal Kaur was proceeded against ex parte. The partition was confirmed on 16.6.1975 and the case was fixed for instrument of partition for 16.7.1975. Rai Jasbir Singh, plaintiff No. 2 purchased land measuring 80 Kanals from Smt. Kirpal Kaur (plaintiff No. 1) vide sale deed dated 27.5.1975 during the pendency of the partition proceedings and plaintiff No. 2 and 3, i.e., Rai Jasbir Singh and Swaran Singh were in actual physical possession of 228 Kanals 8 Marias and 77 Kanals 8 Marias, respectively. The plaintiffs challenged the order dated 16.7.1975 passed by the Assistant Grade, 1st Class, Guhla, by filing the present suit for declaration, which was dismissed by the Sub Judge, 1st Class, Kaithal, vide judgment and decree dated 29.1.1980 on the ground that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The plaintiffs then filed appeal to challenge the judgment and decree dated 29.1.1980 passed by the trial Court. During the pendency of the appeal, Smt. Kirpal Kaur withdrew herself from being the appellant. Consequently, vide order dated 17.1.1980 the appeal qua Kirpal Kaur was ordered to be dismissed as withdrawn. The appeal qua the remaining two appellants, i.e., Rai Jasbir Singh and Swaran Singh (present appellants) was dismissed by the Additional District Judge, Kurukshetra, vide judgment and decree dated 4.12.1981 and the decision of the trial Court with regard to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was upheld. Now Rai Jasbir Singh arid Swaran Singh have filed the present appeal wherein challenge has been made to the findings of both the Courts below.</p><p>3. It has been contended by Mr. R.S. Mittal, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the appellants, that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not duly served and, thus,the ex parte order dated 16.6.1975/16.7.1975 passed by the Assistant Collector,1st Grade, Guhla, was a nullity. It has further been argued by the learned counsel for the appellants that the Courts below erred in holding that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit against partition ordered by the Revenue Officer in view of the provisions of the <a>Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887</a> (for short 'the Act'), despite the fact that the order for partition of the suit land was passed ex parte without serving Smt.Kirpal Kaur according to the prescribed legal procedure.</p><p>4. The contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellants have been controverted by Mr. M.L.Sarin, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the respondents. It has been contended by him that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to go into the validity of the partition proceedings. The appellants have approached the Civil Court without exhausting the remedy available to them under Section 13 of the Act. It has further been contended by him that Smt. Kirpal Kaur had duly been served in the partition proceedings by sending notice to her by registered post.The counsel has also contended that she had withdrawn her appeal before the lower appellate court and in this view of the matter, the present appellants, who had purchased the land from her during the pendency of the partition proceedings, had no locus standi to challenge the order of partition passed by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade.</p><p>5. 1 have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the evidence adduced on record.</p><p>6. The only question that arises for consideration in the present appeal is to the following effect:-</p><p>Whether or not the Civil Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the suit wherein the order of partition passed by a Revenue Officer has been challenged and Smt. Kirpal Kaur was properly served in the partition proceedings</p><p>7. The first objection raised on behalf of the appellants is that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not served in the partition proceedings before the Assistant Collector 1st Grade, Guhla, as per the provisions contained in Section 20 of the Act.</p><p>8. I do not find any merit in this contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants. It is not the case of the appellants that Smt.Kirpal Kaur was not served at all. The bald statement of the plaintiffs was rebutted by the statement on oath of defendant Balwant Singh and also by documentary evidence adduced on record which shows that a registered notice was issued to her and acknowledgement due (Ex.DIO) was received in the office of the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade. Sub-section (3) of Section 20 of the Act gives discretion to the Revenue Officer to serve the concerned person 'either in addition to, or in substitution for, any other mode of service, by forwarding the summons by post in a-letter addressed' to him and registered under Part II of the Indian Post Office Act, 1886. In this view of the matter, it cannot be said that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not served as per the procedure prescribed under the Act.</p><p>9. The next contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants is that the Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain the ex parte order passed by the Revenue Officer.</p><p>10. This contention is also without any merit. Section 158 of the Act specifically excludes the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts in matters within the jurisdiction of the Revenue Officers. In order to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector, a provision for filing of appeals before the higher Revenue Authorities has been made in Section 13 of the Act. The plaintiffs without exhausting the remedies available to them under Section 13, approached the Civil Court to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector.</p><p>11. Moreover, it has come on record that Smt. Kirpal Kaur, from whom the present appellants had purchased the land during the pendency of the partition proceedings, had withdrawn from the appeal before the lower appellate Court. As the present appellants had purchased the suit land during the pendency of the partition proceedings, they have, therefore, no locus standi to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector 1st Grade and pursue the appeal. It is not the case of the plaintiff-appellants that the ex parte decree was obtained by the defendant-respondents by fraud or misrepresentation. In A.C. Ananthaswamy and Ors. v. Boraiah (D) by Lrs. (2004-3)138 Punjab Law Reporter 557, it has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that in the absence of any fraud or misrepresentation, an ex parte order on the bare plea of non-service cannot be set aside. In the present case it is an undisputed fact that registered notice (Ex.DIO) was issued to Smt. Kirpal Kaur and she had even filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order passed by the Assistant Collector. The ratio of the authority Firm Seth Radha Kishun (deceased) represented by Hari Kishan and Ors. v. Administrator Municipal Committee, Ludhiana : [1964]2SCR273 , that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not specifically ousted where a statute created a liability and provided a remedy, is not applicable to the facts appearing in the present case. In the present case, as already mentioned above, registered A.D. notice was issued to and served on Smt. Kirpal Kaur, who had thereafter, filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order.</p><p>12. Both the courts below have given concurrent findings of fact which cannot be interfered with in the second appeal in view of the provisions of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as no substantial question of law has either been pleaded in the memorandum of appeal or arises for consideration in the present appeal. I do not find any infirmity in the well-reasoned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below.</p><p>13. Consequently, there is no merit in this appeal. It is, accordingly, dismissed. However, I do no make any order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
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			'id' => '629369',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/136769/the-punjab-land-revenue-act-1887-complete-act">Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887</a> - Sections 13, 20, 20(3) and 158; Indian Post Office Act, 1886; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) - Sections 100',
			'appealno' => 'Regular Second Appeal No. 615 of 1982 (O and M)',
			'appellant' => 'Rai Jasbir Singh and anr.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Rai Jasbir Singh and anr. Vs. Balwant Singh and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' - HINDU LAW -- Custom: [Vijender Jain, C.J., M.M. Kumar, Jasbir Singh, Rajive Bhalla & Rajesh Bindal, JJ] Alienation of ancestral property - Punjab and Haryana -  Held, In respect of State of Punjab by virtue of Punjab Amendment Act, 1973 there is a complete bar to contest any alienation of ancestral or non-ancestral immovable property or appointment of an heir to such property on ground that such alienation or appointment was contrary to custom. In Punjab the property in hands of a successor has to be treated as coparcenary property and its alienation has to be governed by Hindu Law except to the extent it is regulated by Sections 6 and 30 of the Hindu Succession Act. In Haryana, property  in hands of successor has to be treated as coparcenary property as well as ancestral property. Parties can fall back upon Hindu Law in case they fail to establish that rule of decision is custom. Therefore, in Haryana both under Hindu law and the Customary Law, the alienation would be open to challenge. Custom was given precedent over uncodified Hindu Law presumably for reason that custom has been consistently replacing the Hindu Law. However, it was soon realized that ancestral immovable property, which ordinarily held to be inalienable amongst Jats of Punjab by virtue of custom except for necessity, no limitation was placed on degrees of collateral, eligible to contest such alienation. It was, therefore, felt necessary to engraft certain restriction on degrees of collateral, eligible to contest an alienation, which under the custom itself was not limited. Accordingly, the Punjab Custom (Power to Contest) Act, 1920 (Act No.2 of 1920) was enacted. The Hindu Succession Act was extended to the State of Punjab.  Act 2 of Punjab Act defined expression alienation to include any testamentary disposition of property and appointment of an heir was to include any adoption made or purporting to be made according to custom. A further provision was made by Section 3 that Hindu Succession Act was to apply only in respect of alienation of immovable property or appointment of heirs made by persons who in regard to such alienation or appointment were governed by custom. Whereas  Section 4 declared that Hindu Succession Act was not to affect any right to contest any alienation or appointment of an heir made before the date on which the Succession Act was to come into force. In other words, Act, No.2 of 1920 was not to affect alienation or appointments of heir made before date on which it came into force. It also preserved the rights of any alienation or appointment of an heir made by a family. After Section 7 was inserted in Act of 1920 by the Punjab Amendment Act of 1973 right of contest being contrary to custom had been totally effaced and taken away. Therefore, no person has any right to contest any alienation of immovable property whether ancestral or non-ancestral on ground of being contrary to custom after January 23, 1973. In Haryana, the situation as enunciated by Act No.2 of 1920 continued to prevail in respect of alienation because no reforms parallel to Punjab as brought by Amendment Act of 1973, had been enacted although right to pre-emption has been substantially abolished in Haryana also. No steps even have been taken in that regard. Therefore, situation in Haryana have to be regarded as it existed under Act No. 2 of 1920.
HINDU SUCCESSION ACT,1956[C.A.No.30/1956] --  Sections 6 & 30: [Vijender Jain, C.J., M.M.Kumar, Jasbir Singh, Rajive Bhalla & Rajesh Bindal, JJ]  Alienation of coparcenary property - Law laid down by Full Bench in Joginder Singh Kundha Singh v Kehar Singh Dasaundha Singh [AIR 1965 Punjab 407] and Pritam Singh v Assistant Controller of Estate Duty, Patiala [1976 Punj LR 342] -Whether there is any conflict? - Held, The basic controversy in the Full Bench decision of Joginder Singhs case was regarding constitutional validity of Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act and as to whether it infringes Article 14 of Constitution. It was held that the estate held by male and limitation on his power of alienation were in no way removed and the reversioners were not debarred from challenging such alienations. The Full Bench held that Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act postulates that estate held by a Hindu female before enforcement of Succession Act either by inheritance or otherwise, was enlarged and on date of enforcement of Succession Act, she became a full owner. Likewise, if she has inherited any estate after the commencement of the Act,  she was to be regarded as absolute owner rather than a limited owner. Consequently, the limitations on power of alienation automatically vanished. This was the necessary result of the provisions made in Section 14 of the Act. The Full Bench further held that in respect of male proprietors, no corresponding provision was made either enlarging their estate in ancestral property or enlarging their power of alienation over property inherited by them. However, it noticed Section 30 and observed that it only deals with power of his share in coparcenary property by Will, which prior to enforcement of the Act, he had no right to do. The only provision made in respect of male proprietor regarding alienation of property was his power of alienation by Will. In so far as persons governed by custom are concerned, they continued to be governed by the restriction on the power of alienation of a male holder as existed before enforcement of the Act. Likewise, other restriction on alienation other than disposal by Will also continued. The Full Bench, thus, recognized the superior right of Hindu females by virtue of Section 14 and upheld the provision as intra vires. The argument that reversioners have ceased to exist after enactment of provisions of Section 14 of Succession Act, was rejected as there was no provision pointed out to that effect. The proposition laid down by the full Bench in Pritam Singhs case was that the Hindu Succession Act has not abolished joint Hindu family with respect to rights of those who were members of Mitakshara coparcenary, except in the manner and to the extent mentioned in Sections 6 and 30 of the Act, This Statement should also imply, though it does not say so expressly, the Succession Act to this extent does not affect the rights of the members governed by Dayabhaga coparcenary. The Full Bench in Pritam Singh;s case expressly noticed the judgment of earlier Full Bench in Joginder Singhs case but construed the same as irrelevant by observing that it dealt with the power of alienation of a person governed by Customary law and constitutional validity of Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act. Thus there is no real conflict between the two Full Bench judgments. Both the Full Bench judgments have been delivered on the assumption that Joginder Singhs case dealt with question of alienation whereas Pritam Singhs case had decided the question concerning succession. Even on fact in Joginder Singhs case the issue was validity of alienation by consent decree by a father to his two sons, which was challenged by third son, whereas in Pritam Singhs case the question of nature of property in hands of sons on death of their father had arisen  for purposes of assessment of estate duty. In Pritam  Singhs case the property in the hands of the sons was held to be coparcenary property and only 1/3rd of  property belonging to deceased father was considered eligible for estate duty. Therefore, there was no question of alienation in Pritam Singhs case. -  I do not find any infirmity in the well-reasoned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Hari Kishan and Ors. v. Administrator Municipal Committee;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal, Sr. Adv. and; Sudhir Mittal, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' M.L Sarin, Sr. Adv.,; Ashish Handa,; H.N. Mehtani an',
			'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2005-05-25',
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			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Ashutosh Mohunta, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The vendee-plaintiffs have filed this appeal to challenge the judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below whereby their suit and the appeal against the partition of the land ordered by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Guhla, vide order dated 16.7.1975, were dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. In brief the facts giving rise to this appeal are that defendant-respondent Nos. 1 to 5 filed an application for partition of the suit land against Smt.Kirpal Kaur (Plaintiff No. 1) and defendant Nos. 6 to 15 in the court of Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Guhla. In that application Smt. Kirpal Kaur was proceeded against ex parte. The partition was confirmed on 16.6.1975 and the case was fixed for instrument of partition for 16.7.1975. Rai Jasbir Singh, plaintiff No. 2 purchased land measuring 80 Kanals from Smt. Kirpal Kaur (plaintiff No. 1) vide sale deed dated 27.5.1975 during the pendency of the partition proceedings and plaintiff No. 2 and 3, i.e., Rai Jasbir Singh and Swaran Singh were in actual physical possession of 228 Kanals 8 Marias and 77 Kanals 8 Marias, respectively. The plaintiffs challenged the order dated 16.7.1975 passed by the Assistant Grade, 1st Class, Guhla, by filing the present suit for declaration, which was dismissed by the Sub Judge, 1st Class, Kaithal, vide judgment and decree dated 29.1.1980 on the ground that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The plaintiffs then filed appeal to challenge the judgment and decree dated 29.1.1980 passed by the trial Court. During the pendency of the appeal, Smt. Kirpal Kaur withdrew herself from being the appellant. Consequently, vide order dated 17.1.1980 the appeal qua Kirpal Kaur was ordered to be dismissed as withdrawn. The appeal qua the remaining two appellants, i.e., Rai Jasbir Singh and Swaran Singh (present appellants) was dismissed by the Additional District Judge, Kurukshetra, vide judgment and decree dated 4.12.1981 and the decision of the trial Court with regard to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was upheld. Now Rai Jasbir Singh arid Swaran Singh have filed the present appeal wherein challenge has been made to the findings of both the Courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. It has been contended by Mr. R.S. Mittal, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the appellants, that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not duly served and, thus,the ex parte order dated 16.6.1975/16.7.1975 passed by the Assistant Collector,1st Grade, Guhla, was a nullity. It has further been argued by the learned counsel for the appellants that the Courts below erred in holding that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit against partition ordered by the Revenue Officer in view of the provisions of the <a href="/act/136769/the-punjab-land-revenue-act-1887-complete-act">Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887</a> (for short 'the Act'), despite the fact that the order for partition of the suit land was passed ex parte without serving Smt.Kirpal Kaur according to the prescribed legal procedure.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellants have been controverted by Mr. M.L.Sarin, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the respondents. It has been contended by him that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to go into the validity of the partition proceedings. The appellants have approached the Civil Court without exhausting the remedy available to them under Section 13 of the Act. It has further been contended by him that Smt. Kirpal Kaur had duly been served in the partition proceedings by sending notice to her by registered post.The counsel has also contended that she had withdrawn her appeal before the lower appellate court and in this view of the matter, the present appellants, who had purchased the land from her during the pendency of the partition proceedings, had no locus standi to challenge the order of partition passed by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. 1 have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the evidence adduced on record.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The only question that arises for consideration in the present appeal is to the following effect:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether or not the Civil Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the suit wherein the order of partition passed by a Revenue Officer has been challenged and Smt. Kirpal Kaur was properly served in the partition proceedings</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The first objection raised on behalf of the appellants is that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not served in the partition proceedings before the Assistant Collector 1st Grade, Guhla, as per the provisions contained in Section 20 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. I do not find any merit in this contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants. It is not the case of the appellants that Smt.Kirpal Kaur was not served at all. The bald statement of the plaintiffs was rebutted by the statement on oath of defendant Balwant Singh and also by documentary evidence adduced on record which shows that a registered notice was issued to her and acknowledgement due (Ex.DIO) was received in the office of the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade. Sub-section (3) of Section 20 of the Act gives discretion to the Revenue Officer to serve the concerned person 'either in addition to, or in substitution for, any other mode of service, by forwarding the summons by post in a-letter addressed' to him and registered under Part II of the Indian Post Office Act, 1886. In this view of the matter, it cannot be said that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not served as per the procedure prescribed under the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The next contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants is that the Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain the ex parte order passed by the Revenue Officer.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. This contention is also without any merit. Section 158 of the Act specifically excludes the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts in matters within the jurisdiction of the Revenue Officers. In order to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector, a provision for filing of appeals before the higher Revenue Authorities has been made in Section 13 of the Act. The plaintiffs without exhausting the remedies available to them under Section 13, approached the Civil Court to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Moreover, it has come on record that Smt. Kirpal Kaur, from whom the present appellants had purchased the land during the pendency of the partition proceedings, had withdrawn from the appeal before the lower appellate Court. As the present appellants had purchased the suit land during the pendency of the partition proceedings, they have, therefore, no locus standi to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector 1st Grade and pursue the appeal. It is not the case of the plaintiff-appellants that the ex parte decree was obtained by the defendant-respondents by fraud or misrepresentation. In A.C. Ananthaswamy and Ors. v. Boraiah (D) by Lrs. (2004-3)138 Punjab Law Reporter 557, it has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that in the absence of any fraud or misrepresentation, an ex parte order on the bare plea of non-service cannot be set aside. In the present case it is an undisputed fact that registered notice (Ex.DIO) was issued to Smt. Kirpal Kaur and she had even filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order passed by the Assistant Collector. The ratio of the authority Firm Seth Radha Kishun (deceased) represented by Hari Kishan and Ors. v. Administrator Municipal Committee, Ludhiana : [1964]2SCR273 , that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not specifically ousted where a statute created a liability and provided a remedy, is not applicable to the facts appearing in the present case. In the present case, as already mentioned above, registered A.D. notice was issued to and served on Smt. Kirpal Kaur, who had thereafter, filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Both the courts below have given concurrent findings of fact which cannot be interfered with in the second appeal in view of the provisions of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as no substantial question of law has either been pleaded in the memorandum of appeal or arises for consideration in the present appeal. I do not find any infirmity in the well-reasoned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Consequently, there is no merit in this appeal. It is, accordingly, dismissed. However, I do no make any order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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			'pubs' => '(2006)142PLR339',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Balwant Singh and ors.',
			'sub' => 'Property',
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			'circuit' => null
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$title_for_layout = 'Rai Jasbir Singh and anr Vs Balwant Singh and ors - Citation 629369 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '629369',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/136769/the-punjab-land-revenue-act-1887-complete-act">Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887</a> - Sections 13, 20, 20(3) and 158; Indian Post Office Act, 1886; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) - Sections 100',
		'appealno' => 'Regular Second Appeal No. 615 of 1982 (O and M)',
		'appellant' => 'Rai Jasbir Singh and anr.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Rai Jasbir Singh and anr. Vs. Balwant Singh and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' - HINDU LAW -- Custom: [Vijender Jain, C.J., M.M. Kumar, Jasbir Singh, Rajive Bhalla & Rajesh Bindal, JJ] Alienation of ancestral property - Punjab and Haryana -  Held, In respect of State of Punjab by virtue of Punjab Amendment Act, 1973 there is a complete bar to contest any alienation of ancestral or non-ancestral immovable property or appointment of an heir to such property on ground that such alienation or appointment was contrary to custom. In Punjab the property in hands of a successor has to be treated as coparcenary property and its alienation has to be governed by Hindu Law except to the extent it is regulated by Sections 6 and 30 of the Hindu Succession Act. In Haryana, property  in hands of successor has to be treated as coparcenary property as well as ancestral property. Parties can fall back upon Hindu Law in case they fail to establish that rule of decision is custom. Therefore, in Haryana both under Hindu law and the Customary Law, the alienation would be open to challenge. Custom was given precedent over uncodified Hindu Law presumably for reason that custom has been consistently replacing the Hindu Law. However, it was soon realized that ancestral immovable property, which ordinarily held to be inalienable amongst Jats of Punjab by virtue of custom except for necessity, no limitation was placed on degrees of collateral, eligible to contest such alienation. It was, therefore, felt necessary to engraft certain restriction on degrees of collateral, eligible to contest an alienation, which under the custom itself was not limited. Accordingly, the Punjab Custom (Power to Contest) Act, 1920 (Act No.2 of 1920) was enacted. The Hindu Succession Act was extended to the State of Punjab.  Act 2 of Punjab Act defined expression alienation to include any testamentary disposition of property and appointment of an heir was to include any adoption made or purporting to be made according to custom. A further provision was made by Section 3 that Hindu Succession Act was to apply only in respect of alienation of immovable property or appointment of heirs made by persons who in regard to such alienation or appointment were governed by custom. Whereas  Section 4 declared that Hindu Succession Act was not to affect any right to contest any alienation or appointment of an heir made before the date on which the Succession Act was to come into force. In other words, Act, No.2 of 1920 was not to affect alienation or appointments of heir made before date on which it came into force. It also preserved the rights of any alienation or appointment of an heir made by a family. After Section 7 was inserted in Act of 1920 by the Punjab Amendment Act of 1973 right of contest being contrary to custom had been totally effaced and taken away. Therefore, no person has any right to contest any alienation of immovable property whether ancestral or non-ancestral on ground of being contrary to custom after January 23, 1973. In Haryana, the situation as enunciated by Act No.2 of 1920 continued to prevail in respect of alienation because no reforms parallel to Punjab as brought by Amendment Act of 1973, had been enacted although right to pre-emption has been substantially abolished in Haryana also. No steps even have been taken in that regard. Therefore, situation in Haryana have to be regarded as it existed under Act No. 2 of 1920.
HINDU SUCCESSION ACT,1956[C.A.No.30/1956] --  Sections 6 & 30: [Vijender Jain, C.J., M.M.Kumar, Jasbir Singh, Rajive Bhalla & Rajesh Bindal, JJ]  Alienation of coparcenary property - Law laid down by Full Bench in Joginder Singh Kundha Singh v Kehar Singh Dasaundha Singh [AIR 1965 Punjab 407] and Pritam Singh v Assistant Controller of Estate Duty, Patiala [1976 Punj LR 342] -Whether there is any conflict? - Held, The basic controversy in the Full Bench decision of Joginder Singhs case was regarding constitutional validity of Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act and as to whether it infringes Article 14 of Constitution. It was held that the estate held by male and limitation on his power of alienation were in no way removed and the reversioners were not debarred from challenging such alienations. The Full Bench held that Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act postulates that estate held by a Hindu female before enforcement of Succession Act either by inheritance or otherwise, was enlarged and on date of enforcement of Succession Act, she became a full owner. Likewise, if she has inherited any estate after the commencement of the Act,  she was to be regarded as absolute owner rather than a limited owner. Consequently, the limitations on power of alienation automatically vanished. This was the necessary result of the provisions made in Section 14 of the Act. The Full Bench further held that in respect of male proprietors, no corresponding provision was made either enlarging their estate in ancestral property or enlarging their power of alienation over property inherited by them. However, it noticed Section 30 and observed that it only deals with power of his share in coparcenary property by Will, which prior to enforcement of the Act, he had no right to do. The only provision made in respect of male proprietor regarding alienation of property was his power of alienation by Will. In so far as persons governed by custom are concerned, they continued to be governed by the restriction on the power of alienation of a male holder as existed before enforcement of the Act. Likewise, other restriction on alienation other than disposal by Will also continued. The Full Bench, thus, recognized the superior right of Hindu females by virtue of Section 14 and upheld the provision as intra vires. The argument that reversioners have ceased to exist after enactment of provisions of Section 14 of Succession Act, was rejected as there was no provision pointed out to that effect. The proposition laid down by the full Bench in Pritam Singhs case was that the Hindu Succession Act has not abolished joint Hindu family with respect to rights of those who were members of Mitakshara coparcenary, except in the manner and to the extent mentioned in Sections 6 and 30 of the Act, This Statement should also imply, though it does not say so expressly, the Succession Act to this extent does not affect the rights of the members governed by Dayabhaga coparcenary. The Full Bench in Pritam Singh;s case expressly noticed the judgment of earlier Full Bench in Joginder Singhs case but construed the same as irrelevant by observing that it dealt with the power of alienation of a person governed by Customary law and constitutional validity of Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act. Thus there is no real conflict between the two Full Bench judgments. Both the Full Bench judgments have been delivered on the assumption that Joginder Singhs case dealt with question of alienation whereas Pritam Singhs case had decided the question concerning succession. Even on fact in Joginder Singhs case the issue was validity of alienation by consent decree by a father to his two sons, which was challenged by third son, whereas in Pritam Singhs case the question of nature of property in hands of sons on death of their father had arisen  for purposes of assessment of estate duty. In Pritam  Singhs case the property in the hands of the sons was held to be coparcenary property and only 1/3rd of  property belonging to deceased father was considered eligible for estate duty. Therefore, there was no question of alienation in Pritam Singhs case. -  I do not find any infirmity in the well-reasoned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Hari Kishan and Ors. v. Administrator Municipal Committee;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal, Sr. Adv. and; Sudhir Mittal, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' M.L Sarin, Sr. Adv.,; Ashish Handa,; H.N. Mehtani an',
		'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2005-05-25',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Ashutosh Mohunta, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Ashutosh Mohunta, J.</p><p>1. The vendee-plaintiffs have filed this appeal to challenge the judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below whereby their suit and the appeal against the partition of the land ordered by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Guhla, vide order dated 16.7.1975, were dismissed.</p><p>2. In brief the facts giving rise to this appeal are that defendant-respondent Nos. 1 to 5 filed an application for partition of the suit land against Smt.Kirpal Kaur (Plaintiff No. 1) and defendant Nos. 6 to 15 in the court of Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Guhla. In that application Smt. Kirpal Kaur was proceeded against ex parte. The partition was confirmed on 16.6.1975 and the case was fixed for instrument of partition for 16.7.1975. Rai Jasbir Singh, plaintiff No. 2 purchased land measuring 80 Kanals from Smt. Kirpal Kaur (plaintiff No. 1) vide sale deed dated 27.5.1975 during the pendency of the partition proceedings and plaintiff No. 2 and 3, i.e., Rai Jasbir Singh and Swaran Singh were in actual physical possession of 228 Kanals 8 Marias and 77 Kanals 8 Marias, respectively. The plaintiffs challenged the order dated 16.7.1975 passed by the Assistant Grade, 1st Class, Guhla, by filing the present suit for declaration, which was dismissed by the Sub Judge, 1st Class, Kaithal, vide judgment and decree dated 29.1.1980 on the ground that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The plaintiffs then filed appeal to challenge the judgment and decree dated 29.1.1980 passed by the trial Court. During the pendency of the appeal, Smt. Kirpal Kaur withdrew herself from being the appellant. Consequently, vide order dated 17.1.1980 the appeal qua Kirpal Kaur was ordered to be dismissed as withdrawn. The appeal qua the remaining two appellants, i.e., Rai Jasbir Singh and Swaran Singh (present appellants) was dismissed by the Additional District Judge, Kurukshetra, vide judgment and decree dated 4.12.1981 and the decision of the trial Court with regard to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was upheld. Now Rai Jasbir Singh arid Swaran Singh have filed the present appeal wherein challenge has been made to the findings of both the Courts below.</p><p>3. It has been contended by Mr. R.S. Mittal, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the appellants, that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not duly served and, thus,the ex parte order dated 16.6.1975/16.7.1975 passed by the Assistant Collector,1st Grade, Guhla, was a nullity. It has further been argued by the learned counsel for the appellants that the Courts below erred in holding that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit against partition ordered by the Revenue Officer in view of the provisions of the <a>Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887</a> (for short 'the Act'), despite the fact that the order for partition of the suit land was passed ex parte without serving Smt.Kirpal Kaur according to the prescribed legal procedure.</p><p>4. The contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellants have been controverted by Mr. M.L.Sarin, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the respondents. It has been contended by him that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to go into the validity of the partition proceedings. The appellants have approached the Civil Court without exhausting the remedy available to them under Section 13 of the Act. It has further been contended by him that Smt. Kirpal Kaur had duly been served in the partition proceedings by sending notice to her by registered post.The counsel has also contended that she had withdrawn her appeal before the lower appellate court and in this view of the matter, the present appellants, who had purchased the land from her during the pendency of the partition proceedings, had no locus standi to challenge the order of partition passed by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade.</p><p>5. 1 have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the evidence adduced on record.</p><p>6. The only question that arises for consideration in the present appeal is to the following effect:-</p><p>Whether or not the Civil Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the suit wherein the order of partition passed by a Revenue Officer has been challenged and Smt. Kirpal Kaur was properly served in the partition proceedings</p><p>7. The first objection raised on behalf of the appellants is that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not served in the partition proceedings before the Assistant Collector 1st Grade, Guhla, as per the provisions contained in Section 20 of the Act.</p><p>8. I do not find any merit in this contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants. It is not the case of the appellants that Smt.Kirpal Kaur was not served at all. The bald statement of the plaintiffs was rebutted by the statement on oath of defendant Balwant Singh and also by documentary evidence adduced on record which shows that a registered notice was issued to her and acknowledgement due (Ex.DIO) was received in the office of the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade. Sub-section (3) of Section 20 of the Act gives discretion to the Revenue Officer to serve the concerned person 'either in addition to, or in substitution for, any other mode of service, by forwarding the summons by post in a-letter addressed' to him and registered under Part II of the Indian Post Office Act, 1886. In this view of the matter, it cannot be said that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not served as per the procedure prescribed under the Act.</p><p>9. The next contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants is that the Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain the ex parte order passed by the Revenue Officer.</p><p>10. This contention is also without any merit. Section 158 of the Act specifically excludes the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts in matters within the jurisdiction of the Revenue Officers. In order to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector, a provision for filing of appeals before the higher Revenue Authorities has been made in Section 13 of the Act. The plaintiffs without exhausting the remedies available to them under Section 13, approached the Civil Court to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector.</p><p>11. Moreover, it has come on record that Smt. Kirpal Kaur, from whom the present appellants had purchased the land during the pendency of the partition proceedings, had withdrawn from the appeal before the lower appellate Court. As the present appellants had purchased the suit land during the pendency of the partition proceedings, they have, therefore, no locus standi to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector 1st Grade and pursue the appeal. It is not the case of the plaintiff-appellants that the ex parte decree was obtained by the defendant-respondents by fraud or misrepresentation. In A.C. Ananthaswamy and Ors. v. Boraiah (D) by Lrs. (2004-3)138 Punjab Law Reporter 557, it has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that in the absence of any fraud or misrepresentation, an ex parte order on the bare plea of non-service cannot be set aside. In the present case it is an undisputed fact that registered notice (Ex.DIO) was issued to Smt. Kirpal Kaur and she had even filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order passed by the Assistant Collector. The ratio of the authority Firm Seth Radha Kishun (deceased) represented by Hari Kishan and Ors. v. Administrator Municipal Committee, Ludhiana : [1964]2SCR273 , that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not specifically ousted where a statute created a liability and provided a remedy, is not applicable to the facts appearing in the present case. In the present case, as already mentioned above, registered A.D. notice was issued to and served on Smt. Kirpal Kaur, who had thereafter, filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order.</p><p>12. Both the courts below have given concurrent findings of fact which cannot be interfered with in the second appeal in view of the provisions of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as no substantial question of law has either been pleaded in the memorandum of appeal or arises for consideration in the present appeal. I do not find any infirmity in the well-reasoned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below.</p><p>13. Consequently, there is no merit in this appeal. It is, accordingly, dismissed. However, I do no make any order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
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		'respondent' => 'Balwant Singh and ors.',
		'sub' => 'Property',
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		'circuit' => null
	)
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$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>Ashutosh Mohunta, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The vendee-plaintiffs have filed this appeal to challenge the judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below whereby their suit and the appeal against the partition of the land ordered by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Guhla, vide order dated 16.7.1975, were dismissed.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. In brief the facts giving rise to this appeal are that defendant-respondent Nos. 1 to 5 filed an application for partition of the suit land against Smt.Kirpal Kaur (Plaintiff No. 1) and defendant Nos. 6 to 15 in the court of Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Guhla. In that application Smt. Kirpal Kaur was proceeded against ex parte. The partition was confirmed on 16.6.1975 and the case was fixed for instrument of partition for 16.7.1975. Rai Jasbir Singh, plaintiff No. 2 purchased land measuring 80 Kanals from Smt. Kirpal Kaur (plaintiff No. 1) vide sale deed dated 27.5.1975 during the pendency of the partition proceedings and plaintiff No. 2 and 3, i.e., Rai Jasbir Singh and Swaran Singh were in actual physical possession of 228 Kanals 8 Marias and 77 Kanals 8 Marias, respectively. The plaintiffs challenged the order dated 16.7.1975 passed by the Assistant Grade, 1st Class, Guhla, by filing the present suit for declaration, which was dismissed by the Sub Judge, 1st Class, Kaithal, vide judgment and decree dated 29.1.1980 on the ground that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The plaintiffs then filed appeal to challenge the judgment and decree dated 29.1.1980 passed by the trial Court. During the pendency of the appeal, Smt. Kirpal Kaur withdrew herself from being the appellant. Consequently, vide order dated 17.1.1980 the appeal qua Kirpal Kaur was ordered to be dismissed as withdrawn. The appeal qua the remaining two appellants, i.e., Rai Jasbir Singh and Swaran Singh (present appellants) was dismissed by the Additional District Judge, Kurukshetra, vide judgment and decree dated 4.12.1981 and the decision of the trial Court with regard to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was upheld. Now Rai Jasbir Singh arid Swaran Singh have filed the present appeal wherein challenge has been made to the findings of both the Courts below.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. It has been contended by Mr. R.S. Mittal, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the appellants, that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not duly served and, thus,the ex parte order dated 16.6.1975/16.7.1975 passed by the Assistant Collector,1st Grade, Guhla, was a nullity. It has further been argued by the learned counsel for the appellants that the Courts below erred in holding that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit against partition ordered by the Revenue Officer in view of the provisions of the <a>Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887</a> (for short 'the Act'), despite the fact that the order for partition of the suit land was passed ex parte without serving Smt.Kirpal Kaur according to the prescribed legal procedure.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. The contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellants have been controverted by Mr. M.L.Sarin, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the respondents. It has been contended by him that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to go into the validity of the partition proceedings. The appellants have approached the Civil Court without exhausting the remedy available to them under Section 13 of the Act. It has further been contended by him that Smt. Kirpal Kaur had duly been served in the partition proceedings by sending notice to her by registered post.The counsel has also contended that she had withdrawn her appeal before the lower appellate court and in this view of the matter, the present appellants, who had purchased the land from her during the pendency of the partition proceedings, had no locus standi to challenge the order of partition passed by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. 1 have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the evidence adduced on record.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. The only question that arises for consideration in the present appeal is to the following effect:-',
	(int) 7 => '<p>Whether or not the Civil Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the suit wherein the order of partition passed by a Revenue Officer has been challenged and Smt. Kirpal Kaur was properly served in the partition proceedings',
	(int) 8 => '<p>7. The first objection raised on behalf of the appellants is that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not served in the partition proceedings before the Assistant Collector 1st Grade, Guhla, as per the provisions contained in Section 20 of the Act.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>8. I do not find any merit in this contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants. It is not the case of the appellants that Smt.Kirpal Kaur was not served at all. The bald statement of the plaintiffs was rebutted by the statement on oath of defendant Balwant Singh and also by documentary evidence adduced on record which shows that a registered notice was issued to her and acknowledgement due (Ex.DIO) was received in the office of the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade. Sub-section (3) of Section 20 of the Act gives discretion to the Revenue Officer to serve the concerned person 'either in addition to, or in substitution for, any other mode of service, by forwarding the summons by post in a-letter addressed' to him and registered under Part II of the Indian Post Office Act, 1886. In this view of the matter, it cannot be said that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not served as per the procedure prescribed under the Act.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>9. The next contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants is that the Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain the ex parte order passed by the Revenue Officer.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>10. This contention is also without any merit. Section 158 of the Act specifically excludes the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts in matters within the jurisdiction of the Revenue Officers. In order to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector, a provision for filing of appeals before the higher Revenue Authorities has been made in Section 13 of the Act. The plaintiffs without exhausting the remedies available to them under Section 13, approached the Civil Court to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>11. Moreover, it has come on record that Smt. Kirpal Kaur, from whom the present appellants had purchased the land during the pendency of the partition proceedings, had withdrawn from the appeal before the lower appellate Court. As the present appellants had purchased the suit land during the pendency of the partition proceedings, they have, therefore, no locus standi to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector 1st Grade and pursue the appeal. It is not the case of the plaintiff-appellants that the ex parte decree was obtained by the defendant-respondents by fraud or misrepresentation. In A.C. Ananthaswamy and Ors. v. Boraiah (D) by Lrs. (2004-3)138 Punjab Law Reporter 557, it has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that in the absence of any fraud or misrepresentation, an ex parte order on the bare plea of non-service cannot be set aside. In the present case it is an undisputed fact that registered notice (Ex.DIO) was issued to Smt. Kirpal Kaur and she had even filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order passed by the Assistant Collector. The ratio of the authority Firm Seth Radha Kishun (deceased) represented by Hari Kishan and Ors. v. Administrator Municipal Committee, Ludhiana : [1964]2SCR273 , that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not specifically ousted where a statute created a liability and provided a remedy, is not applicable to the facts appearing in the present case. In the present case, as already mentioned above, registered A.D. notice was issued to and served on Smt. Kirpal Kaur, who had thereafter, filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>12. Both the courts below have given concurrent findings of fact which cannot be interfered with in the second appeal in view of the provisions of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as no substantial question of law has either been pleaded in the memorandum of appeal or arises for consideration in the present appeal. I do not find any infirmity in the well-reasoned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>13. Consequently, there is no merit in this appeal. It is, accordingly, dismissed. However, I do no make any order as to costs.<p>',
	(int) 15 => '<p>'
)
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Ashutosh Mohunta, J.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Rai Jasbir Singh and anr Vs Balwant Singh and ors - Citation 629369 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '629369',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/136769/the-punjab-land-revenue-act-1887-complete-act">Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887</a> - Sections 13, 20, 20(3) and 158; Indian Post Office Act, 1886; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) - Sections 100',
			'appealno' => 'Regular Second Appeal No. 615 of 1982 (O and M)',
			'appellant' => 'Rai Jasbir Singh and anr.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Rai Jasbir Singh and anr. Vs. Balwant Singh and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' - HINDU LAW -- Custom: [Vijender Jain, C.J., M.M. Kumar, Jasbir Singh, Rajive Bhalla & Rajesh Bindal, JJ] Alienation of ancestral property - Punjab and Haryana -  Held, In respect of State of Punjab by virtue of Punjab Amendment Act, 1973 there is a complete bar to contest any alienation of ancestral or non-ancestral immovable property or appointment of an heir to such property on ground that such alienation or appointment was contrary to custom. In Punjab the property in hands of a successor has to be treated as coparcenary property and its alienation has to be governed by Hindu Law except to the extent it is regulated by Sections 6 and 30 of the Hindu Succession Act. In Haryana, property  in hands of successor has to be treated as coparcenary property as well as ancestral property. Parties can fall back upon Hindu Law in case they fail to establish that rule of decision is custom. Therefore, in Haryana both under Hindu law and the Customary Law, the alienation would be open to challenge. Custom was given precedent over uncodified Hindu Law presumably for reason that custom has been consistently replacing the Hindu Law. However, it was soon realized that ancestral immovable property, which ordinarily held to be inalienable amongst Jats of Punjab by virtue of custom except for necessity, no limitation was placed on degrees of collateral, eligible to contest such alienation. It was, therefore, felt necessary to engraft certain restriction on degrees of collateral, eligible to contest an alienation, which under the custom itself was not limited. Accordingly, the Punjab Custom (Power to Contest) Act, 1920 (Act No.2 of 1920) was enacted. The Hindu Succession Act was extended to the State of Punjab.  Act 2 of Punjab Act defined expression alienation to include any testamentary disposition of property and appointment of an heir was to include any adoption made or purporting to be made according to custom. A further provision was made by Section 3 that Hindu Succession Act was to apply only in respect of alienation of immovable property or appointment of heirs made by persons who in regard to such alienation or appointment were governed by custom. Whereas  Section 4 declared that Hindu Succession Act was not to affect any right to contest any alienation or appointment of an heir made before the date on which the Succession Act was to come into force. In other words, Act, No.2 of 1920 was not to affect alienation or appointments of heir made before date on which it came into force. It also preserved the rights of any alienation or appointment of an heir made by a family. After Section 7 was inserted in Act of 1920 by the Punjab Amendment Act of 1973 right of contest being contrary to custom had been totally effaced and taken away. Therefore, no person has any right to contest any alienation of immovable property whether ancestral or non-ancestral on ground of being contrary to custom after January 23, 1973. In Haryana, the situation as enunciated by Act No.2 of 1920 continued to prevail in respect of alienation because no reforms parallel to Punjab as brought by Amendment Act of 1973, had been enacted although right to pre-emption has been substantially abolished in Haryana also. No steps even have been taken in that regard. Therefore, situation in Haryana have to be regarded as it existed under Act No. 2 of 1920.
HINDU SUCCESSION ACT,1956[C.A.No.30/1956] --  Sections 6 & 30: [Vijender Jain, C.J., M.M.Kumar, Jasbir Singh, Rajive Bhalla & Rajesh Bindal, JJ]  Alienation of coparcenary property - Law laid down by Full Bench in Joginder Singh Kundha Singh v Kehar Singh Dasaundha Singh [AIR 1965 Punjab 407] and Pritam Singh v Assistant Controller of Estate Duty, Patiala [1976 Punj LR 342] -Whether there is any conflict? - Held, The basic controversy in the Full Bench decision of Joginder Singhs case was regarding constitutional validity of Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act and as to whether it infringes Article 14 of Constitution. It was held that the estate held by male and limitation on his power of alienation were in no way removed and the reversioners were not debarred from challenging such alienations. The Full Bench held that Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act postulates that estate held by a Hindu female before enforcement of Succession Act either by inheritance or otherwise, was enlarged and on date of enforcement of Succession Act, she became a full owner. Likewise, if she has inherited any estate after the commencement of the Act,  she was to be regarded as absolute owner rather than a limited owner. Consequently, the limitations on power of alienation automatically vanished. This was the necessary result of the provisions made in Section 14 of the Act. The Full Bench further held that in respect of male proprietors, no corresponding provision was made either enlarging their estate in ancestral property or enlarging their power of alienation over property inherited by them. However, it noticed Section 30 and observed that it only deals with power of his share in coparcenary property by Will, which prior to enforcement of the Act, he had no right to do. The only provision made in respect of male proprietor regarding alienation of property was his power of alienation by Will. In so far as persons governed by custom are concerned, they continued to be governed by the restriction on the power of alienation of a male holder as existed before enforcement of the Act. Likewise, other restriction on alienation other than disposal by Will also continued. The Full Bench, thus, recognized the superior right of Hindu females by virtue of Section 14 and upheld the provision as intra vires. The argument that reversioners have ceased to exist after enactment of provisions of Section 14 of Succession Act, was rejected as there was no provision pointed out to that effect. The proposition laid down by the full Bench in Pritam Singhs case was that the Hindu Succession Act has not abolished joint Hindu family with respect to rights of those who were members of Mitakshara coparcenary, except in the manner and to the extent mentioned in Sections 6 and 30 of the Act, This Statement should also imply, though it does not say so expressly, the Succession Act to this extent does not affect the rights of the members governed by Dayabhaga coparcenary. The Full Bench in Pritam Singh;s case expressly noticed the judgment of earlier Full Bench in Joginder Singhs case but construed the same as irrelevant by observing that it dealt with the power of alienation of a person governed by Customary law and constitutional validity of Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act. Thus there is no real conflict between the two Full Bench judgments. Both the Full Bench judgments have been delivered on the assumption that Joginder Singhs case dealt with question of alienation whereas Pritam Singhs case had decided the question concerning succession. Even on fact in Joginder Singhs case the issue was validity of alienation by consent decree by a father to his two sons, which was challenged by third son, whereas in Pritam Singhs case the question of nature of property in hands of sons on death of their father had arisen  for purposes of assessment of estate duty. In Pritam  Singhs case the property in the hands of the sons was held to be coparcenary property and only 1/3rd of  property belonging to deceased father was considered eligible for estate duty. Therefore, there was no question of alienation in Pritam Singhs case. -  I do not find any infirmity in the well-reasoned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Hari Kishan and Ors. v. Administrator Municipal Committee;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal, Sr. Adv. and; Sudhir Mittal, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' M.L Sarin, Sr. Adv.,; Ashish Handa,; H.N. Mehtani an',
			'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2005-05-25',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' Ashutosh Mohunta, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Ashutosh Mohunta, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The vendee-plaintiffs have filed this appeal to challenge the judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below whereby their suit and the appeal against the partition of the land ordered by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Guhla, vide order dated 16.7.1975, were dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. In brief the facts giving rise to this appeal are that defendant-respondent Nos. 1 to 5 filed an application for partition of the suit land against Smt.Kirpal Kaur (Plaintiff No. 1) and defendant Nos. 6 to 15 in the court of Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Guhla. In that application Smt. Kirpal Kaur was proceeded against ex parte. The partition was confirmed on 16.6.1975 and the case was fixed for instrument of partition for 16.7.1975. Rai Jasbir Singh, plaintiff No. 2 purchased land measuring 80 Kanals from Smt. Kirpal Kaur (plaintiff No. 1) vide sale deed dated 27.5.1975 during the pendency of the partition proceedings and plaintiff No. 2 and 3, i.e., Rai Jasbir Singh and Swaran Singh were in actual physical possession of 228 Kanals 8 Marias and 77 Kanals 8 Marias, respectively. The plaintiffs challenged the order dated 16.7.1975 passed by the Assistant Grade, 1st Class, Guhla, by filing the present suit for declaration, which was dismissed by the Sub Judge, 1st Class, Kaithal, vide judgment and decree dated 29.1.1980 on the ground that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The plaintiffs then filed appeal to challenge the judgment and decree dated 29.1.1980 passed by the trial Court. During the pendency of the appeal, Smt. Kirpal Kaur withdrew herself from being the appellant. Consequently, vide order dated 17.1.1980 the appeal qua Kirpal Kaur was ordered to be dismissed as withdrawn. The appeal qua the remaining two appellants, i.e., Rai Jasbir Singh and Swaran Singh (present appellants) was dismissed by the Additional District Judge, Kurukshetra, vide judgment and decree dated 4.12.1981 and the decision of the trial Court with regard to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was upheld. Now Rai Jasbir Singh arid Swaran Singh have filed the present appeal wherein challenge has been made to the findings of both the Courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. It has been contended by Mr. R.S. Mittal, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the appellants, that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not duly served and, thus,the ex parte order dated 16.6.1975/16.7.1975 passed by the Assistant Collector,1st Grade, Guhla, was a nullity. It has further been argued by the learned counsel for the appellants that the Courts below erred in holding that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit against partition ordered by the Revenue Officer in view of the provisions of the <a href="/act/136769/the-punjab-land-revenue-act-1887-complete-act">Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887</a> (for short 'the Act'), despite the fact that the order for partition of the suit land was passed ex parte without serving Smt.Kirpal Kaur according to the prescribed legal procedure.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellants have been controverted by Mr. M.L.Sarin, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the respondents. It has been contended by him that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to go into the validity of the partition proceedings. The appellants have approached the Civil Court without exhausting the remedy available to them under Section 13 of the Act. It has further been contended by him that Smt. Kirpal Kaur had duly been served in the partition proceedings by sending notice to her by registered post.The counsel has also contended that she had withdrawn her appeal before the lower appellate court and in this view of the matter, the present appellants, who had purchased the land from her during the pendency of the partition proceedings, had no locus standi to challenge the order of partition passed by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. 1 have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the evidence adduced on record.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The only question that arises for consideration in the present appeal is to the following effect:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether or not the Civil Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the suit wherein the order of partition passed by a Revenue Officer has been challenged and Smt. Kirpal Kaur was properly served in the partition proceedings</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The first objection raised on behalf of the appellants is that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not served in the partition proceedings before the Assistant Collector 1st Grade, Guhla, as per the provisions contained in Section 20 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. I do not find any merit in this contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants. It is not the case of the appellants that Smt.Kirpal Kaur was not served at all. The bald statement of the plaintiffs was rebutted by the statement on oath of defendant Balwant Singh and also by documentary evidence adduced on record which shows that a registered notice was issued to her and acknowledgement due (Ex.DIO) was received in the office of the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade. Sub-section (3) of Section 20 of the Act gives discretion to the Revenue Officer to serve the concerned person 'either in addition to, or in substitution for, any other mode of service, by forwarding the summons by post in a-letter addressed' to him and registered under Part II of the Indian Post Office Act, 1886. In this view of the matter, it cannot be said that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not served as per the procedure prescribed under the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The next contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants is that the Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain the ex parte order passed by the Revenue Officer.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. This contention is also without any merit. Section 158 of the Act specifically excludes the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts in matters within the jurisdiction of the Revenue Officers. In order to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector, a provision for filing of appeals before the higher Revenue Authorities has been made in Section 13 of the Act. The plaintiffs without exhausting the remedies available to them under Section 13, approached the Civil Court to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Moreover, it has come on record that Smt. Kirpal Kaur, from whom the present appellants had purchased the land during the pendency of the partition proceedings, had withdrawn from the appeal before the lower appellate Court. As the present appellants had purchased the suit land during the pendency of the partition proceedings, they have, therefore, no locus standi to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector 1st Grade and pursue the appeal. It is not the case of the plaintiff-appellants that the ex parte decree was obtained by the defendant-respondents by fraud or misrepresentation. In A.C. Ananthaswamy and Ors. v. Boraiah (D) by Lrs. (2004-3)138 Punjab Law Reporter 557, it has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that in the absence of any fraud or misrepresentation, an ex parte order on the bare plea of non-service cannot be set aside. In the present case it is an undisputed fact that registered notice (Ex.DIO) was issued to Smt. Kirpal Kaur and she had even filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order passed by the Assistant Collector. The ratio of the authority Firm Seth Radha Kishun (deceased) represented by Hari Kishan and Ors. v. Administrator Municipal Committee, Ludhiana : [1964]2SCR273 , that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not specifically ousted where a statute created a liability and provided a remedy, is not applicable to the facts appearing in the present case. In the present case, as already mentioned above, registered A.D. notice was issued to and served on Smt. Kirpal Kaur, who had thereafter, filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Both the courts below have given concurrent findings of fact which cannot be interfered with in the second appeal in view of the provisions of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as no substantial question of law has either been pleaded in the memorandum of appeal or arises for consideration in the present appeal. I do not find any infirmity in the well-reasoned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Consequently, there is no merit in this appeal. It is, accordingly, dismissed. However, I do no make any order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
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			'pubs' => '(2006)142PLR339',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Balwant Singh and ors.',
			'sub' => 'Property',
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			'circuit' => null
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		'id' => '629369',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/136769/the-punjab-land-revenue-act-1887-complete-act">Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887</a> - Sections 13, 20, 20(3) and 158; Indian Post Office Act, 1886; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) - Sections 100',
		'appealno' => 'Regular Second Appeal No. 615 of 1982 (O and M)',
		'appellant' => 'Rai Jasbir Singh and anr.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Rai Jasbir Singh and anr. Vs. Balwant Singh and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' - HINDU LAW -- Custom: [Vijender Jain, C.J., M.M. Kumar, Jasbir Singh, Rajive Bhalla & Rajesh Bindal, JJ] Alienation of ancestral property - Punjab and Haryana -  Held, In respect of State of Punjab by virtue of Punjab Amendment Act, 1973 there is a complete bar to contest any alienation of ancestral or non-ancestral immovable property or appointment of an heir to such property on ground that such alienation or appointment was contrary to custom. In Punjab the property in hands of a successor has to be treated as coparcenary property and its alienation has to be governed by Hindu Law except to the extent it is regulated by Sections 6 and 30 of the Hindu Succession Act. In Haryana, property  in hands of successor has to be treated as coparcenary property as well as ancestral property. Parties can fall back upon Hindu Law in case they fail to establish that rule of decision is custom. Therefore, in Haryana both under Hindu law and the Customary Law, the alienation would be open to challenge. Custom was given precedent over uncodified Hindu Law presumably for reason that custom has been consistently replacing the Hindu Law. However, it was soon realized that ancestral immovable property, which ordinarily held to be inalienable amongst Jats of Punjab by virtue of custom except for necessity, no limitation was placed on degrees of collateral, eligible to contest such alienation. It was, therefore, felt necessary to engraft certain restriction on degrees of collateral, eligible to contest an alienation, which under the custom itself was not limited. Accordingly, the Punjab Custom (Power to Contest) Act, 1920 (Act No.2 of 1920) was enacted. The Hindu Succession Act was extended to the State of Punjab.  Act 2 of Punjab Act defined expression alienation to include any testamentary disposition of property and appointment of an heir was to include any adoption made or purporting to be made according to custom. A further provision was made by Section 3 that Hindu Succession Act was to apply only in respect of alienation of immovable property or appointment of heirs made by persons who in regard to such alienation or appointment were governed by custom. Whereas  Section 4 declared that Hindu Succession Act was not to affect any right to contest any alienation or appointment of an heir made before the date on which the Succession Act was to come into force. In other words, Act, No.2 of 1920 was not to affect alienation or appointments of heir made before date on which it came into force. It also preserved the rights of any alienation or appointment of an heir made by a family. After Section 7 was inserted in Act of 1920 by the Punjab Amendment Act of 1973 right of contest being contrary to custom had been totally effaced and taken away. Therefore, no person has any right to contest any alienation of immovable property whether ancestral or non-ancestral on ground of being contrary to custom after January 23, 1973. In Haryana, the situation as enunciated by Act No.2 of 1920 continued to prevail in respect of alienation because no reforms parallel to Punjab as brought by Amendment Act of 1973, had been enacted although right to pre-emption has been substantially abolished in Haryana also. No steps even have been taken in that regard. Therefore, situation in Haryana have to be regarded as it existed under Act No. 2 of 1920.
HINDU SUCCESSION ACT,1956[C.A.No.30/1956] --  Sections 6 & 30: [Vijender Jain, C.J., M.M.Kumar, Jasbir Singh, Rajive Bhalla & Rajesh Bindal, JJ]  Alienation of coparcenary property - Law laid down by Full Bench in Joginder Singh Kundha Singh v Kehar Singh Dasaundha Singh [AIR 1965 Punjab 407] and Pritam Singh v Assistant Controller of Estate Duty, Patiala [1976 Punj LR 342] -Whether there is any conflict? - Held, The basic controversy in the Full Bench decision of Joginder Singhs case was regarding constitutional validity of Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act and as to whether it infringes Article 14 of Constitution. It was held that the estate held by male and limitation on his power of alienation were in no way removed and the reversioners were not debarred from challenging such alienations. The Full Bench held that Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act postulates that estate held by a Hindu female before enforcement of Succession Act either by inheritance or otherwise, was enlarged and on date of enforcement of Succession Act, she became a full owner. Likewise, if she has inherited any estate after the commencement of the Act,  she was to be regarded as absolute owner rather than a limited owner. Consequently, the limitations on power of alienation automatically vanished. This was the necessary result of the provisions made in Section 14 of the Act. The Full Bench further held that in respect of male proprietors, no corresponding provision was made either enlarging their estate in ancestral property or enlarging their power of alienation over property inherited by them. However, it noticed Section 30 and observed that it only deals with power of his share in coparcenary property by Will, which prior to enforcement of the Act, he had no right to do. The only provision made in respect of male proprietor regarding alienation of property was his power of alienation by Will. In so far as persons governed by custom are concerned, they continued to be governed by the restriction on the power of alienation of a male holder as existed before enforcement of the Act. Likewise, other restriction on alienation other than disposal by Will also continued. The Full Bench, thus, recognized the superior right of Hindu females by virtue of Section 14 and upheld the provision as intra vires. The argument that reversioners have ceased to exist after enactment of provisions of Section 14 of Succession Act, was rejected as there was no provision pointed out to that effect. The proposition laid down by the full Bench in Pritam Singhs case was that the Hindu Succession Act has not abolished joint Hindu family with respect to rights of those who were members of Mitakshara coparcenary, except in the manner and to the extent mentioned in Sections 6 and 30 of the Act, This Statement should also imply, though it does not say so expressly, the Succession Act to this extent does not affect the rights of the members governed by Dayabhaga coparcenary. The Full Bench in Pritam Singh;s case expressly noticed the judgment of earlier Full Bench in Joginder Singhs case but construed the same as irrelevant by observing that it dealt with the power of alienation of a person governed by Customary law and constitutional validity of Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act. Thus there is no real conflict between the two Full Bench judgments. Both the Full Bench judgments have been delivered on the assumption that Joginder Singhs case dealt with question of alienation whereas Pritam Singhs case had decided the question concerning succession. Even on fact in Joginder Singhs case the issue was validity of alienation by consent decree by a father to his two sons, which was challenged by third son, whereas in Pritam Singhs case the question of nature of property in hands of sons on death of their father had arisen  for purposes of assessment of estate duty. In Pritam  Singhs case the property in the hands of the sons was held to be coparcenary property and only 1/3rd of  property belonging to deceased father was considered eligible for estate duty. Therefore, there was no question of alienation in Pritam Singhs case. -  I do not find any infirmity in the well-reasoned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Hari Kishan and Ors. v. Administrator Municipal Committee;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal, Sr. Adv. and; Sudhir Mittal, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' M.L Sarin, Sr. Adv.,; Ashish Handa,; H.N. Mehtani an',
		'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2005-05-25',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Ashutosh Mohunta, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Ashutosh Mohunta, J.</p><p>1. The vendee-plaintiffs have filed this appeal to challenge the judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below whereby their suit and the appeal against the partition of the land ordered by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Guhla, vide order dated 16.7.1975, were dismissed.</p><p>2. In brief the facts giving rise to this appeal are that defendant-respondent Nos. 1 to 5 filed an application for partition of the suit land against Smt.Kirpal Kaur (Plaintiff No. 1) and defendant Nos. 6 to 15 in the court of Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Guhla. In that application Smt. Kirpal Kaur was proceeded against ex parte. The partition was confirmed on 16.6.1975 and the case was fixed for instrument of partition for 16.7.1975. Rai Jasbir Singh, plaintiff No. 2 purchased land measuring 80 Kanals from Smt. Kirpal Kaur (plaintiff No. 1) vide sale deed dated 27.5.1975 during the pendency of the partition proceedings and plaintiff No. 2 and 3, i.e., Rai Jasbir Singh and Swaran Singh were in actual physical possession of 228 Kanals 8 Marias and 77 Kanals 8 Marias, respectively. The plaintiffs challenged the order dated 16.7.1975 passed by the Assistant Grade, 1st Class, Guhla, by filing the present suit for declaration, which was dismissed by the Sub Judge, 1st Class, Kaithal, vide judgment and decree dated 29.1.1980 on the ground that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The plaintiffs then filed appeal to challenge the judgment and decree dated 29.1.1980 passed by the trial Court. During the pendency of the appeal, Smt. Kirpal Kaur withdrew herself from being the appellant. Consequently, vide order dated 17.1.1980 the appeal qua Kirpal Kaur was ordered to be dismissed as withdrawn. The appeal qua the remaining two appellants, i.e., Rai Jasbir Singh and Swaran Singh (present appellants) was dismissed by the Additional District Judge, Kurukshetra, vide judgment and decree dated 4.12.1981 and the decision of the trial Court with regard to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was upheld. Now Rai Jasbir Singh arid Swaran Singh have filed the present appeal wherein challenge has been made to the findings of both the Courts below.</p><p>3. It has been contended by Mr. R.S. Mittal, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the appellants, that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not duly served and, thus,the ex parte order dated 16.6.1975/16.7.1975 passed by the Assistant Collector,1st Grade, Guhla, was a nullity. It has further been argued by the learned counsel for the appellants that the Courts below erred in holding that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit against partition ordered by the Revenue Officer in view of the provisions of the <a>Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887</a> (for short 'the Act'), despite the fact that the order for partition of the suit land was passed ex parte without serving Smt.Kirpal Kaur according to the prescribed legal procedure.</p><p>4. The contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellants have been controverted by Mr. M.L.Sarin, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the respondents. It has been contended by him that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to go into the validity of the partition proceedings. The appellants have approached the Civil Court without exhausting the remedy available to them under Section 13 of the Act. It has further been contended by him that Smt. Kirpal Kaur had duly been served in the partition proceedings by sending notice to her by registered post.The counsel has also contended that she had withdrawn her appeal before the lower appellate court and in this view of the matter, the present appellants, who had purchased the land from her during the pendency of the partition proceedings, had no locus standi to challenge the order of partition passed by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade.</p><p>5. 1 have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the evidence adduced on record.</p><p>6. The only question that arises for consideration in the present appeal is to the following effect:-</p><p>Whether or not the Civil Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the suit wherein the order of partition passed by a Revenue Officer has been challenged and Smt. Kirpal Kaur was properly served in the partition proceedings</p><p>7. The first objection raised on behalf of the appellants is that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not served in the partition proceedings before the Assistant Collector 1st Grade, Guhla, as per the provisions contained in Section 20 of the Act.</p><p>8. I do not find any merit in this contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants. It is not the case of the appellants that Smt.Kirpal Kaur was not served at all. The bald statement of the plaintiffs was rebutted by the statement on oath of defendant Balwant Singh and also by documentary evidence adduced on record which shows that a registered notice was issued to her and acknowledgement due (Ex.DIO) was received in the office of the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade. Sub-section (3) of Section 20 of the Act gives discretion to the Revenue Officer to serve the concerned person 'either in addition to, or in substitution for, any other mode of service, by forwarding the summons by post in a-letter addressed' to him and registered under Part II of the Indian Post Office Act, 1886. In this view of the matter, it cannot be said that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not served as per the procedure prescribed under the Act.</p><p>9. The next contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants is that the Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain the ex parte order passed by the Revenue Officer.</p><p>10. This contention is also without any merit. Section 158 of the Act specifically excludes the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts in matters within the jurisdiction of the Revenue Officers. In order to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector, a provision for filing of appeals before the higher Revenue Authorities has been made in Section 13 of the Act. The plaintiffs without exhausting the remedies available to them under Section 13, approached the Civil Court to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector.</p><p>11. Moreover, it has come on record that Smt. Kirpal Kaur, from whom the present appellants had purchased the land during the pendency of the partition proceedings, had withdrawn from the appeal before the lower appellate Court. As the present appellants had purchased the suit land during the pendency of the partition proceedings, they have, therefore, no locus standi to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector 1st Grade and pursue the appeal. It is not the case of the plaintiff-appellants that the ex parte decree was obtained by the defendant-respondents by fraud or misrepresentation. In A.C. Ananthaswamy and Ors. v. Boraiah (D) by Lrs. (2004-3)138 Punjab Law Reporter 557, it has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that in the absence of any fraud or misrepresentation, an ex parte order on the bare plea of non-service cannot be set aside. In the present case it is an undisputed fact that registered notice (Ex.DIO) was issued to Smt. Kirpal Kaur and she had even filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order passed by the Assistant Collector. The ratio of the authority Firm Seth Radha Kishun (deceased) represented by Hari Kishan and Ors. v. Administrator Municipal Committee, Ludhiana : [1964]2SCR273 , that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not specifically ousted where a statute created a liability and provided a remedy, is not applicable to the facts appearing in the present case. In the present case, as already mentioned above, registered A.D. notice was issued to and served on Smt. Kirpal Kaur, who had thereafter, filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order.</p><p>12. Both the courts below have given concurrent findings of fact which cannot be interfered with in the second appeal in view of the provisions of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as no substantial question of law has either been pleaded in the memorandum of appeal or arises for consideration in the present appeal. I do not find any infirmity in the well-reasoned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below.</p><p>13. Consequently, there is no merit in this appeal. It is, accordingly, dismissed. However, I do no make any order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
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		'pubs' => '(2006)142PLR339',
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		'respondent' => 'Balwant Singh and ors.',
		'sub' => 'Property',
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		'circuit' => null
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Ashutosh Mohunta, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The vendee-plaintiffs have filed this appeal to challenge the judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below whereby their suit and the appeal against the partition of the land ordered by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Guhla, vide order dated 16.7.1975, were dismissed.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. In brief the facts giving rise to this appeal are that defendant-respondent Nos. 1 to 5 filed an application for partition of the suit land against Smt.Kirpal Kaur (Plaintiff No. 1) and defendant Nos. 6 to 15 in the court of Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Guhla. In that application Smt. Kirpal Kaur was proceeded against ex parte. The partition was confirmed on 16.6.1975 and the case was fixed for instrument of partition for 16.7.1975. Rai Jasbir Singh, plaintiff No. 2 purchased land measuring 80 Kanals from Smt. Kirpal Kaur (plaintiff No. 1) vide sale deed dated 27.5.1975 during the pendency of the partition proceedings and plaintiff No. 2 and 3, i.e., Rai Jasbir Singh and Swaran Singh were in actual physical possession of 228 Kanals 8 Marias and 77 Kanals 8 Marias, respectively. The plaintiffs challenged the order dated 16.7.1975 passed by the Assistant Grade, 1st Class, Guhla, by filing the present suit for declaration, which was dismissed by the Sub Judge, 1st Class, Kaithal, vide judgment and decree dated 29.1.1980 on the ground that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The plaintiffs then filed appeal to challenge the judgment and decree dated 29.1.1980 passed by the trial Court. During the pendency of the appeal, Smt. Kirpal Kaur withdrew herself from being the appellant. Consequently, vide order dated 17.1.1980 the appeal qua Kirpal Kaur was ordered to be dismissed as withdrawn. The appeal qua the remaining two appellants, i.e., Rai Jasbir Singh and Swaran Singh (present appellants) was dismissed by the Additional District Judge, Kurukshetra, vide judgment and decree dated 4.12.1981 and the decision of the trial Court with regard to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was upheld. Now Rai Jasbir Singh arid Swaran Singh have filed the present appeal wherein challenge has been made to the findings of both the Courts below.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. It has been contended by Mr. R.S. Mittal, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the appellants, that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not duly served and, thus,the ex parte order dated 16.6.1975/16.7.1975 passed by the Assistant Collector,1st Grade, Guhla, was a nullity. It has further been argued by the learned counsel for the appellants that the Courts below erred in holding that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit against partition ordered by the Revenue Officer in view of the provisions of the <a>Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887</a> (for short 'the Act'), despite the fact that the order for partition of the suit land was passed ex parte without serving Smt.Kirpal Kaur according to the prescribed legal procedure.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. The contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellants have been controverted by Mr. M.L.Sarin, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the respondents. It has been contended by him that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to go into the validity of the partition proceedings. The appellants have approached the Civil Court without exhausting the remedy available to them under Section 13 of the Act. It has further been contended by him that Smt. Kirpal Kaur had duly been served in the partition proceedings by sending notice to her by registered post.The counsel has also contended that she had withdrawn her appeal before the lower appellate court and in this view of the matter, the present appellants, who had purchased the land from her during the pendency of the partition proceedings, had no locus standi to challenge the order of partition passed by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. 1 have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the evidence adduced on record.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. The only question that arises for consideration in the present appeal is to the following effect:-',
	(int) 7 => '<p>Whether or not the Civil Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the suit wherein the order of partition passed by a Revenue Officer has been challenged and Smt. Kirpal Kaur was properly served in the partition proceedings',
	(int) 8 => '<p>7. The first objection raised on behalf of the appellants is that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not served in the partition proceedings before the Assistant Collector 1st Grade, Guhla, as per the provisions contained in Section 20 of the Act.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>8. I do not find any merit in this contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants. It is not the case of the appellants that Smt.Kirpal Kaur was not served at all. The bald statement of the plaintiffs was rebutted by the statement on oath of defendant Balwant Singh and also by documentary evidence adduced on record which shows that a registered notice was issued to her and acknowledgement due (Ex.DIO) was received in the office of the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade. Sub-section (3) of Section 20 of the Act gives discretion to the Revenue Officer to serve the concerned person 'either in addition to, or in substitution for, any other mode of service, by forwarding the summons by post in a-letter addressed' to him and registered under Part II of the Indian Post Office Act, 1886. In this view of the matter, it cannot be said that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not served as per the procedure prescribed under the Act.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>9. The next contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants is that the Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain the ex parte order passed by the Revenue Officer.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>10. This contention is also without any merit. Section 158 of the Act specifically excludes the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts in matters within the jurisdiction of the Revenue Officers. In order to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector, a provision for filing of appeals before the higher Revenue Authorities has been made in Section 13 of the Act. The plaintiffs without exhausting the remedies available to them under Section 13, approached the Civil Court to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>11. Moreover, it has come on record that Smt. Kirpal Kaur, from whom the present appellants had purchased the land during the pendency of the partition proceedings, had withdrawn from the appeal before the lower appellate Court. As the present appellants had purchased the suit land during the pendency of the partition proceedings, they have, therefore, no locus standi to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector 1st Grade and pursue the appeal. It is not the case of the plaintiff-appellants that the ex parte decree was obtained by the defendant-respondents by fraud or misrepresentation. In A.C. Ananthaswamy and Ors. v. Boraiah (D) by Lrs. (2004-3)138 Punjab Law Reporter 557, it has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that in the absence of any fraud or misrepresentation, an ex parte order on the bare plea of non-service cannot be set aside. In the present case it is an undisputed fact that registered notice (Ex.DIO) was issued to Smt. Kirpal Kaur and she had even filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order passed by the Assistant Collector. The ratio of the authority Firm Seth Radha Kishun (deceased) represented by Hari Kishan and Ors. v. Administrator Municipal Committee, Ludhiana : [1964]2SCR273 , that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not specifically ousted where a statute created a liability and provided a remedy, is not applicable to the facts appearing in the present case. In the present case, as already mentioned above, registered A.D. notice was issued to and served on Smt. Kirpal Kaur, who had thereafter, filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>12. Both the courts below have given concurrent findings of fact which cannot be interfered with in the second appeal in view of the provisions of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as no substantial question of law has either been pleaded in the memorandum of appeal or arises for consideration in the present appeal. I do not find any infirmity in the well-reasoned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>13. Consequently, there is no merit in this appeal. It is, accordingly, dismissed. However, I do no make any order as to costs.<p>',
	(int) 15 => '<p>'
)
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1. The vendee-plaintiffs have filed this appeal to challenge the judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below whereby their suit and the appeal against the partition of the land ordered by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Guhla, vide order dated 16.7.1975, were dismissed.

