Kartar Singh and anr. Vs. Financial Commissioner (Planning) and ors. - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
- - on their complaint the managing officer, rehabilitation department, after perusing the file of the case recommended the setting aside of the proprietary rights in favour of respondent no. the order annexure p1 was wrong when the managing officer wrongly recommended for the setting aside of the, proprietary rights. 1 to 3. 6. i have heard the learned counsel for the parties and with their assistance i have gone through the record of the case, including the annexures and the case law relied upon by the parties and this court is of the considered opinion that the present writ petition is a sinister move on the part of the petitioners who appeared to be a frustrated lot and who have given challenge to orders annexure p2 and p3, after remaining unsuccessful in the civil courts. 4 was bad in the eyes of law and this vital aspect has not been considered by the chief settlement commissioner and financial commissioner vide orders annexures p2 and p3. before i narrate as to how the civil court has dealt with the entire issue, first of all i would like to make a brief mention of the operative portion of the orders as contained in annexures p2 and p3. khichho as she failed to lead any evidence. these pleas were open to them even in the civil suits and the effect of non-incorporating those pleas in the earlier litigation would amount to a constructive res judicata and it will be most unfair on the part of the petitioners to reagitate a settled issue by taking one weak plea or the other. once they were satisfied with regard to those allegations, the petitioners cannot reagitate the issue in the writ jurisdiction. even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that the powers of revision as contained under section 24 of the act are vast and the authorities can entertain an issue after the expiry of any amount of limitation, still the authorities were satisfied that there was no fraud or false representation or concealment of any material fact on the part of gurdip singh or ujagar singh, leaving no scope for this court to interfere in the orders annexures p2 and p3. it was for the department to see whether on admission of ujagar singh, the title could vest in favour of gurdip singh or not and if that aspect of the case was never objected to by the department or by the government which is always interested in its exchequer, and if the government was satisfied about the genuineness of the consent, it would be most unreasonable on the part of this court to interfere with that order. if the powers have been exercised by the chief settlement commissioner and the financial commissioner under that very act, how the exercise of powers would be considered as bad in passing the orders annexures p2 and p3? and i would also like to discuss the case law relied upon by him, who has put in appearance on behalf of the petitioner's. the first authority from which support has been derived by the learned counsel shri cheema in support of his argument that the orders p2 and p3 were inherently bad and without jurisdiction and no consent can confer a valid jurisdiction so as to transfer the proprietary rights in favour of gurdip singh, is gajjan singh and ors. cheema, was that the chief settlement commissioner and the financial commissioner failed to exercise that jurisdiction which vested in them when they did not take notice of the fact that the proprietary rights have been conferred upon gurdip singh in a manner which is not warranted according to section 10 of the act. i do not subscribe to the argument again because every contention raised by the present complainants was taken note of both by the chief settlement commissioner as well as the financial commissioner in the earlier parts of the orders p2 and p3 and, thereafter, suo moto reference was declined 11. learned counsel for the petitioners also placed reliance on davindar singh and anr. further it was held that the gift which was initially bad, does not revive in favour of the donees. the writ petitioners were well aware of the stand taken up by defendant gurdip singh in the suit which culminated into the judgment (exhibit r1) and, therefore, it is not open for the writ petitioners to say that the present writ petition is not barred by the principles of res judicata. 3 of the judgment (r1) it is clearly pleaded by gurdip singh that ujagar singh had transferred his claim in his favour, as a result of which the land in suit was allotted in his name in lieu of the land left by ujagar singh in pakistan. they were made well aware about the stand by gurdip singh. shri cheema submitted that the division bench was satisfied about the prime facie illegalities committed by the chief settlement commissioner and the financial commissioner, who in the opinion of shri cheema, should be directed to re-write the order as the orders p2 and p3 have been written for extraneous reasons when both the authorities did not deal with all the arguments raised by the writ petitioners, though noted in the earlier parts of the impugned orders. once that authority has passed the order after taking note of the arguments and the submissions raised by the parties, this court cannot comment in a convenient manner by saying that the chief settlement commissioner and the financial commissioner failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in them. in these circumstances no directions can be given to the chief settlement commissioner as well as to the financial commissioner to pass a more detailed order.r.l. anand, j.1. by this judgment i dispose of civil writ petition no. 3531 of 1991 and the two civil misc. applications.2. initially the writ petition was filed by kartar singh and suresh kumar petitioners against the respondents, including contesting respondent no. 4 gurdip singh, under articles 226/227 of the constitution of india for the issuance of a writ in