The State of Haryana Through the Collector and anr. Vs. Jindal Strips Ltd. - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
- administrative law - government contract: [vijender jain, c.j., rajive bhalla & sury kant, jj] government contract rejection of highest bid challenge as to held, state has no dominus status to dictate unilateral terms and conditions when it enters into contract. its actions must be reasonable, fair and just in consonance with rule of law. as a necessary corollary thereto, state cannot refuse to confirm highest bid without assigning any valid reason and/or by giving erratic, irrational or irrelevant reasons. the state is free to enter into a contract just like any other individual and the contract shall not change its legal character merely because other party to contract is state. though no citizen possesses a legal right to compel state to enter into a contract, yet latter can neither pick and choose any person arbitrarily for entering into such agreement nor can it discriminate between persons similarly circumstanced. similarly, where breach of contract at hands of state violates fundamental rights of a citizen or its refusal to enter into a contract is contrary to statutory provisions or public duty, judicial review of such state action is inevitable. likewise, if state enters into a contract in consonance with article 299 rights of the parties shall be determined by terms of such contract irrespective of fact that one of the parties to it is a state or a statutory authority. for these precise reasons the equitable doctrine of promissory estoppel has been made applicable against the government, as against any other private individual, even in cases where no valid contract in terms of article 299 was entered into between the parties. hence, if government makes a representation or a promise and an individual alters his position by acting upon such promise, the government may be required to make good that promise and shall not be allowed to fall back upon the formal defect in the contract, though subject to well known limitations like larger public interest. the state, thus, has no dominus status to dictate unilateral terms and conditions when it enters into contract and its actions must be reasonable, fair and just and in consonance with rule of law. as a necessary corollary thereto state cannot refuse to confirm highest bid without assigning any valid reason and/or by giving erratic, irrational or irrelevant reasons. -- consumer protection act, 1986 [c.a. no. 68/1986]. articles 14 & 300a: government contract noon-acceptance of highest bid held, it does not result in taking away right to property of highest bidder highest bid, per se, unless it is accepted by competent authority, and consequential sale certificate is issued, does not grant the highest bidder right to property of type which is protected under article 300a right to property is limited to confer highest bidder the right to challenge action of appropriate authority in refusing to accept highest or other bids. [air 1984 p&h 282 (fb) explained] articles 14 & 226: government contract rejection of highest bid held, highest bidder has locus standi to maintain writ petition and assail action of state government or its authorities by contending that his bid has been turned down for arbitrary, illegal or perverse reasons however in such matters, heavy onus would like on petitioner bidder to establish his allegations as state action shall always be presumed to be in accordance with law - 1940 privy council 105. speaking for the bench, it was held, as under :it is settled law that the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil courts is not to be readily inferred, but that such-exclusion must either be explicitly expressed or clearly implied. it is also well settled that even if jurisdiction is so excluded, the civil courts have jurisdiction to examine into cases where the provisions of the act has not been complied with, or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure.v.s. aggarwal, j.1. the only question that craves for an answer is as to if in the facts of the present case the civil court had the jurisdiction to try a suit filed by the respondent.2. to appreciate the said controversy the necessary facts can easily be delineated. respondent owned a jeep bearing registration no. mpr 6763. on 12.10.1976, at about 5 p.m. the taxation officer intercepted the vehicle and found that the driver of the respondent was carrying 6 gas cylinders in the above-mentioned vehicle. he issued a detection memo to the driver and took the registration certificate of the vehicle into possession. the respondent was subsequently directed to deposit a sum of rs. 1250/- per annum as tax on the vehicle. respondent filed a civil suit before the learned subordinate judge, district hissar, seeking a declaration that the detection memo dated 12.10.1976 and the letter whereby the respondent was directed to pay goods tax were illegal and without jurisdiction. as a consequential relief, injunction was prayed to restrain the appellants from recovering the goods tax on the vehicle. it was asserted that the vehicle was never used for carrying goods on hire or reward.2. needless to say that the appellants contested the suit challenging the jurisdiction of the civil court to try the same. the assertions made by the respondent on facts were controverted.3. learned subordinate judge returned the findings that the civil court had no jurisdiction to try the suit. the same as such was dismissed. the findings of the learned subordinate judge were reversed by the learned additional judge, hisar on 21.2.1979 and it was