| SooperKanoon Citation | sooperkanoon.com/621024 |
| Subject | Family |
| Court | Punjab and Haryana High Court |
| Decided On | Oct-11-2001 |
| Case Number | First Appeal from Order No. 154 of 1998 |
| Judge | Adarsh Kumar Goel, J. |
| Reported in | II(2002)DMC371 |
| Acts | Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 - Sections 13(1) |
| Appellant | Dalbir Singh |
| Respondent | Simar Kaur Alias Simro |
| Advocates: | Surinder Sharma, Adv. |
| Disposition | Appeal dismissed |
| Cases Referred | and Shardu Rani v. Mangal Ram
|
Excerpt:
- sections 80 (2) & 89 & punjab motor vehicles rules, 1989, rules 85 & 80: [t.s. thakur, cj, jasbir singh & surya kant, jj] appeal against orders of state or regional transport authority imitation held, a stipulation regarding the period of limitation available for invoking the remedy shall have to be strictly construed. that is because any provision by way of limitation is in the nature of a restraint on the remedy provided under the act. so viewed two inferences are clear viz., (1) sections 80 and 89 of the act read with rule 85 of the rules make it obligatory for the authorities making the order to communicate it to the applicant concerned and (2) the period of limitation for any appeal against the order is reckonable from the date of such communication of the reasons would imply communication of a copy of the written order itself, a party who knows about the making of an order cannot ignore the same and allow grass to grow under its feet and do nothing except waiting for a formal communication of the order or to choose a tenuous plea that even though he knew about the order, he was waiting for its formal communication to seek redress against the same in appeal. if a party does not know about the making of the order either actually or constructively it may claim that the period of limitation would start running from the date it acquires knowledge of the making of an order but one cannot understand how a party, who has acquired knowledge of the making an order either directly or constructively can ignore the same and belatedly seek redress just because the authority making the order had made a default in formally communicating the order to him. allowing a party to do so would amount to placing a premium on the lack of diligence of a party, who is remiss in seeking a remedy that was available to it. therefore, knowledge whether actual or construction of the order passed by the state or regional transport authority should result in commencement of the period of limitation. thus,. in cases where the state or regional transport authority has not communicated the order of refusal passed to the persons concerned, the period of limitation for filing an appeal would commence from the date when the parties concerned acquire knowledge of passing of the said order. - the children from the previous marriage of the husband were adult and were held to have terrorised the wife to such an extent that the apprehension of the wife was reasonable that it will not be safe for her to return to the matrimonial home. she has been so maltreated, harassed and terrorised that her apprehension of being unsafe in husband's house cannot be said to be ill-founded.adarsh kumar goel, j.1. the appellant-husband has filed this appeal against the dismissal of his petition for restitution of conjugal rights.2. the husband filed the petition for restitution of conjugal rights on 23.5.1996 alleging inter alia that the marriage between the parties took place in the year 1989; no issue was born out of the wedlock; the husband had three issues from the first wife who had died; the wife had withdrawn from the society of the husband without any reasonable excuse; the wife used to the insist that the husband should take separate residence from his parents and children which was not acceptable to the husband; the wife refused to cook and serve food, she went to her parents place on the pretext that she wanted to see them but she took away her belongings and thereafter refused to resume cohabitation. the wife contested the petition stating inter alia, that the husband had filed this petition to avoid maintenance proceedings; dispute arose between the parties on account of cruel treatment meted cut to the wife by the children from the previous marriage and the husband gave beating to the wife and turned her out of the matrimonial home threatening her the death if she entered the house of the husband.3. after appreciating the evidence on record, the trial court held that the wife had withdrawn from the society of the husband without reasonable cause as she has been terrorised by the husband and his children which was clear from the evidence of the wife who appeared in the witness box as rw1 and was also supported by her father sardara singh rw2 and sarpanch wariam singh rw3. the trial court also referred to the observations of the magistrate in maintenance proceedings while noting that the said observations were not binding.4. learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the trial court has erred in observing that the petition filed is a counter blast to the maintenance proceedings which was not a fact, he also states that the wife has stated that she was not willing to go to the matrimonial home. learned counsel for the appellant relied on brij lal v. krishna, (1996-3) 114 p.l.r. 357; smt. nirmala devi v. pritam singh, 1988(1) h.l.r. 760; baljit singh v. maju kaur, 1990(1) h.l.r. 65; smt. santosh kumar v. rajesh kumar, (1988-1) 93 p.l.r. 145 and shardu rani v. mangal ram, (1990-1) 97 p.l.r. 323 and submitted that since wife was not willing to live with the husband any reasonable cause, the trial court ought to have granted decree for restitution as sought by the husband.5. i have considered the submissions of the counsel for the appellant and have perused of the record of the case and the decisions cited at the bar.6. in my view, there is no infirmity in the reasoning and conclusion of the trial court. the main finding of the trial court, with which i concur, is that the wife had reasonable cause for withdrawing from the company of the husband. the children from the previous marriage of the husband were adult and were held to have terrorised the wife to such an extent that the apprehension of the wife was reasonable that it will not be safe for her to return to the matrimonial home. the trial court has believed the version of the wife and nothing has been shown as to why the said version should not have been believed. even if the observation that the husband's petition was a counter-blast to the maintenance proceedings filed by the wife is ignored the conclusion of the trial court, not being based on the said observation alone, cannot be assailed. there is no dispute with the prepositions laid down in the decisions cited at the bar that if wife withdraw from the husband's society without reasonable cause, the husband is entitled to seek a decree for restitution. the present case, however, is different on facts. in the present case, the wife has a genuine apprehension. she has been so maltreated, harassed and terrorised that her apprehension of being unsafe in husband's house cannot be said to be ill-founded. the decisions cited, therefore, do not help the appellant.for the above, reasons, there is no merit in this appeal and the same is dismissed.
