SooperKanoon Citation | sooperkanoon.com/626434 |
Subject | Property |
Court | Punjab and Haryana High Court |
Decided On | Oct-19-1993 |
Case Number | Regular Second Appeal No. 2631 of 1979 |
Judge | V.K. Bali, J. |
Reported in | (1994)108PLR644 |
Acts | Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913 - Sections 15(1) and 15(2) |
Appellant | Mangtu Ram |
Respondent | Rohtash and ors. |
Appellant Advocate | Hemant Kumar Gupta, Adv. |
Respondent Advocate | Arun Jain, Adv. |
Disposition | Appeal allowed |
Cases Referred | Nand Kishore v. Avtar Singh
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Excerpt:
- administrative law - government contract: [vijender jain, c.j., rajive bhalla & sury kant, jj] government contract rejection of highest bid challenge as to held, state has no dominus status to dictate unilateral terms and conditions when it enters into contract. its actions must be reasonable, fair and just in consonance with rule of law. as a necessary corollary thereto, state cannot refuse to confirm highest bid without assigning any valid reason and/or by giving erratic, irrational or irrelevant reasons. the state is free to enter into a contract just like any other individual and the contract shall not change its legal character merely because other party to contract is state. though no citizen possesses a legal right to compel state to enter into a contract, yet latter can neither pick and choose any person arbitrarily for entering into such agreement nor can it discriminate between persons similarly circumstanced. similarly, where breach of contract at hands of state violates fundamental rights of a citizen or its refusal to enter into a contract is contrary to statutory provisions or public duty, judicial review of such state action is inevitable. likewise, if state enters into a contract in consonance with article 299 rights of the parties shall be determined by terms of such contract irrespective of fact that one of the parties to it is a state or a statutory authority. for these precise reasons the equitable doctrine of promissory estoppel has been made applicable against the government, as against any other private individual, even in cases where no valid contract in terms of article 299 was entered into between the parties. hence, if government makes a representation or a promise and an individual alters his position by acting upon such promise, the government may be required to make good that promise and shall not be allowed to fall back upon the formal defect in the contract, though subject to well known limitations like larger public interest. the state, thus, has no dominus status to dictate unilateral terms and conditions when it enters into contract and its actions must be reasonable, fair and just and in consonance with rule of law. as a necessary corollary thereto state cannot refuse to confirm highest bid without assigning any valid reason and/or by giving erratic, irrational or irrelevant reasons. -- consumer protection act, 1986 [c.a. no. 68/1986]. articles 14 & 300a: government contract noon-acceptance of highest bid held, it does not result in taking away right to property of highest bidder highest bid, per se, unless it is accepted by competent authority, and consequential sale certificate is issued, does not grant the highest bidder right to property of type which is protected under article 300a right to property is limited to confer highest bidder the right to challenge action of appropriate authority in refusing to accept highest or other bids. [air 1984 p&h 282 (fb) explained]
articles 14 & 226: government contract rejection of highest bid held, highest bidder has locus standi to maintain writ petition and assail action of state government or its authorities by contending that his bid has been turned down for arbitrary, illegal or perverse reasons however in such matters, heavy onus would like on petitioner bidder to establish his allegations as state action shall always be presumed to be in accordance with lawv.k. bali, j.1. plaintiff-appellant, mangtu ram vide suit giving rise to the present appeal, sought to pre-empt the land sold by smt. bholi wife of shri gajanand. the sale aforesaid was effected by the vendor on may 7, 1970 and the land was purchased by respondents rohtas and others. staking his superior right, appellant pleaded that he was not only related to the vendor but was also tenant as also co-sharer in the land in dispute. in as much as the sale was effected by female, the trial court came tothe conclusion that the same could not be pre-empted by appellant as the matter was covered under section 15(2) of the punjab pre-emption act. in appeal, the findings of the trial court were confirmed by the first appellate court. aggrieved, appellant has filed this regular second appeal challenging the judgment and decrees passed by the court below.2. the matter seems to be covered in favour of appellant by decision of this court in mange ram v. tulsi ram and ors., 1989 p.l.j. 207 wherein it was held that 'when a sale is made by a female or a male, a co-sharer is entitled to pre-empt the sale made by bothunder section 15(1) as also section 15(2). section 15(1) was an exception to it when sale was made by a female, who had succeeded the land through her husband or through her son, in case the son had inherited the land from his father or was of land which she had succeeded through her father or brother. the right of per-emption under both the circumstances was given to certain named relations. the right of pre-emption under section 15(2) of the act had been struck down with the result that tands wiped out and under section 15(1) of the act, as stated by the supreme court in nand kishore v. avtar singh, 1988 p.l.j. 47, the pre-emptor as a co-sharer is entitled to pre-empt the entire sale.'3. as the matter is squarely covered in favour of the appellant by virtue of the judgment, referred to above, this appeal is allowed. the suit of plaintiff for possession by way of pre-emption is decreed subject to his depositing sale consideration alongwith registration charges within a period of two months from today, failing which the suit shall be deemed to have been dismissed. however, in view of the change in law during the pendency of this appeal, the parties are left to bear own costs.
Judgment:V.K. Bali, J.
1. Plaintiff-appellant, Mangtu Ram vide suit giving rise to the present appeal, sought to pre-empt the land sold by Smt. Bholi wife of Shri Gajanand. The sale aforesaid was effected by the vendor on May 7, 1970 and the land was purchased by respondents Rohtas and others. Staking his superior right, appellant pleaded that he was not only related to the vendor but was also tenant as also co-sharer in the land in dispute. In as much as the sale was effected by female, the trial court came tothe conclusion that the same could not be pre-empted by appellant as the matter was covered under Section 15(2) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act. In appeal, the findings of the trial Court were confirmed by the first Appellate Court. Aggrieved, appellant has filed this Regular Second Appeal challenging the judgment and decrees passed by the court below.
2. The matter seems to be covered in favour of appellant by decision of this court in Mange Ram v. Tulsi Ram and Ors., 1989 P.L.J. 207 wherein it was held that 'when a sale is made by a female or a male, a co-sharer is entitled to pre-empt the sale made by bothunder Section 15(1) as also Section 15(2). Section 15(1) was an exception to it when sale was made by a female, who had succeeded the land through her husband or through her son, in case the son had inherited the land from his father or was of land which she had succeeded through her father or brother. The right of per-emption under both the circumstances was given to certain named relations. The right of pre-emption under Section 15(2) of the Act had been struck down with the result that tands wiped out and under Section 15(1) of the Act, as stated by the Supreme Court in Nand Kishore v. Avtar Singh, 1988 P.L.J. 47, the pre-emptor as a co-sharer is entitled to pre-empt the entire sale.'
3. As the matter is squarely covered in favour of the appellant by virtue of the judgment, referred to above, this appeal is allowed. The suit of plaintiff for possession by way of pre-emption is decreed subject to his depositing sale consideration alongwith registration charges within a period of two months from today, failing which the suit shall be deemed to have been dismissed. However, in view of the change in law during the pendency of this appeal, the parties are left to bear own costs.