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$dataForView = array(
	'title_for_layout' => 'Rai Jasbir Singh and anr Vs Balwant Singh and ors - Citation 629369 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '629369',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/136769/the-punjab-land-revenue-act-1887-complete-act">Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887</a> - Sections 13, 20, 20(3) and 158; Indian Post Office Act, 1886; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) - Sections 100',
			'appealno' => 'Regular Second Appeal No. 615 of 1982 (O and M)',
			'appellant' => 'Rai Jasbir Singh and anr.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Rai Jasbir Singh and anr. Vs. Balwant Singh and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' - HINDU LAW -- Custom: [Vijender Jain, C.J., M.M. Kumar, Jasbir Singh, Rajive Bhalla & Rajesh Bindal, JJ] Alienation of ancestral property - Punjab and Haryana -  Held, In respect of State of Punjab by virtue of Punjab Amendment Act, 1973 there is a complete bar to contest any alienation of ancestral or non-ancestral immovable property or appointment of an heir to such property on ground that such alienation or appointment was contrary to custom. In Punjab the property in hands of a successor has to be treated as coparcenary property and its alienation has to be governed by Hindu Law except to the extent it is regulated by Sections 6 and 30 of the Hindu Succession Act. In Haryana, property  in hands of successor has to be treated as coparcenary property as well as ancestral property. Parties can fall back upon Hindu Law in case they fail to establish that rule of decision is custom. Therefore, in Haryana both under Hindu law and the Customary Law, the alienation would be open to challenge. Custom was given precedent over uncodified Hindu Law presumably for reason that custom has been consistently replacing the Hindu Law. However, it was soon realized that ancestral immovable property, which ordinarily held to be inalienable amongst Jats of Punjab by virtue of custom except for necessity, no limitation was placed on degrees of collateral, eligible to contest such alienation. It was, therefore, felt necessary to engraft certain restriction on degrees of collateral, eligible to contest an alienation, which under the custom itself was not limited. Accordingly, the Punjab Custom (Power to Contest) Act, 1920 (Act No.2 of 1920) was enacted. The Hindu Succession Act was extended to the State of Punjab.  Act 2 of Punjab Act defined expression alienation to include any testamentary disposition of property and appointment of an heir was to include any adoption made or purporting to be made according to custom. A further provision was made by Section 3 that Hindu Succession Act was to apply only in respect of alienation of immovable property or appointment of heirs made by persons who in regard to such alienation or appointment were governed by custom. Whereas  Section 4 declared that Hindu Succession Act was not to affect any right to contest any alienation or appointment of an heir made before the date on which the Succession Act was to come into force. In other words, Act, No.2 of 1920 was not to affect alienation or appointments of heir made before date on which it came into force. It also preserved the rights of any alienation or appointment of an heir made by a family. After Section 7 was inserted in Act of 1920 by the Punjab Amendment Act of 1973 right of contest being contrary to custom had been totally effaced and taken away. Therefore, no person has any right to contest any alienation of immovable property whether ancestral or non-ancestral on ground of being contrary to custom after January 23, 1973. In Haryana, the situation as enunciated by Act No.2 of 1920 continued to prevail in respect of alienation because no reforms parallel to Punjab as brought by Amendment Act of 1973, had been enacted although right to pre-emption has been substantially abolished in Haryana also. No steps even have been taken in that regard. Therefore, situation in Haryana have to be regarded as it existed under Act No. 2 of 1920.
HINDU SUCCESSION ACT,1956[C.A.No.30/1956] --  Sections 6 & 30: [Vijender Jain, C.J., M.M.Kumar, Jasbir Singh, Rajive Bhalla & Rajesh Bindal, JJ]  Alienation of coparcenary property - Law laid down by Full Bench in Joginder Singh Kundha Singh v Kehar Singh Dasaundha Singh [AIR 1965 Punjab 407] and Pritam Singh v Assistant Controller of Estate Duty, Patiala [1976 Punj LR 342] -Whether there is any conflict? - Held, The basic controversy in the Full Bench decision of Joginder Singhs case was regarding constitutional validity of Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act and as to whether it infringes Article 14 of Constitution. It was held that the estate held by male and limitation on his power of alienation were in no way removed and the reversioners were not debarred from challenging such alienations. The Full Bench held that Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act postulates that estate held by a Hindu female before enforcement of Succession Act either by inheritance or otherwise, was enlarged and on date of enforcement of Succession Act, she became a full owner. Likewise, if she has inherited any estate after the commencement of the Act,  she was to be regarded as absolute owner rather than a limited owner. Consequently, the limitations on power of alienation automatically vanished. This was the necessary result of the provisions made in Section 14 of the Act. The Full Bench further held that in respect of male proprietors, no corresponding provision was made either enlarging their estate in ancestral property or enlarging their power of alienation over property inherited by them. However, it noticed Section 30 and observed that it only deals with power of his share in coparcenary property by Will, which prior to enforcement of the Act, he had no right to do. The only provision made in respect of male proprietor regarding alienation of property was his power of alienation by Will. In so far as persons governed by custom are concerned, they continued to be governed by the restriction on the power of alienation of a male holder as existed before enforcement of the Act. Likewise, other restriction on alienation other than disposal by Will also continued. The Full Bench, thus, recognized the superior right of Hindu females by virtue of Section 14 and upheld the provision as intra vires. The argument that reversioners have ceased to exist after enactment of provisions of Section 14 of Succession Act, was rejected as there was no provision pointed out to that effect. The proposition laid down by the full Bench in Pritam Singhs case was that the Hindu Succession Act has not abolished joint Hindu family with respect to rights of those who were members of Mitakshara coparcenary, except in the manner and to the extent mentioned in Sections 6 and 30 of the Act, This Statement should also imply, though it does not say so expressly, the Succession Act to this extent does not affect the rights of the members governed by Dayabhaga coparcenary. The Full Bench in Pritam Singh;s case expressly noticed the judgment of earlier Full Bench in Joginder Singhs case but construed the same as irrelevant by observing that it dealt with the power of alienation of a person governed by Customary law and constitutional validity of Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act. Thus there is no real conflict between the two Full Bench judgments. Both the Full Bench judgments have been delivered on the assumption that Joginder Singhs case dealt with question of alienation whereas Pritam Singhs case had decided the question concerning succession. Even on fact in Joginder Singhs case the issue was validity of alienation by consent decree by a father to his two sons, which was challenged by third son, whereas in Pritam Singhs case the question of nature of property in hands of sons on death of their father had arisen  for purposes of assessment of estate duty. In Pritam  Singhs case the property in the hands of the sons was held to be coparcenary property and only 1/3rd of  property belonging to deceased father was considered eligible for estate duty. Therefore, there was no question of alienation in Pritam Singhs case. -  I do not find any infirmity in the well-reasoned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Hari Kishan and Ors. v. Administrator Municipal Committee;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal, Sr. Adv. and; Sudhir Mittal, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' M.L Sarin, Sr. Adv.,; Ashish Handa,; H.N. Mehtani an',
			'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2005-05-25',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' Ashutosh Mohunta, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Ashutosh Mohunta, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The vendee-plaintiffs have filed this appeal to challenge the judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below whereby their suit and the appeal against the partition of the land ordered by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Guhla, vide order dated 16.7.1975, were dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. In brief the facts giving rise to this appeal are that defendant-respondent Nos. 1 to 5 filed an application for partition of the suit land against Smt.Kirpal Kaur (Plaintiff No. 1) and defendant Nos. 6 to 15 in the court of Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Guhla. In that application Smt. Kirpal Kaur was proceeded against ex parte. The partition was confirmed on 16.6.1975 and the case was fixed for instrument of partition for 16.7.1975. Rai Jasbir Singh, plaintiff No. 2 purchased land measuring 80 Kanals from Smt. Kirpal Kaur (plaintiff No. 1) vide sale deed dated 27.5.1975 during the pendency of the partition proceedings and plaintiff No. 2 and 3, i.e., Rai Jasbir Singh and Swaran Singh were in actual physical possession of 228 Kanals 8 Marias and 77 Kanals 8 Marias, respectively. The plaintiffs challenged the order dated 16.7.1975 passed by the Assistant Grade, 1st Class, Guhla, by filing the present suit for declaration, which was dismissed by the Sub Judge, 1st Class, Kaithal, vide judgment and decree dated 29.1.1980 on the ground that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The plaintiffs then filed appeal to challenge the judgment and decree dated 29.1.1980 passed by the trial Court. During the pendency of the appeal, Smt. Kirpal Kaur withdrew herself from being the appellant. Consequently, vide order dated 17.1.1980 the appeal qua Kirpal Kaur was ordered to be dismissed as withdrawn. The appeal qua the remaining two appellants, i.e., Rai Jasbir Singh and Swaran Singh (present appellants) was dismissed by the Additional District Judge, Kurukshetra, vide judgment and decree dated 4.12.1981 and the decision of the trial Court with regard to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was upheld. Now Rai Jasbir Singh arid Swaran Singh have filed the present appeal wherein challenge has been made to the findings of both the Courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. It has been contended by Mr. R.S. Mittal, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the appellants, that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not duly served and, thus,the ex parte order dated 16.6.1975/16.7.1975 passed by the Assistant Collector,1st Grade, Guhla, was a nullity. It has further been argued by the learned counsel for the appellants that the Courts below erred in holding that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit against partition ordered by the Revenue Officer in view of the provisions of the <a href="/act/136769/the-punjab-land-revenue-act-1887-complete-act">Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887</a> (for short 'the Act'), despite the fact that the order for partition of the suit land was passed ex parte without serving Smt.Kirpal Kaur according to the prescribed legal procedure.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellants have been controverted by Mr. M.L.Sarin, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the respondents. It has been contended by him that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to go into the validity of the partition proceedings. The appellants have approached the Civil Court without exhausting the remedy available to them under Section 13 of the Act. It has further been contended by him that Smt. Kirpal Kaur had duly been served in the partition proceedings by sending notice to her by registered post.The counsel has also contended that she had withdrawn her appeal before the lower appellate court and in this view of the matter, the present appellants, who had purchased the land from her during the pendency of the partition proceedings, had no locus standi to challenge the order of partition passed by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. 1 have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the evidence adduced on record.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The only question that arises for consideration in the present appeal is to the following effect:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether or not the Civil Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the suit wherein the order of partition passed by a Revenue Officer has been challenged and Smt. Kirpal Kaur was properly served in the partition proceedings</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The first objection raised on behalf of the appellants is that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not served in the partition proceedings before the Assistant Collector 1st Grade, Guhla, as per the provisions contained in Section 20 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. I do not find any merit in this contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants. It is not the case of the appellants that Smt.Kirpal Kaur was not served at all. The bald statement of the plaintiffs was rebutted by the statement on oath of defendant Balwant Singh and also by documentary evidence adduced on record which shows that a registered notice was issued to her and acknowledgement due (Ex.DIO) was received in the office of the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade. Sub-section (3) of Section 20 of the Act gives discretion to the Revenue Officer to serve the concerned person 'either in addition to, or in substitution for, any other mode of service, by forwarding the summons by post in a-letter addressed' to him and registered under Part II of the Indian Post Office Act, 1886. In this view of the matter, it cannot be said that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not served as per the procedure prescribed under the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The next contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants is that the Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain the ex parte order passed by the Revenue Officer.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. This contention is also without any merit. Section 158 of the Act specifically excludes the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts in matters within the jurisdiction of the Revenue Officers. In order to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector, a provision for filing of appeals before the higher Revenue Authorities has been made in Section 13 of the Act. The plaintiffs without exhausting the remedies available to them under Section 13, approached the Civil Court to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Moreover, it has come on record that Smt. Kirpal Kaur, from whom the present appellants had purchased the land during the pendency of the partition proceedings, had withdrawn from the appeal before the lower appellate Court. As the present appellants had purchased the suit land during the pendency of the partition proceedings, they have, therefore, no locus standi to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector 1st Grade and pursue the appeal. It is not the case of the plaintiff-appellants that the ex parte decree was obtained by the defendant-respondents by fraud or misrepresentation. In A.C. Ananthaswamy and Ors. v. Boraiah (D) by Lrs. (2004-3)138 Punjab Law Reporter 557, it has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that in the absence of any fraud or misrepresentation, an ex parte order on the bare plea of non-service cannot be set aside. In the present case it is an undisputed fact that registered notice (Ex.DIO) was issued to Smt. Kirpal Kaur and she had even filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order passed by the Assistant Collector. The ratio of the authority Firm Seth Radha Kishun (deceased) represented by Hari Kishan and Ors. v. Administrator Municipal Committee, Ludhiana : [1964]2SCR273 , that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not specifically ousted where a statute created a liability and provided a remedy, is not applicable to the facts appearing in the present case. In the present case, as already mentioned above, registered A.D. notice was issued to and served on Smt. Kirpal Kaur, who had thereafter, filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Both the courts below have given concurrent findings of fact which cannot be interfered with in the second appeal in view of the provisions of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as no substantial question of law has either been pleaded in the memorandum of appeal or arises for consideration in the present appeal. I do not find any infirmity in the well-reasoned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Consequently, there is no merit in this appeal. It is, accordingly, dismissed. However, I do no make any order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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			'respondent' => 'Balwant Singh and ors.',
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$title_for_layout = 'Rai Jasbir Singh and anr Vs Balwant Singh and ors - Citation 629369 - Court Judgment | '
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	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '629369',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/136769/the-punjab-land-revenue-act-1887-complete-act">Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887</a> - Sections 13, 20, 20(3) and 158; Indian Post Office Act, 1886; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) - Sections 100',
		'appealno' => 'Regular Second Appeal No. 615 of 1982 (O and M)',
		'appellant' => 'Rai Jasbir Singh and anr.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Rai Jasbir Singh and anr. Vs. Balwant Singh and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' - HINDU LAW -- Custom: [Vijender Jain, C.J., M.M. Kumar, Jasbir Singh, Rajive Bhalla & Rajesh Bindal, JJ] Alienation of ancestral property - Punjab and Haryana -  Held, In respect of State of Punjab by virtue of Punjab Amendment Act, 1973 there is a complete bar to contest any alienation of ancestral or non-ancestral immovable property or appointment of an heir to such property on ground that such alienation or appointment was contrary to custom. In Punjab the property in hands of a successor has to be treated as coparcenary property and its alienation has to be governed by Hindu Law except to the extent it is regulated by Sections 6 and 30 of the Hindu Succession Act. In Haryana, property  in hands of successor has to be treated as coparcenary property as well as ancestral property. Parties can fall back upon Hindu Law in case they fail to establish that rule of decision is custom. Therefore, in Haryana both under Hindu law and the Customary Law, the alienation would be open to challenge. Custom was given precedent over uncodified Hindu Law presumably for reason that custom has been consistently replacing the Hindu Law. However, it was soon realized that ancestral immovable property, which ordinarily held to be inalienable amongst Jats of Punjab by virtue of custom except for necessity, no limitation was placed on degrees of collateral, eligible to contest such alienation. It was, therefore, felt necessary to engraft certain restriction on degrees of collateral, eligible to contest an alienation, which under the custom itself was not limited. Accordingly, the Punjab Custom (Power to Contest) Act, 1920 (Act No.2 of 1920) was enacted. The Hindu Succession Act was extended to the State of Punjab.  Act 2 of Punjab Act defined expression alienation to include any testamentary disposition of property and appointment of an heir was to include any adoption made or purporting to be made according to custom. A further provision was made by Section 3 that Hindu Succession Act was to apply only in respect of alienation of immovable property or appointment of heirs made by persons who in regard to such alienation or appointment were governed by custom. Whereas  Section 4 declared that Hindu Succession Act was not to affect any right to contest any alienation or appointment of an heir made before the date on which the Succession Act was to come into force. In other words, Act, No.2 of 1920 was not to affect alienation or appointments of heir made before date on which it came into force. It also preserved the rights of any alienation or appointment of an heir made by a family. After Section 7 was inserted in Act of 1920 by the Punjab Amendment Act of 1973 right of contest being contrary to custom had been totally effaced and taken away. Therefore, no person has any right to contest any alienation of immovable property whether ancestral or non-ancestral on ground of being contrary to custom after January 23, 1973. In Haryana, the situation as enunciated by Act No.2 of 1920 continued to prevail in respect of alienation because no reforms parallel to Punjab as brought by Amendment Act of 1973, had been enacted although right to pre-emption has been substantially abolished in Haryana also. No steps even have been taken in that regard. Therefore, situation in Haryana have to be regarded as it existed under Act No. 2 of 1920.
HINDU SUCCESSION ACT,1956[C.A.No.30/1956] --  Sections 6 & 30: [Vijender Jain, C.J., M.M.Kumar, Jasbir Singh, Rajive Bhalla & Rajesh Bindal, JJ]  Alienation of coparcenary property - Law laid down by Full Bench in Joginder Singh Kundha Singh v Kehar Singh Dasaundha Singh [AIR 1965 Punjab 407] and Pritam Singh v Assistant Controller of Estate Duty, Patiala [1976 Punj LR 342] -Whether there is any conflict? - Held, The basic controversy in the Full Bench decision of Joginder Singhs case was regarding constitutional validity of Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act and as to whether it infringes Article 14 of Constitution. It was held that the estate held by male and limitation on his power of alienation were in no way removed and the reversioners were not debarred from challenging such alienations. The Full Bench held that Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act postulates that estate held by a Hindu female before enforcement of Succession Act either by inheritance or otherwise, was enlarged and on date of enforcement of Succession Act, she became a full owner. Likewise, if she has inherited any estate after the commencement of the Act,  she was to be regarded as absolute owner rather than a limited owner. Consequently, the limitations on power of alienation automatically vanished. This was the necessary result of the provisions made in Section 14 of the Act. The Full Bench further held that in respect of male proprietors, no corresponding provision was made either enlarging their estate in ancestral property or enlarging their power of alienation over property inherited by them. However, it noticed Section 30 and observed that it only deals with power of his share in coparcenary property by Will, which prior to enforcement of the Act, he had no right to do. The only provision made in respect of male proprietor regarding alienation of property was his power of alienation by Will. In so far as persons governed by custom are concerned, they continued to be governed by the restriction on the power of alienation of a male holder as existed before enforcement of the Act. Likewise, other restriction on alienation other than disposal by Will also continued. The Full Bench, thus, recognized the superior right of Hindu females by virtue of Section 14 and upheld the provision as intra vires. The argument that reversioners have ceased to exist after enactment of provisions of Section 14 of Succession Act, was rejected as there was no provision pointed out to that effect. The proposition laid down by the full Bench in Pritam Singhs case was that the Hindu Succession Act has not abolished joint Hindu family with respect to rights of those who were members of Mitakshara coparcenary, except in the manner and to the extent mentioned in Sections 6 and 30 of the Act, This Statement should also imply, though it does not say so expressly, the Succession Act to this extent does not affect the rights of the members governed by Dayabhaga coparcenary. The Full Bench in Pritam Singh;s case expressly noticed the judgment of earlier Full Bench in Joginder Singhs case but construed the same as irrelevant by observing that it dealt with the power of alienation of a person governed by Customary law and constitutional validity of Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act. Thus there is no real conflict between the two Full Bench judgments. Both the Full Bench judgments have been delivered on the assumption that Joginder Singhs case dealt with question of alienation whereas Pritam Singhs case had decided the question concerning succession. Even on fact in Joginder Singhs case the issue was validity of alienation by consent decree by a father to his two sons, which was challenged by third son, whereas in Pritam Singhs case the question of nature of property in hands of sons on death of their father had arisen  for purposes of assessment of estate duty. In Pritam  Singhs case the property in the hands of the sons was held to be coparcenary property and only 1/3rd of  property belonging to deceased father was considered eligible for estate duty. Therefore, there was no question of alienation in Pritam Singhs case. -  I do not find any infirmity in the well-reasoned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Hari Kishan and Ors. v. Administrator Municipal Committee;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal, Sr. Adv. and; Sudhir Mittal, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' M.L Sarin, Sr. Adv.,; Ashish Handa,; H.N. Mehtani an',
		'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2005-05-25',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Ashutosh Mohunta, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Ashutosh Mohunta, J.</p><p>1. The vendee-plaintiffs have filed this appeal to challenge the judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below whereby their suit and the appeal against the partition of the land ordered by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Guhla, vide order dated 16.7.1975, were dismissed.</p><p>2. In brief the facts giving rise to this appeal are that defendant-respondent Nos. 1 to 5 filed an application for partition of the suit land against Smt.Kirpal Kaur (Plaintiff No. 1) and defendant Nos. 6 to 15 in the court of Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Guhla. In that application Smt. Kirpal Kaur was proceeded against ex parte. The partition was confirmed on 16.6.1975 and the case was fixed for instrument of partition for 16.7.1975. Rai Jasbir Singh, plaintiff No. 2 purchased land measuring 80 Kanals from Smt. Kirpal Kaur (plaintiff No. 1) vide sale deed dated 27.5.1975 during the pendency of the partition proceedings and plaintiff No. 2 and 3, i.e., Rai Jasbir Singh and Swaran Singh were in actual physical possession of 228 Kanals 8 Marias and 77 Kanals 8 Marias, respectively. The plaintiffs challenged the order dated 16.7.1975 passed by the Assistant Grade, 1st Class, Guhla, by filing the present suit for declaration, which was dismissed by the Sub Judge, 1st Class, Kaithal, vide judgment and decree dated 29.1.1980 on the ground that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The plaintiffs then filed appeal to challenge the judgment and decree dated 29.1.1980 passed by the trial Court. During the pendency of the appeal, Smt. Kirpal Kaur withdrew herself from being the appellant. Consequently, vide order dated 17.1.1980 the appeal qua Kirpal Kaur was ordered to be dismissed as withdrawn. The appeal qua the remaining two appellants, i.e., Rai Jasbir Singh and Swaran Singh (present appellants) was dismissed by the Additional District Judge, Kurukshetra, vide judgment and decree dated 4.12.1981 and the decision of the trial Court with regard to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was upheld. Now Rai Jasbir Singh arid Swaran Singh have filed the present appeal wherein challenge has been made to the findings of both the Courts below.</p><p>3. It has been contended by Mr. R.S. Mittal, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the appellants, that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not duly served and, thus,the ex parte order dated 16.6.1975/16.7.1975 passed by the Assistant Collector,1st Grade, Guhla, was a nullity. It has further been argued by the learned counsel for the appellants that the Courts below erred in holding that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit against partition ordered by the Revenue Officer in view of the provisions of the <a>Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887</a> (for short 'the Act'), despite the fact that the order for partition of the suit land was passed ex parte without serving Smt.Kirpal Kaur according to the prescribed legal procedure.</p><p>4. The contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellants have been controverted by Mr. M.L.Sarin, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the respondents. It has been contended by him that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to go into the validity of the partition proceedings. The appellants have approached the Civil Court without exhausting the remedy available to them under Section 13 of the Act. It has further been contended by him that Smt. Kirpal Kaur had duly been served in the partition proceedings by sending notice to her by registered post.The counsel has also contended that she had withdrawn her appeal before the lower appellate court and in this view of the matter, the present appellants, who had purchased the land from her during the pendency of the partition proceedings, had no locus standi to challenge the order of partition passed by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade.</p><p>5. 1 have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the evidence adduced on record.</p><p>6. The only question that arises for consideration in the present appeal is to the following effect:-</p><p>Whether or not the Civil Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the suit wherein the order of partition passed by a Revenue Officer has been challenged and Smt. Kirpal Kaur was properly served in the partition proceedings</p><p>7. The first objection raised on behalf of the appellants is that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not served in the partition proceedings before the Assistant Collector 1st Grade, Guhla, as per the provisions contained in Section 20 of the Act.</p><p>8. I do not find any merit in this contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants. It is not the case of the appellants that Smt.Kirpal Kaur was not served at all. The bald statement of the plaintiffs was rebutted by the statement on oath of defendant Balwant Singh and also by documentary evidence adduced on record which shows that a registered notice was issued to her and acknowledgement due (Ex.DIO) was received in the office of the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade. Sub-section (3) of Section 20 of the Act gives discretion to the Revenue Officer to serve the concerned person 'either in addition to, or in substitution for, any other mode of service, by forwarding the summons by post in a-letter addressed' to him and registered under Part II of the Indian Post Office Act, 1886. In this view of the matter, it cannot be said that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not served as per the procedure prescribed under the Act.</p><p>9. The next contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants is that the Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain the ex parte order passed by the Revenue Officer.</p><p>10. This contention is also without any merit. Section 158 of the Act specifically excludes the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts in matters within the jurisdiction of the Revenue Officers. In order to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector, a provision for filing of appeals before the higher Revenue Authorities has been made in Section 13 of the Act. The plaintiffs without exhausting the remedies available to them under Section 13, approached the Civil Court to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector.</p><p>11. Moreover, it has come on record that Smt. Kirpal Kaur, from whom the present appellants had purchased the land during the pendency of the partition proceedings, had withdrawn from the appeal before the lower appellate Court. As the present appellants had purchased the suit land during the pendency of the partition proceedings, they have, therefore, no locus standi to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector 1st Grade and pursue the appeal. It is not the case of the plaintiff-appellants that the ex parte decree was obtained by the defendant-respondents by fraud or misrepresentation. In A.C. Ananthaswamy and Ors. v. Boraiah (D) by Lrs. (2004-3)138 Punjab Law Reporter 557, it has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that in the absence of any fraud or misrepresentation, an ex parte order on the bare plea of non-service cannot be set aside. In the present case it is an undisputed fact that registered notice (Ex.DIO) was issued to Smt. Kirpal Kaur and she had even filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order passed by the Assistant Collector. The ratio of the authority Firm Seth Radha Kishun (deceased) represented by Hari Kishan and Ors. v. Administrator Municipal Committee, Ludhiana : [1964]2SCR273 , that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not specifically ousted where a statute created a liability and provided a remedy, is not applicable to the facts appearing in the present case. In the present case, as already mentioned above, registered A.D. notice was issued to and served on Smt. Kirpal Kaur, who had thereafter, filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order.</p><p>12. Both the courts below have given concurrent findings of fact which cannot be interfered with in the second appeal in view of the provisions of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as no substantial question of law has either been pleaded in the memorandum of appeal or arises for consideration in the present appeal. I do not find any infirmity in the well-reasoned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below.</p><p>13. Consequently, there is no merit in this appeal. It is, accordingly, dismissed. However, I do no make any order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Ashutosh Mohunta, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The vendee-plaintiffs have filed this appeal to challenge the judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below whereby their suit and the appeal against the partition of the land ordered by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Guhla, vide order dated 16.7.1975, were dismissed.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. In brief the facts giving rise to this appeal are that defendant-respondent Nos. 1 to 5 filed an application for partition of the suit land against Smt.Kirpal Kaur (Plaintiff No. 1) and defendant Nos. 6 to 15 in the court of Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Guhla. In that application Smt. Kirpal Kaur was proceeded against ex parte. The partition was confirmed on 16.6.1975 and the case was fixed for instrument of partition for 16.7.1975. Rai Jasbir Singh, plaintiff No. 2 purchased land measuring 80 Kanals from Smt. Kirpal Kaur (plaintiff No. 1) vide sale deed dated 27.5.1975 during the pendency of the partition proceedings and plaintiff No. 2 and 3, i.e., Rai Jasbir Singh and Swaran Singh were in actual physical possession of 228 Kanals 8 Marias and 77 Kanals 8 Marias, respectively. The plaintiffs challenged the order dated 16.7.1975 passed by the Assistant Grade, 1st Class, Guhla, by filing the present suit for declaration, which was dismissed by the Sub Judge, 1st Class, Kaithal, vide judgment and decree dated 29.1.1980 on the ground that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The plaintiffs then filed appeal to challenge the judgment and decree dated 29.1.1980 passed by the trial Court. During the pendency of the appeal, Smt. Kirpal Kaur withdrew herself from being the appellant. Consequently, vide order dated 17.1.1980 the appeal qua Kirpal Kaur was ordered to be dismissed as withdrawn. The appeal qua the remaining two appellants, i.e., Rai Jasbir Singh and Swaran Singh (present appellants) was dismissed by the Additional District Judge, Kurukshetra, vide judgment and decree dated 4.12.1981 and the decision of the trial Court with regard to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was upheld. Now Rai Jasbir Singh arid Swaran Singh have filed the present appeal wherein challenge has been made to the findings of both the Courts below.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. It has been contended by Mr. R.S. Mittal, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the appellants, that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not duly served and, thus,the ex parte order dated 16.6.1975/16.7.1975 passed by the Assistant Collector,1st Grade, Guhla, was a nullity. It has further been argued by the learned counsel for the appellants that the Courts below erred in holding that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit against partition ordered by the Revenue Officer in view of the provisions of the <a>Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887</a> (for short 'the Act'), despite the fact that the order for partition of the suit land was passed ex parte without serving Smt.Kirpal Kaur according to the prescribed legal procedure.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. The contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellants have been controverted by Mr. M.L.Sarin, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the respondents. It has been contended by him that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to go into the validity of the partition proceedings. The appellants have approached the Civil Court without exhausting the remedy available to them under Section 13 of the Act. It has further been contended by him that Smt. Kirpal Kaur had duly been served in the partition proceedings by sending notice to her by registered post.The counsel has also contended that she had withdrawn her appeal before the lower appellate court and in this view of the matter, the present appellants, who had purchased the land from her during the pendency of the partition proceedings, had no locus standi to challenge the order of partition passed by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. 1 have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the evidence adduced on record.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. The only question that arises for consideration in the present appeal is to the following effect:-',
	(int) 7 => '<p>Whether or not the Civil Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the suit wherein the order of partition passed by a Revenue Officer has been challenged and Smt. Kirpal Kaur was properly served in the partition proceedings',
	(int) 8 => '<p>7. The first objection raised on behalf of the appellants is that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not served in the partition proceedings before the Assistant Collector 1st Grade, Guhla, as per the provisions contained in Section 20 of the Act.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>8. I do not find any merit in this contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants. It is not the case of the appellants that Smt.Kirpal Kaur was not served at all. The bald statement of the plaintiffs was rebutted by the statement on oath of defendant Balwant Singh and also by documentary evidence adduced on record which shows that a registered notice was issued to her and acknowledgement due (Ex.DIO) was received in the office of the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade. Sub-section (3) of Section 20 of the Act gives discretion to the Revenue Officer to serve the concerned person 'either in addition to, or in substitution for, any other mode of service, by forwarding the summons by post in a-letter addressed' to him and registered under Part II of the Indian Post Office Act, 1886. In this view of the matter, it cannot be said that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not served as per the procedure prescribed under the Act.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>9. The next contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants is that the Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain the ex parte order passed by the Revenue Officer.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>10. This contention is also without any merit. Section 158 of the Act specifically excludes the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts in matters within the jurisdiction of the Revenue Officers. In order to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector, a provision for filing of appeals before the higher Revenue Authorities has been made in Section 13 of the Act. The plaintiffs without exhausting the remedies available to them under Section 13, approached the Civil Court to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>11. Moreover, it has come on record that Smt. Kirpal Kaur, from whom the present appellants had purchased the land during the pendency of the partition proceedings, had withdrawn from the appeal before the lower appellate Court. As the present appellants had purchased the suit land during the pendency of the partition proceedings, they have, therefore, no locus standi to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector 1st Grade and pursue the appeal. It is not the case of the plaintiff-appellants that the ex parte decree was obtained by the defendant-respondents by fraud or misrepresentation. In A.C. Ananthaswamy and Ors. v. Boraiah (D) by Lrs. (2004-3)138 Punjab Law Reporter 557, it has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that in the absence of any fraud or misrepresentation, an ex parte order on the bare plea of non-service cannot be set aside. In the present case it is an undisputed fact that registered notice (Ex.DIO) was issued to Smt. Kirpal Kaur and she had even filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order passed by the Assistant Collector. The ratio of the authority Firm Seth Radha Kishun (deceased) represented by Hari Kishan and Ors. v. Administrator Municipal Committee, Ludhiana : [1964]2SCR273 , that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not specifically ousted where a statute created a liability and provided a remedy, is not applicable to the facts appearing in the present case. In the present case, as already mentioned above, registered A.D. notice was issued to and served on Smt. Kirpal Kaur, who had thereafter, filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>12. Both the courts below have given concurrent findings of fact which cannot be interfered with in the second appeal in view of the provisions of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as no substantial question of law has either been pleaded in the memorandum of appeal or arises for consideration in the present appeal. I do not find any infirmity in the well-reasoned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>13. Consequently, there is no merit in this appeal. It is, accordingly, dismissed. However, I do no make any order as to costs.<p>',
	(int) 15 => '<p>'
)
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2. In brief the facts giving rise to this appeal are that defendant-respondent Nos. 1 to 5 filed an application for partition of the suit land against Smt.Kirpal Kaur (Plaintiff No. 1) and defendant Nos. 6 to 15 in the court of Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Guhla. In that application Smt. Kirpal Kaur was proceeded against ex parte. The partition was confirmed on 16.6.1975 and the case was fixed for instrument of partition for 16.7.1975. Rai Jasbir Singh, plaintiff No. 2 purchased land measuring 80 Kanals from Smt. Kirpal Kaur (plaintiff No. 1) vide sale deed dated 27.5.1975 during the pendency of the partition proceedings and plaintiff No. 2 and 3, i.e., Rai Jasbir Singh and Swaran Singh were in actual physical possession of 228 Kanals 8 Marias and 77 Kanals 8 Marias, respectively. The plaintiffs challenged the order dated 16.7.1975 passed by the Assistant Grade, 1st Class, Guhla, by filing the present suit for declaration, which was dismissed by the Sub Judge, 1st Class, Kaithal, vide judgment and decree dated 29.1.1980 on the ground that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The plaintiffs then filed appeal to challenge the judgment and decree dated 29.1.1980 passed by the trial Court. During the pendency of the appeal, Smt. Kirpal Kaur withdrew herself from being the appellant. Consequently, vide order dated 17.1.1980 the appeal qua Kirpal Kaur was ordered to be dismissed as withdrawn. The appeal qua the remaining two appellants, i.e., Rai Jasbir Singh and Swaran Singh (present appellants) was dismissed by the Additional District Judge, Kurukshetra, vide judgment and decree dated 4.12.1981 and the decision of the trial Court with regard to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was upheld. Now Rai Jasbir Singh arid Swaran Singh have filed the present appeal wherein challenge has been made to the findings of both the Courts below.

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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '629369',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/136769/the-punjab-land-revenue-act-1887-complete-act">Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887</a> - Sections 13, 20, 20(3) and 158; Indian Post Office Act, 1886; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) - Sections 100',
			'appealno' => 'Regular Second Appeal No. 615 of 1982 (O and M)',
			'appellant' => 'Rai Jasbir Singh and anr.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Rai Jasbir Singh and anr. Vs. Balwant Singh and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' - HINDU LAW -- Custom: [Vijender Jain, C.J., M.M. Kumar, Jasbir Singh, Rajive Bhalla & Rajesh Bindal, JJ] Alienation of ancestral property - Punjab and Haryana -  Held, In respect of State of Punjab by virtue of Punjab Amendment Act, 1973 there is a complete bar to contest any alienation of ancestral or non-ancestral immovable property or appointment of an heir to such property on ground that such alienation or appointment was contrary to custom. In Punjab the property in hands of a successor has to be treated as coparcenary property and its alienation has to be governed by Hindu Law except to the extent it is regulated by Sections 6 and 30 of the Hindu Succession Act. In Haryana, property  in hands of successor has to be treated as coparcenary property as well as ancestral property. Parties can fall back upon Hindu Law in case they fail to establish that rule of decision is custom. Therefore, in Haryana both under Hindu law and the Customary Law, the alienation would be open to challenge. Custom was given precedent over uncodified Hindu Law presumably for reason that custom has been consistently replacing the Hindu Law. However, it was soon realized that ancestral immovable property, which ordinarily held to be inalienable amongst Jats of Punjab by virtue of custom except for necessity, no limitation was placed on degrees of collateral, eligible to contest such alienation. It was, therefore, felt necessary to engraft certain restriction on degrees of collateral, eligible to contest an alienation, which under the custom itself was not limited. Accordingly, the Punjab Custom (Power to Contest) Act, 1920 (Act No.2 of 1920) was enacted. The Hindu Succession Act was extended to the State of Punjab.  Act 2 of Punjab Act defined expression alienation to include any testamentary disposition of property and appointment of an heir was to include any adoption made or purporting to be made according to custom. A further provision was made by Section 3 that Hindu Succession Act was to apply only in respect of alienation of immovable property or appointment of heirs made by persons who in regard to such alienation or appointment were governed by custom. Whereas  Section 4 declared that Hindu Succession Act was not to affect any right to contest any alienation or appointment of an heir made before the date on which the Succession Act was to come into force. In other words, Act, No.2 of 1920 was not to affect alienation or appointments of heir made before date on which it came into force. It also preserved the rights of any alienation or appointment of an heir made by a family. After Section 7 was inserted in Act of 1920 by the Punjab Amendment Act of 1973 right of contest being contrary to custom had been totally effaced and taken away. Therefore, no person has any right to contest any alienation of immovable property whether ancestral or non-ancestral on ground of being contrary to custom after January 23, 1973. In Haryana, the situation as enunciated by Act No.2 of 1920 continued to prevail in respect of alienation because no reforms parallel to Punjab as brought by Amendment Act of 1973, had been enacted although right to pre-emption has been substantially abolished in Haryana also. No steps even have been taken in that regard. Therefore, situation in Haryana have to be regarded as it existed under Act No. 2 of 1920.
HINDU SUCCESSION ACT,1956[C.A.No.30/1956] --  Sections 6 & 30: [Vijender Jain, C.J., M.M.Kumar, Jasbir Singh, Rajive Bhalla & Rajesh Bindal, JJ]  Alienation of coparcenary property - Law laid down by Full Bench in Joginder Singh Kundha Singh v Kehar Singh Dasaundha Singh [AIR 1965 Punjab 407] and Pritam Singh v Assistant Controller of Estate Duty, Patiala [1976 Punj LR 342] -Whether there is any conflict? - Held, The basic controversy in the Full Bench decision of Joginder Singhs case was regarding constitutional validity of Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act and as to whether it infringes Article 14 of Constitution. It was held that the estate held by male and limitation on his power of alienation were in no way removed and the reversioners were not debarred from challenging such alienations. The Full Bench held that Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act postulates that estate held by a Hindu female before enforcement of Succession Act either by inheritance or otherwise, was enlarged and on date of enforcement of Succession Act, she became a full owner. Likewise, if she has inherited any estate after the commencement of the Act,  she was to be regarded as absolute owner rather than a limited owner. Consequently, the limitations on power of alienation automatically vanished. This was the necessary result of the provisions made in Section 14 of the Act. The Full Bench further held that in respect of male proprietors, no corresponding provision was made either enlarging their estate in ancestral property or enlarging their power of alienation over property inherited by them. However, it noticed Section 30 and observed that it only deals with power of his share in coparcenary property by Will, which prior to enforcement of the Act, he had no right to do. The only provision made in respect of male proprietor regarding alienation of property was his power of alienation by Will. In so far as persons governed by custom are concerned, they continued to be governed by the restriction on the power of alienation of a male holder as existed before enforcement of the Act. Likewise, other restriction on alienation other than disposal by Will also continued. The Full Bench, thus, recognized the superior right of Hindu females by virtue of Section 14 and upheld the provision as intra vires. The argument that reversioners have ceased to exist after enactment of provisions of Section 14 of Succession Act, was rejected as there was no provision pointed out to that effect. The proposition laid down by the full Bench in Pritam Singhs case was that the Hindu Succession Act has not abolished joint Hindu family with respect to rights of those who were members of Mitakshara coparcenary, except in the manner and to the extent mentioned in Sections 6 and 30 of the Act, This Statement should also imply, though it does not say so expressly, the Succession Act to this extent does not affect the rights of the members governed by Dayabhaga coparcenary. The Full Bench in Pritam Singh;s case expressly noticed the judgment of earlier Full Bench in Joginder Singhs case but construed the same as irrelevant by observing that it dealt with the power of alienation of a person governed by Customary law and constitutional validity of Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act. Thus there is no real conflict between the two Full Bench judgments. Both the Full Bench judgments have been delivered on the assumption that Joginder Singhs case dealt with question of alienation whereas Pritam Singhs case had decided the question concerning succession. Even on fact in Joginder Singhs case the issue was validity of alienation by consent decree by a father to his two sons, which was challenged by third son, whereas in Pritam Singhs case the question of nature of property in hands of sons on death of their father had arisen  for purposes of assessment of estate duty. In Pritam  Singhs case the property in the hands of the sons was held to be coparcenary property and only 1/3rd of  property belonging to deceased father was considered eligible for estate duty. Therefore, there was no question of alienation in Pritam Singhs case. -  I do not find any infirmity in the well-reasoned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Hari Kishan and Ors. v. Administrator Municipal Committee;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal, Sr. Adv. and; Sudhir Mittal, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' M.L Sarin, Sr. Adv.,; Ashish Handa,; H.N. Mehtani an',
			'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2005-05-25',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' Ashutosh Mohunta, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Ashutosh Mohunta, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The vendee-plaintiffs have filed this appeal to challenge the judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below whereby their suit and the appeal against the partition of the land ordered by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Guhla, vide order dated 16.7.1975, were dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. In brief the facts giving rise to this appeal are that defendant-respondent Nos. 1 to 5 filed an application for partition of the suit land against Smt.Kirpal Kaur (Plaintiff No. 1) and defendant Nos. 6 to 15 in the court of Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Guhla. In that application Smt. Kirpal Kaur was proceeded against ex parte. The partition was confirmed on 16.6.1975 and the case was fixed for instrument of partition for 16.7.1975. Rai Jasbir Singh, plaintiff No. 2 purchased land measuring 80 Kanals from Smt. Kirpal Kaur (plaintiff No. 1) vide sale deed dated 27.5.1975 during the pendency of the partition proceedings and plaintiff No. 2 and 3, i.e., Rai Jasbir Singh and Swaran Singh were in actual physical possession of 228 Kanals 8 Marias and 77 Kanals 8 Marias, respectively. The plaintiffs challenged the order dated 16.7.1975 passed by the Assistant Grade, 1st Class, Guhla, by filing the present suit for declaration, which was dismissed by the Sub Judge, 1st Class, Kaithal, vide judgment and decree dated 29.1.1980 on the ground that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The plaintiffs then filed appeal to challenge the judgment and decree dated 29.1.1980 passed by the trial Court. During the pendency of the appeal, Smt. Kirpal Kaur withdrew herself from being the appellant. Consequently, vide order dated 17.1.1980 the appeal qua Kirpal Kaur was ordered to be dismissed as withdrawn. The appeal qua the remaining two appellants, i.e., Rai Jasbir Singh and Swaran Singh (present appellants) was dismissed by the Additional District Judge, Kurukshetra, vide judgment and decree dated 4.12.1981 and the decision of the trial Court with regard to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was upheld. Now Rai Jasbir Singh arid Swaran Singh have filed the present appeal wherein challenge has been made to the findings of both the Courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. It has been contended by Mr. R.S. Mittal, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the appellants, that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not duly served and, thus,the ex parte order dated 16.6.1975/16.7.1975 passed by the Assistant Collector,1st Grade, Guhla, was a nullity. It has further been argued by the learned counsel for the appellants that the Courts below erred in holding that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit against partition ordered by the Revenue Officer in view of the provisions of the <a href="/act/136769/the-punjab-land-revenue-act-1887-complete-act">Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887</a> (for short 'the Act'), despite the fact that the order for partition of the suit land was passed ex parte without serving Smt.Kirpal Kaur according to the prescribed legal procedure.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellants have been controverted by Mr. M.L.Sarin, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the respondents. It has been contended by him that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to go into the validity of the partition proceedings. The appellants have approached the Civil Court without exhausting the remedy available to them under Section 13 of the Act. It has further been contended by him that Smt. Kirpal Kaur had duly been served in the partition proceedings by sending notice to her by registered post.The counsel has also contended that she had withdrawn her appeal before the lower appellate court and in this view of the matter, the present appellants, who had purchased the land from her during the pendency of the partition proceedings, had no locus standi to challenge the order of partition passed by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. 1 have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the evidence adduced on record.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The only question that arises for consideration in the present appeal is to the following effect:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether or not the Civil Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the suit wherein the order of partition passed by a Revenue Officer has been challenged and Smt. Kirpal Kaur was properly served in the partition proceedings</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The first objection raised on behalf of the appellants is that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not served in the partition proceedings before the Assistant Collector 1st Grade, Guhla, as per the provisions contained in Section 20 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. I do not find any merit in this contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants. It is not the case of the appellants that Smt.Kirpal Kaur was not served at all. The bald statement of the plaintiffs was rebutted by the statement on oath of defendant Balwant Singh and also by documentary evidence adduced on record which shows that a registered notice was issued to her and acknowledgement due (Ex.DIO) was received in the office of the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade. Sub-section (3) of Section 20 of the Act gives discretion to the Revenue Officer to serve the concerned person 'either in addition to, or in substitution for, any other mode of service, by forwarding the summons by post in a-letter addressed' to him and registered under Part II of the Indian Post Office Act, 1886. In this view of the matter, it cannot be said that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not served as per the procedure prescribed under the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The next contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants is that the Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain the ex parte order passed by the Revenue Officer.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. This contention is also without any merit. Section 158 of the Act specifically excludes the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts in matters within the jurisdiction of the Revenue Officers. In order to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector, a provision for filing of appeals before the higher Revenue Authorities has been made in Section 13 of the Act. The plaintiffs without exhausting the remedies available to them under Section 13, approached the Civil Court to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Moreover, it has come on record that Smt. Kirpal Kaur, from whom the present appellants had purchased the land during the pendency of the partition proceedings, had withdrawn from the appeal before the lower appellate Court. As the present appellants had purchased the suit land during the pendency of the partition proceedings, they have, therefore, no locus standi to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector 1st Grade and pursue the appeal. It is not the case of the plaintiff-appellants that the ex parte decree was obtained by the defendant-respondents by fraud or misrepresentation. In A.C. Ananthaswamy and Ors. v. Boraiah (D) by Lrs. (2004-3)138 Punjab Law Reporter 557, it has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that in the absence of any fraud or misrepresentation, an ex parte order on the bare plea of non-service cannot be set aside. In the present case it is an undisputed fact that registered notice (Ex.DIO) was issued to Smt. Kirpal Kaur and she had even filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order passed by the Assistant Collector. The ratio of the authority Firm Seth Radha Kishun (deceased) represented by Hari Kishan and Ors. v. Administrator Municipal Committee, Ludhiana : [1964]2SCR273 , that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not specifically ousted where a statute created a liability and provided a remedy, is not applicable to the facts appearing in the present case. In the present case, as already mentioned above, registered A.D. notice was issued to and served on Smt. Kirpal Kaur, who had thereafter, filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Both the courts below have given concurrent findings of fact which cannot be interfered with in the second appeal in view of the provisions of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as no substantial question of law has either been pleaded in the memorandum of appeal or arises for consideration in the present appeal. I do not find any infirmity in the well-reasoned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Consequently, there is no merit in this appeal. It is, accordingly, dismissed. However, I do no make any order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '(2006)142PLR339',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Balwant Singh and ors.',
			'sub' => 'Property',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'rai-jasbir-singh-vs-balwant',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '629369',
		(int) 1 => 'rai-jasbir-singh-vs-balwant'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Rai Jasbir Singh and anr Vs Balwant Singh and ors - Citation 629369 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '629369',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/136769/the-punjab-land-revenue-act-1887-complete-act">Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887</a> - Sections 13, 20, 20(3) and 158; Indian Post Office Act, 1886; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) - Sections 100',
		'appealno' => 'Regular Second Appeal No. 615 of 1982 (O and M)',
		'appellant' => 'Rai Jasbir Singh and anr.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Rai Jasbir Singh and anr. Vs. Balwant Singh and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' - HINDU LAW -- Custom: [Vijender Jain, C.J., M.M. Kumar, Jasbir Singh, Rajive Bhalla & Rajesh Bindal, JJ] Alienation of ancestral property - Punjab and Haryana -  Held, In respect of State of Punjab by virtue of Punjab Amendment Act, 1973 there is a complete bar to contest any alienation of ancestral or non-ancestral immovable property or appointment of an heir to such property on ground that such alienation or appointment was contrary to custom. In Punjab the property in hands of a successor has to be treated as coparcenary property and its alienation has to be governed by Hindu Law except to the extent it is regulated by Sections 6 and 30 of the Hindu Succession Act. In Haryana, property  in hands of successor has to be treated as coparcenary property as well as ancestral property. Parties can fall back upon Hindu Law in case they fail to establish that rule of decision is custom. Therefore, in Haryana both under Hindu law and the Customary Law, the alienation would be open to challenge. Custom was given precedent over uncodified Hindu Law presumably for reason that custom has been consistently replacing the Hindu Law. However, it was soon realized that ancestral immovable property, which ordinarily held to be inalienable amongst Jats of Punjab by virtue of custom except for necessity, no limitation was placed on degrees of collateral, eligible to contest such alienation. It was, therefore, felt necessary to engraft certain restriction on degrees of collateral, eligible to contest an alienation, which under the custom itself was not limited. Accordingly, the Punjab Custom (Power to Contest) Act, 1920 (Act No.2 of 1920) was enacted. The Hindu Succession Act was extended to the State of Punjab.  Act 2 of Punjab Act defined expression alienation to include any testamentary disposition of property and appointment of an heir was to include any adoption made or purporting to be made according to custom. A further provision was made by Section 3 that Hindu Succession Act was to apply only in respect of alienation of immovable property or appointment of heirs made by persons who in regard to such alienation or appointment were governed by custom. Whereas  Section 4 declared that Hindu Succession Act was not to affect any right to contest any alienation or appointment of an heir made before the date on which the Succession Act was to come into force. In other words, Act, No.2 of 1920 was not to affect alienation or appointments of heir made before date on which it came into force. It also preserved the rights of any alienation or appointment of an heir made by a family. After Section 7 was inserted in Act of 1920 by the Punjab Amendment Act of 1973 right of contest being contrary to custom had been totally effaced and taken away. Therefore, no person has any right to contest any alienation of immovable property whether ancestral or non-ancestral on ground of being contrary to custom after January 23, 1973. In Haryana, the situation as enunciated by Act No.2 of 1920 continued to prevail in respect of alienation because no reforms parallel to Punjab as brought by Amendment Act of 1973, had been enacted although right to pre-emption has been substantially abolished in Haryana also. No steps even have been taken in that regard. Therefore, situation in Haryana have to be regarded as it existed under Act No. 2 of 1920.
HINDU SUCCESSION ACT,1956[C.A.No.30/1956] --  Sections 6 & 30: [Vijender Jain, C.J., M.M.Kumar, Jasbir Singh, Rajive Bhalla & Rajesh Bindal, JJ]  Alienation of coparcenary property - Law laid down by Full Bench in Joginder Singh Kundha Singh v Kehar Singh Dasaundha Singh [AIR 1965 Punjab 407] and Pritam Singh v Assistant Controller of Estate Duty, Patiala [1976 Punj LR 342] -Whether there is any conflict? - Held, The basic controversy in the Full Bench decision of Joginder Singhs case was regarding constitutional validity of Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act and as to whether it infringes Article 14 of Constitution. It was held that the estate held by male and limitation on his power of alienation were in no way removed and the reversioners were not debarred from challenging such alienations. The Full Bench held that Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act postulates that estate held by a Hindu female before enforcement of Succession Act either by inheritance or otherwise, was enlarged and on date of enforcement of Succession Act, she became a full owner. Likewise, if she has inherited any estate after the commencement of the Act,  she was to be regarded as absolute owner rather than a limited owner. Consequently, the limitations on power of alienation automatically vanished. This was the necessary result of the provisions made in Section 14 of the Act. The Full Bench further held that in respect of male proprietors, no corresponding provision was made either enlarging their estate in ancestral property or enlarging their power of alienation over property inherited by them. However, it noticed Section 30 and observed that it only deals with power of his share in coparcenary property by Will, which prior to enforcement of the Act, he had no right to do. The only provision made in respect of male proprietor regarding alienation of property was his power of alienation by Will. In so far as persons governed by custom are concerned, they continued to be governed by the restriction on the power of alienation of a male holder as existed before enforcement of the Act. Likewise, other restriction on alienation other than disposal by Will also continued. The Full Bench, thus, recognized the superior right of Hindu females by virtue of Section 14 and upheld the provision as intra vires. The argument that reversioners have ceased to exist after enactment of provisions of Section 14 of Succession Act, was rejected as there was no provision pointed out to that effect. The proposition laid down by the full Bench in Pritam Singhs case was that the Hindu Succession Act has not abolished joint Hindu family with respect to rights of those who were members of Mitakshara coparcenary, except in the manner and to the extent mentioned in Sections 6 and 30 of the Act, This Statement should also imply, though it does not say so expressly, the Succession Act to this extent does not affect the rights of the members governed by Dayabhaga coparcenary. The Full Bench in Pritam Singh;s case expressly noticed the judgment of earlier Full Bench in Joginder Singhs case but construed the same as irrelevant by observing that it dealt with the power of alienation of a person governed by Customary law and constitutional validity of Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act. Thus there is no real conflict between the two Full Bench judgments. Both the Full Bench judgments have been delivered on the assumption that Joginder Singhs case dealt with question of alienation whereas Pritam Singhs case had decided the question concerning succession. Even on fact in Joginder Singhs case the issue was validity of alienation by consent decree by a father to his two sons, which was challenged by third son, whereas in Pritam Singhs case the question of nature of property in hands of sons on death of their father had arisen  for purposes of assessment of estate duty. In Pritam  Singhs case the property in the hands of the sons was held to be coparcenary property and only 1/3rd of  property belonging to deceased father was considered eligible for estate duty. Therefore, there was no question of alienation in Pritam Singhs case. -  I do not find any infirmity in the well-reasoned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Hari Kishan and Ors. v. Administrator Municipal Committee;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal, Sr. Adv. and; Sudhir Mittal, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' M.L Sarin, Sr. Adv.,; Ashish Handa,; H.N. Mehtani an',
		'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2005-05-25',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Ashutosh Mohunta, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Ashutosh Mohunta, J.</p><p>1. The vendee-plaintiffs have filed this appeal to challenge the judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below whereby their suit and the appeal against the partition of the land ordered by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Guhla, vide order dated 16.7.1975, were dismissed.</p><p>2. In brief the facts giving rise to this appeal are that defendant-respondent Nos. 1 to 5 filed an application for partition of the suit land against Smt.Kirpal Kaur (Plaintiff No. 1) and defendant Nos. 6 to 15 in the court of Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Guhla. In that application Smt. Kirpal Kaur was proceeded against ex parte. The partition was confirmed on 16.6.1975 and the case was fixed for instrument of partition for 16.7.1975. Rai Jasbir Singh, plaintiff No. 2 purchased land measuring 80 Kanals from Smt. Kirpal Kaur (plaintiff No. 1) vide sale deed dated 27.5.1975 during the pendency of the partition proceedings and plaintiff No. 2 and 3, i.e., Rai Jasbir Singh and Swaran Singh were in actual physical possession of 228 Kanals 8 Marias and 77 Kanals 8 Marias, respectively. The plaintiffs challenged the order dated 16.7.1975 passed by the Assistant Grade, 1st Class, Guhla, by filing the present suit for declaration, which was dismissed by the Sub Judge, 1st Class, Kaithal, vide judgment and decree dated 29.1.1980 on the ground that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The plaintiffs then filed appeal to challenge the judgment and decree dated 29.1.1980 passed by the trial Court. During the pendency of the appeal, Smt. Kirpal Kaur withdrew herself from being the appellant. Consequently, vide order dated 17.1.1980 the appeal qua Kirpal Kaur was ordered to be dismissed as withdrawn. The appeal qua the remaining two appellants, i.e., Rai Jasbir Singh and Swaran Singh (present appellants) was dismissed by the Additional District Judge, Kurukshetra, vide judgment and decree dated 4.12.1981 and the decision of the trial Court with regard to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was upheld. Now Rai Jasbir Singh arid Swaran Singh have filed the present appeal wherein challenge has been made to the findings of both the Courts below.</p><p>3. It has been contended by Mr. R.S. Mittal, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the appellants, that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not duly served and, thus,the ex parte order dated 16.6.1975/16.7.1975 passed by the Assistant Collector,1st Grade, Guhla, was a nullity. It has further been argued by the learned counsel for the appellants that the Courts below erred in holding that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit against partition ordered by the Revenue Officer in view of the provisions of the <a>Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887</a> (for short 'the Act'), despite the fact that the order for partition of the suit land was passed ex parte without serving Smt.Kirpal Kaur according to the prescribed legal procedure.</p><p>4. The contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellants have been controverted by Mr. M.L.Sarin, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the respondents. It has been contended by him that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to go into the validity of the partition proceedings. The appellants have approached the Civil Court without exhausting the remedy available to them under Section 13 of the Act. It has further been contended by him that Smt. Kirpal Kaur had duly been served in the partition proceedings by sending notice to her by registered post.The counsel has also contended that she had withdrawn her appeal before the lower appellate court and in this view of the matter, the present appellants, who had purchased the land from her during the pendency of the partition proceedings, had no locus standi to challenge the order of partition passed by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade.</p><p>5. 1 have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the evidence adduced on record.</p><p>6. The only question that arises for consideration in the present appeal is to the following effect:-</p><p>Whether or not the Civil Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the suit wherein the order of partition passed by a Revenue Officer has been challenged and Smt. Kirpal Kaur was properly served in the partition proceedings</p><p>7. The first objection raised on behalf of the appellants is that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not served in the partition proceedings before the Assistant Collector 1st Grade, Guhla, as per the provisions contained in Section 20 of the Act.</p><p>8. I do not find any merit in this contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants. It is not the case of the appellants that Smt.Kirpal Kaur was not served at all. The bald statement of the plaintiffs was rebutted by the statement on oath of defendant Balwant Singh and also by documentary evidence adduced on record which shows that a registered notice was issued to her and acknowledgement due (Ex.DIO) was received in the office of the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade. Sub-section (3) of Section 20 of the Act gives discretion to the Revenue Officer to serve the concerned person 'either in addition to, or in substitution for, any other mode of service, by forwarding the summons by post in a-letter addressed' to him and registered under Part II of the Indian Post Office Act, 1886. In this view of the matter, it cannot be said that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not served as per the procedure prescribed under the Act.</p><p>9. The next contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants is that the Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain the ex parte order passed by the Revenue Officer.</p><p>10. This contention is also without any merit. Section 158 of the Act specifically excludes the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts in matters within the jurisdiction of the Revenue Officers. In order to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector, a provision for filing of appeals before the higher Revenue Authorities has been made in Section 13 of the Act. The plaintiffs without exhausting the remedies available to them under Section 13, approached the Civil Court to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector.</p><p>11. Moreover, it has come on record that Smt. Kirpal Kaur, from whom the present appellants had purchased the land during the pendency of the partition proceedings, had withdrawn from the appeal before the lower appellate Court. As the present appellants had purchased the suit land during the pendency of the partition proceedings, they have, therefore, no locus standi to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector 1st Grade and pursue the appeal. It is not the case of the plaintiff-appellants that the ex parte decree was obtained by the defendant-respondents by fraud or misrepresentation. In A.C. Ananthaswamy and Ors. v. Boraiah (D) by Lrs. (2004-3)138 Punjab Law Reporter 557, it has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that in the absence of any fraud or misrepresentation, an ex parte order on the bare plea of non-service cannot be set aside. In the present case it is an undisputed fact that registered notice (Ex.DIO) was issued to Smt. Kirpal Kaur and she had even filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order passed by the Assistant Collector. The ratio of the authority Firm Seth Radha Kishun (deceased) represented by Hari Kishan and Ors. v. Administrator Municipal Committee, Ludhiana : [1964]2SCR273 , that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not specifically ousted where a statute created a liability and provided a remedy, is not applicable to the facts appearing in the present case. In the present case, as already mentioned above, registered A.D. notice was issued to and served on Smt. Kirpal Kaur, who had thereafter, filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order.</p><p>12. Both the courts below have given concurrent findings of fact which cannot be interfered with in the second appeal in view of the provisions of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as no substantial question of law has either been pleaded in the memorandum of appeal or arises for consideration in the present appeal. I do not find any infirmity in the well-reasoned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below.</p><p>13. Consequently, there is no merit in this appeal. It is, accordingly, dismissed. However, I do no make any order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Ashutosh Mohunta, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The vendee-plaintiffs have filed this appeal to challenge the judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below whereby their suit and the appeal against the partition of the land ordered by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Guhla, vide order dated 16.7.1975, were dismissed.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. In brief the facts giving rise to this appeal are that defendant-respondent Nos. 1 to 5 filed an application for partition of the suit land against Smt.Kirpal Kaur (Plaintiff No. 1) and defendant Nos. 6 to 15 in the court of Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Guhla. In that application Smt. Kirpal Kaur was proceeded against ex parte. The partition was confirmed on 16.6.1975 and the case was fixed for instrument of partition for 16.7.1975. Rai Jasbir Singh, plaintiff No. 2 purchased land measuring 80 Kanals from Smt. Kirpal Kaur (plaintiff No. 1) vide sale deed dated 27.5.1975 during the pendency of the partition proceedings and plaintiff No. 2 and 3, i.e., Rai Jasbir Singh and Swaran Singh were in actual physical possession of 228 Kanals 8 Marias and 77 Kanals 8 Marias, respectively. The plaintiffs challenged the order dated 16.7.1975 passed by the Assistant Grade, 1st Class, Guhla, by filing the present suit for declaration, which was dismissed by the Sub Judge, 1st Class, Kaithal, vide judgment and decree dated 29.1.1980 on the ground that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The plaintiffs then filed appeal to challenge the judgment and decree dated 29.1.1980 passed by the trial Court. During the pendency of the appeal, Smt. Kirpal Kaur withdrew herself from being the appellant. Consequently, vide order dated 17.1.1980 the appeal qua Kirpal Kaur was ordered to be dismissed as withdrawn. The appeal qua the remaining two appellants, i.e., Rai Jasbir Singh and Swaran Singh (present appellants) was dismissed by the Additional District Judge, Kurukshetra, vide judgment and decree dated 4.12.1981 and the decision of the trial Court with regard to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was upheld. Now Rai Jasbir Singh arid Swaran Singh have filed the present appeal wherein challenge has been made to the findings of both the Courts below.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. It has been contended by Mr. R.S. Mittal, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the appellants, that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not duly served and, thus,the ex parte order dated 16.6.1975/16.7.1975 passed by the Assistant Collector,1st Grade, Guhla, was a nullity. It has further been argued by the learned counsel for the appellants that the Courts below erred in holding that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit against partition ordered by the Revenue Officer in view of the provisions of the <a>Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887</a> (for short 'the Act'), despite the fact that the order for partition of the suit land was passed ex parte without serving Smt.Kirpal Kaur according to the prescribed legal procedure.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. The contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellants have been controverted by Mr. M.L.Sarin, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the respondents. It has been contended by him that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to go into the validity of the partition proceedings. The appellants have approached the Civil Court without exhausting the remedy available to them under Section 13 of the Act. It has further been contended by him that Smt. Kirpal Kaur had duly been served in the partition proceedings by sending notice to her by registered post.The counsel has also contended that she had withdrawn her appeal before the lower appellate court and in this view of the matter, the present appellants, who had purchased the land from her during the pendency of the partition proceedings, had no locus standi to challenge the order of partition passed by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. 1 have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the evidence adduced on record.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. The only question that arises for consideration in the present appeal is to the following effect:-',
	(int) 7 => '<p>Whether or not the Civil Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the suit wherein the order of partition passed by a Revenue Officer has been challenged and Smt. Kirpal Kaur was properly served in the partition proceedings',
	(int) 8 => '<p>7. The first objection raised on behalf of the appellants is that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not served in the partition proceedings before the Assistant Collector 1st Grade, Guhla, as per the provisions contained in Section 20 of the Act.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>8. I do not find any merit in this contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants. It is not the case of the appellants that Smt.Kirpal Kaur was not served at all. The bald statement of the plaintiffs was rebutted by the statement on oath of defendant Balwant Singh and also by documentary evidence adduced on record which shows that a registered notice was issued to her and acknowledgement due (Ex.DIO) was received in the office of the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade. Sub-section (3) of Section 20 of the Act gives discretion to the Revenue Officer to serve the concerned person 'either in addition to, or in substitution for, any other mode of service, by forwarding the summons by post in a-letter addressed' to him and registered under Part II of the Indian Post Office Act, 1886. In this view of the matter, it cannot be said that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not served as per the procedure prescribed under the Act.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>9. The next contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants is that the Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain the ex parte order passed by the Revenue Officer.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>10. This contention is also without any merit. Section 158 of the Act specifically excludes the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts in matters within the jurisdiction of the Revenue Officers. In order to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector, a provision for filing of appeals before the higher Revenue Authorities has been made in Section 13 of the Act. The plaintiffs without exhausting the remedies available to them under Section 13, approached the Civil Court to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>11. Moreover, it has come on record that Smt. Kirpal Kaur, from whom the present appellants had purchased the land during the pendency of the partition proceedings, had withdrawn from the appeal before the lower appellate Court. As the present appellants had purchased the suit land during the pendency of the partition proceedings, they have, therefore, no locus standi to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector 1st Grade and pursue the appeal. It is not the case of the plaintiff-appellants that the ex parte decree was obtained by the defendant-respondents by fraud or misrepresentation. In A.C. Ananthaswamy and Ors. v. Boraiah (D) by Lrs. (2004-3)138 Punjab Law Reporter 557, it has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that in the absence of any fraud or misrepresentation, an ex parte order on the bare plea of non-service cannot be set aside. In the present case it is an undisputed fact that registered notice (Ex.DIO) was issued to Smt. Kirpal Kaur and she had even filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order passed by the Assistant Collector. The ratio of the authority Firm Seth Radha Kishun (deceased) represented by Hari Kishan and Ors. v. Administrator Municipal Committee, Ludhiana : [1964]2SCR273 , that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not specifically ousted where a statute created a liability and provided a remedy, is not applicable to the facts appearing in the present case. In the present case, as already mentioned above, registered A.D. notice was issued to and served on Smt. Kirpal Kaur, who had thereafter, filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>12. Both the courts below have given concurrent findings of fact which cannot be interfered with in the second appeal in view of the provisions of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as no substantial question of law has either been pleaded in the memorandum of appeal or arises for consideration in the present appeal. I do not find any infirmity in the well-reasoned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>13. Consequently, there is no merit in this appeal. It is, accordingly, dismissed. However, I do no make any order as to costs.<p>',
	(int) 15 => '<p>'
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3. It has been contended by Mr. R.S. Mittal, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the appellants, that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not duly served and, thus,the ex parte order dated 16.6.1975/16.7.1975 passed by the Assistant Collector,1st Grade, Guhla, was a nullity. It has further been argued by the learned counsel for the appellants that the Courts below erred in holding that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit against partition ordered by the Revenue Officer in view of the provisions of the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887 (for short 'the Act'), despite the fact that the order for partition of the suit land was passed ex parte without serving Smt.Kirpal Kaur according to the prescribed legal procedure.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Rai Jasbir Singh and anr Vs Balwant Singh and ors - Citation 629369 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '629369',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/136769/the-punjab-land-revenue-act-1887-complete-act">Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887</a> - Sections 13, 20, 20(3) and 158; Indian Post Office Act, 1886; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) - Sections 100',
			'appealno' => 'Regular Second Appeal No. 615 of 1982 (O and M)',
			'appellant' => 'Rai Jasbir Singh and anr.',
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			'casename' => 'Rai Jasbir Singh and anr. Vs. Balwant Singh and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' - HINDU LAW -- Custom: [Vijender Jain, C.J., M.M. Kumar, Jasbir Singh, Rajive Bhalla & Rajesh Bindal, JJ] Alienation of ancestral property - Punjab and Haryana -  Held, In respect of State of Punjab by virtue of Punjab Amendment Act, 1973 there is a complete bar to contest any alienation of ancestral or non-ancestral immovable property or appointment of an heir to such property on ground that such alienation or appointment was contrary to custom. In Punjab the property in hands of a successor has to be treated as coparcenary property and its alienation has to be governed by Hindu Law except to the extent it is regulated by Sections 6 and 30 of the Hindu Succession Act. In Haryana, property  in hands of successor has to be treated as coparcenary property as well as ancestral property. Parties can fall back upon Hindu Law in case they fail to establish that rule of decision is custom. Therefore, in Haryana both under Hindu law and the Customary Law, the alienation would be open to challenge. Custom was given precedent over uncodified Hindu Law presumably for reason that custom has been consistently replacing the Hindu Law. However, it was soon realized that ancestral immovable property, which ordinarily held to be inalienable amongst Jats of Punjab by virtue of custom except for necessity, no limitation was placed on degrees of collateral, eligible to contest such alienation. It was, therefore, felt necessary to engraft certain restriction on degrees of collateral, eligible to contest an alienation, which under the custom itself was not limited. Accordingly, the Punjab Custom (Power to Contest) Act, 1920 (Act No.2 of 1920) was enacted. The Hindu Succession Act was extended to the State of Punjab.  Act 2 of Punjab Act defined expression alienation to include any testamentary disposition of property and appointment of an heir was to include any adoption made or purporting to be made according to custom. A further provision was made by Section 3 that Hindu Succession Act was to apply only in respect of alienation of immovable property or appointment of heirs made by persons who in regard to such alienation or appointment were governed by custom. Whereas  Section 4 declared that Hindu Succession Act was not to affect any right to contest any alienation or appointment of an heir made before the date on which the Succession Act was to come into force. In other words, Act, No.2 of 1920 was not to affect alienation or appointments of heir made before date on which it came into force. It also preserved the rights of any alienation or appointment of an heir made by a family. After Section 7 was inserted in Act of 1920 by the Punjab Amendment Act of 1973 right of contest being contrary to custom had been totally effaced and taken away. Therefore, no person has any right to contest any alienation of immovable property whether ancestral or non-ancestral on ground of being contrary to custom after January 23, 1973. In Haryana, the situation as enunciated by Act No.2 of 1920 continued to prevail in respect of alienation because no reforms parallel to Punjab as brought by Amendment Act of 1973, had been enacted although right to pre-emption has been substantially abolished in Haryana also. No steps even have been taken in that regard. Therefore, situation in Haryana have to be regarded as it existed under Act No. 2 of 1920.
