Mehta Goods Carrier (P) Ltd. Vs. Darshan Devi and ors. - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
- sections 100-a [as inserted by act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & letters patent, 1865, clause 10: [dr. b.s. chauhan, cj, l. mohapatra & a.s. naidu, jj] letters patent appeal order of single judge of high court passed while deciding matters filed under order 43, rule1 of c.p.c., - held, after introduction of section 110a in the c.p.c., by 2002 amendment act, no letters patent appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a single judge of a high court. a right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. it is pertinent to note that section 100-a introduced by 2002 amendment of the code starts with a non obstante clause. the purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. the legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. it is well settled that the definition of judgment in section 2(9) of c.p.c., is much wider and more liberal, intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to clause (a) to (w) of order 43, rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. amended section 100-a of the code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a single judge of a high court, no further appeal shall lie. even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under section 2(9) means a statement given by a judge on the grounds of a decree or order. thus the contention that against an order passed by a single judge in an appeal filed under section 104 c.p.c., a further appeal lies to a division bench cannot be accepted. the newly incorporated section 100a in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a single judge to a division bench notwithstanding anything contained in the letters patent. the letters patent which provides for further appeal to a division bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a single judge. it has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an appeal to the high court. it has not made any provision for filing appeal to a division bench against the judgment or decree or order of a single judge. no letters patent appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a single judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a special act. sections 100-a [as inserted by act 22 of 2002] & 104:[dr. b.s. chauhan, cj, l. mohapatra & a.s. naidu, jj] writ appeal held, a writ appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by single judge in a writ petition filed under article 226 of the constitution of india. in a writ application filed under articles 226 and 227 of constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under article 226, a writ appeal will lie. but, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a single judge in exercising powers of superintendence under article 227 of the constitution. - admittedly, the application for compensation filed on 17-11-1959 was well with time. besides, according to the proviso to sub-section (3) of section 110-a of the act, the tribunal could certain the application even after the expiry of the prescribed period of 60 days, if it was satisfied cause from making the application in time. under these circumstances, the tribunal was well within its rights to impleaded the petitioning-company and entertain the application against the same even after the prescribed period of 60 days.(1) this is a petition under article 227 of the constitution of india challenging the order dated 28-2-1960 passed by the motor accident claims tribunal, punjab. (2) it appears that an accident took place on 20-9-1959, in which one hardev krishan died. on 17-11-1959 his heirs filed an application before the tribunal for compensation. in this application, they impleaded the drivers of the two trucks, which were involved in this accident, their owners and the insurance company with which these trucks were insured. (3) in the written statement filed by the insurance company, it was stated that the company had insured messrs. mehta goods carrier (private) limited with respect to truck no. dle-6936. on 24-10-1960 one mohan lal bhasin filed an application on behalf of the alleged owner of this truck no. dle-6939 that messrs. mehta goods carrier (private) limited be impleaded as a party to this application for compensation. on 20-12-1960 the tribunal ordered that since it was discovered from the written statement filed by the insurance company that the party insured with them regarding truck no. dle-6939 was messrs. mehta goods carrier (private) limited, they should be impleaded as a party to the application. this having been done, they filed a written statement in which they raised a preliminary objection that the claim against them was time barred. (4) on 28-2-1961 the tribunal rejected the preliminary objection and held that the application for compensation was within time. against this order, messrs. mehta goods carrier (private) limited have filed the present petition. (5) learned counsel for the petitioning company has submitted that, according to section 110-a, sub-section (3) of the motor vehicles act, 1939, the application for compensation has to be filed within 60 days of the occurrence of the accident, but the order impleading the company as a defendant was passed on 20-12-1960 any by virture of the provisions of section 22 of the indian limitation act, the suit against the company should be deemed to have been instituted on 20-12-1960 and, consequently, it was barred by limitation. (6) after hearing the counsel for the parties, i am of the view that there is no merit in this submission. admittedly, the application for compensation filed on 17-11-1959 was well with time. besides, according to the proviso to sub-section (3) of section 110-a of the act, the tribunal could certain the application even after the expiry of the prescribed period of 60 days, if it was satisfied cause from making the application in time. the tribunal while ordering the impleading of messrs. mehta goods carrier (private) limited, observed that it was only from the written statement filed by the insurance company that it was discovered that the owner of truck no. dle-6939 was the petitioning-company. under these circumstances, the tribunal was well within its rights to impleaded the petitioning-company and entertain the application against the same even after the prescribed period of 60 days. moreover, in my opinion, by impleading the petitioning-company, no injustice has been done in this case and i decline to interfere with the impugned order of the tribunal in these proceedings under article 227 of the constitution. (7) in view of the matter, no other question arises for decision. (8) this petition is, consequently, dismissed. but in the circumstances of this case, however, i will leave the parties to bear their own costs in this court. (9) petition dismissed.