| SooperKanoon Citation | sooperkanoon.com/621159 | 
| Subject | Property;Civil | 
| Court | Punjab and Haryana High Court | 
| Decided On | Feb-10-1995 | 
| Case Number | C.W.P. No. 10395 of 1994 | 
| Judge |  A.P. Chowdhri and; H.S. Brar, JJ. | 
| Reported in | (1995)109PLR645 | 
| Acts | Chandigarh Lease Holding of Sites and Building Rules, 1973; Constitution of India - Articles 226 and 227 | 
| Appellant | Mukhtiar Singh | 
| Respondent | Union Territory and ors. | 
| Appellant Advocate |  R.S. Dass, Adv. | 
| Respondent Advocate |  N.K. Zakhmi, Adv. | 
Excerpt:
 - sections 80 (2) & 89 & punjab motor vehicles rules, 1989, rules 85 & 80: [t.s. thakur, cj, jasbir singh & surya kant, jj] appeal against orders of state or regional transport authority  imitation  held, a stipulation regarding the period of limitation available for invoking the remedy shall have to be strictly construed. that is because any provision by way of limitation is in the nature of a restraint on the remedy provided under the act. so viewed two inferences are clear viz., (1) sections 80 and 89 of the act read with rule 85 of the rules make it obligatory for the authorities making the order to communicate it to the applicant concerned and (2) the period of limitation for any appeal against the order is reckonable from the date of such communication of the reasons would imply communication of a copy of the written order itself, a party who knows about the making of an order cannot ignore the same and allow grass to grow under its feet and do nothing except waiting for a formal communication of the order or to choose a tenuous plea that even though he knew about the order, he was waiting for its formal communication to seek redress against the same in appeal. if a party does not know about the making of the order either actually or constructively it may claim that the period of limitation would start running from the date it acquires knowledge of the making of an order but one cannot understand how a party, who has acquired knowledge of the making an order either directly or constructively can ignore the same and belatedly seek redress just because the authority making the order had made a default in formally communicating the order to him. allowing a party to do so would amount to placing a premium on the lack of diligence of a party, who is remiss in seeking a remedy that was available to it. therefore, knowledge whether actual or construction of the order passed  by the state or regional transport authority should result in commencement of the period of limitation. thus,. in cases where the state or regional transport authority has not communicated the order of refusal passed to the persons concerned, the period of limitation for filing an appeal would commence from the date when the parties concerned acquire knowledge of passing of the said order.ordera.p. chowdhri and h.s. brar, jj.1. the petitioner was given 99 years old lease in respect of booth no. 71, sector 34 d, chandigarh on july 13, 1979 by order, dated august 11, 1989, annexure p2. the estate officer cancelled the aforesaid lease on the ground that the lessee had sublet the premises to one p.j.s. mehta in contravention of clause 11 of the allotment letter.2. the petitioner preferred an appeal which was dismissed by the chief administrator by order, annexure p3, dated january 4, 1993 and a revision petition there against met the same fate when it was dismissed by the adviser to the administrator by order, annexure p4, dated april 27,1994.3. we have gone through these three orders which have been impugned in this writ petition. we find that not an iota of material has been referred to in any one of them for the finding that the lessee had sublet the premises to another person. learned counsel for the chandigarh administration submitted that a general survey was carried out of various booths. in the survey, it was reported that certain booths had been sublet. it was on the basis of the report of the survey that further action for cancellation was started. we may point out that there is no reference to even that survey or the person who conducted the survey who might have appeared in the witness-box in the proceedings relating to cancellation of the lease. in the facts and circumstances of this case, therefore, we have hardly any choice except to set aside the three impugned orders leaving it open to the estate officer to proceed afresh and pass an order, according to law.4. mr. r.s. dass, counsel for the petitioner has brought to our notice that following the order of cancellation, the premises were sealed in proceedings under the public premises (eviction of unauthorised occupants) act and it is still lying sealed and is in possession of the estate officer.5. we directed that without prejudice to the result of the proceedings which may be initiated by the estate officer in compliance with the above direction, the seal shall be opened and possession of the premises restored to the lessee. this direction has been given especially as mr. r.s. dass states that the various amounts payable under the lease have since been paid. if any outstanding amount is payable by the lessee (petitioner), the same shall be paid by him within one month of the demand being raised by the estate officer.6. the writ petition is disposed of in these terms.
Judgment:ORDER
A.P. Chowdhri and H.S. Brar, JJ.
1. The petitioner was given 99 years old lease in respect of Booth No. 71, Sector 34 D, Chandigarh on July 13, 1979 by order, dated August 11, 1989, Annexure P2. The Estate Officer cancelled the aforesaid lease on the ground that the lessee had sublet the premises to one P.J.S. Mehta in contravention of Clause 11 of the allotment letter.
2. The petitioner preferred an appeal which was dismissed by the Chief Administrator by order, Annexure P3, dated January 4, 1993 and a Revision Petition there against met the same fate when it was dismissed by the Adviser to the Administrator by order, Annexure P4, dated April 27,1994.
3. We have gone through these three orders which have been impugned in this writ petition. We find that not an iota of material has been referred to in any one of them for the finding that the lessee had sublet the premises to another person. Learned counsel for the Chandigarh Administration submitted that a general survey was carried out of various Booths. In the survey, it was reported that certain Booths had been sublet. It was on the basis of the report of the survey that further action for cancellation was started. We may point out that there is no reference to even that survey or the person who conducted the survey who might have appeared in the witness-box in the proceedings relating to cancellation of the lease. In the facts and circumstances of this case, therefore, we have hardly any choice except to set aside the three impugned orders leaving it open to the Estate Officer to proceed afresh and pass an order, according to law.
4. Mr. R.S. Dass, counsel for the petitioner has brought to our notice that following the order of cancellation, the premises were sealed in proceedings under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act and it is still lying sealed and is in possession of the Estate Officer.
5. We directed that without prejudice to the result of the proceedings which may be initiated by the Estate Officer in compliance with the above direction, the seal shall be opened and possession of the premises restored to the lessee. This direction has been given especially as Mr. R.S. Dass states that the various amounts payable under the lease have since been paid. If any outstanding amount is payable by the lessee (petitioner), the same shall be paid by him within one month of the demand being raised by the Estate Officer.
6. The writ petition is disposed of in these terms.