HINDU SUCCESSION ACT,1956[C.A.No.30/1956] --  Sections 6 & 30: [Vijender Jain, C.J., M.M.Kumar, Jasbir Singh, Rajive Bhalla & Rajesh Bindal, JJ]  Alienation of coparcenary property - Law laid down by Full Bench in Joginder Singh Kundha Singh v Kehar Singh Dasaundha Singh [AIR 1965 Punjab 407] and Pritam Singh v Assistant Controller of Estate Duty, Patiala [1976 Punj LR 342] -Whether there is any conflict? - Held, The basic controversy in the Full Bench decision of Joginder Singhs case was regarding constitutional validity of Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act and as to whether it infringes Article 14 of Constitution. It was held that the estate held by male and limitation on his power of alienation were in no way removed and the reversioners were not debarred from challenging such alienations. The Full Bench held that Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act postulates that estate held by a Hindu female before enforcement of Succession Act either by inheritance or otherwise, was enlarged and on date of enforcement of Succession Act, she became a full owner. Likewise, if she has inherited any estate after the commencement of the Act,  she was to be regarded as absolute owner rather than a limited owner. Consequently, the limitations on power of alienation automatically vanished. This was the necessary result of the provisions made in Section 14 of the Act. The Full Bench further held that in respect of male proprietors, no corresponding provision was made either enlarging their estate in ancestral property or enlarging their power of alienation over property inherited by them. However, it noticed Section 30 and observed that it only deals with power of his share in coparcenary property by Will, which prior to enforcement of the Act, he had no right to do. The only provision made in respect of male proprietor regarding alienation of property was his power of alienation by Will. In so far as persons governed by custom are concerned, they continued to be governed by the restriction on the power of alienation of a male holder as existed before enforcement of the Act. Likewise, other restriction on alienation other than disposal by Will also continued. The Full Bench, thus, recognized the superior right of Hindu females by virtue of Section 14 and upheld the provision as intra vires. The argument that reversioners have ceased to exist after enactment of provisions of Section 14 of Succession Act, was rejected as there was no provision pointed out to that effect. The proposition laid down by the full Bench in Pritam Singhs case was that the Hindu Succession Act has not abolished joint Hindu family with respect to rights of those who were members of Mitakshara coparcenary, except in the manner and to the extent mentioned in Sections 6 and 30 of the Act, This Statement should also imply, though it does not say so expressly, the Succession Act to this extent does not affect the rights of the members governed by Dayabhaga coparcenary. The Full Bench in Pritam Singh;s case expressly noticed the judgment of earlier Full Bench in Joginder Singhs case but construed the same as irrelevant by observing that it dealt with the power of alienation of a person governed by Customary law and constitutional validity of Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act. Thus there is no real conflict between the two Full Bench judgments. Both the Full Bench judgments have been delivered on the assumption that Joginder Singhs case dealt with question of alienation whereas Pritam Singhs case had decided the question concerning succession. Even on fact in Joginder Singhs case the issue was validity of alienation by consent decree by a father to his two sons, which was challenged by third son, whereas in Pritam Singhs case the question of nature of property in hands of sons on death of their father had arisen  for purposes of assessment of estate duty. In Pritam  Singhs case the property in the hands of the sons was held to be coparcenary property and only 1/3rd of  property belonging to deceased father was considered eligible for estate duty. Therefore, there was no question of alienation in Pritam Singhs case. -  I do not find any infirmity in the well-reasoned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Hari Kishan and Ors. v. Administrator Municipal Committee;',
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			'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal, Sr. Adv. and; Sudhir Mittal, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' M.L Sarin, Sr. Adv.,; Ashish Handa,; H.N. Mehtani an',
			'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2005-05-25',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
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			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' Ashutosh Mohunta, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Ashutosh Mohunta, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The vendee-plaintiffs have filed this appeal to challenge the judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below whereby their suit and the appeal against the partition of the land ordered by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Guhla, vide order dated 16.7.1975, were dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. In brief the facts giving rise to this appeal are that defendant-respondent Nos. 1 to 5 filed an application for partition of the suit land against Smt.Kirpal Kaur (Plaintiff No. 1) and defendant Nos. 6 to 15 in the court of Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Guhla. In that application Smt. Kirpal Kaur was proceeded against ex parte. The partition was confirmed on 16.6.1975 and the case was fixed for instrument of partition for 16.7.1975. Rai Jasbir Singh, plaintiff No. 2 purchased land measuring 80 Kanals from Smt. Kirpal Kaur (plaintiff No. 1) vide sale deed dated 27.5.1975 during the pendency of the partition proceedings and plaintiff No. 2 and 3, i.e., Rai Jasbir Singh and Swaran Singh were in actual physical possession of 228 Kanals 8 Marias and 77 Kanals 8 Marias, respectively. The plaintiffs challenged the order dated 16.7.1975 passed by the Assistant Grade, 1st Class, Guhla, by filing the present suit for declaration, which was dismissed by the Sub Judge, 1st Class, Kaithal, vide judgment and decree dated 29.1.1980 on the ground that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The plaintiffs then filed appeal to challenge the judgment and decree dated 29.1.1980 passed by the trial Court. During the pendency of the appeal, Smt. Kirpal Kaur withdrew herself from being the appellant. Consequently, vide order dated 17.1.1980 the appeal qua Kirpal Kaur was ordered to be dismissed as withdrawn. The appeal qua the remaining two appellants, i.e., Rai Jasbir Singh and Swaran Singh (present appellants) was dismissed by the Additional District Judge, Kurukshetra, vide judgment and decree dated 4.12.1981 and the decision of the trial Court with regard to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was upheld. Now Rai Jasbir Singh arid Swaran Singh have filed the present appeal wherein challenge has been made to the findings of both the Courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. It has been contended by Mr. R.S. Mittal, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the appellants, that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not duly served and, thus,the ex parte order dated 16.6.1975/16.7.1975 passed by the Assistant Collector,1st Grade, Guhla, was a nullity. It has further been argued by the learned counsel for the appellants that the Courts below erred in holding that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit against partition ordered by the Revenue Officer in view of the provisions of the <a href="/act/136769/the-punjab-land-revenue-act-1887-complete-act">Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887</a> (for short 'the Act'), despite the fact that the order for partition of the suit land was passed ex parte without serving Smt.Kirpal Kaur according to the prescribed legal procedure.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellants have been controverted by Mr. M.L.Sarin, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the respondents. It has been contended by him that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to go into the validity of the partition proceedings. The appellants have approached the Civil Court without exhausting the remedy available to them under Section 13 of the Act. It has further been contended by him that Smt. Kirpal Kaur had duly been served in the partition proceedings by sending notice to her by registered post.The counsel has also contended that she had withdrawn her appeal before the lower appellate court and in this view of the matter, the present appellants, who had purchased the land from her during the pendency of the partition proceedings, had no locus standi to challenge the order of partition passed by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. 1 have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the evidence adduced on record.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The only question that arises for consideration in the present appeal is to the following effect:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether or not the Civil Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the suit wherein the order of partition passed by a Revenue Officer has been challenged and Smt. Kirpal Kaur was properly served in the partition proceedings</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The first objection raised on behalf of the appellants is that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not served in the partition proceedings before the Assistant Collector 1st Grade, Guhla, as per the provisions contained in Section 20 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. I do not find any merit in this contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants. It is not the case of the appellants that Smt.Kirpal Kaur was not served at all. The bald statement of the plaintiffs was rebutted by the statement on oath of defendant Balwant Singh and also by documentary evidence adduced on record which shows that a registered notice was issued to her and acknowledgement due (Ex.DIO) was received in the office of the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade. Sub-section (3) of Section 20 of the Act gives discretion to the Revenue Officer to serve the concerned person 'either in addition to, or in substitution for, any other mode of service, by forwarding the summons by post in a-letter addressed' to him and registered under Part II of the Indian Post Office Act, 1886. In this view of the matter, it cannot be said that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not served as per the procedure prescribed under the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The next contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants is that the Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain the ex parte order passed by the Revenue Officer.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. This contention is also without any merit. Section 158 of the Act specifically excludes the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts in matters within the jurisdiction of the Revenue Officers. In order to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector, a provision for filing of appeals before the higher Revenue Authorities has been made in Section 13 of the Act. The plaintiffs without exhausting the remedies available to them under Section 13, approached the Civil Court to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Moreover, it has come on record that Smt. Kirpal Kaur, from whom the present appellants had purchased the land during the pendency of the partition proceedings, had withdrawn from the appeal before the lower appellate Court. As the present appellants had purchased the suit land during the pendency of the partition proceedings, they have, therefore, no locus standi to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector 1st Grade and pursue the appeal. It is not the case of the plaintiff-appellants that the ex parte decree was obtained by the defendant-respondents by fraud or misrepresentation. In A.C. Ananthaswamy and Ors. v. Boraiah (D) by Lrs. (2004-3)138 Punjab Law Reporter 557, it has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that in the absence of any fraud or misrepresentation, an ex parte order on the bare plea of non-service cannot be set aside. In the present case it is an undisputed fact that registered notice (Ex.DIO) was issued to Smt. Kirpal Kaur and she had even filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order passed by the Assistant Collector. The ratio of the authority Firm Seth Radha Kishun (deceased) represented by Hari Kishan and Ors. v. Administrator Municipal Committee, Ludhiana : [1964]2SCR273 , that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not specifically ousted where a statute created a liability and provided a remedy, is not applicable to the facts appearing in the present case. In the present case, as already mentioned above, registered A.D. notice was issued to and served on Smt. Kirpal Kaur, who had thereafter, filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Both the courts below have given concurrent findings of fact which cannot be interfered with in the second appeal in view of the provisions of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as no substantial question of law has either been pleaded in the memorandum of appeal or arises for consideration in the present appeal. I do not find any infirmity in the well-reasoned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Consequently, there is no merit in this appeal. It is, accordingly, dismissed. However, I do no make any order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'casename' => 'Rai Jasbir Singh and anr. Vs. Balwant Singh and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' - HINDU LAW -- Custom: [Vijender Jain, C.J., M.M. Kumar, Jasbir Singh, Rajive Bhalla & Rajesh Bindal, JJ] Alienation of ancestral property - Punjab and Haryana -  Held, In respect of State of Punjab by virtue of Punjab Amendment Act, 1973 there is a complete bar to contest any alienation of ancestral or non-ancestral immovable property or appointment of an heir to such property on ground that such alienation or appointment was contrary to custom. In Punjab the property in hands of a successor has to be treated as coparcenary property and its alienation has to be governed by Hindu Law except to the extent it is regulated by Sections 6 and 30 of the Hindu Succession Act. In Haryana, property  in hands of successor has to be treated as coparcenary property as well as ancestral property. Parties can fall back upon Hindu Law in case they fail to establish that rule of decision is custom. Therefore, in Haryana both under Hindu law and the Customary Law, the alienation would be open to challenge. Custom was given precedent over uncodified Hindu Law presumably for reason that custom has been consistently replacing the Hindu Law. However, it was soon realized that ancestral immovable property, which ordinarily held to be inalienable amongst Jats of Punjab by virtue of custom except for necessity, no limitation was placed on degrees of collateral, eligible to contest such alienation. It was, therefore, felt necessary to engraft certain restriction on degrees of collateral, eligible to contest an alienation, which under the custom itself was not limited. Accordingly, the Punjab Custom (Power to Contest) Act, 1920 (Act No.2 of 1920) was enacted. The Hindu Succession Act was extended to the State of Punjab.  Act 2 of Punjab Act defined expression alienation to include any testamentary disposition of property and appointment of an heir was to include any adoption made or purporting to be made according to custom. A further provision was made by Section 3 that Hindu Succession Act was to apply only in respect of alienation of immovable property or appointment of heirs made by persons who in regard to such alienation or appointment were governed by custom. Whereas  Section 4 declared that Hindu Succession Act was not to affect any right to contest any alienation or appointment of an heir made before the date on which the Succession Act was to come into force. In other words, Act, No.2 of 1920 was not to affect alienation or appointments of heir made before date on which it came into force. It also preserved the rights of any alienation or appointment of an heir made by a family. After Section 7 was inserted in Act of 1920 by the Punjab Amendment Act of 1973 right of contest being contrary to custom had been totally effaced and taken away. Therefore, no person has any right to contest any alienation of immovable property whether ancestral or non-ancestral on ground of being contrary to custom after January 23, 1973. In Haryana, the situation as enunciated by Act No.2 of 1920 continued to prevail in respect of alienation because no reforms parallel to Punjab as brought by Amendment Act of 1973, had been enacted although right to pre-emption has been substantially abolished in Haryana also. No steps even have been taken in that regard. Therefore, situation in Haryana have to be regarded as it existed under Act No. 2 of 1920.
HINDU SUCCESSION ACT,1956[C.A.No.30/1956] --  Sections 6 & 30: [Vijender Jain, C.J., M.M.Kumar, Jasbir Singh, Rajive Bhalla & Rajesh Bindal, JJ]  Alienation of coparcenary property - Law laid down by Full Bench in Joginder Singh Kundha Singh v Kehar Singh Dasaundha Singh [AIR 1965 Punjab 407] and Pritam Singh v Assistant Controller of Estate Duty, Patiala [1976 Punj LR 342] -Whether there is any conflict? - Held, The basic controversy in the Full Bench decision of Joginder Singhs case was regarding constitutional validity of Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act and as to whether it infringes Article 14 of Constitution. It was held that the estate held by male and limitation on his power of alienation were in no way removed and the reversioners were not debarred from challenging such alienations. The Full Bench held that Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act postulates that estate held by a Hindu female before enforcement of Succession Act either by inheritance or otherwise, was enlarged and on date of enforcement of Succession Act, she became a full owner. Likewise, if she has inherited any estate after the commencement of the Act,  she was to be regarded as absolute owner rather than a limited owner. Consequently, the limitations on power of alienation automatically vanished. This was the necessary result of the provisions made in Section 14 of the Act. The Full Bench further held that in respect of male proprietors, no corresponding provision was made either enlarging their estate in ancestral property or enlarging their power of alienation over property inherited by them. However, it noticed Section 30 and observed that it only deals with power of his share in coparcenary property by Will, which prior to enforcement of the Act, he had no right to do. The only provision made in respect of male proprietor regarding alienation of property was his power of alienation by Will. In so far as persons governed by custom are concerned, they continued to be governed by the restriction on the power of alienation of a male holder as existed before enforcement of the Act. Likewise, other restriction on alienation other than disposal by Will also continued. The Full Bench, thus, recognized the superior right of Hindu females by virtue of Section 14 and upheld the provision as intra vires. The argument that reversioners have ceased to exist after enactment of provisions of Section 14 of Succession Act, was rejected as there was no provision pointed out to that effect. The proposition laid down by the full Bench in Pritam Singhs case was that the Hindu Succession Act has not abolished joint Hindu family with respect to rights of those who were members of Mitakshara coparcenary, except in the manner and to the extent mentioned in Sections 6 and 30 of the Act, This Statement should also imply, though it does not say so expressly, the Succession Act to this extent does not affect the rights of the members governed by Dayabhaga coparcenary. The Full Bench in Pritam Singh;s case expressly noticed the judgment of earlier Full Bench in Joginder Singhs case but construed the same as irrelevant by observing that it dealt with the power of alienation of a person governed by Customary law and constitutional validity of Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act. Thus there is no real conflict between the two Full Bench judgments. Both the Full Bench judgments have been delivered on the assumption that Joginder Singhs case dealt with question of alienation whereas Pritam Singhs case had decided the question concerning succession. Even on fact in Joginder Singhs case the issue was validity of alienation by consent decree by a father to his two sons, which was challenged by third son, whereas in Pritam Singhs case the question of nature of property in hands of sons on death of their father had arisen  for purposes of assessment of estate duty. In Pritam  Singhs case the property in the hands of the sons was held to be coparcenary property and only 1/3rd of  property belonging to deceased father was considered eligible for estate duty. Therefore, there was no question of alienation in Pritam Singhs case. -  I do not find any infirmity in the well-reasoned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Hari Kishan and Ors. v. Administrator Municipal Committee;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal, Sr. Adv. and; Sudhir Mittal, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' M.L Sarin, Sr. Adv.,; Ashish Handa,; H.N. Mehtani an',
		'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2005-05-25',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Ashutosh Mohunta, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Ashutosh Mohunta, J.</p><p>1. The vendee-plaintiffs have filed this appeal to challenge the judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below whereby their suit and the appeal against the partition of the land ordered by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Guhla, vide order dated 16.7.1975, were dismissed.</p><p>2. In brief the facts giving rise to this appeal are that defendant-respondent Nos. 1 to 5 filed an application for partition of the suit land against Smt.Kirpal Kaur (Plaintiff No. 1) and defendant Nos. 6 to 15 in the court of Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Guhla. In that application Smt. Kirpal Kaur was proceeded against ex parte. The partition was confirmed on 16.6.1975 and the case was fixed for instrument of partition for 16.7.1975. Rai Jasbir Singh, plaintiff No. 2 purchased land measuring 80 Kanals from Smt. Kirpal Kaur (plaintiff No. 1) vide sale deed dated 27.5.1975 during the pendency of the partition proceedings and plaintiff No. 2 and 3, i.e., Rai Jasbir Singh and Swaran Singh were in actual physical possession of 228 Kanals 8 Marias and 77 Kanals 8 Marias, respectively. The plaintiffs challenged the order dated 16.7.1975 passed by the Assistant Grade, 1st Class, Guhla, by filing the present suit for declaration, which was dismissed by the Sub Judge, 1st Class, Kaithal, vide judgment and decree dated 29.1.1980 on the ground that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The plaintiffs then filed appeal to challenge the judgment and decree dated 29.1.1980 passed by the trial Court. During the pendency of the appeal, Smt. Kirpal Kaur withdrew herself from being the appellant. Consequently, vide order dated 17.1.1980 the appeal qua Kirpal Kaur was ordered to be dismissed as withdrawn. The appeal qua the remaining two appellants, i.e., Rai Jasbir Singh and Swaran Singh (present appellants) was dismissed by the Additional District Judge, Kurukshetra, vide judgment and decree dated 4.12.1981 and the decision of the trial Court with regard to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was upheld. Now Rai Jasbir Singh arid Swaran Singh have filed the present appeal wherein challenge has been made to the findings of both the Courts below.</p><p>3. It has been contended by Mr. R.S. Mittal, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the appellants, that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not duly served and, thus,the ex parte order dated 16.6.1975/16.7.1975 passed by the Assistant Collector,1st Grade, Guhla, was a nullity. It has further been argued by the learned counsel for the appellants that the Courts below erred in holding that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit against partition ordered by the Revenue Officer in view of the provisions of the <a>Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887</a> (for short 'the Act'), despite the fact that the order for partition of the suit land was passed ex parte without serving Smt.Kirpal Kaur according to the prescribed legal procedure.</p><p>4. The contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellants have been controverted by Mr. M.L.Sarin, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the respondents. It has been contended by him that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to go into the validity of the partition proceedings. The appellants have approached the Civil Court without exhausting the remedy available to them under Section 13 of the Act. It has further been contended by him that Smt. Kirpal Kaur had duly been served in the partition proceedings by sending notice to her by registered post.The counsel has also contended that she had withdrawn her appeal before the lower appellate court and in this view of the matter, the present appellants, who had purchased the land from her during the pendency of the partition proceedings, had no locus standi to challenge the order of partition passed by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade.</p><p>5. 1 have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the evidence adduced on record.</p><p>6. The only question that arises for consideration in the present appeal is to the following effect:-</p><p>Whether or not the Civil Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the suit wherein the order of partition passed by a Revenue Officer has been challenged and Smt. Kirpal Kaur was properly served in the partition proceedings</p><p>7. The first objection raised on behalf of the appellants is that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not served in the partition proceedings before the Assistant Collector 1st Grade, Guhla, as per the provisions contained in Section 20 of the Act.</p><p>8. I do not find any merit in this contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants. It is not the case of the appellants that Smt.Kirpal Kaur was not served at all. The bald statement of the plaintiffs was rebutted by the statement on oath of defendant Balwant Singh and also by documentary evidence adduced on record which shows that a registered notice was issued to her and acknowledgement due (Ex.DIO) was received in the office of the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade. Sub-section (3) of Section 20 of the Act gives discretion to the Revenue Officer to serve the concerned person 'either in addition to, or in substitution for, any other mode of service, by forwarding the summons by post in a-letter addressed' to him and registered under Part II of the Indian Post Office Act, 1886. In this view of the matter, it cannot be said that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not served as per the procedure prescribed under the Act.</p><p>9. The next contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants is that the Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain the ex parte order passed by the Revenue Officer.</p><p>10. This contention is also without any merit. Section 158 of the Act specifically excludes the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts in matters within the jurisdiction of the Revenue Officers. In order to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector, a provision for filing of appeals before the higher Revenue Authorities has been made in Section 13 of the Act. The plaintiffs without exhausting the remedies available to them under Section 13, approached the Civil Court to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector.</p><p>11. Moreover, it has come on record that Smt. Kirpal Kaur, from whom the present appellants had purchased the land during the pendency of the partition proceedings, had withdrawn from the appeal before the lower appellate Court. As the present appellants had purchased the suit land during the pendency of the partition proceedings, they have, therefore, no locus standi to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector 1st Grade and pursue the appeal. It is not the case of the plaintiff-appellants that the ex parte decree was obtained by the defendant-respondents by fraud or misrepresentation. In A.C. Ananthaswamy and Ors. v. Boraiah (D) by Lrs. (2004-3)138 Punjab Law Reporter 557, it has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that in the absence of any fraud or misrepresentation, an ex parte order on the bare plea of non-service cannot be set aside. In the present case it is an undisputed fact that registered notice (Ex.DIO) was issued to Smt. Kirpal Kaur and she had even filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order passed by the Assistant Collector. The ratio of the authority Firm Seth Radha Kishun (deceased) represented by Hari Kishan and Ors. v. Administrator Municipal Committee, Ludhiana : [1964]2SCR273 , that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not specifically ousted where a statute created a liability and provided a remedy, is not applicable to the facts appearing in the present case. In the present case, as already mentioned above, registered A.D. notice was issued to and served on Smt. Kirpal Kaur, who had thereafter, filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order.</p><p>12. Both the courts below have given concurrent findings of fact which cannot be interfered with in the second appeal in view of the provisions of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as no substantial question of law has either been pleaded in the memorandum of appeal or arises for consideration in the present appeal. I do not find any infirmity in the well-reasoned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below.</p><p>13. Consequently, there is no merit in this appeal. It is, accordingly, dismissed. However, I do no make any order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '(2006)142PLR339',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Balwant Singh and ors.',
		'sub' => 'Property',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Ashutosh Mohunta, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The vendee-plaintiffs have filed this appeal to challenge the judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below whereby their suit and the appeal against the partition of the land ordered by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Guhla, vide order dated 16.7.1975, were dismissed.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. In brief the facts giving rise to this appeal are that defendant-respondent Nos. 1 to 5 filed an application for partition of the suit land against Smt.Kirpal Kaur (Plaintiff No. 1) and defendant Nos. 6 to 15 in the court of Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Guhla. In that application Smt. Kirpal Kaur was proceeded against ex parte. The partition was confirmed on 16.6.1975 and the case was fixed for instrument of partition for 16.7.1975. Rai Jasbir Singh, plaintiff No. 2 purchased land measuring 80 Kanals from Smt. Kirpal Kaur (plaintiff No. 1) vide sale deed dated 27.5.1975 during the pendency of the partition proceedings and plaintiff No. 2 and 3, i.e., Rai Jasbir Singh and Swaran Singh were in actual physical possession of 228 Kanals 8 Marias and 77 Kanals 8 Marias, respectively. The plaintiffs challenged the order dated 16.7.1975 passed by the Assistant Grade, 1st Class, Guhla, by filing the present suit for declaration, which was dismissed by the Sub Judge, 1st Class, Kaithal, vide judgment and decree dated 29.1.1980 on the ground that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The plaintiffs then filed appeal to challenge the judgment and decree dated 29.1.1980 passed by the trial Court. During the pendency of the appeal, Smt. Kirpal Kaur withdrew herself from being the appellant. Consequently, vide order dated 17.1.1980 the appeal qua Kirpal Kaur was ordered to be dismissed as withdrawn. The appeal qua the remaining two appellants, i.e., Rai Jasbir Singh and Swaran Singh (present appellants) was dismissed by the Additional District Judge, Kurukshetra, vide judgment and decree dated 4.12.1981 and the decision of the trial Court with regard to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was upheld. Now Rai Jasbir Singh arid Swaran Singh have filed the present appeal wherein challenge has been made to the findings of both the Courts below.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. It has been contended by Mr. R.S. Mittal, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the appellants, that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not duly served and, thus,the ex parte order dated 16.6.1975/16.7.1975 passed by the Assistant Collector,1st Grade, Guhla, was a nullity. It has further been argued by the learned counsel for the appellants that the Courts below erred in holding that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit against partition ordered by the Revenue Officer in view of the provisions of the <a>Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887</a> (for short 'the Act'), despite the fact that the order for partition of the suit land was passed ex parte without serving Smt.Kirpal Kaur according to the prescribed legal procedure.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. The contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellants have been controverted by Mr. M.L.Sarin, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the respondents. It has been contended by him that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to go into the validity of the partition proceedings. The appellants have approached the Civil Court without exhausting the remedy available to them under Section 13 of the Act. It has further been contended by him that Smt. Kirpal Kaur had duly been served in the partition proceedings by sending notice to her by registered post.The counsel has also contended that she had withdrawn her appeal before the lower appellate court and in this view of the matter, the present appellants, who had purchased the land from her during the pendency of the partition proceedings, had no locus standi to challenge the order of partition passed by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. 1 have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the evidence adduced on record.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. The only question that arises for consideration in the present appeal is to the following effect:-',
	(int) 7 => '<p>Whether or not the Civil Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the suit wherein the order of partition passed by a Revenue Officer has been challenged and Smt. Kirpal Kaur was properly served in the partition proceedings',
	(int) 8 => '<p>7. The first objection raised on behalf of the appellants is that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not served in the partition proceedings before the Assistant Collector 1st Grade, Guhla, as per the provisions contained in Section 20 of the Act.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>8. I do not find any merit in this contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants. It is not the case of the appellants that Smt.Kirpal Kaur was not served at all. The bald statement of the plaintiffs was rebutted by the statement on oath of defendant Balwant Singh and also by documentary evidence adduced on record which shows that a registered notice was issued to her and acknowledgement due (Ex.DIO) was received in the office of the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade. Sub-section (3) of Section 20 of the Act gives discretion to the Revenue Officer to serve the concerned person 'either in addition to, or in substitution for, any other mode of service, by forwarding the summons by post in a-letter addressed' to him and registered under Part II of the Indian Post Office Act, 1886. In this view of the matter, it cannot be said that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not served as per the procedure prescribed under the Act.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>9. The next contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants is that the Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain the ex parte order passed by the Revenue Officer.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>10. This contention is also without any merit. Section 158 of the Act specifically excludes the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts in matters within the jurisdiction of the Revenue Officers. In order to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector, a provision for filing of appeals before the higher Revenue Authorities has been made in Section 13 of the Act. The plaintiffs without exhausting the remedies available to them under Section 13, approached the Civil Court to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>11. Moreover, it has come on record that Smt. Kirpal Kaur, from whom the present appellants had purchased the land during the pendency of the partition proceedings, had withdrawn from the appeal before the lower appellate Court. As the present appellants had purchased the suit land during the pendency of the partition proceedings, they have, therefore, no locus standi to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector 1st Grade and pursue the appeal. It is not the case of the plaintiff-appellants that the ex parte decree was obtained by the defendant-respondents by fraud or misrepresentation. In A.C. Ananthaswamy and Ors. v. Boraiah (D) by Lrs. (2004-3)138 Punjab Law Reporter 557, it has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that in the absence of any fraud or misrepresentation, an ex parte order on the bare plea of non-service cannot be set aside. In the present case it is an undisputed fact that registered notice (Ex.DIO) was issued to Smt. Kirpal Kaur and she had even filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order passed by the Assistant Collector. The ratio of the authority Firm Seth Radha Kishun (deceased) represented by Hari Kishan and Ors. v. Administrator Municipal Committee, Ludhiana : [1964]2SCR273 , that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not specifically ousted where a statute created a liability and provided a remedy, is not applicable to the facts appearing in the present case. In the present case, as already mentioned above, registered A.D. notice was issued to and served on Smt. Kirpal Kaur, who had thereafter, filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>12. Both the courts below have given concurrent findings of fact which cannot be interfered with in the second appeal in view of the provisions of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as no substantial question of law has either been pleaded in the memorandum of appeal or arises for consideration in the present appeal. I do not find any infirmity in the well-reasoned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>13. Consequently, there is no merit in this appeal. It is, accordingly, dismissed. However, I do no make any order as to costs.<p>',
	(int) 15 => '<p>'
)
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4. The contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellants have been controverted by Mr. M.L.Sarin, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the respondents. It has been contended by him that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to go into the validity of the partition proceedings. The appellants have approached the Civil Court without exhausting the remedy available to them under Section 13 of the Act. It has further been contended by him that Smt. Kirpal Kaur had duly been served in the partition proceedings by sending notice to her by registered post.The counsel has also contended that she had withdrawn her appeal before the lower appellate court and in this view of the matter, the present appellants, who had purchased the land from her during the pendency of the partition proceedings, had no locus standi to challenge the order of partition passed by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Rai Jasbir Singh and anr Vs Balwant Singh and ors - Citation 629369 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '629369',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/136769/the-punjab-land-revenue-act-1887-complete-act">Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887</a> - Sections 13, 20, 20(3) and 158; Indian Post Office Act, 1886; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) - Sections 100',
			'appealno' => 'Regular Second Appeal No. 615 of 1982 (O and M)',
			'appellant' => 'Rai Jasbir Singh and anr.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Rai Jasbir Singh and anr. Vs. Balwant Singh and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' - HINDU LAW -- Custom: [Vijender Jain, C.J., M.M. Kumar, Jasbir Singh, Rajive Bhalla & Rajesh Bindal, JJ] Alienation of ancestral property - Punjab and Haryana -  Held, In respect of State of Punjab by virtue of Punjab Amendment Act, 1973 there is a complete bar to contest any alienation of ancestral or non-ancestral immovable property or appointment of an heir to such property on ground that such alienation or appointment was contrary to custom. In Punjab the property in hands of a successor has to be treated as coparcenary property and its alienation has to be governed by Hindu Law except to the extent it is regulated by Sections 6 and 30 of the Hindu Succession Act. In Haryana, property  in hands of successor has to be treated as coparcenary property as well as ancestral property. Parties can fall back upon Hindu Law in case they fail to establish that rule of decision is custom. Therefore, in Haryana both under Hindu law and the Customary Law, the alienation would be open to challenge. Custom was given precedent over uncodified Hindu Law presumably for reason that custom has been consistently replacing the Hindu Law. However, it was soon realized that ancestral immovable property, which ordinarily held to be inalienable amongst Jats of Punjab by virtue of custom except for necessity, no limitation was placed on degrees of collateral, eligible to contest such alienation. It was, therefore, felt necessary to engraft certain restriction on degrees of collateral, eligible to contest an alienation, which under the custom itself was not limited. Accordingly, the Punjab Custom (Power to Contest) Act, 1920 (Act No.2 of 1920) was enacted. The Hindu Succession Act was extended to the State of Punjab.  Act 2 of Punjab Act defined expression alienation to include any testamentary disposition of property and appointment of an heir was to include any adoption made or purporting to be made according to custom. A further provision was made by Section 3 that Hindu Succession Act was to apply only in respect of alienation of immovable property or appointment of heirs made by persons who in regard to such alienation or appointment were governed by custom. Whereas  Section 4 declared that Hindu Succession Act was not to affect any right to contest any alienation or appointment of an heir made before the date on which the Succession Act was to come into force. In other words, Act, No.2 of 1920 was not to affect alienation or appointments of heir made before date on which it came into force. It also preserved the rights of any alienation or appointment of an heir made by a family. After Section 7 was inserted in Act of 1920 by the Punjab Amendment Act of 1973 right of contest being contrary to custom had been totally effaced and taken away. Therefore, no person has any right to contest any alienation of immovable property whether ancestral or non-ancestral on ground of being contrary to custom after January 23, 1973. In Haryana, the situation as enunciated by Act No.2 of 1920 continued to prevail in respect of alienation because no reforms parallel to Punjab as brought by Amendment Act of 1973, had been enacted although right to pre-emption has been substantially abolished in Haryana also. No steps even have been taken in that regard. Therefore, situation in Haryana have to be regarded as it existed under Act No. 2 of 1920.
HINDU SUCCESSION ACT,1956[C.A.No.30/1956] --  Sections 6 & 30: [Vijender Jain, C.J., M.M.Kumar, Jasbir Singh, Rajive Bhalla & Rajesh Bindal, JJ]  Alienation of coparcenary property - Law laid down by Full Bench in Joginder Singh Kundha Singh v Kehar Singh Dasaundha Singh [AIR 1965 Punjab 407] and Pritam Singh v Assistant Controller of Estate Duty, Patiala [1976 Punj LR 342] -Whether there is any conflict? - Held, The basic controversy in the Full Bench decision of Joginder Singhs case was regarding constitutional validity of Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act and as to whether it infringes Article 14 of Constitution. It was held that the estate held by male and limitation on his power of alienation were in no way removed and the reversioners were not debarred from challenging such alienations. The Full Bench held that Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act postulates that estate held by a Hindu female before enforcement of Succession Act either by inheritance or otherwise, was enlarged and on date of enforcement of Succession Act, she became a full owner. Likewise, if she has inherited any estate after the commencement of the Act,  she was to be regarded as absolute owner rather than a limited owner. Consequently, the limitations on power of alienation automatically vanished. This was the necessary result of the provisions made in Section 14 of the Act. The Full Bench further held that in respect of male proprietors, no corresponding provision was made either enlarging their estate in ancestral property or enlarging their power of alienation over property inherited by them. However, it noticed Section 30 and observed that it only deals with power of his share in coparcenary property by Will, which prior to enforcement of the Act, he had no right to do. The only provision made in respect of male proprietor regarding alienation of property was his power of alienation by Will. In so far as persons governed by custom are concerned, they continued to be governed by the restriction on the power of alienation of a male holder as existed before enforcement of the Act. Likewise, other restriction on alienation other than disposal by Will also continued. The Full Bench, thus, recognized the superior right of Hindu females by virtue of Section 14 and upheld the provision as intra vires. The argument that reversioners have ceased to exist after enactment of provisions of Section 14 of Succession Act, was rejected as there was no provision pointed out to that effect. The proposition laid down by the full Bench in Pritam Singhs case was that the Hindu Succession Act has not abolished joint Hindu family with respect to rights of those who were members of Mitakshara coparcenary, except in the manner and to the extent mentioned in Sections 6 and 30 of the Act, This Statement should also imply, though it does not say so expressly, the Succession Act to this extent does not affect the rights of the members governed by Dayabhaga coparcenary. The Full Bench in Pritam Singh;s case expressly noticed the judgment of earlier Full Bench in Joginder Singhs case but construed the same as irrelevant by observing that it dealt with the power of alienation of a person governed by Customary law and constitutional validity of Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act. Thus there is no real conflict between the two Full Bench judgments. Both the Full Bench judgments have been delivered on the assumption that Joginder Singhs case dealt with question of alienation whereas Pritam Singhs case had decided the question concerning succession. Even on fact in Joginder Singhs case the issue was validity of alienation by consent decree by a father to his two sons, which was challenged by third son, whereas in Pritam Singhs case the question of nature of property in hands of sons on death of their father had arisen  for purposes of assessment of estate duty. In Pritam  Singhs case the property in the hands of the sons was held to be coparcenary property and only 1/3rd of  property belonging to deceased father was considered eligible for estate duty. Therefore, there was no question of alienation in Pritam Singhs case. -  I do not find any infirmity in the well-reasoned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Hari Kishan and Ors. v. Administrator Municipal Committee;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal, Sr. Adv. and; Sudhir Mittal, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' M.L Sarin, Sr. Adv.,; Ashish Handa,; H.N. Mehtani an',
			'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2005-05-25',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' Ashutosh Mohunta, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Ashutosh Mohunta, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The vendee-plaintiffs have filed this appeal to challenge the judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below whereby their suit and the appeal against the partition of the land ordered by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Guhla, vide order dated 16.7.1975, were dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. In brief the facts giving rise to this appeal are that defendant-respondent Nos. 1 to 5 filed an application for partition of the suit land against Smt.Kirpal Kaur (Plaintiff No. 1) and defendant Nos. 6 to 15 in the court of Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Guhla. In that application Smt. Kirpal Kaur was proceeded against ex parte. The partition was confirmed on 16.6.1975 and the case was fixed for instrument of partition for 16.7.1975. Rai Jasbir Singh, plaintiff No. 2 purchased land measuring 80 Kanals from Smt. Kirpal Kaur (plaintiff No. 1) vide sale deed dated 27.5.1975 during the pendency of the partition proceedings and plaintiff No. 2 and 3, i.e., Rai Jasbir Singh and Swaran Singh were in actual physical possession of 228 Kanals 8 Marias and 77 Kanals 8 Marias, respectively. The plaintiffs challenged the order dated 16.7.1975 passed by the Assistant Grade, 1st Class, Guhla, by filing the present suit for declaration, which was dismissed by the Sub Judge, 1st Class, Kaithal, vide judgment and decree dated 29.1.1980 on the ground that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The plaintiffs then filed appeal to challenge the judgment and decree dated 29.1.1980 passed by the trial Court. During the pendency of the appeal, Smt. Kirpal Kaur withdrew herself from being the appellant. Consequently, vide order dated 17.1.1980 the appeal qua Kirpal Kaur was ordered to be dismissed as withdrawn. The appeal qua the remaining two appellants, i.e., Rai Jasbir Singh and Swaran Singh (present appellants) was dismissed by the Additional District Judge, Kurukshetra, vide judgment and decree dated 4.12.1981 and the decision of the trial Court with regard to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was upheld. Now Rai Jasbir Singh arid Swaran Singh have filed the present appeal wherein challenge has been made to the findings of both the Courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. It has been contended by Mr. R.S. Mittal, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the appellants, that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not duly served and, thus,the ex parte order dated 16.6.1975/16.7.1975 passed by the Assistant Collector,1st Grade, Guhla, was a nullity. It has further been argued by the learned counsel for the appellants that the Courts below erred in holding that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit against partition ordered by the Revenue Officer in view of the provisions of the <a href="/act/136769/the-punjab-land-revenue-act-1887-complete-act">Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887</a> (for short 'the Act'), despite the fact that the order for partition of the suit land was passed ex parte without serving Smt.Kirpal Kaur according to the prescribed legal procedure.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellants have been controverted by Mr. M.L.Sarin, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the respondents. It has been contended by him that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to go into the validity of the partition proceedings. The appellants have approached the Civil Court without exhausting the remedy available to them under Section 13 of the Act. It has further been contended by him that Smt. Kirpal Kaur had duly been served in the partition proceedings by sending notice to her by registered post.The counsel has also contended that she had withdrawn her appeal before the lower appellate court and in this view of the matter, the present appellants, who had purchased the land from her during the pendency of the partition proceedings, had no locus standi to challenge the order of partition passed by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. 1 have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the evidence adduced on record.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The only question that arises for consideration in the present appeal is to the following effect:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether or not the Civil Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the suit wherein the order of partition passed by a Revenue Officer has been challenged and Smt. Kirpal Kaur was properly served in the partition proceedings</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The first objection raised on behalf of the appellants is that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not served in the partition proceedings before the Assistant Collector 1st Grade, Guhla, as per the provisions contained in Section 20 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. I do not find any merit in this contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants. It is not the case of the appellants that Smt.Kirpal Kaur was not served at all. The bald statement of the plaintiffs was rebutted by the statement on oath of defendant Balwant Singh and also by documentary evidence adduced on record which shows that a registered notice was issued to her and acknowledgement due (Ex.DIO) was received in the office of the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade. Sub-section (3) of Section 20 of the Act gives discretion to the Revenue Officer to serve the concerned person 'either in addition to, or in substitution for, any other mode of service, by forwarding the summons by post in a-letter addressed' to him and registered under Part II of the Indian Post Office Act, 1886. In this view of the matter, it cannot be said that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not served as per the procedure prescribed under the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The next contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants is that the Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain the ex parte order passed by the Revenue Officer.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. This contention is also without any merit. Section 158 of the Act specifically excludes the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts in matters within the jurisdiction of the Revenue Officers. In order to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector, a provision for filing of appeals before the higher Revenue Authorities has been made in Section 13 of the Act. The plaintiffs without exhausting the remedies available to them under Section 13, approached the Civil Court to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Moreover, it has come on record that Smt. Kirpal Kaur, from whom the present appellants had purchased the land during the pendency of the partition proceedings, had withdrawn from the appeal before the lower appellate Court. As the present appellants had purchased the suit land during the pendency of the partition proceedings, they have, therefore, no locus standi to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector 1st Grade and pursue the appeal. It is not the case of the plaintiff-appellants that the ex parte decree was obtained by the defendant-respondents by fraud or misrepresentation. In A.C. Ananthaswamy and Ors. v. Boraiah (D) by Lrs. (2004-3)138 Punjab Law Reporter 557, it has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that in the absence of any fraud or misrepresentation, an ex parte order on the bare plea of non-service cannot be set aside. In the present case it is an undisputed fact that registered notice (Ex.DIO) was issued to Smt. Kirpal Kaur and she had even filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order passed by the Assistant Collector. The ratio of the authority Firm Seth Radha Kishun (deceased) represented by Hari Kishan and Ors. v. Administrator Municipal Committee, Ludhiana : [1964]2SCR273 , that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not specifically ousted where a statute created a liability and provided a remedy, is not applicable to the facts appearing in the present case. In the present case, as already mentioned above, registered A.D. notice was issued to and served on Smt. Kirpal Kaur, who had thereafter, filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Both the courts below have given concurrent findings of fact which cannot be interfered with in the second appeal in view of the provisions of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as no substantial question of law has either been pleaded in the memorandum of appeal or arises for consideration in the present appeal. I do not find any infirmity in the well-reasoned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Consequently, there is no merit in this appeal. It is, accordingly, dismissed. However, I do no make any order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '(2006)142PLR339',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Balwant Singh and ors.',
			'sub' => 'Property',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'rai-jasbir-singh-vs-balwant',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '629369',
		(int) 1 => 'rai-jasbir-singh-vs-balwant'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Rai Jasbir Singh and anr Vs Balwant Singh and ors - Citation 629369 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '629369',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/136769/the-punjab-land-revenue-act-1887-complete-act">Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887</a> - Sections 13, 20, 20(3) and 158; Indian Post Office Act, 1886; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) - Sections 100',
		'appealno' => 'Regular Second Appeal No. 615 of 1982 (O and M)',
		'appellant' => 'Rai Jasbir Singh and anr.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Rai Jasbir Singh and anr. Vs. Balwant Singh and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' - HINDU LAW -- Custom: [Vijender Jain, C.J., M.M. Kumar, Jasbir Singh, Rajive Bhalla & Rajesh Bindal, JJ] Alienation of ancestral property - Punjab and Haryana -  Held, In respect of State of Punjab by virtue of Punjab Amendment Act, 1973 there is a complete bar to contest any alienation of ancestral or non-ancestral immovable property or appointment of an heir to such property on ground that such alienation or appointment was contrary to custom. In Punjab the property in hands of a successor has to be treated as coparcenary property and its alienation has to be governed by Hindu Law except to the extent it is regulated by Sections 6 and 30 of the Hindu Succession Act. In Haryana, property  in hands of successor has to be treated as coparcenary property as well as ancestral property. Parties can fall back upon Hindu Law in case they fail to establish that rule of decision is custom. Therefore, in Haryana both under Hindu law and the Customary Law, the alienation would be open to challenge. Custom was given precedent over uncodified Hindu Law presumably for reason that custom has been consistently replacing the Hindu Law. However, it was soon realized that ancestral immovable property, which ordinarily held to be inalienable amongst Jats of Punjab by virtue of custom except for necessity, no limitation was placed on degrees of collateral, eligible to contest such alienation. It was, therefore, felt necessary to engraft certain restriction on degrees of collateral, eligible to contest an alienation, which under the custom itself was not limited. Accordingly, the Punjab Custom (Power to Contest) Act, 1920 (Act No.2 of 1920) was enacted. The Hindu Succession Act was extended to the State of Punjab.  Act 2 of Punjab Act defined expression alienation to include any testamentary disposition of property and appointment of an heir was to include any adoption made or purporting to be made according to custom. A further provision was made by Section 3 that Hindu Succession Act was to apply only in respect of alienation of immovable property or appointment of heirs made by persons who in regard to such alienation or appointment were governed by custom. Whereas  Section 4 declared that Hindu Succession Act was not to affect any right to contest any alienation or appointment of an heir made before the date on which the Succession Act was to come into force. In other words, Act, No.2 of 1920 was not to affect alienation or appointments of heir made before date on which it came into force. It also preserved the rights of any alienation or appointment of an heir made by a family. After Section 7 was inserted in Act of 1920 by the Punjab Amendment Act of 1973 right of contest being contrary to custom had been totally effaced and taken away. Therefore, no person has any right to contest any alienation of immovable property whether ancestral or non-ancestral on ground of being contrary to custom after January 23, 1973. In Haryana, the situation as enunciated by Act No.2 of 1920 continued to prevail in respect of alienation because no reforms parallel to Punjab as brought by Amendment Act of 1973, had been enacted although right to pre-emption has been substantially abolished in Haryana also. No steps even have been taken in that regard. Therefore, situation in Haryana have to be regarded as it existed under Act No. 2 of 1920.
HINDU SUCCESSION ACT,1956[C.A.No.30/1956] --  Sections 6 & 30: [Vijender Jain, C.J., M.M.Kumar, Jasbir Singh, Rajive Bhalla & Rajesh Bindal, JJ]  Alienation of coparcenary property - Law laid down by Full Bench in Joginder Singh Kundha Singh v Kehar Singh Dasaundha Singh [AIR 1965 Punjab 407] and Pritam Singh v Assistant Controller of Estate Duty, Patiala [1976 Punj LR 342] -Whether there is any conflict? - Held, The basic controversy in the Full Bench decision of Joginder Singhs case was regarding constitutional validity of Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act and as to whether it infringes Article 14 of Constitution. It was held that the estate held by male and limitation on his power of alienation were in no way removed and the reversioners were not debarred from challenging such alienations. The Full Bench held that Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act postulates that estate held by a Hindu female before enforcement of Succession Act either by inheritance or otherwise, was enlarged and on date of enforcement of Succession Act, she became a full owner. Likewise, if she has inherited any estate after the commencement of the Act,  she was to be regarded as absolute owner rather than a limited owner. Consequently, the limitations on power of alienation automatically vanished. This was the necessary result of the provisions made in Section 14 of the Act. The Full Bench further held that in respect of male proprietors, no corresponding provision was made either enlarging their estate in ancestral property or enlarging their power of alienation over property inherited by them. However, it noticed Section 30 and observed that it only deals with power of his share in coparcenary property by Will, which prior to enforcement of the Act, he had no right to do. The only provision made in respect of male proprietor regarding alienation of property was his power of alienation by Will. In so far as persons governed by custom are concerned, they continued to be governed by the restriction on the power of alienation of a male holder as existed before enforcement of the Act. Likewise, other restriction on alienation other than disposal by Will also continued. The Full Bench, thus, recognized the superior right of Hindu females by virtue of Section 14 and upheld the provision as intra vires. The argument that reversioners have ceased to exist after enactment of provisions of Section 14 of Succession Act, was rejected as there was no provision pointed out to that effect. The proposition laid down by the full Bench in Pritam Singhs case was that the Hindu Succession Act has not abolished joint Hindu family with respect to rights of those who were members of Mitakshara coparcenary, except in the manner and to the extent mentioned in Sections 6 and 30 of the Act, This Statement should also imply, though it does not say so expressly, the Succession Act to this extent does not affect the rights of the members governed by Dayabhaga coparcenary. The Full Bench in Pritam Singh;s case expressly noticed the judgment of earlier Full Bench in Joginder Singhs case but construed the same as irrelevant by observing that it dealt with the power of alienation of a person governed by Customary law and constitutional validity of Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act. Thus there is no real conflict between the two Full Bench judgments. Both the Full Bench judgments have been delivered on the assumption that Joginder Singhs case dealt with question of alienation whereas Pritam Singhs case had decided the question concerning succession. Even on fact in Joginder Singhs case the issue was validity of alienation by consent decree by a father to his two sons, which was challenged by third son, whereas in Pritam Singhs case the question of nature of property in hands of sons on death of their father had arisen  for purposes of assessment of estate duty. In Pritam  Singhs case the property in the hands of the sons was held to be coparcenary property and only 1/3rd of  property belonging to deceased father was considered eligible for estate duty. Therefore, there was no question of alienation in Pritam Singhs case. -  I do not find any infirmity in the well-reasoned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Hari Kishan and Ors. v. Administrator Municipal Committee;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal, Sr. Adv. and; Sudhir Mittal, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' M.L Sarin, Sr. Adv.,; Ashish Handa,; H.N. Mehtani an',
		'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2005-05-25',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Ashutosh Mohunta, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Ashutosh Mohunta, J.</p><p>1. The vendee-plaintiffs have filed this appeal to challenge the judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below whereby their suit and the appeal against the partition of the land ordered by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Guhla, vide order dated 16.7.1975, were dismissed.</p><p>2. In brief the facts giving rise to this appeal are that defendant-respondent Nos. 1 to 5 filed an application for partition of the suit land against Smt.Kirpal Kaur (Plaintiff No. 1) and defendant Nos. 6 to 15 in the court of Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Guhla. In that application Smt. Kirpal Kaur was proceeded against ex parte. The partition was confirmed on 16.6.1975 and the case was fixed for instrument of partition for 16.7.1975. Rai Jasbir Singh, plaintiff No. 2 purchased land measuring 80 Kanals from Smt. Kirpal Kaur (plaintiff No. 1) vide sale deed dated 27.5.1975 during the pendency of the partition proceedings and plaintiff No. 2 and 3, i.e., Rai Jasbir Singh and Swaran Singh were in actual physical possession of 228 Kanals 8 Marias and 77 Kanals 8 Marias, respectively. The plaintiffs challenged the order dated 16.7.1975 passed by the Assistant Grade, 1st Class, Guhla, by filing the present suit for declaration, which was dismissed by the Sub Judge, 1st Class, Kaithal, vide judgment and decree dated 29.1.1980 on the ground that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The plaintiffs then filed appeal to challenge the judgment and decree dated 29.1.1980 passed by the trial Court. During the pendency of the appeal, Smt. Kirpal Kaur withdrew herself from being the appellant. Consequently, vide order dated 17.1.1980 the appeal qua Kirpal Kaur was ordered to be dismissed as withdrawn. The appeal qua the remaining two appellants, i.e., Rai Jasbir Singh and Swaran Singh (present appellants) was dismissed by the Additional District Judge, Kurukshetra, vide judgment and decree dated 4.12.1981 and the decision of the trial Court with regard to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was upheld. Now Rai Jasbir Singh arid Swaran Singh have filed the present appeal wherein challenge has been made to the findings of both the Courts below.</p><p>3. It has been contended by Mr. R.S. Mittal, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the appellants, that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not duly served and, thus,the ex parte order dated 16.6.1975/16.7.1975 passed by the Assistant Collector,1st Grade, Guhla, was a nullity. It has further been argued by the learned counsel for the appellants that the Courts below erred in holding that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit against partition ordered by the Revenue Officer in view of the provisions of the <a>Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887</a> (for short 'the Act'), despite the fact that the order for partition of the suit land was passed ex parte without serving Smt.Kirpal Kaur according to the prescribed legal procedure.</p><p>4. The contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellants have been controverted by Mr. M.L.Sarin, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the respondents. It has been contended by him that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to go into the validity of the partition proceedings. The appellants have approached the Civil Court without exhausting the remedy available to them under Section 13 of the Act. It has further been contended by him that Smt. Kirpal Kaur had duly been served in the partition proceedings by sending notice to her by registered post.The counsel has also contended that she had withdrawn her appeal before the lower appellate court and in this view of the matter, the present appellants, who had purchased the land from her during the pendency of the partition proceedings, had no locus standi to challenge the order of partition passed by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade.</p><p>5. 1 have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the evidence adduced on record.</p><p>6. The only question that arises for consideration in the present appeal is to the following effect:-</p><p>Whether or not the Civil Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the suit wherein the order of partition passed by a Revenue Officer has been challenged and Smt. Kirpal Kaur was properly served in the partition proceedings</p><p>7. The first objection raised on behalf of the appellants is that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not served in the partition proceedings before the Assistant Collector 1st Grade, Guhla, as per the provisions contained in Section 20 of the Act.</p><p>8. I do not find any merit in this contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants. It is not the case of the appellants that Smt.Kirpal Kaur was not served at all. The bald statement of the plaintiffs was rebutted by the statement on oath of defendant Balwant Singh and also by documentary evidence adduced on record which shows that a registered notice was issued to her and acknowledgement due (Ex.DIO) was received in the office of the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade. Sub-section (3) of Section 20 of the Act gives discretion to the Revenue Officer to serve the concerned person 'either in addition to, or in substitution for, any other mode of service, by forwarding the summons by post in a-letter addressed' to him and registered under Part II of the Indian Post Office Act, 1886. In this view of the matter, it cannot be said that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not served as per the procedure prescribed under the Act.</p><p>9. The next contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants is that the Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain the ex parte order passed by the Revenue Officer.</p><p>10. This contention is also without any merit. Section 158 of the Act specifically excludes the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts in matters within the jurisdiction of the Revenue Officers. In order to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector, a provision for filing of appeals before the higher Revenue Authorities has been made in Section 13 of the Act. The plaintiffs without exhausting the remedies available to them under Section 13, approached the Civil Court to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector.</p><p>11. Moreover, it has come on record that Smt. Kirpal Kaur, from whom the present appellants had purchased the land during the pendency of the partition proceedings, had withdrawn from the appeal before the lower appellate Court. As the present appellants had purchased the suit land during the pendency of the partition proceedings, they have, therefore, no locus standi to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector 1st Grade and pursue the appeal. It is not the case of the plaintiff-appellants that the ex parte decree was obtained by the defendant-respondents by fraud or misrepresentation. In A.C. Ananthaswamy and Ors. v. Boraiah (D) by Lrs. (2004-3)138 Punjab Law Reporter 557, it has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that in the absence of any fraud or misrepresentation, an ex parte order on the bare plea of non-service cannot be set aside. In the present case it is an undisputed fact that registered notice (Ex.DIO) was issued to Smt. Kirpal Kaur and she had even filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order passed by the Assistant Collector. The ratio of the authority Firm Seth Radha Kishun (deceased) represented by Hari Kishan and Ors. v. Administrator Municipal Committee, Ludhiana : [1964]2SCR273 , that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not specifically ousted where a statute created a liability and provided a remedy, is not applicable to the facts appearing in the present case. In the present case, as already mentioned above, registered A.D. notice was issued to and served on Smt. Kirpal Kaur, who had thereafter, filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order.</p><p>12. Both the courts below have given concurrent findings of fact which cannot be interfered with in the second appeal in view of the provisions of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as no substantial question of law has either been pleaded in the memorandum of appeal or arises for consideration in the present appeal. I do not find any infirmity in the well-reasoned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below.</p><p>13. Consequently, there is no merit in this appeal. It is, accordingly, dismissed. However, I do no make any order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Ashutosh Mohunta, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The vendee-plaintiffs have filed this appeal to challenge the judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below whereby their suit and the appeal against the partition of the land ordered by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Guhla, vide order dated 16.7.1975, were dismissed.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. In brief the facts giving rise to this appeal are that defendant-respondent Nos. 1 to 5 filed an application for partition of the suit land against Smt.Kirpal Kaur (Plaintiff No. 1) and defendant Nos. 6 to 15 in the court of Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Guhla. In that application Smt. Kirpal Kaur was proceeded against ex parte. The partition was confirmed on 16.6.1975 and the case was fixed for instrument of partition for 16.7.1975. Rai Jasbir Singh, plaintiff No. 2 purchased land measuring 80 Kanals from Smt. Kirpal Kaur (plaintiff No. 1) vide sale deed dated 27.5.1975 during the pendency of the partition proceedings and plaintiff No. 2 and 3, i.e., Rai Jasbir Singh and Swaran Singh were in actual physical possession of 228 Kanals 8 Marias and 77 Kanals 8 Marias, respectively. The plaintiffs challenged the order dated 16.7.1975 passed by the Assistant Grade, 1st Class, Guhla, by filing the present suit for declaration, which was dismissed by the Sub Judge, 1st Class, Kaithal, vide judgment and decree dated 29.1.1980 on the ground that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The plaintiffs then filed appeal to challenge the judgment and decree dated 29.1.1980 passed by the trial Court. During the pendency of the appeal, Smt. Kirpal Kaur withdrew herself from being the appellant. Consequently, vide order dated 17.1.1980 the appeal qua Kirpal Kaur was ordered to be dismissed as withdrawn. The appeal qua the remaining two appellants, i.e., Rai Jasbir Singh and Swaran Singh (present appellants) was dismissed by the Additional District Judge, Kurukshetra, vide judgment and decree dated 4.12.1981 and the decision of the trial Court with regard to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was upheld. Now Rai Jasbir Singh arid Swaran Singh have filed the present appeal wherein challenge has been made to the findings of both the Courts below.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. It has been contended by Mr. R.S. Mittal, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the appellants, that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not duly served and, thus,the ex parte order dated 16.6.1975/16.7.1975 passed by the Assistant Collector,1st Grade, Guhla, was a nullity. It has further been argued by the learned counsel for the appellants that the Courts below erred in holding that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit against partition ordered by the Revenue Officer in view of the provisions of the <a>Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887</a> (for short 'the Act'), despite the fact that the order for partition of the suit land was passed ex parte without serving Smt.Kirpal Kaur according to the prescribed legal procedure.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. The contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellants have been controverted by Mr. M.L.Sarin, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the respondents. It has been contended by him that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to go into the validity of the partition proceedings. The appellants have approached the Civil Court without exhausting the remedy available to them under Section 13 of the Act. It has further been contended by him that Smt. Kirpal Kaur had duly been served in the partition proceedings by sending notice to her by registered post.The counsel has also contended that she had withdrawn her appeal before the lower appellate court and in this view of the matter, the present appellants, who had purchased the land from her during the pendency of the partition proceedings, had no locus standi to challenge the order of partition passed by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. 1 have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the evidence adduced on record.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. The only question that arises for consideration in the present appeal is to the following effect:-',
	(int) 7 => '<p>Whether or not the Civil Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the suit wherein the order of partition passed by a Revenue Officer has been challenged and Smt. Kirpal Kaur was properly served in the partition proceedings',
	(int) 8 => '<p>7. The first objection raised on behalf of the appellants is that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not served in the partition proceedings before the Assistant Collector 1st Grade, Guhla, as per the provisions contained in Section 20 of the Act.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>8. I do not find any merit in this contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants. It is not the case of the appellants that Smt.Kirpal Kaur was not served at all. The bald statement of the plaintiffs was rebutted by the statement on oath of defendant Balwant Singh and also by documentary evidence adduced on record which shows that a registered notice was issued to her and acknowledgement due (Ex.DIO) was received in the office of the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade. Sub-section (3) of Section 20 of the Act gives discretion to the Revenue Officer to serve the concerned person 'either in addition to, or in substitution for, any other mode of service, by forwarding the summons by post in a-letter addressed' to him and registered under Part II of the Indian Post Office Act, 1886. In this view of the matter, it cannot be said that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not served as per the procedure prescribed under the Act.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>9. The next contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants is that the Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain the ex parte order passed by the Revenue Officer.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>10. This contention is also without any merit. Section 158 of the Act specifically excludes the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts in matters within the jurisdiction of the Revenue Officers. In order to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector, a provision for filing of appeals before the higher Revenue Authorities has been made in Section 13 of the Act. The plaintiffs without exhausting the remedies available to them under Section 13, approached the Civil Court to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>11. Moreover, it has come on record that Smt. Kirpal Kaur, from whom the present appellants had purchased the land during the pendency of the partition proceedings, had withdrawn from the appeal before the lower appellate Court. As the present appellants had purchased the suit land during the pendency of the partition proceedings, they have, therefore, no locus standi to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector 1st Grade and pursue the appeal. It is not the case of the plaintiff-appellants that the ex parte decree was obtained by the defendant-respondents by fraud or misrepresentation. In A.C. Ananthaswamy and Ors. v. Boraiah (D) by Lrs. (2004-3)138 Punjab Law Reporter 557, it has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that in the absence of any fraud or misrepresentation, an ex parte order on the bare plea of non-service cannot be set aside. In the present case it is an undisputed fact that registered notice (Ex.DIO) was issued to Smt. Kirpal Kaur and she had even filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order passed by the Assistant Collector. The ratio of the authority Firm Seth Radha Kishun (deceased) represented by Hari Kishan and Ors. v. Administrator Municipal Committee, Ludhiana : [1964]2SCR273 , that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not specifically ousted where a statute created a liability and provided a remedy, is not applicable to the facts appearing in the present case. In the present case, as already mentioned above, registered A.D. notice was issued to and served on Smt. Kirpal Kaur, who had thereafter, filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>12. Both the courts below have given concurrent findings of fact which cannot be interfered with in the second appeal in view of the provisions of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as no substantial question of law has either been pleaded in the memorandum of appeal or arises for consideration in the present appeal. I do not find any infirmity in the well-reasoned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>13. Consequently, there is no merit in this appeal. It is, accordingly, dismissed. However, I do no make any order as to costs.<p>',
	(int) 15 => '<p>'
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5. 1 have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the evidence adduced on record.

