| SooperKanoon Citation | sooperkanoon.com/622742 | 
| Subject | Civil | 
| Court | Punjab and Haryana High Court | 
| Decided On | Aug-13-1996 | 
| Case Number | Regular Second Appeal No. 2909 of 1995 | 
| Judge |  S.C. Malte, J. | 
| Reported in | (1996)114PLR370 | 
| Acts | Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908 - Order 7, Rule 1 | 
| Appellant | Gurdial Singh | 
| Respondent | Joginder Singh and anr. | 
| Appellant Advocate |  A.S. Sandhu, Adv. | 
| Respondent Advocate |  Lisa Gill, Adv. | 
Excerpt:
 - sections 80 (2) & 89 & punjab motor vehicles rules, 1989, rules 85 & 80: [t.s. thakur, cj, jasbir singh & surya kant, jj] appeal against orders of state or regional transport authority  imitation  held, a stipulation regarding the period of limitation available for invoking the remedy shall have to be strictly construed. that is because any provision by way of limitation is in the nature of a restraint on the remedy provided under the act. so viewed two inferences are clear viz., (1) sections 80 and 89 of the act read with rule 85 of the rules make it obligatory for the authorities making the order to communicate it to the applicant concerned and (2) the period of limitation for any appeal against the order is reckonable from the date of such communication of the reasons would imply communication of a copy of the written order itself, a party who knows about the making of an order cannot ignore the same and allow grass to grow under its feet and do nothing except waiting for a formal communication of the order or to choose a tenuous plea that even though he knew about the order, he was waiting for its formal communication to seek redress against the same in appeal. if a party does not know about the making of the order either actually or constructively it may claim that the period of limitation would start running from the date it acquires knowledge of the making of an order but one cannot understand how a party, who has acquired knowledge of the making an order either directly or constructively can ignore the same and belatedly seek redress just because the authority making the order had made a default in formally communicating the order to him. allowing a party to do so would amount to placing a premium on the lack of diligence of a party, who is remiss in seeking a remedy that was available to it. therefore, knowledge whether actual or construction of the order passed  by the state or regional transport authority should result in commencement of the period of limitation. thus,. in cases where the state or regional transport authority has not communicated the order of refusal passed to the persons concerned, the period of limitation for filing an appeal would commence from the date when the parties concerned acquire knowledge of passing of the said order. -  only, on the failure of the compliance of the orders, by the court, further steps should have been taken. if the plaintiffs fail to amend the plaint, the district court shall consider its effect, and, even in that case, shall dispose of the appeal on merits of the case.s.c. malte, j.1. this appeal can be disposed of at the motion stage itself. the appellant-plaintiff filed a civil suit in the trial court seeking permanent injunction against the defendant. that suit was decreed. the defendant came in appeal. the district judge allowed the appeal on the solitary ground that the plaint did not contain the statement under order 7 rule1(j) cpc (punjab & haryana high court amendment), which require that the plaint should contain the statement to the effect that there was no previous litigation between the parties, and if, there had been any such litigation, the result of it. the admitted position is that such a statement had not been incorporated in the plaint the only question, therefore, remains whether the district judge was justified in allowing the appeal on that solitary ground and thereby rejecting the plaint, and in effect, dismissing the suit.2. i would say that the provisions, as given in order 7 rule 1 cpc, had not been properly appreciated by the district judge. these provisions, undoubtedly, indicate that the plaint should contain the particulars as prescribed under that rule. if such particulars are not stated, the next question then arise what shall be the effect of it. the plaint in certain circumstances can be returned or rejected as contemplated in order 7 rules 10 and 11 cpc respectively. the occasion to return the plaint arises when it was required to be presented to the proper court the plaint can be rejected in the circumstances covered by order 7 rule 11. it contemplates in all four circumstances:-(i) when it does not disclose a cause of action;(ii) when there was no proper valuation of the relief claimed aid, despite the direction from the court, no steps were takes to correct valuation;(iii) insufficiency of the court-fee stamps, despite direction of the court to make up the deficiency; and(iv) when the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law.3. briefly stated, if the district judge noticed any lacuna in the plaint, but there is no sufficient reason to reject the plaint on the ground of statement in the plaint indicated that it was barred by any law, then in that case he was expected, at least, to afford opportunity to the party/plaintiff to amend the plaint or make up the lacuna. only, on the failure of the compliance of the orders, by the court, further steps should have been taken. order 7 rule 1 cpc enumerates particulars to be given in the plaint, and if the plaintiff fails to supply some particulars, the course open was to call upon him to supply some particulars, that should have been done at the initial stage of the filing of the plaint. once the plaint has been accepted and registered, and the matter proceeded further and ended in passing of a decree in the trial court, thereafter there was no justification in taking up the lacuna in the plaint as stated above as a sole criteria for rejecting the plaint, and thereby, in effect, dismissing the suit. it should be remembered the rules of procedure are meant for promoting the cause of justice and not for the purpose of frustrating it by resorting to technicalities to such a length that it ultimately result into denial of justice. i am not able to appreciate the short-cut measure adopted by the district judge in disposing of the matter in such a way. i, therefore, allow this appeal, set-aside the judgment and decree passed by the district judge, and remand the matter to him for decision after affording opportunity to the plaintiff to incorporate the particulars as required in clause (j) of rule 1 of order 7 cpc, and thereupon to proceed further to decide the appeal on merits. if the plaintiffs fail to amend the plaint, the district court shall consider its effect, and, even in that case, shall dispose of the appeal on merits of the case. under these circumstances, no order as to cost of the appeal. the parties are directed to appear before the district court on 12.9.1996 for furthersteps.
