SooperKanoon Citation | sooperkanoon.com/624788 |
Subject | Motor Vehicles |
Court | Punjab and Haryana High Court |
Decided On | Sep-28-1993 |
Case Number | Letters Patent Appeal No. 688 of 1993 |
Judge | S.D. Agarwala, C.J. and; Jawahar Lal Gupta, J. |
Reported in | (1993)105PLR562 |
Acts | Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 - Sections 103; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908 - Order 9, Rule 13 |
Appellant | Gurmej Singh |
Respondent | The Punjab State Electricity Board and ors. |
Appellant Advocate | Rajiv Atma Ram, Adv. |
Respondent Advocate | Somesh Ojha, Adv. |
Disposition | Appeal allowed |
Excerpt:
- administrative law - government contract: [vijender jain, c.j., rajive bhalla & sury kant, jj] government contract rejection of highest bid challenge as to held, state has no dominus status to dictate unilateral terms and conditions when it enters into contract. its actions must be reasonable, fair and just in consonance with rule of law. as a necessary corollary thereto, state cannot refuse to confirm highest bid without assigning any valid reason and/or by giving erratic, irrational or irrelevant reasons. the state is free to enter into a contract just like any other individual and the contract shall not change its legal character merely because other party to contract is state. though no citizen possesses a legal right to compel state to enter into a contract, yet latter can neither pick and choose any person arbitrarily for entering into such agreement nor can it discriminate between persons similarly circumstanced. similarly, where breach of contract at hands of state violates fundamental rights of a citizen or its refusal to enter into a contract is contrary to statutory provisions or public duty, judicial review of such state action is inevitable. likewise, if state enters into a contract in consonance with article 299 rights of the parties shall be determined by terms of such contract irrespective of fact that one of the parties to it is a state or a statutory authority. for these precise reasons the equitable doctrine of promissory estoppel has been made applicable against the government, as against any other private individual, even in cases where no valid contract in terms of article 299 was entered into between the parties. hence, if government makes a representation or a promise and an individual alters his position by acting upon such promise, the government may be required to make good that promise and shall not be allowed to fall back upon the formal defect in the contract, though subject to well known limitations like larger public interest. the state, thus, has no dominus status to dictate unilateral terms and conditions when it enters into contract and its actions must be reasonable, fair and just and in consonance with rule of law. as a necessary corollary thereto state cannot refuse to confirm highest bid without assigning any valid reason and/or by giving erratic, irrational or irrelevant reasons. -- consumer protection act, 1986 [c.a. no. 68/1986]. articles 14 & 300a: government contract noon-acceptance of highest bid held, it does not result in taking away right to property of highest bidder highest bid, per se, unless it is accepted by competent authority, and consequential sale certificate is issued, does not grant the highest bidder right to property of type which is protected under article 300a right to property is limited to confer highest bidder the right to challenge action of appropriate authority in refusing to accept highest or other bids. [air 1984 p&h 282 (fb) explained]
articles 14 & 226: government contract rejection of highest bid held, highest bidder has locus standi to maintain writ petition and assail action of state government or its authorities by contending that his bid has been turned down for arbitrary, illegal or perverse reasons however in such matters, heavy onus would like on petitioner bidder to establish his allegations as state action shall always be presumed to be in accordance with laws.d. agarwala, c.j. and jawahar lal gupta, j. 1. this appeal is directed against three orders; one dated may 11, 1993 and the two orders dated september 2, 1993. by the order dated may 11, 1993, the petition was dismissed for default of appearance. thereafter, the application for setting aside the dismissal for default of appearance, and for condonation of delay in filing the application for restoration, were filed. the learned single judge dismissed the restoration application on the ground that there was negligence on the part of the counsel and as such no sufficient cause was made out for restoration of the writ petition to its original number. the application for condonation of delay was also dismissed.2. we have heard the learned counsel for the parties. the appellant had filed application for condonation of delay in filing the application for restoration through shri v.k. sharma, advocate. in the said application it has been stated that after the admission of the writ petition, the writ was listed for regular hearing on october 25, 1990, before hon'ble mr. justice amarjeet chaudhary, at serial no. 337 and thereafter it was dclisted from the list. thereafter, it was listed before hon'ble justice v.k. bali. on may 11, 1993, when the petition was dismissed for default of appearance, it had escaped the notice of the learned counsel and he had not noted the case. he came to know of the dismissal of the writ petition only on august 20, 1993, when he was informed by the office. immediately thereafter the application for condonation of delay and the application for restoration of the writ petition to its original number was filed by the appellant. in our opinion, since an affidavit has been filed stating therein the fact that the case was listed on may 11,1993 and that it escaped the notice of the learned counsel, it is a sufficient ground for condonation of delay. in the circumstance, we allow the appeal, set aside the impugned orders. now, the writ petition shall be listed for hearing before a learned single judge who will decide it on merits. no posts.
Judgment:S.D. Agarwala, C.J. and Jawahar Lal Gupta, J.
1. This appeal is directed against three orders; one dated May 11, 1993 and the two orders dated September 2, 1993. By the order dated May 11, 1993, the petition was dismissed for default of appearance. Thereafter, the application for setting aside the dismissal for default of appearance, and for condonation of delay in filing the application for restoration, were filed. The learned Single Judge dismissed the restoration application on the ground that there was negligence on the part of the counsel and as such no sufficient cause was made out for restoration of the writ petition to its original number. The application for condonation of delay was also dismissed.
2. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties. The appellant had filed application for condonation of delay in filing the application for restoration through Shri V.K. Sharma, Advocate. In the said application it has been stated that after the admission of the writ petition, the writ was listed for regular hearing on October 25, 1990, before Hon'ble Mr. Justice Amarjeet Chaudhary, at serial No. 337 and thereafter it was dclisted from the list. Thereafter, it was listed before Hon'ble Justice V.K. Bali. On May 11, 1993, when the petition was dismissed for default of appearance, it had escaped the notice of the learned counsel and he had not noted the case. He came to know of the dismissal of the writ petition only on August 20, 1993, when he was informed by the office. Immediately thereafter the application for condonation of delay and the application for restoration of the writ petition to its original number was filed by the appellant. In our opinion, since an affidavit has been filed stating therein the fact that the case was listed on May 11,1993 and that it escaped the notice of the learned counsel, it is a sufficient ground for condonation of delay. In the circumstance, we allow the appeal, set aside the impugned orders. Now, the writ petition shall be listed for hearing before a learned Single Judge who will decide it on merits. No posts.