Sanjeev Kumar Vs. Bittu @ Jagroop Singh and ors. - Court Judgment

SooperKanoon Citationsooperkanoon.com/626222
SubjectMotor Vehicles
CourtPunjab and Haryana High Court
Decided OnApr-30-2009
Judge A.N. Jindal, J.
Reported in(2009)155PLR446
AppellantSanjeev Kumar
RespondentBittu @ Jagroop Singh and ors.
Cases ReferredAdarwati and Anr. v. Mohan Lal and Ors.
Excerpt:
- administrative law - government contract: [vijender jain, c.j., rajive bhalla & sury kant, jj] government contract rejection of highest bid challenge as to held, state has no dominus status to dictate unilateral terms and conditions when it enters into contract. its actions must be reasonable, fair and just in consonance with rule of law. as a necessary corollary thereto, state cannot refuse to confirm highest bid without assigning any valid reason and/or by giving erratic, irrational or irrelevant reasons. the state is free to enter into a contract just like any other individual and the contract shall not change its legal character merely because other party to contract is state. though no citizen possesses a legal right to compel state to enter into a contract, yet latter can neither pick and choose any person arbitrarily for entering into such agreement nor can it discriminate between persons similarly circumstanced. similarly, where breach of contract at hands of state violates fundamental rights of a citizen or its refusal to enter into a contract is contrary to statutory provisions or public duty, judicial review of such state action is inevitable. likewise, if state enters into a contract in consonance with article 299 rights of the parties shall be determined by terms of such contract irrespective of fact that one of the parties to it is a state or a statutory authority. for these precise reasons the equitable doctrine of promissory estoppel has been made applicable against the government, as against any other private individual, even in cases where no valid contract in terms of article 299 was entered into between the parties. hence, if government makes a representation or a promise and an individual alters his position by acting upon such promise, the government may be required to make good that promise and shall not be allowed to fall back upon the formal defect in the contract, though subject to well known limitations like larger public interest. the state, thus, has no dominus status to dictate unilateral terms and conditions when it enters into contract and its actions must be reasonable, fair and just and in consonance with rule of law. as a necessary corollary thereto state cannot refuse to confirm highest bid without assigning any valid reason and/or by giving erratic, irrational or irrelevant reasons. -- consumer protection act, 1986 [c.a. no. 68/1986]. articles 14 & 300a: government contract noon-acceptance of highest bid held, it does not result in taking away right to property of highest bidder highest bid, per se, unless it is accepted by competent authority, and consequential sale certificate is issued, does not grant the highest bidder right to property of type which is protected under article 300a right to property is limited to confer highest bidder the right to challenge action of appropriate authority in refusing to accept highest or other bids. [air 1984 p&h 282 (fb) explained] articles 14 & 226: government contract rejection of highest bid held, highest bidder has locus standi to maintain writ petition and assail action of state government or its authorities by contending that his bid has been turned down for arbitrary, illegal or perverse reasons however in such matters, heavy onus would like on petitioner bidder to establish his allegations as state action shall always be presumed to be in accordance with law - 4. the law commission in its 119th report had, recommended that every application for a claim be made to the claims tribunal having jurisdiction over the area in which the accident occurred or to the claims tribunal within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the claimant resides or carries on business or within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the defendant resides, at the option of the claimant.a.n. jindal, j.1. this revision petition has arisen out of the order dated 8.4.2008 passed by the motor accident claims tribunal, chandigarh, whereby the tribunal observed that the tribunal at chandigarh has no jurisdiction to try the petition.2. admittedly the accident in the case took place on 10.10.2004, near village manakpur, tehsil kharar, consequently he was admitted in p.g.i. chandigarh from 11.11.2004 to 20.12.2004. the case of the petitioner is that after he recovered from the injuries, he was shifted to house no. 757, sector 22-a, chandigarh owned by rajinder singh. thereafter, he was again admitted in p.g.i. chandigarh on 31.5.2005 and discharged on 12.7.2005. the petitioner has alleged that since he is residing permanently in house no. 757, sector 22-a, chandigarh and he owns a factory there where he is working, as such in view of the amendment in section 166(2) of the act, the claim petition could be filed within the jurisdiction of the tribunal in which the accident occurred or within the local limits of the jurisdiction where the petitioner resides, therefore, the tribunal fell in error while observing that the petitioner should have established that he was residing within the jurisdiction of the court at chandigarh at the time of accident and not thereafter.3. heard.4. the provisions regarding the compensation have been incorporated into this benevolent legislation for extending benefit to those who suffered from the accidents. prior to 1994, there was nothing in the act that the claim petition could be filed at a place where the petitioner resides. for the first time section 166 of the act has been amended by substituting sub-section 2 to it as per motor vehicle (amendment) act, 1994 (no. 54 of 1995) in view of the objects and reasons therefor, para no. 4 of which reads as under:4. the law commission in its 119th report had, recommended that every application for a claim be made to the claims tribunal having jurisdiction over the area in which the accident occurred or to the claims tribunal within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the claimant resides or carries on business or within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the defendant resides, at the option of the claimant. the bill also makes necessary provision to give effect to the said recommendation.5. this was a special concession made to the claimants looking to the circumstances that it would be most inconvenient to drive a claimant to place where the accident occurred or where he normally resides or carries on his business within the local limit of tribunal. this option was given to the claimant with a view to facilitate justice and was made by way of departure from the normal rule. now by way of amendment, the tribunals at the following places were conferred with the jurisdiction to try the claim petitions:1. where the accident occurred; or2. within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the claimant resides or carries oh his business; or3. within the local limit whose jurisdiction the defendant resides or carries his business.now word 'or' separates the three clauses and clear grammatical construction would be that the petitioner could choose either of the three for getting the option. the legislature gave them benefit of option in the second clause by going out of the way. the word 'residence' has been held to denote place where a person eats, drinks and sleeps or where his family or servant eat, drink and sleep.6. the court is to see this benevolent legislation keeping in view the extra care of the person suffering from the accident. neither the legislature ever intended to construe that the court is to see the permanent and actual residence at the time of the accident, therefore, the words 'resides' cannot be so strictly be construed to mean the residence at the time of accident but he is to prove his residence at the time of filing the petition. the positive testimony of the petitioner that he remained admitted in p.g.i. chandigarh and thereafter he was residing in a house at chandigarh and is working in a factory, therefore, this testimony should have been believed in the absence of any evidence to the contrary. not only this, his testimony stands corroborated by the other witness namely rajinder singh owner of the house. similar view was taken in case adarwati and anr. v. mohan lal and ors. : 2001 a.c.j. 1992. the trial court appears to have taken strict view of the fact that the court was to examine his residence at the time of accident, which to my mind is not correct and needs interference of this court.7. resultantly, this petition is accepted, impugned order is set aside and the issue is decided in favour of the petitioner and the case is remitted back to the motor accident claims tribunal, chandigarh for proceeding in accordance with law. parties are directed to appear before the tribunal at chandigarh on 25.5.2009.
Judgment:

