SooperKanoon Citation | sooperkanoon.com/616448 |
Subject | Civil |
Court | Punjab and Haryana High Court |
Decided On | Feb-08-2005 |
Case Number | Civil Revision No. 939 of 2003 |
Judge | M.M. Aggarwal, J. |
Reported in | (2005)140PLR501 |
Acts | Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860 - Sections 120B, 406, 420 and 506 |
Appellant | Daya Ram and ors. |
Respondent | Sube Singh |
Appellant Advocate | Ashit Malik, Adv. |
Respondent Advocate | Kulvir Narwal, Adv. |
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$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp' $dataForView = array( 'title_for_layout' => 'Daya Ram and ors Vs Sube Singh - Citation 616448 - Court Judgment | ', 'desc' => array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '616448', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 120B, 406, 420 and 506', 'appealno' => 'Civil Revision No. 939 of 2003', 'appellant' => 'Daya Ram and ors.', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Daya Ram and ors. Vs. Sube Singh', 'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent Appeal Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., - Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act. Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. ', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => '', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => ' Ashit Malik, Adv.', 'counseldef' => ' Kulvir Narwal, Adv.', 'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana', 'court_type' => 'HC', 'decidedon' => '2005-02-08', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' M.M. Aggarwal, J.', 'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">M.M. Aggarwal, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This petition had been filed against order dated 24.3.2003 of Additional Sessions Judge, Rohtak whereby order of the Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class dated 26.11.2002 had been set aside and the Additional Sessions Judge had directed that the complaint shall proceed for offence under Sections 420/406/120-B and 506 I.P.C.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The facts of the case had been that Sube Singh filed a complaint alleging that Daya Ram and others had entered into an unlawful assembly and hatched a conspiracy. Daya Ram had entered into an agreement to sell his 1/6th share. The sale was to be for Rs. 2 lacs a killa. On 21.8.2000, he had received Rs. 1 lac and then remaining amount Rs. 58,750/- was to be received at the time of registration of sale-deed. However, before 21.12.2000 i.e. the date of performance, Daya Ram had in connivance with other accused cheated the complainant by transferring his 1/6th share to accused Nos. 2 to 10 and accused No. 1 surrendered possession on 4.9.2000 in favour of accused Nos. 2 to 10 and also executed release deed in favour of accused Nos. 2 to 10, that Daya Ram had then lodged a false report with the police. When Sube Singh and witnesses had gone to Daya Ram and other accused, then the accused had threatened that they shall be done to death.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The Additional Sessions Judge vide order dated 24.3.2003 directed that since there was a prima facie case for offence under Sections 406/420/120-B/506 I.P.C., against the petitioners, they should be proceeded against for the aforesaid offence by the Magistrate.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. It is a fact that Sube Singh had already filed a Civil Suit for specific performance on the basis of agreement as against Daya Ram and other accused. That suit is stated to be pending.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Counsel for the petitioner had argued that when the civil suit was pending, no criminal prosecution could be launched.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Counsel for the complainant Sube Singh had argued that Daya Ram in collusions with other accused had cheated the complainant. They had entered into a conspiracy and threatened the complainant; that, in fact, Daya Ram etc. had got complainant Sube Singh wrongfully implicated in a case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. It is a fact that civil Suit filed by Sube Singh against Daya Ram and others for specific performance of the agreement to sell dated 21.8.2000 is pending. However, it is difficult to say as to whether other accused had entered into conspiracy with Daya Ram when Daya Ram executed relinquishment deed in favour of other accused. The averment that all the accused had threatened the complainant appears to have been made to implicate as many as possible.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It is settled law that criminal prosecution and Civil Suit can go together. However, I am of the view that the case of cheating is made out only against Daya Ram petitioner who had entered into agreement of sale and received the amount and not the other petitioners. No other offence is made out.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Under these circumstances, the order dated 24.3.2004 of Additional Sessions Judge, Rohtak is set aside to the extent that only Daya Ram shall face trial for offence under Section 420 I.P.C. The complaint against other petitioners shall stand dismissed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => '(2005)140PLR501', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Sube Singh', 'sub' => 'Civil', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ), 'casename_url' => 'daya-ram-ors-vs-sube-singh', 'args' => array( (int) 0 => '616448', (int) 1 => 'daya-ram-ors-vs-sube-singh' ) ) $title_for_layout = 'Daya Ram and ors Vs Sube Singh - Citation 616448 - Court Judgment | ' $desc = array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '616448', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 120B, 406, 420 and 506', 'appealno' => 'Civil Revision No. 939 of 2003', 'appellant' => 'Daya Ram and ors.', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Daya Ram and ors. Vs. Sube Singh', 'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent Appeal Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., - Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act. Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. ', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => '', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => ' Ashit Malik, Adv.', 'counseldef' => ' Kulvir Narwal, Adv.', 'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana', 'court_type' => 'HC', 'decidedon' => '2005-02-08', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' M.M. Aggarwal, J.', 'judgement' => '<p>M.M. Aggarwal, J.</p><p>1. This petition had been filed against order dated 24.3.2003 of Additional Sessions Judge, Rohtak whereby order of the Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class dated 26.11.2002 had been set aside and the Additional Sessions Judge had directed that the complaint shall proceed for offence under Sections 420/406/120-B and 506 I.P.C.</p><p>2. The facts of the case had been that Sube Singh filed a complaint alleging that Daya Ram and others had entered into an unlawful assembly and hatched a conspiracy. Daya Ram had entered into an agreement to sell his 1/6th share. The sale was to be for Rs. 2 lacs a killa. On 21.8.2000, he had received Rs. 1 lac and then remaining amount Rs. 58,750/- was to be received at the time of registration of sale-deed. However, before 21.12.2000 i.e. the date of performance, Daya Ram had in connivance with other accused cheated the complainant by transferring his 1/6th share to accused Nos. 2 to 10 and accused No. 1 surrendered possession on 4.9.2000 in favour of accused Nos. 2 to 10 and also executed release deed in favour of accused Nos. 2 to 10, that Daya Ram had then lodged a false report with the police. When Sube Singh and witnesses had gone to Daya Ram and other accused, then the accused had threatened that they shall be done to death.</p><p>3. The Additional Sessions Judge vide order dated 24.3.2003 directed that since there was a prima facie case for offence under Sections 406/420/120-B/506 I.P.C., against the petitioners, they should be proceeded against for the aforesaid offence by the Magistrate.</p><p>4. It is a fact that Sube Singh had already filed a Civil Suit for specific performance on the basis of agreement as against Daya Ram and other accused. That suit is stated to be pending.</p><p>5. Counsel for the petitioner had argued that when the civil suit was pending, no criminal prosecution could be launched.</p><p>6. Counsel for the complainant Sube Singh had argued that Daya Ram in collusions with other accused had cheated the complainant. They had entered into a conspiracy and threatened the complainant; that, in fact, Daya Ram etc. had got complainant Sube Singh wrongfully implicated in a case.</p><p>7. It is a fact that civil Suit filed by Sube Singh against Daya Ram and others for specific performance of the agreement to sell dated 21.8.2000 is pending. However, it is difficult to say as to whether other accused had entered into conspiracy with Daya Ram when Daya Ram executed relinquishment deed in favour of other accused. The averment that all the accused had threatened the complainant appears to have been made to implicate as many as possible.</p><p>8. It is settled law that criminal prosecution and Civil Suit can go together. However, I am of the view that the case of cheating is made out only against Daya Ram petitioner who had entered into agreement of sale and received the amount and not the other petitioners. No other offence is made out.</p><p>Under these circumstances, the order dated 24.3.2004 of Additional Sessions Judge, Rohtak is set aside to the extent that only Daya Ram shall face trial for offence under Section 420 I.P.C. The complaint against other petitioners shall stand dismissed.<p></p><p>', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => '(2005)140PLR501', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Sube Singh', 'sub' => 'Civil', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ) $casename_url = 'daya-ram-ors-vs-sube-singh' $args = array( (int) 0 => '616448', (int) 1 => 'daya-ram-ors-vs-sube-singh' ) $url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/616448/daya-ram-ors-vs-sube-singh' $ctype = ' High Court'include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 120 View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971 View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933 View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473 Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963 Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200 Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167 [main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109
Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 120]- sections 100-a [as inserted by act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & letters patent, 1865, clause 10: [dr. b.s. chauhan, cj, l. mohapatra & a.s. naidu, jj] letters patent appeal order of single judge of high court passed while deciding matters filed under order 43, rule1 of c.p.c., - held, after introduction of section 110a in the c.p.c., by 2002 amendment act, no letters patent appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a single judge of a high court. a right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. it is pertinent to note that section 100-a introduced by 2002 amendment of the code starts with a non obstante clause. the purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the.....Code Contextecho "<div class='table-bordered'><b>Excerpt:</b><br/>";
