Smt. Sarto Vs. Dhan Ram - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
- administrative law - government contract: [vijender jain, c.j., rajive bhalla & sury kant, jj] government contract rejection of highest bid challenge as to held, state has no dominus status to dictate unilateral terms and conditions when it enters into contract. its actions must be reasonable, fair and just in consonance with rule of law. as a necessary corollary thereto, state cannot refuse to confirm highest bid without assigning any valid reason and/or by giving erratic, irrational or irrelevant reasons. the state is free to enter into a contract just like any other individual and the contract shall not change its legal character merely because other party to contract is state. though no citizen possesses a legal right to compel state to enter into a contract, yet latter can neither pick and choose any person arbitrarily for entering into such agreement nor can it discriminate between persons similarly circumstanced. similarly, where breach of contract at hands of state violates fundamental rights of a citizen or its refusal to enter into a contract is contrary to statutory provisions or public duty, judicial review of such state action is inevitable. likewise, if state enters into a contract in consonance with article 299 rights of the parties shall be determined by terms of such contract irrespective of fact that one of the parties to it is a state or a statutory authority. for these precise reasons the equitable doctrine of promissory estoppel has been made applicable against the government, as against any other private individual, even in cases where no valid contract in terms of article 299 was entered into between the parties. hence, if government makes a representation or a promise and an individual alters his position by acting upon such promise, the government may be required to make good that promise and shall not be allowed to fall back upon the formal defect in the contract, though subject to well known limitations like larger public interest. the state, thus, has no dominus status to dictate unilateral terms and conditions when it enters into contract and its actions must be reasonable, fair and just and in consonance with rule of law. as a necessary corollary thereto state cannot refuse to confirm highest bid without assigning any valid reason and/or by giving erratic, irrational or irrelevant reasons. -- consumer protection act, 1986 [c.a. no. 68/1986]. articles 14 & 300a: government contract noon-acceptance of highest bid held, it does not result in taking away right to property of highest bidder highest bid, per se, unless it is accepted by competent authority, and consequential sale certificate is issued, does not grant the highest bidder right to property of type which is protected under article 300a right to property is limited to confer highest bidder the right to challenge action of appropriate authority in refusing to accept highest or other bids. [air 1984 p&h 282 (fb) explained] articles 14 & 226: government contract rejection of highest bid held, highest bidder has locus standi to maintain writ petition and assail action of state government or its authorities by contending that his bid has been turned down for arbitrary, illegal or perverse reasons however in such matters, heavy onus would like on petitioner bidder to establish his allegations as state action shall always be presumed to be in accordance with law - it was also stated that the relevance of the document aforesaid to the issue involved was not established and it being very much in the knowledge and possession of the petitioner, could very well have been relied upon in the pleadings or at least alluded to in the evidence. on the facts of the present case, i find that this requirement of law is not satisfied.harjit singh bedi, j.1. this petition is directed against the order of the senior sub judge sonepat dated 17.4.1992 whereby, the application filed by the plaintiff petitioner to adduce additional evidence with regard to the transfer deed of lease rights dated 17 11.1981 has been declined.2. the suit has been filed by the petitioner for a declaration and possession of 27 kanals 2 marlas of land and it was alleged in the application that 17 kanals 7 marlas of the said land was previously on lease with dhan ram son of sis ram for five years from kharif 1980 to rabi 1985, and dhan ram aforesaid had transferred the lease rights from kharif to rabi 1985 to randhir singh, brother of the petitioner vide deed dated 17.11.1981 and, in accordance there of the possession had been handed over to the subsequent lessee the petitioner has also sought to challenge the lease deed allegedly executed by her in favour of the defendant/respondent on 8 3.1983 as the same is alleged to have been got executed fradulently by the latter the case of the petitioner was that the possession of land in dispute had remained with randhir singh and had never been transferred to the respondent by virtue of the lease deed dated 8. 3. 1983. it was also asserted in the application that the lease deed was brought to the notice of her counsel who had inadvertantly neglected to put it in, in the course of evidence. in response to the application the stand of the respondent was that in fact there was in lease deed dated 17. 11.1981 as it had not been raised upon nor alluded to in the plaint or in the replication and was not in any event relevant to the case it was also asserted that the acceptance of the application at so a belated stage would have the effect of setting up of an entirely new case in the trial which was already six years old. the court found that the case was at an advanced stage as the parties thereto had already completed their evidence, and, as such, the application was highly belated. it, however, found that the document in question being a registered one could not have been forged and that the applicant should not be made to suffer for any lapse on the part of the lawyer. it was also stated that the relevance of the document aforesaid to the issue involved was not established and it being very much in the knowledge and possession of the petitioner, could very well have been relied upon in the pleadings or at least alluded to in the evidence. having held as above, the trial court dismissed the application against which the present revision petition has been filed.3. it has been urged by mr. h. l. sarin, learned counsel for the petitioner that the rules of procedure were in fact a means to an end which was to secure the cause of justice and mere technicalities should not frustrate the effort in that direction. he has cited jai jai ram manohar lal v. national building . material supply, gurgaon, a. i. r 1969 s. c. 1267 and punjab and sindh bank limited v. m/s tosh metal and alloys industries (pvt. ) ltd., 1980 cur. l. j. 16.5, to this effect he has further stated, relying on the findings recorded by the trial court that the document, being a registered one, could not have been forged and as no party should be made to suffer for a lapse on the part of his counsel, the document should have been allowed to be produced in evidence.4. mr. m. s. jain, learned senior advocate appearing for the respondent has, however, urged that there was no reference to this document either in the plaint or in the replication or during the course of evidence produced by the petitioner and the said document being in the knowledge of the petitioner, could not be allowed to be produced in evidence at this belated stage. he has brought to my pointed notice the lack of averments with regard to the documents in question in the pleadings of the petitioner.5. after hearing counsel for the parties, i find no merit in this petition. it will be seen that the suit was filed in the year 1988 and at no stage in the pleadings or in the course of evidence of the parties was any effort made to produce or even refer to the deed dated 17.11.1981. an inference can, therefore, be drawn that the petitioner at no stage felt that the production of this document was in any way relevant to the dispute it will be seen from a reading of order 18, rule 17-a, civil procedure code that additional evidence can be allowed to be produced only if after the exercise of due diligence that evidence was not within the knowledge or could not be produced by the party at the time of leading of its evidence. on the facts of the present case, i find that this requirement of law is not satisfied. admittedly, the document dated 17.11.1981 was executed by the petitioner herself in favour of her brother randhir singh was, therefore, within her knowledge and, as per the averments made, was in fact given to the counsel for being produced in court. even for a moment accepting the fact that the counsel was remiss in not producing or relying upon it in the course of pleadings or the evidence, the petitioner, cannot after a so many years, be allowed to re-agitate the matter when the evidence of both the parties has been concluded. the judgments cited by the counsel for the petitioner merely lay down the general principles of law but these have to be applied to the fasts of each case. it is true that rules of procedure are but handmaidens of justice, but the court must ensure that in the attempt to do justice to one party, no injustice should be caused to the other. the facts of the present case do not justify the prayer that additional evidence be allowed to be produced at this belated stage.6. for the reasons recorded above, the petition is dismissed with no order as to costs the parties are directed to appear before the trial court on 23.10.1992.