The Khalsa College, Through Its Hony. Secretary Vs. the Joint Director, Panchayats and ors. - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
- sections 80 (2) & 89 & punjab motor vehicles rules, 1989, rules 85 & 80: [t.s. thakur, cj, jasbir singh & surya kant, jj] appeal against orders of state or regional transport authority imitation held, a stipulation regarding the period of limitation available for invoking the remedy shall have to be strictly construed. that is because any provision by way of limitation is in the nature of a restraint on the remedy provided under the act. so viewed two inferences are clear viz., (1) sections 80 and 89 of the act read with rule 85 of the rules make it obligatory for the authorities making the order to communicate it to the applicant concerned and (2) the period of limitation for any appeal against the order is reckonable from the date of such communication of the reasons would imply communication of a copy of the written order itself, a party who knows about the making of an order cannot ignore the same and allow grass to grow under its feet and do nothing except waiting for a formal communication of the order or to choose a tenuous plea that even though he knew about the order, he was waiting for its formal communication to seek redress against the same in appeal. if a party does not know about the making of the order either actually or constructively it may claim that the period of limitation would start running from the date it acquires knowledge of the making of an order but one cannot understand how a party, who has acquired knowledge of the making an order either directly or constructively can ignore the same and belatedly seek redress just because the authority making the order had made a default in formally communicating the order to him. allowing a party to do so would amount to placing a premium on the lack of diligence of a party, who is remiss in seeking a remedy that was available to it. therefore, knowledge whether actual or construction of the order passed by the state or regional transport authority should result in commencement of the period of limitation. thus,. in cases where the state or regional transport authority has not communicated the order of refusal passed to the persons concerned, the period of limitation for filing an appeal would commence from the date when the parties concerned acquire knowledge of passing of the said order. - even if assumed for a moment that the land was reserved for any common purpose, non-utilisation of land for nineteen years by the gram panchayat for the purpose for which it was reserved under the consolidation proceedings clearly indicates that it was no longer required by the gram panchayat for utilising the same for any common purpose. it is not the case of the gram panchayat that it was in possession of the land either in 1971 or during 1972-73. therefore, no reliance can be placed on the entry in the jamabandi recorded for the year 1972-73. both the authorities below failed to examine the scheme framed under the consolidation act and the entry and utilisation of the property by the occupant.t.h.b. chalapathi, j.1 this writ petition is filed to quash the orders of the district development and panchayat officer, amritsar dated march 9, 1981, as confirmed by joint director. panchayats, vide his order dated july 14, 1982.2. the petitioner which is an educational institution, claims ownership of the land measuring 19 kanals in khasra no. 47/13, 16, 17 and 18. the gram panchayat, mahal, through its sarpanch filed an application before the district development and panchayat officer, amritsar, for eviction of the petitioner institution under sections 2 and 3 of the punjab gram panchayat (common purposes land) eviction and rent recovery act, 1976 read with section 5 of the punjab public premises and land (eviction and rent recovery) act, 1973. the authorities below basing on the entry in jamabandi for the year 1972-73 came to the conclusion that the disputed land belonged to the gram panchayat and reserved for common purposes and accordingly ordered eviction. hence this petition.3. admittedly, the disputed land was shown in the revenue record as jumla mushtarka malkhan as can be seen from the written statement filed by the collector, district development and panchayat office, amritsar. respondent no.3 gram panchayat in its written statement stated that the land was reserved for common purposes by the consolidation authorities which took place during 1962-63 and it is further averred inter alia that the petitioner institution is in unauthorised occupation of the land for the last eighteen or nineteen years. there is nothing on the record to show that the land was reserved for common purposes during the consolidation proceedings which admittedly took place in the year 1962-63. neither the district development and panchayat officer, amritsar, nor the joint director, panchayats, referred to the consolidation scheme in their orders. thus, there is nothing to show that the land was reserved for common purposes and whether the said common purposes came to an end or still continuing. admittedly, the land had been in possession of the institution for the last eighteen or nineteen years. if that is so, it is clear that the gram panchayat has not utilised this land for any common purpose as already said, the purpose for which the land was reserved, was also not known as the scheme was not referred to by any of the authorities below. the fact remains that the land has been described in the revenue records as jumla mushtarka malkan. even if assumed for a moment that the land was reserved for any common purpose, non-utilisation of land for nineteen years by the gram panchayat for the purpose for which it was reserved under the consolidation proceedings clearly indicates that it was no longer required by the gram panchayat for utilising the same for any common purpose. if the land has not been utilised, then it ceased to be the panchayat land and, therefore, it reverts back to the proprietors from whom it was taken as held by this court in gram panchayat, gunia majri v. director, consolidation of holdings and ors, (1991-1)99 p.l.r. 342. the mere entry in the jamabandi which was made in the year 1972 in favour of gram panchayat does not confer any right on the gram panchayat as admittedly gram panchayat was never in possession of the land at any time. it is not the case of the gram panchayat that it was in possession of the land either in 1971 or during 1972-73. therefore, no reliance can be placed on the entry in the jamabandi recorded for the year 1972-73. both the authorities below failed to examine the scheme framed under the consolidation act and the entry and utilisation of the property by the occupant. in the circumstances of the case, when the petitioner was admittedly in possession of the land for about twenty years prior to 1932, the authorities cannot pass an order of eviction without referring to the scheme framed under the consolidation act. the gram panchayat has not placed any material on record to show that it was in possession of the land at any time and it exercised its rights of ownership. in these premises, it cannot be said that the gram panchayat, is entitled to evict the petitioner-institution. in fact, the record shows that the educational institution has been utilising this land for the demonstration farm of the students of the agriculture college, amritsar. i am, therefore, not able to sustain the orders passed by the authorities below. writ petition is therefore to be allowed.4. writ petition is accordingly allowed. no order as to costs.