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$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp' $dataForView = array( 'title_for_layout' => 'Daya Ram and ors Vs Sube Singh - Citation 616448 - Court Judgment | ', 'desc' => array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '616448', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 120B, 406, 420 and 506', 'appealno' => 'Civil Revision No. 939 of 2003', 'appellant' => 'Daya Ram and ors.', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Daya Ram and ors. Vs. Sube Singh', 'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent Appeal Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., - Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act. Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. ', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => '', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => ' Ashit Malik, Adv.', 'counseldef' => ' Kulvir Narwal, Adv.', 'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana', 'court_type' => 'HC', 'decidedon' => '2005-02-08', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' M.M. Aggarwal, J.', 'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">M.M. Aggarwal, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This petition had been filed against order dated 24.3.2003 of Additional Sessions Judge, Rohtak whereby order of the Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class dated 26.11.2002 had been set aside and the Additional Sessions Judge had directed that the complaint shall proceed for offence under Sections 420/406/120-B and 506 I.P.C.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The facts of the case had been that Sube Singh filed a complaint alleging that Daya Ram and others had entered into an unlawful assembly and hatched a conspiracy. Daya Ram had entered into an agreement to sell his 1/6th share. The sale was to be for Rs. 2 lacs a killa. On 21.8.2000, he had received Rs. 1 lac and then remaining amount Rs. 58,750/- was to be received at the time of registration of sale-deed. However, before 21.12.2000 i.e. the date of performance, Daya Ram had in connivance with other accused cheated the complainant by transferring his 1/6th share to accused Nos. 2 to 10 and accused No. 1 surrendered possession on 4.9.2000 in favour of accused Nos. 2 to 10 and also executed release deed in favour of accused Nos. 2 to 10, that Daya Ram had then lodged a false report with the police. When Sube Singh and witnesses had gone to Daya Ram and other accused, then the accused had threatened that they shall be done to death.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The Additional Sessions Judge vide order dated 24.3.2003 directed that since there was a prima facie case for offence under Sections 406/420/120-B/506 I.P.C., against the petitioners, they should be proceeded against for the aforesaid offence by the Magistrate.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. It is a fact that Sube Singh had already filed a Civil Suit for specific performance on the basis of agreement as against Daya Ram and other accused. That suit is stated to be pending.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Counsel for the petitioner had argued that when the civil suit was pending, no criminal prosecution could be launched.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Counsel for the complainant Sube Singh had argued that Daya Ram in collusions with other accused had cheated the complainant. They had entered into a conspiracy and threatened the complainant; that, in fact, Daya Ram etc. had got complainant Sube Singh wrongfully implicated in a case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. It is a fact that civil Suit filed by Sube Singh against Daya Ram and others for specific performance of the agreement to sell dated 21.8.2000 is pending. However, it is difficult to say as to whether other accused had entered into conspiracy with Daya Ram when Daya Ram executed relinquishment deed in favour of other accused. The averment that all the accused had threatened the complainant appears to have been made to implicate as many as possible.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It is settled law that criminal prosecution and Civil Suit can go together. However, I am of the view that the case of cheating is made out only against Daya Ram petitioner who had entered into agreement of sale and received the amount and not the other petitioners. No other offence is made out.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Under these circumstances, the order dated 24.3.2004 of Additional Sessions Judge, Rohtak is set aside to the extent that only Daya Ram shall face trial for offence under Section 420 I.P.C. The complaint against other petitioners shall stand dismissed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => '(2005)140PLR501', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Sube Singh', 'sub' => 'Civil', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ), 'casename_url' => 'daya-ram-ors-vs-sube-singh', 'args' => array( (int) 0 => '616448', (int) 1 => 'daya-ram-ors-vs-sube-singh' ) ) $title_for_layout = 'Daya Ram and ors Vs Sube Singh - Citation 616448 - Court Judgment | ' $desc = array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '616448', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 120B, 406, 420 and 506', 'appealno' => 'Civil Revision No. 939 of 2003', 'appellant' => 'Daya Ram and ors.', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Daya Ram and ors. Vs. Sube Singh', 'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent Appeal Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., - Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act. Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. ', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => '', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => ' Ashit Malik, Adv.', 'counseldef' => ' Kulvir Narwal, Adv.', 'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana', 'court_type' => 'HC', 'decidedon' => '2005-02-08', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' M.M. Aggarwal, J.', 'judgement' => '<p>M.M. Aggarwal, J.</p><p>1. This petition had been filed against order dated 24.3.2003 of Additional Sessions Judge, Rohtak whereby order of the Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class dated 26.11.2002 had been set aside and the Additional Sessions Judge had directed that the complaint shall proceed for offence under Sections 420/406/120-B and 506 I.P.C.</p><p>2. The facts of the case had been that Sube Singh filed a complaint alleging that Daya Ram and others had entered into an unlawful assembly and hatched a conspiracy. Daya Ram had entered into an agreement to sell his 1/6th share. The sale was to be for Rs. 2 lacs a killa. On 21.8.2000, he had received Rs. 1 lac and then remaining amount Rs. 58,750/- was to be received at the time of registration of sale-deed. However, before 21.12.2000 i.e. the date of performance, Daya Ram had in connivance with other accused cheated the complainant by transferring his 1/6th share to accused Nos. 2 to 10 and accused No. 1 surrendered possession on 4.9.2000 in favour of accused Nos. 2 to 10 and also executed release deed in favour of accused Nos. 2 to 10, that Daya Ram had then lodged a false report with the police. When Sube Singh and witnesses had gone to Daya Ram and other accused, then the accused had threatened that they shall be done to death.</p><p>3. The Additional Sessions Judge vide order dated 24.3.2003 directed that since there was a prima facie case for offence under Sections 406/420/120-B/506 I.P.C., against the petitioners, they should be proceeded against for the aforesaid offence by the Magistrate.</p><p>4. It is a fact that Sube Singh had already filed a Civil Suit for specific performance on the basis of agreement as against Daya Ram and other accused. That suit is stated to be pending.</p><p>5. Counsel for the petitioner had argued that when the civil suit was pending, no criminal prosecution could be launched.</p><p>6. Counsel for the complainant Sube Singh had argued that Daya Ram in collusions with other accused had cheated the complainant. They had entered into a conspiracy and threatened the complainant; that, in fact, Daya Ram etc. had got complainant Sube Singh wrongfully implicated in a case.</p><p>7. It is a fact that civil Suit filed by Sube Singh against Daya Ram and others for specific performance of the agreement to sell dated 21.8.2000 is pending. However, it is difficult to say as to whether other accused had entered into conspiracy with Daya Ram when Daya Ram executed relinquishment deed in favour of other accused. The averment that all the accused had threatened the complainant appears to have been made to implicate as many as possible.</p><p>8. It is settled law that criminal prosecution and Civil Suit can go together. However, I am of the view that the case of cheating is made out only against Daya Ram petitioner who had entered into agreement of sale and received the amount and not the other petitioners. No other offence is made out.</p><p>Under these circumstances, the order dated 24.3.2004 of Additional Sessions Judge, Rohtak is set aside to the extent that only Daya Ram shall face trial for offence under Section 420 I.P.C. The complaint against other petitioners shall stand dismissed.<p></p><p>', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => '(2005)140PLR501', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Sube Singh', 'sub' => 'Civil', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ) $casename_url = 'daya-ram-ors-vs-sube-singh' $args = array( (int) 0 => '616448', (int) 1 => 'daya-ram-ors-vs-sube-singh' ) $url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/616448/daya-ram-ors-vs-sube-singh' $ctype = ' High Court'include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 120 View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971 View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933 View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473 Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963 Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200 Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167 [main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109
Notice (8): Undefined variable: kword [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 123]Code Context}
//highest occurence of word in the judgement
echo $this->Wand->highlight($this->Excerpt->extractRelevant($kword,strtolower(strip_tags($desc['Judgement']['judgement']))), $query) . "</div>";