A.N. Jindal, J.

1. This revision petition has arisen out of the order dated 8.4.2008 passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Chandigarh, whereby the Tribunal observed that the Tribunal at Chandigarh has no jurisdiction to try the petition.

2. Admittedly the accident in the case took place on 10.10.2004, near village Manakpur, Tehsil Kharar, consequently he was admitted in P.G.I. Chandigarh from 11.11.2004 to 20.12.2004. The case of the petitioner is that after he recovered from the injuries, he was shifted to House No. 757, Sector 22-A, Chandigarh owned by Rajinder Singh. Thereafter, he was again admitted in P.G.I. Chandigarh on 31.5.2005 and discharged on 12.7.2005. The petitioner has alleged that since he is residing permanently in House No. 757, Sector 22-A, Chandigarh and he owns a factory there where he is working, as such in view of the amendment in Section 166(2) of the Act, the claim petition could be filed within the jurisdiction of the tribunal in which the accident occurred or within the local limits of the jurisdiction where the petitioner resides, therefore, the tribunal fell in error while observing that the petitioner should have established that he was residing within the jurisdiction of the court at Chandigarh at the time of accident and not thereafter.

3. Heard.

4. The provisions regarding the compensation have been incorporated into this benevolent legislation for extending benefit to those who suffered from the accidents. Prior to 1994, there was nothing in the Act that the claim petition could be filed at a place where the petitioner resides. For the first time Section 166 of the Act has been amended by substituting sub-section 2 to it as per Motor Vehicle (Amendment) Act, 1994 (No. 54 of 1995) in view of the objects and reasons therefor, para No. 4 of which reads as under:

4. The Law Commission in its 119th Report had, recommended that every application for a claim be made to the Claims Tribunal having jurisdiction over the area in which the accident occurred or to the Claims Tribunal within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the claimant resides or carries on business or within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the defendant resides, at the option of the claimant. The Bill also makes necessary provision to give effect to the said recommendation.

5. This was a special concession made to the claimants looking to the circumstances that it would be most inconvenient to drive a claimant to place where the accident occurred or where he normally resides or carries on his business within the local limit of tribunal. This option was given to the claimant with a view to facilitate justice and was made by way of departure from the normal rule. Now by way of amendment, the tribunals at the following places were conferred with the jurisdiction to try the claim petitions:

1. where the accident occurred; or

2. within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the claimant resides or carries oh his business; or

3. within the local limit whose jurisdiction the defendant resides or carries his business.

Now word 'or' separates the three clauses and clear grammatical construction would be that the petitioner could choose either of the three for getting the option. The legislature gave them benefit of option in the second clause by going out of the way. The word 'residence' has been held to denote place where a person eats, drinks and sleeps or where his family or servant eat, drink and sleep.

6. The court is to see this benevolent legislation keeping in view the extra care of the person suffering from the accident. Neither the legislature ever intended to construe that the court is to see the permanent and actual residence at the time of the accident, therefore, the words 'resides' cannot be so strictly be construed to mean the residence at the time of accident but he is to prove his residence at the time of filing the petition. The positive testimony of the petitioner that he remained admitted in P.G.I. Chandigarh and thereafter he was residing in a house at Chandigarh and is working in a factory, therefore, this testimony should have been believed in the absence of any evidence to the contrary. Not only this, his testimony stands corroborated by the other witness namely Rajinder Singh owner of the house. Similar view was taken in case Adarwati and Anr. v. Mohan Lal and Ors. : 2001 A.C.J. 1992. The trial court appears to have taken strict view of the fact that the court was to examine his residence at the time of accident, which to my mind is not correct and needs interference of this Court.

7. Resultantly, this petition is accepted, impugned order is set aside and the issue is decided in favour of the petitioner and the case is remitted back to the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Chandigarh for proceeding in accordance with law. Parties are directed to appear before the Tribunal at Chandigarh on 25.5.2009.