the nature of certiorari/mandamus seeking directions of this court for the quashment of the orders contained in annexures p2 and p3 and for the issuance of directions to respondents nos. 1 to 3 to declare the proprietary rights conferred upon respondent no. 4 as illegal, fraudulent and null and void.3. before i incorporate the pleadings of the parties in brief, at the first instance i dispose of the civil misc. application filed by the legal representatives of kartar singh, petitioner no. 1, which is hereby allowed and it is ordered that the persons mentioned in civil misc. no. 3328 of 1994 are brought on the record in place of kartar singh, as the alleged cause of action of kartar singh is survived by his legal representatives, who are in a position to tell as to whether the proprietary rights conferred on respondent no. 4 by the respondent-authorities nos. 1 to 3 were valid or not. similarly civil misc. no. 14908 of 1996 filed by respondent no. 4 is also hereby allowed and he is permitted to prove before the court that he was not working as a patwari, as alleged by the petitioners at the relevant time, to rebut the allegation of the petitioners, who alleged in the writ petition that respondent no. 4 had manipulated the proprietary rights in his favour with regard to the estate of ujjagar singh.4. the case set up by kartar singh and suresh kumar in that writ petition is that ujagar singh, sant singh, sons of mangal singh, and jit singh son of kartar singh, owned land jointly in equal shares in village barhianwala, tehsil nankana sahib, district sheikhpura (now in pakistan). after the partition of the country, matalba arazi was filed on 19.3.1948 with the rehabilitation department and an area measuring 82 standard acres 14 units was allotted on 14.1.1950 to the aforesaid persons in village shahpur aryana, tehsilrajpura, district patiala. on 5.12.1955 a declaration was filed with the managing officer, rajpura, stating that ujagar singh had sold his entire land before partition of the country to gurdip singh respondent no. 4 and was such the proprietary rights in the said land had been conferred upon him. on the basis of the declaration gurdip singh, respondent had procured pucca sanad in his favour. it is alleged by the petitioners that gurdip singh was working as a patwari, therefore, he fraudulently and by misrepresentation got the sanad. the petitioners filed a complaint pleading that gurdip singh had secured the proprietary rights fraudulently and by misrepresentation. on their complaint the managing officer, rehabilitation department, after perusing the file of the case recommended the setting aside of the proprietary rights in favour of respondent no. 4 to the higher authorities vide annexure p1. while recommending the case, the managing officer took note of the fact that gurdip singh respondent no. 4 was not able to produce any documentary evidence in support of his case that he purchased the land before the partition of the country from ujagar singh and also that when gurdip singh had already obtained land on the basis of the declaration on 10.1.1957 why he got a will executed from ujagar singh on 11.10.1967 in favour of pritpal singh and others, who are his sons. the mutation was sanctioned in the favour of his sons on the basis of the will. however, the order of the managing officer (p1) was not approved and the reference was declined by the chief settlement commissioner vide his order dated 12.6.1989 primarily on the ground that the complaint had been filed by the petitioners after more than 31 years and that the civil court was only competent to adjudicate the matter in issue. the order of the chief settlement commissioner is p2. thereafter the petitioners filed a petition under section 33 of the displaced persons (compensation & rehabilitation) act 1954 (for short 'the act') before respondent no. 1, i.e., the financial commissioner (planning), who also declined to interfere in the order (annexure p2) and held that suo moto reference was not competent on the part of the managing officer when the interest in the compensation pool was not involved on behalf of the government. copy of the order of the financial commissioner is annexure 3. challenge has been given to the orders p2 and p3 on the ground that a perusal of section 24 of the act would show that there is no basis for the authorities to say that interference can only be done when the government has interest in the compensation pool and that no period of limitation is prescribed under section 24 of the act for making a reference to the higher authorities for the cancellation of the proprietary rights in case it is found that a fraud has been played by a person in procuring the property of a genuine allottee. it is also pleaded that the controversy in dispute could only be decided by the authorities under the act and not by the civil court whose jurisdiction is barred under section 36 of the said act. it is also stated that since respondent no. 4 has not bean able to show to the authorities that he purchased the land of ujagar singh prior to the partition of the country and very fact that the ujagar singh himself filed the declaration of claiming the land, i.e., mutalaba arazi therefore, it is a prime facie evidence that gurdip singh respondent no. 4 never purchased the land before the partition of the country from ujagar singh and the proprietary rights conferred upon him are illegal and ultra vires. said gurdip singh prepared a false power of attorney on 14.5.1956 and false affidavit of ujagar singh. he, after fabricating the documents, connived with the rehabilitation department and got his name entered in the sanad which was issued on 10.1.1957, petitioner no. 1 kartar singh is the son of smt. khichho, whereas suresh kumar petitioner no. 2 is a legatee under a will and, in fact, they were entitled to the land allotted to ujagar singh once it is held that the sanad in favour of respondent-no. 4 is illegal. with the above