$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp' $dataForView = array( 'title_for_layout' => 'Daya Ram and ors Vs Sube Singh - Citation 616448 - Court Judgment | ', 'desc' => array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '616448', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 120B, 406, 420 and 506', 'appealno' => 'Civil Revision No. 939 of 2003', 'appellant' => 'Daya Ram and ors.', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Daya Ram and ors. Vs. Sube Singh', 'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent Appeal Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., - Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act. Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. ', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => '', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => ' Ashit Malik, Adv.', 'counseldef' => ' Kulvir Narwal, Adv.', 'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana', 'court_type' => 'HC', 'decidedon' => '2005-02-08', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' M.M. Aggarwal, J.', 'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">M.M. Aggarwal, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This petition had been filed against order dated 24.3.2003 of Additional Sessions Judge, Rohtak whereby order of the Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class dated 26.11.2002 had been set aside and the Additional Sessions Judge had directed that the complaint shall proceed for offence under Sections 420/406/120-B and 506 I.P.C.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The facts of the case had been that Sube Singh filed a complaint alleging that Daya Ram and others had entered into an unlawful assembly and hatched a conspiracy. Daya Ram had entered into an agreement to sell his 1/6th share. The sale was to be for Rs. 2 lacs a killa. On 21.8.2000, he had received Rs. 1 lac and then remaining amount Rs. 58,750/- was to be received at the time of registration of sale-deed. However, before 21.12.2000 i.e. the date of performance, Daya Ram had in connivance with other accused cheated the complainant by transferring his 1/6th share to accused Nos. 2 to 10 and accused No. 1 surrendered possession on 4.9.2000 in favour of accused Nos. 2 to 10 and also executed release deed in favour of accused Nos. 2 to 10, that Daya Ram had then lodged a false report with the police. When Sube Singh and witnesses had gone to Daya Ram and other accused, then the accused had threatened that they shall be done to death.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The Additional Sessions Judge vide order dated 24.3.2003 directed that since there was a prima facie case for offence under Sections 406/420/120-B/506 I.P.C., against the petitioners, they should be proceeded against for the aforesaid offence by the Magistrate.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. It is a fact that Sube Singh had already filed a Civil Suit for specific performance on the basis of agreement as against Daya Ram and other accused. That suit is stated to be pending.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Counsel for the petitioner had argued that when the civil suit was pending, no criminal prosecution could be launched.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Counsel for the complainant Sube Singh had argued that Daya Ram in collusions with other accused had cheated the complainant. They had entered into a conspiracy and threatened the complainant; that, in fact, Daya Ram etc. had got complainant Sube Singh wrongfully implicated in a case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. It is a fact that civil Suit filed by Sube Singh against Daya Ram and others for specific performance of the agreement to sell dated 21.8.2000 is pending. However, it is difficult to say as to whether other accused had entered into conspiracy with Daya Ram when Daya Ram executed relinquishment deed in favour of other accused. The averment that all the accused had threatened the complainant appears to have been made to implicate as many as possible.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It is settled law that criminal prosecution and Civil Suit can go together. However, I am of the view that the case of cheating is made out only against Daya Ram petitioner who had entered into agreement of sale and received the amount and not the other petitioners. No other offence is made out.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Under these circumstances, the order dated 24.3.2004 of Additional Sessions Judge, Rohtak is set aside to the extent that only Daya Ram shall face trial for offence under Section 420 I.P.C. The complaint against other petitioners shall stand dismissed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => '(2005)140PLR501', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Sube Singh', 'sub' => 'Civil', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ), 'casename_url' => 'daya-ram-ors-vs-sube-singh', 'args' => array( (int) 0 => '616448', (int) 1 => 'daya-ram-ors-vs-sube-singh' ) ) $title_for_layout = 'Daya Ram and ors Vs Sube Singh - Citation 616448 - Court Judgment | ' $desc = array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '616448', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 120B, 406, 420 and 506', 'appealno' => 'Civil Revision No. 939 of 2003', 'appellant' => 'Daya Ram and ors.', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Daya Ram and ors. Vs. Sube Singh', 'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent Appeal Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., - Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act. Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. ', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => '', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => ' Ashit Malik, Adv.', 'counseldef' => ' Kulvir Narwal, Adv.', 'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana', 'court_type' => 'HC', 'decidedon' => '2005-02-08', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' M.M. Aggarwal, J.', 'judgement' => '<p>M.M. Aggarwal, J.</p><p>1. This petition had been filed against order dated 24.3.2003 of Additional Sessions Judge, Rohtak whereby order of the Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class dated 26.11.2002 had been set aside and the Additional Sessions Judge had directed that the complaint shall proceed for offence under Sections 420/406/120-B and 506 I.P.C.</p><p>2. The facts of the case had been that Sube Singh filed a complaint alleging that Daya Ram and others had entered into an unlawful assembly and hatched a conspiracy. Daya Ram had entered into an agreement to sell his 1/6th share. The sale was to be for Rs. 2 lacs a killa. On 21.8.2000, he had received Rs. 1 lac and then remaining amount Rs. 58,750/- was to be received at the time of registration of sale-deed. However, before 21.12.2000 i.e. the date of performance, Daya Ram had in connivance with other accused cheated the complainant by transferring his 1/6th share to accused Nos. 2 to 10 and accused No. 1 surrendered possession on 4.9.2000 in favour of accused Nos. 2 to 10 and also executed release deed in favour of accused Nos. 2 to 10, that Daya Ram had then lodged a false report with the police. When Sube Singh and witnesses had gone to Daya Ram and other accused, then the accused had threatened that they shall be done to death.</p><p>3. The Additional Sessions Judge vide order dated 24.3.2003 directed that since there was a prima facie case for offence under Sections 406/420/120-B/506 I.P.C., against the petitioners, they should be proceeded against for the aforesaid offence by the Magistrate.</p><p>4. It is a fact that Sube Singh had already filed a Civil Suit for specific performance on the basis of agreement as against Daya Ram and other accused. That suit is stated to be pending.</p><p>5. Counsel for the petitioner had argued that when the civil suit was pending, no criminal prosecution could be launched.</p><p>6. Counsel for the complainant Sube Singh had argued that Daya Ram in collusions with other accused had cheated the complainant. They had entered into a conspiracy and threatened the complainant; that, in fact, Daya Ram etc. had got complainant Sube Singh wrongfully implicated in a case.</p><p>7. It is a fact that civil Suit filed by Sube Singh against Daya Ram and others for specific performance of the agreement to sell dated 21.8.2000 is pending. However, it is difficult to say as to whether other accused had entered into conspiracy with Daya Ram when Daya Ram executed relinquishment deed in favour of other accused. The averment that all the accused had threatened the complainant appears to have been made to implicate as many as possible.</p><p>8. It is settled law that criminal prosecution and Civil Suit can go together. However, I am of the view that the case of cheating is made out only against Daya Ram petitioner who had entered into agreement of sale and received the amount and not the other petitioners. No other offence is made out.</p><p>Under these circumstances, the order dated 24.3.2004 of Additional Sessions Judge, Rohtak is set aside to the extent that only Daya Ram shall face trial for offence under Section 420 I.P.C. The complaint against other petitioners shall stand dismissed.<p></p><p>', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => '(2005)140PLR501', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Sube Singh', 'sub' => 'Civil', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ) $casename_url = 'daya-ram-ors-vs-sube-singh' $args = array( (int) 0 => '616448', (int) 1 => 'daya-ram-ors-vs-sube-singh' ) $url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/616448/daya-ram-ors-vs-sube-singh' $ctype = ' High Court'include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 123 View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971 View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933 View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473 Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963 Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200 Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167 [main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109
Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 123]m.m. aggarwal, j.1. this petition had been filed against order dated 24.3.2003 of additional sessions judge, rohtak whereby order of the judicial magistrate, 1st class dated 26.11.2002 had been set aside and the additional sessions judge had directed that the complaint shall proceed for offence under sections 420/406/120-b and 506 i.p.c.2. the facts of the case had been that sube singh filed a complaint alleging that daya ram and others had entered into an unlawful assembly and hatched a conspiracy. daya ram had entered into an agreement to sell his 1/6th share. the sale was to be for rs. 2 lacs a killa. on 21.8.2000, he had received rs. 1 lac and then remaining amount rs. 58,750/- was to be received at the time of registration of sale-deed. however, before 21.12.2000 i.e. the date of.....Code Context}
//highest occurence of word in the judgement
echo $this->Wand->highlight($this->Excerpt->extractRelevant($kword,strtolower(strip_tags($desc['Judgement']['judgement']))), $query) . "</div>";
