Gram Panchayat, Bidhal Vs. Satbir and ors. - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
- sections 80 (2) & 89 & punjab motor vehicles rules, 1989, rules 85 & 80: [t.s. thakur, cj, jasbir singh & surya kant, jj] appeal against orders of state or regional transport authority imitation held, a stipulation regarding the period of limitation available for invoking the remedy shall have to be strictly construed. that is because any provision by way of limitation is in the nature of a restraint on the remedy provided under the act. so viewed two inferences are clear viz., (1) sections 80 and 89 of the act read with rule 85 of the rules make it obligatory for the authorities making the order to communicate it to the applicant concerned and (2) the period of limitation for any appeal against the order is reckonable from the date of such communication of the reasons would imply communication of a copy of the written order itself, a party who knows about the making of an order cannot ignore the same and allow grass to grow under its feet and do nothing except waiting for a formal communication of the order or to choose a tenuous plea that even though he knew about the order, he was waiting for its formal communication to seek redress against the same in appeal. if a party does not know about the making of the order either actually or constructively it may claim that the period of limitation would start running from the date it acquires knowledge of the making of an order but one cannot understand how a party, who has acquired knowledge of the making an order either directly or constructively can ignore the same and belatedly seek redress just because the authority making the order had made a default in formally communicating the order to him. allowing a party to do so would amount to placing a premium on the lack of diligence of a party, who is remiss in seeking a remedy that was available to it. therefore, knowledge whether actual or construction of the order passed by the state or regional transport authority should result in commencement of the period of limitation. thus,. in cases where the state or regional transport authority has not communicated the order of refusal passed to the persons concerned, the period of limitation for filing an appeal would commence from the date when the parties concerned acquire knowledge of passing of the said order. - sarpanch of the gram panchayat was not well and, therefore, the appeal could not be filed within time. 130. 11. the plaintiff/respondent challenged the decree of the learned trial court passed in favour of the defendant/appellant primarily on the plea that gram panchayat has failed to prove their ownership over khasra no. 12. the learned lower appellate court accepted the appeal primarily on the ground that the gram panchayat has failed to produce on record any document to prove its ownership over khasra no. 6 by holding that the defendant/appellant has failed to prove its ownership. 189, the learned trial court was justified in accepting the suit as well as counter claim in view of the admission made by the respective parties.vinod k. sharma, j.c.m. no. 6580-c of 20061. allowed as prayed for.c.m. no. 6579-c of 20062. this is an application under section 5 of the limitation act for condoning the delay of 80 days in filing the appeal.3. it has been averred in the application that authorised person i.e. sarpanch of the gram panchayat was not well and, therefore, the appeal could not be filed within time. thereafter, due to procedural requirement, delay of 80 days has occurred in filing the appeal. notice of the application was given. however, no reply has been filed. the application is supported by an affidavit.4. the averments made, therefore, remain unrebutted. the averments made, make out sufficient cause for condoning the delay. c.m. is accordingly allowed and the delay of 80 days in filing the appeal is ordered to be condoned.r.s.a. no. 2734 of 20065. this regular second appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 8.10.2005 passed by the learned lower appellate court, vide which counter claim filed by the defendant/appellant, has been ordered to be dismissed and the appeal filed by the plaintiff/respondent was allowed.6. the plaintiff/respondent no. 1 filed a suit for declaration with consequential relief of permanent injunction restraining the defendants, including gram panchayat, from interfering in his possession over plot mearing 181 sq. yds. purchased by him by way of registered sale deed dated 26.10.1998. the plaintiff had even constructed a shop over the plot sold to him which is in khasra no. 189 measuring 9 marlas.7. the suit was contested wherein claim of the plaintiff/respondent qua ownership and possession over khasra no. 189 was admitted. a positive stand was taken that the gram panchayat or the defendants had no intention to interfer with the possession of the plaintiff/respondent. a plea was also raised that in the garb of purchase of khasra no. 189, the plaintiff/respondent was, in fact, trying to encroach upon khasra no. 130 which is under the ownership of the gram panchayat.8. the appellant also raised a counter claim seeking injunction against the plaintiff/respondent from interfering in possession of the gram panchayat over khasra no. 130.9. in reply filed, the plaintiff/respondent did not dispute the possession of the gram panchayat over khasra no. 130, and took a positive stand that he was not interfering in the possession of the defendant/appellant qua khasra no. 130 and was to protect his possession over khasra no. 189, which was purchased by him.10. the learned trial court decreed the suit of the plaintiff/respondent qua khasra no. 189. however, counter claim filed by the gram panchayat was also accepted and the plaintiff/respondent was restrained from interfering in possession of gram panchayat over khasra no. 130.11. the plaintiff/respondent challenged the decree of the learned trial court passed in favour of the defendant/appellant primarily on the plea that gram panchayat has failed to prove their ownership over khasra no. 130 and, therefore, they were not entitled to injunction.12. the learned lower appellate court accepted the appeal primarily on the ground that the gram panchayat has failed to produce on record any document to prove its ownership over khasra no. 130.13. the learned lower appellate court further held that mere oral statement of the defendant witnesses could not be used to hold that the gram panchayat was owner of khasra no. 130 and, thus, reversed the finding on issue no. 6.14. the learned counsel for the appellant contends, that the appeal raises the following substantial question of law:whether the judgment and decree passed by the learned lower appellate court is outcome of misreading of evidence and is otherwise contrary to the settled law and, thus, perverse? 15. in support of the substantial question of law, the learned counsel for the appellant contends that the learned lower appellate court committed an error in law in reversing the finding of the learned trial court on issue no. 6 by holding that the defendant/appellant has failed to prove its ownership.16. the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant deserves to be accepted. in a suit for injunction, question of title was not to be determined and in any case the dispute regarding the title of gram panchayat could only be adjudicated under the punjab village common lands (regulation) act and not in the civil suit. for the purpose of injunction, the court was only to see the possession of the parties. once the plaintiff/respondent had not raised any claim over khasra no. 130 and had taken a stand that he had no intention to interfere with the possession over khasra no. 130, and was only to protect his possession and ownership over khasra no. 189, the learned trial court was justified in accepting the suit as well as counter claim in view of the admission made by the respective parties.17. the judgment and decree passed by the learned lower appellate court is, therefore, outcome of mis-reading of the pleadings, evidence and is also contrary to established law that in a suit for injunction, question of title was not to be determined.18. for the reasons stated, the appeal is allowed. the judgment and decree passed by the learned lower appellate court is set aside and that of learned trial court is restored, but with no order as to costs.