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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '629369',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/136769/the-punjab-land-revenue-act-1887-complete-act">Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887</a> - Sections 13, 20, 20(3) and 158; Indian Post Office Act, 1886; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) - Sections 100',
			'appealno' => 'Regular Second Appeal No. 615 of 1982 (O and M)',
			'appellant' => 'Rai Jasbir Singh and anr.',
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			'casename' => 'Rai Jasbir Singh and anr. Vs. Balwant Singh and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' - HINDU LAW -- Custom: [Vijender Jain, C.J., M.M. Kumar, Jasbir Singh, Rajive Bhalla & Rajesh Bindal, JJ] Alienation of ancestral property - Punjab and Haryana -  Held, In respect of State of Punjab by virtue of Punjab Amendment Act, 1973 there is a complete bar to contest any alienation of ancestral or non-ancestral immovable property or appointment of an heir to such property on ground that such alienation or appointment was contrary to custom. In Punjab the property in hands of a successor has to be treated as coparcenary property and its alienation has to be governed by Hindu Law except to the extent it is regulated by Sections 6 and 30 of the Hindu Succession Act. In Haryana, property  in hands of successor has to be treated as coparcenary property as well as ancestral property. Parties can fall back upon Hindu Law in case they fail to establish that rule of decision is custom. Therefore, in Haryana both under Hindu law and the Customary Law, the alienation would be open to challenge. Custom was given precedent over uncodified Hindu Law presumably for reason that custom has been consistently replacing the Hindu Law. However, it was soon realized that ancestral immovable property, which ordinarily held to be inalienable amongst Jats of Punjab by virtue of custom except for necessity, no limitation was placed on degrees of collateral, eligible to contest such alienation. It was, therefore, felt necessary to engraft certain restriction on degrees of collateral, eligible to contest an alienation, which under the custom itself was not limited. Accordingly, the Punjab Custom (Power to Contest) Act, 1920 (Act No.2 of 1920) was enacted. The Hindu Succession Act was extended to the State of Punjab.  Act 2 of Punjab Act defined expression alienation to include any testamentary disposition of property and appointment of an heir was to include any adoption made or purporting to be made according to custom. A further provision was made by Section 3 that Hindu Succession Act was to apply only in respect of alienation of immovable property or appointment of heirs made by persons who in regard to such alienation or appointment were governed by custom. Whereas  Section 4 declared that Hindu Succession Act was not to affect any right to contest any alienation or appointment of an heir made before the date on which the Succession Act was to come into force. In other words, Act, No.2 of 1920 was not to affect alienation or appointments of heir made before date on which it came into force. It also preserved the rights of any alienation or appointment of an heir made by a family. After Section 7 was inserted in Act of 1920 by the Punjab Amendment Act of 1973 right of contest being contrary to custom had been totally effaced and taken away. Therefore, no person has any right to contest any alienation of immovable property whether ancestral or non-ancestral on ground of being contrary to custom after January 23, 1973. In Haryana, the situation as enunciated by Act No.2 of 1920 continued to prevail in respect of alienation because no reforms parallel to Punjab as brought by Amendment Act of 1973, had been enacted although right to pre-emption has been substantially abolished in Haryana also. No steps even have been taken in that regard. Therefore, situation in Haryana have to be regarded as it existed under Act No. 2 of 1920.
HINDU SUCCESSION ACT,1956[C.A.No.30/1956] --  Sections 6 & 30: [Vijender Jain, C.J., M.M.Kumar, Jasbir Singh, Rajive Bhalla & Rajesh Bindal, JJ]  Alienation of coparcenary property - Law laid down by Full Bench in Joginder Singh Kundha Singh v Kehar Singh Dasaundha Singh [AIR 1965 Punjab 407] and Pritam Singh v Assistant Controller of Estate Duty, Patiala [1976 Punj LR 342] -Whether there is any conflict? - Held, The basic controversy in the Full Bench decision of Joginder Singhs case was regarding constitutional validity of Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act and as to whether it infringes Article 14 of Constitution. It was held that the estate held by male and limitation on his power of alienation were in no way removed and the reversioners were not debarred from challenging such alienations. The Full Bench held that Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act postulates that estate held by a Hindu female before enforcement of Succession Act either by inheritance or otherwise, was enlarged and on date of enforcement of Succession Act, she became a full owner. Likewise, if she has inherited any estate after the commencement of the Act,  she was to be regarded as absolute owner rather than a limited owner. Consequently, the limitations on power of alienation automatically vanished. This was the necessary result of the provisions made in Section 14 of the Act. The Full Bench further held that in respect of male proprietors, no corresponding provision was made either enlarging their estate in ancestral property or enlarging their power of alienation over property inherited by them. However, it noticed Section 30 and observed that it only deals with power of his share in coparcenary property by Will, which prior to enforcement of the Act, he had no right to do. The only provision made in respect of male proprietor regarding alienation of property was his power of alienation by Will. In so far as persons governed by custom are concerned, they continued to be governed by the restriction on the power of alienation of a male holder as existed before enforcement of the Act. Likewise, other restriction on alienation other than disposal by Will also continued. The Full Bench, thus, recognized the superior right of Hindu females by virtue of Section 14 and upheld the provision as intra vires. The argument that reversioners have ceased to exist after enactment of provisions of Section 14 of Succession Act, was rejected as there was no provision pointed out to that effect. The proposition laid down by the full Bench in Pritam Singhs case was that the Hindu Succession Act has not abolished joint Hindu family with respect to rights of those who were members of Mitakshara coparcenary, except in the manner and to the extent mentioned in Sections 6 and 30 of the Act, This Statement should also imply, though it does not say so expressly, the Succession Act to this extent does not affect the rights of the members governed by Dayabhaga coparcenary. The Full Bench in Pritam Singh;s case expressly noticed the judgment of earlier Full Bench in Joginder Singhs case but construed the same as irrelevant by observing that it dealt with the power of alienation of a person governed by Customary law and constitutional validity of Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act. Thus there is no real conflict between the two Full Bench judgments. Both the Full Bench judgments have been delivered on the assumption that Joginder Singhs case dealt with question of alienation whereas Pritam Singhs case had decided the question concerning succession. Even on fact in Joginder Singhs case the issue was validity of alienation by consent decree by a father to his two sons, which was challenged by third son, whereas in Pritam Singhs case the question of nature of property in hands of sons on death of their father had arisen  for purposes of assessment of estate duty. In Pritam  Singhs case the property in the hands of the sons was held to be coparcenary property and only 1/3rd of  property belonging to deceased father was considered eligible for estate duty. Therefore, there was no question of alienation in Pritam Singhs case. -  I do not find any infirmity in the well-reasoned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Hari Kishan and Ors. v. Administrator Municipal Committee;',
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			'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal, Sr. Adv. and; Sudhir Mittal, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' M.L Sarin, Sr. Adv.,; Ashish Handa,; H.N. Mehtani an',
			'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2005-05-25',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' Ashutosh Mohunta, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Ashutosh Mohunta, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The vendee-plaintiffs have filed this appeal to challenge the judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below whereby their suit and the appeal against the partition of the land ordered by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Guhla, vide order dated 16.7.1975, were dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. In brief the facts giving rise to this appeal are that defendant-respondent Nos. 1 to 5 filed an application for partition of the suit land against Smt.Kirpal Kaur (Plaintiff No. 1) and defendant Nos. 6 to 15 in the court of Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Guhla. In that application Smt. Kirpal Kaur was proceeded against ex parte. The partition was confirmed on 16.6.1975 and the case was fixed for instrument of partition for 16.7.1975. Rai Jasbir Singh, plaintiff No. 2 purchased land measuring 80 Kanals from Smt. Kirpal Kaur (plaintiff No. 1) vide sale deed dated 27.5.1975 during the pendency of the partition proceedings and plaintiff No. 2 and 3, i.e., Rai Jasbir Singh and Swaran Singh were in actual physical possession of 228 Kanals 8 Marias and 77 Kanals 8 Marias, respectively. The plaintiffs challenged the order dated 16.7.1975 passed by the Assistant Grade, 1st Class, Guhla, by filing the present suit for declaration, which was dismissed by the Sub Judge, 1st Class, Kaithal, vide judgment and decree dated 29.1.1980 on the ground that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The plaintiffs then filed appeal to challenge the judgment and decree dated 29.1.1980 passed by the trial Court. During the pendency of the appeal, Smt. Kirpal Kaur withdrew herself from being the appellant. Consequently, vide order dated 17.1.1980 the appeal qua Kirpal Kaur was ordered to be dismissed as withdrawn. The appeal qua the remaining two appellants, i.e., Rai Jasbir Singh and Swaran Singh (present appellants) was dismissed by the Additional District Judge, Kurukshetra, vide judgment and decree dated 4.12.1981 and the decision of the trial Court with regard to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was upheld. Now Rai Jasbir Singh arid Swaran Singh have filed the present appeal wherein challenge has been made to the findings of both the Courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. It has been contended by Mr. R.S. Mittal, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the appellants, that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not duly served and, thus,the ex parte order dated 16.6.1975/16.7.1975 passed by the Assistant Collector,1st Grade, Guhla, was a nullity. It has further been argued by the learned counsel for the appellants that the Courts below erred in holding that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit against partition ordered by the Revenue Officer in view of the provisions of the <a href="/act/136769/the-punjab-land-revenue-act-1887-complete-act">Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887</a> (for short 'the Act'), despite the fact that the order for partition of the suit land was passed ex parte without serving Smt.Kirpal Kaur according to the prescribed legal procedure.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellants have been controverted by Mr. M.L.Sarin, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the respondents. It has been contended by him that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to go into the validity of the partition proceedings. The appellants have approached the Civil Court without exhausting the remedy available to them under Section 13 of the Act. It has further been contended by him that Smt. Kirpal Kaur had duly been served in the partition proceedings by sending notice to her by registered post.The counsel has also contended that she had withdrawn her appeal before the lower appellate court and in this view of the matter, the present appellants, who had purchased the land from her during the pendency of the partition proceedings, had no locus standi to challenge the order of partition passed by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. 1 have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the evidence adduced on record.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The only question that arises for consideration in the present appeal is to the following effect:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether or not the Civil Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the suit wherein the order of partition passed by a Revenue Officer has been challenged and Smt. Kirpal Kaur was properly served in the partition proceedings</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The first objection raised on behalf of the appellants is that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not served in the partition proceedings before the Assistant Collector 1st Grade, Guhla, as per the provisions contained in Section 20 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. I do not find any merit in this contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants. It is not the case of the appellants that Smt.Kirpal Kaur was not served at all. The bald statement of the plaintiffs was rebutted by the statement on oath of defendant Balwant Singh and also by documentary evidence adduced on record which shows that a registered notice was issued to her and acknowledgement due (Ex.DIO) was received in the office of the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade. Sub-section (3) of Section 20 of the Act gives discretion to the Revenue Officer to serve the concerned person 'either in addition to, or in substitution for, any other mode of service, by forwarding the summons by post in a-letter addressed' to him and registered under Part II of the Indian Post Office Act, 1886. In this view of the matter, it cannot be said that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not served as per the procedure prescribed under the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The next contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants is that the Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain the ex parte order passed by the Revenue Officer.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. This contention is also without any merit. Section 158 of the Act specifically excludes the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts in matters within the jurisdiction of the Revenue Officers. In order to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector, a provision for filing of appeals before the higher Revenue Authorities has been made in Section 13 of the Act. The plaintiffs without exhausting the remedies available to them under Section 13, approached the Civil Court to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Moreover, it has come on record that Smt. Kirpal Kaur, from whom the present appellants had purchased the land during the pendency of the partition proceedings, had withdrawn from the appeal before the lower appellate Court. As the present appellants had purchased the suit land during the pendency of the partition proceedings, they have, therefore, no locus standi to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector 1st Grade and pursue the appeal. It is not the case of the plaintiff-appellants that the ex parte decree was obtained by the defendant-respondents by fraud or misrepresentation. In A.C. Ananthaswamy and Ors. v. Boraiah (D) by Lrs. (2004-3)138 Punjab Law Reporter 557, it has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that in the absence of any fraud or misrepresentation, an ex parte order on the bare plea of non-service cannot be set aside. In the present case it is an undisputed fact that registered notice (Ex.DIO) was issued to Smt. Kirpal Kaur and she had even filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order passed by the Assistant Collector. The ratio of the authority Firm Seth Radha Kishun (deceased) represented by Hari Kishan and Ors. v. Administrator Municipal Committee, Ludhiana : [1964]2SCR273 , that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not specifically ousted where a statute created a liability and provided a remedy, is not applicable to the facts appearing in the present case. In the present case, as already mentioned above, registered A.D. notice was issued to and served on Smt. Kirpal Kaur, who had thereafter, filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Both the courts below have given concurrent findings of fact which cannot be interfered with in the second appeal in view of the provisions of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as no substantial question of law has either been pleaded in the memorandum of appeal or arises for consideration in the present appeal. I do not find any infirmity in the well-reasoned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Consequently, there is no merit in this appeal. It is, accordingly, dismissed. However, I do no make any order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'casename' => 'Rai Jasbir Singh and anr. Vs. Balwant Singh and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' - HINDU LAW -- Custom: [Vijender Jain, C.J., M.M. Kumar, Jasbir Singh, Rajive Bhalla & Rajesh Bindal, JJ] Alienation of ancestral property - Punjab and Haryana -  Held, In respect of State of Punjab by virtue of Punjab Amendment Act, 1973 there is a complete bar to contest any alienation of ancestral or non-ancestral immovable property or appointment of an heir to such property on ground that such alienation or appointment was contrary to custom. In Punjab the property in hands of a successor has to be treated as coparcenary property and its alienation has to be governed by Hindu Law except to the extent it is regulated by Sections 6 and 30 of the Hindu Succession Act. In Haryana, property  in hands of successor has to be treated as coparcenary property as well as ancestral property. Parties can fall back upon Hindu Law in case they fail to establish that rule of decision is custom. Therefore, in Haryana both under Hindu law and the Customary Law, the alienation would be open to challenge. Custom was given precedent over uncodified Hindu Law presumably for reason that custom has been consistently replacing the Hindu Law. However, it was soon realized that ancestral immovable property, which ordinarily held to be inalienable amongst Jats of Punjab by virtue of custom except for necessity, no limitation was placed on degrees of collateral, eligible to contest such alienation. It was, therefore, felt necessary to engraft certain restriction on degrees of collateral, eligible to contest an alienation, which under the custom itself was not limited. Accordingly, the Punjab Custom (Power to Contest) Act, 1920 (Act No.2 of 1920) was enacted. The Hindu Succession Act was extended to the State of Punjab.  Act 2 of Punjab Act defined expression alienation to include any testamentary disposition of property and appointment of an heir was to include any adoption made or purporting to be made according to custom. A further provision was made by Section 3 that Hindu Succession Act was to apply only in respect of alienation of immovable property or appointment of heirs made by persons who in regard to such alienation or appointment were governed by custom. Whereas  Section 4 declared that Hindu Succession Act was not to affect any right to contest any alienation or appointment of an heir made before the date on which the Succession Act was to come into force. In other words, Act, No.2 of 1920 was not to affect alienation or appointments of heir made before date on which it came into force. It also preserved the rights of any alienation or appointment of an heir made by a family. After Section 7 was inserted in Act of 1920 by the Punjab Amendment Act of 1973 right of contest being contrary to custom had been totally effaced and taken away. Therefore, no person has any right to contest any alienation of immovable property whether ancestral or non-ancestral on ground of being contrary to custom after January 23, 1973. In Haryana, the situation as enunciated by Act No.2 of 1920 continued to prevail in respect of alienation because no reforms parallel to Punjab as brought by Amendment Act of 1973, had been enacted although right to pre-emption has been substantially abolished in Haryana also. No steps even have been taken in that regard. Therefore, situation in Haryana have to be regarded as it existed under Act No. 2 of 1920.
HINDU SUCCESSION ACT,1956[C.A.No.30/1956] --  Sections 6 & 30: [Vijender Jain, C.J., M.M.Kumar, Jasbir Singh, Rajive Bhalla & Rajesh Bindal, JJ]  Alienation of coparcenary property - Law laid down by Full Bench in Joginder Singh Kundha Singh v Kehar Singh Dasaundha Singh [AIR 1965 Punjab 407] and Pritam Singh v Assistant Controller of Estate Duty, Patiala [1976 Punj LR 342] -Whether there is any conflict? - Held, The basic controversy in the Full Bench decision of Joginder Singhs case was regarding constitutional validity of Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act and as to whether it infringes Article 14 of Constitution. It was held that the estate held by male and limitation on his power of alienation were in no way removed and the reversioners were not debarred from challenging such alienations. The Full Bench held that Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act postulates that estate held by a Hindu female before enforcement of Succession Act either by inheritance or otherwise, was enlarged and on date of enforcement of Succession Act, she became a full owner. Likewise, if she has inherited any estate after the commencement of the Act,  she was to be regarded as absolute owner rather than a limited owner. Consequently, the limitations on power of alienation automatically vanished. This was the necessary result of the provisions made in Section 14 of the Act. The Full Bench further held that in respect of male proprietors, no corresponding provision was made either enlarging their estate in ancestral property or enlarging their power of alienation over property inherited by them. However, it noticed Section 30 and observed that it only deals with power of his share in coparcenary property by Will, which prior to enforcement of the Act, he had no right to do. The only provision made in respect of male proprietor regarding alienation of property was his power of alienation by Will. In so far as persons governed by custom are concerned, they continued to be governed by the restriction on the power of alienation of a male holder as existed before enforcement of the Act. Likewise, other restriction on alienation other than disposal by Will also continued. The Full Bench, thus, recognized the superior right of Hindu females by virtue of Section 14 and upheld the provision as intra vires. The argument that reversioners have ceased to exist after enactment of provisions of Section 14 of Succession Act, was rejected as there was no provision pointed out to that effect. The proposition laid down by the full Bench in Pritam Singhs case was that the Hindu Succession Act has not abolished joint Hindu family with respect to rights of those who were members of Mitakshara coparcenary, except in the manner and to the extent mentioned in Sections 6 and 30 of the Act, This Statement should also imply, though it does not say so expressly, the Succession Act to this extent does not affect the rights of the members governed by Dayabhaga coparcenary. The Full Bench in Pritam Singh;s case expressly noticed the judgment of earlier Full Bench in Joginder Singhs case but construed the same as irrelevant by observing that it dealt with the power of alienation of a person governed by Customary law and constitutional validity of Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act. Thus there is no real conflict between the two Full Bench judgments. Both the Full Bench judgments have been delivered on the assumption that Joginder Singhs case dealt with question of alienation whereas Pritam Singhs case had decided the question concerning succession. Even on fact in Joginder Singhs case the issue was validity of alienation by consent decree by a father to his two sons, which was challenged by third son, whereas in Pritam Singhs case the question of nature of property in hands of sons on death of their father had arisen  for purposes of assessment of estate duty. In Pritam  Singhs case the property in the hands of the sons was held to be coparcenary property and only 1/3rd of  property belonging to deceased father was considered eligible for estate duty. Therefore, there was no question of alienation in Pritam Singhs case. -  I do not find any infirmity in the well-reasoned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Hari Kishan and Ors. v. Administrator Municipal Committee;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal, Sr. Adv. and; Sudhir Mittal, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' M.L Sarin, Sr. Adv.,; Ashish Handa,; H.N. Mehtani an',
		'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2005-05-25',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Ashutosh Mohunta, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Ashutosh Mohunta, J.</p><p>1. The vendee-plaintiffs have filed this appeal to challenge the judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below whereby their suit and the appeal against the partition of the land ordered by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Guhla, vide order dated 16.7.1975, were dismissed.</p><p>2. In brief the facts giving rise to this appeal are that defendant-respondent Nos. 1 to 5 filed an application for partition of the suit land against Smt.Kirpal Kaur (Plaintiff No. 1) and defendant Nos. 6 to 15 in the court of Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Guhla. In that application Smt. Kirpal Kaur was proceeded against ex parte. The partition was confirmed on 16.6.1975 and the case was fixed for instrument of partition for 16.7.1975. Rai Jasbir Singh, plaintiff No. 2 purchased land measuring 80 Kanals from Smt. Kirpal Kaur (plaintiff No. 1) vide sale deed dated 27.5.1975 during the pendency of the partition proceedings and plaintiff No. 2 and 3, i.e., Rai Jasbir Singh and Swaran Singh were in actual physical possession of 228 Kanals 8 Marias and 77 Kanals 8 Marias, respectively. The plaintiffs challenged the order dated 16.7.1975 passed by the Assistant Grade, 1st Class, Guhla, by filing the present suit for declaration, which was dismissed by the Sub Judge, 1st Class, Kaithal, vide judgment and decree dated 29.1.1980 on the ground that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The plaintiffs then filed appeal to challenge the judgment and decree dated 29.1.1980 passed by the trial Court. During the pendency of the appeal, Smt. Kirpal Kaur withdrew herself from being the appellant. Consequently, vide order dated 17.1.1980 the appeal qua Kirpal Kaur was ordered to be dismissed as withdrawn. The appeal qua the remaining two appellants, i.e., Rai Jasbir Singh and Swaran Singh (present appellants) was dismissed by the Additional District Judge, Kurukshetra, vide judgment and decree dated 4.12.1981 and the decision of the trial Court with regard to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was upheld. Now Rai Jasbir Singh arid Swaran Singh have filed the present appeal wherein challenge has been made to the findings of both the Courts below.</p><p>3. It has been contended by Mr. R.S. Mittal, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the appellants, that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not duly served and, thus,the ex parte order dated 16.6.1975/16.7.1975 passed by the Assistant Collector,1st Grade, Guhla, was a nullity. It has further been argued by the learned counsel for the appellants that the Courts below erred in holding that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit against partition ordered by the Revenue Officer in view of the provisions of the <a>Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887</a> (for short 'the Act'), despite the fact that the order for partition of the suit land was passed ex parte without serving Smt.Kirpal Kaur according to the prescribed legal procedure.</p><p>4. The contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellants have been controverted by Mr. M.L.Sarin, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the respondents. It has been contended by him that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to go into the validity of the partition proceedings. The appellants have approached the Civil Court without exhausting the remedy available to them under Section 13 of the Act. It has further been contended by him that Smt. Kirpal Kaur had duly been served in the partition proceedings by sending notice to her by registered post.The counsel has also contended that she had withdrawn her appeal before the lower appellate court and in this view of the matter, the present appellants, who had purchased the land from her during the pendency of the partition proceedings, had no locus standi to challenge the order of partition passed by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade.</p><p>5. 1 have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the evidence adduced on record.</p><p>6. The only question that arises for consideration in the present appeal is to the following effect:-</p><p>Whether or not the Civil Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the suit wherein the order of partition passed by a Revenue Officer has been challenged and Smt. Kirpal Kaur was properly served in the partition proceedings</p><p>7. The first objection raised on behalf of the appellants is that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not served in the partition proceedings before the Assistant Collector 1st Grade, Guhla, as per the provisions contained in Section 20 of the Act.</p><p>8. I do not find any merit in this contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants. It is not the case of the appellants that Smt.Kirpal Kaur was not served at all. The bald statement of the plaintiffs was rebutted by the statement on oath of defendant Balwant Singh and also by documentary evidence adduced on record which shows that a registered notice was issued to her and acknowledgement due (Ex.DIO) was received in the office of the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade. Sub-section (3) of Section 20 of the Act gives discretion to the Revenue Officer to serve the concerned person 'either in addition to, or in substitution for, any other mode of service, by forwarding the summons by post in a-letter addressed' to him and registered under Part II of the Indian Post Office Act, 1886. In this view of the matter, it cannot be said that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not served as per the procedure prescribed under the Act.</p><p>9. The next contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants is that the Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain the ex parte order passed by the Revenue Officer.</p><p>10. This contention is also without any merit. Section 158 of the Act specifically excludes the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts in matters within the jurisdiction of the Revenue Officers. In order to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector, a provision for filing of appeals before the higher Revenue Authorities has been made in Section 13 of the Act. The plaintiffs without exhausting the remedies available to them under Section 13, approached the Civil Court to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector.</p><p>11. Moreover, it has come on record that Smt. Kirpal Kaur, from whom the present appellants had purchased the land during the pendency of the partition proceedings, had withdrawn from the appeal before the lower appellate Court. As the present appellants had purchased the suit land during the pendency of the partition proceedings, they have, therefore, no locus standi to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector 1st Grade and pursue the appeal. It is not the case of the plaintiff-appellants that the ex parte decree was obtained by the defendant-respondents by fraud or misrepresentation. In A.C. Ananthaswamy and Ors. v. Boraiah (D) by Lrs. (2004-3)138 Punjab Law Reporter 557, it has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that in the absence of any fraud or misrepresentation, an ex parte order on the bare plea of non-service cannot be set aside. In the present case it is an undisputed fact that registered notice (Ex.DIO) was issued to Smt. Kirpal Kaur and she had even filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order passed by the Assistant Collector. The ratio of the authority Firm Seth Radha Kishun (deceased) represented by Hari Kishan and Ors. v. Administrator Municipal Committee, Ludhiana : [1964]2SCR273 , that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not specifically ousted where a statute created a liability and provided a remedy, is not applicable to the facts appearing in the present case. In the present case, as already mentioned above, registered A.D. notice was issued to and served on Smt. Kirpal Kaur, who had thereafter, filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order.</p><p>12. Both the courts below have given concurrent findings of fact which cannot be interfered with in the second appeal in view of the provisions of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as no substantial question of law has either been pleaded in the memorandum of appeal or arises for consideration in the present appeal. I do not find any infirmity in the well-reasoned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below.</p><p>13. Consequently, there is no merit in this appeal. It is, accordingly, dismissed. However, I do no make any order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
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		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '(2006)142PLR339',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Balwant Singh and ors.',
		'sub' => 'Property',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Ashutosh Mohunta, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The vendee-plaintiffs have filed this appeal to challenge the judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below whereby their suit and the appeal against the partition of the land ordered by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Guhla, vide order dated 16.7.1975, were dismissed.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. In brief the facts giving rise to this appeal are that defendant-respondent Nos. 1 to 5 filed an application for partition of the suit land against Smt.Kirpal Kaur (Plaintiff No. 1) and defendant Nos. 6 to 15 in the court of Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Guhla. In that application Smt. Kirpal Kaur was proceeded against ex parte. The partition was confirmed on 16.6.1975 and the case was fixed for instrument of partition for 16.7.1975. Rai Jasbir Singh, plaintiff No. 2 purchased land measuring 80 Kanals from Smt. Kirpal Kaur (plaintiff No. 1) vide sale deed dated 27.5.1975 during the pendency of the partition proceedings and plaintiff No. 2 and 3, i.e., Rai Jasbir Singh and Swaran Singh were in actual physical possession of 228 Kanals 8 Marias and 77 Kanals 8 Marias, respectively. The plaintiffs challenged the order dated 16.7.1975 passed by the Assistant Grade, 1st Class, Guhla, by filing the present suit for declaration, which was dismissed by the Sub Judge, 1st Class, Kaithal, vide judgment and decree dated 29.1.1980 on the ground that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The plaintiffs then filed appeal to challenge the judgment and decree dated 29.1.1980 passed by the trial Court. During the pendency of the appeal, Smt. Kirpal Kaur withdrew herself from being the appellant. Consequently, vide order dated 17.1.1980 the appeal qua Kirpal Kaur was ordered to be dismissed as withdrawn. The appeal qua the remaining two appellants, i.e., Rai Jasbir Singh and Swaran Singh (present appellants) was dismissed by the Additional District Judge, Kurukshetra, vide judgment and decree dated 4.12.1981 and the decision of the trial Court with regard to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was upheld. Now Rai Jasbir Singh arid Swaran Singh have filed the present appeal wherein challenge has been made to the findings of both the Courts below.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. It has been contended by Mr. R.S. Mittal, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the appellants, that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not duly served and, thus,the ex parte order dated 16.6.1975/16.7.1975 passed by the Assistant Collector,1st Grade, Guhla, was a nullity. It has further been argued by the learned counsel for the appellants that the Courts below erred in holding that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit against partition ordered by the Revenue Officer in view of the provisions of the <a>Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887</a> (for short 'the Act'), despite the fact that the order for partition of the suit land was passed ex parte without serving Smt.Kirpal Kaur according to the prescribed legal procedure.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. The contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellants have been controverted by Mr. M.L.Sarin, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the respondents. It has been contended by him that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to go into the validity of the partition proceedings. The appellants have approached the Civil Court without exhausting the remedy available to them under Section 13 of the Act. It has further been contended by him that Smt. Kirpal Kaur had duly been served in the partition proceedings by sending notice to her by registered post.The counsel has also contended that she had withdrawn her appeal before the lower appellate court and in this view of the matter, the present appellants, who had purchased the land from her during the pendency of the partition proceedings, had no locus standi to challenge the order of partition passed by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. 1 have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the evidence adduced on record.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. The only question that arises for consideration in the present appeal is to the following effect:-',
	(int) 7 => '<p>Whether or not the Civil Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the suit wherein the order of partition passed by a Revenue Officer has been challenged and Smt. Kirpal Kaur was properly served in the partition proceedings',
	(int) 8 => '<p>7. The first objection raised on behalf of the appellants is that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not served in the partition proceedings before the Assistant Collector 1st Grade, Guhla, as per the provisions contained in Section 20 of the Act.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>8. I do not find any merit in this contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants. It is not the case of the appellants that Smt.Kirpal Kaur was not served at all. The bald statement of the plaintiffs was rebutted by the statement on oath of defendant Balwant Singh and also by documentary evidence adduced on record which shows that a registered notice was issued to her and acknowledgement due (Ex.DIO) was received in the office of the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade. Sub-section (3) of Section 20 of the Act gives discretion to the Revenue Officer to serve the concerned person 'either in addition to, or in substitution for, any other mode of service, by forwarding the summons by post in a-letter addressed' to him and registered under Part II of the Indian Post Office Act, 1886. In this view of the matter, it cannot be said that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not served as per the procedure prescribed under the Act.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>9. The next contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants is that the Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain the ex parte order passed by the Revenue Officer.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>10. This contention is also without any merit. Section 158 of the Act specifically excludes the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts in matters within the jurisdiction of the Revenue Officers. In order to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector, a provision for filing of appeals before the higher Revenue Authorities has been made in Section 13 of the Act. The plaintiffs without exhausting the remedies available to them under Section 13, approached the Civil Court to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>11. Moreover, it has come on record that Smt. Kirpal Kaur, from whom the present appellants had purchased the land during the pendency of the partition proceedings, had withdrawn from the appeal before the lower appellate Court. As the present appellants had purchased the suit land during the pendency of the partition proceedings, they have, therefore, no locus standi to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector 1st Grade and pursue the appeal. It is not the case of the plaintiff-appellants that the ex parte decree was obtained by the defendant-respondents by fraud or misrepresentation. In A.C. Ananthaswamy and Ors. v. Boraiah (D) by Lrs. (2004-3)138 Punjab Law Reporter 557, it has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that in the absence of any fraud or misrepresentation, an ex parte order on the bare plea of non-service cannot be set aside. In the present case it is an undisputed fact that registered notice (Ex.DIO) was issued to Smt. Kirpal Kaur and she had even filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order passed by the Assistant Collector. The ratio of the authority Firm Seth Radha Kishun (deceased) represented by Hari Kishan and Ors. v. Administrator Municipal Committee, Ludhiana : [1964]2SCR273 , that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not specifically ousted where a statute created a liability and provided a remedy, is not applicable to the facts appearing in the present case. In the present case, as already mentioned above, registered A.D. notice was issued to and served on Smt. Kirpal Kaur, who had thereafter, filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>12. Both the courts below have given concurrent findings of fact which cannot be interfered with in the second appeal in view of the provisions of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as no substantial question of law has either been pleaded in the memorandum of appeal or arises for consideration in the present appeal. I do not find any infirmity in the well-reasoned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>13. Consequently, there is no merit in this appeal. It is, accordingly, dismissed. However, I do no make any order as to costs.<p>',
	(int) 15 => '<p>'
)
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6. The only question that arises for consideration in the present appeal is to the following effect:-

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Rai Jasbir Singh and anr Vs Balwant Singh and ors - Citation 629369 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '629369',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/136769/the-punjab-land-revenue-act-1887-complete-act">Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887</a> - Sections 13, 20, 20(3) and 158; Indian Post Office Act, 1886; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) - Sections 100',
			'appealno' => 'Regular Second Appeal No. 615 of 1982 (O and M)',
			'appellant' => 'Rai Jasbir Singh and anr.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Rai Jasbir Singh and anr. Vs. Balwant Singh and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' - HINDU LAW -- Custom: [Vijender Jain, C.J., M.M. Kumar, Jasbir Singh, Rajive Bhalla & Rajesh Bindal, JJ] Alienation of ancestral property - Punjab and Haryana -  Held, In respect of State of Punjab by virtue of Punjab Amendment Act, 1973 there is a complete bar to contest any alienation of ancestral or non-ancestral immovable property or appointment of an heir to such property on ground that such alienation or appointment was contrary to custom. In Punjab the property in hands of a successor has to be treated as coparcenary property and its alienation has to be governed by Hindu Law except to the extent it is regulated by Sections 6 and 30 of the Hindu Succession Act. In Haryana, property  in hands of successor has to be treated as coparcenary property as well as ancestral property. Parties can fall back upon Hindu Law in case they fail to establish that rule of decision is custom. Therefore, in Haryana both under Hindu law and the Customary Law, the alienation would be open to challenge. Custom was given precedent over uncodified Hindu Law presumably for reason that custom has been consistently replacing the Hindu Law. However, it was soon realized that ancestral immovable property, which ordinarily held to be inalienable amongst Jats of Punjab by virtue of custom except for necessity, no limitation was placed on degrees of collateral, eligible to contest such alienation. It was, therefore, felt necessary to engraft certain restriction on degrees of collateral, eligible to contest an alienation, which under the custom itself was not limited. Accordingly, the Punjab Custom (Power to Contest) Act, 1920 (Act No.2 of 1920) was enacted. The Hindu Succession Act was extended to the State of Punjab.  Act 2 of Punjab Act defined expression alienation to include any testamentary disposition of property and appointment of an heir was to include any adoption made or purporting to be made according to custom. A further provision was made by Section 3 that Hindu Succession Act was to apply only in respect of alienation of immovable property or appointment of heirs made by persons who in regard to such alienation or appointment were governed by custom. Whereas  Section 4 declared that Hindu Succession Act was not to affect any right to contest any alienation or appointment of an heir made before the date on which the Succession Act was to come into force. In other words, Act, No.2 of 1920 was not to affect alienation or appointments of heir made before date on which it came into force. It also preserved the rights of any alienation or appointment of an heir made by a family. After Section 7 was inserted in Act of 1920 by the Punjab Amendment Act of 1973 right of contest being contrary to custom had been totally effaced and taken away. Therefore, no person has any right to contest any alienation of immovable property whether ancestral or non-ancestral on ground of being contrary to custom after January 23, 1973. In Haryana, the situation as enunciated by Act No.2 of 1920 continued to prevail in respect of alienation because no reforms parallel to Punjab as brought by Amendment Act of 1973, had been enacted although right to pre-emption has been substantially abolished in Haryana also. No steps even have been taken in that regard. Therefore, situation in Haryana have to be regarded as it existed under Act No. 2 of 1920.
HINDU SUCCESSION ACT,1956[C.A.No.30/1956] --  Sections 6 & 30: [Vijender Jain, C.J., M.M.Kumar, Jasbir Singh, Rajive Bhalla & Rajesh Bindal, JJ]  Alienation of coparcenary property - Law laid down by Full Bench in Joginder Singh Kundha Singh v Kehar Singh Dasaundha Singh [AIR 1965 Punjab 407] and Pritam Singh v Assistant Controller of Estate Duty, Patiala [1976 Punj LR 342] -Whether there is any conflict? - Held, The basic controversy in the Full Bench decision of Joginder Singhs case was regarding constitutional validity of Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act and as to whether it infringes Article 14 of Constitution. It was held that the estate held by male and limitation on his power of alienation were in no way removed and the reversioners were not debarred from challenging such alienations. The Full Bench held that Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act postulates that estate held by a Hindu female before enforcement of Succession Act either by inheritance or otherwise, was enlarged and on date of enforcement of Succession Act, she became a full owner. Likewise, if she has inherited any estate after the commencement of the Act,  she was to be regarded as absolute owner rather than a limited owner. Consequently, the limitations on power of alienation automatically vanished. This was the necessary result of the provisions made in Section 14 of the Act. The Full Bench further held that in respect of male proprietors, no corresponding provision was made either enlarging their estate in ancestral property or enlarging their power of alienation over property inherited by them. However, it noticed Section 30 and observed that it only deals with power of his share in coparcenary property by Will, which prior to enforcement of the Act, he had no right to do. The only provision made in respect of male proprietor regarding alienation of property was his power of alienation by Will. In so far as persons governed by custom are concerned, they continued to be governed by the restriction on the power of alienation of a male holder as existed before enforcement of the Act. Likewise, other restriction on alienation other than disposal by Will also continued. The Full Bench, thus, recognized the superior right of Hindu females by virtue of Section 14 and upheld the provision as intra vires. The argument that reversioners have ceased to exist after enactment of provisions of Section 14 of Succession Act, was rejected as there was no provision pointed out to that effect. The proposition laid down by the full Bench in Pritam Singhs case was that the Hindu Succession Act has not abolished joint Hindu family with respect to rights of those who were members of Mitakshara coparcenary, except in the manner and to the extent mentioned in Sections 6 and 30 of the Act, This Statement should also imply, though it does not say so expressly, the Succession Act to this extent does not affect the rights of the members governed by Dayabhaga coparcenary. The Full Bench in Pritam Singh;s case expressly noticed the judgment of earlier Full Bench in Joginder Singhs case but construed the same as irrelevant by observing that it dealt with the power of alienation of a person governed by Customary law and constitutional validity of Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act. Thus there is no real conflict between the two Full Bench judgments. Both the Full Bench judgments have been delivered on the assumption that Joginder Singhs case dealt with question of alienation whereas Pritam Singhs case had decided the question concerning succession. Even on fact in Joginder Singhs case the issue was validity of alienation by consent decree by a father to his two sons, which was challenged by third son, whereas in Pritam Singhs case the question of nature of property in hands of sons on death of their father had arisen  for purposes of assessment of estate duty. In Pritam  Singhs case the property in the hands of the sons was held to be coparcenary property and only 1/3rd of  property belonging to deceased father was considered eligible for estate duty. Therefore, there was no question of alienation in Pritam Singhs case. -  I do not find any infirmity in the well-reasoned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Hari Kishan and Ors. v. Administrator Municipal Committee;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal, Sr. Adv. and; Sudhir Mittal, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' M.L Sarin, Sr. Adv.,; Ashish Handa,; H.N. Mehtani an',
			'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2005-05-25',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' Ashutosh Mohunta, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Ashutosh Mohunta, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The vendee-plaintiffs have filed this appeal to challenge the judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below whereby their suit and the appeal against the partition of the land ordered by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Guhla, vide order dated 16.7.1975, were dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. In brief the facts giving rise to this appeal are that defendant-respondent Nos. 1 to 5 filed an application for partition of the suit land against Smt.Kirpal Kaur (Plaintiff No. 1) and defendant Nos. 6 to 15 in the court of Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Guhla. In that application Smt. Kirpal Kaur was proceeded against ex parte. The partition was confirmed on 16.6.1975 and the case was fixed for instrument of partition for 16.7.1975. Rai Jasbir Singh, plaintiff No. 2 purchased land measuring 80 Kanals from Smt. Kirpal Kaur (plaintiff No. 1) vide sale deed dated 27.5.1975 during the pendency of the partition proceedings and plaintiff No. 2 and 3, i.e., Rai Jasbir Singh and Swaran Singh were in actual physical possession of 228 Kanals 8 Marias and 77 Kanals 8 Marias, respectively. The plaintiffs challenged the order dated 16.7.1975 passed by the Assistant Grade, 1st Class, Guhla, by filing the present suit for declaration, which was dismissed by the Sub Judge, 1st Class, Kaithal, vide judgment and decree dated 29.1.1980 on the ground that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The plaintiffs then filed appeal to challenge the judgment and decree dated 29.1.1980 passed by the trial Court. During the pendency of the appeal, Smt. Kirpal Kaur withdrew herself from being the appellant. Consequently, vide order dated 17.1.1980 the appeal qua Kirpal Kaur was ordered to be dismissed as withdrawn. The appeal qua the remaining two appellants, i.e., Rai Jasbir Singh and Swaran Singh (present appellants) was dismissed by the Additional District Judge, Kurukshetra, vide judgment and decree dated 4.12.1981 and the decision of the trial Court with regard to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was upheld. Now Rai Jasbir Singh arid Swaran Singh have filed the present appeal wherein challenge has been made to the findings of both the Courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. It has been contended by Mr. R.S. Mittal, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the appellants, that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not duly served and, thus,the ex parte order dated 16.6.1975/16.7.1975 passed by the Assistant Collector,1st Grade, Guhla, was a nullity. It has further been argued by the learned counsel for the appellants that the Courts below erred in holding that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit against partition ordered by the Revenue Officer in view of the provisions of the <a href="/act/136769/the-punjab-land-revenue-act-1887-complete-act">Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887</a> (for short 'the Act'), despite the fact that the order for partition of the suit land was passed ex parte without serving Smt.Kirpal Kaur according to the prescribed legal procedure.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellants have been controverted by Mr. M.L.Sarin, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the respondents. It has been contended by him that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to go into the validity of the partition proceedings. The appellants have approached the Civil Court without exhausting the remedy available to them under Section 13 of the Act. It has further been contended by him that Smt. Kirpal Kaur had duly been served in the partition proceedings by sending notice to her by registered post.The counsel has also contended that she had withdrawn her appeal before the lower appellate court and in this view of the matter, the present appellants, who had purchased the land from her during the pendency of the partition proceedings, had no locus standi to challenge the order of partition passed by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. 1 have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the evidence adduced on record.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The only question that arises for consideration in the present appeal is to the following effect:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether or not the Civil Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the suit wherein the order of partition passed by a Revenue Officer has been challenged and Smt. Kirpal Kaur was properly served in the partition proceedings</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The first objection raised on behalf of the appellants is that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not served in the partition proceedings before the Assistant Collector 1st Grade, Guhla, as per the provisions contained in Section 20 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. I do not find any merit in this contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants. It is not the case of the appellants that Smt.Kirpal Kaur was not served at all. The bald statement of the plaintiffs was rebutted by the statement on oath of defendant Balwant Singh and also by documentary evidence adduced on record which shows that a registered notice was issued to her and acknowledgement due (Ex.DIO) was received in the office of the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade. Sub-section (3) of Section 20 of the Act gives discretion to the Revenue Officer to serve the concerned person 'either in addition to, or in substitution for, any other mode of service, by forwarding the summons by post in a-letter addressed' to him and registered under Part II of the Indian Post Office Act, 1886. In this view of the matter, it cannot be said that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not served as per the procedure prescribed under the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The next contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants is that the Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain the ex parte order passed by the Revenue Officer.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. This contention is also without any merit. Section 158 of the Act specifically excludes the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts in matters within the jurisdiction of the Revenue Officers. In order to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector, a provision for filing of appeals before the higher Revenue Authorities has been made in Section 13 of the Act. The plaintiffs without exhausting the remedies available to them under Section 13, approached the Civil Court to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Moreover, it has come on record that Smt. Kirpal Kaur, from whom the present appellants had purchased the land during the pendency of the partition proceedings, had withdrawn from the appeal before the lower appellate Court. As the present appellants had purchased the suit land during the pendency of the partition proceedings, they have, therefore, no locus standi to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector 1st Grade and pursue the appeal. It is not the case of the plaintiff-appellants that the ex parte decree was obtained by the defendant-respondents by fraud or misrepresentation. In A.C. Ananthaswamy and Ors. v. Boraiah (D) by Lrs. (2004-3)138 Punjab Law Reporter 557, it has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that in the absence of any fraud or misrepresentation, an ex parte order on the bare plea of non-service cannot be set aside. In the present case it is an undisputed fact that registered notice (Ex.DIO) was issued to Smt. Kirpal Kaur and she had even filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order passed by the Assistant Collector. The ratio of the authority Firm Seth Radha Kishun (deceased) represented by Hari Kishan and Ors. v. Administrator Municipal Committee, Ludhiana : [1964]2SCR273 , that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not specifically ousted where a statute created a liability and provided a remedy, is not applicable to the facts appearing in the present case. In the present case, as already mentioned above, registered A.D. notice was issued to and served on Smt. Kirpal Kaur, who had thereafter, filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Both the courts below have given concurrent findings of fact which cannot be interfered with in the second appeal in view of the provisions of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as no substantial question of law has either been pleaded in the memorandum of appeal or arises for consideration in the present appeal. I do not find any infirmity in the well-reasoned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Consequently, there is no merit in this appeal. It is, accordingly, dismissed. However, I do no make any order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '(2006)142PLR339',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Balwant Singh and ors.',
			'sub' => 'Property',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'rai-jasbir-singh-vs-balwant',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '629369',
		(int) 1 => 'rai-jasbir-singh-vs-balwant'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Rai Jasbir Singh and anr Vs Balwant Singh and ors - Citation 629369 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '629369',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/136769/the-punjab-land-revenue-act-1887-complete-act">Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887</a> - Sections 13, 20, 20(3) and 158; Indian Post Office Act, 1886; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) - Sections 100',
		'appealno' => 'Regular Second Appeal No. 615 of 1982 (O and M)',
		'appellant' => 'Rai Jasbir Singh and anr.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Rai Jasbir Singh and anr. Vs. Balwant Singh and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' - HINDU LAW -- Custom: [Vijender Jain, C.J., M.M. Kumar, Jasbir Singh, Rajive Bhalla & Rajesh Bindal, JJ] Alienation of ancestral property - Punjab and Haryana -  Held, In respect of State of Punjab by virtue of Punjab Amendment Act, 1973 there is a complete bar to contest any alienation of ancestral or non-ancestral immovable property or appointment of an heir to such property on ground that such alienation or appointment was contrary to custom. In Punjab the property in hands of a successor has to be treated as coparcenary property and its alienation has to be governed by Hindu Law except to the extent it is regulated by Sections 6 and 30 of the Hindu Succession Act. In Haryana, property  in hands of successor has to be treated as coparcenary property as well as ancestral property. Parties can fall back upon Hindu Law in case they fail to establish that rule of decision is custom. Therefore, in Haryana both under Hindu law and the Customary Law, the alienation would be open to challenge. Custom was given precedent over uncodified Hindu Law presumably for reason that custom has been consistently replacing the Hindu Law. However, it was soon realized that ancestral immovable property, which ordinarily held to be inalienable amongst Jats of Punjab by virtue of custom except for necessity, no limitation was placed on degrees of collateral, eligible to contest such alienation. It was, therefore, felt necessary to engraft certain restriction on degrees of collateral, eligible to contest an alienation, which under the custom itself was not limited. Accordingly, the Punjab Custom (Power to Contest) Act, 1920 (Act No.2 of 1920) was enacted. The Hindu Succession Act was extended to the State of Punjab.  Act 2 of Punjab Act defined expression alienation to include any testamentary disposition of property and appointment of an heir was to include any adoption made or purporting to be made according to custom. A further provision was made by Section 3 that Hindu Succession Act was to apply only in respect of alienation of immovable property or appointment of heirs made by persons who in regard to such alienation or appointment were governed by custom. Whereas  Section 4 declared that Hindu Succession Act was not to affect any right to contest any alienation or appointment of an heir made before the date on which the Succession Act was to come into force. In other words, Act, No.2 of 1920 was not to affect alienation or appointments of heir made before date on which it came into force. It also preserved the rights of any alienation or appointment of an heir made by a family. After Section 7 was inserted in Act of 1920 by the Punjab Amendment Act of 1973 right of contest being contrary to custom had been totally effaced and taken away. Therefore, no person has any right to contest any alienation of immovable property whether ancestral or non-ancestral on ground of being contrary to custom after January 23, 1973. In Haryana, the situation as enunciated by Act No.2 of 1920 continued to prevail in respect of alienation because no reforms parallel to Punjab as brought by Amendment Act of 1973, had been enacted although right to pre-emption has been substantially abolished in Haryana also. No steps even have been taken in that regard. Therefore, situation in Haryana have to be regarded as it existed under Act No. 2 of 1920.
HINDU SUCCESSION ACT,1956[C.A.No.30/1956] --  Sections 6 & 30: [Vijender Jain, C.J., M.M.Kumar, Jasbir Singh, Rajive Bhalla & Rajesh Bindal, JJ]  Alienation of coparcenary property - Law laid down by Full Bench in Joginder Singh Kundha Singh v Kehar Singh Dasaundha Singh [AIR 1965 Punjab 407] and Pritam Singh v Assistant Controller of Estate Duty, Patiala [1976 Punj LR 342] -Whether there is any conflict? - Held, The basic controversy in the Full Bench decision of Joginder Singhs case was regarding constitutional validity of Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act and as to whether it infringes Article 14 of Constitution. It was held that the estate held by male and limitation on his power of alienation were in no way removed and the reversioners were not debarred from challenging such alienations. The Full Bench held that Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act postulates that estate held by a Hindu female before enforcement of Succession Act either by inheritance or otherwise, was enlarged and on date of enforcement of Succession Act, she became a full owner. Likewise, if she has inherited any estate after the commencement of the Act,  she was to be regarded as absolute owner rather than a limited owner. Consequently, the limitations on power of alienation automatically vanished. This was the necessary result of the provisions made in Section 14 of the Act. The Full Bench further held that in respect of male proprietors, no corresponding provision was made either enlarging their estate in ancestral property or enlarging their power of alienation over property inherited by them. However, it noticed Section 30 and observed that it only deals with power of his share in coparcenary property by Will, which prior to enforcement of the Act, he had no right to do. The only provision made in respect of male proprietor regarding alienation of property was his power of alienation by Will. In so far as persons governed by custom are concerned, they continued to be governed by the restriction on the power of alienation of a male holder as existed before enforcement of the Act. Likewise, other restriction on alienation other than disposal by Will also continued. The Full Bench, thus, recognized the superior right of Hindu females by virtue of Section 14 and upheld the provision as intra vires. The argument that reversioners have ceased to exist after enactment of provisions of Section 14 of Succession Act, was rejected as there was no provision pointed out to that effect. The proposition laid down by the full Bench in Pritam Singhs case was that the Hindu Succession Act has not abolished joint Hindu family with respect to rights of those who were members of Mitakshara coparcenary, except in the manner and to the extent mentioned in Sections 6 and 30 of the Act, This Statement should also imply, though it does not say so expressly, the Succession Act to this extent does not affect the rights of the members governed by Dayabhaga coparcenary. The Full Bench in Pritam Singh;s case expressly noticed the judgment of earlier Full Bench in Joginder Singhs case but construed the same as irrelevant by observing that it dealt with the power of alienation of a person governed by Customary law and constitutional validity of Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act. Thus there is no real conflict between the two Full Bench judgments. Both the Full Bench judgments have been delivered on the assumption that Joginder Singhs case dealt with question of alienation whereas Pritam Singhs case had decided the question concerning succession. Even on fact in Joginder Singhs case the issue was validity of alienation by consent decree by a father to his two sons, which was challenged by third son, whereas in Pritam Singhs case the question of nature of property in hands of sons on death of their father had arisen  for purposes of assessment of estate duty. In Pritam  Singhs case the property in the hands of the sons was held to be coparcenary property and only 1/3rd of  property belonging to deceased father was considered eligible for estate duty. Therefore, there was no question of alienation in Pritam Singhs case. -  I do not find any infirmity in the well-reasoned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Hari Kishan and Ors. v. Administrator Municipal Committee;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal, Sr. Adv. and; Sudhir Mittal, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' M.L Sarin, Sr. Adv.,; Ashish Handa,; H.N. Mehtani an',
		'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2005-05-25',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Ashutosh Mohunta, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Ashutosh Mohunta, J.</p><p>1. The vendee-plaintiffs have filed this appeal to challenge the judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below whereby their suit and the appeal against the partition of the land ordered by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Guhla, vide order dated 16.7.1975, were dismissed.</p><p>2. In brief the facts giving rise to this appeal are that defendant-respondent Nos. 1 to 5 filed an application for partition of the suit land against Smt.Kirpal Kaur (Plaintiff No. 1) and defendant Nos. 6 to 15 in the court of Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Guhla. In that application Smt. Kirpal Kaur was proceeded against ex parte. The partition was confirmed on 16.6.1975 and the case was fixed for instrument of partition for 16.7.1975. Rai Jasbir Singh, plaintiff No. 2 purchased land measuring 80 Kanals from Smt. Kirpal Kaur (plaintiff No. 1) vide sale deed dated 27.5.1975 during the pendency of the partition proceedings and plaintiff No. 2 and 3, i.e., Rai Jasbir Singh and Swaran Singh were in actual physical possession of 228 Kanals 8 Marias and 77 Kanals 8 Marias, respectively. The plaintiffs challenged the order dated 16.7.1975 passed by the Assistant Grade, 1st Class, Guhla, by filing the present suit for declaration, which was dismissed by the Sub Judge, 1st Class, Kaithal, vide judgment and decree dated 29.1.1980 on the ground that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The plaintiffs then filed appeal to challenge the judgment and decree dated 29.1.1980 passed by the trial Court. During the pendency of the appeal, Smt. Kirpal Kaur withdrew herself from being the appellant. Consequently, vide order dated 17.1.1980 the appeal qua Kirpal Kaur was ordered to be dismissed as withdrawn. The appeal qua the remaining two appellants, i.e., Rai Jasbir Singh and Swaran Singh (present appellants) was dismissed by the Additional District Judge, Kurukshetra, vide judgment and decree dated 4.12.1981 and the decision of the trial Court with regard to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was upheld. Now Rai Jasbir Singh arid Swaran Singh have filed the present appeal wherein challenge has been made to the findings of both the Courts below.</p><p>3. It has been contended by Mr. R.S. Mittal, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the appellants, that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not duly served and, thus,the ex parte order dated 16.6.1975/16.7.1975 passed by the Assistant Collector,1st Grade, Guhla, was a nullity. It has further been argued by the learned counsel for the appellants that the Courts below erred in holding that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit against partition ordered by the Revenue Officer in view of the provisions of the <a>Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887</a> (for short 'the Act'), despite the fact that the order for partition of the suit land was passed ex parte without serving Smt.Kirpal Kaur according to the prescribed legal procedure.</p><p>4. The contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellants have been controverted by Mr. M.L.Sarin, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the respondents. It has been contended by him that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to go into the validity of the partition proceedings. The appellants have approached the Civil Court without exhausting the remedy available to them under Section 13 of the Act. It has further been contended by him that Smt. Kirpal Kaur had duly been served in the partition proceedings by sending notice to her by registered post.The counsel has also contended that she had withdrawn her appeal before the lower appellate court and in this view of the matter, the present appellants, who had purchased the land from her during the pendency of the partition proceedings, had no locus standi to challenge the order of partition passed by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade.</p><p>5. 1 have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the evidence adduced on record.</p><p>6. The only question that arises for consideration in the present appeal is to the following effect:-</p><p>Whether or not the Civil Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the suit wherein the order of partition passed by a Revenue Officer has been challenged and Smt. Kirpal Kaur was properly served in the partition proceedings</p><p>7. The first objection raised on behalf of the appellants is that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not served in the partition proceedings before the Assistant Collector 1st Grade, Guhla, as per the provisions contained in Section 20 of the Act.</p><p>8. I do not find any merit in this contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants. It is not the case of the appellants that Smt.Kirpal Kaur was not served at all. The bald statement of the plaintiffs was rebutted by the statement on oath of defendant Balwant Singh and also by documentary evidence adduced on record which shows that a registered notice was issued to her and acknowledgement due (Ex.DIO) was received in the office of the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade. Sub-section (3) of Section 20 of the Act gives discretion to the Revenue Officer to serve the concerned person 'either in addition to, or in substitution for, any other mode of service, by forwarding the summons by post in a-letter addressed' to him and registered under Part II of the Indian Post Office Act, 1886. In this view of the matter, it cannot be said that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not served as per the procedure prescribed under the Act.</p><p>9. The next contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants is that the Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain the ex parte order passed by the Revenue Officer.</p><p>10. This contention is also without any merit. Section 158 of the Act specifically excludes the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts in matters within the jurisdiction of the Revenue Officers. In order to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector, a provision for filing of appeals before the higher Revenue Authorities has been made in Section 13 of the Act. The plaintiffs without exhausting the remedies available to them under Section 13, approached the Civil Court to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector.</p><p>11. Moreover, it has come on record that Smt. Kirpal Kaur, from whom the present appellants had purchased the land during the pendency of the partition proceedings, had withdrawn from the appeal before the lower appellate Court. As the present appellants had purchased the suit land during the pendency of the partition proceedings, they have, therefore, no locus standi to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector 1st Grade and pursue the appeal. It is not the case of the plaintiff-appellants that the ex parte decree was obtained by the defendant-respondents by fraud or misrepresentation. In A.C. Ananthaswamy and Ors. v. Boraiah (D) by Lrs. (2004-3)138 Punjab Law Reporter 557, it has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that in the absence of any fraud or misrepresentation, an ex parte order on the bare plea of non-service cannot be set aside. In the present case it is an undisputed fact that registered notice (Ex.DIO) was issued to Smt. Kirpal Kaur and she had even filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order passed by the Assistant Collector. The ratio of the authority Firm Seth Radha Kishun (deceased) represented by Hari Kishan and Ors. v. Administrator Municipal Committee, Ludhiana : [1964]2SCR273 , that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not specifically ousted where a statute created a liability and provided a remedy, is not applicable to the facts appearing in the present case. In the present case, as already mentioned above, registered A.D. notice was issued to and served on Smt. Kirpal Kaur, who had thereafter, filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order.</p><p>12. Both the courts below have given concurrent findings of fact which cannot be interfered with in the second appeal in view of the provisions of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as no substantial question of law has either been pleaded in the memorandum of appeal or arises for consideration in the present appeal. I do not find any infirmity in the well-reasoned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below.</p><p>13. Consequently, there is no merit in this appeal. It is, accordingly, dismissed. However, I do no make any order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Ashutosh Mohunta, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The vendee-plaintiffs have filed this appeal to challenge the judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below whereby their suit and the appeal against the partition of the land ordered by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Guhla, vide order dated 16.7.1975, were dismissed.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. In brief the facts giving rise to this appeal are that defendant-respondent Nos. 1 to 5 filed an application for partition of the suit land against Smt.Kirpal Kaur (Plaintiff No. 1) and defendant Nos. 6 to 15 in the court of Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Guhla. In that application Smt. Kirpal Kaur was proceeded against ex parte. The partition was confirmed on 16.6.1975 and the case was fixed for instrument of partition for 16.7.1975. Rai Jasbir Singh, plaintiff No. 2 purchased land measuring 80 Kanals from Smt. Kirpal Kaur (plaintiff No. 1) vide sale deed dated 27.5.1975 during the pendency of the partition proceedings and plaintiff No. 2 and 3, i.e., Rai Jasbir Singh and Swaran Singh were in actual physical possession of 228 Kanals 8 Marias and 77 Kanals 8 Marias, respectively. The plaintiffs challenged the order dated 16.7.1975 passed by the Assistant Grade, 1st Class, Guhla, by filing the present suit for declaration, which was dismissed by the Sub Judge, 1st Class, Kaithal, vide judgment and decree dated 29.1.1980 on the ground that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The plaintiffs then filed appeal to challenge the judgment and decree dated 29.1.1980 passed by the trial Court. During the pendency of the appeal, Smt. Kirpal Kaur withdrew herself from being the appellant. Consequently, vide order dated 17.1.1980 the appeal qua Kirpal Kaur was ordered to be dismissed as withdrawn. The appeal qua the remaining two appellants, i.e., Rai Jasbir Singh and Swaran Singh (present appellants) was dismissed by the Additional District Judge, Kurukshetra, vide judgment and decree dated 4.12.1981 and the decision of the trial Court with regard to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was upheld. Now Rai Jasbir Singh arid Swaran Singh have filed the present appeal wherein challenge has been made to the findings of both the Courts below.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. It has been contended by Mr. R.S. Mittal, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the appellants, that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not duly served and, thus,the ex parte order dated 16.6.1975/16.7.1975 passed by the Assistant Collector,1st Grade, Guhla, was a nullity. It has further been argued by the learned counsel for the appellants that the Courts below erred in holding that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit against partition ordered by the Revenue Officer in view of the provisions of the <a>Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887</a> (for short 'the Act'), despite the fact that the order for partition of the suit land was passed ex parte without serving Smt.Kirpal Kaur according to the prescribed legal procedure.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. The contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellants have been controverted by Mr. M.L.Sarin, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the respondents. It has been contended by him that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to go into the validity of the partition proceedings. The appellants have approached the Civil Court without exhausting the remedy available to them under Section 13 of the Act. It has further been contended by him that Smt. Kirpal Kaur had duly been served in the partition proceedings by sending notice to her by registered post.The counsel has also contended that she had withdrawn her appeal before the lower appellate court and in this view of the matter, the present appellants, who had purchased the land from her during the pendency of the partition proceedings, had no locus standi to challenge the order of partition passed by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. 1 have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the evidence adduced on record.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. The only question that arises for consideration in the present appeal is to the following effect:-',
	(int) 7 => '<p>Whether or not the Civil Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the suit wherein the order of partition passed by a Revenue Officer has been challenged and Smt. Kirpal Kaur was properly served in the partition proceedings',
	(int) 8 => '<p>7. The first objection raised on behalf of the appellants is that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not served in the partition proceedings before the Assistant Collector 1st Grade, Guhla, as per the provisions contained in Section 20 of the Act.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>8. I do not find any merit in this contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants. It is not the case of the appellants that Smt.Kirpal Kaur was not served at all. The bald statement of the plaintiffs was rebutted by the statement on oath of defendant Balwant Singh and also by documentary evidence adduced on record which shows that a registered notice was issued to her and acknowledgement due (Ex.DIO) was received in the office of the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade. Sub-section (3) of Section 20 of the Act gives discretion to the Revenue Officer to serve the concerned person 'either in addition to, or in substitution for, any other mode of service, by forwarding the summons by post in a-letter addressed' to him and registered under Part II of the Indian Post Office Act, 1886. In this view of the matter, it cannot be said that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not served as per the procedure prescribed under the Act.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>9. The next contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants is that the Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain the ex parte order passed by the Revenue Officer.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>10. This contention is also without any merit. Section 158 of the Act specifically excludes the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts in matters within the jurisdiction of the Revenue Officers. In order to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector, a provision for filing of appeals before the higher Revenue Authorities has been made in Section 13 of the Act. The plaintiffs without exhausting the remedies available to them under Section 13, approached the Civil Court to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>11. Moreover, it has come on record that Smt. Kirpal Kaur, from whom the present appellants had purchased the land during the pendency of the partition proceedings, had withdrawn from the appeal before the lower appellate Court. As the present appellants had purchased the suit land during the pendency of the partition proceedings, they have, therefore, no locus standi to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector 1st Grade and pursue the appeal. It is not the case of the plaintiff-appellants that the ex parte decree was obtained by the defendant-respondents by fraud or misrepresentation. In A.C. Ananthaswamy and Ors. v. Boraiah (D) by Lrs. (2004-3)138 Punjab Law Reporter 557, it has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that in the absence of any fraud or misrepresentation, an ex parte order on the bare plea of non-service cannot be set aside. In the present case it is an undisputed fact that registered notice (Ex.DIO) was issued to Smt. Kirpal Kaur and she had even filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order passed by the Assistant Collector. The ratio of the authority Firm Seth Radha Kishun (deceased) represented by Hari Kishan and Ors. v. Administrator Municipal Committee, Ludhiana : [1964]2SCR273 , that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not specifically ousted where a statute created a liability and provided a remedy, is not applicable to the facts appearing in the present case. In the present case, as already mentioned above, registered A.D. notice was issued to and served on Smt. Kirpal Kaur, who had thereafter, filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>12. Both the courts below have given concurrent findings of fact which cannot be interfered with in the second appeal in view of the provisions of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as no substantial question of law has either been pleaded in the memorandum of appeal or arises for consideration in the present appeal. I do not find any infirmity in the well-reasoned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>13. Consequently, there is no merit in this appeal. It is, accordingly, dismissed. However, I do no make any order as to costs.<p>',
	(int) 15 => '<p>'
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Whether or not the Civil Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the suit wherein the order of partition passed by a Revenue Officer has been challenged and Smt. Kirpal Kaur was properly served in the partition proceedings

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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '629369',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/136769/the-punjab-land-revenue-act-1887-complete-act">Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887</a> - Sections 13, 20, 20(3) and 158; Indian Post Office Act, 1886; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) - Sections 100',
			'appealno' => 'Regular Second Appeal No. 615 of 1982 (O and M)',
			'appellant' => 'Rai Jasbir Singh and anr.',
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			'casename' => 'Rai Jasbir Singh and anr. Vs. Balwant Singh and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' - HINDU LAW -- Custom: [Vijender Jain, C.J., M.M. Kumar, Jasbir Singh, Rajive Bhalla & Rajesh Bindal, JJ] Alienation of ancestral property - Punjab and Haryana -  Held, In respect of State of Punjab by virtue of Punjab Amendment Act, 1973 there is a complete bar to contest any alienation of ancestral or non-ancestral immovable property or appointment of an heir to such property on ground that such alienation or appointment was contrary to custom. In Punjab the property in hands of a successor has to be treated as coparcenary property and its alienation has to be governed by Hindu Law except to the extent it is regulated by Sections 6 and 30 of the Hindu Succession Act. In Haryana, property  in hands of successor has to be treated as coparcenary property as well as ancestral property. Parties can fall back upon Hindu Law in case they fail to establish that rule of decision is custom. Therefore, in Haryana both under Hindu law and the Customary Law, the alienation would be open to challenge. Custom was given precedent over uncodified Hindu Law presumably for reason that custom has been consistently replacing the Hindu Law. However, it was soon realized that ancestral immovable property, which ordinarily held to be inalienable amongst Jats of Punjab by virtue of custom except for necessity, no limitation was placed on degrees of collateral, eligible to contest such alienation. It was, therefore, felt necessary to engraft certain restriction on degrees of collateral, eligible to contest an alienation, which under the custom itself was not limited. Accordingly, the Punjab Custom (Power to Contest) Act, 1920 (Act No.2 of 1920) was enacted. The Hindu Succession Act was extended to the State of Punjab.  Act 2 of Punjab Act defined expression alienation to include any testamentary disposition of property and appointment of an heir was to include any adoption made or purporting to be made according to custom. A further provision was made by Section 3 that Hindu Succession Act was to apply only in respect of alienation of immovable property or appointment of heirs made by persons who in regard to such alienation or appointment were governed by custom. Whereas  Section 4 declared that Hindu Succession Act was not to affect any right to contest any alienation or appointment of an heir made before the date on which the Succession Act was to come into force. In other words, Act, No.2 of 1920 was not to affect alienation or appointments of heir made before date on which it came into force. It also preserved the rights of any alienation or appointment of an heir made by a family. After Section 7 was inserted in Act of 1920 by the Punjab Amendment Act of 1973 right of contest being contrary to custom had been totally effaced and taken away. Therefore, no person has any right to contest any alienation of immovable property whether ancestral or non-ancestral on ground of being contrary to custom after January 23, 1973. In Haryana, the situation as enunciated by Act No.2 of 1920 continued to prevail in respect of alienation because no reforms parallel to Punjab as brought by Amendment Act of 1973, had been enacted although right to pre-emption has been substantially abolished in Haryana also. No steps even have been taken in that regard. Therefore, situation in Haryana have to be regarded as it existed under Act No. 2 of 1920.