$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp' $dataForView = array( 'title_for_layout' => 'Daya Ram and ors Vs Sube Singh - Citation 616448 - Court Judgment | ', 'desc' => array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '616448', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 120B, 406, 420 and 506', 'appealno' => 'Civil Revision No. 939 of 2003', 'appellant' => 'Daya Ram and ors.', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Daya Ram and ors. Vs. Sube Singh', 'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent Appeal Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., - Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act. Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. ', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => '', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => ' Ashit Malik, Adv.', 'counseldef' => ' Kulvir Narwal, Adv.', 'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana', 'court_type' => 'HC', 'decidedon' => '2005-02-08', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' M.M. Aggarwal, J.', 'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">M.M. Aggarwal, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This petition had been filed against order dated 24.3.2003 of Additional Sessions Judge, Rohtak whereby order of the Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class dated 26.11.2002 had been set aside and the Additional Sessions Judge had directed that the complaint shall proceed for offence under Sections 420/406/120-B and 506 I.P.C.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The facts of the case had been that Sube Singh filed a complaint alleging that Daya Ram and others had entered into an unlawful assembly and hatched a conspiracy. Daya Ram had entered into an agreement to sell his 1/6th share. The sale was to be for Rs. 2 lacs a killa. On 21.8.2000, he had received Rs. 1 lac and then remaining amount Rs. 58,750/- was to be received at the time of registration of sale-deed. However, before 21.12.2000 i.e. the date of performance, Daya Ram had in connivance with other accused cheated the complainant by transferring his 1/6th share to accused Nos. 2 to 10 and accused No. 1 surrendered possession on 4.9.2000 in favour of accused Nos. 2 to 10 and also executed release deed in favour of accused Nos. 2 to 10, that Daya Ram had then lodged a false report with the police. When Sube Singh and witnesses had gone to Daya Ram and other accused, then the accused had threatened that they shall be done to death.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The Additional Sessions Judge vide order dated 24.3.2003 directed that since there was a prima facie case for offence under Sections 406/420/120-B/506 I.P.C., against the petitioners, they should be proceeded against for the aforesaid offence by the Magistrate.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. It is a fact that Sube Singh had already filed a Civil Suit for specific performance on the basis of agreement as against Daya Ram and other accused. That suit is stated to be pending.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Counsel for the petitioner had argued that when the civil suit was pending, no criminal prosecution could be launched.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Counsel for the complainant Sube Singh had argued that Daya Ram in collusions with other accused had cheated the complainant. They had entered into a conspiracy and threatened the complainant; that, in fact, Daya Ram etc. had got complainant Sube Singh wrongfully implicated in a case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. It is a fact that civil Suit filed by Sube Singh against Daya Ram and others for specific performance of the agreement to sell dated 21.8.2000 is pending. However, it is difficult to say as to whether other accused had entered into conspiracy with Daya Ram when Daya Ram executed relinquishment deed in favour of other accused. The averment that all the accused had threatened the complainant appears to have been made to implicate as many as possible.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It is settled law that criminal prosecution and Civil Suit can go together. However, I am of the view that the case of cheating is made out only against Daya Ram petitioner who had entered into agreement of sale and received the amount and not the other petitioners. No other offence is made out.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Under these circumstances, the order dated 24.3.2004 of Additional Sessions Judge, Rohtak is set aside to the extent that only Daya Ram shall face trial for offence under Section 420 I.P.C. The complaint against other petitioners shall stand dismissed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => '(2005)140PLR501', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Sube Singh', 'sub' => 'Civil', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ), 'casename_url' => 'daya-ram-ors-vs-sube-singh', 'args' => array( (int) 0 => '616448', (int) 1 => 'daya-ram-ors-vs-sube-singh' ) ) $title_for_layout = 'Daya Ram and ors Vs Sube Singh - Citation 616448 - Court Judgment | ' $desc = array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '616448', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 120B, 406, 420 and 506', 'appealno' => 'Civil Revision No. 939 of 2003', 'appellant' => 'Daya Ram and ors.', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Daya Ram and ors. Vs. Sube Singh', 'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent Appeal Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., - Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act. Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. ', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => '', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => ' Ashit Malik, Adv.', 'counseldef' => ' Kulvir Narwal, Adv.', 'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana', 'court_type' => 'HC', 'decidedon' => '2005-02-08', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' M.M. Aggarwal, J.', 'judgement' => '<p>M.M. Aggarwal, J.</p><p>1. This petition had been filed against order dated 24.3.2003 of Additional Sessions Judge, Rohtak whereby order of the Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class dated 26.11.2002 had been set aside and the Additional Sessions Judge had directed that the complaint shall proceed for offence under Sections 420/406/120-B and 506 I.P.C.</p><p>2. The facts of the case had been that Sube Singh filed a complaint alleging that Daya Ram and others had entered into an unlawful assembly and hatched a conspiracy. Daya Ram had entered into an agreement to sell his 1/6th share. The sale was to be for Rs. 2 lacs a killa. On 21.8.2000, he had received Rs. 1 lac and then remaining amount Rs. 58,750/- was to be received at the time of registration of sale-deed. However, before 21.12.2000 i.e. the date of performance, Daya Ram had in connivance with other accused cheated the complainant by transferring his 1/6th share to accused Nos. 2 to 10 and accused No. 1 surrendered possession on 4.9.2000 in favour of accused Nos. 2 to 10 and also executed release deed in favour of accused Nos. 2 to 10, that Daya Ram had then lodged a false report with the police. When Sube Singh and witnesses had gone to Daya Ram and other accused, then the accused had threatened that they shall be done to death.</p><p>3. The Additional Sessions Judge vide order dated 24.3.2003 directed that since there was a prima facie case for offence under Sections 406/420/120-B/506 I.P.C., against the petitioners, they should be proceeded against for the aforesaid offence by the Magistrate.</p><p>4. It is a fact that Sube Singh had already filed a Civil Suit for specific performance on the basis of agreement as against Daya Ram and other accused. That suit is stated to be pending.</p><p>5. Counsel for the petitioner had argued that when the civil suit was pending, no criminal prosecution could be launched.</p><p>6. Counsel for the complainant Sube Singh had argued that Daya Ram in collusions with other accused had cheated the complainant. They had entered into a conspiracy and threatened the complainant; that, in fact, Daya Ram etc. had got complainant Sube Singh wrongfully implicated in a case.</p><p>7. It is a fact that civil Suit filed by Sube Singh against Daya Ram and others for specific performance of the agreement to sell dated 21.8.2000 is pending. However, it is difficult to say as to whether other accused had entered into conspiracy with Daya Ram when Daya Ram executed relinquishment deed in favour of other accused. The averment that all the accused had threatened the complainant appears to have been made to implicate as many as possible.</p><p>8. It is settled law that criminal prosecution and Civil Suit can go together. However, I am of the view that the case of cheating is made out only against Daya Ram petitioner who had entered into agreement of sale and received the amount and not the other petitioners. No other offence is made out.</p><p>Under these circumstances, the order dated 24.3.2004 of Additional Sessions Judge, Rohtak is set aside to the extent that only Daya Ram shall face trial for offence under Section 420 I.P.C. The complaint against other petitioners shall stand dismissed.<p></p><p>', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => '(2005)140PLR501', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Sube Singh', 'sub' => 'Civil', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ) $casename_url = 'daya-ram-ors-vs-sube-singh' $args = array( (int) 0 => '616448', (int) 1 => 'daya-ram-ors-vs-sube-singh' ) $url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/616448/daya-ram-ors-vs-sube-singh' $ctype = ' High Court'include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 123 View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971 View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933 View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473 Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963 Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200 Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167 [main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109
Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144]Code Contextecho $this->Adsense->display('responsive_rect');
}
echo html_entity_decode($this->Wand->highlight($content[$i], $query));
$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp' $dataForView = array( 'title_for_layout' => 'Daya Ram and ors Vs Sube Singh - Citation 616448 - Court Judgment | ', 'desc' => array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '616448', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 120B, 406, 420 and 506', 'appealno' => 'Civil Revision No. 939 of 2003', 'appellant' => 'Daya Ram and ors.', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Daya Ram and ors. Vs. Sube Singh', 'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent Appeal Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., - Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act. Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. ', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => '', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => ' Ashit Malik, Adv.', 'counseldef' => ' Kulvir Narwal, Adv.', 'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana', 'court_type' => 'HC', 'decidedon' => '2005-02-08', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' M.M. Aggarwal, J.', 'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">M.M. Aggarwal, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This petition had been filed against order dated 24.3.2003 of Additional Sessions Judge, Rohtak whereby order of the Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class dated 26.11.2002 had been set aside and the Additional Sessions Judge had directed that the complaint shall proceed for offence under Sections 420/406/120-B and 506 I.P.C.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The facts of the case had been that Sube Singh filed a complaint alleging that Daya Ram and others had entered into an unlawful assembly and hatched a conspiracy. Daya Ram had entered into an agreement to sell his 1/6th share. The sale was to be for Rs. 2 lacs a killa. On 21.8.2000, he had received Rs. 1 lac and then remaining amount Rs. 58,750/- was to be received at the time of registration of sale-deed. However, before 21.12.2000 i.e. the date of performance, Daya Ram had in connivance with other accused cheated the complainant by transferring his 1/6th share to accused Nos. 2 to 10 and accused No. 1 surrendered possession on 4.9.2000 in favour of accused Nos. 2 to 10 and also executed release deed in favour of accused Nos. 2 to 10, that Daya Ram had then lodged a false report with the police. When Sube Singh and witnesses had gone to Daya Ram and other accused, then the accused had threatened that they shall be done to death.