Darshan Lal Vs. Director, State Transport and ors. - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
- sections 80 (2) & 89 & punjab motor vehicles rules, 1989, rules 85 & 80: [t.s. thakur, cj, jasbir singh & surya kant, jj] appeal against orders of state or regional transport authority imitation held, a stipulation regarding the period of limitation available for invoking the remedy shall have to be strictly construed. that is because any provision by way of limitation is in the nature of a restraint on the remedy provided under the act. so viewed two inferences are clear viz., (1) sections 80 and 89 of the act read with rule 85 of the rules make it obligatory for the authorities making the order to communicate it to the applicant concerned and (2) the period of limitation for any appeal against the order is reckonable from the date of such communication of the reasons would imply communication of a copy of the written order itself, a party who knows about the making of an order cannot ignore the same and allow grass to grow under its feet and do nothing except waiting for a formal communication of the order or to choose a tenuous plea that even though he knew about the order, he was waiting for its formal communication to seek redress against the same in appeal. if a party does not know about the making of the order either actually or constructively it may claim that the period of limitation would start running from the date it acquires knowledge of the making of an order but one cannot understand how a party, who has acquired knowledge of the making an order either directly or constructively can ignore the same and belatedly seek redress just because the authority making the order had made a default in formally communicating the order to him. allowing a party to do so would amount to placing a premium on the lack of diligence of a party, who is remiss in seeking a remedy that was available to it. therefore, knowledge whether actual or construction of the order passed by the state or regional transport authority should result in commencement of the period of limitation. thus,. in cases where the state or regional transport authority has not communicated the order of refusal passed to the persons concerned, the period of limitation for filing an appeal would commence from the date when the parties concerned acquire knowledge of passing of the said order. - the petitioner's duty at best was that of a skilled clerk having in his clerical duties to put up notes and seek instructions.t.h.b. chalapathi, j. 1. challenging the award passed by the labour court, patiala, dated september 20, 1982, refusing to grant any relief to the petitioner, he filed this writ petition to quash the same by issuing a writ of certiorari.2. the petitioner was employed as a legal assistant and has put in service of 3 years 9 months and his services were terminated without any notice, charge-sheet or enquiry on april 3, 1980. thereafter, the petitioner raised an industrial dispute. the management, namely, the punjab roadways, contended that the petitioner was not a workman as defined under section 2(s) of the industrial disputes act, 1947. therefore, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief under the provisions of the said act. this contention of the management was found favour with the labour court. accordingly, the labour court declined to grant any relief to the petitioner on the ground that the petitioner is not a workman. the labour court did not decide the matter on merits as it held that the petitioner is not a workman.3. the only question that arises for consideration in this writ petition is whether the petitioner, who was employed as a legal assistant in punjab roadways, is a workman. this question has already been settled by this court in rajesh garg v. punjab state tubewell corporation ltd. 1985 1 plr 153. in that case also, the petitioner was employed as a legal assistant by the punjab state tubewell corporation. dealing with the question that the legal assistant employed by the corporation is a workman within the meaning of section 2(s) of the industrial disputes act, this court held as follows:'the petitioner's duty at best was that of a skilled clerk having in his clerical duties to put up notes and seek instructions. besides that as urged he had to tender legal advice when asked by the corporation and draft and approve documents as asked by the corporation from the legal point of view. the duties of the petitioner have even been termed by learned counsel to be 'techno-clerical' with the aid of legal knowledge which the petitioner possessed. and, on these grounds, it is contended that these duties could by no stretch of imagination be regarded as administrative or managerial especially when the petitioner had no administrative control over anybody and was rightly designated to assist the corporation in matters asked by it. once, it is held that the petitioner was not working in the corporation in any administrative or managerial capacity, he has conversely to be held a 'workman' within the meaning of section 2(s) of the act.'4. learned counsel for the respondents contended that the petitioner is drawing a sum of rs. 1,150 at the time of termination of his services. therefore, according to him, clause (iv) of section 2(s) the petitioner cannot be termed as a workman under the definition. clause (iv) of section 2(s) reads as follows:'who, being employed in a supervisory capacity, draws wages exceeding rs. 500 per mensem or exercises, either by the nature of the duties attached to the office or by reason of the powers vested in him, functions mainly of a managerial nature.'5. in view of the judgment referred to above, the petitioner cannot be said to be discharging any functions of managerial nature. it cannot also be said that the petitioner has been employed in supervisory capacity. he is not supervising the work of any other person. the petitioner had been only tendering the legal advice to the punjab roadways as and when called upon by the management. therefore, the employment of the petitioner cannot be termed as in a supervisory capacity. therefore, clause (iv) of section 2(s) has no application to the facts of this case. in this view of the matter, i am of the opinion, that the award of the labour court is liable to be set aside. as the matter has not been decided by the labour court on merits, the matter has to be remitted back to the labour court to determine as to whether the termination of the services of the petitioner was contrary to law and invalid and whether he is entitled to any relief,6. accordingly, the writ petition is allowed and the award of the labour court, patiala, dated september 20, 1982 (vide annexure p-5), is hereby set aside and the matter is remitted back to the labour court, patiala, to proceed further in accordance with law. however, there will be no order as to costs.7. the parties are directed to appear before the labour court, patiala, on april 7, 1997.