Pritam Singh Vs. Paramjit Kaur - Court Judgment

SooperKanoon Citationsooperkanoon.com/627019
SubjectProperty
CourtPunjab and Haryana High Court
Decided OnSep-25-1996
Case NumberRegular Second Appeal No. 1382 of 1996
Judge G.C. Garg, J.
Reported in(1997)115PLR231
ActsSpecific Relief Act, 1963 - Sections 38 and 41
AppellantPritam Singh
RespondentParamjit Kaur
Appellant Advocate Vinod K. Kataria, Adv.
Respondent Advocate H.S. Kathuria, Adv.
DispositionAppeal allowed
Cases Referred and Sunil Kumar and Anr. v. Ram Parkash
Excerpt:
- administrative law - government contract: [vijender jain, c.j., rajive bhalla & sury kant, jj] government contract rejection of highest bid challenge as to held, state has no dominus status to dictate unilateral terms and conditions when it enters into contract. its actions must be reasonable, fair and just in consonance with rule of law. as a necessary corollary thereto, state cannot refuse to confirm highest bid without assigning any valid reason and/or by giving erratic, irrational or irrelevant reasons. the state is free to enter into a contract just like any other individual and the contract shall not change its legal character merely because other party to contract is state. though no citizen possesses a legal right to compel state to enter into a contract, yet latter can neither pick and choose any person arbitrarily for entering into such agreement nor can it discriminate between persons similarly circumstanced. similarly, where breach of contract at hands of state violates fundamental rights of a citizen or its refusal to enter into a contract is contrary to statutory provisions or public duty, judicial review of such state action is inevitable. likewise, if state enters into a contract in consonance with article 299 rights of the parties shall be determined by terms of such contract irrespective of fact that one of the parties to it is a state or a statutory authority. for these precise reasons the equitable doctrine of promissory estoppel has been made applicable against the government, as against any other private individual, even in cases where no valid contract in terms of article 299 was entered into between the parties. hence, if government makes a representation or a promise and an individual alters his position by acting upon such promise, the government may be required to make good that promise and shall not be allowed to fall back upon the formal defect in the contract, though subject to well known limitations like larger public interest. the state, thus, has no dominus status to dictate unilateral terms and conditions when it enters into contract and its actions must be reasonable, fair and just and in consonance with rule of law. as a necessary corollary thereto state cannot refuse to confirm highest bid without assigning any valid reason and/or by giving erratic, irrational or irrelevant reasons. -- consumer protection act, 1986 [c.a. no. 68/1986]. articles 14 & 300a: government contract noon-acceptance of highest bid held, it does not result in taking away right to property of highest bidder highest bid, per se, unless it is accepted by competent authority, and consequential sale certificate is issued, does not grant the highest bidder right to property of type which is protected under article 300a right to property is limited to confer highest bidder the right to challenge action of appropriate authority in refusing to accept highest or other bids. [air 1984 p&h 282 (fb) explained] articles 14 & 226: government contract rejection of highest bid held, highest bidder has locus standi to maintain writ petition and assail action of state government or its authorities by contending that his bid has been turned down for arbitrary, illegal or perverse reasons however in such matters, heavy onus would like on petitioner bidder to establish his allegations as state action shall always be presumed to be in accordance with law - he in support of his submission placed strong reliance on jujhar v.g.c. garg, j.1. paramjit kaur filed a suit against the defendant, her father, for permanent injunction restraining him from alienating the suit land in any manner without any legal necessity or to suffer any collusive decree on the ground that the defendant had assured her that he will give l/3rd property to her at the time of her marriage. the trial court by judgment and decree dated 16.2.1994 decreed the suit and restrained the defendant from alienating l/4th share belonging to the plaintiff or to suffer a collusive decree. appeal there-against was dismissed by the learned additional district judge by judgment and decree dated 8.2.1996. it is against this decree of the courts below that the present appeal has been preferred.2. learned counsel for the defendant-appellant submitted that a daughter has no right to seek an injunction against her father restraining him from alienating the suit properties, which are owned by him. he in support of his submission placed strong reliance on jujhar v. giani tarlok singh, (1987-1)91 p.l.r. 399 and sunil kumar and anr. v. ram parkash, (1988-2)94 p.l.r. 159 (s.c). mr. kathuria, learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent has not been able to bring to my notice any fact which may persuade me to take a different view. learned counsel had ultimately to concede that the land in dispute is owned by the appellant and plaintiff has no share therein either on account of purchase or inheritance. after hearing learned counsel for the parties, i am of the opinion that the suit as framed by the plaintiff-respondent was not competent. she could only file the suit, if at all, after alienation takes place and not for injuncting the owner of the property to effect sale thereof. this appeal is accordingly allowed, judgment and decree under appeal is set aside and the suit filed by the plaintiff is dismissed with no order as to costs.
Judgment:

G.C. Garg, J.

1. Paramjit Kaur filed a suit against the defendant, her father, for permanent injunction restraining him from alienating the suit land in any manner without any legal necessity or to suffer any collusive decree on the ground that the defendant had assured her that he will give l/3rd property to her at the time of her marriage. The trial Court by judgment and decree dated 16.2.1994 decreed the suit and restrained the defendant from alienating l/4th share belonging to the plaintiff or to suffer a collusive decree. Appeal there-against was dismissed by the learned Additional District Judge by judgment and decree dated 8.2.1996. It is against this decree of the Courts below that the present appeal has been preferred.

2. Learned counsel for the defendant-appellant submitted that a daughter has no right to seek an injunction against her father restraining him from alienating the suit properties, which are owned by him. He in support of his submission placed strong reliance on Jujhar v. Giani Tarlok Singh, (1987-1)91 P.L.R. 399 and Sunil Kumar and Anr. v. Ram Parkash, (1988-2)94 P.L.R. 159 (S.C). Mr. Kathuria, learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent has not been able to bring to my notice any fact which may persuade me to take a different view. Learned counsel had ultimately to concede that the land in dispute is owned by the appellant and plaintiff has no share therein either on account of purchase or inheritance. After hearing learned counsel for the parties, I am of the opinion that the suit as framed by the plaintiff-respondent was not competent. She could only file the suit, if at all, after alienation takes place and not for injuncting the owner of the property to effect sale thereof. This appeal is accordingly allowed, judgment and decree under appeal is set aside and the suit filed by the plaintiff is dismissed with no order as to costs.