HINDU SUCCESSION ACT,1956[C.A.No.30/1956] --  Sections 6 & 30: [Vijender Jain, C.J., M.M.Kumar, Jasbir Singh, Rajive Bhalla & Rajesh Bindal, JJ]  Alienation of coparcenary property - Law laid down by Full Bench in Joginder Singh Kundha Singh v Kehar Singh Dasaundha Singh [AIR 1965 Punjab 407] and Pritam Singh v Assistant Controller of Estate Duty, Patiala [1976 Punj LR 342] -Whether there is any conflict? - Held, The basic controversy in the Full Bench decision of Joginder Singhs case was regarding constitutional validity of Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act and as to whether it infringes Article 14 of Constitution. It was held that the estate held by male and limitation on his power of alienation were in no way removed and the reversioners were not debarred from challenging such alienations. The Full Bench held that Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act postulates that estate held by a Hindu female before enforcement of Succession Act either by inheritance or otherwise, was enlarged and on date of enforcement of Succession Act, she became a full owner. Likewise, if she has inherited any estate after the commencement of the Act,  she was to be regarded as absolute owner rather than a limited owner. Consequently, the limitations on power of alienation automatically vanished. This was the necessary result of the provisions made in Section 14 of the Act. The Full Bench further held that in respect of male proprietors, no corresponding provision was made either enlarging their estate in ancestral property or enlarging their power of alienation over property inherited by them. However, it noticed Section 30 and observed that it only deals with power of his share in coparcenary property by Will, which prior to enforcement of the Act, he had no right to do. The only provision made in respect of male proprietor regarding alienation of property was his power of alienation by Will. In so far as persons governed by custom are concerned, they continued to be governed by the restriction on the power of alienation of a male holder as existed before enforcement of the Act. Likewise, other restriction on alienation other than disposal by Will also continued. The Full Bench, thus, recognized the superior right of Hindu females by virtue of Section 14 and upheld the provision as intra vires. The argument that reversioners have ceased to exist after enactment of provisions of Section 14 of Succession Act, was rejected as there was no provision pointed out to that effect. The proposition laid down by the full Bench in Pritam Singhs case was that the Hindu Succession Act has not abolished joint Hindu family with respect to rights of those who were members of Mitakshara coparcenary, except in the manner and to the extent mentioned in Sections 6 and 30 of the Act, This Statement should also imply, though it does not say so expressly, the Succession Act to this extent does not affect the rights of the members governed by Dayabhaga coparcenary. The Full Bench in Pritam Singh;s case expressly noticed the judgment of earlier Full Bench in Joginder Singhs case but construed the same as irrelevant by observing that it dealt with the power of alienation of a person governed by Customary law and constitutional validity of Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act. Thus there is no real conflict between the two Full Bench judgments. Both the Full Bench judgments have been delivered on the assumption that Joginder Singhs case dealt with question of alienation whereas Pritam Singhs case had decided the question concerning succession. Even on fact in Joginder Singhs case the issue was validity of alienation by consent decree by a father to his two sons, which was challenged by third son, whereas in Pritam Singhs case the question of nature of property in hands of sons on death of their father had arisen  for purposes of assessment of estate duty. In Pritam  Singhs case the property in the hands of the sons was held to be coparcenary property and only 1/3rd of  property belonging to deceased father was considered eligible for estate duty. Therefore, there was no question of alienation in Pritam Singhs case. -  I do not find any infirmity in the well-reasoned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
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			'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal, Sr. Adv. and; Sudhir Mittal, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' M.L Sarin, Sr. Adv.,; Ashish Handa,; H.N. Mehtani an',
			'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2005-05-25',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
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			'judge' => ' Ashutosh Mohunta, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Ashutosh Mohunta, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The vendee-plaintiffs have filed this appeal to challenge the judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below whereby their suit and the appeal against the partition of the land ordered by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Guhla, vide order dated 16.7.1975, were dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. In brief the facts giving rise to this appeal are that defendant-respondent Nos. 1 to 5 filed an application for partition of the suit land against Smt.Kirpal Kaur (Plaintiff No. 1) and defendant Nos. 6 to 15 in the court of Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Guhla. In that application Smt. Kirpal Kaur was proceeded against ex parte. The partition was confirmed on 16.6.1975 and the case was fixed for instrument of partition for 16.7.1975. Rai Jasbir Singh, plaintiff No. 2 purchased land measuring 80 Kanals from Smt. Kirpal Kaur (plaintiff No. 1) vide sale deed dated 27.5.1975 during the pendency of the partition proceedings and plaintiff No. 2 and 3, i.e., Rai Jasbir Singh and Swaran Singh were in actual physical possession of 228 Kanals 8 Marias and 77 Kanals 8 Marias, respectively. The plaintiffs challenged the order dated 16.7.1975 passed by the Assistant Grade, 1st Class, Guhla, by filing the present suit for declaration, which was dismissed by the Sub Judge, 1st Class, Kaithal, vide judgment and decree dated 29.1.1980 on the ground that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The plaintiffs then filed appeal to challenge the judgment and decree dated 29.1.1980 passed by the trial Court. During the pendency of the appeal, Smt. Kirpal Kaur withdrew herself from being the appellant. Consequently, vide order dated 17.1.1980 the appeal qua Kirpal Kaur was ordered to be dismissed as withdrawn. The appeal qua the remaining two appellants, i.e., Rai Jasbir Singh and Swaran Singh (present appellants) was dismissed by the Additional District Judge, Kurukshetra, vide judgment and decree dated 4.12.1981 and the decision of the trial Court with regard to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was upheld. Now Rai Jasbir Singh arid Swaran Singh have filed the present appeal wherein challenge has been made to the findings of both the Courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. It has been contended by Mr. R.S. Mittal, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the appellants, that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not duly served and, thus,the ex parte order dated 16.6.1975/16.7.1975 passed by the Assistant Collector,1st Grade, Guhla, was a nullity. It has further been argued by the learned counsel for the appellants that the Courts below erred in holding that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit against partition ordered by the Revenue Officer in view of the provisions of the <a href="/act/136769/the-punjab-land-revenue-act-1887-complete-act">Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887</a> (for short 'the Act'), despite the fact that the order for partition of the suit land was passed ex parte without serving Smt.Kirpal Kaur according to the prescribed legal procedure.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellants have been controverted by Mr. M.L.Sarin, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the respondents. It has been contended by him that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to go into the validity of the partition proceedings. The appellants have approached the Civil Court without exhausting the remedy available to them under Section 13 of the Act. It has further been contended by him that Smt. Kirpal Kaur had duly been served in the partition proceedings by sending notice to her by registered post.The counsel has also contended that she had withdrawn her appeal before the lower appellate court and in this view of the matter, the present appellants, who had purchased the land from her during the pendency of the partition proceedings, had no locus standi to challenge the order of partition passed by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. 1 have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the evidence adduced on record.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The only question that arises for consideration in the present appeal is to the following effect:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether or not the Civil Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the suit wherein the order of partition passed by a Revenue Officer has been challenged and Smt. Kirpal Kaur was properly served in the partition proceedings</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The first objection raised on behalf of the appellants is that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not served in the partition proceedings before the Assistant Collector 1st Grade, Guhla, as per the provisions contained in Section 20 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. I do not find any merit in this contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants. It is not the case of the appellants that Smt.Kirpal Kaur was not served at all. The bald statement of the plaintiffs was rebutted by the statement on oath of defendant Balwant Singh and also by documentary evidence adduced on record which shows that a registered notice was issued to her and acknowledgement due (Ex.DIO) was received in the office of the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade. Sub-section (3) of Section 20 of the Act gives discretion to the Revenue Officer to serve the concerned person 'either in addition to, or in substitution for, any other mode of service, by forwarding the summons by post in a-letter addressed' to him and registered under Part II of the Indian Post Office Act, 1886. In this view of the matter, it cannot be said that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not served as per the procedure prescribed under the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The next contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants is that the Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain the ex parte order passed by the Revenue Officer.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. This contention is also without any merit. Section 158 of the Act specifically excludes the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts in matters within the jurisdiction of the Revenue Officers. In order to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector, a provision for filing of appeals before the higher Revenue Authorities has been made in Section 13 of the Act. The plaintiffs without exhausting the remedies available to them under Section 13, approached the Civil Court to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Moreover, it has come on record that Smt. Kirpal Kaur, from whom the present appellants had purchased the land during the pendency of the partition proceedings, had withdrawn from the appeal before the lower appellate Court. As the present appellants had purchased the suit land during the pendency of the partition proceedings, they have, therefore, no locus standi to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector 1st Grade and pursue the appeal. It is not the case of the plaintiff-appellants that the ex parte decree was obtained by the defendant-respondents by fraud or misrepresentation. In A.C. Ananthaswamy and Ors. v. Boraiah (D) by Lrs. (2004-3)138 Punjab Law Reporter 557, it has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that in the absence of any fraud or misrepresentation, an ex parte order on the bare plea of non-service cannot be set aside. In the present case it is an undisputed fact that registered notice (Ex.DIO) was issued to Smt. Kirpal Kaur and she had even filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order passed by the Assistant Collector. The ratio of the authority Firm Seth Radha Kishun (deceased) represented by Hari Kishan and Ors. v. Administrator Municipal Committee, Ludhiana : [1964]2SCR273 , that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not specifically ousted where a statute created a liability and provided a remedy, is not applicable to the facts appearing in the present case. In the present case, as already mentioned above, registered A.D. notice was issued to and served on Smt. Kirpal Kaur, who had thereafter, filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Both the courts below have given concurrent findings of fact which cannot be interfered with in the second appeal in view of the provisions of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as no substantial question of law has either been pleaded in the memorandum of appeal or arises for consideration in the present appeal. I do not find any infirmity in the well-reasoned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Consequently, there is no merit in this appeal. It is, accordingly, dismissed. However, I do no make any order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'casename' => 'Rai Jasbir Singh and anr. Vs. Balwant Singh and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' - HINDU LAW -- Custom: [Vijender Jain, C.J., M.M. Kumar, Jasbir Singh, Rajive Bhalla & Rajesh Bindal, JJ] Alienation of ancestral property - Punjab and Haryana -  Held, In respect of State of Punjab by virtue of Punjab Amendment Act, 1973 there is a complete bar to contest any alienation of ancestral or non-ancestral immovable property or appointment of an heir to such property on ground that such alienation or appointment was contrary to custom. In Punjab the property in hands of a successor has to be treated as coparcenary property and its alienation has to be governed by Hindu Law except to the extent it is regulated by Sections 6 and 30 of the Hindu Succession Act. In Haryana, property  in hands of successor has to be treated as coparcenary property as well as ancestral property. Parties can fall back upon Hindu Law in case they fail to establish that rule of decision is custom. Therefore, in Haryana both under Hindu law and the Customary Law, the alienation would be open to challenge. Custom was given precedent over uncodified Hindu Law presumably for reason that custom has been consistently replacing the Hindu Law. However, it was soon realized that ancestral immovable property, which ordinarily held to be inalienable amongst Jats of Punjab by virtue of custom except for necessity, no limitation was placed on degrees of collateral, eligible to contest such alienation. It was, therefore, felt necessary to engraft certain restriction on degrees of collateral, eligible to contest an alienation, which under the custom itself was not limited. Accordingly, the Punjab Custom (Power to Contest) Act, 1920 (Act No.2 of 1920) was enacted. The Hindu Succession Act was extended to the State of Punjab.  Act 2 of Punjab Act defined expression alienation to include any testamentary disposition of property and appointment of an heir was to include any adoption made or purporting to be made according to custom. A further provision was made by Section 3 that Hindu Succession Act was to apply only in respect of alienation of immovable property or appointment of heirs made by persons who in regard to such alienation or appointment were governed by custom. Whereas  Section 4 declared that Hindu Succession Act was not to affect any right to contest any alienation or appointment of an heir made before the date on which the Succession Act was to come into force. In other words, Act, No.2 of 1920 was not to affect alienation or appointments of heir made before date on which it came into force. It also preserved the rights of any alienation or appointment of an heir made by a family. After Section 7 was inserted in Act of 1920 by the Punjab Amendment Act of 1973 right of contest being contrary to custom had been totally effaced and taken away. Therefore, no person has any right to contest any alienation of immovable property whether ancestral or non-ancestral on ground of being contrary to custom after January 23, 1973. In Haryana, the situation as enunciated by Act No.2 of 1920 continued to prevail in respect of alienation because no reforms parallel to Punjab as brought by Amendment Act of 1973, had been enacted although right to pre-emption has been substantially abolished in Haryana also. No steps even have been taken in that regard. Therefore, situation in Haryana have to be regarded as it existed under Act No. 2 of 1920.
HINDU SUCCESSION ACT,1956[C.A.No.30/1956] --  Sections 6 & 30: [Vijender Jain, C.J., M.M.Kumar, Jasbir Singh, Rajive Bhalla & Rajesh Bindal, JJ]  Alienation of coparcenary property - Law laid down by Full Bench in Joginder Singh Kundha Singh v Kehar Singh Dasaundha Singh [AIR 1965 Punjab 407] and Pritam Singh v Assistant Controller of Estate Duty, Patiala [1976 Punj LR 342] -Whether there is any conflict? - Held, The basic controversy in the Full Bench decision of Joginder Singhs case was regarding constitutional validity of Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act and as to whether it infringes Article 14 of Constitution. It was held that the estate held by male and limitation on his power of alienation were in no way removed and the reversioners were not debarred from challenging such alienations. The Full Bench held that Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act postulates that estate held by a Hindu female before enforcement of Succession Act either by inheritance or otherwise, was enlarged and on date of enforcement of Succession Act, she became a full owner. Likewise, if she has inherited any estate after the commencement of the Act,  she was to be regarded as absolute owner rather than a limited owner. Consequently, the limitations on power of alienation automatically vanished. This was the necessary result of the provisions made in Section 14 of the Act. The Full Bench further held that in respect of male proprietors, no corresponding provision was made either enlarging their estate in ancestral property or enlarging their power of alienation over property inherited by them. However, it noticed Section 30 and observed that it only deals with power of his share in coparcenary property by Will, which prior to enforcement of the Act, he had no right to do. The only provision made in respect of male proprietor regarding alienation of property was his power of alienation by Will. In so far as persons governed by custom are concerned, they continued to be governed by the restriction on the power of alienation of a male holder as existed before enforcement of the Act. Likewise, other restriction on alienation other than disposal by Will also continued. The Full Bench, thus, recognized the superior right of Hindu females by virtue of Section 14 and upheld the provision as intra vires. The argument that reversioners have ceased to exist after enactment of provisions of Section 14 of Succession Act, was rejected as there was no provision pointed out to that effect. The proposition laid down by the full Bench in Pritam Singhs case was that the Hindu Succession Act has not abolished joint Hindu family with respect to rights of those who were members of Mitakshara coparcenary, except in the manner and to the extent mentioned in Sections 6 and 30 of the Act, This Statement should also imply, though it does not say so expressly, the Succession Act to this extent does not affect the rights of the members governed by Dayabhaga coparcenary. The Full Bench in Pritam Singh;s case expressly noticed the judgment of earlier Full Bench in Joginder Singhs case but construed the same as irrelevant by observing that it dealt with the power of alienation of a person governed by Customary law and constitutional validity of Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act. Thus there is no real conflict between the two Full Bench judgments. Both the Full Bench judgments have been delivered on the assumption that Joginder Singhs case dealt with question of alienation whereas Pritam Singhs case had decided the question concerning succession. Even on fact in Joginder Singhs case the issue was validity of alienation by consent decree by a father to his two sons, which was challenged by third son, whereas in Pritam Singhs case the question of nature of property in hands of sons on death of their father had arisen  for purposes of assessment of estate duty. In Pritam  Singhs case the property in the hands of the sons was held to be coparcenary property and only 1/3rd of  property belonging to deceased father was considered eligible for estate duty. Therefore, there was no question of alienation in Pritam Singhs case. -  I do not find any infirmity in the well-reasoned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Hari Kishan and Ors. v. Administrator Municipal Committee;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal, Sr. Adv. and; Sudhir Mittal, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' M.L Sarin, Sr. Adv.,; Ashish Handa,; H.N. Mehtani an',
		'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2005-05-25',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Ashutosh Mohunta, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Ashutosh Mohunta, J.</p><p>1. The vendee-plaintiffs have filed this appeal to challenge the judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below whereby their suit and the appeal against the partition of the land ordered by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Guhla, vide order dated 16.7.1975, were dismissed.</p><p>2. In brief the facts giving rise to this appeal are that defendant-respondent Nos. 1 to 5 filed an application for partition of the suit land against Smt.Kirpal Kaur (Plaintiff No. 1) and defendant Nos. 6 to 15 in the court of Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Guhla. In that application Smt. Kirpal Kaur was proceeded against ex parte. The partition was confirmed on 16.6.1975 and the case was fixed for instrument of partition for 16.7.1975. Rai Jasbir Singh, plaintiff No. 2 purchased land measuring 80 Kanals from Smt. Kirpal Kaur (plaintiff No. 1) vide sale deed dated 27.5.1975 during the pendency of the partition proceedings and plaintiff No. 2 and 3, i.e., Rai Jasbir Singh and Swaran Singh were in actual physical possession of 228 Kanals 8 Marias and 77 Kanals 8 Marias, respectively. The plaintiffs challenged the order dated 16.7.1975 passed by the Assistant Grade, 1st Class, Guhla, by filing the present suit for declaration, which was dismissed by the Sub Judge, 1st Class, Kaithal, vide judgment and decree dated 29.1.1980 on the ground that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The plaintiffs then filed appeal to challenge the judgment and decree dated 29.1.1980 passed by the trial Court. During the pendency of the appeal, Smt. Kirpal Kaur withdrew herself from being the appellant. Consequently, vide order dated 17.1.1980 the appeal qua Kirpal Kaur was ordered to be dismissed as withdrawn. The appeal qua the remaining two appellants, i.e., Rai Jasbir Singh and Swaran Singh (present appellants) was dismissed by the Additional District Judge, Kurukshetra, vide judgment and decree dated 4.12.1981 and the decision of the trial Court with regard to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was upheld. Now Rai Jasbir Singh arid Swaran Singh have filed the present appeal wherein challenge has been made to the findings of both the Courts below.</p><p>3. It has been contended by Mr. R.S. Mittal, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the appellants, that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not duly served and, thus,the ex parte order dated 16.6.1975/16.7.1975 passed by the Assistant Collector,1st Grade, Guhla, was a nullity. It has further been argued by the learned counsel for the appellants that the Courts below erred in holding that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit against partition ordered by the Revenue Officer in view of the provisions of the <a>Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887</a> (for short 'the Act'), despite the fact that the order for partition of the suit land was passed ex parte without serving Smt.Kirpal Kaur according to the prescribed legal procedure.</p><p>4. The contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellants have been controverted by Mr. M.L.Sarin, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the respondents. It has been contended by him that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to go into the validity of the partition proceedings. The appellants have approached the Civil Court without exhausting the remedy available to them under Section 13 of the Act. It has further been contended by him that Smt. Kirpal Kaur had duly been served in the partition proceedings by sending notice to her by registered post.The counsel has also contended that she had withdrawn her appeal before the lower appellate court and in this view of the matter, the present appellants, who had purchased the land from her during the pendency of the partition proceedings, had no locus standi to challenge the order of partition passed by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade.</p><p>5. 1 have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the evidence adduced on record.</p><p>6. The only question that arises for consideration in the present appeal is to the following effect:-</p><p>Whether or not the Civil Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the suit wherein the order of partition passed by a Revenue Officer has been challenged and Smt. Kirpal Kaur was properly served in the partition proceedings</p><p>7. The first objection raised on behalf of the appellants is that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not served in the partition proceedings before the Assistant Collector 1st Grade, Guhla, as per the provisions contained in Section 20 of the Act.</p><p>8. I do not find any merit in this contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants. It is not the case of the appellants that Smt.Kirpal Kaur was not served at all. The bald statement of the plaintiffs was rebutted by the statement on oath of defendant Balwant Singh and also by documentary evidence adduced on record which shows that a registered notice was issued to her and acknowledgement due (Ex.DIO) was received in the office of the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade. Sub-section (3) of Section 20 of the Act gives discretion to the Revenue Officer to serve the concerned person 'either in addition to, or in substitution for, any other mode of service, by forwarding the summons by post in a-letter addressed' to him and registered under Part II of the Indian Post Office Act, 1886. In this view of the matter, it cannot be said that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not served as per the procedure prescribed under the Act.</p><p>9. The next contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants is that the Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain the ex parte order passed by the Revenue Officer.</p><p>10. This contention is also without any merit. Section 158 of the Act specifically excludes the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts in matters within the jurisdiction of the Revenue Officers. In order to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector, a provision for filing of appeals before the higher Revenue Authorities has been made in Section 13 of the Act. The plaintiffs without exhausting the remedies available to them under Section 13, approached the Civil Court to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector.</p><p>11. Moreover, it has come on record that Smt. Kirpal Kaur, from whom the present appellants had purchased the land during the pendency of the partition proceedings, had withdrawn from the appeal before the lower appellate Court. As the present appellants had purchased the suit land during the pendency of the partition proceedings, they have, therefore, no locus standi to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector 1st Grade and pursue the appeal. It is not the case of the plaintiff-appellants that the ex parte decree was obtained by the defendant-respondents by fraud or misrepresentation. In A.C. Ananthaswamy and Ors. v. Boraiah (D) by Lrs. (2004-3)138 Punjab Law Reporter 557, it has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that in the absence of any fraud or misrepresentation, an ex parte order on the bare plea of non-service cannot be set aside. In the present case it is an undisputed fact that registered notice (Ex.DIO) was issued to Smt. Kirpal Kaur and she had even filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order passed by the Assistant Collector. The ratio of the authority Firm Seth Radha Kishun (deceased) represented by Hari Kishan and Ors. v. Administrator Municipal Committee, Ludhiana : [1964]2SCR273 , that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not specifically ousted where a statute created a liability and provided a remedy, is not applicable to the facts appearing in the present case. In the present case, as already mentioned above, registered A.D. notice was issued to and served on Smt. Kirpal Kaur, who had thereafter, filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order.</p><p>12. Both the courts below have given concurrent findings of fact which cannot be interfered with in the second appeal in view of the provisions of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as no substantial question of law has either been pleaded in the memorandum of appeal or arises for consideration in the present appeal. I do not find any infirmity in the well-reasoned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below.</p><p>13. Consequently, there is no merit in this appeal. It is, accordingly, dismissed. However, I do no make any order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '(2006)142PLR339',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Balwant Singh and ors.',
		'sub' => 'Property',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Ashutosh Mohunta, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The vendee-plaintiffs have filed this appeal to challenge the judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below whereby their suit and the appeal against the partition of the land ordered by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Guhla, vide order dated 16.7.1975, were dismissed.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. In brief the facts giving rise to this appeal are that defendant-respondent Nos. 1 to 5 filed an application for partition of the suit land against Smt.Kirpal Kaur (Plaintiff No. 1) and defendant Nos. 6 to 15 in the court of Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Guhla. In that application Smt. Kirpal Kaur was proceeded against ex parte. The partition was confirmed on 16.6.1975 and the case was fixed for instrument of partition for 16.7.1975. Rai Jasbir Singh, plaintiff No. 2 purchased land measuring 80 Kanals from Smt. Kirpal Kaur (plaintiff No. 1) vide sale deed dated 27.5.1975 during the pendency of the partition proceedings and plaintiff No. 2 and 3, i.e., Rai Jasbir Singh and Swaran Singh were in actual physical possession of 228 Kanals 8 Marias and 77 Kanals 8 Marias, respectively. The plaintiffs challenged the order dated 16.7.1975 passed by the Assistant Grade, 1st Class, Guhla, by filing the present suit for declaration, which was dismissed by the Sub Judge, 1st Class, Kaithal, vide judgment and decree dated 29.1.1980 on the ground that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The plaintiffs then filed appeal to challenge the judgment and decree dated 29.1.1980 passed by the trial Court. During the pendency of the appeal, Smt. Kirpal Kaur withdrew herself from being the appellant. Consequently, vide order dated 17.1.1980 the appeal qua Kirpal Kaur was ordered to be dismissed as withdrawn. The appeal qua the remaining two appellants, i.e., Rai Jasbir Singh and Swaran Singh (present appellants) was dismissed by the Additional District Judge, Kurukshetra, vide judgment and decree dated 4.12.1981 and the decision of the trial Court with regard to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was upheld. Now Rai Jasbir Singh arid Swaran Singh have filed the present appeal wherein challenge has been made to the findings of both the Courts below.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. It has been contended by Mr. R.S. Mittal, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the appellants, that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not duly served and, thus,the ex parte order dated 16.6.1975/16.7.1975 passed by the Assistant Collector,1st Grade, Guhla, was a nullity. It has further been argued by the learned counsel for the appellants that the Courts below erred in holding that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit against partition ordered by the Revenue Officer in view of the provisions of the <a>Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887</a> (for short 'the Act'), despite the fact that the order for partition of the suit land was passed ex parte without serving Smt.Kirpal Kaur according to the prescribed legal procedure.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. The contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellants have been controverted by Mr. M.L.Sarin, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the respondents. It has been contended by him that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to go into the validity of the partition proceedings. The appellants have approached the Civil Court without exhausting the remedy available to them under Section 13 of the Act. It has further been contended by him that Smt. Kirpal Kaur had duly been served in the partition proceedings by sending notice to her by registered post.The counsel has also contended that she had withdrawn her appeal before the lower appellate court and in this view of the matter, the present appellants, who had purchased the land from her during the pendency of the partition proceedings, had no locus standi to challenge the order of partition passed by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. 1 have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the evidence adduced on record.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. The only question that arises for consideration in the present appeal is to the following effect:-',
	(int) 7 => '<p>Whether or not the Civil Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the suit wherein the order of partition passed by a Revenue Officer has been challenged and Smt. Kirpal Kaur was properly served in the partition proceedings',
	(int) 8 => '<p>7. The first objection raised on behalf of the appellants is that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not served in the partition proceedings before the Assistant Collector 1st Grade, Guhla, as per the provisions contained in Section 20 of the Act.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>8. I do not find any merit in this contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants. It is not the case of the appellants that Smt.Kirpal Kaur was not served at all. The bald statement of the plaintiffs was rebutted by the statement on oath of defendant Balwant Singh and also by documentary evidence adduced on record which shows that a registered notice was issued to her and acknowledgement due (Ex.DIO) was received in the office of the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade. Sub-section (3) of Section 20 of the Act gives discretion to the Revenue Officer to serve the concerned person 'either in addition to, or in substitution for, any other mode of service, by forwarding the summons by post in a-letter addressed' to him and registered under Part II of the Indian Post Office Act, 1886. In this view of the matter, it cannot be said that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not served as per the procedure prescribed under the Act.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>9. The next contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants is that the Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain the ex parte order passed by the Revenue Officer.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>10. This contention is also without any merit. Section 158 of the Act specifically excludes the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts in matters within the jurisdiction of the Revenue Officers. In order to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector, a provision for filing of appeals before the higher Revenue Authorities has been made in Section 13 of the Act. The plaintiffs without exhausting the remedies available to them under Section 13, approached the Civil Court to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>11. Moreover, it has come on record that Smt. Kirpal Kaur, from whom the present appellants had purchased the land during the pendency of the partition proceedings, had withdrawn from the appeal before the lower appellate Court. As the present appellants had purchased the suit land during the pendency of the partition proceedings, they have, therefore, no locus standi to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector 1st Grade and pursue the appeal. It is not the case of the plaintiff-appellants that the ex parte decree was obtained by the defendant-respondents by fraud or misrepresentation. In A.C. Ananthaswamy and Ors. v. Boraiah (D) by Lrs. (2004-3)138 Punjab Law Reporter 557, it has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that in the absence of any fraud or misrepresentation, an ex parte order on the bare plea of non-service cannot be set aside. In the present case it is an undisputed fact that registered notice (Ex.DIO) was issued to Smt. Kirpal Kaur and she had even filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order passed by the Assistant Collector. The ratio of the authority Firm Seth Radha Kishun (deceased) represented by Hari Kishan and Ors. v. Administrator Municipal Committee, Ludhiana : [1964]2SCR273 , that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not specifically ousted where a statute created a liability and provided a remedy, is not applicable to the facts appearing in the present case. In the present case, as already mentioned above, registered A.D. notice was issued to and served on Smt. Kirpal Kaur, who had thereafter, filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>12. Both the courts below have given concurrent findings of fact which cannot be interfered with in the second appeal in view of the provisions of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as no substantial question of law has either been pleaded in the memorandum of appeal or arises for consideration in the present appeal. I do not find any infirmity in the well-reasoned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>13. Consequently, there is no merit in this appeal. It is, accordingly, dismissed. However, I do no make any order as to costs.<p>',
	(int) 15 => '<p>'
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7. The first objection raised on behalf of the appellants is that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not served in the partition proceedings before the Assistant Collector 1st Grade, Guhla, as per the provisions contained in Section 20 of the Act.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Rai Jasbir Singh and anr Vs Balwant Singh and ors - Citation 629369 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '629369',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/136769/the-punjab-land-revenue-act-1887-complete-act">Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887</a> - Sections 13, 20, 20(3) and 158; Indian Post Office Act, 1886; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) - Sections 100',
			'appealno' => 'Regular Second Appeal No. 615 of 1982 (O and M)',
			'appellant' => 'Rai Jasbir Singh and anr.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Rai Jasbir Singh and anr. Vs. Balwant Singh and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' - HINDU LAW -- Custom: [Vijender Jain, C.J., M.M. Kumar, Jasbir Singh, Rajive Bhalla & Rajesh Bindal, JJ] Alienation of ancestral property - Punjab and Haryana -  Held, In respect of State of Punjab by virtue of Punjab Amendment Act, 1973 there is a complete bar to contest any alienation of ancestral or non-ancestral immovable property or appointment of an heir to such property on ground that such alienation or appointment was contrary to custom. In Punjab the property in hands of a successor has to be treated as coparcenary property and its alienation has to be governed by Hindu Law except to the extent it is regulated by Sections 6 and 30 of the Hindu Succession Act. In Haryana, property  in hands of successor has to be treated as coparcenary property as well as ancestral property. Parties can fall back upon Hindu Law in case they fail to establish that rule of decision is custom. Therefore, in Haryana both under Hindu law and the Customary Law, the alienation would be open to challenge. Custom was given precedent over uncodified Hindu Law presumably for reason that custom has been consistently replacing the Hindu Law. However, it was soon realized that ancestral immovable property, which ordinarily held to be inalienable amongst Jats of Punjab by virtue of custom except for necessity, no limitation was placed on degrees of collateral, eligible to contest such alienation. It was, therefore, felt necessary to engraft certain restriction on degrees of collateral, eligible to contest an alienation, which under the custom itself was not limited. Accordingly, the Punjab Custom (Power to Contest) Act, 1920 (Act No.2 of 1920) was enacted. The Hindu Succession Act was extended to the State of Punjab.  Act 2 of Punjab Act defined expression alienation to include any testamentary disposition of property and appointment of an heir was to include any adoption made or purporting to be made according to custom. A further provision was made by Section 3 that Hindu Succession Act was to apply only in respect of alienation of immovable property or appointment of heirs made by persons who in regard to such alienation or appointment were governed by custom. Whereas  Section 4 declared that Hindu Succession Act was not to affect any right to contest any alienation or appointment of an heir made before the date on which the Succession Act was to come into force. In other words, Act, No.2 of 1920 was not to affect alienation or appointments of heir made before date on which it came into force. It also preserved the rights of any alienation or appointment of an heir made by a family. After Section 7 was inserted in Act of 1920 by the Punjab Amendment Act of 1973 right of contest being contrary to custom had been totally effaced and taken away. Therefore, no person has any right to contest any alienation of immovable property whether ancestral or non-ancestral on ground of being contrary to custom after January 23, 1973. In Haryana, the situation as enunciated by Act No.2 of 1920 continued to prevail in respect of alienation because no reforms parallel to Punjab as brought by Amendment Act of 1973, had been enacted although right to pre-emption has been substantially abolished in Haryana also. No steps even have been taken in that regard. Therefore, situation in Haryana have to be regarded as it existed under Act No. 2 of 1920.
HINDU SUCCESSION ACT,1956[C.A.No.30/1956] --  Sections 6 & 30: [Vijender Jain, C.J., M.M.Kumar, Jasbir Singh, Rajive Bhalla & Rajesh Bindal, JJ]  Alienation of coparcenary property - Law laid down by Full Bench in Joginder Singh Kundha Singh v Kehar Singh Dasaundha Singh [AIR 1965 Punjab 407] and Pritam Singh v Assistant Controller of Estate Duty, Patiala [1976 Punj LR 342] -Whether there is any conflict? - Held, The basic controversy in the Full Bench decision of Joginder Singhs case was regarding constitutional validity of Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act and as to whether it infringes Article 14 of Constitution. It was held that the estate held by male and limitation on his power of alienation were in no way removed and the reversioners were not debarred from challenging such alienations. The Full Bench held that Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act postulates that estate held by a Hindu female before enforcement of Succession Act either by inheritance or otherwise, was enlarged and on date of enforcement of Succession Act, she became a full owner. Likewise, if she has inherited any estate after the commencement of the Act,  she was to be regarded as absolute owner rather than a limited owner. Consequently, the limitations on power of alienation automatically vanished. This was the necessary result of the provisions made in Section 14 of the Act. The Full Bench further held that in respect of male proprietors, no corresponding provision was made either enlarging their estate in ancestral property or enlarging their power of alienation over property inherited by them. However, it noticed Section 30 and observed that it only deals with power of his share in coparcenary property by Will, which prior to enforcement of the Act, he had no right to do. The only provision made in respect of male proprietor regarding alienation of property was his power of alienation by Will. In so far as persons governed by custom are concerned, they continued to be governed by the restriction on the power of alienation of a male holder as existed before enforcement of the Act. Likewise, other restriction on alienation other than disposal by Will also continued. The Full Bench, thus, recognized the superior right of Hindu females by virtue of Section 14 and upheld the provision as intra vires. The argument that reversioners have ceased to exist after enactment of provisions of Section 14 of Succession Act, was rejected as there was no provision pointed out to that effect. The proposition laid down by the full Bench in Pritam Singhs case was that the Hindu Succession Act has not abolished joint Hindu family with respect to rights of those who were members of Mitakshara coparcenary, except in the manner and to the extent mentioned in Sections 6 and 30 of the Act, This Statement should also imply, though it does not say so expressly, the Succession Act to this extent does not affect the rights of the members governed by Dayabhaga coparcenary. The Full Bench in Pritam Singh;s case expressly noticed the judgment of earlier Full Bench in Joginder Singhs case but construed the same as irrelevant by observing that it dealt with the power of alienation of a person governed by Customary law and constitutional validity of Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act. Thus there is no real conflict between the two Full Bench judgments. Both the Full Bench judgments have been delivered on the assumption that Joginder Singhs case dealt with question of alienation whereas Pritam Singhs case had decided the question concerning succession. Even on fact in Joginder Singhs case the issue was validity of alienation by consent decree by a father to his two sons, which was challenged by third son, whereas in Pritam Singhs case the question of nature of property in hands of sons on death of their father had arisen  for purposes of assessment of estate duty. In Pritam  Singhs case the property in the hands of the sons was held to be coparcenary property and only 1/3rd of  property belonging to deceased father was considered eligible for estate duty. Therefore, there was no question of alienation in Pritam Singhs case. -  I do not find any infirmity in the well-reasoned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Hari Kishan and Ors. v. Administrator Municipal Committee;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal, Sr. Adv. and; Sudhir Mittal, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' M.L Sarin, Sr. Adv.,; Ashish Handa,; H.N. Mehtani an',
			'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2005-05-25',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' Ashutosh Mohunta, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Ashutosh Mohunta, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The vendee-plaintiffs have filed this appeal to challenge the judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below whereby their suit and the appeal against the partition of the land ordered by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Guhla, vide order dated 16.7.1975, were dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. In brief the facts giving rise to this appeal are that defendant-respondent Nos. 1 to 5 filed an application for partition of the suit land against Smt.Kirpal Kaur (Plaintiff No. 1) and defendant Nos. 6 to 15 in the court of Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Guhla. In that application Smt. Kirpal Kaur was proceeded against ex parte. The partition was confirmed on 16.6.1975 and the case was fixed for instrument of partition for 16.7.1975. Rai Jasbir Singh, plaintiff No. 2 purchased land measuring 80 Kanals from Smt. Kirpal Kaur (plaintiff No. 1) vide sale deed dated 27.5.1975 during the pendency of the partition proceedings and plaintiff No. 2 and 3, i.e., Rai Jasbir Singh and Swaran Singh were in actual physical possession of 228 Kanals 8 Marias and 77 Kanals 8 Marias, respectively. The plaintiffs challenged the order dated 16.7.1975 passed by the Assistant Grade, 1st Class, Guhla, by filing the present suit for declaration, which was dismissed by the Sub Judge, 1st Class, Kaithal, vide judgment and decree dated 29.1.1980 on the ground that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The plaintiffs then filed appeal to challenge the judgment and decree dated 29.1.1980 passed by the trial Court. During the pendency of the appeal, Smt. Kirpal Kaur withdrew herself from being the appellant. Consequently, vide order dated 17.1.1980 the appeal qua Kirpal Kaur was ordered to be dismissed as withdrawn. The appeal qua the remaining two appellants, i.e., Rai Jasbir Singh and Swaran Singh (present appellants) was dismissed by the Additional District Judge, Kurukshetra, vide judgment and decree dated 4.12.1981 and the decision of the trial Court with regard to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was upheld. Now Rai Jasbir Singh arid Swaran Singh have filed the present appeal wherein challenge has been made to the findings of both the Courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. It has been contended by Mr. R.S. Mittal, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the appellants, that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not duly served and, thus,the ex parte order dated 16.6.1975/16.7.1975 passed by the Assistant Collector,1st Grade, Guhla, was a nullity. It has further been argued by the learned counsel for the appellants that the Courts below erred in holding that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit against partition ordered by the Revenue Officer in view of the provisions of the <a href="/act/136769/the-punjab-land-revenue-act-1887-complete-act">Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887</a> (for short 'the Act'), despite the fact that the order for partition of the suit land was passed ex parte without serving Smt.Kirpal Kaur according to the prescribed legal procedure.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellants have been controverted by Mr. M.L.Sarin, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the respondents. It has been contended by him that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to go into the validity of the partition proceedings. The appellants have approached the Civil Court without exhausting the remedy available to them under Section 13 of the Act. It has further been contended by him that Smt. Kirpal Kaur had duly been served in the partition proceedings by sending notice to her by registered post.The counsel has also contended that she had withdrawn her appeal before the lower appellate court and in this view of the matter, the present appellants, who had purchased the land from her during the pendency of the partition proceedings, had no locus standi to challenge the order of partition passed by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. 1 have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the evidence adduced on record.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The only question that arises for consideration in the present appeal is to the following effect:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether or not the Civil Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the suit wherein the order of partition passed by a Revenue Officer has been challenged and Smt. Kirpal Kaur was properly served in the partition proceedings</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The first objection raised on behalf of the appellants is that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not served in the partition proceedings before the Assistant Collector 1st Grade, Guhla, as per the provisions contained in Section 20 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. I do not find any merit in this contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants. It is not the case of the appellants that Smt.Kirpal Kaur was not served at all. The bald statement of the plaintiffs was rebutted by the statement on oath of defendant Balwant Singh and also by documentary evidence adduced on record which shows that a registered notice was issued to her and acknowledgement due (Ex.DIO) was received in the office of the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade. Sub-section (3) of Section 20 of the Act gives discretion to the Revenue Officer to serve the concerned person 'either in addition to, or in substitution for, any other mode of service, by forwarding the summons by post in a-letter addressed' to him and registered under Part II of the Indian Post Office Act, 1886. In this view of the matter, it cannot be said that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not served as per the procedure prescribed under the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The next contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants is that the Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain the ex parte order passed by the Revenue Officer.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. This contention is also without any merit. Section 158 of the Act specifically excludes the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts in matters within the jurisdiction of the Revenue Officers. In order to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector, a provision for filing of appeals before the higher Revenue Authorities has been made in Section 13 of the Act. The plaintiffs without exhausting the remedies available to them under Section 13, approached the Civil Court to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Moreover, it has come on record that Smt. Kirpal Kaur, from whom the present appellants had purchased the land during the pendency of the partition proceedings, had withdrawn from the appeal before the lower appellate Court. As the present appellants had purchased the suit land during the pendency of the partition proceedings, they have, therefore, no locus standi to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector 1st Grade and pursue the appeal. It is not the case of the plaintiff-appellants that the ex parte decree was obtained by the defendant-respondents by fraud or misrepresentation. In A.C. Ananthaswamy and Ors. v. Boraiah (D) by Lrs. (2004-3)138 Punjab Law Reporter 557, it has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that in the absence of any fraud or misrepresentation, an ex parte order on the bare plea of non-service cannot be set aside. In the present case it is an undisputed fact that registered notice (Ex.DIO) was issued to Smt. Kirpal Kaur and she had even filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order passed by the Assistant Collector. The ratio of the authority Firm Seth Radha Kishun (deceased) represented by Hari Kishan and Ors. v. Administrator Municipal Committee, Ludhiana : [1964]2SCR273 , that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not specifically ousted where a statute created a liability and provided a remedy, is not applicable to the facts appearing in the present case. In the present case, as already mentioned above, registered A.D. notice was issued to and served on Smt. Kirpal Kaur, who had thereafter, filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Both the courts below have given concurrent findings of fact which cannot be interfered with in the second appeal in view of the provisions of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as no substantial question of law has either been pleaded in the memorandum of appeal or arises for consideration in the present appeal. I do not find any infirmity in the well-reasoned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Consequently, there is no merit in this appeal. It is, accordingly, dismissed. However, I do no make any order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '(2006)142PLR339',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Balwant Singh and ors.',
			'sub' => 'Property',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'rai-jasbir-singh-vs-balwant',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '629369',
		(int) 1 => 'rai-jasbir-singh-vs-balwant'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Rai Jasbir Singh and anr Vs Balwant Singh and ors - Citation 629369 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '629369',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/136769/the-punjab-land-revenue-act-1887-complete-act">Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887</a> - Sections 13, 20, 20(3) and 158; Indian Post Office Act, 1886; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) - Sections 100',
		'appealno' => 'Regular Second Appeal No. 615 of 1982 (O and M)',
		'appellant' => 'Rai Jasbir Singh and anr.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Rai Jasbir Singh and anr. Vs. Balwant Singh and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' - HINDU LAW -- Custom: [Vijender Jain, C.J., M.M. Kumar, Jasbir Singh, Rajive Bhalla & Rajesh Bindal, JJ] Alienation of ancestral property - Punjab and Haryana -  Held, In respect of State of Punjab by virtue of Punjab Amendment Act, 1973 there is a complete bar to contest any alienation of ancestral or non-ancestral immovable property or appointment of an heir to such property on ground that such alienation or appointment was contrary to custom. In Punjab the property in hands of a successor has to be treated as coparcenary property and its alienation has to be governed by Hindu Law except to the extent it is regulated by Sections 6 and 30 of the Hindu Succession Act. In Haryana, property  in hands of successor has to be treated as coparcenary property as well as ancestral property. Parties can fall back upon Hindu Law in case they fail to establish that rule of decision is custom. Therefore, in Haryana both under Hindu law and the Customary Law, the alienation would be open to challenge. Custom was given precedent over uncodified Hindu Law presumably for reason that custom has been consistently replacing the Hindu Law. However, it was soon realized that ancestral immovable property, which ordinarily held to be inalienable amongst Jats of Punjab by virtue of custom except for necessity, no limitation was placed on degrees of collateral, eligible to contest such alienation. It was, therefore, felt necessary to engraft certain restriction on degrees of collateral, eligible to contest an alienation, which under the custom itself was not limited. Accordingly, the Punjab Custom (Power to Contest) Act, 1920 (Act No.2 of 1920) was enacted. The Hindu Succession Act was extended to the State of Punjab.  Act 2 of Punjab Act defined expression alienation to include any testamentary disposition of property and appointment of an heir was to include any adoption made or purporting to be made according to custom. A further provision was made by Section 3 that Hindu Succession Act was to apply only in respect of alienation of immovable property or appointment of heirs made by persons who in regard to such alienation or appointment were governed by custom. Whereas  Section 4 declared that Hindu Succession Act was not to affect any right to contest any alienation or appointment of an heir made before the date on which the Succession Act was to come into force. In other words, Act, No.2 of 1920 was not to affect alienation or appointments of heir made before date on which it came into force. It also preserved the rights of any alienation or appointment of an heir made by a family. After Section 7 was inserted in Act of 1920 by the Punjab Amendment Act of 1973 right of contest being contrary to custom had been totally effaced and taken away. Therefore, no person has any right to contest any alienation of immovable property whether ancestral or non-ancestral on ground of being contrary to custom after January 23, 1973. In Haryana, the situation as enunciated by Act No.2 of 1920 continued to prevail in respect of alienation because no reforms parallel to Punjab as brought by Amendment Act of 1973, had been enacted although right to pre-emption has been substantially abolished in Haryana also. No steps even have been taken in that regard. Therefore, situation in Haryana have to be regarded as it existed under Act No. 2 of 1920.
HINDU SUCCESSION ACT,1956[C.A.No.30/1956] --  Sections 6 & 30: [Vijender Jain, C.J., M.M.Kumar, Jasbir Singh, Rajive Bhalla & Rajesh Bindal, JJ]  Alienation of coparcenary property - Law laid down by Full Bench in Joginder Singh Kundha Singh v Kehar Singh Dasaundha Singh [AIR 1965 Punjab 407] and Pritam Singh v Assistant Controller of Estate Duty, Patiala [1976 Punj LR 342] -Whether there is any conflict? - Held, The basic controversy in the Full Bench decision of Joginder Singhs case was regarding constitutional validity of Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act and as to whether it infringes Article 14 of Constitution. It was held that the estate held by male and limitation on his power of alienation were in no way removed and the reversioners were not debarred from challenging such alienations. The Full Bench held that Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act postulates that estate held by a Hindu female before enforcement of Succession Act either by inheritance or otherwise, was enlarged and on date of enforcement of Succession Act, she became a full owner. Likewise, if she has inherited any estate after the commencement of the Act,  she was to be regarded as absolute owner rather than a limited owner. Consequently, the limitations on power of alienation automatically vanished. This was the necessary result of the provisions made in Section 14 of the Act. The Full Bench further held that in respect of male proprietors, no corresponding provision was made either enlarging their estate in ancestral property or enlarging their power of alienation over property inherited by them. However, it noticed Section 30 and observed that it only deals with power of his share in coparcenary property by Will, which prior to enforcement of the Act, he had no right to do. The only provision made in respect of male proprietor regarding alienation of property was his power of alienation by Will. In so far as persons governed by custom are concerned, they continued to be governed by the restriction on the power of alienation of a male holder as existed before enforcement of the Act. Likewise, other restriction on alienation other than disposal by Will also continued. The Full Bench, thus, recognized the superior right of Hindu females by virtue of Section 14 and upheld the provision as intra vires. The argument that reversioners have ceased to exist after enactment of provisions of Section 14 of Succession Act, was rejected as there was no provision pointed out to that effect. The proposition laid down by the full Bench in Pritam Singhs case was that the Hindu Succession Act has not abolished joint Hindu family with respect to rights of those who were members of Mitakshara coparcenary, except in the manner and to the extent mentioned in Sections 6 and 30 of the Act, This Statement should also imply, though it does not say so expressly, the Succession Act to this extent does not affect the rights of the members governed by Dayabhaga coparcenary. The Full Bench in Pritam Singh;s case expressly noticed the judgment of earlier Full Bench in Joginder Singhs case but construed the same as irrelevant by observing that it dealt with the power of alienation of a person governed by Customary law and constitutional validity of Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act. Thus there is no real conflict between the two Full Bench judgments. Both the Full Bench judgments have been delivered on the assumption that Joginder Singhs case dealt with question of alienation whereas Pritam Singhs case had decided the question concerning succession. Even on fact in Joginder Singhs case the issue was validity of alienation by consent decree by a father to his two sons, which was challenged by third son, whereas in Pritam Singhs case the question of nature of property in hands of sons on death of their father had arisen  for purposes of assessment of estate duty. In Pritam  Singhs case the property in the hands of the sons was held to be coparcenary property and only 1/3rd of  property belonging to deceased father was considered eligible for estate duty. Therefore, there was no question of alienation in Pritam Singhs case. -  I do not find any infirmity in the well-reasoned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Hari Kishan and Ors. v. Administrator Municipal Committee;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal, Sr. Adv. and; Sudhir Mittal, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' M.L Sarin, Sr. Adv.,; Ashish Handa,; H.N. Mehtani an',
		'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2005-05-25',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Ashutosh Mohunta, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Ashutosh Mohunta, J.</p><p>1. The vendee-plaintiffs have filed this appeal to challenge the judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below whereby their suit and the appeal against the partition of the land ordered by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Guhla, vide order dated 16.7.1975, were dismissed.</p><p>2. In brief the facts giving rise to this appeal are that defendant-respondent Nos. 1 to 5 filed an application for partition of the suit land against Smt.Kirpal Kaur (Plaintiff No. 1) and defendant Nos. 6 to 15 in the court of Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Guhla. In that application Smt. Kirpal Kaur was proceeded against ex parte. The partition was confirmed on 16.6.1975 and the case was fixed for instrument of partition for 16.7.1975. Rai Jasbir Singh, plaintiff No. 2 purchased land measuring 80 Kanals from Smt. Kirpal Kaur (plaintiff No. 1) vide sale deed dated 27.5.1975 during the pendency of the partition proceedings and plaintiff No. 2 and 3, i.e., Rai Jasbir Singh and Swaran Singh were in actual physical possession of 228 Kanals 8 Marias and 77 Kanals 8 Marias, respectively. The plaintiffs challenged the order dated 16.7.1975 passed by the Assistant Grade, 1st Class, Guhla, by filing the present suit for declaration, which was dismissed by the Sub Judge, 1st Class, Kaithal, vide judgment and decree dated 29.1.1980 on the ground that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The plaintiffs then filed appeal to challenge the judgment and decree dated 29.1.1980 passed by the trial Court. During the pendency of the appeal, Smt. Kirpal Kaur withdrew herself from being the appellant. Consequently, vide order dated 17.1.1980 the appeal qua Kirpal Kaur was ordered to be dismissed as withdrawn. The appeal qua the remaining two appellants, i.e., Rai Jasbir Singh and Swaran Singh (present appellants) was dismissed by the Additional District Judge, Kurukshetra, vide judgment and decree dated 4.12.1981 and the decision of the trial Court with regard to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was upheld. Now Rai Jasbir Singh arid Swaran Singh have filed the present appeal wherein challenge has been made to the findings of both the Courts below.</p><p>3. It has been contended by Mr. R.S. Mittal, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the appellants, that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not duly served and, thus,the ex parte order dated 16.6.1975/16.7.1975 passed by the Assistant Collector,1st Grade, Guhla, was a nullity. It has further been argued by the learned counsel for the appellants that the Courts below erred in holding that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit against partition ordered by the Revenue Officer in view of the provisions of the <a>Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887</a> (for short 'the Act'), despite the fact that the order for partition of the suit land was passed ex parte without serving Smt.Kirpal Kaur according to the prescribed legal procedure.</p><p>4. The contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellants have been controverted by Mr. M.L.Sarin, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the respondents. It has been contended by him that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to go into the validity of the partition proceedings. The appellants have approached the Civil Court without exhausting the remedy available to them under Section 13 of the Act. It has further been contended by him that Smt. Kirpal Kaur had duly been served in the partition proceedings by sending notice to her by registered post.The counsel has also contended that she had withdrawn her appeal before the lower appellate court and in this view of the matter, the present appellants, who had purchased the land from her during the pendency of the partition proceedings, had no locus standi to challenge the order of partition passed by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade.</p><p>5. 1 have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the evidence adduced on record.</p><p>6. The only question that arises for consideration in the present appeal is to the following effect:-</p><p>Whether or not the Civil Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the suit wherein the order of partition passed by a Revenue Officer has been challenged and Smt. Kirpal Kaur was properly served in the partition proceedings</p><p>7. The first objection raised on behalf of the appellants is that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not served in the partition proceedings before the Assistant Collector 1st Grade, Guhla, as per the provisions contained in Section 20 of the Act.</p><p>8. I do not find any merit in this contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants. It is not the case of the appellants that Smt.Kirpal Kaur was not served at all. The bald statement of the plaintiffs was rebutted by the statement on oath of defendant Balwant Singh and also by documentary evidence adduced on record which shows that a registered notice was issued to her and acknowledgement due (Ex.DIO) was received in the office of the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade. Sub-section (3) of Section 20 of the Act gives discretion to the Revenue Officer to serve the concerned person 'either in addition to, or in substitution for, any other mode of service, by forwarding the summons by post in a-letter addressed' to him and registered under Part II of the Indian Post Office Act, 1886. In this view of the matter, it cannot be said that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not served as per the procedure prescribed under the Act.</p><p>9. The next contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants is that the Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain the ex parte order passed by the Revenue Officer.</p><p>10. This contention is also without any merit. Section 158 of the Act specifically excludes the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts in matters within the jurisdiction of the Revenue Officers. In order to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector, a provision for filing of appeals before the higher Revenue Authorities has been made in Section 13 of the Act. The plaintiffs without exhausting the remedies available to them under Section 13, approached the Civil Court to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector.</p><p>11. Moreover, it has come on record that Smt. Kirpal Kaur, from whom the present appellants had purchased the land during the pendency of the partition proceedings, had withdrawn from the appeal before the lower appellate Court. As the present appellants had purchased the suit land during the pendency of the partition proceedings, they have, therefore, no locus standi to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector 1st Grade and pursue the appeal. It is not the case of the plaintiff-appellants that the ex parte decree was obtained by the defendant-respondents by fraud or misrepresentation. In A.C. Ananthaswamy and Ors. v. Boraiah (D) by Lrs. (2004-3)138 Punjab Law Reporter 557, it has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that in the absence of any fraud or misrepresentation, an ex parte order on the bare plea of non-service cannot be set aside. In the present case it is an undisputed fact that registered notice (Ex.DIO) was issued to Smt. Kirpal Kaur and she had even filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order passed by the Assistant Collector. The ratio of the authority Firm Seth Radha Kishun (deceased) represented by Hari Kishan and Ors. v. Administrator Municipal Committee, Ludhiana : [1964]2SCR273 , that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not specifically ousted where a statute created a liability and provided a remedy, is not applicable to the facts appearing in the present case. In the present case, as already mentioned above, registered A.D. notice was issued to and served on Smt. Kirpal Kaur, who had thereafter, filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order.</p><p>12. Both the courts below have given concurrent findings of fact which cannot be interfered with in the second appeal in view of the provisions of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as no substantial question of law has either been pleaded in the memorandum of appeal or arises for consideration in the present appeal. I do not find any infirmity in the well-reasoned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below.</p><p>13. Consequently, there is no merit in this appeal. It is, accordingly, dismissed. However, I do no make any order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
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		'respondent' => 'Balwant Singh and ors.',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Ashutosh Mohunta, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The vendee-plaintiffs have filed this appeal to challenge the judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below whereby their suit and the appeal against the partition of the land ordered by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Guhla, vide order dated 16.7.1975, were dismissed.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. In brief the facts giving rise to this appeal are that defendant-respondent Nos. 1 to 5 filed an application for partition of the suit land against Smt.Kirpal Kaur (Plaintiff No. 1) and defendant Nos. 6 to 15 in the court of Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Guhla. In that application Smt. Kirpal Kaur was proceeded against ex parte. The partition was confirmed on 16.6.1975 and the case was fixed for instrument of partition for 16.7.1975. Rai Jasbir Singh, plaintiff No. 2 purchased land measuring 80 Kanals from Smt. Kirpal Kaur (plaintiff No. 1) vide sale deed dated 27.5.1975 during the pendency of the partition proceedings and plaintiff No. 2 and 3, i.e., Rai Jasbir Singh and Swaran Singh were in actual physical possession of 228 Kanals 8 Marias and 77 Kanals 8 Marias, respectively. The plaintiffs challenged the order dated 16.7.1975 passed by the Assistant Grade, 1st Class, Guhla, by filing the present suit for declaration, which was dismissed by the Sub Judge, 1st Class, Kaithal, vide judgment and decree dated 29.1.1980 on the ground that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The plaintiffs then filed appeal to challenge the judgment and decree dated 29.1.1980 passed by the trial Court. During the pendency of the appeal, Smt. Kirpal Kaur withdrew herself from being the appellant. Consequently, vide order dated 17.1.1980 the appeal qua Kirpal Kaur was ordered to be dismissed as withdrawn. The appeal qua the remaining two appellants, i.e., Rai Jasbir Singh and Swaran Singh (present appellants) was dismissed by the Additional District Judge, Kurukshetra, vide judgment and decree dated 4.12.1981 and the decision of the trial Court with regard to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was upheld. Now Rai Jasbir Singh arid Swaran Singh have filed the present appeal wherein challenge has been made to the findings of both the Courts below.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. It has been contended by Mr. R.S. Mittal, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the appellants, that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not duly served and, thus,the ex parte order dated 16.6.1975/16.7.1975 passed by the Assistant Collector,1st Grade, Guhla, was a nullity. It has further been argued by the learned counsel for the appellants that the Courts below erred in holding that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit against partition ordered by the Revenue Officer in view of the provisions of the <a>Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887</a> (for short 'the Act'), despite the fact that the order for partition of the suit land was passed ex parte without serving Smt.Kirpal Kaur according to the prescribed legal procedure.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. The contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellants have been controverted by Mr. M.L.Sarin, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the respondents. It has been contended by him that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to go into the validity of the partition proceedings. The appellants have approached the Civil Court without exhausting the remedy available to them under Section 13 of the Act. It has further been contended by him that Smt. Kirpal Kaur had duly been served in the partition proceedings by sending notice to her by registered post.The counsel has also contended that she had withdrawn her appeal before the lower appellate court and in this view of the matter, the present appellants, who had purchased the land from her during the pendency of the partition proceedings, had no locus standi to challenge the order of partition passed by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. 1 have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the evidence adduced on record.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. The only question that arises for consideration in the present appeal is to the following effect:-',
	(int) 7 => '<p>Whether or not the Civil Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the suit wherein the order of partition passed by a Revenue Officer has been challenged and Smt. Kirpal Kaur was properly served in the partition proceedings',
	(int) 8 => '<p>7. The first objection raised on behalf of the appellants is that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not served in the partition proceedings before the Assistant Collector 1st Grade, Guhla, as per the provisions contained in Section 20 of the Act.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>8. I do not find any merit in this contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants. It is not the case of the appellants that Smt.Kirpal Kaur was not served at all. The bald statement of the plaintiffs was rebutted by the statement on oath of defendant Balwant Singh and also by documentary evidence adduced on record which shows that a registered notice was issued to her and acknowledgement due (Ex.DIO) was received in the office of the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade. Sub-section (3) of Section 20 of the Act gives discretion to the Revenue Officer to serve the concerned person 'either in addition to, or in substitution for, any other mode of service, by forwarding the summons by post in a-letter addressed' to him and registered under Part II of the Indian Post Office Act, 1886. In this view of the matter, it cannot be said that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not served as per the procedure prescribed under the Act.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>9. The next contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants is that the Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain the ex parte order passed by the Revenue Officer.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>10. This contention is also without any merit. Section 158 of the Act specifically excludes the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts in matters within the jurisdiction of the Revenue Officers. In order to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector, a provision for filing of appeals before the higher Revenue Authorities has been made in Section 13 of the Act. The plaintiffs without exhausting the remedies available to them under Section 13, approached the Civil Court to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>11. Moreover, it has come on record that Smt. Kirpal Kaur, from whom the present appellants had purchased the land during the pendency of the partition proceedings, had withdrawn from the appeal before the lower appellate Court. As the present appellants had purchased the suit land during the pendency of the partition proceedings, they have, therefore, no locus standi to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector 1st Grade and pursue the appeal. It is not the case of the plaintiff-appellants that the ex parte decree was obtained by the defendant-respondents by fraud or misrepresentation. In A.C. Ananthaswamy and Ors. v. Boraiah (D) by Lrs. (2004-3)138 Punjab Law Reporter 557, it has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that in the absence of any fraud or misrepresentation, an ex parte order on the bare plea of non-service cannot be set aside. In the present case it is an undisputed fact that registered notice (Ex.DIO) was issued to Smt. Kirpal Kaur and she had even filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order passed by the Assistant Collector. The ratio of the authority Firm Seth Radha Kishun (deceased) represented by Hari Kishan and Ors. v. Administrator Municipal Committee, Ludhiana : [1964]2SCR273 , that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not specifically ousted where a statute created a liability and provided a remedy, is not applicable to the facts appearing in the present case. In the present case, as already mentioned above, registered A.D. notice was issued to and served on Smt. Kirpal Kaur, who had thereafter, filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>12. Both the courts below have given concurrent findings of fact which cannot be interfered with in the second appeal in view of the provisions of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as no substantial question of law has either been pleaded in the memorandum of appeal or arises for consideration in the present appeal. I do not find any infirmity in the well-reasoned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>13. Consequently, there is no merit in this appeal. It is, accordingly, dismissed. However, I do no make any order as to costs.<p>',
	(int) 15 => '<p>'
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8. I do not find any merit in this contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants. It is not the case of the appellants that Smt.Kirpal Kaur was not served at all. The bald statement of the plaintiffs was rebutted by the statement on oath of defendant Balwant Singh and also by documentary evidence adduced on record which shows that a registered notice was issued to her and acknowledgement due (Ex.DIO) was received in the office of the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade. Sub-section (3) of Section 20 of the Act gives discretion to the Revenue Officer to serve the concerned person 'either in addition to, or in substitution for, any other mode of service, by forwarding the summons by post in a-letter addressed' to him and registered under Part II of the Indian Post Office Act, 1886. In this view of the matter, it cannot be said that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not served as per the procedure prescribed under the Act.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Rai Jasbir Singh and anr Vs Balwant Singh and ors - Citation 629369 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '629369',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/136769/the-punjab-land-revenue-act-1887-complete-act">Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887</a> - Sections 13, 20, 20(3) and 158; Indian Post Office Act, 1886; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) - Sections 100',
			'appealno' => 'Regular Second Appeal No. 615 of 1982 (O and M)',
			'appellant' => 'Rai Jasbir Singh and anr.',
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			'casename' => 'Rai Jasbir Singh and anr. Vs. Balwant Singh and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' - HINDU LAW -- Custom: [Vijender Jain, C.J., M.M. Kumar, Jasbir Singh, Rajive Bhalla & Rajesh Bindal, JJ] Alienation of ancestral property - Punjab and Haryana -  Held, In respect of State of Punjab by virtue of Punjab Amendment Act, 1973 there is a complete bar to contest any alienation of ancestral or non-ancestral immovable property or appointment of an heir to such property on ground that such alienation or appointment was contrary to custom. In Punjab the property in hands of a successor has to be treated as coparcenary property and its alienation has to be governed by Hindu Law except to the extent it is regulated by Sections 6 and 30 of the Hindu Succession Act. In Haryana, property  in hands of successor has to be treated as coparcenary property as well as ancestral property. Parties can fall back upon Hindu Law in case they fail to establish that rule of decision is custom. Therefore, in Haryana both under Hindu law and the Customary Law, the alienation would be open to challenge. Custom was given precedent over uncodified Hindu Law presumably for reason that custom has been consistently replacing the Hindu Law. However, it was soon realized that ancestral immovable property, which ordinarily held to be inalienable amongst Jats of Punjab by virtue of custom except for necessity, no limitation was placed on degrees of collateral, eligible to contest such alienation. It was, therefore, felt necessary to engraft certain restriction on degrees of collateral, eligible to contest an alienation, which under the custom itself was not limited. Accordingly, the Punjab Custom (Power to Contest) Act, 1920 (Act No.2 of 1920) was enacted. The Hindu Succession Act was extended to the State of Punjab.  Act 2 of Punjab Act defined expression alienation to include any testamentary disposition of property and appointment of an heir was to include any adoption made or purporting to be made according to custom. A further provision was made by Section 3 that Hindu Succession Act was to apply only in respect of alienation of immovable property or appointment of heirs made by persons who in regard to such alienation or appointment were governed by custom. Whereas  Section 4 declared that Hindu Succession Act was not to affect any right to contest any alienation or appointment of an heir made before the date on which the Succession Act was to come into force. In other words, Act, No.2 of 1920 was not to affect alienation or appointments of heir made before date on which it came into force. It also preserved the rights of any alienation or appointment of an heir made by a family. After Section 7 was inserted in Act of 1920 by the Punjab Amendment Act of 1973 right of contest being contrary to custom had been totally effaced and taken away. Therefore, no person has any right to contest any alienation of immovable property whether ancestral or non-ancestral on ground of being contrary to custom after January 23, 1973. In Haryana, the situation as enunciated by Act No.2 of 1920 continued to prevail in respect of alienation because no reforms parallel to Punjab as brought by Amendment Act of 1973, had been enacted although right to pre-emption has been substantially abolished in Haryana also. No steps even have been taken in that regard. Therefore, situation in Haryana have to be regarded as it existed under Act No. 2 of 1920.
