Prem Chand Vs. Punjab National Bank and ors. - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
- administrative law - government contract: [vijender jain, c.j., rajive bhalla & sury kant, jj] government contract rejection of highest bid challenge as to held, state has no dominus status to dictate unilateral terms and conditions when it enters into contract. its actions must be reasonable, fair and just in consonance with rule of law. as a necessary corollary thereto, state cannot refuse to confirm highest bid without assigning any valid reason and/or by giving erratic, irrational or irrelevant reasons. the state is free to enter into a contract just like any other individual and the contract shall not change its legal character merely because other party to contract is state. though no citizen possesses a legal right to compel state to enter into a contract, yet latter can neither pick and choose any person arbitrarily for entering into such agreement nor can it discriminate between persons similarly circumstanced. similarly, where breach of contract at hands of state violates fundamental rights of a citizen or its refusal to enter into a contract is contrary to statutory provisions or public duty, judicial review of such state action is inevitable. likewise, if state enters into a contract in consonance with article 299 rights of the parties shall be determined by terms of such contract irrespective of fact that one of the parties to it is a state or a statutory authority. for these precise reasons the equitable doctrine of promissory estoppel has been made applicable against the government, as against any other private individual, even in cases where no valid contract in terms of article 299 was entered into between the parties. hence, if government makes a representation or a promise and an individual alters his position by acting upon such promise, the government may be required to make good that promise and shall not be allowed to fall back upon the formal defect in the contract, though subject to well known limitations like larger public interest. the state, thus, has no dominus status to dictate unilateral terms and conditions when it enters into contract and its actions must be reasonable, fair and just and in consonance with rule of law. as a necessary corollary thereto state cannot refuse to confirm highest bid without assigning any valid reason and/or by giving erratic, irrational or irrelevant reasons. -- consumer protection act, 1986 [c.a. no. 68/1986]. articles 14 & 300a: government contract noon-acceptance of highest bid held, it does not result in taking away right to property of highest bidder highest bid, per se, unless it is accepted by competent authority, and consequential sale certificate is issued, does not grant the highest bidder right to property of type which is protected under article 300a right to property is limited to confer highest bidder the right to challenge action of appropriate authority in refusing to accept highest or other bids. [air 1984 p&h 282 (fb) explained] articles 14 & 226: government contract rejection of highest bid held, highest bidder has locus standi to maintain writ petition and assail action of state government or its authorities by contending that his bid has been turned down for arbitrary, illegal or perverse reasons however in such matters, heavy onus would like on petitioner bidder to establish his allegations as state action shall always be presumed to be in accordance with lawswatanter kumar, j.1. this revision is directed against the order dated 5.8.1999 passed by learned civil judge (junior division), panipat. the learned trial court passed the following order:-'one dw present and recorded. no other dw is present. defendant evidence closed by order of the court after availing a number of opportunities. now case to come up on 12.8.99 for rebuttal evidence if any and arguments.'2. upon notice, it was reported by the registry that the respondents have been served. despite service nobody appeared on 5.5.2000 and in the interest of justice the case was adjourned to 11.5.2000. on 11.5.2000 also the case was called out twice but nobody appeared on behalf of the respondents. thus, arguments were heard in absence of the respondents.3. the learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the evidence of the plaintiff- bank was closed on 26.5.1999 and the case was adjourned to 7.6.1999 for the evidence of the defendant-petitioner. evidence could not be produced because of intervening period of vacations from 15.6.1999 to 15.7.1999 the witnesses could not be summoned. on 17.7.1999 an application for summoning the original accounts books of the bank pertaining to the loan of the defendant-petitioner was filed, however, the application was allowed subject to deposit of requisite money. there was suspension of work on 24.7.1999, therefore, the witnesses could not be examined and there was some confusion about the date then fixed i.e. 29.9.1999 or 30.7.1999.4. the above conduct of the petitioners is certainly indicative that the petitioner has been negligent about pursuing his case. however, the negligence of the petitioner is not of the kind which would left the petitioner with such consequences. it was certainly the duty of the petitioner to summon the witnesses and as appears from the above facts, he had taken steps to summon the witnesses, but they could not be examined because of suspension of work. the law of procedure is mean to achieve the ends of justice and to do substantial justice with an intention to finally and completely determine the dispute between the parties. it cannot be said that the order of the court is without jurisdiction. however, the court could have passed an order which would give complete background of the case with reasons and it may have been more appropriate if the learned trial court would have passed order of lessor gravity before passing the impugned order. closing defence of a party is an order of a very serious nature and, therefore, normally should preceded by order of lessor gravity. in this regard reference can be made to mool chand v. presiding officer and anr., (1999-2) 122 p. l. r. 514.5. for the reasons afore-stated this petition is allowed to the extent that the impugned order shall stand modified. the petitioner herein, defendant in the suit, shall be entitled to last final opportunity in spread over two dates for completing his entire evidence. the petitioner shall be at liberty to summon the witnesses through the process of court, but presence of the witnesses before the court would be at his risk and responsibility. no further adjournment would be allowed under any. circumstance except for paucity of time with the court. the petitioner shall pay costs of rs. 1500/- costs being conditional. the petitioner would bring his evidence on the date now to be fixed by the learned trial court.