inder SaIn Vs. Gian Chand Malik - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
- sections 80 (2) & 89 & punjab motor vehicles rules, 1989, rules 85 & 80: [t.s. thakur, cj, jasbir singh & surya kant, jj] appeal against orders of state or regional transport authority imitation held, a stipulation regarding the period of limitation available for invoking the remedy shall have to be strictly construed. that is because any provision by way of limitation is in the nature of a restraint on the remedy provided under the act. so viewed two inferences are clear viz., (1) sections 80 and 89 of the act read with rule 85 of the rules make it obligatory for the authorities making the order to communicate it to the applicant concerned and (2) the period of limitation for any appeal against the order is reckonable from the date of such communication of the reasons would imply communication of a copy of the written order itself, a party who knows about the making of an order cannot ignore the same and allow grass to grow under its feet and do nothing except waiting for a formal communication of the order or to choose a tenuous plea that even though he knew about the order, he was waiting for its formal communication to seek redress against the same in appeal. if a party does not know about the making of the order either actually or constructively it may claim that the period of limitation would start running from the date it acquires knowledge of the making of an order but one cannot understand how a party, who has acquired knowledge of the making an order either directly or constructively can ignore the same and belatedly seek redress just because the authority making the order had made a default in formally communicating the order to him. allowing a party to do so would amount to placing a premium on the lack of diligence of a party, who is remiss in seeking a remedy that was available to it. therefore, knowledge whether actual or construction of the order passed by the state or regional transport authority should result in commencement of the period of limitation. thus,. in cases where the state or regional transport authority has not communicated the order of refusal passed to the persons concerned, the period of limitation for filing an appeal would commence from the date when the parties concerned acquire knowledge of passing of the said order. - interests of justice clearly warrant the grant of such permission and this evidence is accordingly allowed to be placed on record. this is what both the appellate authority as also the rent controller failed to appreciate and thus fell in errer. this circumstance clearly lends credence to the testimony of both the landlord pw1 inder sain and also his witness pw 2 harbans singh that suman kumar chhabra, had in fact, started practice. 10. there can thus be no manner of doubt that the landlord has clearly established the requisite intention of his son suman kumar chbabra to start practice as a lawyer at chandigarh in terms of the relevant statutory provision.s.s. sodhi, j.1. the controversy in revision here with regard to the ejectment of the tenant, sought by the landlord, on the ground that the demised premises were required by him for use as office or consulting room for his son for practice as a lawyer at chandigah.2. a reference to the material on record shows that there is, in this behalf the statement of the landlord p.w. 1 inder sain to the effect that his son suman kumar chhabra was practicing as a lawyer on the income tax aside and was a member of the bar association. exhibit p. 1, a copy of the certificate issued by the bar council of punjab & haryana, to show that said suman kumar chhabra had been enrolled as an advocate was also placed on the record. it was further stated by him that the demised premises were required for the setting up of an office, consulting room for his son and that he did not own any other house' in chandigarh nor had he vacated any such house or other building.3. next there is a testimony of p.w. 2 harbans singh jaison, of 2170, sector 15, chandigarh, who deposed that the son of the landlord had been residing with him for the 1 year and was practising on the sales tax and income tax side, it was also his statement that suman chhabra had set up an office in his house too.4. after taking note, of the fact that the landlord had not examined his son nor produced any judgment to show that his son had appeared as a counsel and that the record of membership of the income tax bar association too had not been produced, both the appellate authority as also the rent controller chose to prefer instead the statement of the tenant, that the landlord did not require the premises for the stated purpose, as his son resided at melout mandi.5. faced with this situation, the landlord filed an application in this court seeks permission to adduce in evidence two orders of the sales tax authority, chandigarh, where the presence of the landlord's son suman kumar chhabra is duly marked as counsel in the matter. interests of justice clearly warrant the grant of such permission and this evidence is accordingly allowed to be placed on record.6. the relief sought by the landlords has to be considered in the context of the relevant statutory provisions and, of course, the material on record.7. the relevant extract of section 13 of the east punjab urban rent restriction act, 1949, reads as under : - '13(3)(a)(iv) : in the case of any residential building, if he requires it for use as an office, or consulting room by his son who intends to start practice as a lawyer or as a 'registered practitioner' within the meaning of that expression as used in the punjab medical registration act, 1916 or for the residence of his son who is married, if-(a) his son as aforesaid is not occupying in the urban area concerned any other building for use as office, consulting room or residence, as the case may be ; and(b) his son as aforesaid has not vacated such a building without sufficient cause after the commencement of this act, in the urban area concerned :'8. it will be seen that the statutory requirement is only that the landlord's son 'intends to start practice' and not that he must actually be practising as a lawyer before the landlord can invoke this provision to seek the tenant's ejectment. this is what both the appellate authority as also the rent controller failed to appreciate and thus fell in errer.9. in the face of exhibit p-1, the certificate of enrolment issued by the bar council of punjab and haryana, there can be no manner of doubt that the landlord's son is indeed enrolled as an advocate. to support the landlord assertion that his son suman kumar chhabra had the requisite intention to start practice at chandigarh, we also have on record now the two orders of the sales tax authority chandigarh, referred to earlier, where his presence as counsel stands recorded. this circumstance clearly lends credence to the testimony of both the landlord pw1 inder sain and also his witness pw 2 harbans singh that suman kumar chhabra, had in fact, started practice. seen in this light, the circumstance that the landlord had not examined his son or that the record of the income tax bar association had not been produced cannot operate to deny the landlord the relief claimed.10. there can thus be no manner of doubt that the landlord has clearly established the requisite intention of his son suman kumar chbabra to start practice as a lawyer at chandigarh in terms of the relevant statutory provision. this being so, both, the order of the appellate authority as also of the rent controller are hereby set aside and an order for ejectment is passed against the tenant gian chand malik. this revision petition is consequently accepted. in the circumstance, however, there will be no order as to costs.