Hirda Ram Vs. Narinder Singh - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
- administrative law - government contract: [vijender jain, c.j., rajive bhalla & sury kant, jj] government contract rejection of highest bid challenge as to held, state has no dominus status to dictate unilateral terms and conditions when it enters into contract. its actions must be reasonable, fair and just in consonance with rule of law. as a necessary corollary thereto, state cannot refuse to confirm highest bid without assigning any valid reason and/or by giving erratic, irrational or irrelevant reasons. the state is free to enter into a contract just like any other individual and the contract shall not change its legal character merely because other party to contract is state. though no citizen possesses a legal right to compel state to enter into a contract, yet latter can neither pick and choose any person arbitrarily for entering into such agreement nor can it discriminate between persons similarly circumstanced. similarly, where breach of contract at hands of state violates fundamental rights of a citizen or its refusal to enter into a contract is contrary to statutory provisions or public duty, judicial review of such state action is inevitable. likewise, if state enters into a contract in consonance with article 299 rights of the parties shall be determined by terms of such contract irrespective of fact that one of the parties to it is a state or a statutory authority. for these precise reasons the equitable doctrine of promissory estoppel has been made applicable against the government, as against any other private individual, even in cases where no valid contract in terms of article 299 was entered into between the parties. hence, if government makes a representation or a promise and an individual alters his position by acting upon such promise, the government may be required to make good that promise and shall not be allowed to fall back upon the formal defect in the contract, though subject to well known limitations like larger public interest. the state, thus, has no dominus status to dictate unilateral terms and conditions when it enters into contract and its actions must be reasonable, fair and just and in consonance with rule of law. as a necessary corollary thereto state cannot refuse to confirm highest bid without assigning any valid reason and/or by giving erratic, irrational or irrelevant reasons. -- consumer protection act, 1986 [c.a. no. 68/1986]. articles 14 & 300a: government contract noon-acceptance of highest bid held, it does not result in taking away right to property of highest bidder highest bid, per se, unless it is accepted by competent authority, and consequential sale certificate is issued, does not grant the highest bidder right to property of type which is protected under article 300a right to property is limited to confer highest bidder the right to challenge action of appropriate authority in refusing to accept highest or other bids. [air 1984 p&h 282 (fb) explained] articles 14 & 226: government contract rejection of highest bid held, highest bidder has locus standi to maintain writ petition and assail action of state government or its authorities by contending that his bid has been turned down for arbitrary, illegal or perverse reasons however in such matters, heavy onus would like on petitioner bidder to establish his allegations as state action shall always be presumed to be in accordance with laworderv.k. jhanji, j. 1. in this revision petition, the order impugned is declining of prayer of the plaintiff (petitioner herein) for restoration of the suit which was dismissed on 27.12.1978.2. in brief, the facts are that the petitioner filed a suit for possession by pre-emption of land measuring 14 kanals 18 marlas, which was purchased by the defendants (respondents herein) for a total consideration of rs. 20,000/-. the suit was filed on 9/13/4-1978. on one date of hearing i.e. 6.12.1978, the case was adjourned to 27.12.1978 for filing of written statement by the respondents. on 27.12.1978, the suit was dismissed in default because of non-appearance of the plaintiff or his counsel. an application for setting aside the order dated 27.12.1978 was filed on 3.1.1979. in the application, it was stated that the counsel wrongly noted the date as 3.1.1979, and also informed the plaintiff accordingly. when the plaintiff came to the court on 3.1.1979, on enquiry, he found that his case had already been dismissed in default on 27.12.1978. on the same very date, i.e. 3.1.1979, plaintiff made an application for restoration of the suit. the application, on contest, was dismissed by the trial court and in appeal, the said order was affirmed by the district judge. this order is now being impugned by the plaintiff by way of present revision petition.3. learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the petitioner should not be made to suffer because of mistake of the counsel, and particularly if an application for restoration of the suit was made within time. for this, he placed reliance upon judgment of this court as hukmi rai v, rattan chand, 1987 p.l.j. 350. atma ram and ors. v. molu ram, 1991(1) rrr 285 and asha bhardwaj v. maharaj kishan, 1991(2) rrr 164.4. in reply, learned counsel for the respondent contended that this court should not interfere in revision particularly when the suit of the plaintiff is to pre-empt the sale of the year 1978.5. having heard the learned counsel for the parties, i am not inclined to interfere in the orders of the courts below. there is no dispute with the proposition of law as laid down in the aforesaid judgments that the party should not be made to suffer if on date the counsel does not appear for one reason or the other normally, an application for restoration of the suit, if filed within time, should be allowed, without recording any evidence, on payment of costs, if any. however, in the present case, i find that the trial court framed issues, '(1) whether there was sufficient cause for the non-appearance of the plaintiff and when the suit was called for hearing and dismissed opp, (2) relief.' after recording evidence, the trial court did not agree with the contention of the plaintiff that there was a mistake on the part of the counsel regarding the date of hearing and, therefore, the trial court held that his absence was wilful and deliberate and he had no intention to prosecute the case. in appeal, this finding was challenged before the district judge, karnal, who again on appreciation of evidence on record, disbelieved the plaintiff. while holding this, the district judge also took into consideration that previously too, the suit was dismissed, in default, but on an application made by the plaintiff, the same was restored. in this view of the matter, i am not prepared to take a different view from the one taken by the courts below, while exercising the revisional jurisdiction.6. consequently, there being op merit in the revision petition, the same is dismissed as such. however, there shall be no order as to costs.

