Gram Panchayat Vs. S.D.M. and ors. - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
- sections 80 (2) & 89 & punjab motor vehicles rules, 1989, rules 85 & 80: [t.s. thakur, cj, jasbir singh & surya kant, jj] appeal against orders of state or regional transport authority imitation held, a stipulation regarding the period of limitation available for invoking the remedy shall have to be strictly construed. that is because any provision by way of limitation is in the nature of a restraint on the remedy provided under the act. so viewed two inferences are clear viz., (1) sections 80 and 89 of the act read with rule 85 of the rules make it obligatory for the authorities making the order to communicate it to the applicant concerned and (2) the period of limitation for any appeal against the order is reckonable from the date of such communication of the reasons would imply communication of a copy of the written order itself, a party who knows about the making of an order cannot ignore the same and allow grass to grow under its feet and do nothing except waiting for a formal communication of the order or to choose a tenuous plea that even though he knew about the order, he was waiting for its formal communication to seek redress against the same in appeal. if a party does not know about the making of the order either actually or constructively it may claim that the period of limitation would start running from the date it acquires knowledge of the making of an order but one cannot understand how a party, who has acquired knowledge of the making an order either directly or constructively can ignore the same and belatedly seek redress just because the authority making the order had made a default in formally communicating the order to him. allowing a party to do so would amount to placing a premium on the lack of diligence of a party, who is remiss in seeking a remedy that was available to it. therefore, knowledge whether actual or construction of the order passed by the state or regional transport authority should result in commencement of the period of limitation. thus,. in cases where the state or regional transport authority has not communicated the order of refusal passed to the persons concerned, the period of limitation for filing an appeal would commence from the date when the parties concerned acquire knowledge of passing of the said order. - there is no scope to doubt or dispute the position that the decree of the civil court is binding on the criminal court in a matter like the one before us. we are, therefore, satisfied that parallel proceedings should not continue and the order of the learned magistrate should be quashed.orderpritpal singh, j.1. there is a land dispute between the petitioner gram panchayat and respondents nos. 2 to 7. regarding this land the respondents filed three separate suits against the petitioner on feb. 27, 1986. temporary injunction applications were also : filed in the suits upon which the trial court, issued ad interim injunction restraining the i present petitioner from interfering with the possession of respondents nos. 2 to 7 during the pendency of the suits. this order was passed on march 27, 1986. thereafter on april 10, 1986, the respondents nos. 2 to 7 initiated proceedings under section 145 of the code of criminal procedure (hereinafter called the code') against the petitioner regarding the same land. the sub-divisional magistrate, panipat, issued notices to the parties to appear before him and to file their respective claims, j simultaneously, under section 146 of the code, the disputed land was attached and naib tehsildar, panipat, was appointed as the receiver. the petitioner gram panchayat has sought the quashing of the proceedings taken by the sub-divisional magistrate, panipat, under sections 145 and 146 of the code.2. it is held by the supreme court in ram sumer pun mahant v. state of u.p. (1985) 1 chand lr (cri) 521 : 1985 cri lj 752 that:when a civil litigation is pending for the property wherein the question of possession is involved and has been adjudicated, we see hardly any justification for initiating a parallel criminal proceeding under section 145 of the code. there is no scope to doubt or dispute the position that the decree of the civil court is binding on the criminal court in a matter like the one before us. counsel for respondents nos. 2-5 was not in a position to challenge the proposition that parallel proceedings should not be permitted to continue and in the event of a decree of the civil court, the criminal court should not be allowed to invoke its jurisdiction particularly when possession is being examined by the civil court and parties are in a position to approach the civil court for interim orders such as injunction or appointment of receiver for adequate protection of the property during pendency of the dispute. multiplicity of litigation is not in the interest of the parties nor should public time be allowed to be wasted over meaningless litigation. we are, therefore, satisfied that parallel proceedings should not continue and the order of the learned magistrate should be quashed.the present case is fully covered by the dictum of the supreme court. civil litigation is pending between the parties in respect of the land in dispute, wherein question of possession is also involved. hence, initiation of a parallel criminal proceeding under sections 145 and 146 of the code would not be justified.3. the learned respondents' counsel referred me to a single bench judgment of this court in nachhattar singh v. gurinder singh (1983) 2 chand lr (cri) 125 : 1983 cri lj 718, wherein it was casually observed that when the interim injunction of the civil court restriaining the other party from interfering with the possession of one party is in force then proceedings under section 145, code of criminal procedure, could be launched only in aid of the order of the civil court. this observation runs counter to the dictum of the supreme court in the case of ram sumer puri mahant 1985 cri lj 75 (supra) and, therefore, this view cannot be followed.for aforesaid reasons the present petition is allowed and the orders of the magistrate by which the proceedings under sections 145 and 146 of the code have been initiated are quashed.

