Roshan Lal Vs. the Secretary, Govt. of Haryana - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
- sections 80 (2) & 89 & punjab motor vehicles rules, 1989, rules 85 & 80: [t.s. thakur, cj, jasbir singh & surya kant, jj] appeal against orders of state or regional transport authority imitation held, a stipulation regarding the period of limitation available for invoking the remedy shall have to be strictly construed. that is because any provision by way of limitation is in the nature of a restraint on the remedy provided under the act. so viewed two inferences are clear viz., (1) sections 80 and 89 of the act read with rule 85 of the rules make it obligatory for the authorities making the order to communicate it to the applicant concerned and (2) the period of limitation for any appeal against the order is reckonable from the date of such communication of the reasons would imply communication of a copy of the written order itself, a party who knows about the making of an order cannot ignore the same and allow grass to grow under its feet and do nothing except waiting for a formal communication of the order or to choose a tenuous plea that even though he knew about the order, he was waiting for its formal communication to seek redress against the same in appeal. if a party does not know about the making of the order either actually or constructively it may claim that the period of limitation would start running from the date it acquires knowledge of the making of an order but one cannot understand how a party, who has acquired knowledge of the making an order either directly or constructively can ignore the same and belatedly seek redress just because the authority making the order had made a default in formally communicating the order to him. allowing a party to do so would amount to placing a premium on the lack of diligence of a party, who is remiss in seeking a remedy that was available to it. therefore, knowledge whether actual or construction of the order passed by the state or regional transport authority should result in commencement of the period of limitation. thus,. in cases where the state or regional transport authority has not communicated the order of refusal passed to the persons concerned, the period of limitation for filing an appeal would commence from the date when the parties concerned acquire knowledge of passing of the said order.v.k. bali, j. 1. petitioners roshan lal and others through present writ filed by them under articles 226/227 of the constitution of india seek a writ in the nature of certiorari so as to quash order passed by the assistant collector and the collector karnal vide which they had been evicted from the land in dispute under the provisions of the punjab village common lands (regulation) act, 1961.2. one of the points raised in the writ petition is that a lessee whose lease has already expired and who is in possession, can be ejected from the land in accordance with law i.e. either by filing a suit or under the provisions of haryana public premises and land (eviction and rent recovery) act. for the aforestated stand, reliance has been placed upon a division bench judgment of this court in civil writ petition no. 17276 of 1991 'om parkash v. the assistant collector 1st grade,' 1, decided on april 1, 1992: (1992-2) 102 p.l.r. 97 (d.b.). i was one of the members of the bench in the civil writ petition aforesaid . while dealing with the matter aforesaid, the court held 'present is a case of a lessee whose lease has already expired and is in possession. he can be ejected from the land in accordance with law either by filing a suit or under the provisions of haryana public premises and land (eviction and rent recovery) act. the observations made above are in direct conflict with a division bench judgment of this court in 'jaimal v. commissioner, ambala division'2, 1969 p.lj. 378. while deciding jaimal's case (supra), the court took into consideration rule 19 of the punjab village common lands (regulation) rules, 1964. rule 19 which defines unauthorised occupation of shamlat deh reads thus:-'19. unauthorised occupation of shamlat deh -- for purposes of section 7 of the act, a person shall be deemed to be in unauthorized occupation of any land in shamlat deh -- (a) where he has, whether before or after the commencement of the act, entered into possession there of otherwise than under and in pursuance of any allotment, lease or grant of by the panchayat; or (b) where he being an allottee, lessee or grantee, has, by reason of the determination or cancellation of his allotment, lease or grant in accordance with the terms in that behalf, therein contained, ceased whether before or after the commencement of the act, to be entitled to occupy or hold such land in shamlat deh; or (c) where any person authorised to occupy any land in shamlat deh has, whether before or after the commencement of the act - (i) sub-let in contravention of the terms of allotment lease or grant, without the permission of the panchayat or of any other authority competent to permit such sub-letting the whole or any part of such land in shamlat deh; or (ii) otherwise acted in contravention of any of the terms express or implied, under which he is authorised to occupy such land in shamlat deh. explanation - for purposes of clause (a), a person shall not merely by reason of the fact that he has paid any rent be deemed to have entered into possession as allottee, lessee or grantee.' the vires of rule 19 were also upheld in jaimal's case (supra). in a recent decision recorded in 'the gram panchayat of village bhagal v. bachna,'3 1987 p.lj. 656 (s.c.), the supreme court has held that upon expiry of term of tenancy, the person in occupation of land had no authority to continue in occupation of the common land belonging to the gram panchayat. he, upon the expiry of five years terms, had thus become an unauthorised occupant. a single bench of this court in fatia v. shri b.r. anand, ias, collector kurukshetra,'4 (1987-2) 92 p.l.r. 673 followed the judgment given by the supreme court in gram panchayat's case (supra). neither rule 19 nor the judgments that have been referred to above were noticed by us while deciding civil writ petition no. 17276 of 1991, om parkash v. the assistant collector 1st grade,1 (supra). the papers of this case be placed before the hon'ble chief justice for constituting a larger bench as the decision recorded in civil writ petition no. 17276 of 1991 does not appear to be laying correct law. the petitioners who are in possession and have obtained stay do not deserve to remain in occupation of the land any more without atleast paying some amount for, use and occupation. it is admitted position that for the kind of land which is in their occupation, gram panchayat can earn minimum of rs. 4,500/- per acre per year ft is, thus, ordered that the petitioners would pay to the gram panchayat at the rate of rs. 4,500/- per acre per year from the date when the assistant collector passed orders of eviction against them. if they do not pay this amount within a period of one month from today, it shall be open to the gram panchayat to execute the order of eviction passed against them.