Jaspal Singh and ors. Vs. Sardul Singh and ors. - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
- administrative law - government contract: [vijender jain, c.j., rajive bhalla & sury kant, jj] government contract rejection of highest bid challenge as to held, state has no dominus status to dictate unilateral terms and conditions when it enters into contract. its actions must be reasonable, fair and just in consonance with rule of law. as a necessary corollary thereto, state cannot refuse to confirm highest bid without assigning any valid reason and/or by giving erratic, irrational or irrelevant reasons. the state is free to enter into a contract just like any other individual and the contract shall not change its legal character merely because other party to contract is state. though no citizen possesses a legal right to compel state to enter into a contract, yet latter can neither pick and choose any person arbitrarily for entering into such agreement nor can it discriminate between persons similarly circumstanced. similarly, where breach of contract at hands of state violates fundamental rights of a citizen or its refusal to enter into a contract is contrary to statutory provisions or public duty, judicial review of such state action is inevitable. likewise, if state enters into a contract in consonance with article 299 rights of the parties shall be determined by terms of such contract irrespective of fact that one of the parties to it is a state or a statutory authority. for these precise reasons the equitable doctrine of promissory estoppel has been made applicable against the government, as against any other private individual, even in cases where no valid contract in terms of article 299 was entered into between the parties. hence, if government makes a representation or a promise and an individual alters his position by acting upon such promise, the government may be required to make good that promise and shall not be allowed to fall back upon the formal defect in the contract, though subject to well known limitations like larger public interest. the state, thus, has no dominus status to dictate unilateral terms and conditions when it enters into contract and its actions must be reasonable, fair and just and in consonance with rule of law. as a necessary corollary thereto state cannot refuse to confirm highest bid without assigning any valid reason and/or by giving erratic, irrational or irrelevant reasons. -- consumer protection act, 1986 [c.a. no. 68/1986]. articles 14 & 300a: government contract noon-acceptance of highest bid held, it does not result in taking away right to property of highest bidder highest bid, per se, unless it is accepted by competent authority, and consequential sale certificate is issued, does not grant the highest bidder right to property of type which is protected under article 300a right to property is limited to confer highest bidder the right to challenge action of appropriate authority in refusing to accept highest or other bids. [air 1984 p&h 282 (fb) explained] articles 14 & 226: government contract rejection of highest bid held, highest bidder has locus standi to maintain writ petition and assail action of state government or its authorities by contending that his bid has been turned down for arbitrary, illegal or perverse reasons however in such matters, heavy onus would like on petitioner bidder to establish his allegations as state action shall always be presumed to be in accordance with law - the trial court thread-bare discussed oral as well as documentary evidence, referred to above and came to a definite conclusion on cogent grounds that the plea of defendants thay they were tenants was totally hollow and the evidence was created after filing of the suit by the plaintiffs with a view to defeat their claim. plaintiffs suggested to the witness aforesaid that he was enimical to them and even though he denied the said suggestion, his statement leaves no one in doubt that he had no love lost for the plaintiffs. it is significant to note that he supported the cause of defendant-vendees on all conceivable pleas on which a suit for pre-emption could be defeated. no reliance could be placed on the testimony of such a witness as well. mere mention in the sale-deed that defendant-vendees were tenants over the suit land in the absence of corroborative evidence, like, revenue record or rent receipts, was totally meaningless and could well even be made with a view to ward off pre-emptive right of plaintiffs. it also rightly came to the conclusion that recitals in the sale-deed with regard to possession was a weak piece of evidence even between the parties to the document and the same, in no circumstances, bind a stranger to the sale-deed. the appellate court erred in setting aside the well reasoned judgment of the trial court on mere conjectures and surmises and, as referred to above, by misquoting and misinterpreting, both, oral