averments, the prayer referred to above.5. notice of the writ petition was given to the respondents. return was filed by respondent no. 4 who denied the allegations on merits and also took preliminary objections, such as that the petitioners had concealed most material facts from this court and for this reason they do not deserve any relief at all, an claimed by them. according to this respondent, ujagar singh died on 1.6.1969 and in his life time he never made any complaint regarding his properties. the petitioners are bound by the admissions of ujagar singh. smt. khichho, sister of ujagar singh, filed a civil suit for possession of the land, previously belonging to ujagar singh, against respondent no. 4, on the ground that the land was owned by ujagar singh and she being his heir was entitled to take possession after his death and that the present respondent no. 4 got the land mutated in his name wrongly. that suit was contented by respondent no. 4 on the ground that ujagar singh had transferred his claim in his favour, as a result of which the land in suit was allotted in his name in lieu of the land left by ujagar singh in pakistan. in the said suit issue no. 1 was to the effect: 'whether ujagar singh was the owner of the land in dispute?' the suit of smt. khichho was dismissed by the civil court on 31.10.1972, holding that ujagar singh was not the owner of the disputed land, vide judgment annexure r.1. ujagar singh also made a registered will dated 11.10.1967 in favour of the sons of respondent no. 4.' again smt.khichho filed another civil suit for possession of the land measuring 63 bighas 18 biswas, which was mutated in the names of the sons of respondent no. 4 after the death of ujagar singh. during the pendency of the suite smt. khichho died and she was represented by kartar singh petitioner no. 1 and suresh kumar petitioner no. 2. their suit was dismissed on 27.11.1987 and the registered will of ujagar singh was held to be genuine. the petitioners have no right against the land of ujagar singh and it was so held vide annexure r2, i.e., the copy of the judgment dated 17.11.1987. the petitioner then filed the appeal against the judgment and decree dated 27.11.1987, which was dismissed on 30.2.1993 and the judgment of the trial court dated 27.11.1987 was confirmed. during the pendency of the appeal kartar singh also died and his legal representatives filed a regular second appeal in the high court which was dismissed on 22.12.1993 after contest vide annexures r3 and r4, respectively. special leave petition was also filed in the hon'ble supreme court which was dismissed on 16.3.1994 vide annexure p5. the present writ petition has been filed by the petitioners on 5.3.1991 after the decision of the suit filed by smt. khichho against the respondents and after the decision of her another suit, but not a word has been mentioned in the writ petition of the orders r 1 and r2. these, are material concealment of facts on the part of the petitioners and, therefore, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed on this short ground. earlier also the present writ petition was dismissed in limine on 6.3.1991. the petitioners filed a review petition after about 2 years, alleging the same ground as contained in the writ petition. the review application was allowed and the order dated 6.3.1991 was recalled and notice of motion was issued in the main writ petition. the civil court time and again held between the parties that the petitioners had no claim qua the land of the deceased ujagar singh and the findings have been affirmed right upto the hon'ble supreme court and in these circumstances this court has no writ jurisdiction to interfere with the findings of facts. the order dated 10.1.1956 is based on consent of ujagar singh. the proprietary rights of land falling to the share of ujagar singh were conferred upon respondent no. 4. ujagar singh remained alive upto 1.6.1969 and during his life time he never challenged the order dated 10.1.1956; so much so, ujagar singh executed general power of attorney duly registered in favour of respondent no. 4, meaning thereby that he had faith in him. even ujagar singh executed a registered will in favour of the son of respondent no. 4 on 11.10.1967. ujagar singh never challenged the proprietary rights granted to respondent no. 4 in his life time. hence the legal heirs of ujagar singh are bound by his admission. when the suits of the petitioners were dismissed, they resorted to file the complaint after 33 years and started alleging against the proprietary rights. all the courts concurrently held that the proprietary rights were rightly conferred upon respondent no. 4 and it is not open for them now to challenge the same findings in the present writ petition. on merits this respondent also stated that the land was allotted in the name of ujagar singh and he himself filed the declaration and accordingly a consent order was passed by the managing officer granting proprietary rights in favour of respondent no. 4. there is nothing wrong in this procedure. the consent orders/decrees do not require any registration. no fraud has been played either upon the authorities: ujagar singh remained alive upto 1969 and he never challenged the consent order. the present writ petition has been filed by petitioners when they lost the in the civil court and that too after 33 years from the granting of the proprietary rights. the complaint was never filed during the life time of ujagar singh. the complaint is a mala fide one in order to harass respondent no 4. the consent given by ujagar singh before the managing officer was neither challenged in appeal nor in revision under the displaced persons (compensation & rehabilitation) act. that order has already attained finality and could not be reopened. the order annexure p1 was wrong when the managing officer wrongly recommended for the setting aside of the, proprietary rights. ujagar singh was of the firm view that the property should