Ram Chander Vs. Prem Chand and ors. - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
- sections 80 (2) & 89 & punjab motor vehicles rules, 1989, rules 85 & 80: [t.s. thakur, cj, jasbir singh & surya kant, jj] appeal against orders of state or regional transport authority imitation held, a stipulation regarding the period of limitation available for invoking the remedy shall have to be strictly construed. that is because any provision by way of limitation is in the nature of a restraint on the remedy provided under the act. so viewed two inferences are clear viz., (1) sections 80 and 89 of the act read with rule 85 of the rules make it obligatory for the authorities making the order to communicate it to the applicant concerned and (2) the period of limitation for any appeal against the order is reckonable from the date of such communication of the reasons would imply communication of a copy of the written order itself, a party who knows about the making of an order cannot ignore the same and allow grass to grow under its feet and do nothing except waiting for a formal communication of the order or to choose a tenuous plea that even though he knew about the order, he was waiting for its formal communication to seek redress against the same in appeal. if a party does not know about the making of the order either actually or constructively it may claim that the period of limitation would start running from the date it acquires knowledge of the making of an order but one cannot understand how a party, who has acquired knowledge of the making an order either directly or constructively can ignore the same and belatedly seek redress just because the authority making the order had made a default in formally communicating the order to him. allowing a party to do so would amount to placing a premium on the lack of diligence of a party, who is remiss in seeking a remedy that was available to it. therefore, knowledge whether actual or construction of the order passed by the state or regional transport authority should result in commencement of the period of limitation. thus,. in cases where the state or regional transport authority has not communicated the order of refusal passed to the persons concerned, the period of limitation for filing an appeal would commence from the date when the parties concerned acquire knowledge of passing of the said order. - 2. after hearing the learned counsel i am of the considered view hat the right of preemption is a very weak type of right and it has to be shown to the satisfaction of the court that on the date of filing the suit at the time of sale and even at the time of decree, the plaintiff-appellant was entitled to pre-empt the sale.m.m. kumar, j.1. the plaintiff has approached this court by invoking section 100 of the civil procedure code, 1908 (for brevity 'the code'), challenging the judgment dated 29.10,2003 passed by the addl. distt. judge, ambala holding that the plaintiff-appellant is not entitled to exercise right of pre-emption because on the date of filing the suit on 2.8.1996 he was shown to be a tenant with respondents no. 7 to 10. the courts below have followed the principle that one single tenant cannot avail the right of pre-emption and pre-empt the sale. the plaintiff-appellant has been non-suited and reliance in this regard has been placed on a judgment of this court in hola ram v. kewal krishan and ors., 1989 punjab law journal 556. it has further been held that on the basis of subsequent corrections ordered vide ex.p1 dated 3.12.1996 no right of pre-emption could be asserted as on the date of filing the suit, right to pre-emption has to be established. the date of filing the suit is 2.8.1996. reliance has also been placed by the learned addl. district judge on a judgment of this court in the case of jinda ram v. ram parkash and anr.? 1996(1) all india land laws reporter 408. ms sunint kaur, learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant has made two fold submission (a) that the application for correction of khasra girdawari was filed much before the filing of the suit and the correction was ordered vide annexure p9 on 3.12.1996 and therefore, the plaintiff-appellant cannot be non-suited on the ground that on the date of filing the suit he had no right of pre-emption. she further submitted that 1/3rd batai had always been deposited by the plaintiff-appellant alone as is evident from ex.p3 to p6 and not by tenant-defendants no. 7 to 10 showing that they were not the tenants that the plaintiff-appellant alone was the tenant.2. after hearing the learned counsel i am of the considered view hat the right of preemption is a very weak type of right and it has to be shown to the satisfaction of the court that on the date of filing the suit at the time of sale and even at the time of decree, the plaintiff-appellant was entitled to pre-empt the sale. in the present case, neither on the date of the sale i.e. 6.5.1995 nor on the date of filing the suit i.e. 2.8.1996 the plaintiff-appellant has the right of pre-emption as the entry in the record showed that he was a co-tenant with others. one tenant alone cannot pre-empt the sale. therefore, no interference is called for.for the reasons recorded above, this appeal fails and the same is dismissed.