as well as documentary evidence.v.k. bali, j.1. appellants sought possession by way of pre-emption of land measuring 19 kanals 1 marla being 1/5th share of total land measuring 95 kanals 4 marks on the basis that they were co-sharers in the land in dispute which was sold by ajmer singh to respondent-vendees for a consideration of rs. 1,33,350/- vide sale-deed dated june 11, 1990. the matter was contested by the vendees on various pleas inclusive of that they were tenants over the land in dispute for the last more than two years prior to the sale and had, thus, preferential right to purchase the same. whereas all the pleas raised by them were negated by the trial court, the first appellate court in an appeal preferred by them i.e. vendees reversed the findings of the trial court on the only issue with regard to their being tenants whereas all other findings recorded by the trial court were upheld. inasmuch, respondents were held to be tenants over the land in dispute, sale in their favour was protected resulting into dismissal of the suit. obviously, plaintiff-appellants are in appeal asking for setting aside the judgment and decree passed by the first appellate court and restoring the one passed by the trial court.2. it is admitted position that in the revene records inclusive of latest jamabandi for the year 1988-89 that was available immediately prior to the sale in question, vendee-respondents found no mention as tenants under the vendor or any one else. they still pleaded that they were tenants and sought to prove the said plea on the strength of oral evidence by examining dw2 harnam singh, dw3 ajmer singh vendor and dw5 karnail singh. they also produced on records pedigree table, ex.d1, decree dated february 29,1992, ex. d3 and khasra girdawaris, ex. d4 and d5, that came into existence on the strength of decree, ex. d3. they also relied upon recitals in the sale-deed wherein they were mentioned to be tenants over the suit land. the trial court thread-bare discussed oral as well as documentary evidence, referred to above and came to a definite conclusion on cogent grounds that the plea of defendants thay they were tenants was totally hollow and the evidence was created after filing of the suit by the plaintiffs with a view to defeat their claim. appellate court, as referred to above, reversed the findings of the trial court on the crucial issue and dismissed the suit.3. this court, after going through the evidence and hearing learned counsel for the parties, is of the considered view that whereas, the trial court correctly appreciated the evidence and came to a correct conclusion, the first appellate court dealt with the matter by misinterpreting, misreading and mis-quoting both, oral and documentary evidence as also by drawing absolutely wrong conclusions. coming first to the oral evidence it will be seen that dw2 harnam singh in his examination stated that he was owner of land adjoining the land in dispute and that he was instrumental in getting the sale effected in favour of defendant-vendees. he also stated that he had seen the vendees paying rent (batai) to the vendor. however, when cross-examined, he could not state as to in which killa number tubewell was installed nor could be stated that as to when the tubewell was actually installed. he also stated that defendant-vendees had paid advance of rs. 80,000/- to the vendor which is factually incorrect. he also could not state as to who was the deed-writer. he also could not state as to how many days before the sale, agreement was executed. it is significant to mention that agreement of sale which was proved to be available with the vendees as admitted by them and which could certainly contain recital with regard to possession of vendees was withheld from the scrutiny of the court. no rent receipt evidencing payment of rent was produced on the records nor dw2 ever stated that any such receipt was executed.4. in so far as dw3 ajmer singh is concerned, suffice it to say that he is a remote collateral of the plaintiffs. the pedigree table produced on the records would reveal that common ancestor of plaintiffs and ajmer singh vendor, dw3, was one kura. kura had two sons, namely, nihala and partapa. nihala's son was desu. whereas, vendor, ajmer singh is son of desu, plaintiff - jaspal singh is great-grand-son of partapa. plaintiffs suggested to the witness aforesaid that he was enimical to them and even though he denied the said suggestion, his statement leaves no one in doubt that he had no love lost for the plaintiffs. it is significant to note that he supported the cause of defendant-vendees on all conceivable pleas on which a suit for pre-emption could be defeated. not only that he stated that the defendants were his tenants prior to the sale in question, he also stated that the land in dispute had since been partitioned and plaintiffs are not co-sharers with him in the land in dispute. he also stated that