either go to respondent no. 4 or to his sons, as the deceased had confidence in respondent no. 4 till his death, the chief settlement commissioner had rightly held that since the dispute was between the private parties and that the interest of compensation pool was not involved, therefore, the complaint was not competent after 33 years from a consent order when it was not challenged during the life time of ujagar singh and even the civil court had decided the matter in favour of respondent no. 4. the chief settlement commissioner had exercised the jurisdiction vested in him after satisfying himself about the propriety of the order vide which the proprietary rights were ordered to be transferred in favour of respondent no. 4. the financial commissioner has also rightly dismissed the petition. the chief settlement commissioner has been invested with the powers to satisfy himself regarding the orders passed by the lower authorities and after satisfying himself he passed the order annexure p2. similarly respondent no. 3 passed the order (p3), seeing no illegality in the order annexure p2. the findings given by the civil court are binding upon the rehabilitation authorities. once the property goes out of the compensation pool, the authorities under the act have no jurisdiction to probe into the matter. the jurisdiction of the court was not barred where the dispute is between the private parties and the interest of the compensation pool is not involved. since the petitioners had alleged that they are the original legal heirs of the deceased, hence the civil court could only decide who were the legal heirs of ujagar singh deceased. if the petitioners wanted to prove that the consent order was passed with fraud, the only! proper forum was the civil court and not the authorities under the displaced persons! (compensation & rehabilitation) act and the order of transfer was never challenged! during the life time of ujagar singh who survived upto 1969. the petitioners want to grab the land from the original owners. with the above averments, respondent no. 4 has prayed for the dismissal of the writ petition after relying upon various annexures as contained in annexures r1 to r5. no separate written statement has been filed on] behalf of respondents nos. 1 to 3.6. i have heard the learned counsel for the parties and with their assistance i have gone through the record of the case, including the annexures and the case law relied upon by the parties and this court is of the considered opinion that the present writ petition is a sinister move on the part of the petitioners who appeared to be a frustrated lot and who have given challenge to orders annexure p2 and p3, after remaining unsuccessful in the civil courts. before filing the present petition, at least two litigations were decided against the petitioners vide annexures r1 and r2. annexure r1 was filed on 29.5.1971 and was decided on 31.10.1972. smt. khichho was a party to that suit. annexure r2 would show that the civil suit was filed on 20.5.1971 and decided on 27.11.1987. smt. khichho, kartar singh and suresh kumar were parties to the suit. it is not believable that the original petitioners, i.e., kartar singh and suresh kumar were not aware about the litigation going on in the civil court right upto the hon'ble supreme court. even after the death of kartar singh, his legal heirs have not made any application to incorporate the facts of the earlier litigation. in these circumstances respondent no. 4 is justified in alleging that there is a material concealment of essential facts required to be incorporated in the writ petition and non inclusion of those facts entitles this court to dismiss this writ petition in limine. it is held in 'savitri and ors. v. state of haryana and ors., 1996(1) r.r.r. 697, that when a petitioner does not disclose the facts regarding the filing of the civil suit and injunction order, and those facts are material to the decision of the writ petition, such a petitioner is guilty of concealment of facts and the petition is liable to be dismissed. otherwise also there is a glaring fact which has emerged from the pleadings of the parties. the entire attack of the petitioners it as to whether the alleged consent given by ujagar singh in favour of gurdip singh, respondent no. 4, in the transfer of the proprietary rights was validly given or not. this is a disputed fact which requires evidence. rather this point was earlier agitated in the civil court. such a disputed fact cannot be agitated in the writ jurisdiction as held in pardeep kumar and ors. v. state of punjab and ors., 1996(1) aij 245. also there is an inordinate delay and laches in the filing of the present writ petition. the proprietary rights were conferred, as per the petitioners themselves, upon respondent no. 4 somewhere in the year 1957. would it be proper to interfere with those orders in the present writ: petition, which was filed in the year 1991? the answer of this court is in the negative. yet another important preliminary question is whether it will be fair on the part of this court in exercise of writ jurisdiction, after the decision of the civil suits which have gone in favour of respondent no. 4, to interfere with the decisions of the civil courts which after obtaining evidence of the parties had given findings with regard to this very property in favour of respondent no. 4? the answer of this court again is in the negative.7. the attack of the petitioners is that the order of transfer of the property amounts to a transfer of interest of immovable property, which could only be transferred by a registered document and not on consent, therefore, the sanad granted in favour of respondent no. 4 was bad in the eyes of law and this vital aspect has not been considered by the chief settlement commissioner and financial commissioner vide orders annexures p2 and p3. before i narrate as to how the civil court has dealt with the entire issue, first of all i would like to make a brief mention of the operative portion of the orders as contained in annexures p2 and p3. in para no. 4 of the order (anncxure p-2) dated 12.6.1989 the chief settlement commissioner, punjab, chandigarh, has held as follows:-'4. 