Narinder Singh Vs. Devinder Singh and ors. - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
- sections 80 (2) & 89 & punjab motor vehicles rules, 1989, rules 85 & 80: [t.s. thakur, cj, jasbir singh & surya kant, jj] appeal against orders of state or regional transport authority imitation held, a stipulation regarding the period of limitation available for invoking the remedy shall have to be strictly construed. that is because any provision by way of limitation is in the nature of a restraint on the remedy provided under the act. so viewed two inferences are clear viz., (1) sections 80 and 89 of the act read with rule 85 of the rules make it obligatory for the authorities making the order to communicate it to the applicant concerned and (2) the period of limitation for any appeal against the order is reckonable from the date of such communication of the reasons would imply communication of a copy of the written order itself, a party who knows about the making of an order cannot ignore the same and allow grass to grow under its feet and do nothing except waiting for a formal communication of the order or to choose a tenuous plea that even though he knew about the order, he was waiting for its formal communication to seek redress against the same in appeal. if a party does not know about the making of the order either actually or constructively it may claim that the period of limitation would start running from the date it acquires knowledge of the making of an order but one cannot understand how a party, who has acquired knowledge of the making an order either directly or constructively can ignore the same and belatedly seek redress just because the authority making the order had made a default in formally communicating the order to him. allowing a party to do so would amount to placing a premium on the lack of diligence of a party, who is remiss in seeking a remedy that was available to it. therefore, knowledge whether actual or construction of the order passed by the state or regional transport authority should result in commencement of the period of limitation. thus,. in cases where the state or regional transport authority has not communicated the order of refusal passed to the persons concerned, the period of limitation for filing an appeal would commence from the date when the parties concerned acquire knowledge of passing of the said order. - section 8(3) of the hindu minority and guardianship act, 1956 clearly lays down that any disposal of immovable property by a natural guardian, in contravention of sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), is voidable at the instance of the minor or any person claiming under him.1. this is a second appeal against a concurrent decision of two courts below, which has arisen in the circumstances, which are these. devinder singh and other respondents filed a suit for possession of agricultural land to the extent of 1/4the share, and for a declaration in respect of the remaining 3/4th share, to the effect that the sale of the land effected by defendants nos. 1 to 4, would not affect their reversionary rights. it may be mentioned here that amar kaur defendant acting as a guardian of the plaintiff-respondents along with defendant no. 1, had sold 79 kanals and 19 marlas of land, as described in the plaint. the sale was effected without obtaining the permission of the court, as required under s. 8 of the hindu minority and guardianship act, and on this score the sale was challenged to be void. the suit was resisted by the defendants on several grounds. the trial court framed various issues to cover the points in controversy arising from the pleadings of the parties, and after considering the evidence produced by them, the suit of devinder singh respondent was decreed for possession to the extent of 1/4th share in the land, on payment of rs.1,500/- plus some charges to the vendees or their successors-in-interest. the suit for declaration in regard to the remaining land was, however, dismissed. the appellant filed an appeal which was heard by the additional district judge, karnal, who dismissed the same and affirmed the decision of the trial court.2. it is apparent from a perusal of the judgments of the courts below that the only point which requires consideration in the present case is, as to whether the sale of the land effected by amar kaur, guardian of devinder singh plaintiff-respondent without obtaining the permission of the court was valid, or not. there is no dispute that at the time when the sale was effected, the plaintiff was a minor and he was about 19 years of age, at the time when the suit was filed. section 8(3) of the hindu minority and guardianship act, 1956 clearly lays down that any disposal of immovable property by a natural guardian, in contravention of sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), is voidable at the instance of the minor or any person claiming under him. sub-section (2) referred to above, enacts that the natural guardian shall not, without the previous permission of the court alienate any immovable property or part thereof, belonging to the minor. mr. j. k. sharma, learned counsel for the appellant has referred to in re krishnakant maganlal, air 1961 guj 68 and smt. sugga bai v. smt. hiralal, air 1969 madh pra 32, in support of his contention that the provisions of s. 8 of the hindu minority and guardianship act, are not applicable to a joint interest of the minor in the joint family property. the learned counsel, however, ignores the fact that there was no averment in the pleadings of the parties that the plaintiff-respondent was a member of the undivided hindu family, nor was this matter incorporated in any of the issues framed in this case. the matter cannot be permitted to be raised for the first time in second appeal, as the determination thereof would require the recording of evidence. the mere facts that the plaintiff-respondent claimed 1/4th share in the property, would not necessarily mean that he was member of an undivided hindu family. the contention of the learned counsel must, therefore, be repelled. the finding of the courts below that the sale by the guardian of the plaintiff-respondent without the permission of the court was invalid is, therefore, quite correct and is affirmed.3. no other point has been argued in this appeal which is without force, and is consequently dismissed, but with no order as to costs.4. appeal dismissed.