Sukhdip Singh (Minor) Vs. Life Insurance Corporation of India - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
- hindu law -- custom: [vijender jain, c.j., m.m. kumar, jasbir singh, rajive bhalla & rajesh bindal, jj] alienation of ancestral property - punjab and haryana - held, in respect of state of punjab by virtue of punjab amendment act, 1973 there is a complete bar to contest any alienation of ancestral or non-ancestral immovable property or appointment of an heir to such property on ground that such alienation or appointment was contrary to custom. in punjab the property in hands of a successor has to be treated as coparcenary property and its alienation has to be governed by hindu law except to the extent it is regulated by sections 6 and 30 of the hindu succession act. in haryana, property in hands of successor has to be treated as coparcenary property as well as ancestral property. parties can fall back upon hindu law in case they fail to establish that rule of decision is custom. therefore, in haryana both under hindu law and the customary law, the alienation would be open to challenge. custom was given precedent over uncodified hindu law presumably for reason that custom has been consistently replacing the hindu law. however, it was soon realized that ancestral immovable property, which ordinarily held to be inalienable amongst jats of punjab by virtue of custom except for necessity, no limitation was placed on degrees of collateral, eligible to contest such alienation. it was, therefore, felt necessary to engraft certain restriction on degrees of collateral, eligible to contest an alienation, which under the custom itself was not limited. accordingly, the punjab custom (power to contest) act, 1920 (act no.2 of 1920) was enacted. the hindu succession act was extended to the state of punjab. act 2 of punjab act defined expression alienation to include any testamentary disposition of property and appointment of an heir was to include any adoption made or purporting to be made according to custom. a further provision was made by section 3 that hindu succession act was to apply only in respect of alienation of immovable property or appointment of heirs made by persons who in regard to such alienation or appointment were governed by custom. whereas section 4 declared that hindu succession act was not to affect any right to contest any alienation or appointment of an heir made before the date on which the succession act was to come into force. in other words, act, no.2 of 1920 was not to affect alienation or appointments of heir made before date on which it came into force. it also preserved the rights of any alienation or appointment of an heir made by a family. after section 7 was inserted in act of 1920 by the punjab amendment act of 1973 right of contest being contrary to custom had been totally effaced and taken away. therefore, no person has any right to contest any alienation of immovable property whether ancestral or non-ancestral on ground of being contrary to custom after january 23, 1973. in haryana, the situation as enunciated by act no.2 of 1920 continued to prevail in respect of alienation because no reforms parallel to punjab as brought by amendment act of 1973, had been enacted although right to pre-emption has been substantially abolished in haryana also. no steps even have been taken in that regard. therefore, situation in haryana have to be regarded as it existed under act no. 2 of 1920. hindu succession act,1956[c.a.no.30/1956] -- sections 6 & 30: [vijender jain, c.j., m.m.kumar, jasbir singh, rajive bhalla & rajesh bindal, jj] alienation of coparcenary property - law laid down by full bench in joginder singh kundha singh v kehar singh dasaundha singh [air 1965 punjab 407] and pritam singh v assistant controller of estate duty, patiala [1976 punj lr 342] -whether there is any conflict? - held, the basic controversy in the full bench decision of joginder singhs case was regarding constitutional validity of section 14 of hindu succession act and as to whether it infringes article 14 of constitution. it was held that the estate held by male and limitation on his power of alienation were in no way removed and the reversioners were not debarred from challenging such alienations. the full bench held that section 14 of hindu succession act postulates that estate held by a hindu female before enforcement of succession act either by inheritance or otherwise, was enlarged and on date of enforcement of succession act, she became a full owner. likewise, if she has inherited any estate after the commencement of the act, she was to be regarded as absolute owner rather than a limited owner. consequently, the limitations on power of alienation automatically vanished. this was the necessary result of the provisions made in section 14 of the act. the full bench further held that in respect of male proprietors, no corresponding provision was made either enlarging their estate in ancestral property or enlarging their power of alienation over property inherited by them. however, it noticed section 30 and observed that it only deals with power of his share in coparcenary property by will, which prior to enforcement of the act, he had no right to do. the only provision made in respect of male proprietor regarding alienation of property was his power of alienation by will. in so far as persons governed by custom are concerned, they continued to be governed by the restriction on the power of alienation of a male holder as existed before enforcement of the act. likewise, other restriction on alienation other than disposal by will also continued. the full bench, thus, recognized the superior right of hindu females by virtue of section 14 and upheld the provision as intra vires. the argument that reversioners have ceased to exist after enactment of provisions of section 14 of succession act, was rejected as there was no provision pointed out to that effect. the proposition laid down by the full bench in pritam singhs case was that the hindu succession act has not abolished joint hindu family with respect to rights of those who were members of mitakshara coparcenary, except in the manner and