Judgment:S.C. Malte, J.
1. This appeal can be disposed of at the motion stage itself. The appellant-plaintiff filed a civil suit in the trial Court seeking permanent injunction against the defendant. That suit was decreed. The defendant came in appeal. The District Judge allowed the appeal on the solitary ground that the plaint did not contain the statement under Order 7 Rule1(j) CPC (Punjab & Haryana High Court Amendment), which require that the plaint should contain the statement to the effect that there was no previous litigation between the parties, and if, there had been any such litigation, the result of it. The admitted position is that such a statement had not been incorporated in the plaint The only question, therefore, remains whether the District Judge was justified in allowing the appeal on that solitary ground and thereby rejecting the plaint, and in effect, dismissing the suit.
2. I would say that the provisions, as given in Order 7 Rule 1 CPC, had not been properly appreciated by the District Judge. These provisions, undoubtedly, indicate that the plaint should contain the particulars as prescribed under that rule. If such particulars are not stated, the next question then arise what shall be the effect of it. The plaint in certain circumstances can be returned or rejected as contemplated in Order 7 Rules 10 and 11 CPC respectively. The occasion to return the plaint arises when it was required to be presented to the proper Court The plaint can be rejected in the circumstances covered by Order 7 Rule 11. It contemplates in all four circumstances:-
(i) when it does not disclose a cause of action;
(ii) when there was no proper valuation of the relief claimed aid, despite the direction from the Court, no steps were takes to correct valuation;
(iii) insufficiency of the Court-fee stamps, despite direction of the Court to make up the deficiency; and
(iv) when the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law.
3. Briefly stated, if the District Judge noticed any lacuna in the plaint, but there is no sufficient reason to reject the plaint on the ground of statement in the plaint indicated that it was barred by any law, then in that case he was expected, at least, to afford opportunity to the party/plaintiff to amend the plaint or make up the lacuna. Only, on the failure of the compliance of the orders, by the Court, further steps should have been taken. Order 7 Rule 1 CPC enumerates particulars to be given in the plaint, and if the plaintiff fails to supply some particulars, the course open was to call upon him to supply some particulars, that should have been done at the initial stage of the filing of the plaint. Once the plaint has been accepted and registered, and the matter proceeded further and ended in passing of a decree in the trial Court, thereafter there was no justification in taking up the lacuna in the plaint as stated above as a sole criteria for rejecting the plaint, and thereby, in effect, dismissing the suit. It should be remembered the rules of procedure are meant for promoting the cause of justice and not for the purpose of frustrating it by resorting to technicalities to such a length that it ultimately result into denial of justice. I am not able to appreciate the short-cut measure adopted by the District Judge in disposing of the matter in such a way. I, therefore, allow this appeal, set-aside the judgment and decree passed by the District Judge, and remand the matter to him for decision after affording opportunity to the plaintiff to incorporate the particulars as required in Clause (j) of Rule 1 of Order 7 CPC, and thereupon to proceed further to decide the appeal on merits. If the plaintiffs fail to amend the plaint, the District Court shall consider its effect, and, even in that case, shall dispose of the appeal on merits of the case. Under these circumstances, no order as to cost of the appeal. The parties are directed to appear before the District Court on 12.9.1996 for furthersteps.