HINDU SUCCESSION ACT,1956[C.A.No.30/1956] --  Sections 6 & 30: [Vijender Jain, C.J., M.M.Kumar, Jasbir Singh, Rajive Bhalla & Rajesh Bindal, JJ]  Alienation of coparcenary property - Law laid down by Full Bench in Joginder Singh Kundha Singh v Kehar Singh Dasaundha Singh [AIR 1965 Punjab 407] and Pritam Singh v Assistant Controller of Estate Duty, Patiala [1976 Punj LR 342] -Whether there is any conflict? - Held, The basic controversy in the Full Bench decision of Joginder Singhs case was regarding constitutional validity of Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act and as to whether it infringes Article 14 of Constitution. It was held that the estate held by male and limitation on his power of alienation were in no way removed and the reversioners were not debarred from challenging such alienations. The Full Bench held that Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act postulates that estate held by a Hindu female before enforcement of Succession Act either by inheritance or otherwise, was enlarged and on date of enforcement of Succession Act, she became a full owner. Likewise, if she has inherited any estate after the commencement of the Act,  she was to be regarded as absolute owner rather than a limited owner. Consequently, the limitations on power of alienation automatically vanished. This was the necessary result of the provisions made in Section 14 of the Act. The Full Bench further held that in respect of male proprietors, no corresponding provision was made either enlarging their estate in ancestral property or enlarging their power of alienation over property inherited by them. However, it noticed Section 30 and observed that it only deals with power of his share in coparcenary property by Will, which prior to enforcement of the Act, he had no right to do. The only provision made in respect of male proprietor regarding alienation of property was his power of alienation by Will. In so far as persons governed by custom are concerned, they continued to be governed by the restriction on the power of alienation of a male holder as existed before enforcement of the Act. Likewise, other restriction on alienation other than disposal by Will also continued. The Full Bench, thus, recognized the superior right of Hindu females by virtue of Section 14 and upheld the provision as intra vires. The argument that reversioners have ceased to exist after enactment of provisions of Section 14 of Succession Act, was rejected as there was no provision pointed out to that effect. The proposition laid down by the full Bench in Pritam Singhs case was that the Hindu Succession Act has not abolished joint Hindu family with respect to rights of those who were members of Mitakshara coparcenary, except in the manner and to the extent mentioned in Sections 6 and 30 of the Act, This Statement should also imply, though it does not say so expressly, the Succession Act to this extent does not affect the rights of the members governed by Dayabhaga coparcenary. The Full Bench in Pritam Singh;s case expressly noticed the judgment of earlier Full Bench in Joginder Singhs case but construed the same as irrelevant by observing that it dealt with the power of alienation of a person governed by Customary law and constitutional validity of Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act. Thus there is no real conflict between the two Full Bench judgments. Both the Full Bench judgments have been delivered on the assumption that Joginder Singhs case dealt with question of alienation whereas Pritam Singhs case had decided the question concerning succession. Even on fact in Joginder Singhs case the issue was validity of alienation by consent decree by a father to his two sons, which was challenged by third son, whereas in Pritam Singhs case the question of nature of property in hands of sons on death of their father had arisen  for purposes of assessment of estate duty. In Pritam  Singhs case the property in the hands of the sons was held to be coparcenary property and only 1/3rd of  property belonging to deceased father was considered eligible for estate duty. Therefore, there was no question of alienation in Pritam Singhs case. -  I do not find any infirmity in the well-reasoned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Hari Kishan and Ors. v. Administrator Municipal Committee;',
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			'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal, Sr. Adv. and; Sudhir Mittal, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' M.L Sarin, Sr. Adv.,; Ashish Handa,; H.N. Mehtani an',
			'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2005-05-25',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' Ashutosh Mohunta, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Ashutosh Mohunta, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The vendee-plaintiffs have filed this appeal to challenge the judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below whereby their suit and the appeal against the partition of the land ordered by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Guhla, vide order dated 16.7.1975, were dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. In brief the facts giving rise to this appeal are that defendant-respondent Nos. 1 to 5 filed an application for partition of the suit land against Smt.Kirpal Kaur (Plaintiff No. 1) and defendant Nos. 6 to 15 in the court of Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Guhla. In that application Smt. Kirpal Kaur was proceeded against ex parte. The partition was confirmed on 16.6.1975 and the case was fixed for instrument of partition for 16.7.1975. Rai Jasbir Singh, plaintiff No. 2 purchased land measuring 80 Kanals from Smt. Kirpal Kaur (plaintiff No. 1) vide sale deed dated 27.5.1975 during the pendency of the partition proceedings and plaintiff No. 2 and 3, i.e., Rai Jasbir Singh and Swaran Singh were in actual physical possession of 228 Kanals 8 Marias and 77 Kanals 8 Marias, respectively. The plaintiffs challenged the order dated 16.7.1975 passed by the Assistant Grade, 1st Class, Guhla, by filing the present suit for declaration, which was dismissed by the Sub Judge, 1st Class, Kaithal, vide judgment and decree dated 29.1.1980 on the ground that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The plaintiffs then filed appeal to challenge the judgment and decree dated 29.1.1980 passed by the trial Court. During the pendency of the appeal, Smt. Kirpal Kaur withdrew herself from being the appellant. Consequently, vide order dated 17.1.1980 the appeal qua Kirpal Kaur was ordered to be dismissed as withdrawn. The appeal qua the remaining two appellants, i.e., Rai Jasbir Singh and Swaran Singh (present appellants) was dismissed by the Additional District Judge, Kurukshetra, vide judgment and decree dated 4.12.1981 and the decision of the trial Court with regard to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was upheld. Now Rai Jasbir Singh arid Swaran Singh have filed the present appeal wherein challenge has been made to the findings of both the Courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. It has been contended by Mr. R.S. Mittal, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the appellants, that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not duly served and, thus,the ex parte order dated 16.6.1975/16.7.1975 passed by the Assistant Collector,1st Grade, Guhla, was a nullity. It has further been argued by the learned counsel for the appellants that the Courts below erred in holding that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit against partition ordered by the Revenue Officer in view of the provisions of the <a href="/act/136769/the-punjab-land-revenue-act-1887-complete-act">Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887</a> (for short 'the Act'), despite the fact that the order for partition of the suit land was passed ex parte without serving Smt.Kirpal Kaur according to the prescribed legal procedure.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellants have been controverted by Mr. M.L.Sarin, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the respondents. It has been contended by him that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to go into the validity of the partition proceedings. The appellants have approached the Civil Court without exhausting the remedy available to them under Section 13 of the Act. It has further been contended by him that Smt. Kirpal Kaur had duly been served in the partition proceedings by sending notice to her by registered post.The counsel has also contended that she had withdrawn her appeal before the lower appellate court and in this view of the matter, the present appellants, who had purchased the land from her during the pendency of the partition proceedings, had no locus standi to challenge the order of partition passed by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. 1 have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the evidence adduced on record.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The only question that arises for consideration in the present appeal is to the following effect:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether or not the Civil Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the suit wherein the order of partition passed by a Revenue Officer has been challenged and Smt. Kirpal Kaur was properly served in the partition proceedings</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The first objection raised on behalf of the appellants is that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not served in the partition proceedings before the Assistant Collector 1st Grade, Guhla, as per the provisions contained in Section 20 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. I do not find any merit in this contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants. It is not the case of the appellants that Smt.Kirpal Kaur was not served at all. The bald statement of the plaintiffs was rebutted by the statement on oath of defendant Balwant Singh and also by documentary evidence adduced on record which shows that a registered notice was issued to her and acknowledgement due (Ex.DIO) was received in the office of the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade. Sub-section (3) of Section 20 of the Act gives discretion to the Revenue Officer to serve the concerned person 'either in addition to, or in substitution for, any other mode of service, by forwarding the summons by post in a-letter addressed' to him and registered under Part II of the Indian Post Office Act, 1886. In this view of the matter, it cannot be said that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not served as per the procedure prescribed under the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The next contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants is that the Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain the ex parte order passed by the Revenue Officer.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. This contention is also without any merit. Section 158 of the Act specifically excludes the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts in matters within the jurisdiction of the Revenue Officers. In order to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector, a provision for filing of appeals before the higher Revenue Authorities has been made in Section 13 of the Act. The plaintiffs without exhausting the remedies available to them under Section 13, approached the Civil Court to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Moreover, it has come on record that Smt. Kirpal Kaur, from whom the present appellants had purchased the land during the pendency of the partition proceedings, had withdrawn from the appeal before the lower appellate Court. As the present appellants had purchased the suit land during the pendency of the partition proceedings, they have, therefore, no locus standi to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector 1st Grade and pursue the appeal. It is not the case of the plaintiff-appellants that the ex parte decree was obtained by the defendant-respondents by fraud or misrepresentation. In A.C. Ananthaswamy and Ors. v. Boraiah (D) by Lrs. (2004-3)138 Punjab Law Reporter 557, it has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that in the absence of any fraud or misrepresentation, an ex parte order on the bare plea of non-service cannot be set aside. In the present case it is an undisputed fact that registered notice (Ex.DIO) was issued to Smt. Kirpal Kaur and she had even filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order passed by the Assistant Collector. The ratio of the authority Firm Seth Radha Kishun (deceased) represented by Hari Kishan and Ors. v. Administrator Municipal Committee, Ludhiana : [1964]2SCR273 , that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not specifically ousted where a statute created a liability and provided a remedy, is not applicable to the facts appearing in the present case. In the present case, as already mentioned above, registered A.D. notice was issued to and served on Smt. Kirpal Kaur, who had thereafter, filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Both the courts below have given concurrent findings of fact which cannot be interfered with in the second appeal in view of the provisions of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as no substantial question of law has either been pleaded in the memorandum of appeal or arises for consideration in the present appeal. I do not find any infirmity in the well-reasoned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Consequently, there is no merit in this appeal. It is, accordingly, dismissed. However, I do no make any order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'casename' => 'Rai Jasbir Singh and anr. Vs. Balwant Singh and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' - HINDU LAW -- Custom: [Vijender Jain, C.J., M.M. Kumar, Jasbir Singh, Rajive Bhalla & Rajesh Bindal, JJ] Alienation of ancestral property - Punjab and Haryana -  Held, In respect of State of Punjab by virtue of Punjab Amendment Act, 1973 there is a complete bar to contest any alienation of ancestral or non-ancestral immovable property or appointment of an heir to such property on ground that such alienation or appointment was contrary to custom. In Punjab the property in hands of a successor has to be treated as coparcenary property and its alienation has to be governed by Hindu Law except to the extent it is regulated by Sections 6 and 30 of the Hindu Succession Act. In Haryana, property  in hands of successor has to be treated as coparcenary property as well as ancestral property. Parties can fall back upon Hindu Law in case they fail to establish that rule of decision is custom. Therefore, in Haryana both under Hindu law and the Customary Law, the alienation would be open to challenge. Custom was given precedent over uncodified Hindu Law presumably for reason that custom has been consistently replacing the Hindu Law. However, it was soon realized that ancestral immovable property, which ordinarily held to be inalienable amongst Jats of Punjab by virtue of custom except for necessity, no limitation was placed on degrees of collateral, eligible to contest such alienation. It was, therefore, felt necessary to engraft certain restriction on degrees of collateral, eligible to contest an alienation, which under the custom itself was not limited. Accordingly, the Punjab Custom (Power to Contest) Act, 1920 (Act No.2 of 1920) was enacted. The Hindu Succession Act was extended to the State of Punjab.  Act 2 of Punjab Act defined expression alienation to include any testamentary disposition of property and appointment of an heir was to include any adoption made or purporting to be made according to custom. A further provision was made by Section 3 that Hindu Succession Act was to apply only in respect of alienation of immovable property or appointment of heirs made by persons who in regard to such alienation or appointment were governed by custom. Whereas  Section 4 declared that Hindu Succession Act was not to affect any right to contest any alienation or appointment of an heir made before the date on which the Succession Act was to come into force. In other words, Act, No.2 of 1920 was not to affect alienation or appointments of heir made before date on which it came into force. It also preserved the rights of any alienation or appointment of an heir made by a family. After Section 7 was inserted in Act of 1920 by the Punjab Amendment Act of 1973 right of contest being contrary to custom had been totally effaced and taken away. Therefore, no person has any right to contest any alienation of immovable property whether ancestral or non-ancestral on ground of being contrary to custom after January 23, 1973. In Haryana, the situation as enunciated by Act No.2 of 1920 continued to prevail in respect of alienation because no reforms parallel to Punjab as brought by Amendment Act of 1973, had been enacted although right to pre-emption has been substantially abolished in Haryana also. No steps even have been taken in that regard. Therefore, situation in Haryana have to be regarded as it existed under Act No. 2 of 1920.
HINDU SUCCESSION ACT,1956[C.A.No.30/1956] --  Sections 6 & 30: [Vijender Jain, C.J., M.M.Kumar, Jasbir Singh, Rajive Bhalla & Rajesh Bindal, JJ]  Alienation of coparcenary property - Law laid down by Full Bench in Joginder Singh Kundha Singh v Kehar Singh Dasaundha Singh [AIR 1965 Punjab 407] and Pritam Singh v Assistant Controller of Estate Duty, Patiala [1976 Punj LR 342] -Whether there is any conflict? - Held, The basic controversy in the Full Bench decision of Joginder Singhs case was regarding constitutional validity of Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act and as to whether it infringes Article 14 of Constitution. It was held that the estate held by male and limitation on his power of alienation were in no way removed and the reversioners were not debarred from challenging such alienations. The Full Bench held that Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act postulates that estate held by a Hindu female before enforcement of Succession Act either by inheritance or otherwise, was enlarged and on date of enforcement of Succession Act, she became a full owner. Likewise, if she has inherited any estate after the commencement of the Act,  she was to be regarded as absolute owner rather than a limited owner. Consequently, the limitations on power of alienation automatically vanished. This was the necessary result of the provisions made in Section 14 of the Act. The Full Bench further held that in respect of male proprietors, no corresponding provision was made either enlarging their estate in ancestral property or enlarging their power of alienation over property inherited by them. However, it noticed Section 30 and observed that it only deals with power of his share in coparcenary property by Will, which prior to enforcement of the Act, he had no right to do. The only provision made in respect of male proprietor regarding alienation of property was his power of alienation by Will. In so far as persons governed by custom are concerned, they continued to be governed by the restriction on the power of alienation of a male holder as existed before enforcement of the Act. Likewise, other restriction on alienation other than disposal by Will also continued. The Full Bench, thus, recognized the superior right of Hindu females by virtue of Section 14 and upheld the provision as intra vires. The argument that reversioners have ceased to exist after enactment of provisions of Section 14 of Succession Act, was rejected as there was no provision pointed out to that effect. The proposition laid down by the full Bench in Pritam Singhs case was that the Hindu Succession Act has not abolished joint Hindu family with respect to rights of those who were members of Mitakshara coparcenary, except in the manner and to the extent mentioned in Sections 6 and 30 of the Act, This Statement should also imply, though it does not say so expressly, the Succession Act to this extent does not affect the rights of the members governed by Dayabhaga coparcenary. The Full Bench in Pritam Singh;s case expressly noticed the judgment of earlier Full Bench in Joginder Singhs case but construed the same as irrelevant by observing that it dealt with the power of alienation of a person governed by Customary law and constitutional validity of Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act. Thus there is no real conflict between the two Full Bench judgments. Both the Full Bench judgments have been delivered on the assumption that Joginder Singhs case dealt with question of alienation whereas Pritam Singhs case had decided the question concerning succession. Even on fact in Joginder Singhs case the issue was validity of alienation by consent decree by a father to his two sons, which was challenged by third son, whereas in Pritam Singhs case the question of nature of property in hands of sons on death of their father had arisen  for purposes of assessment of estate duty. In Pritam  Singhs case the property in the hands of the sons was held to be coparcenary property and only 1/3rd of  property belonging to deceased father was considered eligible for estate duty. Therefore, there was no question of alienation in Pritam Singhs case. -  I do not find any infirmity in the well-reasoned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Hari Kishan and Ors. v. Administrator Municipal Committee;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal, Sr. Adv. and; Sudhir Mittal, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' M.L Sarin, Sr. Adv.,; Ashish Handa,; H.N. Mehtani an',
		'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2005-05-25',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Ashutosh Mohunta, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Ashutosh Mohunta, J.</p><p>1. The vendee-plaintiffs have filed this appeal to challenge the judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below whereby their suit and the appeal against the partition of the land ordered by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Guhla, vide order dated 16.7.1975, were dismissed.</p><p>2. In brief the facts giving rise to this appeal are that defendant-respondent Nos. 1 to 5 filed an application for partition of the suit land against Smt.Kirpal Kaur (Plaintiff No. 1) and defendant Nos. 6 to 15 in the court of Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Guhla. In that application Smt. Kirpal Kaur was proceeded against ex parte. The partition was confirmed on 16.6.1975 and the case was fixed for instrument of partition for 16.7.1975. Rai Jasbir Singh, plaintiff No. 2 purchased land measuring 80 Kanals from Smt. Kirpal Kaur (plaintiff No. 1) vide sale deed dated 27.5.1975 during the pendency of the partition proceedings and plaintiff No. 2 and 3, i.e., Rai Jasbir Singh and Swaran Singh were in actual physical possession of 228 Kanals 8 Marias and 77 Kanals 8 Marias, respectively. The plaintiffs challenged the order dated 16.7.1975 passed by the Assistant Grade, 1st Class, Guhla, by filing the present suit for declaration, which was dismissed by the Sub Judge, 1st Class, Kaithal, vide judgment and decree dated 29.1.1980 on the ground that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The plaintiffs then filed appeal to challenge the judgment and decree dated 29.1.1980 passed by the trial Court. During the pendency of the appeal, Smt. Kirpal Kaur withdrew herself from being the appellant. Consequently, vide order dated 17.1.1980 the appeal qua Kirpal Kaur was ordered to be dismissed as withdrawn. The appeal qua the remaining two appellants, i.e., Rai Jasbir Singh and Swaran Singh (present appellants) was dismissed by the Additional District Judge, Kurukshetra, vide judgment and decree dated 4.12.1981 and the decision of the trial Court with regard to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was upheld. Now Rai Jasbir Singh arid Swaran Singh have filed the present appeal wherein challenge has been made to the findings of both the Courts below.</p><p>3. It has been contended by Mr. R.S. Mittal, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the appellants, that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not duly served and, thus,the ex parte order dated 16.6.1975/16.7.1975 passed by the Assistant Collector,1st Grade, Guhla, was a nullity. It has further been argued by the learned counsel for the appellants that the Courts below erred in holding that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit against partition ordered by the Revenue Officer in view of the provisions of the <a>Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887</a> (for short 'the Act'), despite the fact that the order for partition of the suit land was passed ex parte without serving Smt.Kirpal Kaur according to the prescribed legal procedure.</p><p>4. The contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellants have been controverted by Mr. M.L.Sarin, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the respondents. It has been contended by him that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to go into the validity of the partition proceedings. The appellants have approached the Civil Court without exhausting the remedy available to them under Section 13 of the Act. It has further been contended by him that Smt. Kirpal Kaur had duly been served in the partition proceedings by sending notice to her by registered post.The counsel has also contended that she had withdrawn her appeal before the lower appellate court and in this view of the matter, the present appellants, who had purchased the land from her during the pendency of the partition proceedings, had no locus standi to challenge the order of partition passed by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade.</p><p>5. 1 have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the evidence adduced on record.</p><p>6. The only question that arises for consideration in the present appeal is to the following effect:-</p><p>Whether or not the Civil Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the suit wherein the order of partition passed by a Revenue Officer has been challenged and Smt. Kirpal Kaur was properly served in the partition proceedings</p><p>7. The first objection raised on behalf of the appellants is that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not served in the partition proceedings before the Assistant Collector 1st Grade, Guhla, as per the provisions contained in Section 20 of the Act.</p><p>8. I do not find any merit in this contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants. It is not the case of the appellants that Smt.Kirpal Kaur was not served at all. The bald statement of the plaintiffs was rebutted by the statement on oath of defendant Balwant Singh and also by documentary evidence adduced on record which shows that a registered notice was issued to her and acknowledgement due (Ex.DIO) was received in the office of the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade. Sub-section (3) of Section 20 of the Act gives discretion to the Revenue Officer to serve the concerned person 'either in addition to, or in substitution for, any other mode of service, by forwarding the summons by post in a-letter addressed' to him and registered under Part II of the Indian Post Office Act, 1886. In this view of the matter, it cannot be said that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not served as per the procedure prescribed under the Act.</p><p>9. The next contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants is that the Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain the ex parte order passed by the Revenue Officer.</p><p>10. This contention is also without any merit. Section 158 of the Act specifically excludes the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts in matters within the jurisdiction of the Revenue Officers. In order to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector, a provision for filing of appeals before the higher Revenue Authorities has been made in Section 13 of the Act. The plaintiffs without exhausting the remedies available to them under Section 13, approached the Civil Court to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector.</p><p>11. Moreover, it has come on record that Smt. Kirpal Kaur, from whom the present appellants had purchased the land during the pendency of the partition proceedings, had withdrawn from the appeal before the lower appellate Court. As the present appellants had purchased the suit land during the pendency of the partition proceedings, they have, therefore, no locus standi to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector 1st Grade and pursue the appeal. It is not the case of the plaintiff-appellants that the ex parte decree was obtained by the defendant-respondents by fraud or misrepresentation. In A.C. Ananthaswamy and Ors. v. Boraiah (D) by Lrs. (2004-3)138 Punjab Law Reporter 557, it has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that in the absence of any fraud or misrepresentation, an ex parte order on the bare plea of non-service cannot be set aside. In the present case it is an undisputed fact that registered notice (Ex.DIO) was issued to Smt. Kirpal Kaur and she had even filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order passed by the Assistant Collector. The ratio of the authority Firm Seth Radha Kishun (deceased) represented by Hari Kishan and Ors. v. Administrator Municipal Committee, Ludhiana : [1964]2SCR273 , that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not specifically ousted where a statute created a liability and provided a remedy, is not applicable to the facts appearing in the present case. In the present case, as already mentioned above, registered A.D. notice was issued to and served on Smt. Kirpal Kaur, who had thereafter, filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order.</p><p>12. Both the courts below have given concurrent findings of fact which cannot be interfered with in the second appeal in view of the provisions of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as no substantial question of law has either been pleaded in the memorandum of appeal or arises for consideration in the present appeal. I do not find any infirmity in the well-reasoned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below.</p><p>13. Consequently, there is no merit in this appeal. It is, accordingly, dismissed. However, I do no make any order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
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		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '(2006)142PLR339',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Balwant Singh and ors.',
		'sub' => 'Property',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Ashutosh Mohunta, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The vendee-plaintiffs have filed this appeal to challenge the judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below whereby their suit and the appeal against the partition of the land ordered by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Guhla, vide order dated 16.7.1975, were dismissed.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. In brief the facts giving rise to this appeal are that defendant-respondent Nos. 1 to 5 filed an application for partition of the suit land against Smt.Kirpal Kaur (Plaintiff No. 1) and defendant Nos. 6 to 15 in the court of Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Guhla. In that application Smt. Kirpal Kaur was proceeded against ex parte. The partition was confirmed on 16.6.1975 and the case was fixed for instrument of partition for 16.7.1975. Rai Jasbir Singh, plaintiff No. 2 purchased land measuring 80 Kanals from Smt. Kirpal Kaur (plaintiff No. 1) vide sale deed dated 27.5.1975 during the pendency of the partition proceedings and plaintiff No. 2 and 3, i.e., Rai Jasbir Singh and Swaran Singh were in actual physical possession of 228 Kanals 8 Marias and 77 Kanals 8 Marias, respectively. The plaintiffs challenged the order dated 16.7.1975 passed by the Assistant Grade, 1st Class, Guhla, by filing the present suit for declaration, which was dismissed by the Sub Judge, 1st Class, Kaithal, vide judgment and decree dated 29.1.1980 on the ground that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The plaintiffs then filed appeal to challenge the judgment and decree dated 29.1.1980 passed by the trial Court. During the pendency of the appeal, Smt. Kirpal Kaur withdrew herself from being the appellant. Consequently, vide order dated 17.1.1980 the appeal qua Kirpal Kaur was ordered to be dismissed as withdrawn. The appeal qua the remaining two appellants, i.e., Rai Jasbir Singh and Swaran Singh (present appellants) was dismissed by the Additional District Judge, Kurukshetra, vide judgment and decree dated 4.12.1981 and the decision of the trial Court with regard to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was upheld. Now Rai Jasbir Singh arid Swaran Singh have filed the present appeal wherein challenge has been made to the findings of both the Courts below.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. It has been contended by Mr. R.S. Mittal, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the appellants, that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not duly served and, thus,the ex parte order dated 16.6.1975/16.7.1975 passed by the Assistant Collector,1st Grade, Guhla, was a nullity. It has further been argued by the learned counsel for the appellants that the Courts below erred in holding that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit against partition ordered by the Revenue Officer in view of the provisions of the <a>Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887</a> (for short 'the Act'), despite the fact that the order for partition of the suit land was passed ex parte without serving Smt.Kirpal Kaur according to the prescribed legal procedure.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. The contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellants have been controverted by Mr. M.L.Sarin, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the respondents. It has been contended by him that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to go into the validity of the partition proceedings. The appellants have approached the Civil Court without exhausting the remedy available to them under Section 13 of the Act. It has further been contended by him that Smt. Kirpal Kaur had duly been served in the partition proceedings by sending notice to her by registered post.The counsel has also contended that she had withdrawn her appeal before the lower appellate court and in this view of the matter, the present appellants, who had purchased the land from her during the pendency of the partition proceedings, had no locus standi to challenge the order of partition passed by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. 1 have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the evidence adduced on record.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. The only question that arises for consideration in the present appeal is to the following effect:-',
	(int) 7 => '<p>Whether or not the Civil Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the suit wherein the order of partition passed by a Revenue Officer has been challenged and Smt. Kirpal Kaur was properly served in the partition proceedings',
	(int) 8 => '<p>7. The first objection raised on behalf of the appellants is that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not served in the partition proceedings before the Assistant Collector 1st Grade, Guhla, as per the provisions contained in Section 20 of the Act.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>8. I do not find any merit in this contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants. It is not the case of the appellants that Smt.Kirpal Kaur was not served at all. The bald statement of the plaintiffs was rebutted by the statement on oath of defendant Balwant Singh and also by documentary evidence adduced on record which shows that a registered notice was issued to her and acknowledgement due (Ex.DIO) was received in the office of the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade. Sub-section (3) of Section 20 of the Act gives discretion to the Revenue Officer to serve the concerned person 'either in addition to, or in substitution for, any other mode of service, by forwarding the summons by post in a-letter addressed' to him and registered under Part II of the Indian Post Office Act, 1886. In this view of the matter, it cannot be said that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not served as per the procedure prescribed under the Act.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>9. The next contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants is that the Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain the ex parte order passed by the Revenue Officer.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>10. This contention is also without any merit. Section 158 of the Act specifically excludes the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts in matters within the jurisdiction of the Revenue Officers. In order to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector, a provision for filing of appeals before the higher Revenue Authorities has been made in Section 13 of the Act. The plaintiffs without exhausting the remedies available to them under Section 13, approached the Civil Court to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>11. Moreover, it has come on record that Smt. Kirpal Kaur, from whom the present appellants had purchased the land during the pendency of the partition proceedings, had withdrawn from the appeal before the lower appellate Court. As the present appellants had purchased the suit land during the pendency of the partition proceedings, they have, therefore, no locus standi to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector 1st Grade and pursue the appeal. It is not the case of the plaintiff-appellants that the ex parte decree was obtained by the defendant-respondents by fraud or misrepresentation. In A.C. Ananthaswamy and Ors. v. Boraiah (D) by Lrs. (2004-3)138 Punjab Law Reporter 557, it has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that in the absence of any fraud or misrepresentation, an ex parte order on the bare plea of non-service cannot be set aside. In the present case it is an undisputed fact that registered notice (Ex.DIO) was issued to Smt. Kirpal Kaur and she had even filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order passed by the Assistant Collector. The ratio of the authority Firm Seth Radha Kishun (deceased) represented by Hari Kishan and Ors. v. Administrator Municipal Committee, Ludhiana : [1964]2SCR273 , that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not specifically ousted where a statute created a liability and provided a remedy, is not applicable to the facts appearing in the present case. In the present case, as already mentioned above, registered A.D. notice was issued to and served on Smt. Kirpal Kaur, who had thereafter, filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>12. Both the courts below have given concurrent findings of fact which cannot be interfered with in the second appeal in view of the provisions of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as no substantial question of law has either been pleaded in the memorandum of appeal or arises for consideration in the present appeal. I do not find any infirmity in the well-reasoned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>13. Consequently, there is no merit in this appeal. It is, accordingly, dismissed. However, I do no make any order as to costs.<p>',
	(int) 15 => '<p>'
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9. The next contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants is that the Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain the ex parte order passed by the Revenue Officer.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Rai Jasbir Singh and anr Vs Balwant Singh and ors - Citation 629369 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '629369',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/136769/the-punjab-land-revenue-act-1887-complete-act">Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887</a> - Sections 13, 20, 20(3) and 158; Indian Post Office Act, 1886; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) - Sections 100',
			'appealno' => 'Regular Second Appeal No. 615 of 1982 (O and M)',
			'appellant' => 'Rai Jasbir Singh and anr.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Rai Jasbir Singh and anr. Vs. Balwant Singh and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' - HINDU LAW -- Custom: [Vijender Jain, C.J., M.M. Kumar, Jasbir Singh, Rajive Bhalla & Rajesh Bindal, JJ] Alienation of ancestral property - Punjab and Haryana -  Held, In respect of State of Punjab by virtue of Punjab Amendment Act, 1973 there is a complete bar to contest any alienation of ancestral or non-ancestral immovable property or appointment of an heir to such property on ground that such alienation or appointment was contrary to custom. In Punjab the property in hands of a successor has to be treated as coparcenary property and its alienation has to be governed by Hindu Law except to the extent it is regulated by Sections 6 and 30 of the Hindu Succession Act. In Haryana, property  in hands of successor has to be treated as coparcenary property as well as ancestral property. Parties can fall back upon Hindu Law in case they fail to establish that rule of decision is custom. Therefore, in Haryana both under Hindu law and the Customary Law, the alienation would be open to challenge. Custom was given precedent over uncodified Hindu Law presumably for reason that custom has been consistently replacing the Hindu Law. However, it was soon realized that ancestral immovable property, which ordinarily held to be inalienable amongst Jats of Punjab by virtue of custom except for necessity, no limitation was placed on degrees of collateral, eligible to contest such alienation. It was, therefore, felt necessary to engraft certain restriction on degrees of collateral, eligible to contest an alienation, which under the custom itself was not limited. Accordingly, the Punjab Custom (Power to Contest) Act, 1920 (Act No.2 of 1920) was enacted. The Hindu Succession Act was extended to the State of Punjab.  Act 2 of Punjab Act defined expression alienation to include any testamentary disposition of property and appointment of an heir was to include any adoption made or purporting to be made according to custom. A further provision was made by Section 3 that Hindu Succession Act was to apply only in respect of alienation of immovable property or appointment of heirs made by persons who in regard to such alienation or appointment were governed by custom. Whereas  Section 4 declared that Hindu Succession Act was not to affect any right to contest any alienation or appointment of an heir made before the date on which the Succession Act was to come into force. In other words, Act, No.2 of 1920 was not to affect alienation or appointments of heir made before date on which it came into force. It also preserved the rights of any alienation or appointment of an heir made by a family. After Section 7 was inserted in Act of 1920 by the Punjab Amendment Act of 1973 right of contest being contrary to custom had been totally effaced and taken away. Therefore, no person has any right to contest any alienation of immovable property whether ancestral or non-ancestral on ground of being contrary to custom after January 23, 1973. In Haryana, the situation as enunciated by Act No.2 of 1920 continued to prevail in respect of alienation because no reforms parallel to Punjab as brought by Amendment Act of 1973, had been enacted although right to pre-emption has been substantially abolished in Haryana also. No steps even have been taken in that regard. Therefore, situation in Haryana have to be regarded as it existed under Act No. 2 of 1920.
HINDU SUCCESSION ACT,1956[C.A.No.30/1956] --  Sections 6 & 30: [Vijender Jain, C.J., M.M.Kumar, Jasbir Singh, Rajive Bhalla & Rajesh Bindal, JJ]  Alienation of coparcenary property - Law laid down by Full Bench in Joginder Singh Kundha Singh v Kehar Singh Dasaundha Singh [AIR 1965 Punjab 407] and Pritam Singh v Assistant Controller of Estate Duty, Patiala [1976 Punj LR 342] -Whether there is any conflict? - Held, The basic controversy in the Full Bench decision of Joginder Singhs case was regarding constitutional validity of Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act and as to whether it infringes Article 14 of Constitution. It was held that the estate held by male and limitation on his power of alienation were in no way removed and the reversioners were not debarred from challenging such alienations. The Full Bench held that Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act postulates that estate held by a Hindu female before enforcement of Succession Act either by inheritance or otherwise, was enlarged and on date of enforcement of Succession Act, she became a full owner. Likewise, if she has inherited any estate after the commencement of the Act,  she was to be regarded as absolute owner rather than a limited owner. Consequently, the limitations on power of alienation automatically vanished. This was the necessary result of the provisions made in Section 14 of the Act. The Full Bench further held that in respect of male proprietors, no corresponding provision was made either enlarging their estate in ancestral property or enlarging their power of alienation over property inherited by them. However, it noticed Section 30 and observed that it only deals with power of his share in coparcenary property by Will, which prior to enforcement of the Act, he had no right to do. The only provision made in respect of male proprietor regarding alienation of property was his power of alienation by Will. In so far as persons governed by custom are concerned, they continued to be governed by the restriction on the power of alienation of a male holder as existed before enforcement of the Act. Likewise, other restriction on alienation other than disposal by Will also continued. The Full Bench, thus, recognized the superior right of Hindu females by virtue of Section 14 and upheld the provision as intra vires. The argument that reversioners have ceased to exist after enactment of provisions of Section 14 of Succession Act, was rejected as there was no provision pointed out to that effect. The proposition laid down by the full Bench in Pritam Singhs case was that the Hindu Succession Act has not abolished joint Hindu family with respect to rights of those who were members of Mitakshara coparcenary, except in the manner and to the extent mentioned in Sections 6 and 30 of the Act, This Statement should also imply, though it does not say so expressly, the Succession Act to this extent does not affect the rights of the members governed by Dayabhaga coparcenary. The Full Bench in Pritam Singh;s case expressly noticed the judgment of earlier Full Bench in Joginder Singhs case but construed the same as irrelevant by observing that it dealt with the power of alienation of a person governed by Customary law and constitutional validity of Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act. Thus there is no real conflict between the two Full Bench judgments. Both the Full Bench judgments have been delivered on the assumption that Joginder Singhs case dealt with question of alienation whereas Pritam Singhs case had decided the question concerning succession. Even on fact in Joginder Singhs case the issue was validity of alienation by consent decree by a father to his two sons, which was challenged by third son, whereas in Pritam Singhs case the question of nature of property in hands of sons on death of their father had arisen  for purposes of assessment of estate duty. In Pritam  Singhs case the property in the hands of the sons was held to be coparcenary property and only 1/3rd of  property belonging to deceased father was considered eligible for estate duty. Therefore, there was no question of alienation in Pritam Singhs case. -  I do not find any infirmity in the well-reasoned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Hari Kishan and Ors. v. Administrator Municipal Committee;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal, Sr. Adv. and; Sudhir Mittal, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' M.L Sarin, Sr. Adv.,; Ashish Handa,; H.N. Mehtani an',
			'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2005-05-25',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' Ashutosh Mohunta, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Ashutosh Mohunta, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The vendee-plaintiffs have filed this appeal to challenge the judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below whereby their suit and the appeal against the partition of the land ordered by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Guhla, vide order dated 16.7.1975, were dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. In brief the facts giving rise to this appeal are that defendant-respondent Nos. 1 to 5 filed an application for partition of the suit land against Smt.Kirpal Kaur (Plaintiff No. 1) and defendant Nos. 6 to 15 in the court of Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Guhla. In that application Smt. Kirpal Kaur was proceeded against ex parte. The partition was confirmed on 16.6.1975 and the case was fixed for instrument of partition for 16.7.1975. Rai Jasbir Singh, plaintiff No. 2 purchased land measuring 80 Kanals from Smt. Kirpal Kaur (plaintiff No. 1) vide sale deed dated 27.5.1975 during the pendency of the partition proceedings and plaintiff No. 2 and 3, i.e., Rai Jasbir Singh and Swaran Singh were in actual physical possession of 228 Kanals 8 Marias and 77 Kanals 8 Marias, respectively. The plaintiffs challenged the order dated 16.7.1975 passed by the Assistant Grade, 1st Class, Guhla, by filing the present suit for declaration, which was dismissed by the Sub Judge, 1st Class, Kaithal, vide judgment and decree dated 29.1.1980 on the ground that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The plaintiffs then filed appeal to challenge the judgment and decree dated 29.1.1980 passed by the trial Court. During the pendency of the appeal, Smt. Kirpal Kaur withdrew herself from being the appellant. Consequently, vide order dated 17.1.1980 the appeal qua Kirpal Kaur was ordered to be dismissed as withdrawn. The appeal qua the remaining two appellants, i.e., Rai Jasbir Singh and Swaran Singh (present appellants) was dismissed by the Additional District Judge, Kurukshetra, vide judgment and decree dated 4.12.1981 and the decision of the trial Court with regard to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was upheld. Now Rai Jasbir Singh arid Swaran Singh have filed the present appeal wherein challenge has been made to the findings of both the Courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. It has been contended by Mr. R.S. Mittal, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the appellants, that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not duly served and, thus,the ex parte order dated 16.6.1975/16.7.1975 passed by the Assistant Collector,1st Grade, Guhla, was a nullity. It has further been argued by the learned counsel for the appellants that the Courts below erred in holding that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit against partition ordered by the Revenue Officer in view of the provisions of the <a href="/act/136769/the-punjab-land-revenue-act-1887-complete-act">Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887</a> (for short 'the Act'), despite the fact that the order for partition of the suit land was passed ex parte without serving Smt.Kirpal Kaur according to the prescribed legal procedure.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellants have been controverted by Mr. M.L.Sarin, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the respondents. It has been contended by him that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to go into the validity of the partition proceedings. The appellants have approached the Civil Court without exhausting the remedy available to them under Section 13 of the Act. It has further been contended by him that Smt. Kirpal Kaur had duly been served in the partition proceedings by sending notice to her by registered post.The counsel has also contended that she had withdrawn her appeal before the lower appellate court and in this view of the matter, the present appellants, who had purchased the land from her during the pendency of the partition proceedings, had no locus standi to challenge the order of partition passed by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. 1 have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the evidence adduced on record.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The only question that arises for consideration in the present appeal is to the following effect:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether or not the Civil Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the suit wherein the order of partition passed by a Revenue Officer has been challenged and Smt. Kirpal Kaur was properly served in the partition proceedings</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The first objection raised on behalf of the appellants is that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not served in the partition proceedings before the Assistant Collector 1st Grade, Guhla, as per the provisions contained in Section 20 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. I do not find any merit in this contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants. It is not the case of the appellants that Smt.Kirpal Kaur was not served at all. The bald statement of the plaintiffs was rebutted by the statement on oath of defendant Balwant Singh and also by documentary evidence adduced on record which shows that a registered notice was issued to her and acknowledgement due (Ex.DIO) was received in the office of the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade. Sub-section (3) of Section 20 of the Act gives discretion to the Revenue Officer to serve the concerned person 'either in addition to, or in substitution for, any other mode of service, by forwarding the summons by post in a-letter addressed' to him and registered under Part II of the Indian Post Office Act, 1886. In this view of the matter, it cannot be said that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not served as per the procedure prescribed under the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The next contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants is that the Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain the ex parte order passed by the Revenue Officer.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. This contention is also without any merit. Section 158 of the Act specifically excludes the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts in matters within the jurisdiction of the Revenue Officers. In order to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector, a provision for filing of appeals before the higher Revenue Authorities has been made in Section 13 of the Act. The plaintiffs without exhausting the remedies available to them under Section 13, approached the Civil Court to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Moreover, it has come on record that Smt. Kirpal Kaur, from whom the present appellants had purchased the land during the pendency of the partition proceedings, had withdrawn from the appeal before the lower appellate Court. As the present appellants had purchased the suit land during the pendency of the partition proceedings, they have, therefore, no locus standi to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector 1st Grade and pursue the appeal. It is not the case of the plaintiff-appellants that the ex parte decree was obtained by the defendant-respondents by fraud or misrepresentation. In A.C. Ananthaswamy and Ors. v. Boraiah (D) by Lrs. (2004-3)138 Punjab Law Reporter 557, it has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that in the absence of any fraud or misrepresentation, an ex parte order on the bare plea of non-service cannot be set aside. In the present case it is an undisputed fact that registered notice (Ex.DIO) was issued to Smt. Kirpal Kaur and she had even filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order passed by the Assistant Collector. The ratio of the authority Firm Seth Radha Kishun (deceased) represented by Hari Kishan and Ors. v. Administrator Municipal Committee, Ludhiana : [1964]2SCR273 , that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not specifically ousted where a statute created a liability and provided a remedy, is not applicable to the facts appearing in the present case. In the present case, as already mentioned above, registered A.D. notice was issued to and served on Smt. Kirpal Kaur, who had thereafter, filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Both the courts below have given concurrent findings of fact which cannot be interfered with in the second appeal in view of the provisions of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as no substantial question of law has either been pleaded in the memorandum of appeal or arises for consideration in the present appeal. I do not find any infirmity in the well-reasoned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Consequently, there is no merit in this appeal. It is, accordingly, dismissed. However, I do no make any order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '(2006)142PLR339',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Balwant Singh and ors.',
			'sub' => 'Property',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'rai-jasbir-singh-vs-balwant',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '629369',
		(int) 1 => 'rai-jasbir-singh-vs-balwant'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Rai Jasbir Singh and anr Vs Balwant Singh and ors - Citation 629369 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '629369',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/136769/the-punjab-land-revenue-act-1887-complete-act">Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887</a> - Sections 13, 20, 20(3) and 158; Indian Post Office Act, 1886; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) - Sections 100',
		'appealno' => 'Regular Second Appeal No. 615 of 1982 (O and M)',
		'appellant' => 'Rai Jasbir Singh and anr.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Rai Jasbir Singh and anr. Vs. Balwant Singh and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' - HINDU LAW -- Custom: [Vijender Jain, C.J., M.M. Kumar, Jasbir Singh, Rajive Bhalla & Rajesh Bindal, JJ] Alienation of ancestral property - Punjab and Haryana -  Held, In respect of State of Punjab by virtue of Punjab Amendment Act, 1973 there is a complete bar to contest any alienation of ancestral or non-ancestral immovable property or appointment of an heir to such property on ground that such alienation or appointment was contrary to custom. In Punjab the property in hands of a successor has to be treated as coparcenary property and its alienation has to be governed by Hindu Law except to the extent it is regulated by Sections 6 and 30 of the Hindu Succession Act. In Haryana, property  in hands of successor has to be treated as coparcenary property as well as ancestral property. Parties can fall back upon Hindu Law in case they fail to establish that rule of decision is custom. Therefore, in Haryana both under Hindu law and the Customary Law, the alienation would be open to challenge. Custom was given precedent over uncodified Hindu Law presumably for reason that custom has been consistently replacing the Hindu Law. However, it was soon realized that ancestral immovable property, which ordinarily held to be inalienable amongst Jats of Punjab by virtue of custom except for necessity, no limitation was placed on degrees of collateral, eligible to contest such alienation. It was, therefore, felt necessary to engraft certain restriction on degrees of collateral, eligible to contest an alienation, which under the custom itself was not limited. Accordingly, the Punjab Custom (Power to Contest) Act, 1920 (Act No.2 of 1920) was enacted. The Hindu Succession Act was extended to the State of Punjab.  Act 2 of Punjab Act defined expression alienation to include any testamentary disposition of property and appointment of an heir was to include any adoption made or purporting to be made according to custom. A further provision was made by Section 3 that Hindu Succession Act was to apply only in respect of alienation of immovable property or appointment of heirs made by persons who in regard to such alienation or appointment were governed by custom. Whereas  Section 4 declared that Hindu Succession Act was not to affect any right to contest any alienation or appointment of an heir made before the date on which the Succession Act was to come into force. In other words, Act, No.2 of 1920 was not to affect alienation or appointments of heir made before date on which it came into force. It also preserved the rights of any alienation or appointment of an heir made by a family. After Section 7 was inserted in Act of 1920 by the Punjab Amendment Act of 1973 right of contest being contrary to custom had been totally effaced and taken away. Therefore, no person has any right to contest any alienation of immovable property whether ancestral or non-ancestral on ground of being contrary to custom after January 23, 1973. In Haryana, the situation as enunciated by Act No.2 of 1920 continued to prevail in respect of alienation because no reforms parallel to Punjab as brought by Amendment Act of 1973, had been enacted although right to pre-emption has been substantially abolished in Haryana also. No steps even have been taken in that regard. Therefore, situation in Haryana have to be regarded as it existed under Act No. 2 of 1920.
HINDU SUCCESSION ACT,1956[C.A.No.30/1956] --  Sections 6 & 30: [Vijender Jain, C.J., M.M.Kumar, Jasbir Singh, Rajive Bhalla & Rajesh Bindal, JJ]  Alienation of coparcenary property - Law laid down by Full Bench in Joginder Singh Kundha Singh v Kehar Singh Dasaundha Singh [AIR 1965 Punjab 407] and Pritam Singh v Assistant Controller of Estate Duty, Patiala [1976 Punj LR 342] -Whether there is any conflict? - Held, The basic controversy in the Full Bench decision of Joginder Singhs case was regarding constitutional validity of Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act and as to whether it infringes Article 14 of Constitution. It was held that the estate held by male and limitation on his power of alienation were in no way removed and the reversioners were not debarred from challenging such alienations. The Full Bench held that Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act postulates that estate held by a Hindu female before enforcement of Succession Act either by inheritance or otherwise, was enlarged and on date of enforcement of Succession Act, she became a full owner. Likewise, if she has inherited any estate after the commencement of the Act,  she was to be regarded as absolute owner rather than a limited owner. Consequently, the limitations on power of alienation automatically vanished. This was the necessary result of the provisions made in Section 14 of the Act. The Full Bench further held that in respect of male proprietors, no corresponding provision was made either enlarging their estate in ancestral property or enlarging their power of alienation over property inherited by them. However, it noticed Section 30 and observed that it only deals with power of his share in coparcenary property by Will, which prior to enforcement of the Act, he had no right to do. The only provision made in respect of male proprietor regarding alienation of property was his power of alienation by Will. In so far as persons governed by custom are concerned, they continued to be governed by the restriction on the power of alienation of a male holder as existed before enforcement of the Act. Likewise, other restriction on alienation other than disposal by Will also continued. The Full Bench, thus, recognized the superior right of Hindu females by virtue of Section 14 and upheld the provision as intra vires. The argument that reversioners have ceased to exist after enactment of provisions of Section 14 of Succession Act, was rejected as there was no provision pointed out to that effect. The proposition laid down by the full Bench in Pritam Singhs case was that the Hindu Succession Act has not abolished joint Hindu family with respect to rights of those who were members of Mitakshara coparcenary, except in the manner and to the extent mentioned in Sections 6 and 30 of the Act, This Statement should also imply, though it does not say so expressly, the Succession Act to this extent does not affect the rights of the members governed by Dayabhaga coparcenary. The Full Bench in Pritam Singh;s case expressly noticed the judgment of earlier Full Bench in Joginder Singhs case but construed the same as irrelevant by observing that it dealt with the power of alienation of a person governed by Customary law and constitutional validity of Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act. Thus there is no real conflict between the two Full Bench judgments. Both the Full Bench judgments have been delivered on the assumption that Joginder Singhs case dealt with question of alienation whereas Pritam Singhs case had decided the question concerning succession. Even on fact in Joginder Singhs case the issue was validity of alienation by consent decree by a father to his two sons, which was challenged by third son, whereas in Pritam Singhs case the question of nature of property in hands of sons on death of their father had arisen  for purposes of assessment of estate duty. In Pritam  Singhs case the property in the hands of the sons was held to be coparcenary property and only 1/3rd of  property belonging to deceased father was considered eligible for estate duty. Therefore, there was no question of alienation in Pritam Singhs case. -  I do not find any infirmity in the well-reasoned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Hari Kishan and Ors. v. Administrator Municipal Committee;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal, Sr. Adv. and; Sudhir Mittal, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' M.L Sarin, Sr. Adv.,; Ashish Handa,; H.N. Mehtani an',
		'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2005-05-25',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Ashutosh Mohunta, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Ashutosh Mohunta, J.</p><p>1. The vendee-plaintiffs have filed this appeal to challenge the judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below whereby their suit and the appeal against the partition of the land ordered by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Guhla, vide order dated 16.7.1975, were dismissed.</p><p>2. In brief the facts giving rise to this appeal are that defendant-respondent Nos. 1 to 5 filed an application for partition of the suit land against Smt.Kirpal Kaur (Plaintiff No. 1) and defendant Nos. 6 to 15 in the court of Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Guhla. In that application Smt. Kirpal Kaur was proceeded against ex parte. The partition was confirmed on 16.6.1975 and the case was fixed for instrument of partition for 16.7.1975. Rai Jasbir Singh, plaintiff No. 2 purchased land measuring 80 Kanals from Smt. Kirpal Kaur (plaintiff No. 1) vide sale deed dated 27.5.1975 during the pendency of the partition proceedings and plaintiff No. 2 and 3, i.e., Rai Jasbir Singh and Swaran Singh were in actual physical possession of 228 Kanals 8 Marias and 77 Kanals 8 Marias, respectively. The plaintiffs challenged the order dated 16.7.1975 passed by the Assistant Grade, 1st Class, Guhla, by filing the present suit for declaration, which was dismissed by the Sub Judge, 1st Class, Kaithal, vide judgment and decree dated 29.1.1980 on the ground that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The plaintiffs then filed appeal to challenge the judgment and decree dated 29.1.1980 passed by the trial Court. During the pendency of the appeal, Smt. Kirpal Kaur withdrew herself from being the appellant. Consequently, vide order dated 17.1.1980 the appeal qua Kirpal Kaur was ordered to be dismissed as withdrawn. The appeal qua the remaining two appellants, i.e., Rai Jasbir Singh and Swaran Singh (present appellants) was dismissed by the Additional District Judge, Kurukshetra, vide judgment and decree dated 4.12.1981 and the decision of the trial Court with regard to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was upheld. Now Rai Jasbir Singh arid Swaran Singh have filed the present appeal wherein challenge has been made to the findings of both the Courts below.</p><p>3. It has been contended by Mr. R.S. Mittal, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the appellants, that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not duly served and, thus,the ex parte order dated 16.6.1975/16.7.1975 passed by the Assistant Collector,1st Grade, Guhla, was a nullity. It has further been argued by the learned counsel for the appellants that the Courts below erred in holding that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit against partition ordered by the Revenue Officer in view of the provisions of the <a>Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887</a> (for short 'the Act'), despite the fact that the order for partition of the suit land was passed ex parte without serving Smt.Kirpal Kaur according to the prescribed legal procedure.</p><p>4. The contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellants have been controverted by Mr. M.L.Sarin, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the respondents. It has been contended by him that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to go into the validity of the partition proceedings. The appellants have approached the Civil Court without exhausting the remedy available to them under Section 13 of the Act. It has further been contended by him that Smt. Kirpal Kaur had duly been served in the partition proceedings by sending notice to her by registered post.The counsel has also contended that she had withdrawn her appeal before the lower appellate court and in this view of the matter, the present appellants, who had purchased the land from her during the pendency of the partition proceedings, had no locus standi to challenge the order of partition passed by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade.</p><p>5. 1 have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the evidence adduced on record.</p><p>6. The only question that arises for consideration in the present appeal is to the following effect:-</p><p>Whether or not the Civil Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the suit wherein the order of partition passed by a Revenue Officer has been challenged and Smt. Kirpal Kaur was properly served in the partition proceedings</p><p>7. The first objection raised on behalf of the appellants is that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not served in the partition proceedings before the Assistant Collector 1st Grade, Guhla, as per the provisions contained in Section 20 of the Act.</p><p>8. I do not find any merit in this contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants. It is not the case of the appellants that Smt.Kirpal Kaur was not served at all. The bald statement of the plaintiffs was rebutted by the statement on oath of defendant Balwant Singh and also by documentary evidence adduced on record which shows that a registered notice was issued to her and acknowledgement due (Ex.DIO) was received in the office of the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade. Sub-section (3) of Section 20 of the Act gives discretion to the Revenue Officer to serve the concerned person 'either in addition to, or in substitution for, any other mode of service, by forwarding the summons by post in a-letter addressed' to him and registered under Part II of the Indian Post Office Act, 1886. In this view of the matter, it cannot be said that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not served as per the procedure prescribed under the Act.</p><p>9. The next contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants is that the Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain the ex parte order passed by the Revenue Officer.</p><p>10. This contention is also without any merit. Section 158 of the Act specifically excludes the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts in matters within the jurisdiction of the Revenue Officers. In order to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector, a provision for filing of appeals before the higher Revenue Authorities has been made in Section 13 of the Act. The plaintiffs without exhausting the remedies available to them under Section 13, approached the Civil Court to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector.</p><p>11. Moreover, it has come on record that Smt. Kirpal Kaur, from whom the present appellants had purchased the land during the pendency of the partition proceedings, had withdrawn from the appeal before the lower appellate Court. As the present appellants had purchased the suit land during the pendency of the partition proceedings, they have, therefore, no locus standi to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector 1st Grade and pursue the appeal. It is not the case of the plaintiff-appellants that the ex parte decree was obtained by the defendant-respondents by fraud or misrepresentation. In A.C. Ananthaswamy and Ors. v. Boraiah (D) by Lrs. (2004-3)138 Punjab Law Reporter 557, it has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that in the absence of any fraud or misrepresentation, an ex parte order on the bare plea of non-service cannot be set aside. In the present case it is an undisputed fact that registered notice (Ex.DIO) was issued to Smt. Kirpal Kaur and she had even filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order passed by the Assistant Collector. The ratio of the authority Firm Seth Radha Kishun (deceased) represented by Hari Kishan and Ors. v. Administrator Municipal Committee, Ludhiana : [1964]2SCR273 , that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not specifically ousted where a statute created a liability and provided a remedy, is not applicable to the facts appearing in the present case. In the present case, as already mentioned above, registered A.D. notice was issued to and served on Smt. Kirpal Kaur, who had thereafter, filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order.</p><p>12. Both the courts below have given concurrent findings of fact which cannot be interfered with in the second appeal in view of the provisions of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as no substantial question of law has either been pleaded in the memorandum of appeal or arises for consideration in the present appeal. I do not find any infirmity in the well-reasoned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below.</p><p>13. Consequently, there is no merit in this appeal. It is, accordingly, dismissed. However, I do no make any order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Ashutosh Mohunta, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The vendee-plaintiffs have filed this appeal to challenge the judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below whereby their suit and the appeal against the partition of the land ordered by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Guhla, vide order dated 16.7.1975, were dismissed.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. In brief the facts giving rise to this appeal are that defendant-respondent Nos. 1 to 5 filed an application for partition of the suit land against Smt.Kirpal Kaur (Plaintiff No. 1) and defendant Nos. 6 to 15 in the court of Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Guhla. In that application Smt. Kirpal Kaur was proceeded against ex parte. The partition was confirmed on 16.6.1975 and the case was fixed for instrument of partition for 16.7.1975. Rai Jasbir Singh, plaintiff No. 2 purchased land measuring 80 Kanals from Smt. Kirpal Kaur (plaintiff No. 1) vide sale deed dated 27.5.1975 during the pendency of the partition proceedings and plaintiff No. 2 and 3, i.e., Rai Jasbir Singh and Swaran Singh were in actual physical possession of 228 Kanals 8 Marias and 77 Kanals 8 Marias, respectively. The plaintiffs challenged the order dated 16.7.1975 passed by the Assistant Grade, 1st Class, Guhla, by filing the present suit for declaration, which was dismissed by the Sub Judge, 1st Class, Kaithal, vide judgment and decree dated 29.1.1980 on the ground that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The plaintiffs then filed appeal to challenge the judgment and decree dated 29.1.1980 passed by the trial Court. During the pendency of the appeal, Smt. Kirpal Kaur withdrew herself from being the appellant. Consequently, vide order dated 17.1.1980 the appeal qua Kirpal Kaur was ordered to be dismissed as withdrawn. The appeal qua the remaining two appellants, i.e., Rai Jasbir Singh and Swaran Singh (present appellants) was dismissed by the Additional District Judge, Kurukshetra, vide judgment and decree dated 4.12.1981 and the decision of the trial Court with regard to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was upheld. Now Rai Jasbir Singh arid Swaran Singh have filed the present appeal wherein challenge has been made to the findings of both the Courts below.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. It has been contended by Mr. R.S. Mittal, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the appellants, that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not duly served and, thus,the ex parte order dated 16.6.1975/16.7.1975 passed by the Assistant Collector,1st Grade, Guhla, was a nullity. It has further been argued by the learned counsel for the appellants that the Courts below erred in holding that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit against partition ordered by the Revenue Officer in view of the provisions of the <a>Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887</a> (for short 'the Act'), despite the fact that the order for partition of the suit land was passed ex parte without serving Smt.Kirpal Kaur according to the prescribed legal procedure.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. The contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellants have been controverted by Mr. M.L.Sarin, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the respondents. It has been contended by him that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to go into the validity of the partition proceedings. The appellants have approached the Civil Court without exhausting the remedy available to them under Section 13 of the Act. It has further been contended by him that Smt. Kirpal Kaur had duly been served in the partition proceedings by sending notice to her by registered post.The counsel has also contended that she had withdrawn her appeal before the lower appellate court and in this view of the matter, the present appellants, who had purchased the land from her during the pendency of the partition proceedings, had no locus standi to challenge the order of partition passed by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. 1 have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the evidence adduced on record.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. The only question that arises for consideration in the present appeal is to the following effect:-',
	(int) 7 => '<p>Whether or not the Civil Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the suit wherein the order of partition passed by a Revenue Officer has been challenged and Smt. Kirpal Kaur was properly served in the partition proceedings',
	(int) 8 => '<p>7. The first objection raised on behalf of the appellants is that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not served in the partition proceedings before the Assistant Collector 1st Grade, Guhla, as per the provisions contained in Section 20 of the Act.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>8. I do not find any merit in this contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants. It is not the case of the appellants that Smt.Kirpal Kaur was not served at all. The bald statement of the plaintiffs was rebutted by the statement on oath of defendant Balwant Singh and also by documentary evidence adduced on record which shows that a registered notice was issued to her and acknowledgement due (Ex.DIO) was received in the office of the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade. Sub-section (3) of Section 20 of the Act gives discretion to the Revenue Officer to serve the concerned person 'either in addition to, or in substitution for, any other mode of service, by forwarding the summons by post in a-letter addressed' to him and registered under Part II of the Indian Post Office Act, 1886. In this view of the matter, it cannot be said that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not served as per the procedure prescribed under the Act.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>9. The next contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants is that the Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain the ex parte order passed by the Revenue Officer.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>10. This contention is also without any merit. Section 158 of the Act specifically excludes the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts in matters within the jurisdiction of the Revenue Officers. In order to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector, a provision for filing of appeals before the higher Revenue Authorities has been made in Section 13 of the Act. The plaintiffs without exhausting the remedies available to them under Section 13, approached the Civil Court to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>11. Moreover, it has come on record that Smt. Kirpal Kaur, from whom the present appellants had purchased the land during the pendency of the partition proceedings, had withdrawn from the appeal before the lower appellate Court. As the present appellants had purchased the suit land during the pendency of the partition proceedings, they have, therefore, no locus standi to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector 1st Grade and pursue the appeal. It is not the case of the plaintiff-appellants that the ex parte decree was obtained by the defendant-respondents by fraud or misrepresentation. In A.C. Ananthaswamy and Ors. v. Boraiah (D) by Lrs. (2004-3)138 Punjab Law Reporter 557, it has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that in the absence of any fraud or misrepresentation, an ex parte order on the bare plea of non-service cannot be set aside. In the present case it is an undisputed fact that registered notice (Ex.DIO) was issued to Smt. Kirpal Kaur and she had even filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order passed by the Assistant Collector. The ratio of the authority Firm Seth Radha Kishun (deceased) represented by Hari Kishan and Ors. v. Administrator Municipal Committee, Ludhiana : [1964]2SCR273 , that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not specifically ousted where a statute created a liability and provided a remedy, is not applicable to the facts appearing in the present case. In the present case, as already mentioned above, registered A.D. notice was issued to and served on Smt. Kirpal Kaur, who had thereafter, filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>12. Both the courts below have given concurrent findings of fact which cannot be interfered with in the second appeal in view of the provisions of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as no substantial question of law has either been pleaded in the memorandum of appeal or arises for consideration in the present appeal. I do not find any infirmity in the well-reasoned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>13. Consequently, there is no merit in this appeal. It is, accordingly, dismissed. However, I do no make any order as to costs.<p>',
	(int) 15 => '<p>'
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10. This contention is also without any merit. Section 158 of the Act specifically excludes the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts in matters within the jurisdiction of the Revenue Officers. In order to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector, a provision for filing of appeals before the higher Revenue Authorities has been made in Section 13 of the Act. The plaintiffs without exhausting the remedies available to them under Section 13, approached the Civil Court to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Rai Jasbir Singh and anr Vs Balwant Singh and ors - Citation 629369 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '629369',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/136769/the-punjab-land-revenue-act-1887-complete-act">Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887</a> - Sections 13, 20, 20(3) and 158; Indian Post Office Act, 1886; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) - Sections 100',
			'appealno' => 'Regular Second Appeal No. 615 of 1982 (O and M)',
			'appellant' => 'Rai Jasbir Singh and anr.',
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			'casename' => 'Rai Jasbir Singh and anr. Vs. Balwant Singh and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' - HINDU LAW -- Custom: [Vijender Jain, C.J., M.M. Kumar, Jasbir Singh, Rajive Bhalla & Rajesh Bindal, JJ] Alienation of ancestral property - Punjab and Haryana -  Held, In respect of State of Punjab by virtue of Punjab Amendment Act, 1973 there is a complete bar to contest any alienation of ancestral or non-ancestral immovable property or appointment of an heir to such property on ground that such alienation or appointment was contrary to custom. In Punjab the property in hands of a successor has to be treated as coparcenary property and its alienation has to be governed by Hindu Law except to the extent it is regulated by Sections 6 and 30 of the Hindu Succession Act. In Haryana, property  in hands of successor has to be treated as coparcenary property as well as ancestral property. Parties can fall back upon Hindu Law in case they fail to establish that rule of decision is custom. Therefore, in Haryana both under Hindu law and the Customary Law, the alienation would be open to challenge. Custom was given precedent over uncodified Hindu Law presumably for reason that custom has been consistently replacing the Hindu Law. However, it was soon realized that ancestral immovable property, which ordinarily held to be inalienable amongst Jats of Punjab by virtue of custom except for necessity, no limitation was placed on degrees of collateral, eligible to contest such alienation. It was, therefore, felt necessary to engraft certain restriction on degrees of collateral, eligible to contest an alienation, which under the custom itself was not limited. Accordingly, the Punjab Custom (Power to Contest) Act, 1920 (Act No.2 of 1920) was enacted. The Hindu Succession Act was extended to the State of Punjab.  Act 2 of Punjab Act defined expression alienation to include any testamentary disposition of property and appointment of an heir was to include any adoption made or purporting to be made according to custom. A further provision was made by Section 3 that Hindu Succession Act was to apply only in respect of alienation of immovable property or appointment of heirs made by persons who in regard to such alienation or appointment were governed by custom. Whereas  Section 4 declared that Hindu Succession Act was not to affect any right to contest any alienation or appointment of an heir made before the date on which the Succession Act was to come into force. In other words, Act, No.2 of 1920 was not to affect alienation or appointments of heir made before date on which it came into force. It also preserved the rights of any alienation or appointment of an heir made by a family. After Section 7 was inserted in Act of 1920 by the Punjab Amendment Act of 1973 right of contest being contrary to custom had been totally effaced and taken away. Therefore, no person has any right to contest any alienation of immovable property whether ancestral or non-ancestral on ground of being contrary to custom after January 23, 1973. In Haryana, the situation as enunciated by Act No.2 of 1920 continued to prevail in respect of alienation because no reforms parallel to Punjab as brought by Amendment Act of 1973, had been enacted although right to pre-emption has been substantially abolished in Haryana also. No steps even have been taken in that regard. Therefore, situation in Haryana have to be regarded as it existed under Act No. 2 of 1920.