Judgment:
ORDER

Pritpal Singh, J.

1. There is a land dispute between the petitioner Gram Panchayat and respondents Nos. 2 to 7. Regarding this land the respondents filed three separate suits against the petitioner on Feb. 27, 1986. Temporary injunction applications were also : filed in the suits upon which the trial Court, issued ad interim injunction restraining the i present petitioner from interfering with the possession of respondents Nos. 2 to 7 during the pendency of the suits. This order was passed on March 27, 1986. Thereafter on April 10, 1986, the respondents Nos. 2 to 7 initiated proceedings under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter called the Code') against the petitioner regarding the same land. The Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Panipat, issued notices to the parties to appear before him and to file their respective claims, j Simultaneously, under Section 146 of the Code, the disputed land was attached and Naib Tehsildar, Panipat, was appointed as the Receiver. The petitioner Gram Panchayat has sought the quashing of the proceedings taken by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Panipat, under Sections 145 and 146 of the Code.

2. It is held by the Supreme Court in Ram Sumer Pun Mahant v. State of U.P. (1985) 1 Chand LR (Cri) 521 : 1985 Cri LJ 752 that:

When a civil litigation is pending for the property wherein the question of possession is involved and has been adjudicated, we see hardly any justification for initiating a parallel criminal proceeding under Section 145 of the Code. There is no scope to doubt or dispute the position that the decree of the Civil Court is binding on the criminal Court in a matter like the one before us. Counsel for respondents Nos. 2-5 was not in a position to challenge the proposition that parallel proceedings should not be permitted to continue and in the event of a decree of the Civil Court, the criminal Court should not be allowed to invoke its jurisdiction particularly when possession is being examined by the civil Court and parties are in a position to approach the civil Court for interim orders such as injunction or appointment of receiver for adequate protection of the property during pendency of the dispute. Multiplicity of litigation is not in the interest of the parties nor should public time be allowed to be wasted over meaningless litigation. We are, therefore, satisfied that parallel proceedings should not continue and the order of the learned Magistrate should be quashed.

The present case is fully covered by the dictum of the Supreme Court. Civil litigation is pending between the parties in respect of the land in dispute, wherein question of possession is also involved. Hence, initiation of a parallel criminal proceeding under Sections 145 and 146 of the Code would not be justified.

3. The learned respondents' counsel referred me to a single Bench judgment of this Court in Nachhattar Singh v. Gurinder Singh (1983) 2 Chand LR (Cri) 125 : 1983 Cri LJ 718, wherein it was casually observed that when the interim injunction of the Civil Court restriaining the other party from interfering with the possession of one party is in force then proceedings under Section 145, Code of Criminal Procedure, could be launched only in aid of the order of the civil Court. This observation runs counter to the dictum of the Supreme Court in the case of Ram Sumer Puri Mahant 1985 Cri LJ 75 (supra) and, therefore, this view cannot be followed.

For aforesaid reasons the present petition is allowed and the orders of the Magistrate by which the proceedings under Sections 145 and 146 of the Code have been initiated are quashed.