Sh. Chet Ram and ors. Vs. the State of Haryana and ors. - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
- administrative law - government contract: [vijender jain, c.j., rajive bhalla & sury kant, jj] government contract rejection of highest bid challenge as to held, state has no dominus status to dictate unilateral terms and conditions when it enters into contract. its actions must be reasonable, fair and just in consonance with rule of law. as a necessary corollary thereto, state cannot refuse to confirm highest bid without assigning any valid reason and/or by giving erratic, irrational or irrelevant reasons. the state is free to enter into a contract just like any other individual and the contract shall not change its legal character merely because other party to contract is state. though no citizen possesses a legal right to compel state to enter into a contract, yet latter can neither pick and choose any person arbitrarily for entering into such agreement nor can it discriminate between persons similarly circumstanced. similarly, where breach of contract at hands of state violates fundamental rights of a citizen or its refusal to enter into a contract is contrary to statutory provisions or public duty, judicial review of such state action is inevitable. likewise, if state enters into a contract in consonance with article 299 rights of the parties shall be determined by terms of such contract irrespective of fact that one of the parties to it is a state or a statutory authority. for these precise reasons the equitable doctrine of promissory estoppel has been made applicable against the government, as against any other private individual, even in cases where no valid contract in terms of article 299 was entered into between the parties. hence, if government makes a representation or a promise and an individual alters his position by acting upon such promise, the government may be required to make good that promise and shall not be allowed to fall back upon the formal defect in the contract, though subject to well known limitations like larger public interest. the state, thus, has no dominus status to dictate unilateral terms and conditions when it enters into contract and its actions must be reasonable, fair and just and in consonance with rule of law. as a necessary corollary thereto state cannot refuse to confirm highest bid without assigning any valid reason and/or by giving erratic, irrational or irrelevant reasons. -- consumer protection act, 1986 [c.a. no. 68/1986]. articles 14 & 300a: government contract noon-acceptance of highest bid held, it does not result in taking away right to property of highest bidder highest bid, per se, unless it is accepted by competent authority, and consequential sale certificate is issued, does not grant the highest bidder right to property of type which is protected under article 300a right to property is limited to confer highest bidder the right to challenge action of appropriate authority in refusing to accept highest or other bids. [air 1984 p&h 282 (fb) explained] articles 14 & 226: government contract rejection of highest bid held, highest bidder has locus standi to maintain writ petition and assail action of state government or its authorities by contending that his bid has been turned down for arbitrary, illegal or perverse reasons however in such matters, heavy onus would like on petitioner bidder to establish his allegations as state action shall always be presumed to be in accordance with law - 1. the efforts of the petitioners for persuading the authorities to make a reference having failed and the notice sent by them having elicited no response, they have approached this court through the present writ petition.jawahar lal gupta, j.1. the petitioners seek a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents to forward their application under section 18 of the land acquisition act, 1894 to the land acquisition court for determination of their entitlement to compensation. admittedly, their land was acquired vide notification dated september 26, 1972 which was published in the government gazette dated october 3, 1972. it appears that the collector gave the award on january 10, 1973. aggrieved against the award, the petitioners submitted a petition under section 18 of the act on february 13, 1973. a copy of this petition has been produced on record as annexure p-1. their request for a reference to the court was declined vide order dated september 19, 1973 on the ground that the application had been received in the office of the land acquisition collector on february 22, 1973. a copy of this order with the written statement is annexure r.1. the efforts of the petitioners for persuading the authorities to make a reference having failed and the notice sent by them having elicited no response, they have approached this court through the present writ petition. 2. in the written statement filed on behalf of the respondents it has been averred that the intimation had been sent to the petitioners regarding the rejection of their request for making of the reference on the ground of limitation vide letters dated september 19, 1973 and january 10, 1978. in this situation, the respondents claim that a reference as prayed for by the petitioners cannot be made. 3. it is surprising that even though the respondents claim that the petitioners were conveyed the decision vide letters dated september 19, 1973 and january 10, 1978, yet no objection regarding delay has been raised in the written statement. in this situation, it appears extremely doubtful if the decision had actually been conveyed to the petitioners. 4. mr. mahesh grover, learned counsel for the petitioners contends that the application having been sent on february 13, 1973, was actually within limitation. the mere fact that it was received in the office of the collector on february 22, 1973, viz. a day after the expiry of the period of limitation, should not dis-en-title the petitioners to have their claim adjudicated upon. the learned counsel has placed reliance on the decision of d.k. mahajan, j. in dalip singh v. the land acquisition collector drainage department, amritsar, 1974 p.l.j. 17. in this case following the decision of the madras high court in ranganathan v. revenue divisional officer pattukottai, 1971 madras law journal 167, his lordship was pleased to hold that the application sent by post within the period of limitation could not be rejected on the ground that it had been received after the expiry of the period of limitation.5. respectfully following the view taken by his lordships, i allow this writ petition. the respondents are directed to forward the application under section 18 submitted by the petitioners to the appropriate court for decision within one month from the receipt of a certified copy of this order. since ho one has appeared on behalf of the respondent i make no order as to costs.