1 have given my thoughtful consideration to the arguments put forth by the respective parties. i find considerable weight in the argument of the learned counsel for the respondent that after the conferment of proprietary rights, the property goes out of compensation pool and the rehabilitation department has nothing to do with the case at this stage. 1 am in further agreement with his contention that since a prayer has been made for allotment of the disputed land after its retrieval from the respondent the dispute is inter se the private parties and the pool is not likely to get any benefit out of it. since no interest of rehabilitation department, is involved in it, the present reference is not tenable in view of the judgment of learned f.c.(t) reported as 1973 p.l.j. 783. it is also evident that the complainants remained silent for more than 31 years when they filed the complaint with the tehsildar (headquarters)-cum-m.o. and specially during the life time of shri ujjagar singh, deceased claimant. if some dispute has arisen at this stage regarding the land of which proprietary rights have already been granted to the allottee, it is only the civil court to adjudicate upon the matter. the present reference is, therefore, misconceived and is hereby refused as such.' similarly, in para no. 5 of the order dated 29.5.1990 (annexure p3), the financial commissioner (planning), punjab, exercising the powers of central government under section 33 of the displaced persons (compensation & rehabilitation) act, 1954, has held as follows:-'5. i have considered the arguments advanced on both sides and have also gone through the relevant record. i am inclined to agree with the view taken by the chief settlement commissioner that the dispute in this case is inter se the private parties and that the interest of the compensation pool is not involved in it. as held in the judgment reported in 1973 plj 783 and 1975 pl.i 75, the tehsildar (hc)-cum-managing officer was not justified in making a suo moto reference under section 24 of the act for cancellation of proprietary rights conferred on respondent no. 2 in respect of the land allotted to ujagar singh when interest of compensation pool was not involved. there is also force in the contention of the counsel for respondent no. 2, that managing officer was not competent to entertain the complaint of the petitioners after lapse of more than 31 years from the date of conferment of proprietary rights. the petitioners having not assailed the order of the managing officer dated 10.1.1957 during the life time of ujagar singh, were estopped from challenging its validity at this stage. further it was after thorough enquiry that the managing officer conferred proprietary rights on respondent no. 2, at the specific request of ujagar singh contained in his statement dated 31-10-1956. the fact that the sons of respondent no. 2 served ujagar singh during his last days and in consideration thereof the latter had executed a will in their favour on 11.10.1967 further goes to show that respondent no. 2 had not committed any fraud and ujagar singh agreed to the conferment of proprietary rights in respect of land allotted to him or respondent no. 2 without any pressure.' a perusal of the above would show that the managing officer conferred proprietary rights upon respondent no. 4 on the specific request of ujagar singh contained in his statement dated 31.10-.1956. the authorities also took note of the fact that sons of gurdip singh respondent no. 4 served ujagar singh during his last days and in consideration thereof the latter had executed a will in their favour on 11.10.1967. thus there was no fraud played by gurdip singh either upon ujagar singh who in all probabilities wanted to give his property in favour of gurdip singh or to his sons. a glance to annexure r1 would show that smt. khichho filed suit for possession on the plea that the land was owned by ujagar singh and she is his legal heir and as such is entitled to take possession of the disputed land, as claimed in the suit, after his death and that the mutation in favour of gurdip singh was wrong, showing him as the heir of ujagar singh. it was the categoric stand of gurdip singh that ujagar singh transferred his land in his favour, as a result of which the land in the suit was allotted in his name. alternative plea was also taken that he was in adverse possession. issue no. 1 was decided against plaintiff smt. khichho as she failed to lead any evidence. the suit was dismissed on 31.10.1972 and no challenge was given to this judgment and decree in a court of appeal. a perusal of annexure r2 would show that smt khichho through her legal representatives kartar singh and suresh kumar again filed a suit for possession of the land on the plea that it belonged to ujagar singh, who died issueless. smt. khichho is the sister of ujagar singh and as such she is his heir,. also it was pleaded by her that sons of gurdip singh had got the mutation of the land left by ujagar singh in their favour on the basis of a forged will. the suit was contested on the plea that ujagar singh executed a valid registered will on 11.10.1967 and he bequeathed the entire property. the findings on issue no. 2 went in favour of the defendants. it was a hotly contested suit which was dismissed by the court of additional senior sub judge, rajpura on 27.11.1987. the plaintiffs filed appeal in the of additional district judge, patiala, who vide judgment and decree dated 30.1.1993 dismissed the appeal. the regular second appeal was also dismissed by the high court on 22.12.1993 holding that there was no scope for interference. special leave petition was also dismissed by the hon'ble supreme court on 16.3.1994.8. in the light of the