Mahavir Singh Sarpanch Vs. State of Haryana and ors. - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
- administrative law - government contract: [vijender jain, c.j., rajive bhalla & sury kant, jj] government contract rejection of highest bid challenge as to held, state has no dominus status to dictate unilateral terms and conditions when it enters into contract. its actions must be reasonable, fair and just in consonance with rule of law. as a necessary corollary thereto, state cannot refuse to confirm highest bid without assigning any valid reason and/or by giving erratic, irrational or irrelevant reasons. the state is free to enter into a contract just like any other individual and the contract shall not change its legal character merely because other party to contract is state. though no citizen possesses a legal right to compel state to enter into a contract, yet latter can neither pick and choose any person arbitrarily for entering into such agreement nor can it discriminate between persons similarly circumstanced. similarly, where breach of contract at hands of state violates fundamental rights of a citizen or its refusal to enter into a contract is contrary to statutory provisions or public duty, judicial review of such state action is inevitable. likewise, if state enters into a contract in consonance with article 299 rights of the parties shall be determined by terms of such contract irrespective of fact that one of the parties to it is a state or a statutory authority. for these precise reasons the equitable doctrine of promissory estoppel has been made applicable against the government, as against any other private individual, even in cases where no valid contract in terms of article 299 was entered into between the parties. hence, if government makes a representation or a promise and an individual alters his position by acting upon such promise, the government may be required to make good that promise and shall not be allowed to fall back upon the formal defect in the contract, though subject to well known limitations like larger public interest. the state, thus, has no dominus status to dictate unilateral terms and conditions when it enters into contract and its actions must be reasonable, fair and just and in consonance with rule of law. as a necessary corollary thereto state cannot refuse to confirm highest bid without assigning any valid reason and/or by giving erratic, irrational or irrelevant reasons. -- consumer protection act, 1986 [c.a. no. 68/1986]. articles 14 & 300a: government contract noon-acceptance of highest bid held, it does not result in taking away right to property of highest bidder highest bid, per se, unless it is accepted by competent authority, and consequential sale certificate is issued, does not grant the highest bidder right to property of type which is protected under article 300a right to property is limited to confer highest bidder the right to challenge action of appropriate authority in refusing to accept highest or other bids. [air 1984 p&h 282 (fb) explained] articles 14 & 226: government contract rejection of highest bid held, highest bidder has locus standi to maintain writ petition and assail action of state government or its authorities by contending that his bid has been turned down for arbitrary, illegal or perverse reasons however in such matters, heavy onus would like on petitioner bidder to establish his allegations as state action shall always be presumed to be in accordance with law - he further submitted that both the above referred to authorities cited on behalf of the petitioner are not applicable to the facts of the present case and are clearly distinguishable. it has been clearly laid down in the said authorities that the complainant has no right to be heard when the order of suspension is to be revoked.r.s. mongia, j. 1. petitioner was elected as sarpanch of gram panchayat, adhyana, tehsil and district panipat in the elections held in december, 1991. respondents nos. 4 to 7 made a complaint against the petitioner that he had misused the office as sarpanch and committed many irregularities. a regular enquiry was ordered on 26th february, 1992 against the petitioner under section 102(2) of the punjab gram panchayat act, 1952 by the director, panchayats, haryana and additional deputy commissioner, panipat was appointed as enquiry officer. simultaneously director, panchayats, haryana passed an order placing the petitioner under suspension. against the order of suspension, petitioner filed an appeal under section 102(5) of the act before the commissioner and secretary to government haryana, panchayats department, haryana. the appellate authority granted stay of the operation of the order of suspension. the appeal is still pending before the appellate authority.2. respondents no. 4 to 7 filed an application under order 1 rule 10 of the civil procedure code before the appellate authority for being impleaded as parties in the appeal filed by the petitioner. vide order dated 26th may, 1992 the said application of respondents no. 4 to 7 was allowed by the appellate authority and they were ordered to be impleaded as respondents in the appeal. a copy of the order has been attached as annexure p-4 to the writ petition. it is this order that has been impugned in the present writ petition.3. notice of motion was issued to the respondents. written statement has been filed on behalf of respondents no. 1, 2 and 3. notice of motion was issued to the respondents. written statement has been filed on behalf of respondents no. 1,2 and 3.4. shri s.k. sud, advocate has put in appearance on behalf of