| SooperKanoon Citation | sooperkanoon.com/624971 | 
| Subject | Tenancy;Property | 
| Court | Punjab and Haryana High Court | 
| Decided On | Sep-26-1994 | 
| Case Number | Civil Revision No. 2371 of 1991 | 
| Judge |  G.C. Garg, J. | 
| Reported in | (1995)109PLR371 | 
| Acts | East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 - Sections 13 | 
| Appellant | Avtar Singh | 
| Respondent | Kesho Parshad | 
| Appellant Advocate |  D.S. Pheruman and; B.S. Jaswal, Advs. | 
| Respondent Advocate |  B.R. Mahajan, Adv. | 
| Disposition | Petition allowed | 
| Cases Referred | Shivalik Poultry Farm and Ors. v. Indian Bank
  | 
Excerpt:
 - administrative law - government contract: [vijender jain, c.j., rajive bhalla & sury kant, jj] government contract  rejection of highest bid  challenge as to  held, state has no dominus status to dictate unilateral terms and conditions when it enters into contract. its actions must be reasonable, fair and just in consonance with rule of law. as a necessary corollary thereto, state cannot refuse to confirm highest bid without assigning any valid reason and/or by giving erratic, irrational or irrelevant reasons. the state is free to enter into a contract just like any other individual and the contract shall not change its legal character merely because other party to contract is state. though no citizen possesses a legal right to compel state to enter into a contract, yet latter can neither pick and choose any person arbitrarily for entering into such agreement nor can it discriminate between persons similarly circumstanced. similarly, where breach of contract at hands of state violates fundamental rights of a citizen or its refusal to enter into a contract is contrary to statutory provisions  or public duty, judicial review of such state action is inevitable. likewise, if state enters into a contract in consonance with article 299 rights of the parties shall be determined by terms of such contract irrespective of fact that one of the parties to it is a state or a statutory authority. for these precise reasons the equitable doctrine of promissory estoppel has been made applicable against the government, as against any other private individual, even in cases where no valid contract in terms of article 299 was entered into between the parties. hence, if government makes a representation or a promise and an individual alters his position by acting upon such promise, the government may be required to make good that promise and shall not be allowed to fall back upon the formal defect in the contract, though subject to well known limitations like larger public interest. the state, thus, has no dominus status to dictate unilateral terms and conditions when it enters into contract and its actions must be reasonable, fair and just and in consonance with rule of law. as a necessary corollary thereto state cannot refuse to confirm highest bid without assigning any valid reason and/or by giving erratic, irrational or irrelevant reasons. -- consumer protection act, 1986 [c.a. no. 68/1986]. articles 14 & 300a: government contract  noon-acceptance of highest bid   held, it does not result in taking away right to property of highest bidder  highest bid, per se, unless it is accepted by competent authority, and consequential sale  certificate is issued, does not grant the highest bidder right to property of type which is protected under article 300a  right to property is limited to confer highest bidder the right to challenge action of appropriate authority in refusing to accept highest or other bids. [air 1984 p&h 282 (fb) explained]
articles 14 & 226: government contract  rejection of highest bid  held,  highest bidder has locus standi to maintain writ petition and assail action of state government or its authorities by contending that his bid has been turned down for arbitrary, illegal or perverse reasons  however in such matters, heavy onus would like on petitioner bidder to establish his allegations as state action shall always be presumed to be in accordance with law -  i fail to understand as to how the right to sue did not survive in favour of chatter singh. i am not inclined to accept this contention as well, in view of the observations of mr.g.c. garg, j.1. one bishan singh was the owner of the property in dispute. his estate was inherited by atma singh who inducted chatter singh as a tenant on the property in question by virtue of a rent note dated august 18, 1956 with an authority to sub-let. this rent note was only for a period of eleven months. chatter singh let out the property to kesho parshad, respondent herein, on march 12, 1981. chatter singh thereafter filed a petition under section 13 of the east punjab urban rent restriction act, 1949 (for short 'the act') seeking ejectment of the respondent, sub-tenant on the ground of non payment of arrears of rent. the petition was contested by the respondent. it was alleged by him that he was not the tenant under chattar singh but was a direct tenant under atma singh. after the issues had been framed in the ejectment petition, chatter singh died on january 14, 1991. avtar singh, petitioner herein, son of chatter singh on the strength of a will dated december 12, 1990 in his favour, moved an application march 9, 1991 for being impleaded as a petitioner in place of chatter singh, being his heir. this application was dismissed by the learned rent controller by his order dated may 4,1991 and while dismissing the application, learned rent controller also dismissed the ejectment petition having abated. this is how the present revision came to be filed by avtar singh son of chatter singh.2. learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently contended that tenancy being heritable, right to sue survived to the petitioner and the learned rent controller acted illegally in dismissing the application and resultantly the ejectment petition. mr. mahajan, learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, submitted that chatter singh was a tenant under rent note dated august 18, 1956 only for a period of eleven months and as the property had been sub-let in the year 1991 without the permission of the landlord, he had no right to seek ejectment of the respondent. the contention of learned counsel for the respondent has no merit. it is not to be seen at this stage, whether the petition for ejectment filed by chatter singh is or is not competent or whether he is entitled to seek ejectment or not. the only question here is, whether avtar singh son of chatter singh is entitled to be brought on record to continue the proceedings after the death of his father, chatter singh.3. mr. mahajan also contended that even if it be taken the respondent was inducted by chattar singh, avtar singh the son of the latter cannot pursue the ejectment petition as the sub-tenancy was without the permission of the landlord. this contention again has no merit for the reasons mentioned above. tenancy under the act aforesaid, has already been held to be heritable and even if the respondent is able to prove that sub-tenancy had been created without the permission of the landlord, he will not gain in any way, he having been inducted by chatter singh will face the consequences and will be able to defeat the right of chatter singh by showing that he was inducted as a tenant by atma singh and not chatter singh as was pleaded by him. faced with the situation, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that right to sue did not survive and, therefore, learned rent controller rightly dismissed the application. as observed above, i am not impressed with the contention, tenancy being heritable. i fail to understand as to how the right to sue did not survive in favour of chatter singh.4. learned counsel for the respondent still raised another contention that the order passed by the learned rent controller was appealable as by the said order, the ejectment petition had also been dismissed after dismissal of the application seeking implead as an heir. i am not inclined to accept this contention as well, in view of the observations of mr. j.v. gupta, j. (as his lordship then was) in m/s. shivalik poultry farm and ors. v. indian bank, 1985(1)87 p.l.r. 746. it was held therein that revision against the order of the trial court dismissing application of the defendant under order 37 rule 3(5) of the code of civil procedure and at the same time decreeing the suit of the plaintiff by the said order, was maintainable though the order decreeing the suit was admittedly appealable.5. for what has been observed above, the revision succeeds and is allowed accordingly. order under revision is set aside. application of avtar singh, petitioner for being brought on record as legal representative of chatter singh is allowed and he is ordered to be impleaded as a petitioner in the ejectment petition. learned rent controller shall now proceed with the ejectment petition and dispose it of in accordance with law. there will be no order as to costs.