above facts, it will be most unfair on my part to reopen the entire issue which has been adjudicated finally right upto the supreme court. it is not difficult for me to understand the mood of the petitioners who appeared to be a frustrated lot. the title with regard to the property of ujagar singh has gone in the family of gurdip singh, firstly, on the basis of the consent given by ujagar singh himself during his life time and on the basis of that administrative orders were passed, which were not challenged. the will by ujagar singh in favour of the sons of gurdip singh has got the seal of the civil court. the petitioners cannot be permitted to say that in the earlier litigations the civil court had no jurisdiction. when the question of title was involved, the civil courts always had the jurisdiction to decide the controversy. the present petitioners had never challenged the transfer of proprietary rights on the haws of the pleas now being incorporated in the writ petition. these pleas were open to them even in the civil suits and the effect of non-incorporating those pleas in the earlier litigation would amount to a constructive res judicata and it will be most unfair on the part of the petitioners to reagitate a settled issue by taking one weak plea or the other.9. there is another angle of vision to view the present matter. the orders annexures p2 and p3 were passed by the authorities on a suo moto reference made by the managing officer. the chief settlement commissioner and the financial commissioner were to see whether with respect to the evacuee property any fraud has been played by respondent no. 4 when the proprietary rights were transferred in his favour on the basis of consent given by ujagar singh. if ujagar singh during his life time has admitted the claim in favour of respondent no. 4, that admission will always remain binding upon the petitioners. whether any illegality or impropriety has been committed or not either on the part of gurdip singh or on the part of ujagar singh, this aspect of the case has to be examined by the authorities under the act. once they were satisfied with regard to those allegations, the petitioners cannot reagitate the issue in the writ jurisdiction. even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that the powers of revision as contained under section 24 of the act are vast and the authorities can entertain an issue after the expiry of any amount of limitation, still the authorities were satisfied that there was no fraud or false representation or concealment of any material fact on the part of gurdip singh or ujagar singh, leaving no scope for this court to interfere in the orders annexures p2 and p3. the alleged illegality for the transfer of title has to be independently construed from a fraud or false representation or concealment of material fact. it was for the department to see whether on admission of ujagar singh, the title could vest in favour of gurdip singh or not and if that aspect of the case was never objected to by the department or by the government which is always interested in its exchequer, and if the government was satisfied about the genuineness of the consent, it would be most unreasonable on the part of this court to interfere with that order. section 36 of the act again debars only those litigations which were within the domain of the authorities under the act. since the dispute was raised with regard to the evacuee property as to whether it has been validly transferred in favour of gurdip singh or not, the authorities had the jurisdiction to deal with the issue as done in annexures p2 and p3. also it will be unfair now on the part of the petitioners to say that propriety of the orders annexures p2 and p3 can be considered by the high court in the writ jurisdiction as the orders p2 and p3 could not have been passed by those authorities. why the petitioners moved the complaint to the managing officer for setting aside the proprietary rights? when the order annexure pi was passed by the managing officer, he was also exercising the powers under the displaced persons (compensation & rehabilitation) act. if the powers have been exercised by the chief settlement commissioner and the financial commissioner under that very act, how the exercise of powers would be considered as bad in passing the orders annexures p2 and p3? the will of ujagar singh in favour of the sons of gurdip singh had been held to be a valid one. this will has got the approval even of the hon'ble supreme court. the petitioners are not going to get anything. the present move by filing a writ petition is nothing but a glaring depiction of frustrated mood of the petitioners, who are bent upon teasing the opposite party by filing one litigation or the other.10. band of authorities have been relied upon by the learned counsel shri a.s. cheema, advocate; and i would also like to discuss the case law relied upon by him, who has put in appearance on behalf of the petitioner's. the first authority from which support has been derived by the learned counsel shri cheema in support of his argument that the orders p2 and p3 were inherently bad and without jurisdiction and no consent can confer a valid jurisdiction so as to transfer the proprietary rights in favour of gurdip singh, is gajjan singh and ors. v. commissioner, ambala division, and ors., 1972 revenue law reporter. 