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The Additional Sessions Judge vide order dated 24.3.2003 directed that since there was a prima facie case for offence under Sections 406/420/120-B/506 I.P.C., against the petitioners, they should be proceeded against for the aforesaid offence by the Magistrate.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. It is a fact that Sube Singh had already filed a Civil Suit for specific performance on the basis of agreement as against Daya Ram and other accused. That suit is stated to be pending.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Counsel for the petitioner had argued that when the civil suit was pending, no criminal prosecution could be launched.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Counsel for the complainant Sube Singh had argued that Daya Ram in collusions with other accused had cheated the complainant. They had entered into a conspiracy and threatened the complainant; that, in fact, Daya Ram etc. had got complainant Sube Singh wrongfully implicated in a case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. It is a fact that civil Suit filed by Sube Singh against Daya Ram and others for specific performance of the agreement to sell dated 21.8.2000 is pending. However, it is difficult to say as to whether other accused had entered into conspiracy with Daya Ram when Daya Ram executed relinquishment deed in favour of other accused. The averment that all the accused had threatened the complainant appears to have been made to implicate as many as possible.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It is settled law that criminal prosecution and Civil Suit can go together. However, I am of the view that the case of cheating is made out only against Daya Ram petitioner who had entered into agreement of sale and received the amount and not the other petitioners. No other offence is made out.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Under these circumstances, the order dated 24.3.2004 of Additional Sessions Judge, Rohtak is set aside to the extent that only Daya Ram shall face trial for offence under Section 420 I.P.C. The complaint against other petitioners shall stand dismissed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => '(2005)140PLR501', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Sube Singh', 'sub' => 'Civil', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ), 'casename_url' => 'daya-ram-ors-vs-sube-singh', 'args' => array( (int) 0 => '616448', (int) 1 => 'daya-ram-ors-vs-sube-singh' ) ) $title_for_layout = 'Daya Ram and ors Vs Sube Singh - Citation 616448 - Court Judgment | ' $desc = array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '616448', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 120B, 406, 420 and 506', 'appealno' => 'Civil Revision No. 939 of 2003', 'appellant' => 'Daya Ram and ors.', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Daya Ram and ors. Vs. Sube Singh', 'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent Appeal Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., - Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act. Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. ', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => '', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => ' Ashit Malik, Adv.', 'counseldef' => ' Kulvir Narwal, Adv.', 'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana', 'court_type' => 'HC', 'decidedon' => '2005-02-08', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' M.M. Aggarwal, J.', 'judgement' => '<p>M.M. Aggarwal, J.</p><p>1. This petition had been filed against order dated 24.3.2003 of Additional Sessions Judge, Rohtak whereby order of the Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class dated 26.11.2002 had been set aside and the Additional Sessions Judge had directed that the complaint shall proceed for offence under Sections 420/406/120-B and 506 I.P.C.</p><p>2. The facts of the case had been that Sube Singh filed a complaint alleging that Daya Ram and others had entered into an unlawful assembly and hatched a conspiracy. Daya Ram had entered into an agreement to sell his 1/6th share. The sale was to be for Rs. 2 lacs a killa. On 21.8.2000, he had received Rs. 1 lac and then remaining amount Rs. 58,750/- was to be received at the time of registration of sale-deed. However, before 21.12.2000 i.e. the date of performance, Daya Ram had in connivance with other accused cheated the complainant by transferring his 1/6th share to accused Nos. 2 to 10 and accused No. 1 surrendered possession on 4.9.2000 in favour of accused Nos. 2 to 10 and also executed release deed in favour of accused Nos. 2 to 10, that Daya Ram had then lodged a false report with the police. When Sube Singh and witnesses had gone to Daya Ram and other accused, then the accused had threatened that they shall be done to death.</p><p>3. The Additional Sessions Judge vide order dated 24.3.2003 directed that since there was a prima facie case for offence under Sections 406/420/120-B/506 I.P.C., against the petitioners, they should be proceeded against for the aforesaid offence by the Magistrate.</p><p>4. It is a fact that Sube Singh had already filed a Civil Suit for specific performance on the basis of agreement as against Daya Ram and other accused. That suit is stated to be pending.</p><p>5. Counsel for the petitioner had argued that when the civil suit was pending, no criminal prosecution could be launched.</p><p>6. Counsel for the complainant Sube Singh had argued that Daya Ram in collusions with other accused had cheated the complainant. They had entered into a conspiracy and threatened the complainant; that, in fact, Daya Ram etc. had got complainant Sube Singh wrongfully implicated in a case.</p><p>7. It is a fact that civil Suit filed by Sube Singh against Daya Ram and others for specific performance of the agreement to sell dated 21.8.2000 is pending. However, it is difficult to say as to whether other accused had entered into conspiracy with Daya Ram when Daya Ram executed relinquishment deed in favour of other accused. The averment that all the accused had threatened the complainant appears to have been made to implicate as many as possible.</p><p>8. It is settled law that criminal prosecution and Civil Suit can go together. However, I am of the view that the case of cheating is made out only against Daya Ram petitioner who had entered into agreement of sale and received the amount and not the other petitioners. No other offence is made out.</p><p>Under these circumstances, the order dated 24.3.2004 of Additional Sessions Judge, Rohtak is set aside to the extent that only Daya Ram shall face trial for offence under Section 420 I.P.C. The complaint against other petitioners shall stand dismissed.<p></p><p>', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => '(2005)140PLR501', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Sube Singh', 'sub' => 'Civil', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ) $casename_url = 'daya-ram-ors-vs-sube-singh' $args = array( (int) 0 => '616448', (int) 1 => 'daya-ram-ors-vs-sube-singh' ) $url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/616448/daya-ram-ors-vs-sube-singh' $ctype = ' High Court' $content = array( (int) 0 => '<p>M.M. Aggarwal, J.', (int) 1 => '<p>1. This petition had been filed against order dated 24.3.2003 of Additional Sessions Judge, Rohtak whereby order of the Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class dated 26.11.2002 had been set aside and the Additional Sessions Judge had directed that the complaint shall proceed for offence under Sections 420/406/120-B and 506 I.P.C.', (int) 2 => '<p>2. The facts of the case had been that Sube Singh filed a complaint alleging that Daya Ram and others had entered into an unlawful assembly and hatched a conspiracy. Daya Ram had entered into an agreement to sell his 1/6th share. The sale was to be for Rs. 2 lacs a killa. On 21.8.2000, he had received Rs. 1 lac and then remaining amount Rs. 58,750/- was to be received at the time of registration of sale-deed. However, before 21.12.2000 i.e. the date of performance, Daya Ram had in connivance with other accused cheated the complainant by transferring his 1/6th share to accused Nos. 2 to 10 and accused No. 1 surrendered possession on 4.9.2000 in favour of accused Nos. 2 to 10 and also executed release deed in favour of accused Nos. 2 to 10, that Daya Ram had then lodged a false report with the police. When Sube Singh and witnesses had gone to Daya Ram and other accused, then the accused had threatened that they shall be done to death.', (int) 3 => '<p>3. The Additional Sessions Judge vide order dated 24.3.2003 directed that since there was a prima facie case for offence under Sections 406/420/120-B/506 I.P.C., against the petitioners, they should be proceeded against for the aforesaid offence by the Magistrate.', (int) 4 => '<p>4. It is a fact that Sube Singh had already filed a Civil Suit for specific performance on the basis of agreement as against Daya Ram and other accused. That suit is stated to be pending.', (int) 5 => '<p>5. Counsel for the petitioner had argued that when the civil suit was pending, no criminal prosecution could be launched.', (int) 6 => '<p>6. Counsel for the complainant Sube Singh had argued that Daya Ram in collusions with other accused had cheated the complainant. They had entered into a conspiracy and threatened the complainant; that, in fact, Daya Ram etc. had got complainant Sube Singh wrongfully implicated in a case.', (int) 7 => '<p>7. It is a fact that civil Suit filed by Sube Singh against Daya Ram and others for specific performance of the agreement to sell dated 21.8.2000 is pending. However, it is difficult to say as to whether other accused had entered into conspiracy with Daya Ram when Daya Ram executed relinquishment deed in favour of other accused. The averment that all the accused had threatened the complainant appears to have been made to implicate as many as possible.', (int) 8 => '<p>8. It is settled law that criminal prosecution and Civil Suit can go together. However, I am of the view that the case of cheating is made out only against Daya Ram petitioner who had entered into agreement of sale and received the amount and not the other petitioners. No other offence is made out.', (int) 9 => '<p>Under these circumstances, the order dated 24.3.2004 of Additional Sessions Judge, Rohtak is set aside to the extent that only Daya Ram shall face trial for offence under Section 420 I.P.C. The complaint against other petitioners shall stand dismissed.<p>', (int) 10 => '<p>' ) $paragraphAfter = (int) 1 $cnt = (int) 11 $i = (int) 0include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144 View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971 View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933 View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473 Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963 Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200 Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167 [main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109
M.M. Aggarwal, J.
Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144]Code Contextecho $this->Adsense->display('responsive_rect');
}
echo html_entity_decode($this->Wand->highlight($content[$i], $query));
$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp' $dataForView = array( 'title_for_layout' => 'Daya Ram and ors Vs Sube Singh - Citation 616448 - Court Judgment | ', 'desc' => array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '616448', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 120B, 406, 420 and 506', 'appealno' => 'Civil Revision No. 939 of 2003', 'appellant' => 'Daya Ram and ors.', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Daya Ram and ors. Vs. Sube Singh', 'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent Appeal Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., - Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act. Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. ', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => '', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => ' Ashit Malik, Adv.', 'counseldef' => ' Kulvir Narwal, Adv.', 'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana', 'court_type' => 'HC', 'decidedon' => '2005-02-08', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' M.M. Aggarwal, J.', 'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">M.M. Aggarwal, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This petition had been filed against order dated 24.3.2003 of Additional Sessions Judge, Rohtak whereby order of the Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class dated 26.11.2002 had been set aside and the Additional Sessions Judge had directed that the complaint shall proceed for offence under Sections 420/406/120-B and 506 I.P.C.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The facts of the case had been that Sube Singh filed a complaint alleging that Daya Ram and others had entered into an unlawful assembly and hatched a conspiracy. Daya Ram had entered into an agreement to sell his 1/6th share. The sale was to be for Rs. 2 lacs a killa. On 21.8.2000, he had received Rs. 1 lac and then remaining amount Rs. 58,750/- was to be received at the time of registration of sale-deed. However, before 21.12.2000 i.e. the date of performance, Daya Ram had in connivance with other accused cheated the complainant by transferring his 1/6th share to accused Nos. 2 to 10 and accused No. 1 surrendered possession on 4.9.2000 in favour of accused Nos. 2 to 10 and also executed release deed in favour of accused Nos. 2 to 10, that Daya Ram had then lodged a false report with the police. When Sube Singh and witnesses had gone to Daya Ram and other accused, then the accused had threatened that they shall be done to death.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The Additional Sessions Judge vide order dated 24.3.2003 directed that since there was a prima facie case for offence under Sections 406/420/120-B/506 I.P.C., against the petitioners, they should be proceeded against for the aforesaid offence by the Magistrate.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. It is a fact that Sube Singh had already filed a Civil Suit for specific performance on the basis of agreement as against Daya Ram and other accused. That suit is stated to be pending.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Counsel for the petitioner had argued that when the civil suit was pending, no criminal prosecution could be launched.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Counsel for the complainant Sube Singh had argued that Daya Ram in collusions with other accused had cheated the complainant. They had entered into a conspiracy and threatened the complainant; that, in fact, Daya Ram etc. had got complainant Sube Singh wrongfully implicated in a case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. It is a fact that civil Suit filed by Sube Singh against Daya Ram and others for specific performance of the agreement to sell dated 21.8.2000 is pending. However, it is difficult to say as to whether other accused had entered into conspiracy with Daya Ram when Daya Ram executed relinquishment deed in favour of other accused. The averment that all the accused had threatened the complainant appears to have been made to implicate as many as possible.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It is settled law that criminal prosecution and Civil Suit can go together. However, I am of the view that the case of cheating is made out only against Daya Ram petitioner who had entered into agreement of sale and received the amount and not the other petitioners. No other offence is made out.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Under these circumstances, the order dated 24.3.2004 of Additional Sessions Judge, Rohtak is set aside to the extent that only Daya Ram shall face trial for offence under Section 420 I.P.C. The complaint against other petitioners shall stand dismissed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => '(2005)140PLR501', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Sube Singh', 'sub' => 'Civil', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ), 'casename_url' => 'daya-ram-ors-vs-sube-singh', 'args' => array( (int) 0 => '616448', (int) 1 => 'daya-ram-ors-vs-sube-singh' ) ) $title_for_layout = 'Daya Ram and ors Vs Sube Singh - Citation 616448 - Court Judgment | ' $desc = array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '616448', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 120B, 406, 420 and 506', 'appealno' => 'Civil Revision No. 939 of 2003', 'appellant' => 'Daya Ram and ors.', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Daya Ram and ors. Vs. Sube Singh', 'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent Appeal Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., - Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act. Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. ', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => '', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => ' Ashit Malik, Adv.', 'counseldef' => ' Kulvir Narwal, Adv.', 'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana', 'court_type' => 'HC', 'decidedon' => '2005-02-08', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' M.M. Aggarwal, J.', 'judgement' => '<p>M.M. Aggarwal, J.</p><p>1. This petition had been filed against order dated 24.3.2003 of Additional Sessions Judge, Rohtak whereby order of the Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class dated 26.11.2002 had been set aside and the Additional Sessions Judge had directed that the complaint shall proceed for offence under Sections 420/406/120-B and 506 I.P.C.</p><p>2. The facts of the case had been that Sube Singh filed a complaint alleging that Daya Ram and others had entered into an unlawful assembly and hatched a conspiracy. Daya Ram had entered into an agreement to sell his 1/6th share. The sale was to be for Rs. 2 lacs a killa. On 21.8.2000, he had received Rs. 1 lac and then remaining amount Rs. 58,750/- was to be received at the time of registration of sale-deed. However, before 21.12.2000 i.e. the date of performance, Daya Ram had in connivance with other accused cheated the complainant by transferring his 1/6th share to accused Nos. 2 to 10 and accused No. 1 surrendered possession on 4.9.2000 in favour of accused Nos. 2 to 10 and also executed release deed in favour of accused Nos. 2 to 10, that Daya Ram had then lodged a false report with the police. When Sube Singh and witnesses had gone to Daya Ram and other accused, then the accused had threatened that they shall be done to death.</p><p>3. The Additional Sessions Judge vide order dated 24.3.2003 directed that since there was a prima facie case for offence under Sections 406/420/120-B/506 I.P.C., against the petitioners, they should be proceeded against for the aforesaid offence by the Magistrate.</p><p>4. It is a fact that Sube Singh had already filed a Civil Suit for specific performance on the basis of agreement as against Daya Ram and other accused. That suit is stated to be pending.</p><p>5. Counsel for the petitioner had argued that when the civil suit was pending, no criminal prosecution could be launched.</p><p>6. Counsel for the complainant Sube Singh had argued that Daya Ram in collusions with other accused had cheated the complainant. They had entered into a conspiracy and threatened the complainant; that, in fact, Daya Ram etc. had got complainant Sube Singh wrongfully implicated in a case.</p><p>7. It is a fact that civil Suit filed by Sube Singh against Daya Ram and others for specific performance of the agreement to sell dated 21.8.2000 is pending. However, it is difficult to say as to whether other accused had entered into conspiracy with Daya Ram when Daya Ram executed relinquishment deed in favour of other accused. The averment that all the accused had threatened the complainant appears to have been made to implicate as many as possible.</p><p>8. It is settled law that criminal prosecution and Civil Suit can go together. However, I am of the view that the case of cheating is made out only against Daya Ram petitioner who had entered into agreement of sale and received the amount and not the other petitioners. No other offence is made out.</p><p>Under these circumstances, the order dated 24.3.2004 of Additional Sessions Judge, Rohtak is set aside to the extent that only Daya Ram shall face trial for offence under Section 420 I.P.C. The complaint against other petitioners shall stand dismissed.