Judgment:Adarsh Kumar Goel, J.
1. The Appellant-husband has filed this appeal against the dismissal of his petition for restitution of conjugal rights.
2. The husband filed the petition for restitution of conjugal rights on 23.5.1996 alleging inter alia that the marriage between the parties took place in the year 1989; no issue was born out of the wedlock; the husband had three issues from the first wife who had died; the wife had withdrawn from the society of the husband without any reasonable excuse; the wife used to the insist that the husband should take separate residence from his parents and children which was not acceptable to the husband; the wife refused to cook and serve food, she went to her parents place on the pretext that she wanted to see them but she took away her belongings and thereafter refused to resume cohabitation. The wife contested the petition stating inter alia, that the husband had filed this petition to avoid maintenance proceedings; dispute arose between the parties on account of cruel treatment meted cut to the wife by the children from the previous marriage and the husband gave beating to the wife and turned her out of the matrimonial home threatening her the death if she entered the house of the husband.
3. After appreciating the evidence on record, the trial court held that the wife had withdrawn from the society of the husband without reasonable cause as she has been terrorised by the husband and his children which was clear from the evidence of the wife who appeared in the witness box as RW1 and was also supported by her father Sardara Singh RW2 and Sarpanch Wariam Singh RW3. The trial Court also referred to the observations of the Magistrate in maintenance proceedings while noting that the said observations were not binding.
4. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the trial Court has erred in observing that the petition filed is a counter blast to the maintenance proceedings which was not a fact, he also states that the wife has stated that she was not willing to go to the matrimonial home. Learned counsel for the appellant relied on Brij lal v. Krishna, (1996-3) 114 P.L.R. 357; Smt. Nirmala Devi v. Pritam Singh, 1988(1) H.L.R. 760; Baljit Singh v. Maju Kaur, 1990(1) H.L.R. 65; Smt. Santosh Kumar v. Rajesh Kumar, (1988-1) 93 P.L.R. 145 and Shardu Rani v. Mangal Ram, (1990-1) 97 P.L.R. 323 and submitted that since wife was not willing to live with the husband any reasonable cause, the trial Court ought to have granted decree for restitution as sought by the husband.
5. I have considered the submissions of the counsel for the appellant and have perused of the record of the case and the decisions cited at the bar.
6. In my view, there is no infirmity in the reasoning and conclusion of the trial court. The main finding of the trial court, with which I concur, is that the wife had reasonable cause for withdrawing from the company of the husband. The children from the previous marriage of the husband were adult and were held to have terrorised the wife to such an extent that the apprehension of the wife was reasonable that it will not be safe for her to return to the matrimonial home. The trial court has believed the version of the wife and nothing has been shown as to why the said version should not have been believed. Even if the observation that the husband's petition was a counter-blast to the maintenance proceedings filed by the wife is ignored the conclusion of the trial Court, not being based on the said observation alone, cannot be assailed. There is no dispute with the prepositions laid down in the decisions cited at the bar that if wife withdraw from the husband's society without reasonable cause, the husband is entitled to seek a decree for restitution. The present case, however, is different on facts. In the present case, the wife has a genuine apprehension. She has been so maltreated, harassed and terrorised that her apprehension of being unsafe in husband's house cannot be said to be ill-founded. The decisions cited, therefore, do not help the appellant.
For the above, reasons, there is no merit in this appeal and the same is dismissed.