119, wherein it was held that even consent of the parties cannot cure inherent lack of jurisdiction in a tribunal. this authority is totally not applicable to the facts in hand. the proprietary rights were conferred upon gurdip singh on 10.1.1957 by the managing officer, who initially had the jurisdiction to deal with the issue. on the complaint dated 6.1.1989 the matter was examined by the managing officer, who made a suo moto reference to the chief settlement commissioner, who again had the jurisdiction to deal with the point involved under section 24 of the act. further again- the financial commissioner had the jurisdiction and it is one thing that the chief settlement commissioner and the financial commissioner vide orders p2 and p3 did not agree with the recommendations of the settlement officer. it cannot be said in these circumstances that the orders p2 and p3 have been passed by those authorities, who had no jurisdiction. the foundation of the argument of mr. cheema, was that the chief settlement commissioner and the financial commissioner failed to exercise that jurisdiction which vested in them when they did not take notice of the fact that the proprietary rights have been conferred upon gurdip singh in a manner which is not warranted according to section 10 of the act. by non-appreciation of these facts the authorities have passed the orders p2 and p3 and there is a non exercise of jurisdiction validly vested in them and as such the orders p2 and p3 call for interference on the part of the high court. i do not subscribe to the argument again because every contention raised by the present complainants was taken note of both by the chief settlement commissioner as well as the financial commissioner in the earlier parts of the orders p2 and p3 and, thereafter, suo moto reference was declined11. learned counsel for the petitioners also placed reliance on davindar singh and anr. v. the deputy secretary-cum-settlement commissioner, rural, rehabilitation department, jullunder and ors. (1964)66 p.l.r. 555; ved kumari v. union of india and ors., 1989 p.l.j. 254; dalip singh and ors. v. the financial commissioner-cum-secretary to govt. haryana, rehabilitation department ors, 1995 p.l.j. 411; union of india and anr. v. avtar singh and anr., 1984 p.l.j. 479; and submitted that revisional jurisdiction can be exercised under section 24 of the act by any stretch of limitation and so much so when the tribunal is not seized of the power, the agreement by the parties acquiescing on their part cannot invest jurisdiction to such tribunal which was lacking inherently to exercise the jurisdiction. there is a fallacy in the argument of mr. cheema. all the three authorities, i.e., the chief settlement officer, chief settlement commissioner and the financial commissioner had the jurisdiction to deal with the complaint of the petitioner, but for their own reasons they did not try to interfere into the matter, holding that the civil litigation had already gone in favour of respondent gurdip singh; that the reference was uncalled for when the property does not belong to the compensation pool and that when the dispute purely rests between the private parties. the authorities relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners regarding the point of limitation deals with those cases where the property was still the part of compensation pool and some irregularities or illegalities came to the notice of the authorities for setting right the illegality committed in regard to the allotment of the property.12. on the contrary, shri n.b.s. gujral, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent no. 4, relied upon sucha singh and ors. v. gurdial singh and ors., 1977 p.l.j. 6; in which it has been held that although under section 24 of the displaced persons (compensation & rehabilitation) act no period of limitation is prescribed for invoking the revisional jurisdiction of chief settlement commissioner, yet it does not follow that persons can lie low for any length of time and invoke the revisional powers of the chief settlement commissioner after the lapse of several years. in the present case the complaint was moved after about 32 years to reopen the issue. i cannot lose sight of the fact that arazi mutalawa was filed by ujagar singh himself and he survived for several years and did not raise a finger about the alleged illegal transfer of the proprietary rights in favour of gurdip singh; so much so, he executed a power of attorney in favour of gurdip and later on executed a will in favour of the sons of gurdip singh. at no relevant time he has alleged that a fraud had been played upon him.13. the counsel shri cheema has also placed reliance on goru ram v. the secretary to government of india, rehabilitation department, new delhi and ors., 1977 p.l.j. 422; jagir singh v. the financial commissioner, punjab, chandigarh, and ors., 1975 p.l.j. 421; and submitted that any gift orally made by ujagar singh in favour of gurdip singh is a breach of conditions of allotment and is void and the subsequent conferment of the proprietary rights in the favour of the latter does not , vest a valid title in him, because the land which was allotted to ujagar singh was on quasi permanent basis till proprietary rights are conferred upon him. this authority is not helpful to mr. cheema. here in the cited case, the dispute was when the land was allotted on quasi permanent basis. gift was orally made in breach of the conditions of allotment and the donees were put in possession. in these circumstances that gift was held to be void. later on proprietary rights were conferred upon the original allottee. further it was held that the gift which was initially bad, does not revive in favour of the donees. in the present case ujagar singh himself gave consent to the transfer of the proprietary rights in favour of gurdip singh. he filed the affidavit. it was never objected to by ujagar singh till the time of his death. the petitioners have no locus standi to challenge the conferment of proprietary rights in favour of gurdip singh when it is not being objected to by the department. thus the authority of jagir singh's case (supra) stands on totally different footing.14. mr.cheema also placed reliance on chandev kishore v. bishan das and anr. (1990-2)98 p.l.r. 541; sham nath madan v. mohammad abdullah and ors.' air 1967 j & k 85; basti ram v. ved parkash and ors., air 1974 pb. & hr. 152; richpal singh and ors. v. dalip, air 1987 s.c. 2205; ram sarup v. ram chander, 1976 current law journal 103; and submitted that the principles of res