<p></p><p>', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => '(2005)140PLR501', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Sube Singh', 'sub' => 'Civil', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ) $casename_url = 'daya-ram-ors-vs-sube-singh' $args = array( (int) 0 => '616448', (int) 1 => 'daya-ram-ors-vs-sube-singh' ) $url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/616448/daya-ram-ors-vs-sube-singh' $ctype = ' High Court' $content = array( (int) 0 => '<p>M.M. Aggarwal, J.', (int) 1 => '<p>1. This petition had been filed against order dated 24.3.2003 of Additional Sessions Judge, Rohtak whereby order of the Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class dated 26.11.2002 had been set aside and the Additional Sessions Judge had directed that the complaint shall proceed for offence under Sections 420/406/120-B and 506 I.P.C.', (int) 2 => '<p>2. The facts of the case had been that Sube Singh filed a complaint alleging that Daya Ram and others had entered into an unlawful assembly and hatched a conspiracy. Daya Ram had entered into an agreement to sell his 1/6th share. The sale was to be for Rs. 2 lacs a killa. On 21.8.2000, he had received Rs. 1 lac and then remaining amount Rs. 58,750/- was to be received at the time of registration of sale-deed. However, before 21.12.2000 i.e. the date of performance, Daya Ram had in connivance with other accused cheated the complainant by transferring his 1/6th share to accused Nos. 2 to 10 and accused No. 1 surrendered possession on 4.9.2000 in favour of accused Nos. 2 to 10 and also executed release deed in favour of accused Nos. 2 to 10, that Daya Ram had then lodged a false report with the police. When Sube Singh and witnesses had gone to Daya Ram and other accused, then the accused had threatened that they shall be done to death.', (int) 3 => '<p>3. The Additional Sessions Judge vide order dated 24.3.2003 directed that since there was a prima facie case for offence under Sections 406/420/120-B/506 I.P.C., against the petitioners, they should be proceeded against for the aforesaid offence by the Magistrate.', (int) 4 => '<p>4. It is a fact that Sube Singh had already filed a Civil Suit for specific performance on the basis of agreement as against Daya Ram and other accused. That suit is stated to be pending.', (int) 5 => '<p>5. Counsel for the petitioner had argued that when the civil suit was pending, no criminal prosecution could be launched.', (int) 6 => '<p>6. Counsel for the complainant Sube Singh had argued that Daya Ram in collusions with other accused had cheated the complainant. They had entered into a conspiracy and threatened the complainant; that, in fact, Daya Ram etc. had got complainant Sube Singh wrongfully implicated in a case.', (int) 7 => '<p>7. It is a fact that civil Suit filed by Sube Singh against Daya Ram and others for specific performance of the agreement to sell dated 21.8.2000 is pending. However, it is difficult to say as to whether other accused had entered into conspiracy with Daya Ram when Daya Ram executed relinquishment deed in favour of other accused. The averment that all the accused had threatened the complainant appears to have been made to implicate as many as possible.', (int) 8 => '<p>8. It is settled law that criminal prosecution and Civil Suit can go together. However, I am of the view that the case of cheating is made out only against Daya Ram petitioner who had entered into agreement of sale and received the amount and not the other petitioners. No other offence is made out.', (int) 9 => '<p>Under these circumstances, the order dated 24.3.2004 of Additional Sessions Judge, Rohtak is set aside to the extent that only Daya Ram shall face trial for offence under Section 420 I.P.C. The complaint against other petitioners shall stand dismissed.<p>', (int) 10 => '<p>' ) $paragraphAfter = (int) 1 $cnt = (int) 11 $i = (int) 1include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144 View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971 View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933 View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473 Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963 Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200 Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167 [main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109
1. This petition had been filed against order dated 24.3.2003 of Additional Sessions Judge, Rohtak whereby order of the Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class dated 26.11.2002 had been set aside and the Additional Sessions Judge had directed that the complaint shall proceed for offence under Sections 420/406/120-B and 506 I.P.C.
Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144]Code Contextecho $this->Adsense->display('responsive_rect');
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echo html_entity_decode($this->Wand->highlight($content[$i], $query));
$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp' $dataForView = array( 'title_for_layout' => 'Daya Ram and ors Vs Sube Singh - Citation 616448 - Court Judgment | ', 'desc' => array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '616448', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 120B, 406, 420 and 506', 'appealno' => 'Civil Revision No. 939 of 2003', 'appellant' => 'Daya Ram and ors.', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Daya Ram and ors. Vs. Sube Singh', 'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent Appeal Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., - Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act. Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. ', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => '', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => ' Ashit Malik, Adv.', 'counseldef' => ' Kulvir Narwal, Adv.', 'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana', 'court_type' => 'HC', 'decidedon' => '2005-02-08', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' M.M. Aggarwal, J.', 'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">M.M. Aggarwal, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This petition had been filed against order dated 24.3.2003 of Additional Sessions Judge, Rohtak whereby order of the Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class dated 26.11.2002 had been set aside and the Additional Sessions Judge had directed that the complaint shall proceed for offence under Sections 420/406/120-B and 506 I.P.C.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The facts of the case had been that Sube Singh filed a complaint alleging that Daya Ram and others had entered into an unlawful assembly and hatched a conspiracy. Daya Ram had entered into an agreement to sell his 1/6th share. The sale was to be for Rs. 2 lacs a killa. On 21.8.2000, he had received Rs. 1 lac and then remaining amount Rs. 58,750/- was to be received at the time of registration of sale-deed. However, before 21.12.2000 i.e. the date of performance, Daya Ram had in connivance with other accused cheated the complainant by transferring his 1/6th share to accused Nos. 2 to 10 and accused No. 1 surrendered possession on 4.9.2000 in favour of accused Nos. 2 to 10 and also executed release deed in favour of accused Nos. 2 to 10, that Daya Ram had then lodged a false report with the police. When Sube Singh and witnesses had gone to Daya Ram and other accused, then the accused had threatened that they shall be done to death.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The Additional Sessions Judge vide order dated 24.3.2003 directed that since there was a prima facie case for offence under Sections 406/420/120-B/506 I.P.C., against the petitioners, they should be proceeded against for the aforesaid offence by the Magistrate.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. It is a fact that Sube Singh had already filed a Civil Suit for specific performance on the basis of agreement as against Daya Ram and other accused. That suit is stated to be pending.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Counsel for the petitioner had argued that when the civil suit was pending, no criminal prosecution could be launched.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Counsel for the complainant Sube Singh had argued that Daya Ram in collusions with other accused had cheated the complainant. They had entered into a conspiracy and threatened the complainant; that, in fact, Daya Ram etc. had got complainant Sube Singh wrongfully implicated in a case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. It is a fact that civil Suit filed by Sube Singh against Daya Ram and others for specific performance of the agreement to sell dated 21.8.2000 is pending. However, it is difficult to say as to whether other accused had entered into conspiracy with Daya Ram when Daya Ram executed relinquishment deed in favour of other accused. The averment that all the accused had threatened the complainant appears to have been made to implicate as many as possible.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It is settled law that criminal prosecution and Civil Suit can go together. However, I am of the view that the case of cheating is made out only against Daya Ram petitioner who had entered into agreement of sale and received the amount and not the other petitioners. No other offence is made out.