HINDU SUCCESSION ACT,1956[C.A.No.30/1956] --  Sections 6 & 30: [Vijender Jain, C.J., M.M.Kumar, Jasbir Singh, Rajive Bhalla & Rajesh Bindal, JJ]  Alienation of coparcenary property - Law laid down by Full Bench in Joginder Singh Kundha Singh v Kehar Singh Dasaundha Singh [AIR 1965 Punjab 407] and Pritam Singh v Assistant Controller of Estate Duty, Patiala [1976 Punj LR 342] -Whether there is any conflict? - Held, The basic controversy in the Full Bench decision of Joginder Singhs case was regarding constitutional validity of Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act and as to whether it infringes Article 14 of Constitution. It was held that the estate held by male and limitation on his power of alienation were in no way removed and the reversioners were not debarred from challenging such alienations. The Full Bench held that Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act postulates that estate held by a Hindu female before enforcement of Succession Act either by inheritance or otherwise, was enlarged and on date of enforcement of Succession Act, she became a full owner. Likewise, if she has inherited any estate after the commencement of the Act,  she was to be regarded as absolute owner rather than a limited owner. Consequently, the limitations on power of alienation automatically vanished. This was the necessary result of the provisions made in Section 14 of the Act. The Full Bench further held that in respect of male proprietors, no corresponding provision was made either enlarging their estate in ancestral property or enlarging their power of alienation over property inherited by them. However, it noticed Section 30 and observed that it only deals with power of his share in coparcenary property by Will, which prior to enforcement of the Act, he had no right to do. The only provision made in respect of male proprietor regarding alienation of property was his power of alienation by Will. In so far as persons governed by custom are concerned, they continued to be governed by the restriction on the power of alienation of a male holder as existed before enforcement of the Act. Likewise, other restriction on alienation other than disposal by Will also continued. The Full Bench, thus, recognized the superior right of Hindu females by virtue of Section 14 and upheld the provision as intra vires. The argument that reversioners have ceased to exist after enactment of provisions of Section 14 of Succession Act, was rejected as there was no provision pointed out to that effect. The proposition laid down by the full Bench in Pritam Singhs case was that the Hindu Succession Act has not abolished joint Hindu family with respect to rights of those who were members of Mitakshara coparcenary, except in the manner and to the extent mentioned in Sections 6 and 30 of the Act, This Statement should also imply, though it does not say so expressly, the Succession Act to this extent does not affect the rights of the members governed by Dayabhaga coparcenary. The Full Bench in Pritam Singh;s case expressly noticed the judgment of earlier Full Bench in Joginder Singhs case but construed the same as irrelevant by observing that it dealt with the power of alienation of a person governed by Customary law and constitutional validity of Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act. Thus there is no real conflict between the two Full Bench judgments. Both the Full Bench judgments have been delivered on the assumption that Joginder Singhs case dealt with question of alienation whereas Pritam Singhs case had decided the question concerning succession. Even on fact in Joginder Singhs case the issue was validity of alienation by consent decree by a father to his two sons, which was challenged by third son, whereas in Pritam Singhs case the question of nature of property in hands of sons on death of their father had arisen  for purposes of assessment of estate duty. In Pritam  Singhs case the property in the hands of the sons was held to be coparcenary property and only 1/3rd of  property belonging to deceased father was considered eligible for estate duty. Therefore, there was no question of alienation in Pritam Singhs case. -  I do not find any infirmity in the well-reasoned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Hari Kishan and Ors. v. Administrator Municipal Committee;',
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			'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal, Sr. Adv. and; Sudhir Mittal, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' M.L Sarin, Sr. Adv.,; Ashish Handa,; H.N. Mehtani an',
			'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2005-05-25',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' Ashutosh Mohunta, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Ashutosh Mohunta, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The vendee-plaintiffs have filed this appeal to challenge the judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below whereby their suit and the appeal against the partition of the land ordered by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Guhla, vide order dated 16.7.1975, were dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. In brief the facts giving rise to this appeal are that defendant-respondent Nos. 1 to 5 filed an application for partition of the suit land against Smt.Kirpal Kaur (Plaintiff No. 1) and defendant Nos. 6 to 15 in the court of Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Guhla. In that application Smt. Kirpal Kaur was proceeded against ex parte. The partition was confirmed on 16.6.1975 and the case was fixed for instrument of partition for 16.7.1975. Rai Jasbir Singh, plaintiff No. 2 purchased land measuring 80 Kanals from Smt. Kirpal Kaur (plaintiff No. 1) vide sale deed dated 27.5.1975 during the pendency of the partition proceedings and plaintiff No. 2 and 3, i.e., Rai Jasbir Singh and Swaran Singh were in actual physical possession of 228 Kanals 8 Marias and 77 Kanals 8 Marias, respectively. The plaintiffs challenged the order dated 16.7.1975 passed by the Assistant Grade, 1st Class, Guhla, by filing the present suit for declaration, which was dismissed by the Sub Judge, 1st Class, Kaithal, vide judgment and decree dated 29.1.1980 on the ground that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The plaintiffs then filed appeal to challenge the judgment and decree dated 29.1.1980 passed by the trial Court. During the pendency of the appeal, Smt. Kirpal Kaur withdrew herself from being the appellant. Consequently, vide order dated 17.1.1980 the appeal qua Kirpal Kaur was ordered to be dismissed as withdrawn. The appeal qua the remaining two appellants, i.e., Rai Jasbir Singh and Swaran Singh (present appellants) was dismissed by the Additional District Judge, Kurukshetra, vide judgment and decree dated 4.12.1981 and the decision of the trial Court with regard to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was upheld. Now Rai Jasbir Singh arid Swaran Singh have filed the present appeal wherein challenge has been made to the findings of both the Courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. It has been contended by Mr. R.S. Mittal, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the appellants, that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not duly served and, thus,the ex parte order dated 16.6.1975/16.7.1975 passed by the Assistant Collector,1st Grade, Guhla, was a nullity. It has further been argued by the learned counsel for the appellants that the Courts below erred in holding that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit against partition ordered by the Revenue Officer in view of the provisions of the <a href="/act/136769/the-punjab-land-revenue-act-1887-complete-act">Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887</a> (for short 'the Act'), despite the fact that the order for partition of the suit land was passed ex parte without serving Smt.Kirpal Kaur according to the prescribed legal procedure.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellants have been controverted by Mr. M.L.Sarin, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the respondents. It has been contended by him that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to go into the validity of the partition proceedings. The appellants have approached the Civil Court without exhausting the remedy available to them under Section 13 of the Act. It has further been contended by him that Smt. Kirpal Kaur had duly been served in the partition proceedings by sending notice to her by registered post.The counsel has also contended that she had withdrawn her appeal before the lower appellate court and in this view of the matter, the present appellants, who had purchased the land from her during the pendency of the partition proceedings, had no locus standi to challenge the order of partition passed by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. 1 have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the evidence adduced on record.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The only question that arises for consideration in the present appeal is to the following effect:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether or not the Civil Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the suit wherein the order of partition passed by a Revenue Officer has been challenged and Smt. Kirpal Kaur was properly served in the partition proceedings</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The first objection raised on behalf of the appellants is that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not served in the partition proceedings before the Assistant Collector 1st Grade, Guhla, as per the provisions contained in Section 20 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. I do not find any merit in this contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants. It is not the case of the appellants that Smt.Kirpal Kaur was not served at all. The bald statement of the plaintiffs was rebutted by the statement on oath of defendant Balwant Singh and also by documentary evidence adduced on record which shows that a registered notice was issued to her and acknowledgement due (Ex.DIO) was received in the office of the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade. Sub-section (3) of Section 20 of the Act gives discretion to the Revenue Officer to serve the concerned person 'either in addition to, or in substitution for, any other mode of service, by forwarding the summons by post in a-letter addressed' to him and registered under Part II of the Indian Post Office Act, 1886. In this view of the matter, it cannot be said that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not served as per the procedure prescribed under the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The next contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants is that the Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain the ex parte order passed by the Revenue Officer.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. This contention is also without any merit. Section 158 of the Act specifically excludes the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts in matters within the jurisdiction of the Revenue Officers. In order to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector, a provision for filing of appeals before the higher Revenue Authorities has been made in Section 13 of the Act. The plaintiffs without exhausting the remedies available to them under Section 13, approached the Civil Court to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Moreover, it has come on record that Smt. Kirpal Kaur, from whom the present appellants had purchased the land during the pendency of the partition proceedings, had withdrawn from the appeal before the lower appellate Court. As the present appellants had purchased the suit land during the pendency of the partition proceedings, they have, therefore, no locus standi to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector 1st Grade and pursue the appeal. It is not the case of the plaintiff-appellants that the ex parte decree was obtained by the defendant-respondents by fraud or misrepresentation. In A.C. Ananthaswamy and Ors. v. Boraiah (D) by Lrs. (2004-3)138 Punjab Law Reporter 557, it has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that in the absence of any fraud or misrepresentation, an ex parte order on the bare plea of non-service cannot be set aside. In the present case it is an undisputed fact that registered notice (Ex.DIO) was issued to Smt. Kirpal Kaur and she had even filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order passed by the Assistant Collector. The ratio of the authority Firm Seth Radha Kishun (deceased) represented by Hari Kishan and Ors. v. Administrator Municipal Committee, Ludhiana : [1964]2SCR273 , that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not specifically ousted where a statute created a liability and provided a remedy, is not applicable to the facts appearing in the present case. In the present case, as already mentioned above, registered A.D. notice was issued to and served on Smt. Kirpal Kaur, who had thereafter, filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Both the courts below have given concurrent findings of fact which cannot be interfered with in the second appeal in view of the provisions of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as no substantial question of law has either been pleaded in the memorandum of appeal or arises for consideration in the present appeal. I do not find any infirmity in the well-reasoned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Consequently, there is no merit in this appeal. It is, accordingly, dismissed. However, I do no make any order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'casename' => 'Rai Jasbir Singh and anr. Vs. Balwant Singh and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' - HINDU LAW -- Custom: [Vijender Jain, C.J., M.M. Kumar, Jasbir Singh, Rajive Bhalla & Rajesh Bindal, JJ] Alienation of ancestral property - Punjab and Haryana -  Held, In respect of State of Punjab by virtue of Punjab Amendment Act, 1973 there is a complete bar to contest any alienation of ancestral or non-ancestral immovable property or appointment of an heir to such property on ground that such alienation or appointment was contrary to custom. In Punjab the property in hands of a successor has to be treated as coparcenary property and its alienation has to be governed by Hindu Law except to the extent it is regulated by Sections 6 and 30 of the Hindu Succession Act. In Haryana, property  in hands of successor has to be treated as coparcenary property as well as ancestral property. Parties can fall back upon Hindu Law in case they fail to establish that rule of decision is custom. Therefore, in Haryana both under Hindu law and the Customary Law, the alienation would be open to challenge. Custom was given precedent over uncodified Hindu Law presumably for reason that custom has been consistently replacing the Hindu Law. However, it was soon realized that ancestral immovable property, which ordinarily held to be inalienable amongst Jats of Punjab by virtue of custom except for necessity, no limitation was placed on degrees of collateral, eligible to contest such alienation. It was, therefore, felt necessary to engraft certain restriction on degrees of collateral, eligible to contest an alienation, which under the custom itself was not limited. Accordingly, the Punjab Custom (Power to Contest) Act, 1920 (Act No.2 of 1920) was enacted. The Hindu Succession Act was extended to the State of Punjab.  Act 2 of Punjab Act defined expression alienation to include any testamentary disposition of property and appointment of an heir was to include any adoption made or purporting to be made according to custom. A further provision was made by Section 3 that Hindu Succession Act was to apply only in respect of alienation of immovable property or appointment of heirs made by persons who in regard to such alienation or appointment were governed by custom. Whereas  Section 4 declared that Hindu Succession Act was not to affect any right to contest any alienation or appointment of an heir made before the date on which the Succession Act was to come into force. In other words, Act, No.2 of 1920 was not to affect alienation or appointments of heir made before date on which it came into force. It also preserved the rights of any alienation or appointment of an heir made by a family. After Section 7 was inserted in Act of 1920 by the Punjab Amendment Act of 1973 right of contest being contrary to custom had been totally effaced and taken away. Therefore, no person has any right to contest any alienation of immovable property whether ancestral or non-ancestral on ground of being contrary to custom after January 23, 1973. In Haryana, the situation as enunciated by Act No.2 of 1920 continued to prevail in respect of alienation because no reforms parallel to Punjab as brought by Amendment Act of 1973, had been enacted although right to pre-emption has been substantially abolished in Haryana also. No steps even have been taken in that regard. Therefore, situation in Haryana have to be regarded as it existed under Act No. 2 of 1920.
HINDU SUCCESSION ACT,1956[C.A.No.30/1956] --  Sections 6 & 30: [Vijender Jain, C.J., M.M.Kumar, Jasbir Singh, Rajive Bhalla & Rajesh Bindal, JJ]  Alienation of coparcenary property - Law laid down by Full Bench in Joginder Singh Kundha Singh v Kehar Singh Dasaundha Singh [AIR 1965 Punjab 407] and Pritam Singh v Assistant Controller of Estate Duty, Patiala [1976 Punj LR 342] -Whether there is any conflict? - Held, The basic controversy in the Full Bench decision of Joginder Singhs case was regarding constitutional validity of Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act and as to whether it infringes Article 14 of Constitution. It was held that the estate held by male and limitation on his power of alienation were in no way removed and the reversioners were not debarred from challenging such alienations. The Full Bench held that Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act postulates that estate held by a Hindu female before enforcement of Succession Act either by inheritance or otherwise, was enlarged and on date of enforcement of Succession Act, she became a full owner. Likewise, if she has inherited any estate after the commencement of the Act,  she was to be regarded as absolute owner rather than a limited owner. Consequently, the limitations on power of alienation automatically vanished. This was the necessary result of the provisions made in Section 14 of the Act. The Full Bench further held that in respect of male proprietors, no corresponding provision was made either enlarging their estate in ancestral property or enlarging their power of alienation over property inherited by them. However, it noticed Section 30 and observed that it only deals with power of his share in coparcenary property by Will, which prior to enforcement of the Act, he had no right to do. The only provision made in respect of male proprietor regarding alienation of property was his power of alienation by Will. In so far as persons governed by custom are concerned, they continued to be governed by the restriction on the power of alienation of a male holder as existed before enforcement of the Act. Likewise, other restriction on alienation other than disposal by Will also continued. The Full Bench, thus, recognized the superior right of Hindu females by virtue of Section 14 and upheld the provision as intra vires. The argument that reversioners have ceased to exist after enactment of provisions of Section 14 of Succession Act, was rejected as there was no provision pointed out to that effect. The proposition laid down by the full Bench in Pritam Singhs case was that the Hindu Succession Act has not abolished joint Hindu family with respect to rights of those who were members of Mitakshara coparcenary, except in the manner and to the extent mentioned in Sections 6 and 30 of the Act, This Statement should also imply, though it does not say so expressly, the Succession Act to this extent does not affect the rights of the members governed by Dayabhaga coparcenary. The Full Bench in Pritam Singh;s case expressly noticed the judgment of earlier Full Bench in Joginder Singhs case but construed the same as irrelevant by observing that it dealt with the power of alienation of a person governed by Customary law and constitutional validity of Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act. Thus there is no real conflict between the two Full Bench judgments. Both the Full Bench judgments have been delivered on the assumption that Joginder Singhs case dealt with question of alienation whereas Pritam Singhs case had decided the question concerning succession. Even on fact in Joginder Singhs case the issue was validity of alienation by consent decree by a father to his two sons, which was challenged by third son, whereas in Pritam Singhs case the question of nature of property in hands of sons on death of their father had arisen  for purposes of assessment of estate duty. In Pritam  Singhs case the property in the hands of the sons was held to be coparcenary property and only 1/3rd of  property belonging to deceased father was considered eligible for estate duty. Therefore, there was no question of alienation in Pritam Singhs case. -  I do not find any infirmity in the well-reasoned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Hari Kishan and Ors. v. Administrator Municipal Committee;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal, Sr. Adv. and; Sudhir Mittal, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' M.L Sarin, Sr. Adv.,; Ashish Handa,; H.N. Mehtani an',
		'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2005-05-25',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Ashutosh Mohunta, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Ashutosh Mohunta, J.</p><p>1. The vendee-plaintiffs have filed this appeal to challenge the judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below whereby their suit and the appeal against the partition of the land ordered by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Guhla, vide order dated 16.7.1975, were dismissed.</p><p>2. In brief the facts giving rise to this appeal are that defendant-respondent Nos. 1 to 5 filed an application for partition of the suit land against Smt.Kirpal Kaur (Plaintiff No. 1) and defendant Nos. 6 to 15 in the court of Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Guhla. In that application Smt. Kirpal Kaur was proceeded against ex parte. The partition was confirmed on 16.6.1975 and the case was fixed for instrument of partition for 16.7.1975. Rai Jasbir Singh, plaintiff No. 2 purchased land measuring 80 Kanals from Smt. Kirpal Kaur (plaintiff No. 1) vide sale deed dated 27.5.1975 during the pendency of the partition proceedings and plaintiff No. 2 and 3, i.e., Rai Jasbir Singh and Swaran Singh were in actual physical possession of 228 Kanals 8 Marias and 77 Kanals 8 Marias, respectively. The plaintiffs challenged the order dated 16.7.1975 passed by the Assistant Grade, 1st Class, Guhla, by filing the present suit for declaration, which was dismissed by the Sub Judge, 1st Class, Kaithal, vide judgment and decree dated 29.1.1980 on the ground that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The plaintiffs then filed appeal to challenge the judgment and decree dated 29.1.1980 passed by the trial Court. During the pendency of the appeal, Smt. Kirpal Kaur withdrew herself from being the appellant. Consequently, vide order dated 17.1.1980 the appeal qua Kirpal Kaur was ordered to be dismissed as withdrawn. The appeal qua the remaining two appellants, i.e., Rai Jasbir Singh and Swaran Singh (present appellants) was dismissed by the Additional District Judge, Kurukshetra, vide judgment and decree dated 4.12.1981 and the decision of the trial Court with regard to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was upheld. Now Rai Jasbir Singh arid Swaran Singh have filed the present appeal wherein challenge has been made to the findings of both the Courts below.</p><p>3. It has been contended by Mr. R.S. Mittal, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the appellants, that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not duly served and, thus,the ex parte order dated 16.6.1975/16.7.1975 passed by the Assistant Collector,1st Grade, Guhla, was a nullity. It has further been argued by the learned counsel for the appellants that the Courts below erred in holding that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit against partition ordered by the Revenue Officer in view of the provisions of the <a>Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887</a> (for short 'the Act'), despite the fact that the order for partition of the suit land was passed ex parte without serving Smt.Kirpal Kaur according to the prescribed legal procedure.</p><p>4. The contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellants have been controverted by Mr. M.L.Sarin, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the respondents. It has been contended by him that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to go into the validity of the partition proceedings. The appellants have approached the Civil Court without exhausting the remedy available to them under Section 13 of the Act. It has further been contended by him that Smt. Kirpal Kaur had duly been served in the partition proceedings by sending notice to her by registered post.The counsel has also contended that she had withdrawn her appeal before the lower appellate court and in this view of the matter, the present appellants, who had purchased the land from her during the pendency of the partition proceedings, had no locus standi to challenge the order of partition passed by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade.</p><p>5. 1 have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the evidence adduced on record.</p><p>6. The only question that arises for consideration in the present appeal is to the following effect:-</p><p>Whether or not the Civil Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the suit wherein the order of partition passed by a Revenue Officer has been challenged and Smt. Kirpal Kaur was properly served in the partition proceedings</p><p>7. The first objection raised on behalf of the appellants is that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not served in the partition proceedings before the Assistant Collector 1st Grade, Guhla, as per the provisions contained in Section 20 of the Act.</p><p>8. I do not find any merit in this contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants. It is not the case of the appellants that Smt.Kirpal Kaur was not served at all. The bald statement of the plaintiffs was rebutted by the statement on oath of defendant Balwant Singh and also by documentary evidence adduced on record which shows that a registered notice was issued to her and acknowledgement due (Ex.DIO) was received in the office of the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade. Sub-section (3) of Section 20 of the Act gives discretion to the Revenue Officer to serve the concerned person 'either in addition to, or in substitution for, any other mode of service, by forwarding the summons by post in a-letter addressed' to him and registered under Part II of the Indian Post Office Act, 1886. In this view of the matter, it cannot be said that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not served as per the procedure prescribed under the Act.</p><p>9. The next contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants is that the Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain the ex parte order passed by the Revenue Officer.</p><p>10. This contention is also without any merit. Section 158 of the Act specifically excludes the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts in matters within the jurisdiction of the Revenue Officers. In order to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector, a provision for filing of appeals before the higher Revenue Authorities has been made in Section 13 of the Act. The plaintiffs without exhausting the remedies available to them under Section 13, approached the Civil Court to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector.</p><p>11. Moreover, it has come on record that Smt. Kirpal Kaur, from whom the present appellants had purchased the land during the pendency of the partition proceedings, had withdrawn from the appeal before the lower appellate Court. As the present appellants had purchased the suit land during the pendency of the partition proceedings, they have, therefore, no locus standi to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector 1st Grade and pursue the appeal. It is not the case of the plaintiff-appellants that the ex parte decree was obtained by the defendant-respondents by fraud or misrepresentation. In A.C. Ananthaswamy and Ors. v. Boraiah (D) by Lrs. (2004-3)138 Punjab Law Reporter 557, it has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that in the absence of any fraud or misrepresentation, an ex parte order on the bare plea of non-service cannot be set aside. In the present case it is an undisputed fact that registered notice (Ex.DIO) was issued to Smt. Kirpal Kaur and she had even filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order passed by the Assistant Collector. The ratio of the authority Firm Seth Radha Kishun (deceased) represented by Hari Kishan and Ors. v. Administrator Municipal Committee, Ludhiana : [1964]2SCR273 , that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not specifically ousted where a statute created a liability and provided a remedy, is not applicable to the facts appearing in the present case. In the present case, as already mentioned above, registered A.D. notice was issued to and served on Smt. Kirpal Kaur, who had thereafter, filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order.</p><p>12. Both the courts below have given concurrent findings of fact which cannot be interfered with in the second appeal in view of the provisions of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as no substantial question of law has either been pleaded in the memorandum of appeal or arises for consideration in the present appeal. I do not find any infirmity in the well-reasoned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below.</p><p>13. Consequently, there is no merit in this appeal. It is, accordingly, dismissed. However, I do no make any order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '(2006)142PLR339',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Balwant Singh and ors.',
		'sub' => 'Property',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Ashutosh Mohunta, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The vendee-plaintiffs have filed this appeal to challenge the judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below whereby their suit and the appeal against the partition of the land ordered by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Guhla, vide order dated 16.7.1975, were dismissed.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. In brief the facts giving rise to this appeal are that defendant-respondent Nos. 1 to 5 filed an application for partition of the suit land against Smt.Kirpal Kaur (Plaintiff No. 1) and defendant Nos. 6 to 15 in the court of Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Guhla. In that application Smt. Kirpal Kaur was proceeded against ex parte. The partition was confirmed on 16.6.1975 and the case was fixed for instrument of partition for 16.7.1975. Rai Jasbir Singh, plaintiff No. 2 purchased land measuring 80 Kanals from Smt. Kirpal Kaur (plaintiff No. 1) vide sale deed dated 27.5.1975 during the pendency of the partition proceedings and plaintiff No. 2 and 3, i.e., Rai Jasbir Singh and Swaran Singh were in actual physical possession of 228 Kanals 8 Marias and 77 Kanals 8 Marias, respectively. The plaintiffs challenged the order dated 16.7.1975 passed by the Assistant Grade, 1st Class, Guhla, by filing the present suit for declaration, which was dismissed by the Sub Judge, 1st Class, Kaithal, vide judgment and decree dated 29.1.1980 on the ground that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The plaintiffs then filed appeal to challenge the judgment and decree dated 29.1.1980 passed by the trial Court. During the pendency of the appeal, Smt. Kirpal Kaur withdrew herself from being the appellant. Consequently, vide order dated 17.1.1980 the appeal qua Kirpal Kaur was ordered to be dismissed as withdrawn. The appeal qua the remaining two appellants, i.e., Rai Jasbir Singh and Swaran Singh (present appellants) was dismissed by the Additional District Judge, Kurukshetra, vide judgment and decree dated 4.12.1981 and the decision of the trial Court with regard to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was upheld. Now Rai Jasbir Singh arid Swaran Singh have filed the present appeal wherein challenge has been made to the findings of both the Courts below.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. It has been contended by Mr. R.S. Mittal, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the appellants, that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not duly served and, thus,the ex parte order dated 16.6.1975/16.7.1975 passed by the Assistant Collector,1st Grade, Guhla, was a nullity. It has further been argued by the learned counsel for the appellants that the Courts below erred in holding that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit against partition ordered by the Revenue Officer in view of the provisions of the <a>Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887</a> (for short 'the Act'), despite the fact that the order for partition of the suit land was passed ex parte without serving Smt.Kirpal Kaur according to the prescribed legal procedure.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. The contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellants have been controverted by Mr. M.L.Sarin, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the respondents. It has been contended by him that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to go into the validity of the partition proceedings. The appellants have approached the Civil Court without exhausting the remedy available to them under Section 13 of the Act. It has further been contended by him that Smt. Kirpal Kaur had duly been served in the partition proceedings by sending notice to her by registered post.The counsel has also contended that she had withdrawn her appeal before the lower appellate court and in this view of the matter, the present appellants, who had purchased the land from her during the pendency of the partition proceedings, had no locus standi to challenge the order of partition passed by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. 1 have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the evidence adduced on record.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. The only question that arises for consideration in the present appeal is to the following effect:-',
	(int) 7 => '<p>Whether or not the Civil Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the suit wherein the order of partition passed by a Revenue Officer has been challenged and Smt. Kirpal Kaur was properly served in the partition proceedings',
	(int) 8 => '<p>7. The first objection raised on behalf of the appellants is that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not served in the partition proceedings before the Assistant Collector 1st Grade, Guhla, as per the provisions contained in Section 20 of the Act.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>8. I do not find any merit in this contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants. It is not the case of the appellants that Smt.Kirpal Kaur was not served at all. The bald statement of the plaintiffs was rebutted by the statement on oath of defendant Balwant Singh and also by documentary evidence adduced on record which shows that a registered notice was issued to her and acknowledgement due (Ex.DIO) was received in the office of the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade. Sub-section (3) of Section 20 of the Act gives discretion to the Revenue Officer to serve the concerned person 'either in addition to, or in substitution for, any other mode of service, by forwarding the summons by post in a-letter addressed' to him and registered under Part II of the Indian Post Office Act, 1886. In this view of the matter, it cannot be said that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not served as per the procedure prescribed under the Act.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>9. The next contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants is that the Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain the ex parte order passed by the Revenue Officer.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>10. This contention is also without any merit. Section 158 of the Act specifically excludes the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts in matters within the jurisdiction of the Revenue Officers. In order to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector, a provision for filing of appeals before the higher Revenue Authorities has been made in Section 13 of the Act. The plaintiffs without exhausting the remedies available to them under Section 13, approached the Civil Court to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>11. Moreover, it has come on record that Smt. Kirpal Kaur, from whom the present appellants had purchased the land during the pendency of the partition proceedings, had withdrawn from the appeal before the lower appellate Court. As the present appellants had purchased the suit land during the pendency of the partition proceedings, they have, therefore, no locus standi to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector 1st Grade and pursue the appeal. It is not the case of the plaintiff-appellants that the ex parte decree was obtained by the defendant-respondents by fraud or misrepresentation. In A.C. Ananthaswamy and Ors. v. Boraiah (D) by Lrs. (2004-3)138 Punjab Law Reporter 557, it has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that in the absence of any fraud or misrepresentation, an ex parte order on the bare plea of non-service cannot be set aside. In the present case it is an undisputed fact that registered notice (Ex.DIO) was issued to Smt. Kirpal Kaur and she had even filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order passed by the Assistant Collector. The ratio of the authority Firm Seth Radha Kishun (deceased) represented by Hari Kishan and Ors. v. Administrator Municipal Committee, Ludhiana : [1964]2SCR273 , that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not specifically ousted where a statute created a liability and provided a remedy, is not applicable to the facts appearing in the present case. In the present case, as already mentioned above, registered A.D. notice was issued to and served on Smt. Kirpal Kaur, who had thereafter, filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>12. Both the courts below have given concurrent findings of fact which cannot be interfered with in the second appeal in view of the provisions of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as no substantial question of law has either been pleaded in the memorandum of appeal or arises for consideration in the present appeal. I do not find any infirmity in the well-reasoned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>13. Consequently, there is no merit in this appeal. It is, accordingly, dismissed. However, I do no make any order as to costs.<p>',
	(int) 15 => '<p>'
)
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11. Moreover, it has come on record that Smt. Kirpal Kaur, from whom the present appellants had purchased the land during the pendency of the partition proceedings, had withdrawn from the appeal before the lower appellate Court. As the present appellants had purchased the suit land during the pendency of the partition proceedings, they have, therefore, no locus standi to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector 1st Grade and pursue the appeal. It is not the case of the plaintiff-appellants that the ex parte decree was obtained by the defendant-respondents by fraud or misrepresentation. In A.C. Ananthaswamy and Ors. v. Boraiah (D) by Lrs. (2004-3)138 Punjab Law Reporter 557, it has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that in the absence of any fraud or misrepresentation, an ex parte order on the bare plea of non-service cannot be set aside. In the present case it is an undisputed fact that registered notice (Ex.DIO) was issued to Smt. Kirpal Kaur and she had even filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order passed by the Assistant Collector. The ratio of the authority Firm Seth Radha Kishun (deceased) represented by Hari Kishan and Ors. v. Administrator Municipal Committee, Ludhiana : [1964]2SCR273 , that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not specifically ousted where a statute created a liability and provided a remedy, is not applicable to the facts appearing in the present case. In the present case, as already mentioned above, registered A.D. notice was issued to and served on Smt. Kirpal Kaur, who had thereafter, filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Rai Jasbir Singh and anr Vs Balwant Singh and ors - Citation 629369 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '629369',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/136769/the-punjab-land-revenue-act-1887-complete-act">Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887</a> - Sections 13, 20, 20(3) and 158; Indian Post Office Act, 1886; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) - Sections 100',
			'appealno' => 'Regular Second Appeal No. 615 of 1982 (O and M)',
			'appellant' => 'Rai Jasbir Singh and anr.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Rai Jasbir Singh and anr. Vs. Balwant Singh and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' - HINDU LAW -- Custom: [Vijender Jain, C.J., M.M. Kumar, Jasbir Singh, Rajive Bhalla & Rajesh Bindal, JJ] Alienation of ancestral property - Punjab and Haryana -  Held, In respect of State of Punjab by virtue of Punjab Amendment Act, 1973 there is a complete bar to contest any alienation of ancestral or non-ancestral immovable property or appointment of an heir to such property on ground that such alienation or appointment was contrary to custom. In Punjab the property in hands of a successor has to be treated as coparcenary property and its alienation has to be governed by Hindu Law except to the extent it is regulated by Sections 6 and 30 of the Hindu Succession Act. In Haryana, property  in hands of successor has to be treated as coparcenary property as well as ancestral property. Parties can fall back upon Hindu Law in case they fail to establish that rule of decision is custom. Therefore, in Haryana both under Hindu law and the Customary Law, the alienation would be open to challenge. Custom was given precedent over uncodified Hindu Law presumably for reason that custom has been consistently replacing the Hindu Law. However, it was soon realized that ancestral immovable property, which ordinarily held to be inalienable amongst Jats of Punjab by virtue of custom except for necessity, no limitation was placed on degrees of collateral, eligible to contest such alienation. It was, therefore, felt necessary to engraft certain restriction on degrees of collateral, eligible to contest an alienation, which under the custom itself was not limited. Accordingly, the Punjab Custom (Power to Contest) Act, 1920 (Act No.2 of 1920) was enacted. The Hindu Succession Act was extended to the State of Punjab.  Act 2 of Punjab Act defined expression alienation to include any testamentary disposition of property and appointment of an heir was to include any adoption made or purporting to be made according to custom. A further provision was made by Section 3 that Hindu Succession Act was to apply only in respect of alienation of immovable property or appointment of heirs made by persons who in regard to such alienation or appointment were governed by custom. Whereas  Section 4 declared that Hindu Succession Act was not to affect any right to contest any alienation or appointment of an heir made before the date on which the Succession Act was to come into force. In other words, Act, No.2 of 1920 was not to affect alienation or appointments of heir made before date on which it came into force. It also preserved the rights of any alienation or appointment of an heir made by a family. After Section 7 was inserted in Act of 1920 by the Punjab Amendment Act of 1973 right of contest being contrary to custom had been totally effaced and taken away. Therefore, no person has any right to contest any alienation of immovable property whether ancestral or non-ancestral on ground of being contrary to custom after January 23, 1973. In Haryana, the situation as enunciated by Act No.2 of 1920 continued to prevail in respect of alienation because no reforms parallel to Punjab as brought by Amendment Act of 1973, had been enacted although right to pre-emption has been substantially abolished in Haryana also. No steps even have been taken in that regard. Therefore, situation in Haryana have to be regarded as it existed under Act No. 2 of 1920.
HINDU SUCCESSION ACT,1956[C.A.No.30/1956] --  Sections 6 & 30: [Vijender Jain, C.J., M.M.Kumar, Jasbir Singh, Rajive Bhalla & Rajesh Bindal, JJ]  Alienation of coparcenary property - Law laid down by Full Bench in Joginder Singh Kundha Singh v Kehar Singh Dasaundha Singh [AIR 1965 Punjab 407] and Pritam Singh v Assistant Controller of Estate Duty, Patiala [1976 Punj LR 342] -Whether there is any conflict? - Held, The basic controversy in the Full Bench decision of Joginder Singhs case was regarding constitutional validity of Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act and as to whether it infringes Article 14 of Constitution. It was held that the estate held by male and limitation on his power of alienation were in no way removed and the reversioners were not debarred from challenging such alienations. The Full Bench held that Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act postulates that estate held by a Hindu female before enforcement of Succession Act either by inheritance or otherwise, was enlarged and on date of enforcement of Succession Act, she became a full owner. Likewise, if she has inherited any estate after the commencement of the Act,  she was to be regarded as absolute owner rather than a limited owner. Consequently, the limitations on power of alienation automatically vanished. This was the necessary result of the provisions made in Section 14 of the Act. The Full Bench further held that in respect of male proprietors, no corresponding provision was made either enlarging their estate in ancestral property or enlarging their power of alienation over property inherited by them. However, it noticed Section 30 and observed that it only deals with power of his share in coparcenary property by Will, which prior to enforcement of the Act, he had no right to do. The only provision made in respect of male proprietor regarding alienation of property was his power of alienation by Will. In so far as persons governed by custom are concerned, they continued to be governed by the restriction on the power of alienation of a male holder as existed before enforcement of the Act. Likewise, other restriction on alienation other than disposal by Will also continued. The Full Bench, thus, recognized the superior right of Hindu females by virtue of Section 14 and upheld the provision as intra vires. The argument that reversioners have ceased to exist after enactment of provisions of Section 14 of Succession Act, was rejected as there was no provision pointed out to that effect. The proposition laid down by the full Bench in Pritam Singhs case was that the Hindu Succession Act has not abolished joint Hindu family with respect to rights of those who were members of Mitakshara coparcenary, except in the manner and to the extent mentioned in Sections 6 and 30 of the Act, This Statement should also imply, though it does not say so expressly, the Succession Act to this extent does not affect the rights of the members governed by Dayabhaga coparcenary. The Full Bench in Pritam Singh;s case expressly noticed the judgment of earlier Full Bench in Joginder Singhs case but construed the same as irrelevant by observing that it dealt with the power of alienation of a person governed by Customary law and constitutional validity of Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act. Thus there is no real conflict between the two Full Bench judgments. Both the Full Bench judgments have been delivered on the assumption that Joginder Singhs case dealt with question of alienation whereas Pritam Singhs case had decided the question concerning succession. Even on fact in Joginder Singhs case the issue was validity of alienation by consent decree by a father to his two sons, which was challenged by third son, whereas in Pritam Singhs case the question of nature of property in hands of sons on death of their father had arisen  for purposes of assessment of estate duty. In Pritam  Singhs case the property in the hands of the sons was held to be coparcenary property and only 1/3rd of  property belonging to deceased father was considered eligible for estate duty. Therefore, there was no question of alienation in Pritam Singhs case. -  I do not find any infirmity in the well-reasoned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Hari Kishan and Ors. v. Administrator Municipal Committee;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal, Sr. Adv. and; Sudhir Mittal, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' M.L Sarin, Sr. Adv.,; Ashish Handa,; H.N. Mehtani an',
			'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2005-05-25',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' Ashutosh Mohunta, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Ashutosh Mohunta, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The vendee-plaintiffs have filed this appeal to challenge the judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below whereby their suit and the appeal against the partition of the land ordered by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Guhla, vide order dated 16.7.1975, were dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. In brief the facts giving rise to this appeal are that defendant-respondent Nos. 1 to 5 filed an application for partition of the suit land against Smt.Kirpal Kaur (Plaintiff No. 1) and defendant Nos. 6 to 15 in the court of Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Guhla. In that application Smt. Kirpal Kaur was proceeded against ex parte. The partition was confirmed on 16.6.1975 and the case was fixed for instrument of partition for 16.7.1975. Rai Jasbir Singh, plaintiff No. 2 purchased land measuring 80 Kanals from Smt. Kirpal Kaur (plaintiff No. 1) vide sale deed dated 27.5.1975 during the pendency of the partition proceedings and plaintiff No. 2 and 3, i.e., Rai Jasbir Singh and Swaran Singh were in actual physical possession of 228 Kanals 8 Marias and 77 Kanals 8 Marias, respectively. The plaintiffs challenged the order dated 16.7.1975 passed by the Assistant Grade, 1st Class, Guhla, by filing the present suit for declaration, which was dismissed by the Sub Judge, 1st Class, Kaithal, vide judgment and decree dated 29.1.1980 on the ground that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The plaintiffs then filed appeal to challenge the judgment and decree dated 29.1.1980 passed by the trial Court. During the pendency of the appeal, Smt. Kirpal Kaur withdrew herself from being the appellant. Consequently, vide order dated 17.1.1980 the appeal qua Kirpal Kaur was ordered to be dismissed as withdrawn. The appeal qua the remaining two appellants, i.e., Rai Jasbir Singh and Swaran Singh (present appellants) was dismissed by the Additional District Judge, Kurukshetra, vide judgment and decree dated 4.12.1981 and the decision of the trial Court with regard to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was upheld. Now Rai Jasbir Singh arid Swaran Singh have filed the present appeal wherein challenge has been made to the findings of both the Courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. It has been contended by Mr. R.S. Mittal, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the appellants, that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not duly served and, thus,the ex parte order dated 16.6.1975/16.7.1975 passed by the Assistant Collector,1st Grade, Guhla, was a nullity. It has further been argued by the learned counsel for the appellants that the Courts below erred in holding that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit against partition ordered by the Revenue Officer in view of the provisions of the <a href="/act/136769/the-punjab-land-revenue-act-1887-complete-act">Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887</a> (for short 'the Act'), despite the fact that the order for partition of the suit land was passed ex parte without serving Smt.Kirpal Kaur according to the prescribed legal procedure.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellants have been controverted by Mr. M.L.Sarin, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the respondents. It has been contended by him that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to go into the validity of the partition proceedings. The appellants have approached the Civil Court without exhausting the remedy available to them under Section 13 of the Act. It has further been contended by him that Smt. Kirpal Kaur had duly been served in the partition proceedings by sending notice to her by registered post.The counsel has also contended that she had withdrawn her appeal before the lower appellate court and in this view of the matter, the present appellants, who had purchased the land from her during the pendency of the partition proceedings, had no locus standi to challenge the order of partition passed by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. 1 have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the evidence adduced on record.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The only question that arises for consideration in the present appeal is to the following effect:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether or not the Civil Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the suit wherein the order of partition passed by a Revenue Officer has been challenged and Smt. Kirpal Kaur was properly served in the partition proceedings</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The first objection raised on behalf of the appellants is that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not served in the partition proceedings before the Assistant Collector 1st Grade, Guhla, as per the provisions contained in Section 20 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. I do not find any merit in this contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants. It is not the case of the appellants that Smt.Kirpal Kaur was not served at all. The bald statement of the plaintiffs was rebutted by the statement on oath of defendant Balwant Singh and also by documentary evidence adduced on record which shows that a registered notice was issued to her and acknowledgement due (Ex.DIO) was received in the office of the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade. Sub-section (3) of Section 20 of the Act gives discretion to the Revenue Officer to serve the concerned person 'either in addition to, or in substitution for, any other mode of service, by forwarding the summons by post in a-letter addressed' to him and registered under Part II of the Indian Post Office Act, 1886. In this view of the matter, it cannot be said that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not served as per the procedure prescribed under the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The next contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants is that the Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain the ex parte order passed by the Revenue Officer.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. This contention is also without any merit. Section 158 of the Act specifically excludes the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts in matters within the jurisdiction of the Revenue Officers. In order to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector, a provision for filing of appeals before the higher Revenue Authorities has been made in Section 13 of the Act. The plaintiffs without exhausting the remedies available to them under Section 13, approached the Civil Court to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Moreover, it has come on record that Smt. Kirpal Kaur, from whom the present appellants had purchased the land during the pendency of the partition proceedings, had withdrawn from the appeal before the lower appellate Court. As the present appellants had purchased the suit land during the pendency of the partition proceedings, they have, therefore, no locus standi to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector 1st Grade and pursue the appeal. It is not the case of the plaintiff-appellants that the ex parte decree was obtained by the defendant-respondents by fraud or misrepresentation. In A.C. Ananthaswamy and Ors. v. Boraiah (D) by Lrs. (2004-3)138 Punjab Law Reporter 557, it has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that in the absence of any fraud or misrepresentation, an ex parte order on the bare plea of non-service cannot be set aside. In the present case it is an undisputed fact that registered notice (Ex.DIO) was issued to Smt. Kirpal Kaur and she had even filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order passed by the Assistant Collector. The ratio of the authority Firm Seth Radha Kishun (deceased) represented by Hari Kishan and Ors. v. Administrator Municipal Committee, Ludhiana : [1964]2SCR273 , that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not specifically ousted where a statute created a liability and provided a remedy, is not applicable to the facts appearing in the present case. In the present case, as already mentioned above, registered A.D. notice was issued to and served on Smt. Kirpal Kaur, who had thereafter, filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Both the courts below have given concurrent findings of fact which cannot be interfered with in the second appeal in view of the provisions of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as no substantial question of law has either been pleaded in the memorandum of appeal or arises for consideration in the present appeal. I do not find any infirmity in the well-reasoned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Consequently, there is no merit in this appeal. It is, accordingly, dismissed. However, I do no make any order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '(2006)142PLR339',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Balwant Singh and ors.',
			'sub' => 'Property',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'rai-jasbir-singh-vs-balwant',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '629369',
		(int) 1 => 'rai-jasbir-singh-vs-balwant'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Rai Jasbir Singh and anr Vs Balwant Singh and ors - Citation 629369 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '629369',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/136769/the-punjab-land-revenue-act-1887-complete-act">Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887</a> - Sections 13, 20, 20(3) and 158; Indian Post Office Act, 1886; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) - Sections 100',
		'appealno' => 'Regular Second Appeal No. 615 of 1982 (O and M)',
		'appellant' => 'Rai Jasbir Singh and anr.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Rai Jasbir Singh and anr. Vs. Balwant Singh and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' - HINDU LAW -- Custom: [Vijender Jain, C.J., M.M. Kumar, Jasbir Singh, Rajive Bhalla & Rajesh Bindal, JJ] Alienation of ancestral property - Punjab and Haryana -  Held, In respect of State of Punjab by virtue of Punjab Amendment Act, 1973 there is a complete bar to contest any alienation of ancestral or non-ancestral immovable property or appointment of an heir to such property on ground that such alienation or appointment was contrary to custom. In Punjab the property in hands of a successor has to be treated as coparcenary property and its alienation has to be governed by Hindu Law except to the extent it is regulated by Sections 6 and 30 of the Hindu Succession Act. In Haryana, property  in hands of successor has to be treated as coparcenary property as well as ancestral property. Parties can fall back upon Hindu Law in case they fail to establish that rule of decision is custom. Therefore, in Haryana both under Hindu law and the Customary Law, the alienation would be open to challenge. Custom was given precedent over uncodified Hindu Law presumably for reason that custom has been consistently replacing the Hindu Law. However, it was soon realized that ancestral immovable property, which ordinarily held to be inalienable amongst Jats of Punjab by virtue of custom except for necessity, no limitation was placed on degrees of collateral, eligible to contest such alienation. It was, therefore, felt necessary to engraft certain restriction on degrees of collateral, eligible to contest an alienation, which under the custom itself was not limited. Accordingly, the Punjab Custom (Power to Contest) Act, 1920 (Act No.2 of 1920) was enacted. The Hindu Succession Act was extended to the State of Punjab.  Act 2 of Punjab Act defined expression alienation to include any testamentary disposition of property and appointment of an heir was to include any adoption made or purporting to be made according to custom. A further provision was made by Section 3 that Hindu Succession Act was to apply only in respect of alienation of immovable property or appointment of heirs made by persons who in regard to such alienation or appointment were governed by custom. Whereas  Section 4 declared that Hindu Succession Act was not to affect any right to contest any alienation or appointment of an heir made before the date on which the Succession Act was to come into force. In other words, Act, No.2 of 1920 was not to affect alienation or appointments of heir made before date on which it came into force. It also preserved the rights of any alienation or appointment of an heir made by a family. After Section 7 was inserted in Act of 1920 by the Punjab Amendment Act of 1973 right of contest being contrary to custom had been totally effaced and taken away. Therefore, no person has any right to contest any alienation of immovable property whether ancestral or non-ancestral on ground of being contrary to custom after January 23, 1973. In Haryana, the situation as enunciated by Act No.2 of 1920 continued to prevail in respect of alienation because no reforms parallel to Punjab as brought by Amendment Act of 1973, had been enacted although right to pre-emption has been substantially abolished in Haryana also. No steps even have been taken in that regard. Therefore, situation in Haryana have to be regarded as it existed under Act No. 2 of 1920.
HINDU SUCCESSION ACT,1956[C.A.No.30/1956] --  Sections 6 & 30: [Vijender Jain, C.J., M.M.Kumar, Jasbir Singh, Rajive Bhalla & Rajesh Bindal, JJ]  Alienation of coparcenary property - Law laid down by Full Bench in Joginder Singh Kundha Singh v Kehar Singh Dasaundha Singh [AIR 1965 Punjab 407] and Pritam Singh v Assistant Controller of Estate Duty, Patiala [1976 Punj LR 342] -Whether there is any conflict? - Held, The basic controversy in the Full Bench decision of Joginder Singhs case was regarding constitutional validity of Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act and as to whether it infringes Article 14 of Constitution. It was held that the estate held by male and limitation on his power of alienation were in no way removed and the reversioners were not debarred from challenging such alienations. The Full Bench held that Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act postulates that estate held by a Hindu female before enforcement of Succession Act either by inheritance or otherwise, was enlarged and on date of enforcement of Succession Act, she became a full owner. Likewise, if she has inherited any estate after the commencement of the Act,  she was to be regarded as absolute owner rather than a limited owner. Consequently, the limitations on power of alienation automatically vanished. This was the necessary result of the provisions made in Section 14 of the Act. The Full Bench further held that in respect of male proprietors, no corresponding provision was made either enlarging their estate in ancestral property or enlarging their power of alienation over property inherited by them. However, it noticed Section 30 and observed that it only deals with power of his share in coparcenary property by Will, which prior to enforcement of the Act, he had no right to do. The only provision made in respect of male proprietor regarding alienation of property was his power of alienation by Will. In so far as persons governed by custom are concerned, they continued to be governed by the restriction on the power of alienation of a male holder as existed before enforcement of the Act. Likewise, other restriction on alienation other than disposal by Will also continued. The Full Bench, thus, recognized the superior right of Hindu females by virtue of Section 14 and upheld the provision as intra vires. The argument that reversioners have ceased to exist after enactment of provisions of Section 14 of Succession Act, was rejected as there was no provision pointed out to that effect. The proposition laid down by the full Bench in Pritam Singhs case was that the Hindu Succession Act has not abolished joint Hindu family with respect to rights of those who were members of Mitakshara coparcenary, except in the manner and to the extent mentioned in Sections 6 and 30 of the Act, This Statement should also imply, though it does not say so expressly, the Succession Act to this extent does not affect the rights of the members governed by Dayabhaga coparcenary. The Full Bench in Pritam Singh;s case expressly noticed the judgment of earlier Full Bench in Joginder Singhs case but construed the same as irrelevant by observing that it dealt with the power of alienation of a person governed by Customary law and constitutional validity of Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act. Thus there is no real conflict between the two Full Bench judgments. Both the Full Bench judgments have been delivered on the assumption that Joginder Singhs case dealt with question of alienation whereas Pritam Singhs case had decided the question concerning succession. Even on fact in Joginder Singhs case the issue was validity of alienation by consent decree by a father to his two sons, which was challenged by third son, whereas in Pritam Singhs case the question of nature of property in hands of sons on death of their father had arisen  for purposes of assessment of estate duty. In Pritam  Singhs case the property in the hands of the sons was held to be coparcenary property and only 1/3rd of  property belonging to deceased father was considered eligible for estate duty. Therefore, there was no question of alienation in Pritam Singhs case. -  I do not find any infirmity in the well-reasoned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Hari Kishan and Ors. v. Administrator Municipal Committee;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal, Sr. Adv. and; Sudhir Mittal, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' M.L Sarin, Sr. Adv.,; Ashish Handa,; H.N. Mehtani an',
		'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2005-05-25',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Ashutosh Mohunta, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Ashutosh Mohunta, J.</p><p>1. The vendee-plaintiffs have filed this appeal to challenge the judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below whereby their suit and the appeal against the partition of the land ordered by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Guhla, vide order dated 16.7.1975, were dismissed.</p><p>2. In brief the facts giving rise to this appeal are that defendant-respondent Nos. 1 to 5 filed an application for partition of the suit land against Smt.Kirpal Kaur (Plaintiff No. 1) and defendant Nos. 6 to 15 in the court of Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Guhla. In that application Smt. Kirpal Kaur was proceeded against ex parte. The partition was confirmed on 16.6.1975 and the case was fixed for instrument of partition for 16.7.1975. Rai Jasbir Singh, plaintiff No. 2 purchased land measuring 80 Kanals from Smt. Kirpal Kaur (plaintiff No. 1) vide sale deed dated 27.5.1975 during the pendency of the partition proceedings and plaintiff No. 2 and 3, i.e., Rai Jasbir Singh and Swaran Singh were in actual physical possession of 228 Kanals 8 Marias and 77 Kanals 8 Marias, respectively. The plaintiffs challenged the order dated 16.7.1975 passed by the Assistant Grade, 1st Class, Guhla, by filing the present suit for declaration, which was dismissed by the Sub Judge, 1st Class, Kaithal, vide judgment and decree dated 29.1.1980 on the ground that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The plaintiffs then filed appeal to challenge the judgment and decree dated 29.1.1980 passed by the trial Court. During the pendency of the appeal, Smt. Kirpal Kaur withdrew herself from being the appellant. Consequently, vide order dated 17.1.1980 the appeal qua Kirpal Kaur was ordered to be dismissed as withdrawn. The appeal qua the remaining two appellants, i.e., Rai Jasbir Singh and Swaran Singh (present appellants) was dismissed by the Additional District Judge, Kurukshetra, vide judgment and decree dated 4.12.1981 and the decision of the trial Court with regard to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was upheld. Now Rai Jasbir Singh arid Swaran Singh have filed the present appeal wherein challenge has been made to the findings of both the Courts below.</p><p>3. It has been contended by Mr. R.S. Mittal, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the appellants, that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not duly served and, thus,the ex parte order dated 16.6.1975/16.7.1975 passed by the Assistant Collector,1st Grade, Guhla, was a nullity. It has further been argued by the learned counsel for the appellants that the Courts below erred in holding that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit against partition ordered by the Revenue Officer in view of the provisions of the <a>Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887</a> (for short 'the Act'), despite the fact that the order for partition of the suit land was passed ex parte without serving Smt.Kirpal Kaur according to the prescribed legal procedure.</p><p>4. The contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellants have been controverted by Mr. M.L.Sarin, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the respondents. It has been contended by him that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to go into the validity of the partition proceedings. The appellants have approached the Civil Court without exhausting the remedy available to them under Section 13 of the Act. It has further been contended by him that Smt. Kirpal Kaur had duly been served in the partition proceedings by sending notice to her by registered post.The counsel has also contended that she had withdrawn her appeal before the lower appellate court and in this view of the matter, the present appellants, who had purchased the land from her during the pendency of the partition proceedings, had no locus standi to challenge the order of partition passed by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade.</p><p>5. 1 have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the evidence adduced on record.</p><p>6. The only question that arises for consideration in the present appeal is to the following effect:-</p><p>Whether or not the Civil Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the suit wherein the order of partition passed by a Revenue Officer has been challenged and Smt. Kirpal Kaur was properly served in the partition proceedings</p><p>7. The first objection raised on behalf of the appellants is that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not served in the partition proceedings before the Assistant Collector 1st Grade, Guhla, as per the provisions contained in Section 20 of the Act.</p><p>8. I do not find any merit in this contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants. It is not the case of the appellants that Smt.Kirpal Kaur was not served at all. The bald statement of the plaintiffs was rebutted by the statement on oath of defendant Balwant Singh and also by documentary evidence adduced on record which shows that a registered notice was issued to her and acknowledgement due (Ex.DIO) was received in the office of the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade. Sub-section (3) of Section 20 of the Act gives discretion to the Revenue Officer to serve the concerned person 'either in addition to, or in substitution for, any other mode of service, by forwarding the summons by post in a-letter addressed' to him and registered under Part II of the Indian Post Office Act, 1886. In this view of the matter, it cannot be said that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not served as per the procedure prescribed under the Act.</p><p>9. The next contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants is that the Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain the ex parte order passed by the Revenue Officer.</p><p>10. This contention is also without any merit. Section 158 of the Act specifically excludes the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts in matters within the jurisdiction of the Revenue Officers. In order to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector, a provision for filing of appeals before the higher Revenue Authorities has been made in Section 13 of the Act. The plaintiffs without exhausting the remedies available to them under Section 13, approached the Civil Court to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector.</p><p>11. Moreover, it has come on record that Smt. Kirpal Kaur, from whom the present appellants had purchased the land during the pendency of the partition proceedings, had withdrawn from the appeal before the lower appellate Court. As the present appellants had purchased the suit land during the pendency of the partition proceedings, they have, therefore, no locus standi to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector 1st Grade and pursue the appeal. It is not the case of the plaintiff-appellants that the ex parte decree was obtained by the defendant-respondents by fraud or misrepresentation. In A.C. Ananthaswamy and Ors. v. Boraiah (D) by Lrs. (2004-3)138 Punjab Law Reporter 557, it has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that in the absence of any fraud or misrepresentation, an ex parte order on the bare plea of non-service cannot be set aside. In the present case it is an undisputed fact that registered notice (Ex.DIO) was issued to Smt. Kirpal Kaur and she had even filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order passed by the Assistant Collector. The ratio of the authority Firm Seth Radha Kishun (deceased) represented by Hari Kishan and Ors. v. Administrator Municipal Committee, Ludhiana : [1964]2SCR273 , that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not specifically ousted where a statute created a liability and provided a remedy, is not applicable to the facts appearing in the present case. In the present case, as already mentioned above, registered A.D. notice was issued to and served on Smt. Kirpal Kaur, who had thereafter, filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order.</p><p>12. Both the courts below have given concurrent findings of fact which cannot be interfered with in the second appeal in view of the provisions of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as no substantial question of law has either been pleaded in the memorandum of appeal or arises for consideration in the present appeal. I do not find any infirmity in the well-reasoned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below.</p><p>13. Consequently, there is no merit in this appeal. It is, accordingly, dismissed. However, I do no make any order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Ashutosh Mohunta, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The vendee-plaintiffs have filed this appeal to challenge the judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below whereby their suit and the appeal against the partition of the land ordered by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Guhla, vide order dated 16.7.1975, were dismissed.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. In brief the facts giving rise to this appeal are that defendant-respondent Nos. 1 to 5 filed an application for partition of the suit land against Smt.Kirpal Kaur (Plaintiff No. 1) and defendant Nos. 6 to 15 in the court of Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Guhla. In that application Smt. Kirpal Kaur was proceeded against ex parte. The partition was confirmed on 16.6.1975 and the case was fixed for instrument of partition for 16.7.1975. Rai Jasbir Singh, plaintiff No. 2 purchased land measuring 80 Kanals from Smt. Kirpal Kaur (plaintiff No. 1) vide sale deed dated 27.5.1975 during the pendency of the partition proceedings and plaintiff No. 2 and 3, i.e., Rai Jasbir Singh and Swaran Singh were in actual physical possession of 228 Kanals 8 Marias and 77 Kanals 8 Marias, respectively. The plaintiffs challenged the order dated 16.7.1975 passed by the Assistant Grade, 1st Class, Guhla, by filing the present suit for declaration, which was dismissed by the Sub Judge, 1st Class, Kaithal, vide judgment and decree dated 29.1.1980 on the ground that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The plaintiffs then filed appeal to challenge the judgment and decree dated 29.1.1980 passed by the trial Court. During the pendency of the appeal, Smt. Kirpal Kaur withdrew herself from being the appellant. Consequently, vide order dated 17.1.1980 the appeal qua Kirpal Kaur was ordered to be dismissed as withdrawn. The appeal qua the remaining two appellants, i.e., Rai Jasbir Singh and Swaran Singh (present appellants) was dismissed by the Additional District Judge, Kurukshetra, vide judgment and decree dated 4.12.1981 and the decision of the trial Court with regard to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was upheld. Now Rai Jasbir Singh arid Swaran Singh have filed the present appeal wherein challenge has been made to the findings of both the Courts below.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. It has been contended by Mr. R.S. Mittal, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the appellants, that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not duly served and, thus,the ex parte order dated 16.6.1975/16.7.1975 passed by the Assistant Collector,1st Grade, Guhla, was a nullity. It has further been argued by the learned counsel for the appellants that the Courts below erred in holding that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit against partition ordered by the Revenue Officer in view of the provisions of the <a>Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887</a> (for short 'the Act'), despite the fact that the order for partition of the suit land was passed ex parte without serving Smt.Kirpal Kaur according to the prescribed legal procedure.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. The contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellants have been controverted by Mr. M.L.Sarin, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the respondents. It has been contended by him that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to go into the validity of the partition proceedings. The appellants have approached the Civil Court without exhausting the remedy available to them under Section 13 of the Act. It has further been contended by him that Smt. Kirpal Kaur had duly been served in the partition proceedings by sending notice to her by registered post.The counsel has also contended that she had withdrawn her appeal before the lower appellate court and in this view of the matter, the present appellants, who had purchased the land from her during the pendency of the partition proceedings, had no locus standi to challenge the order of partition passed by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. 1 have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the evidence adduced on record.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. The only question that arises for consideration in the present appeal is to the following effect:-',
	(int) 7 => '<p>Whether or not the Civil Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the suit wherein the order of partition passed by a Revenue Officer has been challenged and Smt. Kirpal Kaur was properly served in the partition proceedings',
	(int) 8 => '<p>7. The first objection raised on behalf of the appellants is that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not served in the partition proceedings before the Assistant Collector 1st Grade, Guhla, as per the provisions contained in Section 20 of the Act.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>8. I do not find any merit in this contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants. It is not the case of the appellants that Smt.Kirpal Kaur was not served at all. The bald statement of the plaintiffs was rebutted by the statement on oath of defendant Balwant Singh and also by documentary evidence adduced on record which shows that a registered notice was issued to her and acknowledgement due (Ex.DIO) was received in the office of the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade. Sub-section (3) of Section 20 of the Act gives discretion to the Revenue Officer to serve the concerned person 'either in addition to, or in substitution for, any other mode of service, by forwarding the summons by post in a-letter addressed' to him and registered under Part II of the Indian Post Office Act, 1886. In this view of the matter, it cannot be said that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not served as per the procedure prescribed under the Act.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>9. The next contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants is that the Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain the ex parte order passed by the Revenue Officer.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>10. This contention is also without any merit. Section 158 of the Act specifically excludes the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts in matters within the jurisdiction of the Revenue Officers. In order to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector, a provision for filing of appeals before the higher Revenue Authorities has been made in Section 13 of the Act. The plaintiffs without exhausting the remedies available to them under Section 13, approached the Civil Court to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>11. Moreover, it has come on record that Smt. Kirpal Kaur, from whom the present appellants had purchased the land during the pendency of the partition proceedings, had withdrawn from the appeal before the lower appellate Court. As the present appellants had purchased the suit land during the pendency of the partition proceedings, they have, therefore, no locus standi to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector 1st Grade and pursue the appeal. It is not the case of the plaintiff-appellants that the ex parte decree was obtained by the defendant-respondents by fraud or misrepresentation. In A.C. Ananthaswamy and Ors. v. Boraiah (D) by Lrs. (2004-3)138 Punjab Law Reporter 557, it has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that in the absence of any fraud or misrepresentation, an ex parte order on the bare plea of non-service cannot be set aside. In the present case it is an undisputed fact that registered notice (Ex.DIO) was issued to Smt. Kirpal Kaur and she had even filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order passed by the Assistant Collector. The ratio of the authority Firm Seth Radha Kishun (deceased) represented by Hari Kishan and Ors. v. Administrator Municipal Committee, Ludhiana : [1964]2SCR273 , that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not specifically ousted where a statute created a liability and provided a remedy, is not applicable to the facts appearing in the present case. In the present case, as already mentioned above, registered A.D. notice was issued to and served on Smt. Kirpal Kaur, who had thereafter, filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>12. Both the courts below have given concurrent findings of fact which cannot be interfered with in the second appeal in view of the provisions of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as no substantial question of law has either been pleaded in the memorandum of appeal or arises for consideration in the present appeal. I do not find any infirmity in the well-reasoned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>13. Consequently, there is no merit in this appeal. It is, accordingly, dismissed. However, I do no make any order as to costs.<p>',
	(int) 15 => '<p>'
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12. Both the courts below have given concurrent findings of fact which cannot be interfered with in the second appeal in view of the provisions of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as no substantial question of law has either been pleaded in the memorandum of appeal or arises for consideration in the present appeal. I do not find any infirmity in the well-reasoned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Rai Jasbir Singh and anr Vs Balwant Singh and ors - Citation 629369 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '629369',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/136769/the-punjab-land-revenue-act-1887-complete-act">Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887</a> - Sections 13, 20, 20(3) and 158; Indian Post Office Act, 1886; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) - Sections 100',
			'appealno' => 'Regular Second Appeal No. 615 of 1982 (O and M)',
			'appellant' => 'Rai Jasbir Singh and anr.',
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			'casename' => 'Rai Jasbir Singh and anr. Vs. Balwant Singh and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' - HINDU LAW -- Custom: [Vijender Jain, C.J., M.M. Kumar, Jasbir Singh, Rajive Bhalla & Rajesh Bindal, JJ] Alienation of ancestral property - Punjab and Haryana -  Held, In respect of State of Punjab by virtue of Punjab Amendment Act, 1973 there is a complete bar to contest any alienation of ancestral or non-ancestral immovable property or appointment of an heir to such property on ground that such alienation or appointment was contrary to custom. In Punjab the property in hands of a successor has to be treated as coparcenary property and its alienation has to be governed by Hindu Law except to the extent it is regulated by Sections 6 and 30 of the Hindu Succession Act. In Haryana, property  in hands of successor has to be treated as coparcenary property as well as ancestral property. Parties can fall back upon Hindu Law in case they fail to establish that rule of decision is custom. Therefore, in Haryana both under Hindu law and the Customary Law, the alienation would be open to challenge. Custom was given precedent over uncodified Hindu Law presumably for reason that custom has been consistently replacing the Hindu Law. However, it was soon realized that ancestral immovable property, which ordinarily held to be inalienable amongst Jats of Punjab by virtue of custom except for necessity, no limitation was placed on degrees of collateral, eligible to contest such alienation. It was, therefore, felt necessary to engraft certain restriction on degrees of collateral, eligible to contest an alienation, which under the custom itself was not limited. Accordingly, the Punjab Custom (Power to Contest) Act, 1920 (Act No.2 of 1920) was enacted. The Hindu Succession Act was extended to the State of Punjab.  Act 2 of Punjab Act defined expression alienation to include any testamentary disposition of property and appointment of an heir was to include any adoption made or purporting to be made according to custom. A further provision was made by Section 3 that Hindu Succession Act was to apply only in respect of alienation of immovable property or appointment of heirs made by persons who in regard to such alienation or appointment were governed by custom. Whereas  Section 4 declared that Hindu Succession Act was not to affect any right to contest any alienation or appointment of an heir made before the date on which the Succession Act was to come into force. In other words, Act, No.2 of 1920 was not to affect alienation or appointments of heir made before date on which it came into force. It also preserved the rights of any alienation or appointment of an heir made by a family. After Section 7 was inserted in Act of 1920 by the Punjab Amendment Act of 1973 right of contest being contrary to custom had been totally effaced and taken away. Therefore, no person has any right to contest any alienation of immovable property whether ancestral or non-ancestral on ground of being contrary to custom after January 23, 1973. In Haryana, the situation as enunciated by Act No.2 of 1920 continued to prevail in respect of alienation because no reforms parallel to Punjab as brought by Amendment Act of 1973, had been enacted although right to pre-emption has been substantially abolished in Haryana also. No steps even have been taken in that regard. Therefore, situation in Haryana have to be regarded as it existed under Act No. 2 of 1920.
