| SooperKanoon Citation | sooperkanoon.com/617444 |
| Subject | Contract |
| Court | Punjab and Haryana High Court |
| Decided On | May-04-1951 |
| Case Number | Civil Revn. No. 455 of 1950 |
| Judge | Kapur, J. |
| Reported in | AIR1952P& H380 |
| Acts | Transfer of Property Act, 1882 - Sections 55(6); Contract Act, 1872 - Sections 74; Specific Relief Act, 1877 - Sections 13 |
| Appellant | Ruldu Ram and ors. |
| Respondent | Bhuri Lal and anr. |
| Appellant Advocate | Indar Singh Karewal, Adv. |
| Respondent Advocate | S.L. Puri, Adv. |
| Cases Referred | Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Faibairn Lawson Combe Harbour |
Notice (8): Undefined variable: kword [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 120]Code Contextecho "<div class='table-bordered'><b>Excerpt:</b><br/>";if (trim($desc['Judgement']['casenote'])) {echo $this->Wand->highlight($this->Excerpt->extractRelevant($kword,strtolower(strip_tags($desc['Judgement']['casenote']))), $query);$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp' $dataForView = array( 'title_for_layout' => 'Ruldu Ram and ors Vs Bhuri Lal and anr - Citation 617444 - Court Judgment | ', 'desc' => array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '617444', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/51778/transfer-of-property-act-1882-complete-act">Transfer of Property Act, 1882</a> - Sections 55(6); <a href="/act/51064/indian-contract-act-1872-complete-act">Contract Act, 1872</a> - Sections 74; Specific Relief Act, 1877 - Sections 13', 'appealno' => 'Civil Revn. No. 455 of 1950', 'appellant' => 'Ruldu Ram and ors.', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Ruldu Ram and ors. Vs. Bhuri Lal and anr.', 'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent Appeal Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., - Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act. Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. - In this case, both on questions of law as well as on facts, I find that it was the plaintiff who was not prepared to get the sale deed executed.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Faibairn Lawson Combe Harbour;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => ' Indar Singh Karewal, Adv.', 'counseldef' => ' S.L. Puri, Adv.', 'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana', 'court_type' => 'HC', 'decidedon' => '1951-05-04', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' Kapur, J.', 'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">Kapur, J. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This is a rule against a judgment and decree of Mr. Mani Ram Khanna, Small Cause Court Judge, Amritsar, holding that the breach of the contract was by the plaintiff and dismissing the suit for the recovery of earnest money.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. On the 22nd of January 1947, the plaintiff, Ruldu Ram agreed to purchase some property consisting of a shop, a staircase, a half share in a house and a khola for a sum of Rs. 12,000/- and Rs. 500/- were paid as earnest money. The sale was to be completed by the 7th of March 1947. This being a contract for sale of immovable property, the time was not the essence of the contract. On the 6th of March 1947, the shop was burnt down in communal riots.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The plaintiff brought the suit on the 21st of June 1950 i.e., three years after the date of the contract for the recovery of Rs. 500/- which he had paid as earnest money. The learned Judge has held that the breach was by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Mr. Indar Singh Karwal submits that the property had been destroyed on the 6th of March 1947, and as ha had a right to complete the contract by the 7th of March 1947, he cannot be said to have been guilty of the breach of the contract. I am unable to agree with this proposition. The shop no doubt was burnt on that day and it is in the evidence of the plaintiff as witness that he was not ready to get the sale deed executed, after the shop was burnt down. In Section 13 of the Specific Relief Act it is provided:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 56 of the Indian Contract Act, a contract is not wholly impossible of performance because a portion of its subject-matter, existing at its date, has ceased to exist at the time of the performance.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> ILLUSTRATIONS (a) A contracts to sell a house to B for a lakh of rupees. The day after the contract is made, the house is destroyed by a cyclone. B may be compelled to perform his part of the contract' by paying the purchase money.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">According to this illustration, if any property, which forms the subject-matter of a contract of sale, is destroyed, the contract can still be specifically performed at the instance of either of the parties. In this case, both on questions of law as well as on facts, I find that it was the plaintiff who was not prepared to get the sale deed executed. The breach has therefore rightly been held to be on the part of the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr. Puri has further submitted that the principle 'the loss lies where it falls' applies to this case. It appears that even in England this principle has not been followed: see 'Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Faibairn Lawson Combe Harbour, Ltd.', 1943 A.C. 32. It is not necessary to go into this question in view of the statutory provisions of the Specific Relief Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. I therefore dismiss this petition for revision and discharge the rule. The respondent will have his costs in this Court and the Court below. Counsel's fee two G.Ms. (Rs. 32/-).<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'AIR1952P& H380', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Bhuri Lal and anr.', 'sub' => 'Contract', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ), 'casename_url' => 'ruldu-ram-ors-vs-bhuri-lal-anr', 'args' => array( (int) 0 => '617444', (int) 1 => 'ruldu-ram-ors-vs-bhuri-lal-anr' ) ) $title_for_layout = 'Ruldu Ram and ors Vs Bhuri Lal and anr - Citation 617444 - Court Judgment | ' $desc = array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '617444', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/51778/transfer-of-property-act-1882-complete-act">Transfer of Property Act, 1882</a> - Sections 55(6); <a href="/act/51064/indian-contract-act-1872-complete-act">Contract Act, 1872</a> - Sections 74; Specific Relief Act, 1877 - Sections 13', 'appealno' => 'Civil Revn. No. 455 of 1950', 'appellant' => 'Ruldu Ram and ors.', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Ruldu Ram and ors. Vs. Bhuri Lal and anr.', 'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent Appeal Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., - Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act. Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. - In this case, both on questions of law as well as on facts, I find that it was the plaintiff who was not prepared to get the sale deed executed.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Faibairn Lawson Combe Harbour;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => ' Indar Singh Karewal, Adv.', 'counseldef' => ' S.L. Puri, Adv.', 'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana', 'court_type' => 'HC', 'decidedon' => '1951-05-04', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' Kapur, J.', 'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>Kapur, J. </p><p>1. This is a rule against a judgment and decree of Mr. Mani Ram Khanna, Small Cause Court Judge, Amritsar, holding that the breach of the contract was by the plaintiff and dismissing the suit for the recovery of earnest money.</p><p>2. On the 22nd of January 1947, the plaintiff, Ruldu Ram agreed to purchase some property consisting of a shop, a staircase, a half share in a house and a khola for a sum of Rs. 12,000/- and Rs. 500/- were paid as earnest money. The sale was to be completed by the 7th of March 1947. This being a contract for sale of immovable property, the time was not the essence of the contract. On the 6th of March 1947, the shop was burnt down in communal riots.</p><p>3. The plaintiff brought the suit on the 21st of June 1950 i.e., three years after the date of the contract for the recovery of Rs. 500/- which he had paid as earnest money. The learned Judge has held that the breach was by the plaintiff.</p><p>4. Mr. Indar Singh Karwal submits that the property had been destroyed on the 6th of March 1947, and as ha had a right to complete the contract by the 7th of March 1947, he cannot be said to have been guilty of the breach of the contract. I am unable to agree with this proposition. The shop no doubt was burnt on that day and it is in the evidence of the plaintiff as witness that he was not ready to get the sale deed executed, after the shop was burnt down. In Section 13 of the Specific Relief Act it is provided:</p><p>'Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 56 of the Indian Contract Act, a contract is not wholly impossible of performance because a portion of its subject-matter, existing at its date, has ceased to exist at the time of the performance.</p><p> ILLUSTRATIONS (a) A contracts to sell a house to B for a lakh of rupees. The day after the contract is made, the house is destroyed by a cyclone. B may be compelled to perform his part of the contract' by paying the purchase money.' </p><p>According to this illustration, if any property, which forms the subject-matter of a contract of sale, is destroyed, the contract can still be specifically performed at the instance of either of the parties. In this case, both on questions of law as well as on facts, I find that it was the plaintiff who was not prepared to get the sale deed executed. The breach has therefore rightly been held to be on the part of the plaintiff.</p><p>5. Mr. Puri has further submitted that the principle 'the loss lies where it falls' applies to this case. It appears that even in England this principle has not been followed: see 'Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Faibairn Lawson Combe Harbour, Ltd.', 1943 A.C. 32. It is not necessary to go into this question in view of the statutory provisions of the Specific Relief Act.</p><p>6. I therefore dismiss this petition for revision and discharge the rule. The respondent will have his costs in this Court and the Court below. Counsel's fee two G.Ms. (Rs. 32/-).<p></p><p>', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'AIR1952P& H380', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Bhuri Lal and anr.', 'sub' => 'Contract', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ) $casename_url = 'ruldu-ram-ors-vs-bhuri-lal-anr' $args = array( (int) 0 => '617444', (int) 1 => 'ruldu-ram-ors-vs-bhuri-lal-anr' ) $url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/617444/ruldu-ram-ors-vs-bhuri-lal-anr' $ctype = ' High Court' $caseref = 'Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Faibairn Lawson Combe Harbour<br>'include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 120 View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971 View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933 View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473 Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963 Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200 Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167 [main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109
Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 120]- sections 100-a [as inserted by act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & letters patent, 1865, clause 10: [dr. b.s. chauhan, cj, l. mohapatra & a.s. naidu, jj] letters patent appeal order of single judge of high court passed while deciding matters filed under order 43, rule1 of c.p.c., - held, after introduction of section 110a in the c.p.c., by 2002 amendment act, no letters patent appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a single judge of a high court. a right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. it is pertinent to note that section 100-a introduced by 2002 amendment of the code starts with a non obstante clause. the purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the.....Code Contextecho "<div class='table-bordered'><b>Excerpt:</b><br/>";if (trim($desc['Judgement']['casenote'])) {echo $this->Wand->highlight($this->Excerpt->extractRelevant($kword,strtolower(strip_tags($desc['Judgement']['casenote']))), $query);$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp' $dataForView = array( 'title_for_layout' => 'Ruldu Ram and ors Vs Bhuri Lal and anr - Citation 617444 - Court Judgment | ', 'desc' => array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '617444', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/51778/transfer-of-property-act-1882-complete-act">Transfer of Property Act, 1882</a> - Sections 55(6); <a href="/act/51064/indian-contract-act-1872-complete-act">Contract Act, 1872</a> - Sections 74; Specific Relief Act, 1877 - Sections 13', 'appealno' => 'Civil Revn. No. 455 of 1950', 'appellant' => 'Ruldu Ram and ors.', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Ruldu Ram and ors. Vs. Bhuri Lal and anr.', 'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent Appeal Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., - Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act. Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. - In this case, both on questions of law as well as on facts, I find that it was the plaintiff who was not prepared to get the sale deed executed.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Faibairn Lawson Combe Harbour;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => ' Indar Singh Karewal, Adv.', 'counseldef' => ' S.L. Puri, Adv.', 'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana', 'court_type' => 'HC', 'decidedon' => '1951-05-04', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' Kapur, J.', 'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">Kapur, J. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This is a rule against a judgment and decree of Mr. Mani Ram Khanna, Small Cause Court Judge, Amritsar, holding that the breach of the contract was by the plaintiff and dismissing the suit for the recovery of earnest money.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. On the 22nd of January 1947, the plaintiff, Ruldu Ram agreed to purchase some property consisting of a shop, a staircase, a half share in a house and a khola for a sum of Rs. 12,000/- and Rs. 500/- were paid as earnest money. The sale was to be completed by the 7th of March 1947. This being a contract for sale of immovable property, the time was not the essence of the contract. On the 6th of March 1947, the shop was burnt down in communal riots.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The plaintiff brought the suit on the 21st of June 1950 i.e., three years after the date of the contract for the recovery of Rs. 500/- which he had paid as earnest money. The learned Judge has held that the breach was by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Mr. Indar Singh Karwal submits that the property had been destroyed on the 6th of March 1947, and as ha had a right to complete the contract by the 7th of March 1947, he cannot be said to have been guilty of the breach of the contract. I am unable to agree with this proposition. The shop no doubt was burnt on that day and it is in the evidence of the plaintiff as witness that he was not ready to get the sale deed executed, after the shop was burnt down. In Section 13 of the Specific Relief Act it is provided:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 56 of the Indian Contract Act, a contract is not wholly impossible of performance because a portion of its subject-matter, existing at its date, has ceased to exist at the time of the performance.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> ILLUSTRATIONS (a) A contracts to sell a house to B for a lakh of rupees. The day after the contract is made, the house is destroyed by a cyclone. B may be compelled to perform his part of the contract' by paying the purchase money.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">According to this illustration, if any property, which forms the subject-matter of a contract of sale, is destroyed, the contract can still be specifically performed at the instance of either of the parties. In this case, both on questions of law as well as on facts, I find that it was the plaintiff who was not prepared to get the sale deed executed. The breach has therefore rightly been held to be on the part of the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr. Puri has further submitted that the principle 'the loss lies where it falls' applies to this case. It appears that even in England this principle has not been followed: see 'Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Faibairn Lawson Combe Harbour, Ltd.', 1943 A.C. 32. It is not necessary to go into this question in view of the statutory provisions of the Specific Relief Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. I therefore dismiss this petition for revision and discharge the rule. The respondent will have his costs in this Court and the Court below. Counsel's fee two G.Ms. (Rs. 32/-).<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'AIR1952P& H380', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Bhuri Lal and anr.', 'sub' => 'Contract', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ), 'casename_url' => 'ruldu-ram-ors-vs-bhuri-lal-anr', 'args' => array( (int) 0 => '617444', (int) 1 => 'ruldu-ram-ors-vs-bhuri-lal-anr' ) ) $title_for_layout = 'Ruldu Ram and ors Vs Bhuri Lal and anr - Citation 617444 - Court Judgment | ' $desc = array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '617444', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/51778/transfer-of-property-act-1882-complete-act">Transfer of Property Act, 1882</a> - Sections 55(6); <a href="/act/51064/indian-contract-act-1872-complete-act">Contract Act, 1872</a> - Sections 74; Specific Relief Act, 1877 - Sections 13', 'appealno' => 'Civil Revn. No. 455 of 1950', 'appellant' => 'Ruldu Ram and ors.', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Ruldu Ram and ors. Vs. Bhuri Lal and anr.', 'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent Appeal Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., - Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act. Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. - In this case, both on questions of law as well as on facts, I find that it was the plaintiff who was not prepared to get the sale deed executed.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Faibairn Lawson Combe Harbour;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => ' Indar Singh Karewal, Adv.', 'counseldef' => ' S.L. Puri, Adv.', 'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana', 'court_type' => 'HC', 'decidedon' => '1951-05-04', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' Kapur, J.', 'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>Kapur, J. </p><p>1. This is a rule against a judgment and decree of Mr. Mani Ram Khanna, Small Cause Court Judge, Amritsar, holding that the breach of the contract was by the plaintiff and dismissing the suit for the recovery of earnest money.</p><p>2. On the 22nd of January 1947, the plaintiff, Ruldu Ram agreed to purchase some property consisting of a shop, a staircase, a half share in a house and a khola for a sum of Rs. 12,000/- and Rs. 500/- were paid as earnest money. The sale was to be completed by the 7th of March 1947. This being a contract for sale of immovable property, the time was not the essence of the contract. On the 6th of March 1947, the shop was burnt down in communal riots.</p><p>3. The plaintiff brought the suit on the 21st of June 1950 i.e., three years after the date of the contract for the recovery of Rs. 500/- which he had paid as earnest money. The learned Judge has held that the breach was by the plaintiff.</p><p>4. Mr. Indar Singh Karwal submits that the property had been destroyed on the 6th of March 1947, and as ha had a right to complete the contract by the 7th of March 1947, he cannot be said to have been guilty of the breach of the contract. I am unable to agree with this proposition. The shop no doubt was burnt on that day and it is in the evidence of the plaintiff as witness that he was not ready to get the sale deed executed, after the shop was burnt down. In Section 13 of the Specific Relief Act it is provided:</p><p>'Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 56 of the Indian Contract Act, a contract is not wholly impossible of performance because a portion of its subject-matter, existing at its date, has ceased to exist at the time of the performance.</p><p> ILLUSTRATIONS (a) A contracts to sell a house to B for a lakh of rupees. The day after the contract is made, the house is destroyed by a cyclone. B may be compelled to perform his part of the contract' by paying the purchase money.' </p><p>According to this illustration, if any property, which forms the subject-matter of a contract of sale, is destroyed, the contract can still be specifically performed at the instance of either of the parties. In this case, both on questions of law as well as on facts, I find that it was the plaintiff who was not prepared to get the sale deed executed. The breach has therefore rightly been held to be on the part of the plaintiff.</p><p>5. Mr. Puri has further submitted that the principle 'the loss lies where it falls' applies to this case. It appears that even in England this principle has not been followed: see 'Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Faibairn Lawson Combe Harbour, Ltd.', 1943 A.C. 32. It is not necessary to go into this question in view of the statutory provisions of the Specific Relief Act.</p><p>6. I therefore dismiss this petition for revision and discharge the rule. The respondent will have his costs in this Court and the Court below. Counsel's fee two G.Ms. (Rs. 32/-).<p></p><p>', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'AIR1952P& H380', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Bhuri Lal and anr.', 'sub' => 'Contract', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ) $casename_url = 'ruldu-ram-ors-vs-bhuri-lal-anr' $args = array( (int) 0 => '617444', (int) 1 => 'ruldu-ram-ors-vs-bhuri-lal-anr' ) $url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/617444/ruldu-ram-ors-vs-bhuri-lal-anr' $ctype = ' High Court' $caseref = 'Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Faibairn Lawson Combe Harbour<br>'include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 120 View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971 View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933 View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473 Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963 Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200 Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167 [main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109