to the extent mentioned in sections 6 and 30 of the act, this statement should also imply, though it does not say so expressly, the succession act to this extent does not affect the rights of the members governed by dayabhaga coparcenary. the full bench in pritam singh;s case expressly noticed the judgment of earlier full bench in joginder singhs case but construed the same as irrelevant by observing that it dealt with the power of alienation of a person governed by customary law and constitutional validity of section 14 of hindu succession act. thus there is no real conflict between the two full bench judgments. both the full bench judgments have been delivered on the assumption that joginder singhs case dealt with question of alienation whereas pritam singhs case had decided the question concerning succession. even on fact in joginder singhs case the issue was validity of alienation by consent decree by a father to his two sons, which was challenged by third son, whereas in pritam singhs case the question of nature of property in hands of sons on death of their father had arisen for purposes of assessment of estate duty. in pritam singhs case the property in the hands of the sons was held to be coparcenary property and only 1/3rd of property belonging to deceased father was considered eligible for estate duty. therefore, there was no question of alienation in pritam singhs case. - it is also well settled that the minor should not be deprived of his valuable rights.amarjeet chaudhary and k.k. srivastava, jj.1. this writ petition has been filed by sukhdip singh, minor through his guardian smt. ranjit kaur for the issuance of a direction to the respondents to release the policy amount to the petitioner alongwith interest. the said directions have been sought for the reason that the father of petitioner late shri darshan singh had got life insurance policy in his name and nominated the petitioner as his nominee. darshan singh, the policy holder died in a road accident on 12.3.1994 and first information report was lodged on 12.3.1994 at police station, sadar, amritsar. it has been averred that the petitioner had approached the respondents and served notice also for the release of the policy amount but despite that, the policy amount has not been released to the petitioner to which the petitioner, being nominee is entitled to. the mother of the petitioner had furnished the requisite documents. she was advised by communication, dated 14.11.1995, copy annexure p3, to contact the branch officer, unit no. 1, amritsar for further necessary action regarding payment of claim. on 17.11.1995, the respondents informed the mother of the petitioner, ranjit kaur, who is his natural guardian to obtain succession certificate and produce the same. the petitioner also served legal notice and the respondents vide their letter dated 16.3.1996 replied that minor cannot give valid discharge regarding the claim of darshan singh and ranjit kaur is not the real mother of the minor. the guardian court, amritsar vide order dated 9.3.1995 had appointed ranjit kaur as guardian of minors amandeep kaur and sukhdev singh and she was allowed to withdraw the amount of ex-gratia grant, g.p. fund and other dues from punjab government on behalf of minors but no order was made by the court concerned under the above policy. the petitioner has approached this court for the issuance of necessary directions.2. on notice of motion, the respondents have filed written statement in which it has admitted that shri darshan singh, father of the petitioner, had insured himself for rs. 1,00,000/- on 31.3.1989 and appointed his son shri sukhdeep singh, aged 6 1/2 years as his nominee without authorising anyone to receive money secured by the policy in the event of death during the minority of the nominee. smt. ranjit kaur was appointed as guardian and has been allowed to withdraw the amount of g.p. fund, leave encashment and other dues from the education department on furnishing indemnity bond of rs. two lacs. the claimant was advised to obtain extended guardianship certificate so as to enable the guardian to withdraw the amount of insurance or produce succession certificate to disburse the amount failing which the insurance amount was payable to all the legal heirs.3. we have considered the submission of learned counsel for the parties and perused the paper book.4. we have gone through the relevant part of para 8.4 of the l.i.c. of india manual for policy servicing department part-i which reads as under;'8.4 where the nominee or an assignee is a minor :- where the nominee is a minor, as provided by the insurance amendment act, 1950, the life assured has the right to appoint any person as the appointee to receive the policy money secured by the policy in the event of the assured's death during the minority of the nominee. where a nominee is a minor and no appointment of appointee is made, the money secured by the policy in the event of the secured's death during the minority of the nominee, should not be paid to the guardian, appointed or natural, but it should be paid only to the legal heirs of the life assured.'5. since the provisions bar the payment to any such person whether he is natural or appointed guardian it was incumbent upon the l.i.c. to have deposited the entire amount in some nationalised bank in fixed deposit in the name of minor till the period, he attains majority. it is settled law that the interest of minor is always to be protected and it is for the court to see that there is no exploitation or the amount is not misused. it is also well settled that the minor should not be deprived of his valuable rights. in this view of the matter, a direction is issued to the respondents to release the policy amount and deposit the same in the name of minor in some nationalised bank in fixed deposit within one month from the date of receipt of copy of this order. the insured died on 12.3.1994 and the claim should have been settled within one year thereof. therefore, the petitioner shall get interest at the rate of 12% per annum from one year.5. writ petition is allowed in the manner indicated above. the parties are left to bear their own costs.