Satpal Kaur Vs. Dhian Singh - Court Judgment

SooperKanoon Citationsooperkanoon.com/616914
SubjectFamily
CourtPunjab and Haryana High Court
Decided OnMar-17-1994
Case NumberFirst Appeal from Order No. 127-M of 1987
Judge S.K. Jain, J.
Reported inI(1995)DMC178
ActsHindu Marriage Act, 1955 - Sections 13(1A)
AppellantSatpal Kaur
RespondentDhian Singh
Appellant Advocate I.D. Singla, Adv.
Respondent Advocate J.S. Kheira, Adv.
DispositionAppeal allowed
Excerpt:
- sections 100-a [as inserted by act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & letters patent, 1865, clause 10: [dr. b.s. chauhan, cj, l. mohapatra & a.s. naidu, jj] letters patent appeal order of single judge of high court passed while deciding matters filed under order 43, rule1 of c.p.c., - held, after introduction of section 110a in the c.p.c., by 2002 amendment act, no letters patent appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a single judge of a high court. a right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. it is pertinent to note that section 100-a introduced by 2002 amendment of the code starts with a non obstante clause. the purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. the legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. it is well settled that the definition of judgment in section 2(9) of c.p.c., is much wider and more liberal, intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to clause (a) to (w) of order 43, rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. amended section 100-a of the code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a single judge of a high court, no further appeal shall lie. even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under section 2(9) means a statement given by a judge on the grounds of a decree or order. thus the contention that against an order passed by a single judge in an appeal filed under section 104 c.p.c., a further appeal lies to a division bench cannot be accepted. the newly incorporated section 100a in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a single judge to a division bench notwithstanding anything contained in the letters patent. the letters patent which provides for further appeal to a division bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a single judge. it has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an appeal to the high court. it has not made any provision for filing appeal to a division bench against the judgment or decree or order of a single judge. no letters patent appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a single judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a special act. sections 100-a [as inserted by act 22 of 2002] & 104:[dr. b.s. chauhan, cj, l. mohapatra & a.s. naidu, jj] writ appeal held, a writ appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by single judge in a writ petition filed under article 226 of the constitution of india. in a writ application filed under articles 226 and 227 of constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under article 226, a writ appeal will lie. but, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a single judge in exercising powers of superintendence under article 227 of the constitution. - with the intervention of relatives and friends, we have seen through reason and in the interest of our married life and in order to save our daughters from disaster we have compromised our disputes outside the court.s.k. jain, j.1. petition under section 13 of the hindu marriage act filed by dhian singh against his wife satpal kaur was allowed and the husband was granted a decree of divorce under section 13(1a)(ii) of the hindu marriage act against the wife, thereby dissolving their marriage. the said judgment dated 25.5.1987 has been challenged by the wife in this fao. today, the parties alongwith their counsel have appeared and have filed agreement, exhibit c-1, in the form of affidavit to the effect that they have compromised the dispute and are living together as husband and wife and that the decree of divorce dated 25.5.1987 passed by district judge, ropar, be set aside. statements of the parties have been recorded separately. statement of dhian singh respondent runs thus:'i was married to satpal kaur, present in court on 9.2.1978. two daughters and a son were born out of our wed-lock but the son had died. we had fallen out and could not reconcile, therefore, i had filed a petition seeking decree of divorce against my wife satpal kaur. that petition was allowed and decree was granted by district judge, ropar, vide his judgment dated 25.5.1987. that judgment has been challenged by satpal kaur in this appeal.with the intervention of the relatives and friends, we have settled out disputes outside the court. we are residing together as husband and wife at fatehgarh barain w.e.f. 24.4.1994. in view of our amicable settlement, i pray that my petition under section 13 of the hindu marriage act for decree of divorce may be dismissed and decree dated 25.5.1987 passed by district judge, ropar, set aside and this appeal be allowed.we have also filed an agreement by way of affidavit.'statement of satpal kaur-appellant runs thus :i was married to dhian singh, my husband, present in court, in the year 1978. one son and two daughters were born out of our wedlock but the son had died. disputes arose between me and my husband which resulted in the filing of a petition for decree of divorce by my husband. dhian singh against me which was allowed by district judge, ropar and a decree of divorce was granted vide judgment dated 25.3.1987. the said judgment has been challenged by me in this appeal.with the intervention of relatives and friends, we have seen through reason and in the interest of our married life and in order to save our daughters from disaster we have compromised our disputes outside the court. my appeal may, therefore, be allowed and the decree dated 25.5.1987 passed by district judge, ropar, which is impugned in this appeal, may be set aside.we have also filed an agreement by way of an affidavit. under the orders of this court, in this appeal i was getting interim maintenance, in view of our compromise, i forego the same.'in view of the above statements of the parties, this fao is allowed and the decree of divorce under section 13(1a)(ii) of the hindu marriage act thereby dissolving the marriage between the parties passed by learned district judge, ropar, vide his order dated 25.5.1987 is hereby set aside. parties are, however, left to bear their own costs.
Judgment:

S.K. Jain, J.

1. Petition under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act filed by Dhian Singh against his wife Satpal Kaur was allowed and the husband was granted a decree of divorce under Section 13(1A)(ii) of the Hindu Marriage Act against the wife, thereby dissolving their marriage. The said judgment dated 25.5.1987 has been challenged by the wife in this FAO. Today, the parties alongwith their Counsel have appeared and have filed agreement, Exhibit C-1, in the form of affidavit to the effect that they have compromised the dispute and are living together as husband and wife and that the decree of divorce dated 25.5.1987 passed by District Judge, Ropar, be set aside. Statements of the parties have been recorded separately. Statement of Dhian Singh respondent runs thus:

'I was married to Satpal Kaur, present in Court on 9.2.1978. Two daughters and a son were born out of our wed-lock but the son had died. We had fallen out and could not reconcile, therefore, I had filed a petition seeking decree of divorce against my wife Satpal Kaur. That petition was allowed and decree was granted by District Judge, Ropar, vide his judgment dated 25.5.1987. That judgment has been challenged by Satpal Kaur in this appeal.

With the intervention of the relatives and friends, we have settled out disputes outside the Court. We are residing together as husband and wife at Fatehgarh Barain w.e.f. 24.4.1994. In view of our amicable settlement, I pray that my petition under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act for decree of divorce may be dismissed and decree dated 25.5.1987 passed by District Judge, Ropar, set aside and this appeal be allowed.

We have also filed an agreement by way of affidavit.'

Statement of Satpal Kaur-appellant runs thus :

I was married to Dhian Singh, my husband, present in Court, in the year 1978. One son and two daughters were born out of our wedlock but the son had died. Disputes arose between me and my husband which resulted in the filing of a petition for decree of divorce by my husband. Dhian Singh against me which was allowed by District Judge, Ropar and a decree of divorce was granted vide judgment dated 25.3.1987. The said judgment has been challenged by me in this appeal.

With the intervention of relatives and friends, we have seen through reason and in the interest of our married life and in order to save our daughters from disaster we have compromised our disputes outside the Court. My appeal may, therefore, be allowed and the decree dated 25.5.1987 passed by District Judge, Ropar, which is impugned in this appeal, may be set aside.

We have also filed an agreement by way of an affidavit. Under the orders of this Court, in this appeal I was getting interim maintenance, In view of our compromise, I forego the same.'

In view of the above statements of the parties, this FAO is allowed and the decree of divorce under Section 13(1A)(ii) of the Hindu Marriage Act thereby dissolving the marriage between the parties passed by learned District Judge, Ropar, vide his order dated 25.5.1987 is hereby set aside. Parties are, however, left to bear their own costs.