concluded that detection memo dated 12.10.1976 and order dated 28.1.1977 are illegal and without jurisdiction. as an offshoot of these conclusions, appellants were further restrained from recovering the said tax from the respondent.4. learned counsel for the appellants vehemently urged that jurisdiction of the civil court is specifically barred and the learned additional district judge hisar was wrong in arriving at the findings to the contrary: to appreciate the controversy reference of some of the precedents cited at the bar would be advantageous. one of the earliest decision on the subject is of hon'ble lord thankerton in case secretary of state v. mask & co. a.i.r. 1940 privy council 105. speaking for the bench, it was held, as under :-'it is settled law that the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil courts is not to be readily inferred, but that such-exclusion must either be explicitly expressed or clearly implied. it is also well settled that even if jurisdiction is so excluded, the civil courts have jurisdiction to examine into cases where the provisions of the act has not been complied with, or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure.'5. to the same effect is the decision of the supreme court in the case of ram swarup and ors. v. shikar chand and anr., a.i.r. 1966 s.c. 893. in unambiguous terms, apex court concluded that the legislature by special acts can exclude jurisdiction of the civil courts to try certain suits which deal with subject matter. however, the statutory provisions must expressly provide for such exclusion and lead to that inference. it was still concluded that where what is sought to prove is that impugned order is a nullity, the jurisdiction of the civil courts would not be barred.6. the subsequent decision in the case of dhulabhai etc. v. state of madhya pradesh, reported as a.i.r. 1969 s.c. 78 comes close at heels to the earlier decision referred to above. the supreme court provided 7 guide-lines and concluded that where finality is given to the orders of the special tribunals the jurisdiction of the civil courts to try the suit should be barred. but once again the conclusions were that jurisdiction of the particular act have not been complied with or it had not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure.7. conclusions are inescapable that if the act of the appellants was without jurisdiction the civil court had the jurisdiction to try the suit.8. on the touchstone of the aforesaid, it is in the fitness of things to have a glance at the provisions of the punjab passengers and goods taxation act, 1952 (hereinafter described as an 'act'). section 2(i) defines 'motor vehicle' to be a vehicle used for the carriage of passengers or goods or a trailer when attached to any such vehicle and includes a motor vehicles used for the carriage of passengers or goods or both for hire or reward in contravention of the provisions of the motor vehicles act, 1939. for purposes of the act, a motor vehicle must be used for the carriage of passengers or of goods on hire or reward before it can fall within the mischief of the provisions of the act. section 4 of the act provides for the method of collection of tax, but section 20 unfolds itself in the following words :-'section 20. exclusion of jurisdiction of civil courts :- no civil court shall have jurisdiction in any matter, which the state government or any prescribed authority is empowered by this act or the rules made thereunder to dispose of or take cognizance of, and regarding the manner in which the state government or any prescribed authority exercise any powers vested in it or him by or under this act or rules made thereunder'.9. on the strength of section 20 of the act, reproduced above, appellants' learned counsel intends to bring home the fact that jurisdiction of civil courts to try the suit is barred. no doubt the provisions at the first blush show that legislature provided for excluding the jurisdiction of the civil court and in addition to that one can hasten to add that even remedy is provided by way of an appeal under section 15 and revision under section 16 of the act.10. does the exclude the jurisdiction of the civil court absolutely? the answer in the facts of the case is in negative because of the principles of law quoted above. if the order passed or action contemplated is without jurisdiction the civil court has the jurisdiction to entertain the suit.11. as already noted above, tax can be imposed on motor vehicle as defined under section 2(i) of the act. it does not include private carriers. the term private carriers implies that goods or passengers are not carried for hire or reward. findings of fact have been arrived at by the learned additional district judge that gas cylinders at the relevant time were not being carried for hire or reward but for personal use. not only it is the finding of fact which cannot be disturbed, but i find no reason to take a view to the contrary. in other words, it must be held that the gas cylinders were not being carried for hire or reward but for personal use. it was a private carrier. once such a conclusion is arrived at that it was a private carrier and that goods were not being carried for hire or re-award, the threatened action of the appellants must be held to, be without jurisdiction. the civil court in that light of the matter had the jurisdiction to try the suit. the findings of the 1st appellate court (additional district judge, hisar), therefore, must be affirmed.12. no other point was urged before this court.13. for the reasons recorded above, the appeal being without merits, fails and is dismissed with costs.