Judgment:G.C. Garg, J.
1. One Bishan Singh was the owner of the property in dispute. His estate was inherited by Atma Singh who inducted Chatter Singh as a tenant on the property in question by virtue of a rent note dated August 18, 1956 with an authority to sub-let. This rent note was only for a period of eleven months. Chatter Singh let out the property to Kesho Parshad, respondent herein, on March 12, 1981. Chatter Singh thereafter filed a petition under Section 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (for short 'the Act') seeking ejectment of the respondent, sub-tenant on the ground of non payment of arrears of rent. The petition was contested by the respondent. It was alleged by him that he was not the tenant under Chattar Singh but was a direct tenant under Atma Singh. After the issues had been framed in the ejectment petition, Chatter Singh died on January 14, 1991. Avtar Singh, petitioner herein, son of Chatter Singh on the strength of a will dated December 12, 1990 in his favour, moved an application March 9, 1991 for being impleaded as a petitioner in place of Chatter Singh, being his heir. This application was dismissed by the learned Rent Controller by his order dated May 4,1991 and while dismissing the application, learned Rent Controller also dismissed the ejectment petition having abated. This is how the present revision came to be filed by Avtar Singh son of Chatter Singh.
2. Learned Counsel for the petitioner vehemently contended that tenancy being heritable, right to sue survived to the petitioner and the learned Rent Controller acted illegally in dismissing the application and resultantly the ejectment petition. Mr. Mahajan, learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, submitted that Chatter Singh was a tenant under rent note dated August 18, 1956 only for a period of eleven months and as the property had been sub-let in the year 1991 without the permission of the landlord, he had no right to seek ejectment of the respondent. The contention of learned counsel for the respondent has no merit. It is not to be seen at this stage, whether the petition for ejectment filed by Chatter Singh is or is not competent or whether he is entitled to seek ejectment or not. The only question here is, whether Avtar Singh son of Chatter Singh is entitled to be brought on record to continue the proceedings after the death of his father, Chatter Singh.
3. Mr. Mahajan also contended that even if it be taken the respondent was inducted by Chattar Singh, Avtar Singh the son of the latter cannot pursue the ejectment petition as the sub-tenancy was without the permission of the landlord. This contention again has no merit for the reasons mentioned above. Tenancy under the Act aforesaid, has already been held to be heritable and even if the respondent is able to prove that sub-tenancy had been created without the permission of the landlord, he will not gain in any way, he having been inducted by Chatter Singh will face the consequences and will be able to defeat the right of Chatter Singh by showing that he was inducted as a tenant by Atma Singh and not Chatter Singh as was pleaded by him. Faced with the situation, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that right to sue did not survive and, therefore, learned Rent Controller rightly dismissed the application. As observed above, I am not impressed with the contention, tenancy being heritable. I fail to understand as to how the right to sue did not survive in favour of Chatter Singh.
4. Learned counsel for the respondent still raised another contention that the order passed by the learned Rent Controller was appealable as by the said order, the ejectment petition had also been dismissed after dismissal of the application seeking implead as an heir. I am not inclined to accept this contention as well, in view of the observations of Mr. J.V. Gupta, J. (as his Lordship then was) in M/s. Shivalik Poultry Farm and Ors. v. Indian Bank, 1985(1)87 P.L.R. 746. It was held therein that revision against the order of the trial court dismissing application of the defendant under Order 37 Rule 3(5) of the Code of Civil Procedure and at the same time decreeing the suit of the plaintiff by the said order, was maintainable though the order decreeing the suit was admittedly appealable.
5. For what has been observed above, the revision succeeds and is allowed accordingly. Order under revision is set aside. Application of Avtar Singh, petitioner for being brought on record as legal representative of Chatter Singh is allowed and he is ordered to be impleaded as a petitioner in the ejectment petition. Learned Rent Controller shall now proceed with the ejectment petition and dispose it of in accordance with law. There will be no order as to costs.