Judgment:
ORDER

V.K. Jhanji, J.

1. In this revision petition, the order impugned is declining of prayer of the plaintiff (petitioner herein) for restoration of the suit which was dismissed on 27.12.1978.

2. In brief, the facts are that the petitioner filed a suit for possession by pre-emption of land measuring 14 Kanals 18 Marlas, which was purchased by the defendants (respondents herein) for a total consideration of Rs. 20,000/-. The suit was filed on 9/13/4-1978. On one date of hearing i.e. 6.12.1978, the case was adjourned to 27.12.1978 for filing of written statement by the respondents. On 27.12.1978, the suit was dismissed in default because of non-appearance of the plaintiff or his counsel. An application for setting aside the order dated 27.12.1978 was filed on 3.1.1979. In the application, it was stated that the counsel wrongly noted the date as 3.1.1979, and also informed the plaintiff accordingly. When the plaintiff came to the Court on 3.1.1979, on enquiry, he found that his case had already been dismissed in default on 27.12.1978. On the same very date, i.e. 3.1.1979, plaintiff made an application for restoration of the suit. The application, on contest, was dismissed by the Trial Court and in appeal, the said order was affirmed by the District Judge. This order is now being impugned by the plaintiff by way of present revision petition.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the petitioner should not be made to suffer because of mistake of the counsel, and particularly if an application for restoration of the suit was made within time. For this, he placed reliance upon judgment of this Court as Hukmi Rai v, Rattan Chand, 1987 P.L.J. 350. Atma Ram and Ors. v. Molu Ram, 1991(1) RRR 285 and Asha Bhardwaj v. Maharaj Kishan, 1991(2) RRR 164.

4. In reply, learned counsel for the respondent contended that this Court should not interfere in revision particularly when the suit of the plaintiff is to pre-empt the sale of the year 1978.

5. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, I am not inclined to interfere in the orders of the Courts below. There is no dispute with the proposition of law as laid down in the aforesaid judgments that the party should not be made to suffer if on date the counsel does not appear for one reason or the other normally, an application for restoration of the suit, if filed within time, should be allowed, without recording any evidence, on payment of costs, if any. However, in the present case, I find that the trial Court framed issues, '(1) whether there was sufficient cause for the non-appearance of the plaintiff and when the suit was called for hearing and dismissed OPP, (2) Relief.' After recording evidence, the trial Court did not agree with the contention of the plaintiff that there was a mistake on the part of the counsel regarding the date of hearing and, therefore, the trial Court held that his absence was wilful and deliberate and he had no intention to prosecute the case. In appeal, this finding was challenged before the District Judge, Karnal, who again on appreciation of evidence on record, disbelieved the plaintiff. While holding this, the District Judge also took into consideration that previously too, the suit was dismissed, in default, but on an application made by the plaintiff, the same was restored. In this view of the matter, I am not prepared to take a different view from the one taken by the Courts below, while exercising the revisional jurisdiction.

6. Consequently, there being op merit in the revision petition, the same is dismissed as such. However, there shall be no order as to costs.