judicata cannot operate against his clients because in the civil litigation the point in controversy was totally different. the conferment of proprietary rights in favour of gurdip singh was not the subject-matter in issue, as contained in exhibits r1 and r2 - the two judgments of the civil courts. moreover, that aspect of the case could not be tried by the civil courts, but was within the domain of the authorities under the displaced persons (compensation & rehabilitation) act.15. as against this, the learned counsel for the respondent (gurdip singh) relied upon state of karnataka and ors. v. b.s. nanjundaiah, jt 1996(1) s.c. 631; sharadchandra ganesh muley v. state of maharashtra and ors., j.t. 1995 (7) s.c. 317; and submitted that the present writ petition is barred by the principles of constructive res judicata. all the pleas now taken up by the petitioners in the present writ petition could have been taken by them in order to defeat the claim of the plaintiffs in the civil courts. the writ petitioners were well aware of the stand taken up by defendant gurdip singh in the suit which culminated into the judgment (exhibit r1) and, therefore, it is not open for the writ petitioners to say that the present writ petition is not barred by the principles of res judicata. i subscribe to the arguments raised by the learned counsel shri n.b.s.gujral because in para no. 3 of the judgment (r1) it is clearly pleaded by gurdip singh that ujagar singh had transferred his claim in his favour, as a result of which the land in suit was allotted in his name in lieu of the land left by ujagar singh in pakistan. the petitioners did not file any replication to controvert this aspect of the case. they were made well aware about the stand by gurdip singh. this aspect of the case was not challenged by smt. khichho, kartar singh or suresh kumar when the second suit no. 273 was filed and the judgment (exhibit r2) was passed which remained final upto the supreme court. the plea was very much open to the writ petitioners and they would be now precluded from raising those pleas which were open to them in the earlier litigation. after all i am supposed to give finality to the judgments and cannot allow the writ petitioners to reopen the matter after the expiry of three decades.16. learned counsel shri cheema also submitted that his writ petition cannot be dismissed on the ground that his clients did not make a mention about the earlier litigation in the writ petition when there is a reference of those litigations in exhibits p2 and p3, to the knowledge of the respondents. at the most it is a mistake on the part of the lawyer who drafted the writ petition. furthermore the present writ petitioners have not taken any advantage by non-inclusion of the averments regarding the dismissal of the earlier litigations. support was derived by shri cheema from bhagwana v. divisional canal officer and ors., air 1970 pb. hr. 539; sadhu ram v. gram panchayat pastana, 1984 p.l.j. 217. the submissions of shri cheema again do not cut ice. in my opinion, the non-mentioning of the earlier litigation tantamounts to the concealment of material facts. had the necessary and material averments been made in the writ petition, those might have been considered by the division bench which might have given a different decision against the petitioners. at one point of time the writ petition was dismissed by the division bench. later on the earlier order was recalled. the non-mentioning of material allegations in the writ petition itself entitles this court to dismiss the writ petition.17. last but not the least argument was raised by shri cheema that it may be taken that there is force in the writ petition when the division bench itself wanted to recall its order. shri cheema submitted that the division bench was satisfied about the prime facie illegalities committed by the chief settlement commissioner and the financial commissioner, who in the opinion of shri cheema, should be directed to re-write the order as the orders p2 and p3 have been written for extraneous reasons when both the authorities did not deal with all the arguments raised by the writ petitioners, though noted in the earlier parts of the impugned orders. the argument of shri cheema is devoid of any merit. everything would depend if this court holds that the orders p2 and p3 have passed by an authority not vested with the power. once that authority has passed the order after taking note of the arguments and the submissions raised by the parties, this court cannot comment in a convenient manner by saying that the chief settlement commissioner and the financial commissioner failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in them. a study of the orders p2 and p3 would show that those are the conscious orders. reasons have been, given as to why those authorities did not want to accept the suo moto reference of the managing officer. those authorities took care of every aspect of the case, such as that the property in dispute did not remain of compensation pool; that the civil courts have adjudicated the rights under the will in favour of the sons of gurdip singh; that there is delay and laches; that ujagar during his life time had given the consent for the transfer of the proprietary rights in favour of gurdip singh. in these circumstances no directions can be given to the chief settlement commissioner as well as to the financial commissioner to pass a more detailed order. i have already made a brief mention of the operative portions of these orders in the earlier part of this judgment.18. i have viewed the submissions raised by the learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioners in depth with the help of the case law referred to at the bar, but i am not in agreement to quash the orders p2 and p3, as is being prayed for by the writ petitioners.19. resultantly, i do not find any merit, in this writ petition and the same is hereby dismissed with no order as to costs.