he had informed the plaintiffs that he was going to sell the land do defendant-vendees. it is an admitted position that if plaintiffs had notice of sale and were asked for purchasing the land, they could not successfully maintain suit for pre-empti8on. all these pleas were taken by vendees but were negated. he has, thus, been found to be making false statements on various counts as noticed above and statement of such a witness could not be believed. the matter does not rest there, as, on a suit instituted by defendant-vendees against this witness-ajmer singh, after pre-emption suit was filed against them, for correction of entries in the revenue records and which was conceded by him (ajmer singh), decree, ex. d3 was passed. it would further reveal that this witness was interested in defeating the claim of plaintiffs. what could possibly be the cause of action to file a suit against ajmer singh after he had already washed off his hands of the land in question and was no more interested in the same, has not been established on records of the case. learned counsel appearing for the vendees could not even remotely suggest any cause of action that might have accrued to defendants for instituting the suit culminating into decree, ex. d3. the said suit was filed on january 17, 1992 and the written statement conceding their claim was filed by this witness on february 14, 1992 culminating into decree on february 29,1992. even though, plaintiffs by that time had filed the suit for pre-emption, which was actually instituted on september 20, 1991, they were not impleaded as party-respondents in the said suit. this court is in no doubt whatsoever in that ajmer singh dw3 was not a truthful witness and the trial court rightly rejected his evidence.dw5 karnail singh is admittedly not living in the village where the land in dispute is located. when cross-examined, he could not remember as to when various crops were sown in the land in dispute. he, however, admitted that the revenue patwari used to prepare the khasra girdawari (revenue record) at the spot and he would record possession of those who were actually in possession. this witness never stated that he was present at the time when rent was paid or its receipt and executed. no reliance could be placed on the testimony of such a witness as well.5. in so far as documentary evidence is concerned the appellate court, in view of the detailed facts mentioned above, wrongly, concluded that there was no occasion for dw3 to depose in favour of defendants as he was related to plaintiffs, so proved by pedigree table ex. d1. as mentioned above, the pedigree table would reveal that even though plaintiffs and vendor were related but it was distant relation. recital in the sale-deed was not at all binding upon the plaintiffs who were admittedly not party to the same. mere mention in the sale-deed that defendant-vendees were tenants over the suit land in the absence of corroborative evidence, like, revenue record or rent receipts, was totally meaningless and could well even be made with a view to ward off pre-emptive right of plaintiffs. insofar as decree, ex. d3, is concerned, it has already been mentioned that the same came into being after the institution of the suit by plaintiffs and that too on the consent of the vendor ajmer singh, dw3, who has been held not to be truthful witness. khasra girdawari that came into existence in consequence of decree, ex. d3 are, thus, wholly meaningless. on the strength of the evidence that has been discussed above, the trial court rightly came to conclusion that means adopted by defendants to defeat the right of plaintiffs were not genuine and had infact been applied merely as a camouflage to bypass the law and hoodwink the court. it also came to the conclusion that the evidence led by defendants was created merely and solely to subvert the law. it also rightly came to the conclusion that recitals in the sale-deed with regard to possession was a weak piece of evidence even between the parties to the document and the same, in no circumstances, bind a stranger to the sale-deed. it also rightly came to the conclusion that the admission of vendor in a suit instituted by defendants was procured on the basis of which alone entries were changed in the revenue records. the appellate court erred in setting aside the well reasoned judgment of the trial court on mere conjectures and surmises and, as referred to above, by misquoting and misinterpreting, both, oral as well as documentary evidence.6. for the reasons recorded above, this appeal filed by plaintiffs succeeds. the judgment and decree passed by the appellate court is set-aside and the one passed by the trial court is restored. appeal is allowed with costs. plaintiffs in consequence of the decree passed in their favour by the trial court have already deposited the pre-emption amount and, therefore, no further orders in this regard are required to be passed.