respondents no. 4 to 7.5. we considered it appropriate on the facts and circumstances of the case to dispose of the writ petition at the motion stage itself. consequently, we heard counsel for the parties at length.6. learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that a complainant has no legal or vested right to get an order of suspension of a sarpanch passed by a director and consequently if an order of suspension is passed, the complainant has no locus standi to be heard before an order of suspension is revoked by the same authority or by the appellate authority. according to the learned counsel, suspending a sarpanch is purely a discretion vested in the director of panchayats. the complainant does not come into the picture at all, when an enquiry is initiated on the basis of a complaint. the complainant only furnishes material to the competent authority to take action against a particular panch or a sarpanch and after that is done, it is for the director to act on the basis of that complaint. in support of his submission, learned counsel relied upon a full bench judgment of this court in saktu ram v. the state of haryana and ors.,1 (1988-2) 94 p.l.r. 65 (f.b.), and ram saroop v. the director of panchayats, haryana chandigarh and ors.,2 1983 p.l.j. 350. in ram saroop's case (supra), division bench of this court had held that notice of hearing to the informant on whose complaint a sarpanch had been suspended was not necessary when the order of suspension was being revoked. it was observed that informant is not a party to lis or an aggrieved party. this view of the division bench has been upheld by the full bench in saktu ram's case (supra). it was held by the full bench that both at the stage of making original order of suspension and at the stage of revocation of order of suspension no notice need be given to either the accused officer at the first stage or the complainant at the second stage.7. on the other hand, learned counsel for respondents no. 4 to 7 submitted that the complainants are interested persons in the proceedings against the sarpanch as they being the residents of the village are interested that the sarpanch should not abuse his power but should act in accordance with law for the benefit and welfare of the villagers. therefore, the complainant if not necessary are at least proper parties in the entire proceedings including suspension against the sarpanch arising out of the complaint against him. he further submitted that both the above referred to authorities cited on behalf of the petitioner are not applicable to the facts of the present case and are clearly distinguishable. according to him, in those cases, after suspension order of the sarpanch had been passed by the director of panchayats, the same was revoked without hearing the complainants on whose complaint the sarpanch had been suspended. according to the learned counsel, it was in those circumstances held in the above mentioned authorities that the complainants had no right to be heard before the order of suspension was revoked by the director. learned counsel argued that in the present case, it was at the appellate stage that the complainants were impleaded as parties so that they could assist the appellate authority that the order of suspension passed against the petitioner by the director of panchayats should not be set aside.8. we are of the view that the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner must prevail. under the act the complainant cannot ask as of right to suspend the panch or sarpanch pending enquiry. even if the director suspends a sarpanch on the basis of complaint, it cannot be treated as a relief granted to the complainant or complainants. the complainant is just an informant to the director a particular state of affairs and it is on the basis of that material that the power of suspension which vests in the director can be exercised on his own volition. the complainant does not come into picture at all when the enquiry is initiated on the basis of a complaint. the complainant has no locus standi to be heard regarding the matter of suspension of a sarpanch or the revocation thereof. the complainant is not a necessary or even a proper party in the proceedings which are initiated on the basis of a complaint including suspension of the sarpanch.9. we do not agree with the learned counsel for the respondents no. 4 to 7 that on the facts and circumstances of the case, the above referred to authorities of this court are distinguishable. it has been clearly laid down in the said authorities that the complainant has no right to be heard when the order of suspension is to be revoked. it would hardly make any difference when the question of revocation is being considered by the director himself or by the appellate authority. the appellate authority can also set aside the order of suspension but the complainant has no right to be heard at any stage of revocation of the order of suspension.10. in light of the above discussion, we are of the considered view that the impugned order of the appellate authority dated 26th may, 1992, annexure p-4 impleading respondents no. 4 to 7 as parties in appeal is unsustainable in law and is liable to be quashed.11. for the foregoing reasons, we allow this writ petition and set aside the impugned order dated 26th may, 1992 (annexure p-4) and direct the appellate authority-respondent no. 2 to decide the appeal as presented by the petitioner without impleading respondents no. 4 to 7 as parties and without (respondents no. 4 to 7) or anybody on their behalf, an opportunity of being heard. we make no order as to costs.