HINDU SUCCESSION ACT,1956[C.A.No.30/1956] --  Sections 6 & 30: [Vijender Jain, C.J., M.M.Kumar, Jasbir Singh, Rajive Bhalla & Rajesh Bindal, JJ]  Alienation of coparcenary property - Law laid down by Full Bench in Joginder Singh Kundha Singh v Kehar Singh Dasaundha Singh [AIR 1965 Punjab 407] and Pritam Singh v Assistant Controller of Estate Duty, Patiala [1976 Punj LR 342] -Whether there is any conflict? - Held, The basic controversy in the Full Bench decision of Joginder Singhs case was regarding constitutional validity of Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act and as to whether it infringes Article 14 of Constitution. It was held that the estate held by male and limitation on his power of alienation were in no way removed and the reversioners were not debarred from challenging such alienations. The Full Bench held that Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act postulates that estate held by a Hindu female before enforcement of Succession Act either by inheritance or otherwise, was enlarged and on date of enforcement of Succession Act, she became a full owner. Likewise, if she has inherited any estate after the commencement of the Act,  she was to be regarded as absolute owner rather than a limited owner. Consequently, the limitations on power of alienation automatically vanished. This was the necessary result of the provisions made in Section 14 of the Act. The Full Bench further held that in respect of male proprietors, no corresponding provision was made either enlarging their estate in ancestral property or enlarging their power of alienation over property inherited by them. However, it noticed Section 30 and observed that it only deals with power of his share in coparcenary property by Will, which prior to enforcement of the Act, he had no right to do. The only provision made in respect of male proprietor regarding alienation of property was his power of alienation by Will. In so far as persons governed by custom are concerned, they continued to be governed by the restriction on the power of alienation of a male holder as existed before enforcement of the Act. Likewise, other restriction on alienation other than disposal by Will also continued. The Full Bench, thus, recognized the superior right of Hindu females by virtue of Section 14 and upheld the provision as intra vires. The argument that reversioners have ceased to exist after enactment of provisions of Section 14 of Succession Act, was rejected as there was no provision pointed out to that effect. The proposition laid down by the full Bench in Pritam Singhs case was that the Hindu Succession Act has not abolished joint Hindu family with respect to rights of those who were members of Mitakshara coparcenary, except in the manner and to the extent mentioned in Sections 6 and 30 of the Act, This Statement should also imply, though it does not say so expressly, the Succession Act to this extent does not affect the rights of the members governed by Dayabhaga coparcenary. The Full Bench in Pritam Singh;s case expressly noticed the judgment of earlier Full Bench in Joginder Singhs case but construed the same as irrelevant by observing that it dealt with the power of alienation of a person governed by Customary law and constitutional validity of Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act. Thus there is no real conflict between the two Full Bench judgments. Both the Full Bench judgments have been delivered on the assumption that Joginder Singhs case dealt with question of alienation whereas Pritam Singhs case had decided the question concerning succession. Even on fact in Joginder Singhs case the issue was validity of alienation by consent decree by a father to his two sons, which was challenged by third son, whereas in Pritam Singhs case the question of nature of property in hands of sons on death of their father had arisen  for purposes of assessment of estate duty. In Pritam  Singhs case the property in the hands of the sons was held to be coparcenary property and only 1/3rd of  property belonging to deceased father was considered eligible for estate duty. Therefore, there was no question of alienation in Pritam Singhs case. -  I do not find any infirmity in the well-reasoned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
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			'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal, Sr. Adv. and; Sudhir Mittal, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' M.L Sarin, Sr. Adv.,; Ashish Handa,; H.N. Mehtani an',
			'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2005-05-25',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
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			'judge' => ' Ashutosh Mohunta, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Ashutosh Mohunta, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The vendee-plaintiffs have filed this appeal to challenge the judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below whereby their suit and the appeal against the partition of the land ordered by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Guhla, vide order dated 16.7.1975, were dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. In brief the facts giving rise to this appeal are that defendant-respondent Nos. 1 to 5 filed an application for partition of the suit land against Smt.Kirpal Kaur (Plaintiff No. 1) and defendant Nos. 6 to 15 in the court of Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Guhla. In that application Smt. Kirpal Kaur was proceeded against ex parte. The partition was confirmed on 16.6.1975 and the case was fixed for instrument of partition for 16.7.1975. Rai Jasbir Singh, plaintiff No. 2 purchased land measuring 80 Kanals from Smt. Kirpal Kaur (plaintiff No. 1) vide sale deed dated 27.5.1975 during the pendency of the partition proceedings and plaintiff No. 2 and 3, i.e., Rai Jasbir Singh and Swaran Singh were in actual physical possession of 228 Kanals 8 Marias and 77 Kanals 8 Marias, respectively. The plaintiffs challenged the order dated 16.7.1975 passed by the Assistant Grade, 1st Class, Guhla, by filing the present suit for declaration, which was dismissed by the Sub Judge, 1st Class, Kaithal, vide judgment and decree dated 29.1.1980 on the ground that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The plaintiffs then filed appeal to challenge the judgment and decree dated 29.1.1980 passed by the trial Court. During the pendency of the appeal, Smt. Kirpal Kaur withdrew herself from being the appellant. Consequently, vide order dated 17.1.1980 the appeal qua Kirpal Kaur was ordered to be dismissed as withdrawn. The appeal qua the remaining two appellants, i.e., Rai Jasbir Singh and Swaran Singh (present appellants) was dismissed by the Additional District Judge, Kurukshetra, vide judgment and decree dated 4.12.1981 and the decision of the trial Court with regard to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was upheld. Now Rai Jasbir Singh arid Swaran Singh have filed the present appeal wherein challenge has been made to the findings of both the Courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. It has been contended by Mr. R.S. Mittal, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the appellants, that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not duly served and, thus,the ex parte order dated 16.6.1975/16.7.1975 passed by the Assistant Collector,1st Grade, Guhla, was a nullity. It has further been argued by the learned counsel for the appellants that the Courts below erred in holding that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit against partition ordered by the Revenue Officer in view of the provisions of the <a href="/act/136769/the-punjab-land-revenue-act-1887-complete-act">Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887</a> (for short 'the Act'), despite the fact that the order for partition of the suit land was passed ex parte without serving Smt.Kirpal Kaur according to the prescribed legal procedure.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellants have been controverted by Mr. M.L.Sarin, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the respondents. It has been contended by him that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to go into the validity of the partition proceedings. The appellants have approached the Civil Court without exhausting the remedy available to them under Section 13 of the Act. It has further been contended by him that Smt. Kirpal Kaur had duly been served in the partition proceedings by sending notice to her by registered post.The counsel has also contended that she had withdrawn her appeal before the lower appellate court and in this view of the matter, the present appellants, who had purchased the land from her during the pendency of the partition proceedings, had no locus standi to challenge the order of partition passed by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. 1 have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the evidence adduced on record.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The only question that arises for consideration in the present appeal is to the following effect:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether or not the Civil Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the suit wherein the order of partition passed by a Revenue Officer has been challenged and Smt. Kirpal Kaur was properly served in the partition proceedings</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The first objection raised on behalf of the appellants is that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not served in the partition proceedings before the Assistant Collector 1st Grade, Guhla, as per the provisions contained in Section 20 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. I do not find any merit in this contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants. It is not the case of the appellants that Smt.Kirpal Kaur was not served at all. The bald statement of the plaintiffs was rebutted by the statement on oath of defendant Balwant Singh and also by documentary evidence adduced on record which shows that a registered notice was issued to her and acknowledgement due (Ex.DIO) was received in the office of the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade. Sub-section (3) of Section 20 of the Act gives discretion to the Revenue Officer to serve the concerned person 'either in addition to, or in substitution for, any other mode of service, by forwarding the summons by post in a-letter addressed' to him and registered under Part II of the Indian Post Office Act, 1886. In this view of the matter, it cannot be said that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not served as per the procedure prescribed under the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The next contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants is that the Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain the ex parte order passed by the Revenue Officer.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. This contention is also without any merit. Section 158 of the Act specifically excludes the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts in matters within the jurisdiction of the Revenue Officers. In order to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector, a provision for filing of appeals before the higher Revenue Authorities has been made in Section 13 of the Act. The plaintiffs without exhausting the remedies available to them under Section 13, approached the Civil Court to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Moreover, it has come on record that Smt. Kirpal Kaur, from whom the present appellants had purchased the land during the pendency of the partition proceedings, had withdrawn from the appeal before the lower appellate Court. As the present appellants had purchased the suit land during the pendency of the partition proceedings, they have, therefore, no locus standi to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector 1st Grade and pursue the appeal. It is not the case of the plaintiff-appellants that the ex parte decree was obtained by the defendant-respondents by fraud or misrepresentation. In A.C. Ananthaswamy and Ors. v. Boraiah (D) by Lrs. (2004-3)138 Punjab Law Reporter 557, it has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that in the absence of any fraud or misrepresentation, an ex parte order on the bare plea of non-service cannot be set aside. In the present case it is an undisputed fact that registered notice (Ex.DIO) was issued to Smt. Kirpal Kaur and she had even filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order passed by the Assistant Collector. The ratio of the authority Firm Seth Radha Kishun (deceased) represented by Hari Kishan and Ors. v. Administrator Municipal Committee, Ludhiana : [1964]2SCR273 , that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not specifically ousted where a statute created a liability and provided a remedy, is not applicable to the facts appearing in the present case. In the present case, as already mentioned above, registered A.D. notice was issued to and served on Smt. Kirpal Kaur, who had thereafter, filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Both the courts below have given concurrent findings of fact which cannot be interfered with in the second appeal in view of the provisions of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as no substantial question of law has either been pleaded in the memorandum of appeal or arises for consideration in the present appeal. I do not find any infirmity in the well-reasoned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Consequently, there is no merit in this appeal. It is, accordingly, dismissed. However, I do no make any order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'casename' => 'Rai Jasbir Singh and anr. Vs. Balwant Singh and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' - HINDU LAW -- Custom: [Vijender Jain, C.J., M.M. Kumar, Jasbir Singh, Rajive Bhalla & Rajesh Bindal, JJ] Alienation of ancestral property - Punjab and Haryana -  Held, In respect of State of Punjab by virtue of Punjab Amendment Act, 1973 there is a complete bar to contest any alienation of ancestral or non-ancestral immovable property or appointment of an heir to such property on ground that such alienation or appointment was contrary to custom. In Punjab the property in hands of a successor has to be treated as coparcenary property and its alienation has to be governed by Hindu Law except to the extent it is regulated by Sections 6 and 30 of the Hindu Succession Act. In Haryana, property  in hands of successor has to be treated as coparcenary property as well as ancestral property. Parties can fall back upon Hindu Law in case they fail to establish that rule of decision is custom. Therefore, in Haryana both under Hindu law and the Customary Law, the alienation would be open to challenge. Custom was given precedent over uncodified Hindu Law presumably for reason that custom has been consistently replacing the Hindu Law. However, it was soon realized that ancestral immovable property, which ordinarily held to be inalienable amongst Jats of Punjab by virtue of custom except for necessity, no limitation was placed on degrees of collateral, eligible to contest such alienation. It was, therefore, felt necessary to engraft certain restriction on degrees of collateral, eligible to contest an alienation, which under the custom itself was not limited. Accordingly, the Punjab Custom (Power to Contest) Act, 1920 (Act No.2 of 1920) was enacted. The Hindu Succession Act was extended to the State of Punjab.  Act 2 of Punjab Act defined expression alienation to include any testamentary disposition of property and appointment of an heir was to include any adoption made or purporting to be made according to custom. A further provision was made by Section 3 that Hindu Succession Act was to apply only in respect of alienation of immovable property or appointment of heirs made by persons who in regard to such alienation or appointment were governed by custom. Whereas  Section 4 declared that Hindu Succession Act was not to affect any right to contest any alienation or appointment of an heir made before the date on which the Succession Act was to come into force. In other words, Act, No.2 of 1920 was not to affect alienation or appointments of heir made before date on which it came into force. It also preserved the rights of any alienation or appointment of an heir made by a family. After Section 7 was inserted in Act of 1920 by the Punjab Amendment Act of 1973 right of contest being contrary to custom had been totally effaced and taken away. Therefore, no person has any right to contest any alienation of immovable property whether ancestral or non-ancestral on ground of being contrary to custom after January 23, 1973. In Haryana, the situation as enunciated by Act No.2 of 1920 continued to prevail in respect of alienation because no reforms parallel to Punjab as brought by Amendment Act of 1973, had been enacted although right to pre-emption has been substantially abolished in Haryana also. No steps even have been taken in that regard. Therefore, situation in Haryana have to be regarded as it existed under Act No. 2 of 1920.
HINDU SUCCESSION ACT,1956[C.A.No.30/1956] --  Sections 6 & 30: [Vijender Jain, C.J., M.M.Kumar, Jasbir Singh, Rajive Bhalla & Rajesh Bindal, JJ]  Alienation of coparcenary property - Law laid down by Full Bench in Joginder Singh Kundha Singh v Kehar Singh Dasaundha Singh [AIR 1965 Punjab 407] and Pritam Singh v Assistant Controller of Estate Duty, Patiala [1976 Punj LR 342] -Whether there is any conflict? - Held, The basic controversy in the Full Bench decision of Joginder Singhs case was regarding constitutional validity of Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act and as to whether it infringes Article 14 of Constitution. It was held that the estate held by male and limitation on his power of alienation were in no way removed and the reversioners were not debarred from challenging such alienations. The Full Bench held that Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act postulates that estate held by a Hindu female before enforcement of Succession Act either by inheritance or otherwise, was enlarged and on date of enforcement of Succession Act, she became a full owner. Likewise, if she has inherited any estate after the commencement of the Act,  she was to be regarded as absolute owner rather than a limited owner. Consequently, the limitations on power of alienation automatically vanished. This was the necessary result of the provisions made in Section 14 of the Act. The Full Bench further held that in respect of male proprietors, no corresponding provision was made either enlarging their estate in ancestral property or enlarging their power of alienation over property inherited by them. However, it noticed Section 30 and observed that it only deals with power of his share in coparcenary property by Will, which prior to enforcement of the Act, he had no right to do. The only provision made in respect of male proprietor regarding alienation of property was his power of alienation by Will. In so far as persons governed by custom are concerned, they continued to be governed by the restriction on the power of alienation of a male holder as existed before enforcement of the Act. Likewise, other restriction on alienation other than disposal by Will also continued. The Full Bench, thus, recognized the superior right of Hindu females by virtue of Section 14 and upheld the provision as intra vires. The argument that reversioners have ceased to exist after enactment of provisions of Section 14 of Succession Act, was rejected as there was no provision pointed out to that effect. The proposition laid down by the full Bench in Pritam Singhs case was that the Hindu Succession Act has not abolished joint Hindu family with respect to rights of those who were members of Mitakshara coparcenary, except in the manner and to the extent mentioned in Sections 6 and 30 of the Act, This Statement should also imply, though it does not say so expressly, the Succession Act to this extent does not affect the rights of the members governed by Dayabhaga coparcenary. The Full Bench in Pritam Singh;s case expressly noticed the judgment of earlier Full Bench in Joginder Singhs case but construed the same as irrelevant by observing that it dealt with the power of alienation of a person governed by Customary law and constitutional validity of Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act. Thus there is no real conflict between the two Full Bench judgments. Both the Full Bench judgments have been delivered on the assumption that Joginder Singhs case dealt with question of alienation whereas Pritam Singhs case had decided the question concerning succession. Even on fact in Joginder Singhs case the issue was validity of alienation by consent decree by a father to his two sons, which was challenged by third son, whereas in Pritam Singhs case the question of nature of property in hands of sons on death of their father had arisen  for purposes of assessment of estate duty. In Pritam  Singhs case the property in the hands of the sons was held to be coparcenary property and only 1/3rd of  property belonging to deceased father was considered eligible for estate duty. Therefore, there was no question of alienation in Pritam Singhs case. -  I do not find any infirmity in the well-reasoned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Hari Kishan and Ors. v. Administrator Municipal Committee;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal, Sr. Adv. and; Sudhir Mittal, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' M.L Sarin, Sr. Adv.,; Ashish Handa,; H.N. Mehtani an',
		'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2005-05-25',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Ashutosh Mohunta, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Ashutosh Mohunta, J.</p><p>1. The vendee-plaintiffs have filed this appeal to challenge the judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below whereby their suit and the appeal against the partition of the land ordered by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Guhla, vide order dated 16.7.1975, were dismissed.</p><p>2. In brief the facts giving rise to this appeal are that defendant-respondent Nos. 1 to 5 filed an application for partition of the suit land against Smt.Kirpal Kaur (Plaintiff No. 1) and defendant Nos. 6 to 15 in the court of Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Guhla. In that application Smt. Kirpal Kaur was proceeded against ex parte. The partition was confirmed on 16.6.1975 and the case was fixed for instrument of partition for 16.7.1975. Rai Jasbir Singh, plaintiff No. 2 purchased land measuring 80 Kanals from Smt. Kirpal Kaur (plaintiff No. 1) vide sale deed dated 27.5.1975 during the pendency of the partition proceedings and plaintiff No. 2 and 3, i.e., Rai Jasbir Singh and Swaran Singh were in actual physical possession of 228 Kanals 8 Marias and 77 Kanals 8 Marias, respectively. The plaintiffs challenged the order dated 16.7.1975 passed by the Assistant Grade, 1st Class, Guhla, by filing the present suit for declaration, which was dismissed by the Sub Judge, 1st Class, Kaithal, vide judgment and decree dated 29.1.1980 on the ground that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The plaintiffs then filed appeal to challenge the judgment and decree dated 29.1.1980 passed by the trial Court. During the pendency of the appeal, Smt. Kirpal Kaur withdrew herself from being the appellant. Consequently, vide order dated 17.1.1980 the appeal qua Kirpal Kaur was ordered to be dismissed as withdrawn. The appeal qua the remaining two appellants, i.e., Rai Jasbir Singh and Swaran Singh (present appellants) was dismissed by the Additional District Judge, Kurukshetra, vide judgment and decree dated 4.12.1981 and the decision of the trial Court with regard to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was upheld. Now Rai Jasbir Singh arid Swaran Singh have filed the present appeal wherein challenge has been made to the findings of both the Courts below.</p><p>3. It has been contended by Mr. R.S. Mittal, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the appellants, that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not duly served and, thus,the ex parte order dated 16.6.1975/16.7.1975 passed by the Assistant Collector,1st Grade, Guhla, was a nullity. It has further been argued by the learned counsel for the appellants that the Courts below erred in holding that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit against partition ordered by the Revenue Officer in view of the provisions of the <a>Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887</a> (for short 'the Act'), despite the fact that the order for partition of the suit land was passed ex parte without serving Smt.Kirpal Kaur according to the prescribed legal procedure.</p><p>4. The contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellants have been controverted by Mr. M.L.Sarin, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the respondents. It has been contended by him that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to go into the validity of the partition proceedings. The appellants have approached the Civil Court without exhausting the remedy available to them under Section 13 of the Act. It has further been contended by him that Smt. Kirpal Kaur had duly been served in the partition proceedings by sending notice to her by registered post.The counsel has also contended that she had withdrawn her appeal before the lower appellate court and in this view of the matter, the present appellants, who had purchased the land from her during the pendency of the partition proceedings, had no locus standi to challenge the order of partition passed by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade.</p><p>5. 1 have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the evidence adduced on record.</p><p>6. The only question that arises for consideration in the present appeal is to the following effect:-</p><p>Whether or not the Civil Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the suit wherein the order of partition passed by a Revenue Officer has been challenged and Smt. Kirpal Kaur was properly served in the partition proceedings</p><p>7. The first objection raised on behalf of the appellants is that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not served in the partition proceedings before the Assistant Collector 1st Grade, Guhla, as per the provisions contained in Section 20 of the Act.</p><p>8. I do not find any merit in this contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants. It is not the case of the appellants that Smt.Kirpal Kaur was not served at all. The bald statement of the plaintiffs was rebutted by the statement on oath of defendant Balwant Singh and also by documentary evidence adduced on record which shows that a registered notice was issued to her and acknowledgement due (Ex.DIO) was received in the office of the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade. Sub-section (3) of Section 20 of the Act gives discretion to the Revenue Officer to serve the concerned person 'either in addition to, or in substitution for, any other mode of service, by forwarding the summons by post in a-letter addressed' to him and registered under Part II of the Indian Post Office Act, 1886. In this view of the matter, it cannot be said that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not served as per the procedure prescribed under the Act.</p><p>9. The next contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants is that the Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain the ex parte order passed by the Revenue Officer.</p><p>10. This contention is also without any merit. Section 158 of the Act specifically excludes the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts in matters within the jurisdiction of the Revenue Officers. In order to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector, a provision for filing of appeals before the higher Revenue Authorities has been made in Section 13 of the Act. The plaintiffs without exhausting the remedies available to them under Section 13, approached the Civil Court to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector.</p><p>11. Moreover, it has come on record that Smt. Kirpal Kaur, from whom the present appellants had purchased the land during the pendency of the partition proceedings, had withdrawn from the appeal before the lower appellate Court. As the present appellants had purchased the suit land during the pendency of the partition proceedings, they have, therefore, no locus standi to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector 1st Grade and pursue the appeal. It is not the case of the plaintiff-appellants that the ex parte decree was obtained by the defendant-respondents by fraud or misrepresentation. In A.C. Ananthaswamy and Ors. v. Boraiah (D) by Lrs. (2004-3)138 Punjab Law Reporter 557, it has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that in the absence of any fraud or misrepresentation, an ex parte order on the bare plea of non-service cannot be set aside. In the present case it is an undisputed fact that registered notice (Ex.DIO) was issued to Smt. Kirpal Kaur and she had even filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order passed by the Assistant Collector. The ratio of the authority Firm Seth Radha Kishun (deceased) represented by Hari Kishan and Ors. v. Administrator Municipal Committee, Ludhiana : [1964]2SCR273 , that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not specifically ousted where a statute created a liability and provided a remedy, is not applicable to the facts appearing in the present case. In the present case, as already mentioned above, registered A.D. notice was issued to and served on Smt. Kirpal Kaur, who had thereafter, filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order.</p><p>12. Both the courts below have given concurrent findings of fact which cannot be interfered with in the second appeal in view of the provisions of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as no substantial question of law has either been pleaded in the memorandum of appeal or arises for consideration in the present appeal. I do not find any infirmity in the well-reasoned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below.</p><p>13. Consequently, there is no merit in this appeal. It is, accordingly, dismissed. However, I do no make any order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
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		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '(2006)142PLR339',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Balwant Singh and ors.',
		'sub' => 'Property',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Ashutosh Mohunta, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The vendee-plaintiffs have filed this appeal to challenge the judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below whereby their suit and the appeal against the partition of the land ordered by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Guhla, vide order dated 16.7.1975, were dismissed.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. In brief the facts giving rise to this appeal are that defendant-respondent Nos. 1 to 5 filed an application for partition of the suit land against Smt.Kirpal Kaur (Plaintiff No. 1) and defendant Nos. 6 to 15 in the court of Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Guhla. In that application Smt. Kirpal Kaur was proceeded against ex parte. The partition was confirmed on 16.6.1975 and the case was fixed for instrument of partition for 16.7.1975. Rai Jasbir Singh, plaintiff No. 2 purchased land measuring 80 Kanals from Smt. Kirpal Kaur (plaintiff No. 1) vide sale deed dated 27.5.1975 during the pendency of the partition proceedings and plaintiff No. 2 and 3, i.e., Rai Jasbir Singh and Swaran Singh were in actual physical possession of 228 Kanals 8 Marias and 77 Kanals 8 Marias, respectively. The plaintiffs challenged the order dated 16.7.1975 passed by the Assistant Grade, 1st Class, Guhla, by filing the present suit for declaration, which was dismissed by the Sub Judge, 1st Class, Kaithal, vide judgment and decree dated 29.1.1980 on the ground that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The plaintiffs then filed appeal to challenge the judgment and decree dated 29.1.1980 passed by the trial Court. During the pendency of the appeal, Smt. Kirpal Kaur withdrew herself from being the appellant. Consequently, vide order dated 17.1.1980 the appeal qua Kirpal Kaur was ordered to be dismissed as withdrawn. The appeal qua the remaining two appellants, i.e., Rai Jasbir Singh and Swaran Singh (present appellants) was dismissed by the Additional District Judge, Kurukshetra, vide judgment and decree dated 4.12.1981 and the decision of the trial Court with regard to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was upheld. Now Rai Jasbir Singh arid Swaran Singh have filed the present appeal wherein challenge has been made to the findings of both the Courts below.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. It has been contended by Mr. R.S. Mittal, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the appellants, that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not duly served and, thus,the ex parte order dated 16.6.1975/16.7.1975 passed by the Assistant Collector,1st Grade, Guhla, was a nullity. It has further been argued by the learned counsel for the appellants that the Courts below erred in holding that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit against partition ordered by the Revenue Officer in view of the provisions of the <a>Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887</a> (for short 'the Act'), despite the fact that the order for partition of the suit land was passed ex parte without serving Smt.Kirpal Kaur according to the prescribed legal procedure.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. The contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellants have been controverted by Mr. M.L.Sarin, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the respondents. It has been contended by him that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to go into the validity of the partition proceedings. The appellants have approached the Civil Court without exhausting the remedy available to them under Section 13 of the Act. It has further been contended by him that Smt. Kirpal Kaur had duly been served in the partition proceedings by sending notice to her by registered post.The counsel has also contended that she had withdrawn her appeal before the lower appellate court and in this view of the matter, the present appellants, who had purchased the land from her during the pendency of the partition proceedings, had no locus standi to challenge the order of partition passed by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. 1 have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the evidence adduced on record.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. The only question that arises for consideration in the present appeal is to the following effect:-',
	(int) 7 => '<p>Whether or not the Civil Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the suit wherein the order of partition passed by a Revenue Officer has been challenged and Smt. Kirpal Kaur was properly served in the partition proceedings',
	(int) 8 => '<p>7. The first objection raised on behalf of the appellants is that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not served in the partition proceedings before the Assistant Collector 1st Grade, Guhla, as per the provisions contained in Section 20 of the Act.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>8. I do not find any merit in this contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants. It is not the case of the appellants that Smt.Kirpal Kaur was not served at all. The bald statement of the plaintiffs was rebutted by the statement on oath of defendant Balwant Singh and also by documentary evidence adduced on record which shows that a registered notice was issued to her and acknowledgement due (Ex.DIO) was received in the office of the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade. Sub-section (3) of Section 20 of the Act gives discretion to the Revenue Officer to serve the concerned person 'either in addition to, or in substitution for, any other mode of service, by forwarding the summons by post in a-letter addressed' to him and registered under Part II of the Indian Post Office Act, 1886. In this view of the matter, it cannot be said that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not served as per the procedure prescribed under the Act.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>9. The next contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants is that the Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain the ex parte order passed by the Revenue Officer.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>10. This contention is also without any merit. Section 158 of the Act specifically excludes the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts in matters within the jurisdiction of the Revenue Officers. In order to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector, a provision for filing of appeals before the higher Revenue Authorities has been made in Section 13 of the Act. The plaintiffs without exhausting the remedies available to them under Section 13, approached the Civil Court to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>11. Moreover, it has come on record that Smt. Kirpal Kaur, from whom the present appellants had purchased the land during the pendency of the partition proceedings, had withdrawn from the appeal before the lower appellate Court. As the present appellants had purchased the suit land during the pendency of the partition proceedings, they have, therefore, no locus standi to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector 1st Grade and pursue the appeal. It is not the case of the plaintiff-appellants that the ex parte decree was obtained by the defendant-respondents by fraud or misrepresentation. In A.C. Ananthaswamy and Ors. v. Boraiah (D) by Lrs. (2004-3)138 Punjab Law Reporter 557, it has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that in the absence of any fraud or misrepresentation, an ex parte order on the bare plea of non-service cannot be set aside. In the present case it is an undisputed fact that registered notice (Ex.DIO) was issued to Smt. Kirpal Kaur and she had even filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order passed by the Assistant Collector. The ratio of the authority Firm Seth Radha Kishun (deceased) represented by Hari Kishan and Ors. v. Administrator Municipal Committee, Ludhiana : [1964]2SCR273 , that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not specifically ousted where a statute created a liability and provided a remedy, is not applicable to the facts appearing in the present case. In the present case, as already mentioned above, registered A.D. notice was issued to and served on Smt. Kirpal Kaur, who had thereafter, filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>12. Both the courts below have given concurrent findings of fact which cannot be interfered with in the second appeal in view of the provisions of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as no substantial question of law has either been pleaded in the memorandum of appeal or arises for consideration in the present appeal. I do not find any infirmity in the well-reasoned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>13. Consequently, there is no merit in this appeal. It is, accordingly, dismissed. However, I do no make any order as to costs.<p>',
	(int) 15 => '<p>'
)
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13. Consequently, there is no merit in this appeal. It is, accordingly, dismissed. However, I do no make any order as to costs.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Rai Jasbir Singh and anr Vs Balwant Singh and ors - Citation 629369 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '629369',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/136769/the-punjab-land-revenue-act-1887-complete-act">Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887</a> - Sections 13, 20, 20(3) and 158; Indian Post Office Act, 1886; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) - Sections 100',
			'appealno' => 'Regular Second Appeal No. 615 of 1982 (O and M)',
			'appellant' => 'Rai Jasbir Singh and anr.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Rai Jasbir Singh and anr. Vs. Balwant Singh and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' - HINDU LAW -- Custom: [Vijender Jain, C.J., M.M. Kumar, Jasbir Singh, Rajive Bhalla & Rajesh Bindal, JJ] Alienation of ancestral property - Punjab and Haryana -  Held, In respect of State of Punjab by virtue of Punjab Amendment Act, 1973 there is a complete bar to contest any alienation of ancestral or non-ancestral immovable property or appointment of an heir to such property on ground that such alienation or appointment was contrary to custom. In Punjab the property in hands of a successor has to be treated as coparcenary property and its alienation has to be governed by Hindu Law except to the extent it is regulated by Sections 6 and 30 of the Hindu Succession Act. In Haryana, property  in hands of successor has to be treated as coparcenary property as well as ancestral property. Parties can fall back upon Hindu Law in case they fail to establish that rule of decision is custom. Therefore, in Haryana both under Hindu law and the Customary Law, the alienation would be open to challenge. Custom was given precedent over uncodified Hindu Law presumably for reason that custom has been consistently replacing the Hindu Law. However, it was soon realized that ancestral immovable property, which ordinarily held to be inalienable amongst Jats of Punjab by virtue of custom except for necessity, no limitation was placed on degrees of collateral, eligible to contest such alienation. It was, therefore, felt necessary to engraft certain restriction on degrees of collateral, eligible to contest an alienation, which under the custom itself was not limited. Accordingly, the Punjab Custom (Power to Contest) Act, 1920 (Act No.2 of 1920) was enacted. The Hindu Succession Act was extended to the State of Punjab.  Act 2 of Punjab Act defined expression alienation to include any testamentary disposition of property and appointment of an heir was to include any adoption made or purporting to be made according to custom. A further provision was made by Section 3 that Hindu Succession Act was to apply only in respect of alienation of immovable property or appointment of heirs made by persons who in regard to such alienation or appointment were governed by custom. Whereas  Section 4 declared that Hindu Succession Act was not to affect any right to contest any alienation or appointment of an heir made before the date on which the Succession Act was to come into force. In other words, Act, No.2 of 1920 was not to affect alienation or appointments of heir made before date on which it came into force. It also preserved the rights of any alienation or appointment of an heir made by a family. After Section 7 was inserted in Act of 1920 by the Punjab Amendment Act of 1973 right of contest being contrary to custom had been totally effaced and taken away. Therefore, no person has any right to contest any alienation of immovable property whether ancestral or non-ancestral on ground of being contrary to custom after January 23, 1973. In Haryana, the situation as enunciated by Act No.2 of 1920 continued to prevail in respect of alienation because no reforms parallel to Punjab as brought by Amendment Act of 1973, had been enacted although right to pre-emption has been substantially abolished in Haryana also. No steps even have been taken in that regard. Therefore, situation in Haryana have to be regarded as it existed under Act No. 2 of 1920.
HINDU SUCCESSION ACT,1956[C.A.No.30/1956] --  Sections 6 & 30: [Vijender Jain, C.J., M.M.Kumar, Jasbir Singh, Rajive Bhalla & Rajesh Bindal, JJ]  Alienation of coparcenary property - Law laid down by Full Bench in Joginder Singh Kundha Singh v Kehar Singh Dasaundha Singh [AIR 1965 Punjab 407] and Pritam Singh v Assistant Controller of Estate Duty, Patiala [1976 Punj LR 342] -Whether there is any conflict? - Held, The basic controversy in the Full Bench decision of Joginder Singhs case was regarding constitutional validity of Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act and as to whether it infringes Article 14 of Constitution. It was held that the estate held by male and limitation on his power of alienation were in no way removed and the reversioners were not debarred from challenging such alienations. The Full Bench held that Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act postulates that estate held by a Hindu female before enforcement of Succession Act either by inheritance or otherwise, was enlarged and on date of enforcement of Succession Act, she became a full owner. Likewise, if she has inherited any estate after the commencement of the Act,  she was to be regarded as absolute owner rather than a limited owner. Consequently, the limitations on power of alienation automatically vanished. This was the necessary result of the provisions made in Section 14 of the Act. The Full Bench further held that in respect of male proprietors, no corresponding provision was made either enlarging their estate in ancestral property or enlarging their power of alienation over property inherited by them. However, it noticed Section 30 and observed that it only deals with power of his share in coparcenary property by Will, which prior to enforcement of the Act, he had no right to do. The only provision made in respect of male proprietor regarding alienation of property was his power of alienation by Will. In so far as persons governed by custom are concerned, they continued to be governed by the restriction on the power of alienation of a male holder as existed before enforcement of the Act. Likewise, other restriction on alienation other than disposal by Will also continued. The Full Bench, thus, recognized the superior right of Hindu females by virtue of Section 14 and upheld the provision as intra vires. The argument that reversioners have ceased to exist after enactment of provisions of Section 14 of Succession Act, was rejected as there was no provision pointed out to that effect. The proposition laid down by the full Bench in Pritam Singhs case was that the Hindu Succession Act has not abolished joint Hindu family with respect to rights of those who were members of Mitakshara coparcenary, except in the manner and to the extent mentioned in Sections 6 and 30 of the Act, This Statement should also imply, though it does not say so expressly, the Succession Act to this extent does not affect the rights of the members governed by Dayabhaga coparcenary. The Full Bench in Pritam Singh;s case expressly noticed the judgment of earlier Full Bench in Joginder Singhs case but construed the same as irrelevant by observing that it dealt with the power of alienation of a person governed by Customary law and constitutional validity of Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act. Thus there is no real conflict between the two Full Bench judgments. Both the Full Bench judgments have been delivered on the assumption that Joginder Singhs case dealt with question of alienation whereas Pritam Singhs case had decided the question concerning succession. Even on fact in Joginder Singhs case the issue was validity of alienation by consent decree by a father to his two sons, which was challenged by third son, whereas in Pritam Singhs case the question of nature of property in hands of sons on death of their father had arisen  for purposes of assessment of estate duty. In Pritam  Singhs case the property in the hands of the sons was held to be coparcenary property and only 1/3rd of  property belonging to deceased father was considered eligible for estate duty. Therefore, there was no question of alienation in Pritam Singhs case. -  I do not find any infirmity in the well-reasoned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Hari Kishan and Ors. v. Administrator Municipal Committee;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal, Sr. Adv. and; Sudhir Mittal, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' M.L Sarin, Sr. Adv.,; Ashish Handa,; H.N. Mehtani an',
			'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2005-05-25',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' Ashutosh Mohunta, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Ashutosh Mohunta, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The vendee-plaintiffs have filed this appeal to challenge the judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below whereby their suit and the appeal against the partition of the land ordered by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Guhla, vide order dated 16.7.1975, were dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. In brief the facts giving rise to this appeal are that defendant-respondent Nos. 1 to 5 filed an application for partition of the suit land against Smt.Kirpal Kaur (Plaintiff No. 1) and defendant Nos. 6 to 15 in the court of Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Guhla. In that application Smt. Kirpal Kaur was proceeded against ex parte. The partition was confirmed on 16.6.1975 and the case was fixed for instrument of partition for 16.7.1975. Rai Jasbir Singh, plaintiff No. 2 purchased land measuring 80 Kanals from Smt. Kirpal Kaur (plaintiff No. 1) vide sale deed dated 27.5.1975 during the pendency of the partition proceedings and plaintiff No. 2 and 3, i.e., Rai Jasbir Singh and Swaran Singh were in actual physical possession of 228 Kanals 8 Marias and 77 Kanals 8 Marias, respectively. The plaintiffs challenged the order dated 16.7.1975 passed by the Assistant Grade, 1st Class, Guhla, by filing the present suit for declaration, which was dismissed by the Sub Judge, 1st Class, Kaithal, vide judgment and decree dated 29.1.1980 on the ground that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The plaintiffs then filed appeal to challenge the judgment and decree dated 29.1.1980 passed by the trial Court. During the pendency of the appeal, Smt. Kirpal Kaur withdrew herself from being the appellant. Consequently, vide order dated 17.1.1980 the appeal qua Kirpal Kaur was ordered to be dismissed as withdrawn. The appeal qua the remaining two appellants, i.e., Rai Jasbir Singh and Swaran Singh (present appellants) was dismissed by the Additional District Judge, Kurukshetra, vide judgment and decree dated 4.12.1981 and the decision of the trial Court with regard to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was upheld. Now Rai Jasbir Singh arid Swaran Singh have filed the present appeal wherein challenge has been made to the findings of both the Courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. It has been contended by Mr. R.S. Mittal, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the appellants, that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not duly served and, thus,the ex parte order dated 16.6.1975/16.7.1975 passed by the Assistant Collector,1st Grade, Guhla, was a nullity. It has further been argued by the learned counsel for the appellants that the Courts below erred in holding that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit against partition ordered by the Revenue Officer in view of the provisions of the <a href="/act/136769/the-punjab-land-revenue-act-1887-complete-act">Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887</a> (for short 'the Act'), despite the fact that the order for partition of the suit land was passed ex parte without serving Smt.Kirpal Kaur according to the prescribed legal procedure.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellants have been controverted by Mr. M.L.Sarin, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the respondents. It has been contended by him that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to go into the validity of the partition proceedings. The appellants have approached the Civil Court without exhausting the remedy available to them under Section 13 of the Act. It has further been contended by him that Smt. Kirpal Kaur had duly been served in the partition proceedings by sending notice to her by registered post.The counsel has also contended that she had withdrawn her appeal before the lower appellate court and in this view of the matter, the present appellants, who had purchased the land from her during the pendency of the partition proceedings, had no locus standi to challenge the order of partition passed by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. 1 have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the evidence adduced on record.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The only question that arises for consideration in the present appeal is to the following effect:-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether or not the Civil Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the suit wherein the order of partition passed by a Revenue Officer has been challenged and Smt. Kirpal Kaur was properly served in the partition proceedings</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The first objection raised on behalf of the appellants is that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not served in the partition proceedings before the Assistant Collector 1st Grade, Guhla, as per the provisions contained in Section 20 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. I do not find any merit in this contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants. It is not the case of the appellants that Smt.Kirpal Kaur was not served at all. The bald statement of the plaintiffs was rebutted by the statement on oath of defendant Balwant Singh and also by documentary evidence adduced on record which shows that a registered notice was issued to her and acknowledgement due (Ex.DIO) was received in the office of the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade. Sub-section (3) of Section 20 of the Act gives discretion to the Revenue Officer to serve the concerned person 'either in addition to, or in substitution for, any other mode of service, by forwarding the summons by post in a-letter addressed' to him and registered under Part II of the Indian Post Office Act, 1886. In this view of the matter, it cannot be said that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not served as per the procedure prescribed under the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. The next contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants is that the Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain the ex parte order passed by the Revenue Officer.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. This contention is also without any merit. Section 158 of the Act specifically excludes the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts in matters within the jurisdiction of the Revenue Officers. In order to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector, a provision for filing of appeals before the higher Revenue Authorities has been made in Section 13 of the Act. The plaintiffs without exhausting the remedies available to them under Section 13, approached the Civil Court to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Moreover, it has come on record that Smt. Kirpal Kaur, from whom the present appellants had purchased the land during the pendency of the partition proceedings, had withdrawn from the appeal before the lower appellate Court. As the present appellants had purchased the suit land during the pendency of the partition proceedings, they have, therefore, no locus standi to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector 1st Grade and pursue the appeal. It is not the case of the plaintiff-appellants that the ex parte decree was obtained by the defendant-respondents by fraud or misrepresentation. In A.C. Ananthaswamy and Ors. v. Boraiah (D) by Lrs. (2004-3)138 Punjab Law Reporter 557, it has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that in the absence of any fraud or misrepresentation, an ex parte order on the bare plea of non-service cannot be set aside. In the present case it is an undisputed fact that registered notice (Ex.DIO) was issued to Smt. Kirpal Kaur and she had even filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order passed by the Assistant Collector. The ratio of the authority Firm Seth Radha Kishun (deceased) represented by Hari Kishan and Ors. v. Administrator Municipal Committee, Ludhiana : [1964]2SCR273 , that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not specifically ousted where a statute created a liability and provided a remedy, is not applicable to the facts appearing in the present case. In the present case, as already mentioned above, registered A.D. notice was issued to and served on Smt. Kirpal Kaur, who had thereafter, filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Both the courts below have given concurrent findings of fact which cannot be interfered with in the second appeal in view of the provisions of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as no substantial question of law has either been pleaded in the memorandum of appeal or arises for consideration in the present appeal. I do not find any infirmity in the well-reasoned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Consequently, there is no merit in this appeal. It is, accordingly, dismissed. However, I do no make any order as to costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '(2006)142PLR339',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Balwant Singh and ors.',
			'sub' => 'Property',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'rai-jasbir-singh-vs-balwant',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '629369',
		(int) 1 => 'rai-jasbir-singh-vs-balwant'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Rai Jasbir Singh and anr Vs Balwant Singh and ors - Citation 629369 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '629369',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/136769/the-punjab-land-revenue-act-1887-complete-act">Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887</a> - Sections 13, 20, 20(3) and 158; Indian Post Office Act, 1886; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) - Sections 100',
		'appealno' => 'Regular Second Appeal No. 615 of 1982 (O and M)',
		'appellant' => 'Rai Jasbir Singh and anr.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Rai Jasbir Singh and anr. Vs. Balwant Singh and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' - HINDU LAW -- Custom: [Vijender Jain, C.J., M.M. Kumar, Jasbir Singh, Rajive Bhalla & Rajesh Bindal, JJ] Alienation of ancestral property - Punjab and Haryana -  Held, In respect of State of Punjab by virtue of Punjab Amendment Act, 1973 there is a complete bar to contest any alienation of ancestral or non-ancestral immovable property or appointment of an heir to such property on ground that such alienation or appointment was contrary to custom. In Punjab the property in hands of a successor has to be treated as coparcenary property and its alienation has to be governed by Hindu Law except to the extent it is regulated by Sections 6 and 30 of the Hindu Succession Act. In Haryana, property  in hands of successor has to be treated as coparcenary property as well as ancestral property. Parties can fall back upon Hindu Law in case they fail to establish that rule of decision is custom. Therefore, in Haryana both under Hindu law and the Customary Law, the alienation would be open to challenge. Custom was given precedent over uncodified Hindu Law presumably for reason that custom has been consistently replacing the Hindu Law. However, it was soon realized that ancestral immovable property, which ordinarily held to be inalienable amongst Jats of Punjab by virtue of custom except for necessity, no limitation was placed on degrees of collateral, eligible to contest such alienation. It was, therefore, felt necessary to engraft certain restriction on degrees of collateral, eligible to contest an alienation, which under the custom itself was not limited. Accordingly, the Punjab Custom (Power to Contest) Act, 1920 (Act No.2 of 1920) was enacted. The Hindu Succession Act was extended to the State of Punjab.  Act 2 of Punjab Act defined expression alienation to include any testamentary disposition of property and appointment of an heir was to include any adoption made or purporting to be made according to custom. A further provision was made by Section 3 that Hindu Succession Act was to apply only in respect of alienation of immovable property or appointment of heirs made by persons who in regard to such alienation or appointment were governed by custom. Whereas  Section 4 declared that Hindu Succession Act was not to affect any right to contest any alienation or appointment of an heir made before the date on which the Succession Act was to come into force. In other words, Act, No.2 of 1920 was not to affect alienation or appointments of heir made before date on which it came into force. It also preserved the rights of any alienation or appointment of an heir made by a family. After Section 7 was inserted in Act of 1920 by the Punjab Amendment Act of 1973 right of contest being contrary to custom had been totally effaced and taken away. Therefore, no person has any right to contest any alienation of immovable property whether ancestral or non-ancestral on ground of being contrary to custom after January 23, 1973. In Haryana, the situation as enunciated by Act No.2 of 1920 continued to prevail in respect of alienation because no reforms parallel to Punjab as brought by Amendment Act of 1973, had been enacted although right to pre-emption has been substantially abolished in Haryana also. No steps even have been taken in that regard. Therefore, situation in Haryana have to be regarded as it existed under Act No. 2 of 1920.
HINDU SUCCESSION ACT,1956[C.A.No.30/1956] --  Sections 6 & 30: [Vijender Jain, C.J., M.M.Kumar, Jasbir Singh, Rajive Bhalla & Rajesh Bindal, JJ]  Alienation of coparcenary property - Law laid down by Full Bench in Joginder Singh Kundha Singh v Kehar Singh Dasaundha Singh [AIR 1965 Punjab 407] and Pritam Singh v Assistant Controller of Estate Duty, Patiala [1976 Punj LR 342] -Whether there is any conflict? - Held, The basic controversy in the Full Bench decision of Joginder Singhs case was regarding constitutional validity of Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act and as to whether it infringes Article 14 of Constitution. It was held that the estate held by male and limitation on his power of alienation were in no way removed and the reversioners were not debarred from challenging such alienations. The Full Bench held that Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act postulates that estate held by a Hindu female before enforcement of Succession Act either by inheritance or otherwise, was enlarged and on date of enforcement of Succession Act, she became a full owner. Likewise, if she has inherited any estate after the commencement of the Act,  she was to be regarded as absolute owner rather than a limited owner. Consequently, the limitations on power of alienation automatically vanished. This was the necessary result of the provisions made in Section 14 of the Act. The Full Bench further held that in respect of male proprietors, no corresponding provision was made either enlarging their estate in ancestral property or enlarging their power of alienation over property inherited by them. However, it noticed Section 30 and observed that it only deals with power of his share in coparcenary property by Will, which prior to enforcement of the Act, he had no right to do. The only provision made in respect of male proprietor regarding alienation of property was his power of alienation by Will. In so far as persons governed by custom are concerned, they continued to be governed by the restriction on the power of alienation of a male holder as existed before enforcement of the Act. Likewise, other restriction on alienation other than disposal by Will also continued. The Full Bench, thus, recognized the superior right of Hindu females by virtue of Section 14 and upheld the provision as intra vires. The argument that reversioners have ceased to exist after enactment of provisions of Section 14 of Succession Act, was rejected as there was no provision pointed out to that effect. The proposition laid down by the full Bench in Pritam Singhs case was that the Hindu Succession Act has not abolished joint Hindu family with respect to rights of those who were members of Mitakshara coparcenary, except in the manner and to the extent mentioned in Sections 6 and 30 of the Act, This Statement should also imply, though it does not say so expressly, the Succession Act to this extent does not affect the rights of the members governed by Dayabhaga coparcenary. The Full Bench in Pritam Singh;s case expressly noticed the judgment of earlier Full Bench in Joginder Singhs case but construed the same as irrelevant by observing that it dealt with the power of alienation of a person governed by Customary law and constitutional validity of Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act. Thus there is no real conflict between the two Full Bench judgments. Both the Full Bench judgments have been delivered on the assumption that Joginder Singhs case dealt with question of alienation whereas Pritam Singhs case had decided the question concerning succession. Even on fact in Joginder Singhs case the issue was validity of alienation by consent decree by a father to his two sons, which was challenged by third son, whereas in Pritam Singhs case the question of nature of property in hands of sons on death of their father had arisen  for purposes of assessment of estate duty. In Pritam  Singhs case the property in the hands of the sons was held to be coparcenary property and only 1/3rd of  property belonging to deceased father was considered eligible for estate duty. Therefore, there was no question of alienation in Pritam Singhs case. -  I do not find any infirmity in the well-reasoned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Hari Kishan and Ors. v. Administrator Municipal Committee;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal, Sr. Adv. and; Sudhir Mittal, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' M.L Sarin, Sr. Adv.,; Ashish Handa,; H.N. Mehtani an',
		'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2005-05-25',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Ashutosh Mohunta, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Ashutosh Mohunta, J.</p><p>1. The vendee-plaintiffs have filed this appeal to challenge the judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below whereby their suit and the appeal against the partition of the land ordered by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Guhla, vide order dated 16.7.1975, were dismissed.</p><p>2. In brief the facts giving rise to this appeal are that defendant-respondent Nos. 1 to 5 filed an application for partition of the suit land against Smt.Kirpal Kaur (Plaintiff No. 1) and defendant Nos. 6 to 15 in the court of Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Guhla. In that application Smt. Kirpal Kaur was proceeded against ex parte. The partition was confirmed on 16.6.1975 and the case was fixed for instrument of partition for 16.7.1975. Rai Jasbir Singh, plaintiff No. 2 purchased land measuring 80 Kanals from Smt. Kirpal Kaur (plaintiff No. 1) vide sale deed dated 27.5.1975 during the pendency of the partition proceedings and plaintiff No. 2 and 3, i.e., Rai Jasbir Singh and Swaran Singh were in actual physical possession of 228 Kanals 8 Marias and 77 Kanals 8 Marias, respectively. The plaintiffs challenged the order dated 16.7.1975 passed by the Assistant Grade, 1st Class, Guhla, by filing the present suit for declaration, which was dismissed by the Sub Judge, 1st Class, Kaithal, vide judgment and decree dated 29.1.1980 on the ground that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The plaintiffs then filed appeal to challenge the judgment and decree dated 29.1.1980 passed by the trial Court. During the pendency of the appeal, Smt. Kirpal Kaur withdrew herself from being the appellant. Consequently, vide order dated 17.1.1980 the appeal qua Kirpal Kaur was ordered to be dismissed as withdrawn. The appeal qua the remaining two appellants, i.e., Rai Jasbir Singh and Swaran Singh (present appellants) was dismissed by the Additional District Judge, Kurukshetra, vide judgment and decree dated 4.12.1981 and the decision of the trial Court with regard to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was upheld. Now Rai Jasbir Singh arid Swaran Singh have filed the present appeal wherein challenge has been made to the findings of both the Courts below.</p><p>3. It has been contended by Mr. R.S. Mittal, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the appellants, that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not duly served and, thus,the ex parte order dated 16.6.1975/16.7.1975 passed by the Assistant Collector,1st Grade, Guhla, was a nullity. It has further been argued by the learned counsel for the appellants that the Courts below erred in holding that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit against partition ordered by the Revenue Officer in view of the provisions of the <a>Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887</a> (for short 'the Act'), despite the fact that the order for partition of the suit land was passed ex parte without serving Smt.Kirpal Kaur according to the prescribed legal procedure.</p><p>4. The contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellants have been controverted by Mr. M.L.Sarin, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the respondents. It has been contended by him that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to go into the validity of the partition proceedings. The appellants have approached the Civil Court without exhausting the remedy available to them under Section 13 of the Act. It has further been contended by him that Smt. Kirpal Kaur had duly been served in the partition proceedings by sending notice to her by registered post.The counsel has also contended that she had withdrawn her appeal before the lower appellate court and in this view of the matter, the present appellants, who had purchased the land from her during the pendency of the partition proceedings, had no locus standi to challenge the order of partition passed by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade.</p><p>5. 1 have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the evidence adduced on record.</p><p>6. The only question that arises for consideration in the present appeal is to the following effect:-</p><p>Whether or not the Civil Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the suit wherein the order of partition passed by a Revenue Officer has been challenged and Smt. Kirpal Kaur was properly served in the partition proceedings</p><p>7. The first objection raised on behalf of the appellants is that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not served in the partition proceedings before the Assistant Collector 1st Grade, Guhla, as per the provisions contained in Section 20 of the Act.</p><p>8. I do not find any merit in this contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants. It is not the case of the appellants that Smt.Kirpal Kaur was not served at all. The bald statement of the plaintiffs was rebutted by the statement on oath of defendant Balwant Singh and also by documentary evidence adduced on record which shows that a registered notice was issued to her and acknowledgement due (Ex.DIO) was received in the office of the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade. Sub-section (3) of Section 20 of the Act gives discretion to the Revenue Officer to serve the concerned person 'either in addition to, or in substitution for, any other mode of service, by forwarding the summons by post in a-letter addressed' to him and registered under Part II of the Indian Post Office Act, 1886. In this view of the matter, it cannot be said that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not served as per the procedure prescribed under the Act.</p><p>9. The next contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants is that the Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain the ex parte order passed by the Revenue Officer.</p><p>10. This contention is also without any merit. Section 158 of the Act specifically excludes the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts in matters within the jurisdiction of the Revenue Officers. In order to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector, a provision for filing of appeals before the higher Revenue Authorities has been made in Section 13 of the Act. The plaintiffs without exhausting the remedies available to them under Section 13, approached the Civil Court to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector.</p><p>11. Moreover, it has come on record that Smt. Kirpal Kaur, from whom the present appellants had purchased the land during the pendency of the partition proceedings, had withdrawn from the appeal before the lower appellate Court. As the present appellants had purchased the suit land during the pendency of the partition proceedings, they have, therefore, no locus standi to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector 1st Grade and pursue the appeal. It is not the case of the plaintiff-appellants that the ex parte decree was obtained by the defendant-respondents by fraud or misrepresentation. In A.C. Ananthaswamy and Ors. v. Boraiah (D) by Lrs. (2004-3)138 Punjab Law Reporter 557, it has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that in the absence of any fraud or misrepresentation, an ex parte order on the bare plea of non-service cannot be set aside. In the present case it is an undisputed fact that registered notice (Ex.DIO) was issued to Smt. Kirpal Kaur and she had even filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order passed by the Assistant Collector. The ratio of the authority Firm Seth Radha Kishun (deceased) represented by Hari Kishan and Ors. v. Administrator Municipal Committee, Ludhiana : [1964]2SCR273 , that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not specifically ousted where a statute created a liability and provided a remedy, is not applicable to the facts appearing in the present case. In the present case, as already mentioned above, registered A.D. notice was issued to and served on Smt. Kirpal Kaur, who had thereafter, filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order.</p><p>12. Both the courts below have given concurrent findings of fact which cannot be interfered with in the second appeal in view of the provisions of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as no substantial question of law has either been pleaded in the memorandum of appeal or arises for consideration in the present appeal. I do not find any infirmity in the well-reasoned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below.</p><p>13. Consequently, there is no merit in this appeal. It is, accordingly, dismissed. However, I do no make any order as to costs.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '(2006)142PLR339',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Balwant Singh and ors.',
		'sub' => 'Property',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
$casename_url = 'rai-jasbir-singh-vs-balwant'
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	(int) 0 => '629369',
	(int) 1 => 'rai-jasbir-singh-vs-balwant'
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$ctype = ' High Court'
$caseref = 'Hari Kishan and Ors. v. Administrator Municipal Committee<br>'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>Ashutosh Mohunta, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The vendee-plaintiffs have filed this appeal to challenge the judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below whereby their suit and the appeal against the partition of the land ordered by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Guhla, vide order dated 16.7.1975, were dismissed.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. In brief the facts giving rise to this appeal are that defendant-respondent Nos. 1 to 5 filed an application for partition of the suit land against Smt.Kirpal Kaur (Plaintiff No. 1) and defendant Nos. 6 to 15 in the court of Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Guhla. In that application Smt. Kirpal Kaur was proceeded against ex parte. The partition was confirmed on 16.6.1975 and the case was fixed for instrument of partition for 16.7.1975. Rai Jasbir Singh, plaintiff No. 2 purchased land measuring 80 Kanals from Smt. Kirpal Kaur (plaintiff No. 1) vide sale deed dated 27.5.1975 during the pendency of the partition proceedings and plaintiff No. 2 and 3, i.e., Rai Jasbir Singh and Swaran Singh were in actual physical possession of 228 Kanals 8 Marias and 77 Kanals 8 Marias, respectively. The plaintiffs challenged the order dated 16.7.1975 passed by the Assistant Grade, 1st Class, Guhla, by filing the present suit for declaration, which was dismissed by the Sub Judge, 1st Class, Kaithal, vide judgment and decree dated 29.1.1980 on the ground that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The plaintiffs then filed appeal to challenge the judgment and decree dated 29.1.1980 passed by the trial Court. During the pendency of the appeal, Smt. Kirpal Kaur withdrew herself from being the appellant. Consequently, vide order dated 17.1.1980 the appeal qua Kirpal Kaur was ordered to be dismissed as withdrawn. The appeal qua the remaining two appellants, i.e., Rai Jasbir Singh and Swaran Singh (present appellants) was dismissed by the Additional District Judge, Kurukshetra, vide judgment and decree dated 4.12.1981 and the decision of the trial Court with regard to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was upheld. Now Rai Jasbir Singh arid Swaran Singh have filed the present appeal wherein challenge has been made to the findings of both the Courts below.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. It has been contended by Mr. R.S. Mittal, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the appellants, that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not duly served and, thus,the ex parte order dated 16.6.1975/16.7.1975 passed by the Assistant Collector,1st Grade, Guhla, was a nullity. It has further been argued by the learned counsel for the appellants that the Courts below erred in holding that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit against partition ordered by the Revenue Officer in view of the provisions of the <a>Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887</a> (for short 'the Act'), despite the fact that the order for partition of the suit land was passed ex parte without serving Smt.Kirpal Kaur according to the prescribed legal procedure.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. The contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellants have been controverted by Mr. M.L.Sarin, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the respondents. It has been contended by him that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to go into the validity of the partition proceedings. The appellants have approached the Civil Court without exhausting the remedy available to them under Section 13 of the Act. It has further been contended by him that Smt. Kirpal Kaur had duly been served in the partition proceedings by sending notice to her by registered post.The counsel has also contended that she had withdrawn her appeal before the lower appellate court and in this view of the matter, the present appellants, who had purchased the land from her during the pendency of the partition proceedings, had no locus standi to challenge the order of partition passed by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. 1 have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the evidence adduced on record.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. The only question that arises for consideration in the present appeal is to the following effect:-',
	(int) 7 => '<p>Whether or not the Civil Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the suit wherein the order of partition passed by a Revenue Officer has been challenged and Smt. Kirpal Kaur was properly served in the partition proceedings',
	(int) 8 => '<p>7. The first objection raised on behalf of the appellants is that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not served in the partition proceedings before the Assistant Collector 1st Grade, Guhla, as per the provisions contained in Section 20 of the Act.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>8. I do not find any merit in this contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants. It is not the case of the appellants that Smt.Kirpal Kaur was not served at all. The bald statement of the plaintiffs was rebutted by the statement on oath of defendant Balwant Singh and also by documentary evidence adduced on record which shows that a registered notice was issued to her and acknowledgement due (Ex.DIO) was received in the office of the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade. Sub-section (3) of Section 20 of the Act gives discretion to the Revenue Officer to serve the concerned person 'either in addition to, or in substitution for, any other mode of service, by forwarding the summons by post in a-letter addressed' to him and registered under Part II of the Indian Post Office Act, 1886. In this view of the matter, it cannot be said that Smt. Kirpal Kaur was not served as per the procedure prescribed under the Act.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>9. The next contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants is that the Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain the ex parte order passed by the Revenue Officer.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>10. This contention is also without any merit. Section 158 of the Act specifically excludes the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts in matters within the jurisdiction of the Revenue Officers. In order to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector, a provision for filing of appeals before the higher Revenue Authorities has been made in Section 13 of the Act. The plaintiffs without exhausting the remedies available to them under Section 13, approached the Civil Court to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>11. Moreover, it has come on record that Smt. Kirpal Kaur, from whom the present appellants had purchased the land during the pendency of the partition proceedings, had withdrawn from the appeal before the lower appellate Court. As the present appellants had purchased the suit land during the pendency of the partition proceedings, they have, therefore, no locus standi to challenge the order passed by the Assistant Collector 1st Grade and pursue the appeal. It is not the case of the plaintiff-appellants that the ex parte decree was obtained by the defendant-respondents by fraud or misrepresentation. In A.C. Ananthaswamy and Ors. v. Boraiah (D) by Lrs. (2004-3)138 Punjab Law Reporter 557, it has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that in the absence of any fraud or misrepresentation, an ex parte order on the bare plea of non-service cannot be set aside. In the present case it is an undisputed fact that registered notice (Ex.DIO) was issued to Smt. Kirpal Kaur and she had even filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order passed by the Assistant Collector. The ratio of the authority Firm Seth Radha Kishun (deceased) represented by Hari Kishan and Ors. v. Administrator Municipal Committee, Ludhiana : [1964]2SCR273 , that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not specifically ousted where a statute created a liability and provided a remedy, is not applicable to the facts appearing in the present case. In the present case, as already mentioned above, registered A.D. notice was issued to and served on Smt. Kirpal Kaur, who had thereafter, filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>12. Both the courts below have given concurrent findings of fact which cannot be interfered with in the second appeal in view of the provisions of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as no substantial question of law has either been pleaded in the memorandum of appeal or arises for consideration in the present appeal. I do not find any infirmity in the well-reasoned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>13. Consequently, there is no merit in this appeal. It is, accordingly, dismissed. However, I do no make any order as to costs.<p>',
	(int) 15 => '<p>'
)
$paragraphAfter = (int) 1
$cnt = (int) 16
$i = (int) 15
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