Notice (8): Undefined variable: kword [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 123]Code Context}//highest occurence of word in the judgementecho $this->Wand->highlight($this->Excerpt->extractRelevant($kword,strtolower(strip_tags($desc['Judgement']['judgement']))), $query) . "</div>";$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp' $dataForView = array( 'title_for_layout' => 'Ruldu Ram and ors Vs Bhuri Lal and anr - Citation 617444 - Court Judgment | ', 'desc' => array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '617444', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/51778/transfer-of-property-act-1882-complete-act">Transfer of Property Act, 1882</a> - Sections 55(6); <a href="/act/51064/indian-contract-act-1872-complete-act">Contract Act, 1872</a> - Sections 74; Specific Relief Act, 1877 - Sections 13', 'appealno' => 'Civil Revn. No. 455 of 1950', 'appellant' => 'Ruldu Ram and ors.', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Ruldu Ram and ors. Vs. Bhuri Lal and anr.', 'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent Appeal Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., - Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act. Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. - In this case, both on questions of law as well as on facts, I find that it was the plaintiff who was not prepared to get the sale deed executed.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Faibairn Lawson Combe Harbour;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => ' Indar Singh Karewal, Adv.', 'counseldef' => ' S.L. Puri, Adv.', 'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana', 'court_type' => 'HC', 'decidedon' => '1951-05-04', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' Kapur, J.', 'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">Kapur, J. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This is a rule against a judgment and decree of Mr. Mani Ram Khanna, Small Cause Court Judge, Amritsar, holding that the breach of the contract was by the plaintiff and dismissing the suit for the recovery of earnest money.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. On the 22nd of January 1947, the plaintiff, Ruldu Ram agreed to purchase some property consisting of a shop, a staircase, a half share in a house and a khola for a sum of Rs. 12,000/- and Rs. 500/- were paid as earnest money. The sale was to be completed by the 7th of March 1947. This being a contract for sale of immovable property, the time was not the essence of the contract. On the 6th of March 1947, the shop was burnt down in communal riots.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The plaintiff brought the suit on the 21st of June 1950 i.e., three years after the date of the contract for the recovery of Rs. 500/- which he had paid as earnest money. The learned Judge has held that the breach was by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Mr. Indar Singh Karwal submits that the property had been destroyed on the 6th of March 1947, and as ha had a right to complete the contract by the 7th of March 1947, he cannot be said to have been guilty of the breach of the contract. I am unable to agree with this proposition. The shop no doubt was burnt on that day and it is in the evidence of the plaintiff as witness that he was not ready to get the sale deed executed, after the shop was burnt down. In Section 13 of the Specific Relief Act it is provided:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 56 of the Indian Contract Act, a contract is not wholly impossible of performance because a portion of its subject-matter, existing at its date, has ceased to exist at the time of the performance.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> ILLUSTRATIONS (a) A contracts to sell a house to B for a lakh of rupees. The day after the contract is made, the house is destroyed by a cyclone. B may be compelled to perform his part of the contract' by paying the purchase money.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">According to this illustration, if any property, which forms the subject-matter of a contract of sale, is destroyed, the contract can still be specifically performed at the instance of either of the parties. In this case, both on questions of law as well as on facts, I find that it was the plaintiff who was not prepared to get the sale deed executed. The breach has therefore rightly been held to be on the part of the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr. Puri has further submitted that the principle 'the loss lies where it falls' applies to this case. It appears that even in England this principle has not been followed: see 'Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Faibairn Lawson Combe Harbour, Ltd.', 1943 A.C. 32. It is not necessary to go into this question in view of the statutory provisions of the Specific Relief Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. I therefore dismiss this petition for revision and discharge the rule. The respondent will have his costs in this Court and the Court below. Counsel's fee two G.Ms. (Rs. 32/-).<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'AIR1952P& H380', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Bhuri Lal and anr.', 'sub' => 'Contract', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ), 'casename_url' => 'ruldu-ram-ors-vs-bhuri-lal-anr', 'args' => array( (int) 0 => '617444', (int) 1 => 'ruldu-ram-ors-vs-bhuri-lal-anr' ) ) $title_for_layout = 'Ruldu Ram and ors Vs Bhuri Lal and anr - Citation 617444 - Court Judgment | ' $desc = array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '617444', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/51778/transfer-of-property-act-1882-complete-act">Transfer of Property Act, 1882</a> - Sections 55(6); <a href="/act/51064/indian-contract-act-1872-complete-act">Contract Act, 1872</a> - Sections 74; Specific Relief Act, 1877 - Sections 13', 'appealno' => 'Civil Revn. No. 455 of 1950', 'appellant' => 'Ruldu Ram and ors.', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Ruldu Ram and ors. Vs. Bhuri Lal and anr.', 'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent Appeal Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., - Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act. Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. - In this case, both on questions of law as well as on facts, I find that it was the plaintiff who was not prepared to get the sale deed executed.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Faibairn Lawson Combe Harbour;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => ' Indar Singh Karewal, Adv.', 'counseldef' => ' S.L. Puri, Adv.', 'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana', 'court_type' => 'HC', 'decidedon' => '1951-05-04', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' Kapur, J.', 'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>Kapur, J. </p><p>1. This is a rule against a judgment and decree of Mr. Mani Ram Khanna, Small Cause Court Judge, Amritsar, holding that the breach of the contract was by the plaintiff and dismissing the suit for the recovery of earnest money.</p><p>2. On the 22nd of January 1947, the plaintiff, Ruldu Ram agreed to purchase some property consisting of a shop, a staircase, a half share in a house and a khola for a sum of Rs. 12,000/- and Rs. 500/- were paid as earnest money. The sale was to be completed by the 7th of March 1947. This being a contract for sale of immovable property, the time was not the essence of the contract. On the 6th of March 1947, the shop was burnt down in communal riots.</p><p>3. The plaintiff brought the suit on the 21st of June 1950 i.e., three years after the date of the contract for the recovery of Rs. 500/- which he had paid as earnest money. The learned Judge has held that the breach was by the plaintiff.</p><p>4. Mr. Indar Singh Karwal submits that the property had been destroyed on the 6th of March 1947, and as ha had a right to complete the contract by the 7th of March 1947, he cannot be said to have been guilty of the breach of the contract. I am unable to agree with this proposition. The shop no doubt was burnt on that day and it is in the evidence of the plaintiff as witness that he was not ready to get the sale deed executed, after the shop was burnt down. In Section 13 of the Specific Relief Act it is provided:</p><p>'Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 56 of the Indian Contract Act, a contract is not wholly impossible of performance because a portion of its subject-matter, existing at its date, has ceased to exist at the time of the performance.</p><p> ILLUSTRATIONS (a) A contracts to sell a house to B for a lakh of rupees. The day after the contract is made, the house is destroyed by a cyclone. B may be compelled to perform his part of the contract' by paying the purchase money.' </p><p>According to this illustration, if any property, which forms the subject-matter of a contract of sale, is destroyed, the contract can still be specifically performed at the instance of either of the parties. In this case, both on questions of law as well as on facts, I find that it was the plaintiff who was not prepared to get the sale deed executed. The breach has therefore rightly been held to be on the part of the plaintiff.</p><p>5. Mr. Puri has further submitted that the principle 'the loss lies where it falls' applies to this case. It appears that even in England this principle has not been followed: see 'Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Faibairn Lawson Combe Harbour, Ltd.', 1943 A.C. 32. It is not necessary to go into this question in view of the statutory provisions of the Specific Relief Act.</p><p>6. I therefore dismiss this petition for revision and discharge the rule. The respondent will have his costs in this Court and the Court below. Counsel's fee two G.Ms. (Rs. 32/-).<p></p><p>', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'AIR1952P& H380', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Bhuri Lal and anr.', 'sub' => 'Contract', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ) $casename_url = 'ruldu-ram-ors-vs-bhuri-lal-anr' $args = array( (int) 0 => '617444', (int) 1 => 'ruldu-ram-ors-vs-bhuri-lal-anr' ) $url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/617444/ruldu-ram-ors-vs-bhuri-lal-anr' $ctype = ' High Court' $caseref = 'Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Faibairn Lawson Combe Harbour<br>'include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 123 View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971 View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933 View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473 Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963 Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200 Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167 [main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109
Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 123]orderkapur, j. 1. this is a rule against a judgment and decree of mr. mani ram khanna, small cause court judge, amritsar, holding that the breach of the contract was by the plaintiff and dismissing the suit for the recovery of earnest money.2. on the 22nd of january 1947, the plaintiff, ruldu ram agreed to purchase some property consisting of a shop, a staircase, a half share in a house and a khola for a sum of rs. 12,000/- and rs. 500/- were paid as earnest money. the sale was to be completed by the 7th of march 1947. this being a contract for sale of immovable property, the time was not the essence of the contract. on the 6th of march 1947, the shop was burnt down in communal riots.3. the plaintiff brought the suit on the 21st of june 1950 i.e., three years after the date of the.....Code Context}//highest occurence of word in the judgementecho $this->Wand->highlight($this->Excerpt->extractRelevant($kword,strtolower(strip_tags($desc['Judgement']['judgement']))), $query) . "</div>";$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp' $dataForView = array( 'title_for_layout' => 'Ruldu Ram and ors Vs Bhuri Lal and anr - Citation 617444 - Court Judgment | ', 'desc' => array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '617444', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/51778/transfer-of-property-act-1882-complete-act">Transfer of Property Act, 1882</a> - Sections 55(6); <a href="/act/51064/indian-contract-act-1872-complete-act">Contract Act, 1872</a> - Sections 74; Specific Relief Act, 1877 - Sections 13', 'appealno' => 'Civil Revn. No. 455 of 1950', 'appellant' => 'Ruldu Ram and ors.', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Ruldu Ram and ors. Vs. Bhuri Lal and anr.', 'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent Appeal Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., - Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act. Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. - In this case, both on questions of law as well as on facts, I find that it was the plaintiff who was not prepared to get the sale deed executed.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Faibairn Lawson Combe Harbour;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => ' Indar Singh Karewal, Adv.', 'counseldef' => ' S.L. Puri, Adv.', 'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana', 'court_type' => 'HC', 'decidedon' => '1951-05-04', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' Kapur, J.', 'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">Kapur, J. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This is a rule against a judgment and decree of Mr. Mani Ram Khanna, Small Cause Court Judge, Amritsar, holding that the breach of the contract was by the plaintiff and dismissing the suit for the recovery of earnest money.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. On the 22nd of January 1947, the plaintiff, Ruldu Ram agreed to purchase some property consisting of a shop, a staircase, a half share in a house and a khola for a sum of Rs. 12,000/- and Rs. 500/- were paid as earnest money. The sale was to be completed by the 7th of March 1947. This being a contract for sale of immovable property, the time was not the essence of the contract. On the 6th of March 1947, the shop was burnt down in communal riots.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The plaintiff brought the suit on the 21st of June 1950 i.e., three years after the date of the contract for the recovery of Rs. 500/- which he had paid as earnest money. The learned Judge has held that the breach was by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Mr. Indar Singh Karwal submits that the property had been destroyed on the 6th of March 1947, and as ha had a right to complete the contract by the 7th of March 1947, he cannot be said to have been guilty of the breach of the contract. I am unable to agree with this proposition. The shop no doubt was burnt on that day and it is in the evidence of the plaintiff as witness that he was not ready to get the sale deed executed, after the shop was burnt down. In Section 13 of the Specific Relief Act it is provided:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 56 of the Indian Contract Act, a contract is not wholly impossible of performance because a portion of its subject-matter, existing at its date, has ceased to exist at the time of the performance.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> ILLUSTRATIONS (a) A contracts to sell a house to B for a lakh of rupees. The day after the contract is made, the house is destroyed by a cyclone. B may be compelled to perform his part of the contract' by paying the purchase money.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">According to this illustration, if any property, which forms the subject-matter of a contract of sale, is destroyed, the contract can still be specifically performed at the instance of either of the parties. In this case, both on questions of law as well as on facts, I find that it was the plaintiff who was not prepared to get the sale deed executed. The breach has therefore rightly been held to be on the part of the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr. Puri has further submitted that the principle 'the loss lies where it falls' applies to this case. It appears that even in England this principle has not been followed: see 'Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Faibairn Lawson Combe Harbour, Ltd.', 1943 A.C. 32. It is not necessary to go into this question in view of the statutory provisions of the Specific Relief Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. I therefore dismiss this petition for revision and discharge the rule. The respondent will have his costs in this Court and the Court below. Counsel's fee two G.Ms. (Rs. 32/-).<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'AIR1952P& H380', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Bhuri Lal and anr.', 'sub' => 'Contract', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ), 'casename_url' => 'ruldu-ram-ors-vs-bhuri-lal-anr', 'args' => array( (int) 0 => '617444', (int) 1 => 'ruldu-ram-ors-vs-bhuri-lal-anr' ) ) $title_for_layout = 'Ruldu Ram and ors Vs Bhuri Lal and anr - Citation 617444 - Court Judgment | ' $desc = array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '617444', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/51778/transfer-of-property-act-1882-complete-act">Transfer of Property Act, 1882</a> - Sections 55(6); <a href="/act/51064/indian-contract-act-1872-complete-act">Contract Act, 1872</a> - Sections 74; Specific Relief Act, 1877 - Sections 13', 'appealno' => 'Civil Revn. No. 455 of 1950', 'appellant' => 'Ruldu Ram and ors.', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Ruldu Ram and ors. Vs. Bhuri Lal and anr.', 'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent Appeal Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., - Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act. Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. - In this case, both on questions of law as well as on facts, I find that it was the plaintiff who was not prepared to get the sale deed executed.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Faibairn Lawson Combe Harbour;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => ' Indar Singh Karewal, Adv.', 'counseldef' => ' S.L. Puri, Adv.', 'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana', 'court_type' => 'HC', 'decidedon' => '1951-05-04', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' Kapur, J.', 'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>Kapur, J. </p><p>1. This is a rule against a judgment and decree of Mr. Mani Ram Khanna, Small Cause Court Judge, Amritsar, holding that the breach of the contract was by the plaintiff and dismissing the suit for the recovery of earnest money.</p><p>2. On the 22nd of January 1947, the plaintiff, Ruldu Ram agreed to purchase some property consisting of a shop, a staircase, a half share in a house and a khola for a sum of Rs. 12,000/- and Rs. 500/- were paid as earnest money. The sale was to be completed by the 7th of March 1947. This being a contract for sale of immovable property, the time was not the essence of the contract. On the 6th of March 1947, the shop was burnt down in communal riots.</p><p>3. The plaintiff brought the suit on the 21st of June 1950 i.e., three years after the date of the contract for the recovery of Rs. 500/- which he had paid as earnest money. The learned Judge has held that the breach was by the plaintiff.</p><p>4. Mr. Indar Singh Karwal submits that the property had been destroyed on the 6th of March 1947, and as ha had a right to complete the contract by the 7th of March 1947, he cannot be said to have been guilty of the breach of the contract. I am unable to agree with this proposition. The shop no doubt was burnt on that day and it is in the evidence of the plaintiff as witness that he was not ready to get the sale deed executed, after the shop was burnt down. In Section 13 of the Specific Relief Act it is provided:</p><p>'Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 56 of the Indian Contract Act, a contract is not wholly impossible of performance because a portion of its subject-matter, existing at its date, has ceased to exist at the time of the performance.</p><p> ILLUSTRATIONS (a) A contracts to sell a house to B for a lakh of rupees. The day after the contract is made, the house is destroyed by a cyclone. B may be compelled to perform his part of the contract' by paying the purchase money.' </p><p>According to this illustration, if any property, which forms the subject-matter of a contract of sale, is destroyed, the contract can still be specifically performed at the instance of either of the parties. In this case, both on questions of law as well as on facts, I find that it was the plaintiff who was not prepared to get the sale deed executed. The breach has therefore rightly been held to be on the part of the plaintiff.</p><p>5. Mr. Puri has further submitted that the principle 'the loss lies where it falls' applies to this case. It appears that even in England this principle has not been followed: see 'Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Faibairn Lawson Combe Harbour, Ltd.', 1943 A.C. 32. It is not necessary to go into this question in view of the statutory provisions of the Specific Relief Act.</p><p>6. I therefore dismiss this petition for revision and discharge the rule. The respondent will have his costs in this Court and the Court below. Counsel's fee two G.Ms. (Rs. 32/-).<p></p><p>', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'AIR1952P& H380', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Bhuri Lal and anr.', 'sub' => 'Contract', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ) $casename_url = 'ruldu-ram-ors-vs-bhuri-lal-anr' $args = array( (int) 0 => '617444', (int) 1 => 'ruldu-ram-ors-vs-bhuri-lal-anr' ) $url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/617444/ruldu-ram-ors-vs-bhuri-lal-anr' $ctype = ' High Court' $caseref = 'Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Faibairn Lawson Combe Harbour<br>'include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 123 View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971 View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933 View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473 Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963 Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200 Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167 [main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109
Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144]ORDERCode Contextecho $this->Adsense->display('responsive_rect');}echo html_entity_decode($this->Wand->highlight($content[$i], $query));$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp' $dataForView = array( 'title_for_layout' => 'Ruldu Ram and ors Vs Bhuri Lal and anr - Citation 617444 - Court Judgment | ', 'desc' => array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '617444', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/51778/transfer-of-property-act-1882-complete-act">Transfer of Property Act, 1882</a> - Sections 55(6); <a href="/act/51064/indian-contract-act-1872-complete-act">Contract Act, 1872</a> - Sections 74; Specific Relief Act, 1877 - Sections 13', 'appealno' => 'Civil Revn. No. 455 of 1950', 'appellant' => 'Ruldu Ram and ors.', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Ruldu Ram and ors. Vs. Bhuri Lal and anr.', 'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent Appeal Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., - Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act. Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. - In this case, both on questions of law as well as on facts, I find that it was the plaintiff who was not prepared to get the sale deed executed.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Faibairn Lawson Combe Harbour;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => ' Indar Singh Karewal, Adv.', 'counseldef' => ' S.L. Puri, Adv.', 'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana', 'court_type' => 'HC', 'decidedon' => '1951-05-04', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' Kapur, J.', 'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">Kapur, J. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This is a rule against a judgment and decree of Mr. Mani Ram Khanna, Small Cause Court Judge, Amritsar, holding that the breach of the contract was by the plaintiff and dismissing the suit for the recovery of earnest money.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. On the 22nd of January 1947, the plaintiff, Ruldu Ram agreed to purchase some property consisting of a shop, a staircase, a half share in a house and a khola for a sum of Rs. 12,000/- and Rs. 500/- were paid as earnest money. The sale was to be completed by the 7th of March 1947. This being a contract for sale of immovable property, the time was not the essence of the contract. On the 6th of March 1947, the shop was burnt down in communal riots.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The plaintiff brought the suit on the 21st of June 1950 i.e., three years after the date of the contract for the recovery of Rs. 500/- which he had paid as earnest money. The learned Judge has held that the breach was by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Mr. Indar Singh Karwal submits that the property had been destroyed on the 6th of March 1947, and as ha had a right to complete the contract by the 7th of March 1947, he cannot be said to have been guilty of the breach of the contract. I am unable to agree with this proposition. The shop no doubt was burnt on that day and it is in the evidence of the plaintiff as witness that he was not ready to get the sale deed executed, after the shop was burnt down. In Section 13 of the Specific Relief Act it is provided:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 56 of the Indian Contract Act, a contract is not wholly impossible of performance because a portion of its subject-matter, existing at its date, has ceased to exist at the time of the performance.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> ILLUSTRATIONS (a) A contracts to sell a house to B for a lakh of rupees. The day after the contract is made, the house is destroyed by a cyclone. B may be compelled to perform his part of the contract' by paying the purchase money.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">According to this illustration, if any property, which forms the subject-matter of a contract of sale, is destroyed, the contract can still be specifically performed at the instance of either of the parties. In this case, both on questions of law as well as on facts, I find that it was the plaintiff who was not prepared to get the sale deed executed. The breach has therefore rightly been held to be on the part of the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr. Puri has further submitted that the principle 'the loss lies where it falls' applies to this case. It appears that even in England this principle has not been followed: see 'Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Faibairn Lawson Combe Harbour, Ltd.', 1943 A.C. 32. It is not necessary to go into this question in view of the statutory provisions of the Specific Relief Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. I therefore dismiss this petition for revision and discharge the rule. The respondent will have his costs in this Court and the Court below. Counsel's fee two G.Ms. (Rs. 32/-).<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'AIR1952P& H380', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Bhuri Lal and anr.', 'sub' => 'Contract', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ), 'casename_url' => 'ruldu-ram-ors-vs-bhuri-lal-anr', 'args' => array( (int) 0 => '617444', (int) 1 => 'ruldu-ram-ors-vs-bhuri-lal-anr' ) ) $title_for_layout = 'Ruldu Ram and ors Vs Bhuri Lal and anr - Citation 617444 - Court Judgment | ' $desc = array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '617444', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/51778/transfer-of-property-act-1882-complete-act">Transfer of Property Act, 1882</a> - Sections 55(6); <a href="/act/51064/indian-contract-act-1872-complete-act">Contract Act, 1872</a> - Sections 74; Specific Relief Act, 1877 - Sections 13', 'appealno' => 'Civil Revn. No. 455 of 1950', 'appellant' => 'Ruldu Ram and ors.', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Ruldu Ram and ors. Vs. Bhuri Lal and anr.', 'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent Appeal Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., - Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act. Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. - In this case, both on questions of law as well as on facts, I find that it was the plaintiff who was not prepared to get the sale deed executed.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Faibairn Lawson Combe Harbour;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => ' Indar Singh Karewal, Adv.', 'counseldef' => ' S.L. Puri, Adv.', 'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana', 'court_type' => 'HC', 'decidedon' => '1951-05-04', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' Kapur, J.', 'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>Kapur, J. </p><p>1. This is a rule against a judgment and decree of Mr. Mani Ram Khanna, Small Cause Court Judge, Amritsar, holding that the breach of the contract was by the plaintiff and dismissing the suit for the recovery of earnest money.</p><p>2. On the 22nd of January 1947, the plaintiff, Ruldu Ram agreed to purchase some property consisting of a shop, a staircase, a half share in a house and a khola for a sum of Rs. 12,000/- and Rs. 500/- were paid as earnest money. The sale was to be completed by the 7th of March 1947. This being a contract for sale of immovable property, the time was not the essence of the contract. On the 6th of March 1947, the shop was burnt down in communal riots.</p><p>3. The plaintiff brought the suit on the 21st of June 1950 i.e., three years after the date of the contract for the recovery of Rs. 500/- which he had paid as earnest money. The learned Judge has held that the breach was by the plaintiff.</p><p>4. Mr. Indar Singh Karwal submits that the property had been destroyed on the 6th of March 1947, and as ha had a right to complete the contract by the 7th of March 1947, he cannot be said to have been guilty of the breach of the contract. I am unable to agree with this proposition. The shop no doubt was burnt on that day and it is in the evidence of the plaintiff as witness that he was not ready to get the sale deed executed, after the shop was burnt down. In Section 13 of the Specific Relief Act it is provided:</p><p>'Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 56 of the Indian Contract Act, a contract is not wholly impossible of performance because a portion of its subject-matter, existing at its date, has ceased to exist at the time of the performance.</p><p> ILLUSTRATIONS (a) A contracts to sell a house to B for a lakh of rupees. The day after the contract is made, the house is destroyed by a cyclone. B may be compelled to perform his part of the contract' by paying the purchase money.' </p><p>According to this illustration, if any property, which forms the subject-matter of a contract of sale, is destroyed, the contract can still be specifically performed at the instance of either of the parties. In this case, both on questions of law as well as on facts, I find that it was the plaintiff who was not prepared to get the sale deed executed. The breach has therefore rightly been held to be on the part of the plaintiff.</p><p>5. Mr. Puri has further submitted that the principle 'the loss lies where it falls' applies to this case. It appears that even in England this principle has not been followed: see 'Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Faibairn Lawson Combe Harbour, Ltd.', 1943 A.C. 32. It is not necessary to go into this question in view of the statutory provisions of the Specific Relief Act.</p><p>6. I therefore dismiss this petition for revision and discharge the rule. The respondent will have his costs in this Court and the Court below. Counsel's fee two G.Ms. (Rs. 32/-).<p></p><p>', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'AIR1952P& H380', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Bhuri Lal and anr.', 'sub' => 'Contract', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ) $casename_url = 'ruldu-ram-ors-vs-bhuri-lal-anr' $args = array( (int) 0 => '617444', (int) 1 => 'ruldu-ram-ors-vs-bhuri-lal-anr' ) $url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/617444/ruldu-ram-ors-vs-bhuri-lal-anr' $ctype = ' High Court' $caseref = 'Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Faibairn Lawson Combe Harbour<br>' $content = array( (int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>Kapur, J. ', (int) 1 => '<p>1. This is a rule against a judgment and decree of Mr. Mani Ram Khanna, Small Cause Court Judge, Amritsar, holding that the breach of the contract was by the plaintiff and dismissing the suit for the recovery of earnest money.', (int) 2 => '<p>2. On the 22nd of January 1947, the plaintiff, Ruldu Ram agreed to purchase some property consisting of a shop, a staircase, a half share in a house and a khola for a sum of Rs. 12,000/- and Rs. 500/- were paid as earnest money. The sale was to be completed by the 7th of March 1947. This being a contract for sale of immovable property, the time was not the essence of the contract. On the 6th of March 1947, the shop was burnt down in communal riots.', (int) 3 => '<p>3. The plaintiff brought the suit on the 21st of June 1950 i.e., three years after the date of the contract for the recovery of Rs. 500/- which he had paid as earnest money. The learned Judge has held that the breach was by the plaintiff.', (int) 4 => '<p>4. Mr. Indar Singh Karwal submits that the property had been destroyed on the 6th of March 1947, and as ha had a right to complete the contract by the 7th of March 1947, he cannot be said to have been guilty of the breach of the contract. I am unable to agree with this proposition. The shop no doubt was burnt on that day and it is in the evidence of the plaintiff as witness that he was not ready to get the sale deed executed, after the shop was burnt down. In Section 13 of the Specific Relief Act it is provided:', (int) 5 => '<p>'Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 56 of the Indian Contract Act, a contract is not wholly impossible of performance because a portion of its subject-matter, existing at its date, has ceased to exist at the time of the performance.', (int) 6 => '<p> ILLUSTRATIONS (a) A contracts to sell a house to B for a lakh of rupees. The day after the contract is made, the house is destroyed by a cyclone. B may be compelled to perform his part of the contract' by paying the purchase money.' ', (int) 7 => '<p>According to this illustration, if any property, which forms the subject-matter of a contract of sale, is destroyed, the contract can still be specifically performed at the instance of either of the parties. In this case, both on questions of law as well as on facts, I find that it was the plaintiff who was not prepared to get the sale deed executed. The breach has therefore rightly been held to be on the part of the plaintiff.', (int) 8 => '<p>5. Mr. Puri has further submitted that the principle 'the loss lies where it falls' applies to this case. It appears that even in England this principle has not been followed: see 'Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Faibairn Lawson Combe Harbour, Ltd.', 1943 A.C. 32. It is not necessary to go into this question in view of the statutory provisions of the Specific Relief Act.', (int) 9 => '<p>6. I therefore dismiss this petition for revision and discharge the rule. The respondent will have his costs in this Court and the Court below. Counsel's fee two G.Ms. (Rs. 32/-).<p>', (int) 10 => '<p>' ) $paragraphAfter = (int) 1 $cnt = (int) 11 $i = (int) 0include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144 View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971 View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933 View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473 Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963 Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200 Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167 [main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109
Kapur, J.
Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144]Code Contextecho $this->Adsense->display('responsive_rect');}echo html_entity_decode($this->Wand->highlight($content[$i], $query));$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp' $dataForView = array( 'title_for_layout' => 'Ruldu Ram and ors Vs Bhuri Lal and anr - Citation 617444 - Court Judgment | ', 'desc' => array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '617444', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/51778/transfer-of-property-act-1882-complete-act">Transfer of Property Act, 1882</a> - Sections 55(6); <a href="/act/51064/indian-contract-act-1872-complete-act">Contract Act, 1872</a> - Sections 74; Specific Relief Act, 1877 - Sections 13', 'appealno' => 'Civil Revn. No. 455 of 1950', 'appellant' => 'Ruldu Ram and ors.', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Ruldu Ram and ors. Vs. Bhuri Lal and anr.', 'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent Appeal Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., - Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act. Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. - In this case, both on questions of law as well as on facts, I find that it was the plaintiff who was not prepared to get the sale deed executed.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Faibairn Lawson Combe Harbour;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => ' Indar Singh Karewal, Adv.', 'counseldef' => ' S.L. Puri, Adv.', 'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana', 'court_type' => 'HC', 'decidedon' => '1951-05-04', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' Kapur, J.', 'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">Kapur, J. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This is a rule against a judgment and decree of Mr. Mani Ram Khanna, Small Cause Court Judge, Amritsar, holding that the breach of the contract was by the plaintiff and dismissing the suit for the recovery of earnest money.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. On the 22nd of January 1947, the plaintiff, Ruldu Ram agreed to purchase some property consisting of a shop, a staircase, a half share in a house and a khola for a sum of Rs. 12,000/- and Rs. 500/- were paid as earnest money. The sale was to be completed by the 7th of March 1947. This being a contract for sale of immovable property, the time was not the essence of the contract. On the 6th of March 1947, the shop was burnt down in communal riots.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The plaintiff brought the suit on the 21st of June 1950 i.e., three years after the date of the contract for the recovery of Rs. 500/- which he had paid as earnest money. The learned Judge has held that the breach was by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Mr. Indar Singh Karwal submits that the property had been destroyed on the 6th of March 1947, and as ha had a right to complete the contract by the 7th of March 1947, he cannot be said to have been guilty of the breach of the contract. I am unable to agree with this proposition. The shop no doubt was burnt on that day and it is in the evidence of the plaintiff as witness that he was not ready to get the sale deed executed, after the shop was burnt down. In Section 13 of the Specific Relief Act it is provided:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 56 of the Indian Contract Act, a contract is not wholly impossible of performance because a portion of its subject-matter, existing at its date, has ceased to exist at the time of the performance.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> ILLUSTRATIONS (a) A contracts to sell a house to B for a lakh of rupees. The day after the contract is made, the house is destroyed by a cyclone. B may be compelled to perform his part of the contract' by paying the purchase money.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">According to this illustration, if any property, which forms the subject-matter of a contract of sale, is destroyed, the contract can still be specifically performed at the instance of either of the parties. In this case, both on questions of law as well as on facts, I find that it was the plaintiff who was not prepared to get the sale deed executed. The breach has therefore rightly been held to be on the part of the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr. Puri has further submitted that the principle 'the loss lies where it falls' applies to this case. It appears that even in England this principle has not been followed: see 'Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Faibairn Lawson Combe Harbour, Ltd.', 1943 A.C. 32. It is not necessary to go into this question in view of the statutory provisions of the Specific Relief Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. I therefore dismiss this petition for revision and discharge the rule. The respondent will have his costs in this Court and the Court below. Counsel's fee two G.Ms. (Rs. 32/-).<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'AIR1952P& H380', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Bhuri Lal and anr.', 'sub' => 'Contract', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ), 'casename_url' => 'ruldu-ram-ors-vs-bhuri-lal-anr', 'args' => array( (int) 0 => '617444', (int) 1 => 'ruldu-ram-ors-vs-bhuri-lal-anr' ) ) $title_for_layout = 'Ruldu Ram and ors Vs Bhuri Lal and anr - Citation 617444 - Court Judgment | ' $desc = array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '617444', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/51778/transfer-of-property-act-1882-complete-act">Transfer of Property Act, 1882</a> - Sections 55(6); <a href="/act/51064/indian-contract-act-1872-complete-act">Contract Act, 1872</a> - Sections 74; Specific Relief Act, 1877 - Sections 13', 'appealno' => 'Civil Revn. No. 455 of 1950', 'appellant' => 'Ruldu Ram and ors.', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Ruldu Ram and ors. Vs. Bhuri Lal and anr.', 'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent Appeal Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., - Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act. Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. - In this case, both on questions of law as well as on facts, I find that it was the plaintiff who was not prepared to get the sale deed executed.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Faibairn Lawson Combe Harbour;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => ' Indar Singh Karewal, Adv.', 'counseldef' => ' S.L. Puri, Adv.', 'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana', 'court_type' => 'HC', 'decidedon' => '1951-05-04', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' Kapur, J.', 'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>Kapur, J. </p><p>1. This is a rule against a judgment and decree of Mr. Mani Ram Khanna, Small Cause Court Judge, Amritsar, holding that the breach of the contract was by the plaintiff and dismissing the suit for the recovery of earnest money.</p><p>2. On the 22nd of January 1947, the plaintiff, Ruldu Ram agreed to purchase some property consisting of a shop, a staircase, a half share in a house and a khola for a sum of Rs. 12,000/- and Rs. 500/- were paid as earnest money. The sale was to be completed by the 7th of March 1947. This being a contract for sale of immovable property, the time was not the essence of the contract. On the 6th of March 1947, the shop was burnt down in communal riots.</p><p>3. The plaintiff brought the suit on the 21st of June 1950 i.e., three years after the date of the contract for the recovery of Rs. 500/- which he had paid as earnest money. The learned Judge has held that the breach was by the plaintiff.</p><p>4. Mr. Indar Singh Karwal submits that the property had been destroyed on the 6th of March 1947, and as ha had a right to complete the contract by the 7th of March 1947, he cannot be said to have been guilty of the breach of the contract. I am unable to agree with this proposition. The shop no doubt was burnt on that day and it is in the evidence of the plaintiff as witness that he was not ready to get the sale deed executed, after the shop was burnt down. In Section 13 of the Specific Relief Act it is provided:</p><p>'Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 56 of the Indian Contract Act, a contract is not wholly impossible of performance because a portion of its subject-matter, existing at its date, has ceased to exist at the time of the performance.</p><p> ILLUSTRATIONS (a) A contracts to sell a house to B for a lakh of rupees. The day after the contract is made, the house is destroyed by a cyclone. B may be compelled to perform his part of the contract' by paying the purchase money.' </p><p>According to this illustration, if any property, which forms the subject-matter of a contract of sale, is destroyed, the contract can still be specifically performed at the instance of either of the parties. In this case, both on questions of law as well as on facts, I find that it was the plaintiff who was not prepared to get the sale deed executed. The breach has therefore rightly been held to be on the part of the plaintiff.</p><p>5. Mr. Puri has further submitted that the principle 'the loss lies where it falls' applies to this case. It appears that even in England this principle has not been followed: see 'Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Faibairn Lawson Combe Harbour, Ltd.', 1943 A.C. 32. It is not necessary to go into this question in view of the statutory provisions of the Specific Relief Act.</p><p>6. I therefore dismiss this petition for revision and discharge the rule. The respondent will have his costs in this Court and the Court below. Counsel's fee two G.Ms. (Rs. 32/-).<p></p><p>', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'AIR1952P& H380', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Bhuri Lal and anr.', 'sub' => 'Contract', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ) $casename_url = 'ruldu-ram-ors-vs-bhuri-lal-anr' $args = array( (int) 0 => '617444', (int) 1 => 'ruldu-ram-ors-vs-bhuri-lal-anr' ) $url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/617444/ruldu-ram-ors-vs-bhuri-lal-anr' $ctype = ' High Court' $caseref = 'Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Faibairn Lawson Combe Harbour<br>' $content = array( (int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>Kapur, J. ', (int) 1 => '<p>1. This is a rule against a judgment and decree of Mr. Mani Ram Khanna, Small Cause Court Judge, Amritsar, holding that the breach of the contract was by the plaintiff and dismissing the suit for the recovery of earnest money.', (int) 2 => '<p>2. On the 22nd of January 1947, the plaintiff, Ruldu Ram agreed to purchase some property consisting of a shop, a staircase, a half share in a house and a khola for a sum of Rs. 12,000/- and Rs. 500/- were paid as earnest money. The sale was to be completed by the 7th of March 1947. This being a contract for sale of immovable property, the time was not the essence of the contract. On the 6th of March 1947, the shop was burnt down in communal riots.', (int) 3 => '<p>3. The plaintiff brought the suit on the 21st of June 1950 i.e., three years after the date of the contract for the recovery of Rs. 500/- which he had paid as earnest money. The learned Judge has held that the breach was by the plaintiff.', (int) 4 => '<p>4. Mr. Indar Singh Karwal submits that the property had been destroyed on the 6th of March 1947, and as ha had a right to complete the contract by the 7th of March 1947, he cannot be said to have been guilty of the breach of the contract. I am unable to agree with this proposition. The shop no doubt was burnt on that day and it is in the evidence of the plaintiff as witness that he was not ready to get the sale deed executed, after the shop was burnt down. In Section 13 of the Specific Relief Act it is provided:', (int) 5 => '<p>'Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 56 of the Indian Contract Act, a contract is not wholly impossible of performance because a portion of its subject-matter, existing at its date, has ceased to exist at the time of the performance.', (int) 6 => '<p> ILLUSTRATIONS (a) A contracts to sell a house to B for a lakh of rupees. The day after the contract is made, the house is destroyed by a cyclone. B may be compelled to perform his part of the contract' by paying the purchase money.' ', (int) 7 => '<p>According to this illustration, if any property, which forms the subject-matter of a contract of sale, is destroyed, the contract can still be specifically performed at the instance of either of the parties. In this case, both on questions of law as well as on facts, I find that it was the plaintiff who was not prepared to get the sale deed executed. The breach has therefore rightly been held to be on the part of the plaintiff.', (int) 8 => '<p>5. Mr. Puri has further submitted that the principle 'the loss lies where it falls' applies to this case. It appears that even in England this principle has not been followed: see 'Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Faibairn Lawson Combe Harbour, Ltd.', 1943 A.C. 32. It is not necessary to go into this question in view of the statutory provisions of the Specific Relief Act.', (int) 9 => '<p>6. I therefore dismiss this petition for revision and discharge the rule. The respondent will have his costs in this Court and the Court below. Counsel's fee two G.Ms. (Rs. 32/-).<p>', (int) 10 => '<p>' ) $paragraphAfter = (int) 1 $cnt = (int) 11 $i = (int) 1include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144 View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971 View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933 View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473 Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963 Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200 Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167 [main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109
1. This is a rule against a judgment and decree of Mr. Mani Ram Khanna, Small Cause Court Judge, Amritsar, holding that the breach of the contract was by the plaintiff and dismissing the suit for the recovery of earnest money.
Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144]Code Contextecho $this->Adsense->display('responsive_rect');}echo html_entity_decode($this->Wand->highlight($content[$i], $query));$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp' $dataForView = array( 'title_for_layout' => 'Ruldu Ram and ors Vs Bhuri Lal and anr - Citation 617444 - Court Judgment | ', 'desc' => array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '617444', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/51778/transfer-of-property-act-1882-complete-act">Transfer of Property Act, 1882</a> - Sections 55(6); <a href="/act/51064/indian-contract-act-1872-complete-act">Contract Act, 1872</a> - Sections 74; Specific Relief Act, 1877 - Sections 13', 'appealno' => 'Civil Revn. No. 455 of 1950', 'appellant' => 'Ruldu Ram and ors.', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Ruldu Ram and ors. Vs. Bhuri Lal and anr.', 'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent Appeal Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., - Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act. Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. - In this case, both on questions of law as well as on facts, I find that it was the plaintiff who was not prepared to get the sale deed executed.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Faibairn Lawson Combe Harbour;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => ' Indar Singh Karewal, Adv.', 'counseldef' => ' S.L. Puri, Adv.', 'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana', 'court_type' => 'HC', 'decidedon' => '1951-05-04', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' Kapur, J.', 'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">Kapur, J. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This is a rule against a judgment and decree of Mr. Mani Ram Khanna, Small Cause Court Judge, Amritsar, holding that the breach of the contract was by the plaintiff and dismissing the suit for the recovery of earnest money.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. On the 22nd of January 1947, the plaintiff, Ruldu Ram agreed to purchase some property consisting of a shop, a staircase, a half share in a house and a khola for a sum of Rs. 12,000/- and Rs. 500/- were paid as earnest money. The sale was to be completed by the 7th of March 1947. This being a contract for sale of immovable property, the time was not the essence of the contract. On the 6th of March 1947, the shop was burnt down in communal riots.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The plaintiff brought the suit on the 21st of June 1950 i.e., three years after the date of the contract for the recovery of Rs. 500/- which he had paid as earnest money. The learned Judge has held that the breach was by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Mr. Indar Singh Karwal submits that the property had been destroyed on the 6th of March 1947, and as ha had a right to complete the contract by the 7th of March 1947, he cannot be said to have been guilty of the breach of the contract. I am unable to agree with this proposition. The shop no doubt was burnt on that day and it is in the evidence of the plaintiff as witness that he was not ready to get the sale deed executed, after the shop was burnt down. In Section 13 of the Specific Relief Act it is provided:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 56 of the Indian Contract Act, a contract is not wholly impossible of performance because a portion of its subject-matter, existing at its date, has ceased to exist at the time of the performance.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> ILLUSTRATIONS (a) A contracts to sell a house to B for a lakh of rupees. The day after the contract is made, the house is destroyed by a cyclone. B may be compelled to perform his part of the contract' by paying the purchase money.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">According to this illustration, if any property, which forms the subject-matter of a contract of sale, is destroyed, the contract can still be specifically performed at the instance of either of the parties. In this case, both on questions of law as well as on facts, I find that it was the plaintiff who was not prepared to get the sale deed executed. The breach has therefore rightly been held to be on the part of the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr. Puri has further submitted that the principle 'the loss lies where it falls' applies to this case. It appears that even in England this principle has not been followed: see 'Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Faibairn Lawson Combe Harbour, Ltd.', 1943 A.C. 32. It is not necessary to go into this question in view of the statutory provisions of the Specific Relief Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. I therefore dismiss this petition for revision and discharge the rule. The respondent will have his costs in this Court and the Court below. Counsel's fee two G.Ms. (Rs. 32/-).<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'AIR1952P& H380', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Bhuri Lal and anr.', 'sub' => 'Contract', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ), 'casename_url' => 'ruldu-ram-ors-vs-bhuri-lal-anr', 'args' => array( (int) 0 => '617444', (int) 1 => 'ruldu-ram-ors-vs-bhuri-lal-anr' ) ) $title_for_layout = 'Ruldu Ram and ors Vs Bhuri Lal and anr - Citation 617444 - Court Judgment | ' $desc = array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '617444', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/51778/transfer-of-property-act-1882-complete-act">Transfer of Property Act, 1882</a> - Sections 55(6); <a href="/act/51064/indian-contract-act-1872-complete-act">Contract Act, 1872</a> - Sections 74; Specific Relief Act, 1877 - Sections 13', 'appealno' => 'Civil Revn. No. 455 of 1950', 'appellant' => 'Ruldu Ram and ors.', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Ruldu Ram and ors. Vs. Bhuri Lal and anr.', 'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent Appeal Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., - Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act. Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. - In this case, both on questions of law as well as on facts, I find that it was the plaintiff who was not prepared to get the sale deed executed.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Faibairn Lawson Combe Harbour;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => ' Indar Singh Karewal, Adv.', 'counseldef' => ' S.L. Puri, Adv.', 'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana', 'court_type' => 'HC', 'decidedon' => '1951-05-04', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' Kapur, J.', 'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>Kapur, J. </p><p>1. This is a rule against a judgment and decree of Mr. Mani Ram Khanna, Small Cause Court Judge, Amritsar, holding that the breach of the contract was by the plaintiff and dismissing the suit for the recovery of earnest money.</p><p>2. On the 22nd of January 1947, the plaintiff, Ruldu Ram agreed to purchase some property consisting of a shop, a staircase, a half share in a house and a khola for a sum of Rs. 12,000/- and Rs. 500/- were paid as earnest money. The sale was to be completed by the 7th of March 1947. This being a contract for sale of immovable property, the time was not the essence of the contract. On the 6th of March 1947, the shop was burnt down in communal riots.</p><p>3. The plaintiff brought the suit on the 21st of June 1950 i.e., three years after the date of the contract for the recovery of Rs. 500/- which he had paid as earnest money. The learned Judge has held that the breach was by the plaintiff.</p><p>4. Mr. Indar Singh Karwal submits that the property had been destroyed on the 6th of March 1947, and as ha had a right to complete the contract by the 7th of March 1947, he cannot be said to have been guilty of the breach of the contract. I am unable to agree with this proposition. The shop no doubt was burnt on that day and it is in the evidence of the plaintiff as witness that he was not ready to get the sale deed executed, after the shop was burnt down. In Section 13 of the Specific Relief Act it is provided:</p><p>'Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 56 of the Indian Contract Act, a contract is not wholly impossible of performance because a portion of its subject-matter, existing at its date, has ceased to exist at the time of the performance.</p><p> ILLUSTRATIONS (a) A contracts to sell a house to B for a lakh of rupees. The day after the contract is made, the house is destroyed by a cyclone. B may be compelled to perform his part of the contract' by paying the purchase money.' </p><p>According to this illustration, if any property, which forms the subject-matter of a contract of sale, is destroyed, the contract can still be specifically performed at the instance of either of the parties. In this case, both on questions of law as well as on facts, I find that it was the plaintiff who was not prepared to get the sale deed executed. The breach has therefore rightly been held to be on the part of the plaintiff.</p><p>5. Mr. Puri has further submitted that the principle 'the loss lies where it falls' applies to this case. It appears that even in England this principle has not been followed: see 'Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Faibairn Lawson Combe Harbour, Ltd.', 1943 A.C. 32. It is not necessary to go into this question in view of the statutory provisions of the Specific Relief Act.</p><p>6. I therefore dismiss this petition for revision and discharge the rule. The respondent will have his costs in this Court and the Court below. Counsel's fee two G.Ms. (Rs. 32/-).<p></p><p>', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'AIR1952P& H380', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Bhuri Lal and anr.', 'sub' => 'Contract', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ) $casename_url = 'ruldu-ram-ors-vs-bhuri-lal-anr' $args = array( (int) 0 => '617444', (int) 1 => 'ruldu-ram-ors-vs-bhuri-lal-anr' ) $url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/617444/ruldu-ram-ors-vs-bhuri-lal-anr' $ctype = ' High Court' $caseref = 'Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Faibairn Lawson Combe Harbour<br>' $content = array( (int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>Kapur, J. ', (int) 1 => '<p>1. This is a rule against a judgment and decree of Mr. Mani Ram Khanna, Small Cause Court Judge, Amritsar, holding that the breach of the contract was by the plaintiff and dismissing the suit for the recovery of earnest money.', (int) 2 => '<p>2. On the 22nd of January 1947, the plaintiff, Ruldu Ram agreed to purchase some property consisting of a shop, a staircase, a half share in a house and a khola for a sum of Rs. 12,000/- and Rs. 500/- were paid as earnest money. The sale was to be completed by the 7th of March 1947. This being a contract for sale of immovable property, the time was not the essence of the contract. On the 6th of March 1947, the shop was burnt down in communal riots.', (int) 3 => '<p>3. The plaintiff brought the suit on the 21st of June 1950 i.e., three years after the date of the contract for the recovery of Rs. 500/- which he had paid as earnest money. The learned Judge has held that the breach was by the plaintiff.', (int) 4 => '<p>4. Mr. Indar Singh Karwal submits that the property had been destroyed on the 6th of March 1947, and as ha had a right to complete the contract by the 7th of March 1947, he cannot be said to have been guilty of the breach of the contract. I am unable to agree with this proposition. The shop no doubt was burnt on that day and it is in the evidence of the plaintiff as witness that he was not ready to get the sale deed executed, after the shop was burnt down. In Section 13 of the Specific Relief Act it is provided:', (int) 5 => '<p>'Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 56 of the Indian Contract Act, a contract is not wholly impossible of performance because a portion of its subject-matter, existing at its date, has ceased to exist at the time of the performance.', (int) 6 => '<p> ILLUSTRATIONS (a) A contracts to sell a house to B for a lakh of rupees. The day after the contract is made, the house is destroyed by a cyclone. B may be compelled to perform his part of the contract' by paying the purchase money.' ', (int) 7 => '<p>According to this illustration, if any property, which forms the subject-matter of a contract of sale, is destroyed, the contract can still be specifically performed at the instance of either of the parties. In this case, both on questions of law as well as on facts, I find that it was the plaintiff who was not prepared to get the sale deed executed. The breach has therefore rightly been held to be on the part of the plaintiff.', (int) 8 => '<p>5. Mr. Puri has further submitted that the principle 'the loss lies where it falls' applies to this case. It appears that even in England this principle has not been followed: see 'Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Faibairn Lawson Combe Harbour, Ltd.', 1943 A.C. 32. It is not necessary to go into this question in view of the statutory provisions of the Specific Relief Act.', (int) 9 => '<p>6. I therefore dismiss this petition for revision and discharge the rule. The respondent will have his costs in this Court and the Court below. Counsel's fee two G.Ms. (Rs. 32/-).<p>', (int) 10 => '<p>' ) $paragraphAfter = (int) 1 $cnt = (int) 11 $i = (int) 2include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144 View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971 View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933 View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473 Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963 Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200 Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167 [main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109
2. On the 22nd of January 1947, the plaintiff, Ruldu Ram agreed to purchase some property consisting of a shop, a staircase, a half share in a house and a khola for a sum of Rs. 12,000/- and Rs. 500/- were paid as earnest money. The sale was to be completed by the 7th of March 1947. This being a contract for sale of immovable property, the time was not the essence of the contract. On the 6th of March 1947, the shop was burnt down in communal riots.
Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144]Code Contextecho $this->Adsense->display('responsive_rect');}echo html_entity_decode($this->Wand->highlight($content[$i], $query));$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp' $dataForView = array( 'title_for_layout' => 'Ruldu Ram and ors Vs Bhuri Lal and anr - Citation 617444 - Court Judgment | ', 'desc' => array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '617444', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/51778/transfer-of-property-act-1882-complete-act">Transfer of Property Act, 1882</a> - Sections 55(6); <a href="/act/51064/indian-contract-act-1872-complete-act">Contract Act, 1872</a> - Sections 74; Specific Relief Act, 1877 - Sections 13', 'appealno' => 'Civil Revn. No. 455 of 1950', 'appellant' => 'Ruldu Ram and ors.', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Ruldu Ram and ors. Vs. Bhuri Lal and anr.', 'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent Appeal Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., - Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act. Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. - In this case, both on questions of law as well as on facts, I find that it was the plaintiff who was not prepared to get the sale deed executed.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Faibairn Lawson Combe Harbour;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => ' Indar Singh Karewal, Adv.', 'counseldef' => ' S.L. Puri, Adv.', 'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana', 'court_type' => 'HC', 'decidedon' => '1951-05-04', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' Kapur, J.', 'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">Kapur, J. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This is a rule against a judgment and decree of Mr. Mani Ram Khanna, Small Cause Court Judge, Amritsar, holding that the breach of the contract was by the plaintiff and dismissing the suit for the recovery of earnest money.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. On the 22nd of January 1947, the plaintiff, Ruldu Ram agreed to purchase some property consisting of a shop, a staircase, a half share in a house and a khola for a sum of Rs. 12,000/- and Rs. 500/- were paid as earnest money. The sale was to be completed by the 7th of March 1947. This being a contract for sale of immovable property, the time was not the essence of the contract. On the 6th of March 1947, the shop was burnt down in communal riots.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The plaintiff brought the suit on the 21st of June 1950 i.e., three years after the date of the contract for the recovery of Rs. 500/- which he had paid as earnest money. The learned Judge has held that the breach was by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Mr. Indar Singh Karwal submits that the property had been destroyed on the 6th of March 1947, and as ha had a right to complete the contract by the 7th of March 1947, he cannot be said to have been guilty of the breach of the contract. I am unable to agree with this proposition. The shop no doubt was burnt on that day and it is in the evidence of the plaintiff as witness that he was not ready to get the sale deed executed, after the shop was burnt down. In Section 13 of the Specific Relief Act it is provided:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 56 of the Indian Contract Act, a contract is not wholly impossible of performance because a portion of its subject-matter, existing at its date, has ceased to exist at the time of the performance.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> ILLUSTRATIONS (a) A contracts to sell a house to B for a lakh of rupees. The day after the contract is made, the house is destroyed by a cyclone. B may be compelled to perform his part of the contract' by paying the purchase money.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">According to this illustration, if any property, which forms the subject-matter of a contract of sale, is destroyed, the contract can still be specifically performed at the instance of either of the parties. In this case, both on questions of law as well as on facts, I find that it was the plaintiff who was not prepared to get the sale deed executed. The breach has therefore rightly been held to be on the part of the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr. Puri has further submitted that the principle 'the loss lies where it falls' applies to this case. It appears that even in England this principle has not been followed: see 'Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Faibairn Lawson Combe Harbour, Ltd.', 1943 A.C. 32. It is not necessary to go into this question in view of the statutory provisions of the Specific Relief Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. I therefore dismiss this petition for revision and discharge the rule. The respondent will have his costs in this Court and the Court below. Counsel's fee two G.Ms. (Rs. 32/-).<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'AIR1952P& H380', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Bhuri Lal and anr.', 'sub' => 'Contract', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ), 'casename_url' => 'ruldu-ram-ors-vs-bhuri-lal-anr', 'args' => array( (int) 0 => '617444', (int) 1 => 'ruldu-ram-ors-vs-bhuri-lal-anr' ) ) $title_for_layout = 'Ruldu Ram and ors Vs Bhuri Lal and anr - Citation 617444 - Court Judgment | ' $desc = array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '617444', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/51778/transfer-of-property-act-1882-complete-act">Transfer of Property Act, 1882</a> - Sections 55(6); <a href="/act/51064/indian-contract-act-1872-complete-act">Contract Act, 1872</a> - Sections 74; Specific Relief Act, 1877 - Sections 13', 'appealno' => 'Civil Revn. No. 455 of 1950', 'appellant' => 'Ruldu Ram and ors.', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Ruldu Ram and ors. Vs. Bhuri Lal and anr.', 'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent Appeal Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., - Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act. Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. - In this case, both on questions of law as well as on facts, I find that it was the plaintiff who was not prepared to get the sale deed executed.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Faibairn Lawson Combe Harbour;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => ' Indar Singh Karewal, Adv.', 'counseldef' => ' S.L. Puri, Adv.', 'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana', 'court_type' => 'HC', 'decidedon' => '1951-05-04', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' Kapur, J.', 'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>Kapur, J. </p><p>1. This is a rule against a judgment and decree of Mr. Mani Ram Khanna, Small Cause Court Judge, Amritsar, holding that the breach of the contract was by the plaintiff and dismissing the suit for the recovery of earnest money.</p><p>2. On the 22nd of January 1947, the plaintiff, Ruldu Ram agreed to purchase some property consisting of a shop, a staircase, a half share in a house and a khola for a sum of Rs. 12,000/- and Rs. 500/- were paid as earnest money. The sale was to be completed by the 7th of March 1947. This being a contract for sale of immovable property, the time was not the essence of the contract. On the 6th of March 1947, the shop was burnt down in communal riots.</p><p>3. The plaintiff brought the suit on the 21st of June 1950 i.e., three years after the date of the contract for the recovery of Rs. 500/- which he had paid as earnest money. The learned Judge has held that the breach was by the plaintiff.</p><p>4. Mr. Indar Singh Karwal submits that the property had been destroyed on the 6th of March 1947, and as ha had a right to complete the contract by the 7th of March 1947, he cannot be said to have been guilty of the breach of the contract. I am unable to agree with this proposition. The shop no doubt was burnt on that day and it is in the evidence of the plaintiff as witness that he was not ready to get the sale deed executed, after the shop was burnt down. In Section 13 of the Specific Relief Act it is provided:</p><p>'Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 56 of the Indian Contract Act, a contract is not wholly impossible of performance because a portion of its subject-matter, existing at its date, has ceased to exist at the time of the performance.</p><p> ILLUSTRATIONS (a) A contracts to sell a house to B for a lakh of rupees. The day after the contract is made, the house is destroyed by a cyclone. B may be compelled to perform his part of the contract' by paying the purchase money.' </p><p>According to this illustration, if any property, which forms the subject-matter of a contract of sale, is destroyed, the contract can still be specifically performed at the instance of either of the parties. In this case, both on questions of law as well as on facts, I find that it was the plaintiff who was not prepared to get the sale deed executed. The breach has therefore rightly been held to be on the part of the plaintiff.</p><p>5. Mr. Puri has further submitted that the principle 'the loss lies where it falls' applies to this case. It appears that even in England this principle has not been followed: see 'Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Faibairn Lawson Combe Harbour, Ltd.', 1943 A.C. 32. It is not necessary to go into this question in view of the statutory provisions of the Specific Relief Act.</p><p>6. I therefore dismiss this petition for revision and discharge the rule. The respondent will have his costs in this Court and the Court below. Counsel's fee two G.Ms. (Rs. 32/-).<p></p><p>', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'AIR1952P& H380', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Bhuri Lal and anr.', 'sub' => 'Contract', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ) $casename_url = 'ruldu-ram-ors-vs-bhuri-lal-anr' $args = array( (int) 0 => '617444', (int) 1 => 'ruldu-ram-ors-vs-bhuri-lal-anr' ) $url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/617444/ruldu-ram-ors-vs-bhuri-lal-anr' $ctype = ' High Court' $caseref = 'Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Faibairn Lawson Combe Harbour<br>' $content = array( (int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>Kapur, J. ', (int) 1 => '<p>1. This is a rule against a judgment and decree of Mr. Mani Ram Khanna, Small Cause Court Judge, Amritsar, holding that the breach of the contract was by the plaintiff and dismissing the suit for the recovery of earnest money.', (int) 2 => '<p>2. On the 22nd of January 1947, the plaintiff, Ruldu Ram agreed to purchase some property consisting of a shop, a staircase, a half share in a house and a khola for a sum of Rs. 12,000/- and Rs. 500/- were paid as earnest money. The sale was to be completed by the 7th of March 1947. This being a contract for sale of immovable property, the time was not the essence of the contract. On the 6th of March 1947, the shop was burnt down in communal riots.', (int) 3 => '<p>3. The plaintiff brought the suit on the 21st of June 1950 i.e., three years after the date of the contract for the recovery of Rs. 500/- which he had paid as earnest money. The learned Judge has held that the breach was by the plaintiff.', (int) 4 => '<p>4. Mr. Indar Singh Karwal submits that the property had been destroyed on the 6th of March 1947, and as ha had a right to complete the contract by the 7th of March 1947, he cannot be said to have been guilty of the breach of the contract. I am unable to agree with this proposition. The shop no doubt was burnt on that day and it is in the evidence of the plaintiff as witness that he was not ready to get the sale deed executed, after the shop was burnt down. In Section 13 of the Specific Relief Act it is provided:', (int) 5 => '<p>'Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 56 of the Indian Contract Act, a contract is not wholly impossible of performance because a portion of its subject-matter, existing at its date, has ceased to exist at the time of the performance.', (int) 6 => '<p> ILLUSTRATIONS (a) A contracts to sell a house to B for a lakh of rupees. The day after the contract is made, the house is destroyed by a cyclone. B may be compelled to perform his part of the contract' by paying the purchase money.' ', (int) 7 => '<p>According to this illustration, if any property, which forms the subject-matter of a contract of sale, is destroyed, the contract can still be specifically performed at the instance of either of the parties. In this case, both on questions of law as well as on facts, I find that it was the plaintiff who was not prepared to get the sale deed executed. The breach has therefore rightly been held to be on the part of the plaintiff.', (int) 8 => '<p>5. Mr. Puri has further submitted that the principle 'the loss lies where it falls' applies to this case. It appears that even in England this principle has not been followed: see 'Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Faibairn Lawson Combe Harbour, Ltd.', 1943 A.C. 32. It is not necessary to go into this question in view of the statutory provisions of the Specific Relief Act.', (int) 9 => '<p>6. I therefore dismiss this petition for revision and discharge the rule. The respondent will have his costs in this Court and the Court below. Counsel's fee two G.Ms. (Rs. 32/-).<p>', (int) 10 => '<p>' ) $paragraphAfter = (int) 1 $cnt = (int) 11 $i = (int) 3include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144 View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971 View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933 View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473 Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963 Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200 Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167 [main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109
3. The plaintiff brought the suit on the 21st of June 1950 i.e., three years after the date of the contract for the recovery of Rs. 500/- which he had paid as earnest money. The learned Judge has held that the breach was by the plaintiff.
Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144]Code Contextecho $this->Adsense->display('responsive_rect');}echo html_entity_decode($this->Wand->highlight($content[$i], $query));$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp' $dataForView = array( 'title_for_layout' => 'Ruldu Ram and ors Vs Bhuri Lal and anr - Citation 617444 - Court Judgment | ', 'desc' => array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '617444', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/51778/transfer-of-property-act-1882-complete-act">Transfer of Property Act, 1882</a> - Sections 55(6); <a href="/act/51064/indian-contract-act-1872-complete-act">Contract Act, 1872</a> - Sections 74; Specific Relief Act, 1877 - Sections 13', 'appealno' => 'Civil Revn. No. 455 of 1950', 'appellant' => 'Ruldu Ram and ors.', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Ruldu Ram and ors. Vs. Bhuri Lal and anr.', 'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent Appeal Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., - Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act. Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. - In this case, both on questions of law as well as on facts, I find that it was the plaintiff who was not prepared to get the sale deed executed.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Faibairn Lawson Combe Harbour;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => ' Indar Singh Karewal, Adv.', 'counseldef' => ' S.L. Puri, Adv.', 'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana', 'court_type' => 'HC', 'decidedon' => '1951-05-04', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' Kapur, J.', 'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">Kapur, J. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This is a rule against a judgment and decree of Mr. Mani Ram Khanna, Small Cause Court Judge, Amritsar, holding that the breach of the contract was by the plaintiff and dismissing the suit for the recovery of earnest money.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. On the 22nd of January 1947, the plaintiff, Ruldu Ram agreed to purchase some property consisting of a shop, a staircase, a half share in a house and a khola for a sum of Rs. 12,000/- and Rs. 500/- were paid as earnest money. The sale was to be completed by the 7th of March 1947. This being a contract for sale of immovable property, the time was not the essence of the contract. On the 6th of March 1947, the shop was burnt down in communal riots.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The plaintiff brought the suit on the 21st of June 1950 i.e., three years after the date of the contract for the recovery of Rs. 500/- which he had paid as earnest money. The learned Judge has held that the breach was by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Mr. Indar Singh Karwal submits that the property had been destroyed on the 6th of March 1947, and as ha had a right to complete the contract by the 7th of March 1947, he cannot be said to have been guilty of the breach of the contract. I am unable to agree with this proposition. The shop no doubt was burnt on that day and it is in the evidence of the plaintiff as witness that he was not ready to get the sale deed executed, after the shop was burnt down. In Section 13 of the Specific Relief Act it is provided:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 56 of the Indian Contract Act, a contract is not wholly impossible of performance because a portion of its subject-matter, existing at its date, has ceased to exist at the time of the performance.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> ILLUSTRATIONS (a) A contracts to sell a house to B for a lakh of rupees. The day after the contract is made, the house is destroyed by a cyclone. B may be compelled to perform his part of the contract' by paying the purchase money.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">According to this illustration, if any property, which forms the subject-matter of a contract of sale, is destroyed, the contract can still be specifically performed at the instance of either of the parties. In this case, both on questions of law as well as on facts, I find that it was the plaintiff who was not prepared to get the sale deed executed. The breach has therefore rightly been held to be on the part of the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr. Puri has further submitted that the principle 'the loss lies where it falls' applies to this case. It appears that even in England this principle has not been followed: see 'Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Faibairn Lawson Combe Harbour, Ltd.', 1943 A.C. 32. It is not necessary to go into this question in view of the statutory provisions of the Specific Relief Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. I therefore dismiss this petition for revision and discharge the rule. The respondent will have his costs in this Court and the Court below. Counsel's fee two G.Ms. (Rs. 32/-).<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'AIR1952P& H380', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Bhuri Lal and anr.', 'sub' => 'Contract', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ), 'casename_url' => 'ruldu-ram-ors-vs-bhuri-lal-anr', 'args' => array( (int) 0 => '617444', (int) 1 => 'ruldu-ram-ors-vs-bhuri-lal-anr' ) ) $title_for_layout = 'Ruldu Ram and ors Vs Bhuri Lal and anr - Citation 617444 - Court Judgment | ' $desc = array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '617444', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/51778/transfer-of-property-act-1882-complete-act">Transfer of Property Act, 1882</a> - Sections 55(6); <a href="/act/51064/indian-contract-act-1872-complete-act">Contract Act, 1872</a> - Sections 74; Specific Relief Act, 1877 - Sections 13', 'appealno' => 'Civil Revn. No. 455 of 1950', 'appellant' => 'Ruldu Ram and ors.', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Ruldu Ram and ors. Vs. Bhuri Lal and anr.', 'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent Appeal Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., - Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act. Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. - In this case, both on questions of law as well as on facts, I find that it was the plaintiff who was not prepared to get the sale deed executed.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Faibairn Lawson Combe Harbour;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => ' Indar Singh Karewal, Adv.', 'counseldef' => ' S.L. Puri, Adv.', 'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana', 'court_type' => 'HC', 'decidedon' => '1951-05-04', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' Kapur, J.', 'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>Kapur, J. </p><p>1. This is a rule against a judgment and decree of Mr. Mani Ram Khanna, Small Cause Court Judge, Amritsar, holding that the breach of the contract was by the plaintiff and dismissing the suit for the recovery of earnest money.</p><p>2. On the 22nd of January 1947, the plaintiff, Ruldu Ram agreed to purchase some property consisting of a shop, a staircase, a half share in a house and a khola for a sum of Rs. 12,000/- and Rs. 500/- were paid as earnest money. The sale was to be completed by the 7th of March 1947. This being a contract for sale of immovable property, the time was not the essence of the contract. On the 6th of March 1947, the shop was burnt down in communal riots.</p><p>3. The plaintiff brought the suit on the 21st of June 1950 i.e., three years after the date of the contract for the recovery of Rs. 500/- which he had paid as earnest money. The learned Judge has held that the breach was by the plaintiff.</p><p>4. Mr. Indar Singh Karwal submits that the property had been destroyed on the 6th of March 1947, and as ha had a right to complete the contract by the 7th of March 1947, he cannot be said to have been guilty of the breach of the contract. I am unable to agree with this proposition. The shop no doubt was burnt on that day and it is in the evidence of the plaintiff as witness that he was not ready to get the sale deed executed, after the shop was burnt down. In Section 13 of the Specific Relief Act it is provided:</p><p>'Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 56 of the Indian Contract Act, a contract is not wholly impossible of performance because a portion of its subject-matter, existing at its date, has ceased to exist at the time of the performance.</p><p> ILLUSTRATIONS (a) A contracts to sell a house to B for a lakh of rupees. The day after the contract is made, the house is destroyed by a cyclone. B may be compelled to perform his part of the contract' by paying the purchase money.' </p><p>According to this illustration, if any property, which forms the subject-matter of a contract of sale, is destroyed, the contract can still be specifically performed at the instance of either of the parties. In this case, both on questions of law as well as on facts, I find that it was the plaintiff who was not prepared to get the sale deed executed. The breach has therefore rightly been held to be on the part of the plaintiff.</p><p>5. Mr. Puri has further submitted that the principle 'the loss lies where it falls' applies to this case. It appears that even in England this principle has not been followed: see 'Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Faibairn Lawson Combe Harbour, Ltd.', 1943 A.C. 32. It is not necessary to go into this question in view of the statutory provisions of the Specific Relief Act.</p><p>6. I therefore dismiss this petition for revision and discharge the rule. The respondent will have his costs in this Court and the Court below. Counsel's fee two G.Ms. (Rs. 32/-).<p></p><p>', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'AIR1952P& H380', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Bhuri Lal and anr.', 'sub' => 'Contract', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ) $casename_url = 'ruldu-ram-ors-vs-bhuri-lal-anr' $args = array( (int) 0 => '617444', (int) 1 => 'ruldu-ram-ors-vs-bhuri-lal-anr' ) $url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/617444/ruldu-ram-ors-vs-bhuri-lal-anr' $ctype = ' High Court' $caseref = 'Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Faibairn Lawson Combe Harbour<br>' $content = array( (int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>Kapur, J. ', (int) 1 => '<p>1. This is a rule against a judgment and decree of Mr. Mani Ram Khanna, Small Cause Court Judge, Amritsar, holding that the breach of the contract was by the plaintiff and dismissing the suit for the recovery of earnest money.', (int) 2 => '<p>2. On the 22nd of January 1947, the plaintiff, Ruldu Ram agreed to purchase some property consisting of a shop, a staircase, a half share in a house and a khola for a sum of Rs. 12,000/- and Rs. 500/- were paid as earnest money. The sale was to be completed by the 7th of March 1947. This being a contract for sale of immovable property, the time was not the essence of the contract. On the 6th of March 1947, the shop was burnt down in communal riots.', (int) 3 => '<p>3. The plaintiff brought the suit on the 21st of June 1950 i.e., three years after the date of the contract for the recovery of Rs. 500/- which he had paid as earnest money. The learned Judge has held that the breach was by the plaintiff.', (int) 4 => '<p>4. Mr. Indar Singh Karwal submits that the property had been destroyed on the 6th of March 1947, and as ha had a right to complete the contract by the 7th of March 1947, he cannot be said to have been guilty of the breach of the contract. I am unable to agree with this proposition. The shop no doubt was burnt on that day and it is in the evidence of the plaintiff as witness that he was not ready to get the sale deed executed, after the shop was burnt down. In Section 13 of the Specific Relief Act it is provided:', (int) 5 => '<p>'Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 56 of the Indian Contract Act, a contract is not wholly impossible of performance because a portion of its subject-matter, existing at its date, has ceased to exist at the time of the performance.', (int) 6 => '<p> ILLUSTRATIONS (a) A contracts to sell a house to B for a lakh of rupees. The day after the contract is made, the house is destroyed by a cyclone. B may be compelled to perform his part of the contract' by paying the purchase money.' ', (int) 7 => '<p>According to this illustration, if any property, which forms the subject-matter of a contract of sale, is destroyed, the contract can still be specifically performed at the instance of either of the parties. In this case, both on questions of law as well as on facts, I find that it was the plaintiff who was not prepared to get the sale deed executed. The breach has therefore rightly been held to be on the part of the plaintiff.', (int) 8 => '<p>5. Mr. Puri has further submitted that the principle 'the loss lies where it falls' applies to this case. It appears that even in England this principle has not been followed: see 'Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Faibairn Lawson Combe Harbour, Ltd.', 1943 A.C. 32. It is not necessary to go into this question in view of the statutory provisions of the Specific Relief Act.', (int) 9 => '<p>6. I therefore dismiss this petition for revision and discharge the rule. The respondent will have his costs in this Court and the Court below. Counsel's fee two G.Ms. (Rs. 32/-).<p>', (int) 10 => '<p>' ) $paragraphAfter = (int) 1 $cnt = (int) 11 $i = (int) 4include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144 View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971 View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933 View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473 Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963 Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200 Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167 [main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109
4. Mr. Indar Singh Karwal submits that the property had been destroyed on the 6th of March 1947, and as ha had a right to complete the contract by the 7th of March 1947, he cannot be said to have been guilty of the breach of the contract. I am unable to agree with this proposition. The shop no doubt was burnt on that day and it is in the evidence of the plaintiff as witness that he was not ready to get the sale deed executed, after the shop was burnt down. In Section 13 of the Specific Relief Act it is provided:
Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144]Code Contextecho $this->Adsense->display('responsive_rect');}echo html_entity_decode($this->Wand->highlight($content[$i], $query));$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp' $dataForView = array( 'title_for_layout' => 'Ruldu Ram and ors Vs Bhuri Lal and anr - Citation 617444 - Court Judgment | ', 'desc' => array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '617444', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/51778/transfer-of-property-act-1882-complete-act">Transfer of Property Act, 1882</a> - Sections 55(6); <a href="/act/51064/indian-contract-act-1872-complete-act">Contract Act, 1872</a> - Sections 74; Specific Relief Act, 1877 - Sections 13', 'appealno' => 'Civil Revn. No. 455 of 1950', 'appellant' => 'Ruldu Ram and ors.', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Ruldu Ram and ors. Vs. Bhuri Lal and anr.', 'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent Appeal Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., - Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act. Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. - In this case, both on questions of law as well as on facts, I find that it was the plaintiff who was not prepared to get the sale deed executed.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Faibairn Lawson Combe Harbour;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => ' Indar Singh Karewal, Adv.', 'counseldef' => ' S.L. Puri, Adv.', 'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana', 'court_type' => 'HC', 'decidedon' => '1951-05-04', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' Kapur, J.', 'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">Kapur, J. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This is a rule against a judgment and decree of Mr. Mani Ram Khanna, Small Cause Court Judge, Amritsar, holding that the breach of the contract was by the plaintiff and dismissing the suit for the recovery of earnest money.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. On the 22nd of January 1947, the plaintiff, Ruldu Ram agreed to purchase some property consisting of a shop, a staircase, a half share in a house and a khola for a sum of Rs. 12,000/- and Rs. 500/- were paid as earnest money. The sale was to be completed by the 7th of March 1947. This being a contract for sale of immovable property, the time was not the essence of the contract. On the 6th of March 1947, the shop was burnt down in communal riots.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The plaintiff brought the suit on the 21st of June 1950 i.e., three years after the date of the contract for the recovery of Rs. 500/- which he had paid as earnest money. The learned Judge has held that the breach was by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Mr. Indar Singh Karwal submits that the property had been destroyed on the 6th of March 1947, and as ha had a right to complete the contract by the 7th of March 1947, he cannot be said to have been guilty of the breach of the contract. I am unable to agree with this proposition. The shop no doubt was burnt on that day and it is in the evidence of the plaintiff as witness that he was not ready to get the sale deed executed, after the shop was burnt down. In Section 13 of the Specific Relief Act it is provided:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 56 of the Indian Contract Act, a contract is not wholly impossible of performance because a portion of its subject-matter, existing at its date, has ceased to exist at the time of the performance.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> ILLUSTRATIONS (a) A contracts to sell a house to B for a lakh of rupees. The day after the contract is made, the house is destroyed by a cyclone. B may be compelled to perform his part of the contract' by paying the purchase money.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">According to this illustration, if any property, which forms the subject-matter of a contract of sale, is destroyed, the contract can still be specifically performed at the instance of either of the parties. In this case, both on questions of law as well as on facts, I find that it was the plaintiff who was not prepared to get the sale deed executed. The breach has therefore rightly been held to be on the part of the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr. Puri has further submitted that the principle 'the loss lies where it falls' applies to this case. It appears that even in England this principle has not been followed: see 'Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Faibairn Lawson Combe Harbour, Ltd.', 1943 A.C. 32. It is not necessary to go into this question in view of the statutory provisions of the Specific Relief Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. I therefore dismiss this petition for revision and discharge the rule. The respondent will have his costs in this Court and the Court below. Counsel's fee two G.Ms. (Rs. 32/-).<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'AIR1952P& H380', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Bhuri Lal and anr.', 'sub' => 'Contract', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ), 'casename_url' => 'ruldu-ram-ors-vs-bhuri-lal-anr', 'args' => array( (int) 0 => '617444', (int) 1 => 'ruldu-ram-ors-vs-bhuri-lal-anr' ) ) $title_for_layout = 'Ruldu Ram and ors Vs Bhuri Lal and anr - Citation 617444 - Court Judgment | ' $desc = array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '617444', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/51778/transfer-of-property-act-1882-complete-act">Transfer of Property Act, 1882</a> - Sections 55(6); <a href="/act/51064/indian-contract-act-1872-complete-act">Contract Act, 1872</a> - Sections 74; Specific Relief Act, 1877 - Sections 13', 'appealno' => 'Civil Revn. No. 455 of 1950', 'appellant' => 'Ruldu Ram and ors.', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Ruldu Ram and ors. Vs. Bhuri Lal and anr.', 'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent Appeal Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., - Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act. Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. - In this case, both on questions of law as well as on facts, I find that it was the plaintiff who was not prepared to get the sale deed executed.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Faibairn Lawson Combe Harbour;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => ' Indar Singh Karewal, Adv.', 'counseldef' => ' S.L. Puri, Adv.', 'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana', 'court_type' => 'HC', 'decidedon' => '1951-05-04', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' Kapur, J.', 'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>Kapur, J. </p><p>1. This is a rule against a judgment and decree of Mr. Mani Ram Khanna, Small Cause Court Judge, Amritsar, holding that the breach of the contract was by the plaintiff and dismissing the suit for the recovery of earnest money.</p><p>2. On the 22nd of January 1947, the plaintiff, Ruldu Ram agreed to purchase some property consisting of a shop, a staircase, a half share in a house and a khola for a sum of Rs. 12,000/- and Rs. 500/- were paid as earnest money. The sale was to be completed by the 7th of March 1947. This being a contract for sale of immovable property, the time was not the essence of the contract. On the 6th of March 1947, the shop was burnt down in communal riots.</p><p>3. The plaintiff brought the suit on the 21st of June 1950 i.e., three years after the date of the contract for the recovery of Rs. 500/- which he had paid as earnest money. The learned Judge has held that the breach was by the plaintiff.</p><p>4. Mr. Indar Singh Karwal submits that the property had been destroyed on the 6th of March 1947, and as ha had a right to complete the contract by the 7th of March 1947, he cannot be said to have been guilty of the breach of the contract. I am unable to agree with this proposition. The shop no doubt was burnt on that day and it is in the evidence of the plaintiff as witness that he was not ready to get the sale deed executed, after the shop was burnt down. In Section 13 of the Specific Relief Act it is provided:</p><p>'Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 56 of the Indian Contract Act, a contract is not wholly impossible of performance because a portion of its subject-matter, existing at its date, has ceased to exist at the time of the performance.</p><p> ILLUSTRATIONS (a) A contracts to sell a house to B for a lakh of rupees. The day after the contract is made, the house is destroyed by a cyclone. B may be compelled to perform his part of the contract' by paying the purchase money.' </p><p>According to this illustration, if any property, which forms the subject-matter of a contract of sale, is destroyed, the contract can still be specifically performed at the instance of either of the parties. In this case, both on questions of law as well as on facts, I find that it was the plaintiff who was not prepared to get the sale deed executed. The breach has therefore rightly been held to be on the part of the plaintiff.</p><p>5. Mr. Puri has further submitted that the principle 'the loss lies where it falls' applies to this case. It appears that even in England this principle has not been followed: see 'Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Faibairn Lawson Combe Harbour, Ltd.', 1943 A.C. 32. It is not necessary to go into this question in view of the statutory provisions of the Specific Relief Act.</p><p>6. I therefore dismiss this petition for revision and discharge the rule. The respondent will have his costs in this Court and the Court below. Counsel's fee two G.Ms. (Rs. 32/-).<p></p><p>', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'AIR1952P& H380', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Bhuri Lal and anr.', 'sub' => 'Contract', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ) $casename_url = 'ruldu-ram-ors-vs-bhuri-lal-anr' $args = array( (int) 0 => '617444', (int) 1 => 'ruldu-ram-ors-vs-bhuri-lal-anr' ) $url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/617444/ruldu-ram-ors-vs-bhuri-lal-anr' $ctype = ' High Court' $caseref = 'Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Faibairn Lawson Combe Harbour<br>' $content = array( (int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>Kapur, J. ', (int) 1 => '<p>1. This is a rule against a judgment and decree of Mr. Mani Ram Khanna, Small Cause Court Judge, Amritsar, holding that the breach of the contract was by the plaintiff and dismissing the suit for the recovery of earnest money.', (int) 2 => '<p>2. On the 22nd of January 1947, the plaintiff, Ruldu Ram agreed to purchase some property consisting of a shop, a staircase, a half share in a house and a khola for a sum of Rs. 12,000/- and Rs. 500/- were paid as earnest money. The sale was to be completed by the 7th of March 1947. This being a contract for sale of immovable property, the time was not the essence of the contract. On the 6th of March 1947, the shop was burnt down in communal riots.', (int) 3 => '<p>3. The plaintiff brought the suit on the 21st of June 1950 i.e., three years after the date of the contract for the recovery of Rs. 500/- which he had paid as earnest money. The learned Judge has held that the breach was by the plaintiff.', (int) 4 => '<p>4. Mr. Indar Singh Karwal submits that the property had been destroyed on the 6th of March 1947, and as ha had a right to complete the contract by the 7th of March 1947, he cannot be said to have been guilty of the breach of the contract. I am unable to agree with this proposition. The shop no doubt was burnt on that day and it is in the evidence of the plaintiff as witness that he was not ready to get the sale deed executed, after the shop was burnt down. In Section 13 of the Specific Relief Act it is provided:', (int) 5 => '<p>'Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 56 of the Indian Contract Act, a contract is not wholly impossible of performance because a portion of its subject-matter, existing at its date, has ceased to exist at the time of the performance.', (int) 6 => '<p> ILLUSTRATIONS (a) A contracts to sell a house to B for a lakh of rupees. The day after the contract is made, the house is destroyed by a cyclone. B may be compelled to perform his part of the contract' by paying the purchase money.' ', (int) 7 => '<p>According to this illustration, if any property, which forms the subject-matter of a contract of sale, is destroyed, the contract can still be specifically performed at the instance of either of the parties. In this case, both on questions of law as well as on facts, I find that it was the plaintiff who was not prepared to get the sale deed executed. The breach has therefore rightly been held to be on the part of the plaintiff.', (int) 8 => '<p>5. Mr. Puri has further submitted that the principle 'the loss lies where it falls' applies to this case. It appears that even in England this principle has not been followed: see 'Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Faibairn Lawson Combe Harbour, Ltd.', 1943 A.C. 32. It is not necessary to go into this question in view of the statutory provisions of the Specific Relief Act.', (int) 9 => '<p>6. I therefore dismiss this petition for revision and discharge the rule. The respondent will have his costs in this Court and the Court below. Counsel's fee two G.Ms. (Rs. 32/-).<p>', (int) 10 => '<p>' ) $paragraphAfter = (int) 1 $cnt = (int) 11 $i = (int) 5include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144 View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971 View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933 View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473 Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963 Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200 Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167 [main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109
'Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 56 of the Indian Contract Act, a contract is not wholly impossible of performance because a portion of its subject-matter, existing at its date, has ceased to exist at the time of the performance.
Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144]Code Contextecho $this->Adsense->display('responsive_rect');}echo html_entity_decode($this->Wand->highlight($content[$i], $query));$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp' $dataForView = array( 'title_for_layout' => 'Ruldu Ram and ors Vs Bhuri Lal and anr - Citation 617444 - Court Judgment | ', 'desc' => array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '617444', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/51778/transfer-of-property-act-1882-complete-act">Transfer of Property Act, 1882</a> - Sections 55(6); <a href="/act/51064/indian-contract-act-1872-complete-act">Contract Act, 1872</a> - Sections 74; Specific Relief Act, 1877 - Sections 13', 'appealno' => 'Civil Revn. No. 455 of 1950', 'appellant' => 'Ruldu Ram and ors.', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Ruldu Ram and ors. Vs. Bhuri Lal and anr.', 'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent Appeal Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., - Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act. Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. - In this case, both on questions of law as well as on facts, I find that it was the plaintiff who was not prepared to get the sale deed executed.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Faibairn Lawson Combe Harbour;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => ' Indar Singh Karewal, Adv.', 'counseldef' => ' S.L. Puri, Adv.', 'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana', 'court_type' => 'HC', 'decidedon' => '1951-05-04', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' Kapur, J.', 'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">Kapur, J. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This is a rule against a judgment and decree of Mr. Mani Ram Khanna, Small Cause Court Judge, Amritsar, holding that the breach of the contract was by the plaintiff and dismissing the suit for the recovery of earnest money.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. On the 22nd of January 1947, the plaintiff, Ruldu Ram agreed to purchase some property consisting of a shop, a staircase, a half share in a house and a khola for a sum of Rs. 12,000/- and Rs. 500/- were paid as earnest money. The sale was to be completed by the 7th of March 1947. This being a contract for sale of immovable property, the time was not the essence of the contract. On the 6th of March 1947, the shop was burnt down in communal riots.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The plaintiff brought the suit on the 21st of June 1950 i.e., three years after the date of the contract for the recovery of Rs. 500/- which he had paid as earnest money. The learned Judge has held that the breach was by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Mr. Indar Singh Karwal submits that the property had been destroyed on the 6th of March 1947, and as ha had a right to complete the contract by the 7th of March 1947, he cannot be said to have been guilty of the breach of the contract. I am unable to agree with this proposition. The shop no doubt was burnt on that day and it is in the evidence of the plaintiff as witness that he was not ready to get the sale deed executed, after the shop was burnt down. In Section 13 of the Specific Relief Act it is provided:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 56 of the Indian Contract Act, a contract is not wholly impossible of performance because a portion of its subject-matter, existing at its date, has ceased to exist at the time of the performance.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> ILLUSTRATIONS (a) A contracts to sell a house to B for a lakh of rupees. The day after the contract is made, the house is destroyed by a cyclone. B may be compelled to perform his part of the contract' by paying the purchase money.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">According to this illustration, if any property, which forms the subject-matter of a contract of sale, is destroyed, the contract can still be specifically performed at the instance of either of the parties. In this case, both on questions of law as well as on facts, I find that it was the plaintiff who was not prepared to get the sale deed executed. The breach has therefore rightly been held to be on the part of the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr. Puri has further submitted that the principle 'the loss lies where it falls' applies to this case. It appears that even in England this principle has not been followed: see 'Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Faibairn Lawson Combe Harbour, Ltd.', 1943 A.C. 32. It is not necessary to go into this question in view of the statutory provisions of the Specific Relief Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. I therefore dismiss this petition for revision and discharge the rule. The respondent will have his costs in this Court and the Court below. Counsel's fee two G.Ms. (Rs. 32/-).<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'AIR1952P& H380', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Bhuri Lal and anr.', 'sub' => 'Contract', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ), 'casename_url' => 'ruldu-ram-ors-vs-bhuri-lal-anr', 'args' => array( (int) 0 => '617444', (int) 1 => 'ruldu-ram-ors-vs-bhuri-lal-anr' ) ) $title_for_layout = 'Ruldu Ram and ors Vs Bhuri Lal and anr - Citation 617444 - Court Judgment | ' $desc = array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '617444', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/51778/transfer-of-property-act-1882-complete-act">Transfer of Property Act, 1882</a> - Sections 55(6); <a href="/act/51064/indian-contract-act-1872-complete-act">Contract Act, 1872</a> - Sections 74; Specific Relief Act, 1877 - Sections 13', 'appealno' => 'Civil Revn. No. 455 of 1950', 'appellant' => 'Ruldu Ram and ors.', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Ruldu Ram and ors. Vs. Bhuri Lal and anr.', 'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent Appeal Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., - Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act. Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. - In this case, both on questions of law as well as on facts, I find that it was the plaintiff who was not prepared to get the sale deed executed.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Faibairn Lawson Combe Harbour;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => ' Indar Singh Karewal, Adv.', 'counseldef' => ' S.L. Puri, Adv.', 'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana', 'court_type' => 'HC', 'decidedon' => '1951-05-04', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' Kapur, J.', 'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>Kapur, J. </p><p>1. This is a rule against a judgment and decree of Mr. Mani Ram Khanna, Small Cause Court Judge, Amritsar, holding that the breach of the contract was by the plaintiff and dismissing the suit for the recovery of earnest money.</p><p>2. On the 22nd of January 1947, the plaintiff, Ruldu Ram agreed to purchase some property consisting of a shop, a staircase, a half share in a house and a khola for a sum of Rs. 12,000/- and Rs. 500/- were paid as earnest money. The sale was to be completed by the 7th of March 1947. This being a contract for sale of immovable property, the time was not the essence of the contract. On the 6th of March 1947, the shop was burnt down in communal riots.</p><p>3. The plaintiff brought the suit on the 21st of June 1950 i.e., three years after the date of the contract for the recovery of Rs. 500/- which he had paid as earnest money. The learned Judge has held that the breach was by the plaintiff.</p><p>4. Mr. Indar Singh Karwal submits that the property had been destroyed on the 6th of March 1947, and as ha had a right to complete the contract by the 7th of March 1947, he cannot be said to have been guilty of the breach of the contract. I am unable to agree with this proposition. The shop no doubt was burnt on that day and it is in the evidence of the plaintiff as witness that he was not ready to get the sale deed executed, after the shop was burnt down. In Section 13 of the Specific Relief Act it is provided:</p><p>'Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 56 of the Indian Contract Act, a contract is not wholly impossible of performance because a portion of its subject-matter, existing at its date, has ceased to exist at the time of the performance.</p><p> ILLUSTRATIONS (a) A contracts to sell a house to B for a lakh of rupees. The day after the contract is made, the house is destroyed by a cyclone. B may be compelled to perform his part of the contract' by paying the purchase money.' </p><p>According to this illustration, if any property, which forms the subject-matter of a contract of sale, is destroyed, the contract can still be specifically performed at the instance of either of the parties. In this case, both on questions of law as well as on facts, I find that it was the plaintiff who was not prepared to get the sale deed executed. The breach has therefore rightly been held to be on the part of the plaintiff.</p><p>5. Mr. Puri has further submitted that the principle 'the loss lies where it falls' applies to this case. It appears that even in England this principle has not been followed: see 'Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Faibairn Lawson Combe Harbour, Ltd.', 1943 A.C. 32. It is not necessary to go into this question in view of the statutory provisions of the Specific Relief Act.</p><p>6. I therefore dismiss this petition for revision and discharge the rule. The respondent will have his costs in this Court and the Court below. Counsel's fee two G.Ms. (Rs. 32/-).<p></p><p>', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'AIR1952P& H380', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Bhuri Lal and anr.', 'sub' => 'Contract', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ) $casename_url = 'ruldu-ram-ors-vs-bhuri-lal-anr' $args = array( (int) 0 => '617444', (int) 1 => 'ruldu-ram-ors-vs-bhuri-lal-anr' ) $url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/617444/ruldu-ram-ors-vs-bhuri-lal-anr' $ctype = ' High Court' $caseref = 'Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Faibairn Lawson Combe Harbour<br>' $content = array( (int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>Kapur, J. ', (int) 1 => '<p>1. This is a rule against a judgment and decree of Mr. Mani Ram Khanna, Small Cause Court Judge, Amritsar, holding that the breach of the contract was by the plaintiff and dismissing the suit for the recovery of earnest money.', (int) 2 => '<p>2. On the 22nd of January 1947, the plaintiff, Ruldu Ram agreed to purchase some property consisting of a shop, a staircase, a half share in a house and a khola for a sum of Rs. 12,000/- and Rs. 500/- were paid as earnest money. The sale was to be completed by the 7th of March 1947. This being a contract for sale of immovable property, the time was not the essence of the contract. On the 6th of March 1947, the shop was burnt down in communal riots.', (int) 3 => '<p>3. The plaintiff brought the suit on the 21st of June 1950 i.e., three years after the date of the contract for the recovery of Rs. 500/- which he had paid as earnest money. The learned Judge has held that the breach was by the plaintiff.', (int) 4 => '<p>4. Mr. Indar Singh Karwal submits that the property had been destroyed on the 6th of March 1947, and as ha had a right to complete the contract by the 7th of March 1947, he cannot be said to have been guilty of the breach of the contract. I am unable to agree with this proposition. The shop no doubt was burnt on that day and it is in the evidence of the plaintiff as witness that he was not ready to get the sale deed executed, after the shop was burnt down. In Section 13 of the Specific Relief Act it is provided:', (int) 5 => '<p>'Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 56 of the Indian Contract Act, a contract is not wholly impossible of performance because a portion of its subject-matter, existing at its date, has ceased to exist at the time of the performance.', (int) 6 => '<p> ILLUSTRATIONS (a) A contracts to sell a house to B for a lakh of rupees. The day after the contract is made, the house is destroyed by a cyclone. B may be compelled to perform his part of the contract' by paying the purchase money.' ', (int) 7 => '<p>According to this illustration, if any property, which forms the subject-matter of a contract of sale, is destroyed, the contract can still be specifically performed at the instance of either of the parties. In this case, both on questions of law as well as on facts, I find that it was the plaintiff who was not prepared to get the sale deed executed. The breach has therefore rightly been held to be on the part of the plaintiff.', (int) 8 => '<p>5. Mr. Puri has further submitted that the principle 'the loss lies where it falls' applies to this case. It appears that even in England this principle has not been followed: see 'Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Faibairn Lawson Combe Harbour, Ltd.', 1943 A.C. 32. It is not necessary to go into this question in view of the statutory provisions of the Specific Relief Act.', (int) 9 => '<p>6. I therefore dismiss this petition for revision and discharge the rule. The respondent will have his costs in this Court and the Court below. Counsel's fee two G.Ms. (Rs. 32/-).<p>', (int) 10 => '<p>' ) $paragraphAfter = (int) 1 $cnt = (int) 11 $i = (int) 6include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144 View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971 View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933 View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473 Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963 Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200 Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167 [main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109
ILLUSTRATIONS (a) A contracts to sell a house to B for a lakh of rupees. The day after the contract is made, the house is destroyed by a cyclone. B may be compelled to perform his part of the contract' by paying the purchase money.'
Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144]Code Contextecho $this->Adsense->display('responsive_rect');}echo html_entity_decode($this->Wand->highlight($content[$i], $query));$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp' $dataForView = array( 'title_for_layout' => 'Ruldu Ram and ors Vs Bhuri Lal and anr - Citation 617444 - Court Judgment | ', 'desc' => array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '617444', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/51778/transfer-of-property-act-1882-complete-act">Transfer of Property Act, 1882</a> - Sections 55(6); <a href="/act/51064/indian-contract-act-1872-complete-act">Contract Act, 1872</a> - Sections 74; Specific Relief Act, 1877 - Sections 13', 'appealno' => 'Civil Revn. No. 455 of 1950', 'appellant' => 'Ruldu Ram and ors.', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Ruldu Ram and ors. Vs. Bhuri Lal and anr.', 'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent Appeal Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., - Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act. Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. - In this case, both on questions of law as well as on facts, I find that it was the plaintiff who was not prepared to get the sale deed executed.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Faibairn Lawson Combe Harbour;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => ' Indar Singh Karewal, Adv.', 'counseldef' => ' S.L. Puri, Adv.', 'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana', 'court_type' => 'HC', 'decidedon' => '1951-05-04', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' Kapur, J.', 'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">Kapur, J. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This is a rule against a judgment and decree of Mr. Mani Ram Khanna, Small Cause Court Judge, Amritsar, holding that the breach of the contract was by the plaintiff and dismissing the suit for the recovery of earnest money.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. On the 22nd of January 1947, the plaintiff, Ruldu Ram agreed to purchase some property consisting of a shop, a staircase, a half share in a house and a khola for a sum of Rs. 12,000/- and Rs. 500/- were paid as earnest money. The sale was to be completed by the 7th of March 1947. This being a contract for sale of immovable property, the time was not the essence of the contract. On the 6th of March 1947, the shop was burnt down in communal riots.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The plaintiff brought the suit on the 21st of June 1950 i.e., three years after the date of the contract for the recovery of Rs. 500/- which he had paid as earnest money. The learned Judge has held that the breach was by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Mr. Indar Singh Karwal submits that the property had been destroyed on the 6th of March 1947, and as ha had a right to complete the contract by the 7th of March 1947, he cannot be said to have been guilty of the breach of the contract. I am unable to agree with this proposition. The shop no doubt was burnt on that day and it is in the evidence of the plaintiff as witness that he was not ready to get the sale deed executed, after the shop was burnt down. In Section 13 of the Specific Relief Act it is provided:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 56 of the Indian Contract Act, a contract is not wholly impossible of performance because a portion of its subject-matter, existing at its date, has ceased to exist at the time of the performance.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> ILLUSTRATIONS (a) A contracts to sell a house to B for a lakh of rupees. The day after the contract is made, the house is destroyed by a cyclone. B may be compelled to perform his part of the contract' by paying the purchase money.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">According to this illustration, if any property, which forms the subject-matter of a contract of sale, is destroyed, the contract can still be specifically performed at the instance of either of the parties. In this case, both on questions of law as well as on facts, I find that it was the plaintiff who was not prepared to get the sale deed executed. The breach has therefore rightly been held to be on the part of the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr. Puri has further submitted that the principle 'the loss lies where it falls' applies to this case. It appears that even in England this principle has not been followed: see 'Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Faibairn Lawson Combe Harbour, Ltd.', 1943 A.C. 32. It is not necessary to go into this question in view of the statutory provisions of the Specific Relief Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. I therefore dismiss this petition for revision and discharge the rule. The respondent will have his costs in this Court and the Court below. Counsel's fee two G.Ms. (Rs. 32/-).<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'AIR1952P& H380', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Bhuri Lal and anr.', 'sub' => 'Contract', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ), 'casename_url' => 'ruldu-ram-ors-vs-bhuri-lal-anr', 'args' => array( (int) 0 => '617444', (int) 1 => 'ruldu-ram-ors-vs-bhuri-lal-anr' ) ) $title_for_layout = 'Ruldu Ram and ors Vs Bhuri Lal and anr - Citation 617444 - Court Judgment | ' $desc = array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '617444', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/51778/transfer-of-property-act-1882-complete-act">Transfer of Property Act, 1882</a> - Sections 55(6); <a href="/act/51064/indian-contract-act-1872-complete-act">Contract Act, 1872</a> - Sections 74; Specific Relief Act, 1877 - Sections 13', 'appealno' => 'Civil Revn. No. 455 of 1950', 'appellant' => 'Ruldu Ram and ors.', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Ruldu Ram and ors. Vs. Bhuri Lal and anr.', 'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent Appeal Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., - Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act. Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. - In this case, both on questions of law as well as on facts, I find that it was the plaintiff who was not prepared to get the sale deed executed.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Faibairn Lawson Combe Harbour;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => ' Indar Singh Karewal, Adv.', 'counseldef' => ' S.L. Puri, Adv.', 'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana', 'court_type' => 'HC', 'decidedon' => '1951-05-04', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' Kapur, J.', 'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>Kapur, J. </p><p>1. This is a rule against a judgment and decree of Mr. Mani Ram Khanna, Small Cause Court Judge, Amritsar, holding that the breach of the contract was by the plaintiff and dismissing the suit for the recovery of earnest money.</p><p>2. On the 22nd of January 1947, the plaintiff, Ruldu Ram agreed to purchase some property consisting of a shop, a staircase, a half share in a house and a khola for a sum of Rs. 12,000/- and Rs. 500/- were paid as earnest money. The sale was to be completed by the 7th of March 1947. This being a contract for sale of immovable property, the time was not the essence of the contract. On the 6th of March 1947, the shop was burnt down in communal riots.</p><p>3. The plaintiff brought the suit on the 21st of June 1950 i.e., three years after the date of the contract for the recovery of Rs. 500/- which he had paid as earnest money. The learned Judge has held that the breach was by the plaintiff.</p><p>4. Mr. Indar Singh Karwal submits that the property had been destroyed on the 6th of March 1947, and as ha had a right to complete the contract by the 7th of March 1947, he cannot be said to have been guilty of the breach of the contract. I am unable to agree with this proposition. The shop no doubt was burnt on that day and it is in the evidence of the plaintiff as witness that he was not ready to get the sale deed executed, after the shop was burnt down. In Section 13 of the Specific Relief Act it is provided:</p><p>'Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 56 of the Indian Contract Act, a contract is not wholly impossible of performance because a portion of its subject-matter, existing at its date, has ceased to exist at the time of the performance.</p><p> ILLUSTRATIONS (a) A contracts to sell a house to B for a lakh of rupees. The day after the contract is made, the house is destroyed by a cyclone. B may be compelled to perform his part of the contract' by paying the purchase money.' </p><p>According to this illustration, if any property, which forms the subject-matter of a contract of sale, is destroyed, the contract can still be specifically performed at the instance of either of the parties. In this case, both on questions of law as well as on facts, I find that it was the plaintiff who was not prepared to get the sale deed executed. The breach has therefore rightly been held to be on the part of the plaintiff.</p><p>5. Mr. Puri has further submitted that the principle 'the loss lies where it falls' applies to this case. It appears that even in England this principle has not been followed: see 'Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Faibairn Lawson Combe Harbour, Ltd.', 1943 A.C. 32. It is not necessary to go into this question in view of the statutory provisions of the Specific Relief Act.</p><p>6. I therefore dismiss this petition for revision and discharge the rule. The respondent will have his costs in this Court and the Court below. Counsel's fee two G.Ms. (Rs. 32/-).<p></p><p>', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'AIR1952P& H380', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Bhuri Lal and anr.', 'sub' => 'Contract', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ) $casename_url = 'ruldu-ram-ors-vs-bhuri-lal-anr' $args = array( (int) 0 => '617444', (int) 1 => 'ruldu-ram-ors-vs-bhuri-lal-anr' ) $url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/617444/ruldu-ram-ors-vs-bhuri-lal-anr' $ctype = ' High Court' $caseref = 'Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Faibairn Lawson Combe Harbour<br>' $content = array( (int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>Kapur, J. ', (int) 1 => '<p>1. This is a rule against a judgment and decree of Mr. Mani Ram Khanna, Small Cause Court Judge, Amritsar, holding that the breach of the contract was by the plaintiff and dismissing the suit for the recovery of earnest money.', (int) 2 => '<p>2. On the 22nd of January 1947, the plaintiff, Ruldu Ram agreed to purchase some property consisting of a shop, a staircase, a half share in a house and a khola for a sum of Rs. 12,000/- and Rs. 500/- were paid as earnest money. The sale was to be completed by the 7th of March 1947. This being a contract for sale of immovable property, the time was not the essence of the contract. On the 6th of March 1947, the shop was burnt down in communal riots.', (int) 3 => '<p>3. The plaintiff brought the suit on the 21st of June 1950 i.e., three years after the date of the contract for the recovery of Rs. 500/- which he had paid as earnest money. The learned Judge has held that the breach was by the plaintiff.', (int) 4 => '<p>4. Mr. Indar Singh Karwal submits that the property had been destroyed on the 6th of March 1947, and as ha had a right to complete the contract by the 7th of March 1947, he cannot be said to have been guilty of the breach of the contract. I am unable to agree with this proposition. The shop no doubt was burnt on that day and it is in the evidence of the plaintiff as witness that he was not ready to get the sale deed executed, after the shop was burnt down. In Section 13 of the Specific Relief Act it is provided:', (int) 5 => '<p>'Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 56 of the Indian Contract Act, a contract is not wholly impossible of performance because a portion of its subject-matter, existing at its date, has ceased to exist at the time of the performance.', (int) 6 => '<p> ILLUSTRATIONS (a) A contracts to sell a house to B for a lakh of rupees. The day after the contract is made, the house is destroyed by a cyclone. B may be compelled to perform his part of the contract' by paying the purchase money.' ', (int) 7 => '<p>According to this illustration, if any property, which forms the subject-matter of a contract of sale, is destroyed, the contract can still be specifically performed at the instance of either of the parties. In this case, both on questions of law as well as on facts, I find that it was the plaintiff who was not prepared to get the sale deed executed. The breach has therefore rightly been held to be on the part of the plaintiff.', (int) 8 => '<p>5. Mr. Puri has further submitted that the principle 'the loss lies where it falls' applies to this case. It appears that even in England this principle has not been followed: see 'Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Faibairn Lawson Combe Harbour, Ltd.', 1943 A.C. 32. It is not necessary to go into this question in view of the statutory provisions of the Specific Relief Act.', (int) 9 => '<p>6. I therefore dismiss this petition for revision and discharge the rule. The respondent will have his costs in this Court and the Court below. Counsel's fee two G.Ms. (Rs. 32/-).<p>', (int) 10 => '<p>' ) $paragraphAfter = (int) 1 $cnt = (int) 11 $i = (int) 7include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144 View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971 View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933 View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473 Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963 Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200 Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167 [main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109
According to this illustration, if any property, which forms the subject-matter of a contract of sale, is destroyed, the contract can still be specifically performed at the instance of either of the parties. In this case, both on questions of law as well as on facts, I find that it was the plaintiff who was not prepared to get the sale deed executed. The breach has therefore rightly been held to be on the part of the plaintiff.
Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144]Code Contextecho $this->Adsense->display('responsive_rect');}echo html_entity_decode($this->Wand->highlight($content[$i], $query));$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp' $dataForView = array( 'title_for_layout' => 'Ruldu Ram and ors Vs Bhuri Lal and anr - Citation 617444 - Court Judgment | ', 'desc' => array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '617444', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/51778/transfer-of-property-act-1882-complete-act">Transfer of Property Act, 1882</a> - Sections 55(6); <a href="/act/51064/indian-contract-act-1872-complete-act">Contract Act, 1872</a> - Sections 74; Specific Relief Act, 1877 - Sections 13', 'appealno' => 'Civil Revn. No. 455 of 1950', 'appellant' => 'Ruldu Ram and ors.', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Ruldu Ram and ors. Vs. Bhuri Lal and anr.', 'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent Appeal Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., - Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act. Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. - In this case, both on questions of law as well as on facts, I find that it was the plaintiff who was not prepared to get the sale deed executed.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Faibairn Lawson Combe Harbour;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => ' Indar Singh Karewal, Adv.', 'counseldef' => ' S.L. Puri, Adv.', 'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana', 'court_type' => 'HC', 'decidedon' => '1951-05-04', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' Kapur, J.', 'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">Kapur, J. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This is a rule against a judgment and decree of Mr. Mani Ram Khanna, Small Cause Court Judge, Amritsar, holding that the breach of the contract was by the plaintiff and dismissing the suit for the recovery of earnest money.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. On the 22nd of January 1947, the plaintiff, Ruldu Ram agreed to purchase some property consisting of a shop, a staircase, a half share in a house and a khola for a sum of Rs. 12,000/- and Rs. 500/- were paid as earnest money. The sale was to be completed by the 7th of March 1947. This being a contract for sale of immovable property, the time was not the essence of the contract. On the 6th of March 1947, the shop was burnt down in communal riots.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The plaintiff brought the suit on the 21st of June 1950 i.e., three years after the date of the contract for the recovery of Rs. 500/- which he had paid as earnest money. The learned Judge has held that the breach was by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Mr. Indar Singh Karwal submits that the property had been destroyed on the 6th of March 1947, and as ha had a right to complete the contract by the 7th of March 1947, he cannot be said to have been guilty of the breach of the contract. I am unable to agree with this proposition. The shop no doubt was burnt on that day and it is in the evidence of the plaintiff as witness that he was not ready to get the sale deed executed, after the shop was burnt down. In Section 13 of the Specific Relief Act it is provided:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 56 of the Indian Contract Act, a contract is not wholly impossible of performance because a portion of its subject-matter, existing at its date, has ceased to exist at the time of the performance.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> ILLUSTRATIONS (a) A contracts to sell a house to B for a lakh of rupees. The day after the contract is made, the house is destroyed by a cyclone. B may be compelled to perform his part of the contract' by paying the purchase money.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">According to this illustration, if any property, which forms the subject-matter of a contract of sale, is destroyed, the contract can still be specifically performed at the instance of either of the parties. In this case, both on questions of law as well as on facts, I find that it was the plaintiff who was not prepared to get the sale deed executed. The breach has therefore rightly been held to be on the part of the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr. Puri has further submitted that the principle 'the loss lies where it falls' applies to this case. It appears that even in England this principle has not been followed: see 'Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Faibairn Lawson Combe Harbour, Ltd.', 1943 A.C. 32. It is not necessary to go into this question in view of the statutory provisions of the Specific Relief Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. I therefore dismiss this petition for revision and discharge the rule. The respondent will have his costs in this Court and the Court below. Counsel's fee two G.Ms. (Rs. 32/-).<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'AIR1952P& H380', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Bhuri Lal and anr.', 'sub' => 'Contract', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ), 'casename_url' => 'ruldu-ram-ors-vs-bhuri-lal-anr', 'args' => array( (int) 0 => '617444', (int) 1 => 'ruldu-ram-ors-vs-bhuri-lal-anr' ) ) $title_for_layout = 'Ruldu Ram and ors Vs Bhuri Lal and anr - Citation 617444 - Court Judgment | ' $desc = array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '617444', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/51778/transfer-of-property-act-1882-complete-act">Transfer of Property Act, 1882</a> - Sections 55(6); <a href="/act/51064/indian-contract-act-1872-complete-act">Contract Act, 1872</a> - Sections 74; Specific Relief Act, 1877 - Sections 13', 'appealno' => 'Civil Revn. No. 455 of 1950', 'appellant' => 'Ruldu Ram and ors.', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Ruldu Ram and ors. Vs. Bhuri Lal and anr.', 'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent Appeal Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., - Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act. Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. - In this case, both on questions of law as well as on facts, I find that it was the plaintiff who was not prepared to get the sale deed executed.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Faibairn Lawson Combe Harbour;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => ' Indar Singh Karewal, Adv.', 'counseldef' => ' S.L. Puri, Adv.', 'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana', 'court_type' => 'HC', 'decidedon' => '1951-05-04', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' Kapur, J.', 'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>Kapur, J. </p><p>1. This is a rule against a judgment and decree of Mr. Mani Ram Khanna, Small Cause Court Judge, Amritsar, holding that the breach of the contract was by the plaintiff and dismissing the suit for the recovery of earnest money.</p><p>2. On the 22nd of January 1947, the plaintiff, Ruldu Ram agreed to purchase some property consisting of a shop, a staircase, a half share in a house and a khola for a sum of Rs. 12,000/- and Rs. 500/- were paid as earnest money. The sale was to be completed by the 7th of March 1947. This being a contract for sale of immovable property, the time was not the essence of the contract. On the 6th of March 1947, the shop was burnt down in communal riots.</p><p>3. The plaintiff brought the suit on the 21st of June 1950 i.e., three years after the date of the contract for the recovery of Rs. 500/- which he had paid as earnest money. The learned Judge has held that the breach was by the plaintiff.</p><p>4. Mr. Indar Singh Karwal submits that the property had been destroyed on the 6th of March 1947, and as ha had a right to complete the contract by the 7th of March 1947, he cannot be said to have been guilty of the breach of the contract. I am unable to agree with this proposition. The shop no doubt was burnt on that day and it is in the evidence of the plaintiff as witness that he was not ready to get the sale deed executed, after the shop was burnt down. In Section 13 of the Specific Relief Act it is provided:</p><p>'Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 56 of the Indian Contract Act, a contract is not wholly impossible of performance because a portion of its subject-matter, existing at its date, has ceased to exist at the time of the performance.</p><p> ILLUSTRATIONS (a) A contracts to sell a house to B for a lakh of rupees. The day after the contract is made, the house is destroyed by a cyclone. B may be compelled to perform his part of the contract' by paying the purchase money.' </p><p>According to this illustration, if any property, which forms the subject-matter of a contract of sale, is destroyed, the contract can still be specifically performed at the instance of either of the parties. In this case, both on questions of law as well as on facts, I find that it was the plaintiff who was not prepared to get the sale deed executed. The breach has therefore rightly been held to be on the part of the plaintiff.</p><p>5. Mr. Puri has further submitted that the principle 'the loss lies where it falls' applies to this case. It appears that even in England this principle has not been followed: see 'Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Faibairn Lawson Combe Harbour, Ltd.', 1943 A.C. 32. It is not necessary to go into this question in view of the statutory provisions of the Specific Relief Act.</p><p>6. I therefore dismiss this petition for revision and discharge the rule. The respondent will have his costs in this Court and the Court below. Counsel's fee two G.Ms. (Rs. 32/-).<p></p><p>', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'AIR1952P& H380', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Bhuri Lal and anr.', 'sub' => 'Contract', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ) $casename_url = 'ruldu-ram-ors-vs-bhuri-lal-anr' $args = array( (int) 0 => '617444', (int) 1 => 'ruldu-ram-ors-vs-bhuri-lal-anr' ) $url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/617444/ruldu-ram-ors-vs-bhuri-lal-anr' $ctype = ' High Court' $caseref = 'Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Faibairn Lawson Combe Harbour<br>' $content = array( (int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>Kapur, J. ', (int) 1 => '<p>1. This is a rule against a judgment and decree of Mr. Mani Ram Khanna, Small Cause Court Judge, Amritsar, holding that the breach of the contract was by the plaintiff and dismissing the suit for the recovery of earnest money.', (int) 2 => '<p>2. On the 22nd of January 1947, the plaintiff, Ruldu Ram agreed to purchase some property consisting of a shop, a staircase, a half share in a house and a khola for a sum of Rs. 12,000/- and Rs. 500/- were paid as earnest money. The sale was to be completed by the 7th of March 1947. This being a contract for sale of immovable property, the time was not the essence of the contract. On the 6th of March 1947, the shop was burnt down in communal riots.', (int) 3 => '<p>3. The plaintiff brought the suit on the 21st of June 1950 i.e., three years after the date of the contract for the recovery of Rs. 500/- which he had paid as earnest money. The learned Judge has held that the breach was by the plaintiff.', (int) 4 => '<p>4. Mr. Indar Singh Karwal submits that the property had been destroyed on the 6th of March 1947, and as ha had a right to complete the contract by the 7th of March 1947, he cannot be said to have been guilty of the breach of the contract. I am unable to agree with this proposition. The shop no doubt was burnt on that day and it is in the evidence of the plaintiff as witness that he was not ready to get the sale deed executed, after the shop was burnt down. In Section 13 of the Specific Relief Act it is provided:', (int) 5 => '<p>'Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 56 of the Indian Contract Act, a contract is not wholly impossible of performance because a portion of its subject-matter, existing at its date, has ceased to exist at the time of the performance.', (int) 6 => '<p> ILLUSTRATIONS (a) A contracts to sell a house to B for a lakh of rupees. The day after the contract is made, the house is destroyed by a cyclone. B may be compelled to perform his part of the contract' by paying the purchase money.' ', (int) 7 => '<p>According to this illustration, if any property, which forms the subject-matter of a contract of sale, is destroyed, the contract can still be specifically performed at the instance of either of the parties. In this case, both on questions of law as well as on facts, I find that it was the plaintiff who was not prepared to get the sale deed executed. The breach has therefore rightly been held to be on the part of the plaintiff.', (int) 8 => '<p>5. Mr. Puri has further submitted that the principle 'the loss lies where it falls' applies to this case. It appears that even in England this principle has not been followed: see 'Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Faibairn Lawson Combe Harbour, Ltd.', 1943 A.C. 32. It is not necessary to go into this question in view of the statutory provisions of the Specific Relief Act.', (int) 9 => '<p>6. I therefore dismiss this petition for revision and discharge the rule. The respondent will have his costs in this Court and the Court below. Counsel's fee two G.Ms. (Rs. 32/-).<p>', (int) 10 => '<p>' ) $paragraphAfter = (int) 1 $cnt = (int) 11 $i = (int) 8include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144 View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971 View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933 View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473 Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963 Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200 Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167 [main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109
5. Mr. Puri has further submitted that the principle 'the loss lies where it falls' applies to this case. It appears that even in England this principle has not been followed: see 'Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Faibairn Lawson Combe Harbour, Ltd.', 1943 A.C. 32. It is not necessary to go into this question in view of the statutory provisions of the Specific Relief Act.
Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144]Code Contextecho $this->Adsense->display('responsive_rect');}echo html_entity_decode($this->Wand->highlight($content[$i], $query));$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp' $dataForView = array( 'title_for_layout' => 'Ruldu Ram and ors Vs Bhuri Lal and anr - Citation 617444 - Court Judgment | ', 'desc' => array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '617444', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/51778/transfer-of-property-act-1882-complete-act">Transfer of Property Act, 1882</a> - Sections 55(6); <a href="/act/51064/indian-contract-act-1872-complete-act">Contract Act, 1872</a> - Sections 74; Specific Relief Act, 1877 - Sections 13', 'appealno' => 'Civil Revn. No. 455 of 1950', 'appellant' => 'Ruldu Ram and ors.', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Ruldu Ram and ors. Vs. Bhuri Lal and anr.', 'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent Appeal Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., - Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act. Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. - In this case, both on questions of law as well as on facts, I find that it was the plaintiff who was not prepared to get the sale deed executed.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Faibairn Lawson Combe Harbour;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => ' Indar Singh Karewal, Adv.', 'counseldef' => ' S.L. Puri, Adv.', 'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana', 'court_type' => 'HC', 'decidedon' => '1951-05-04', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' Kapur, J.', 'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">Kapur, J. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This is a rule against a judgment and decree of Mr. Mani Ram Khanna, Small Cause Court Judge, Amritsar, holding that the breach of the contract was by the plaintiff and dismissing the suit for the recovery of earnest money.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. On the 22nd of January 1947, the plaintiff, Ruldu Ram agreed to purchase some property consisting of a shop, a staircase, a half share in a house and a khola for a sum of Rs. 12,000/- and Rs. 500/- were paid as earnest money. The sale was to be completed by the 7th of March 1947. This being a contract for sale of immovable property, the time was not the essence of the contract. On the 6th of March 1947, the shop was burnt down in communal riots.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The plaintiff brought the suit on the 21st of June 1950 i.e., three years after the date of the contract for the recovery of Rs. 500/- which he had paid as earnest money. The learned Judge has held that the breach was by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Mr. Indar Singh Karwal submits that the property had been destroyed on the 6th of March 1947, and as ha had a right to complete the contract by the 7th of March 1947, he cannot be said to have been guilty of the breach of the contract. I am unable to agree with this proposition. The shop no doubt was burnt on that day and it is in the evidence of the plaintiff as witness that he was not ready to get the sale deed executed, after the shop was burnt down. In Section 13 of the Specific Relief Act it is provided:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 56 of the Indian Contract Act, a contract is not wholly impossible of performance because a portion of its subject-matter, existing at its date, has ceased to exist at the time of the performance.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> ILLUSTRATIONS (a) A contracts to sell a house to B for a lakh of rupees. The day after the contract is made, the house is destroyed by a cyclone. B may be compelled to perform his part of the contract' by paying the purchase money.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">According to this illustration, if any property, which forms the subject-matter of a contract of sale, is destroyed, the contract can still be specifically performed at the instance of either of the parties. In this case, both on questions of law as well as on facts, I find that it was the plaintiff who was not prepared to get the sale deed executed. The breach has therefore rightly been held to be on the part of the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr. Puri has further submitted that the principle 'the loss lies where it falls' applies to this case. It appears that even in England this principle has not been followed: see 'Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Faibairn Lawson Combe Harbour, Ltd.', 1943 A.C. 32. It is not necessary to go into this question in view of the statutory provisions of the Specific Relief Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. I therefore dismiss this petition for revision and discharge the rule. The respondent will have his costs in this Court and the Court below. Counsel's fee two G.Ms. (Rs. 32/-).<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'AIR1952P& H380', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Bhuri Lal and anr.', 'sub' => 'Contract', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ), 'casename_url' => 'ruldu-ram-ors-vs-bhuri-lal-anr', 'args' => array( (int) 0 => '617444', (int) 1 => 'ruldu-ram-ors-vs-bhuri-lal-anr' ) ) $title_for_layout = 'Ruldu Ram and ors Vs Bhuri Lal and anr - Citation 617444 - Court Judgment | ' $desc = array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '617444', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/51778/transfer-of-property-act-1882-complete-act">Transfer of Property Act, 1882</a> - Sections 55(6); <a href="/act/51064/indian-contract-act-1872-complete-act">Contract Act, 1872</a> - Sections 74; Specific Relief Act, 1877 - Sections 13', 'appealno' => 'Civil Revn. No. 455 of 1950', 'appellant' => 'Ruldu Ram and ors.', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Ruldu Ram and ors. Vs. Bhuri Lal and anr.', 'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent Appeal Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., - Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act. Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. - In this case, both on questions of law as well as on facts, I find that it was the plaintiff who was not prepared to get the sale deed executed.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Faibairn Lawson Combe Harbour;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => ' Indar Singh Karewal, Adv.', 'counseldef' => ' S.L. Puri, Adv.', 'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana', 'court_type' => 'HC', 'decidedon' => '1951-05-04', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' Kapur, J.', 'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>Kapur, J. </p><p>1. This is a rule against a judgment and decree of Mr. Mani Ram Khanna, Small Cause Court Judge, Amritsar, holding that the breach of the contract was by the plaintiff and dismissing the suit for the recovery of earnest money.</p><p>2. On the 22nd of January 1947, the plaintiff, Ruldu Ram agreed to purchase some property consisting of a shop, a staircase, a half share in a house and a khola for a sum of Rs. 12,000/- and Rs. 500/- were paid as earnest money. The sale was to be completed by the 7th of March 1947. This being a contract for sale of immovable property, the time was not the essence of the contract. On the 6th of March 1947, the shop was burnt down in communal riots.</p><p>3. The plaintiff brought the suit on the 21st of June 1950 i.e., three years after the date of the contract for the recovery of Rs. 500/- which he had paid as earnest money. The learned Judge has held that the breach was by the plaintiff.</p><p>4. Mr. Indar Singh Karwal submits that the property had been destroyed on the 6th of March 1947, and as ha had a right to complete the contract by the 7th of March 1947, he cannot be said to have been guilty of the breach of the contract. I am unable to agree with this proposition. The shop no doubt was burnt on that day and it is in the evidence of the plaintiff as witness that he was not ready to get the sale deed executed, after the shop was burnt down. In Section 13 of the Specific Relief Act it is provided:</p><p>'Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 56 of the Indian Contract Act, a contract is not wholly impossible of performance because a portion of its subject-matter, existing at its date, has ceased to exist at the time of the performance.</p><p> ILLUSTRATIONS (a) A contracts to sell a house to B for a lakh of rupees. The day after the contract is made, the house is destroyed by a cyclone. B may be compelled to perform his part of the contract' by paying the purchase money.' </p><p>According to this illustration, if any property, which forms the subject-matter of a contract of sale, is destroyed, the contract can still be specifically performed at the instance of either of the parties. In this case, both on questions of law as well as on facts, I find that it was the plaintiff who was not prepared to get the sale deed executed. The breach has therefore rightly been held to be on the part of the plaintiff.</p><p>5. Mr. Puri has further submitted that the principle 'the loss lies where it falls' applies to this case. It appears that even in England this principle has not been followed: see 'Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Faibairn Lawson Combe Harbour, Ltd.', 1943 A.C. 32. It is not necessary to go into this question in view of the statutory provisions of the Specific Relief Act.</p><p>6. I therefore dismiss this petition for revision and discharge the rule. The respondent will have his costs in this Court and the Court below. Counsel's fee two G.Ms. (Rs. 32/-).<p></p><p>', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'AIR1952P& H380', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Bhuri Lal and anr.', 'sub' => 'Contract', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ) $casename_url = 'ruldu-ram-ors-vs-bhuri-lal-anr' $args = array( (int) 0 => '617444', (int) 1 => 'ruldu-ram-ors-vs-bhuri-lal-anr' ) $url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/617444/ruldu-ram-ors-vs-bhuri-lal-anr' $ctype = ' High Court' $caseref = 'Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Faibairn Lawson Combe Harbour<br>' $content = array( (int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>Kapur, J. ', (int) 1 => '<p>1. This is a rule against a judgment and decree of Mr. Mani Ram Khanna, Small Cause Court Judge, Amritsar, holding that the breach of the contract was by the plaintiff and dismissing the suit for the recovery of earnest money.', (int) 2 => '<p>2. On the 22nd of January 1947, the plaintiff, Ruldu Ram agreed to purchase some property consisting of a shop, a staircase, a half share in a house and a khola for a sum of Rs. 12,000/- and Rs. 500/- were paid as earnest money. The sale was to be completed by the 7th of March 1947. This being a contract for sale of immovable property, the time was not the essence of the contract. On the 6th of March 1947, the shop was burnt down in communal riots.', (int) 3 => '<p>3. The plaintiff brought the suit on the 21st of June 1950 i.e., three years after the date of the contract for the recovery of Rs. 500/- which he had paid as earnest money. The learned Judge has held that the breach was by the plaintiff.', (int) 4 => '<p>4. Mr. Indar Singh Karwal submits that the property had been destroyed on the 6th of March 1947, and as ha had a right to complete the contract by the 7th of March 1947, he cannot be said to have been guilty of the breach of the contract. I am unable to agree with this proposition. The shop no doubt was burnt on that day and it is in the evidence of the plaintiff as witness that he was not ready to get the sale deed executed, after the shop was burnt down. In Section 13 of the Specific Relief Act it is provided:', (int) 5 => '<p>'Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 56 of the Indian Contract Act, a contract is not wholly impossible of performance because a portion of its subject-matter, existing at its date, has ceased to exist at the time of the performance.', (int) 6 => '<p> ILLUSTRATIONS (a) A contracts to sell a house to B for a lakh of rupees. The day after the contract is made, the house is destroyed by a cyclone. B may be compelled to perform his part of the contract' by paying the purchase money.' ', (int) 7 => '<p>According to this illustration, if any property, which forms the subject-matter of a contract of sale, is destroyed, the contract can still be specifically performed at the instance of either of the parties. In this case, both on questions of law as well as on facts, I find that it was the plaintiff who was not prepared to get the sale deed executed. The breach has therefore rightly been held to be on the part of the plaintiff.', (int) 8 => '<p>5. Mr. Puri has further submitted that the principle 'the loss lies where it falls' applies to this case. It appears that even in England this principle has not been followed: see 'Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Faibairn Lawson Combe Harbour, Ltd.', 1943 A.C. 32. It is not necessary to go into this question in view of the statutory provisions of the Specific Relief Act.', (int) 9 => '<p>6. I therefore dismiss this petition for revision and discharge the rule. The respondent will have his costs in this Court and the Court below. Counsel's fee two G.Ms. (Rs. 32/-).<p>', (int) 10 => '<p>' ) $paragraphAfter = (int) 1 $cnt = (int) 11 $i = (int) 9include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144 View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971 View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933 View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473 Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963 Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200 Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167 [main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109
6. I therefore dismiss this petition for revision and discharge the rule. The respondent will have his costs in this Court and the Court below. Counsel's fee two G.Ms. (Rs. 32/-).
Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144]Code Contextecho $this->Adsense->display('responsive_rect');}echo html_entity_decode($this->Wand->highlight($content[$i], $query));$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp' $dataForView = array( 'title_for_layout' => 'Ruldu Ram and ors Vs Bhuri Lal and anr - Citation 617444 - Court Judgment | ', 'desc' => array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '617444', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/51778/transfer-of-property-act-1882-complete-act">Transfer of Property Act, 1882</a> - Sections 55(6); <a href="/act/51064/indian-contract-act-1872-complete-act">Contract Act, 1872</a> - Sections 74; Specific Relief Act, 1877 - Sections 13', 'appealno' => 'Civil Revn. No. 455 of 1950', 'appellant' => 'Ruldu Ram and ors.', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Ruldu Ram and ors. Vs. Bhuri Lal and anr.', 'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent Appeal Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., - Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act. Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. - In this case, both on questions of law as well as on facts, I find that it was the plaintiff who was not prepared to get the sale deed executed.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Faibairn Lawson Combe Harbour;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => ' Indar Singh Karewal, Adv.', 'counseldef' => ' S.L. Puri, Adv.', 'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana', 'court_type' => 'HC', 'decidedon' => '1951-05-04', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' Kapur, J.', 'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">Kapur, J. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This is a rule against a judgment and decree of Mr. Mani Ram Khanna, Small Cause Court Judge, Amritsar, holding that the breach of the contract was by the plaintiff and dismissing the suit for the recovery of earnest money.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. On the 22nd of January 1947, the plaintiff, Ruldu Ram agreed to purchase some property consisting of a shop, a staircase, a half share in a house and a khola for a sum of Rs. 12,000/- and Rs. 500/- were paid as earnest money. The sale was to be completed by the 7th of March 1947. This being a contract for sale of immovable property, the time was not the essence of the contract. On the 6th of March 1947, the shop was burnt down in communal riots.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The plaintiff brought the suit on the 21st of June 1950 i.e., three years after the date of the contract for the recovery of Rs. 500/- which he had paid as earnest money. The learned Judge has held that the breach was by the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Mr. Indar Singh Karwal submits that the property had been destroyed on the 6th of March 1947, and as ha had a right to complete the contract by the 7th of March 1947, he cannot be said to have been guilty of the breach of the contract. I am unable to agree with this proposition. The shop no doubt was burnt on that day and it is in the evidence of the plaintiff as witness that he was not ready to get the sale deed executed, after the shop was burnt down. In Section 13 of the Specific Relief Act it is provided:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 56 of the Indian Contract Act, a contract is not wholly impossible of performance because a portion of its subject-matter, existing at its date, has ceased to exist at the time of the performance.</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> ILLUSTRATIONS (a) A contracts to sell a house to B for a lakh of rupees. The day after the contract is made, the house is destroyed by a cyclone. B may be compelled to perform his part of the contract' by paying the purchase money.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">According to this illustration, if any property, which forms the subject-matter of a contract of sale, is destroyed, the contract can still be specifically performed at the instance of either of the parties. In this case, both on questions of law as well as on facts, I find that it was the plaintiff who was not prepared to get the sale deed executed. The breach has therefore rightly been held to be on the part of the plaintiff.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr. Puri has further submitted that the principle 'the loss lies where it falls' applies to this case. It appears that even in England this principle has not been followed: see 'Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Faibairn Lawson Combe Harbour, Ltd.', 1943 A.C. 32. It is not necessary to go into this question in view of the statutory provisions of the Specific Relief Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. I therefore dismiss this petition for revision and discharge the rule. The respondent will have his costs in this Court and the Court below. Counsel's fee two G.Ms. (Rs. 32/-).<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'AIR1952P& H380', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Bhuri Lal and anr.', 'sub' => 'Contract', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ), 'casename_url' => 'ruldu-ram-ors-vs-bhuri-lal-anr', 'args' => array( (int) 0 => '617444', (int) 1 => 'ruldu-ram-ors-vs-bhuri-lal-anr' ) ) $title_for_layout = 'Ruldu Ram and ors Vs Bhuri Lal and anr - Citation 617444 - Court Judgment | ' $desc = array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '617444', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/51778/transfer-of-property-act-1882-complete-act">Transfer of Property Act, 1882</a> - Sections 55(6); <a href="/act/51064/indian-contract-act-1872-complete-act">Contract Act, 1872</a> - Sections 74; Specific Relief Act, 1877 - Sections 13', 'appealno' => 'Civil Revn. No. 455 of 1950', 'appellant' => 'Ruldu Ram and ors.', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Ruldu Ram and ors. Vs. Bhuri Lal and anr.', 'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent Appeal Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., - Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act. Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. - In this case, both on questions of law as well as on facts, I find that it was the plaintiff who was not prepared to get the sale deed executed.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Faibairn Lawson Combe Harbour;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => ' Indar Singh Karewal, Adv.', 'counseldef' => ' S.L. Puri, Adv.', 'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana', 'court_type' => 'HC', 'decidedon' => '1951-05-04', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' Kapur, J.', 'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>Kapur, J. </p><p>1. This is a rule against a judgment and decree of Mr. Mani Ram Khanna, Small Cause Court Judge, Amritsar, holding that the breach of the contract was by the plaintiff and dismissing the suit for the recovery of earnest money.</p><p>2. On the 22nd of January 1947, the plaintiff, Ruldu Ram agreed to purchase some property consisting of a shop, a staircase, a half share in a house and a khola for a sum of Rs. 12,000/- and Rs. 500/- were paid as earnest money. The sale was to be completed by the 7th of March 1947. This being a contract for sale of immovable property, the time was not the essence of the contract. On the 6th of March 1947, the shop was burnt down in communal riots.</p><p>3. The plaintiff brought the suit on the 21st of June 1950 i.e., three years after the date of the contract for the recovery of Rs. 500/- which he had paid as earnest money. The learned Judge has held that the breach was by the plaintiff.</p><p>4. Mr. Indar Singh Karwal submits that the property had been destroyed on the 6th of March 1947, and as ha had a right to complete the contract by the 7th of March 1947, he cannot be said to have been guilty of the breach of the contract. I am unable to agree with this proposition. The shop no doubt was burnt on that day and it is in the evidence of the plaintiff as witness that he was not ready to get the sale deed executed, after the shop was burnt down. In Section 13 of the Specific Relief Act it is provided:</p><p>'Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 56 of the Indian Contract Act, a contract is not wholly impossible of performance because a portion of its subject-matter, existing at its date, has ceased to exist at the time of the performance.</p><p> ILLUSTRATIONS (a) A contracts to sell a house to B for a lakh of rupees. The day after the contract is made, the house is destroyed by a cyclone. B may be compelled to perform his part of the contract' by paying the purchase money.' </p><p>According to this illustration, if any property, which forms the subject-matter of a contract of sale, is destroyed, the contract can still be specifically performed at the instance of either of the parties. In this case, both on questions of law as well as on facts, I find that it was the plaintiff who was not prepared to get the sale deed executed. The breach has therefore rightly been held to be on the part of the plaintiff.</p><p>5. Mr. Puri has further submitted that the principle 'the loss lies where it falls' applies to this case. It appears that even in England this principle has not been followed: see 'Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Faibairn Lawson Combe Harbour, Ltd.', 1943 A.C. 32. It is not necessary to go into this question in view of the statutory provisions of the Specific Relief Act.</p><p>6. I therefore dismiss this petition for revision and discharge the rule. The respondent will have his costs in this Court and the Court below. Counsel's fee two G.Ms. (Rs. 32/-).<p></p><p>', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'AIR1952P& H380', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Bhuri Lal and anr.', 'sub' => 'Contract', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ) $casename_url = 'ruldu-ram-ors-vs-bhuri-lal-anr' $args = array( (int) 0 => '617444', (int) 1 => 'ruldu-ram-ors-vs-bhuri-lal-anr' ) $url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/617444/ruldu-ram-ors-vs-bhuri-lal-anr' $ctype = ' High Court' $caseref = 'Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Faibairn Lawson Combe Harbour<br>' $content = array( (int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>Kapur, J. ', (int) 1 => '<p>1. This is a rule against a judgment and decree of Mr. Mani Ram Khanna, Small Cause Court Judge, Amritsar, holding that the breach of the contract was by the plaintiff and dismissing the suit for the recovery of earnest money.', (int) 2 => '<p>2. On the 22nd of January 1947, the plaintiff, Ruldu Ram agreed to purchase some property consisting of a shop, a staircase, a half share in a house and a khola for a sum of Rs. 12,000/- and Rs. 500/- were paid as earnest money. The sale was to be completed by the 7th of March 1947. This being a contract for sale of immovable property, the time was not the essence of the contract. On the 6th of March 1947, the shop was burnt down in communal riots.', (int) 3 => '<p>3. The plaintiff brought the suit on the 21st of June 1950 i.e., three years after the date of the contract for the recovery of Rs. 500/- which he had paid as earnest money. The learned Judge has held that the breach was by the plaintiff.', (int) 4 => '<p>4. Mr. Indar Singh Karwal submits that the property had been destroyed on the 6th of March 1947, and as ha had a right to complete the contract by the 7th of March 1947, he cannot be said to have been guilty of the breach of the contract. I am unable to agree with this proposition. The shop no doubt was burnt on that day and it is in the evidence of the plaintiff as witness that he was not ready to get the sale deed executed, after the shop was burnt down. In Section 13 of the Specific Relief Act it is provided:', (int) 5 => '<p>'Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 56 of the Indian Contract Act, a contract is not wholly impossible of performance because a portion of its subject-matter, existing at its date, has ceased to exist at the time of the performance.', (int) 6 => '<p> ILLUSTRATIONS (a) A contracts to sell a house to B for a lakh of rupees. The day after the contract is made, the house is destroyed by a cyclone. B may be compelled to perform his part of the contract' by paying the purchase money.' ', (int) 7 => '<p>According to this illustration, if any property, which forms the subject-matter of a contract of sale, is destroyed, the contract can still be specifically performed at the instance of either of the parties. In this case, both on questions of law as well as on facts, I find that it was the plaintiff who was not prepared to get the sale deed executed. The breach has therefore rightly been held to be on the part of the plaintiff.', (int) 8 => '<p>5. Mr. Puri has further submitted that the principle 'the loss lies where it falls' applies to this case. It appears that even in England this principle has not been followed: see 'Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Faibairn Lawson Combe Harbour, Ltd.', 1943 A.C. 32. It is not necessary to go into this question in view of the statutory provisions of the Specific Relief Act.', (int) 9 => '<p>6. I therefore dismiss this petition for revision and discharge the rule. The respondent will have his costs in this Court and the Court below. Counsel's fee two G.Ms. (Rs. 32/-).<p>', (int) 10 => '<p>' ) $paragraphAfter = (int) 1 $cnt = (int) 11 $i = (int) 10include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144 View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971 View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933 View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473 Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963 Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200 Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167 [main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109