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Under these circumstances, the order dated 24.3.2004 of Additional Sessions Judge, Rohtak is set aside to the extent that only Daya Ram shall face trial for offence under Section 420 I.P.C. The complaint against other petitioners shall stand dismissed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => '(2005)140PLR501', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Sube Singh', 'sub' => 'Civil', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ), 'casename_url' => 'daya-ram-ors-vs-sube-singh', 'args' => array( (int) 0 => '616448', (int) 1 => 'daya-ram-ors-vs-sube-singh' ) ) $title_for_layout = 'Daya Ram and ors Vs Sube Singh - Citation 616448 - Court Judgment | ' $desc = array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '616448', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 120B, 406, 420 and 506', 'appealno' => 'Civil Revision No. 939 of 2003', 'appellant' => 'Daya Ram and ors.', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Daya Ram and ors. Vs. Sube Singh', 'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent Appeal Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., - Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act. Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. ', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => '', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => ' Ashit Malik, Adv.', 'counseldef' => ' Kulvir Narwal, Adv.', 'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana', 'court_type' => 'HC', 'decidedon' => '2005-02-08', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' M.M. Aggarwal, J.', 'judgement' => '<p>M.M. Aggarwal, J.</p><p>1. This petition had been filed against order dated 24.3.2003 of Additional Sessions Judge, Rohtak whereby order of the Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class dated 26.11.2002 had been set aside and the Additional Sessions Judge had directed that the complaint shall proceed for offence under Sections 420/406/120-B and 506 I.P.C.</p><p>2. The facts of the case had been that Sube Singh filed a complaint alleging that Daya Ram and others had entered into an unlawful assembly and hatched a conspiracy. Daya Ram had entered into an agreement to sell his 1/6th share. The sale was to be for Rs. 2 lacs a killa. On 21.8.2000, he had received Rs. 1 lac and then remaining amount Rs. 58,750/- was to be received at the time of registration of sale-deed. However, before 21.12.2000 i.e. the date of performance, Daya Ram had in connivance with other accused cheated the complainant by transferring his 1/6th share to accused Nos. 2 to 10 and accused No. 1 surrendered possession on 4.9.2000 in favour of accused Nos. 2 to 10 and also executed release deed in favour of accused Nos. 2 to 10, that Daya Ram had then lodged a false report with the police. When Sube Singh and witnesses had gone to Daya Ram and other accused, then the accused had threatened that they shall be done to death.</p><p>3. The Additional Sessions Judge vide order dated 24.3.2003 directed that since there was a prima facie case for offence under Sections 406/420/120-B/506 I.P.C., against the petitioners, they should be proceeded against for the aforesaid offence by the Magistrate.</p><p>4. It is a fact that Sube Singh had already filed a Civil Suit for specific performance on the basis of agreement as against Daya Ram and other accused. That suit is stated to be pending.</p><p>5. Counsel for the petitioner had argued that when the civil suit was pending, no criminal prosecution could be launched.</p><p>6. Counsel for the complainant Sube Singh had argued that Daya Ram in collusions with other accused had cheated the complainant. They had entered into a conspiracy and threatened the complainant; that, in fact, Daya Ram etc. had got complainant Sube Singh wrongfully implicated in a case.</p><p>7. It is a fact that civil Suit filed by Sube Singh against Daya Ram and others for specific performance of the agreement to sell dated 21.8.2000 is pending. However, it is difficult to say as to whether other accused had entered into conspiracy with Daya Ram when Daya Ram executed relinquishment deed in favour of other accused. The averment that all the accused had threatened the complainant appears to have been made to implicate as many as possible.</p><p>8. It is settled law that criminal prosecution and Civil Suit can go together. However, I am of the view that the case of cheating is made out only against Daya Ram petitioner who had entered into agreement of sale and received the amount and not the other petitioners. No other offence is made out.</p><p>Under these circumstances, the order dated 24.3.2004 of Additional Sessions Judge, Rohtak is set aside to the extent that only Daya Ram shall face trial for offence under Section 420 I.P.C. The complaint against other petitioners shall stand dismissed.<p></p><p>', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => '(2005)140PLR501', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Sube Singh', 'sub' => 'Civil', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ) $casename_url = 'daya-ram-ors-vs-sube-singh' $args = array( (int) 0 => '616448', (int) 1 => 'daya-ram-ors-vs-sube-singh' ) $url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/616448/daya-ram-ors-vs-sube-singh' $ctype = ' High Court' $content = array( (int) 0 => '<p>M.M. Aggarwal, J.', (int) 1 => '<p>1. This petition had been filed against order dated 24.3.2003 of Additional Sessions Judge, Rohtak whereby order of the Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class dated 26.11.2002 had been set aside and the Additional Sessions Judge had directed that the complaint shall proceed for offence under Sections 420/406/120-B and 506 I.P.C.', (int) 2 => '<p>2. The facts of the case had been that Sube Singh filed a complaint alleging that Daya Ram and others had entered into an unlawful assembly and hatched a conspiracy. Daya Ram had entered into an agreement to sell his 1/6th share. The sale was to be for Rs. 2 lacs a killa. On 21.8.2000, he had received Rs. 1 lac and then remaining amount Rs. 58,750/- was to be received at the time of registration of sale-deed. However, before 21.12.2000 i.e. the date of performance, Daya Ram had in connivance with other accused cheated the complainant by transferring his 1/6th share to accused Nos. 2 to 10 and accused No. 1 surrendered possession on 4.9.2000 in favour of accused Nos. 2 to 10 and also executed release deed in favour of accused Nos. 2 to 10, that Daya Ram had then lodged a false report with the police. When Sube Singh and witnesses had gone to Daya Ram and other accused, then the accused had threatened that they shall be done to death.', (int) 3 => '<p>3. The Additional Sessions Judge vide order dated 24.3.2003 directed that since there was a prima facie case for offence under Sections 406/420/120-B/506 I.P.C., against the petitioners, they should be proceeded against for the aforesaid offence by the Magistrate.', (int) 4 => '<p>4. It is a fact that Sube Singh had already filed a Civil Suit for specific performance on the basis of agreement as against Daya Ram and other accused. That suit is stated to be pending.', (int) 5 => '<p>5. Counsel for the petitioner had argued that when the civil suit was pending, no criminal prosecution could be launched.', (int) 6 => '<p>6. Counsel for the complainant Sube Singh had argued that Daya Ram in collusions with other accused had cheated the complainant. They had entered into a conspiracy and threatened the complainant; that, in fact, Daya Ram etc. had got complainant Sube Singh wrongfully implicated in a case.', (int) 7 => '<p>7. It is a fact that civil Suit filed by Sube Singh against Daya Ram and others for specific performance of the agreement to sell dated 21.8.2000 is pending. However, it is difficult to say as to whether other accused had entered into conspiracy with Daya Ram when Daya Ram executed relinquishment deed in favour of other accused. The averment that all the accused had threatened the complainant appears to have been made to implicate as many as possible.', (int) 8 => '<p>8. It is settled law that criminal prosecution and Civil Suit can go together. However, I am of the view that the case of cheating is made out only against Daya Ram petitioner who had entered into agreement of sale and received the amount and not the other petitioners. No other offence is made out.', (int) 9 => '<p>Under these circumstances, the order dated 24.3.2004 of Additional Sessions Judge, Rohtak is set aside to the extent that only Daya Ram shall face trial for offence under Section 420 I.P.C. The complaint against other petitioners shall stand dismissed.<p>', (int) 10 => '<p>' ) $paragraphAfter = (int) 1 $cnt = (int) 11 $i = (int) 2include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144 View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971 View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933 View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473 Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963 Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200 Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167 [main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109
2. The facts of the case had been that Sube Singh filed a complaint alleging that Daya Ram and others had entered into an unlawful assembly and hatched a conspiracy. Daya Ram had entered into an agreement to sell his 1/6th share. The sale was to be for Rs. 2 lacs a killa. On 21.8.2000, he had received Rs. 1 lac and then remaining amount Rs. 58,750/- was to be received at the time of registration of sale-deed. However, before 21.12.2000 i.e. the date of performance, Daya Ram had in connivance with other accused cheated the complainant by transferring his 1/6th share to accused Nos. 2 to 10 and accused No. 1 surrendered possession on 4.9.2000 in favour of accused Nos. 2 to 10 and also executed release deed in favour of accused Nos. 2 to 10, that Daya Ram had then lodged a false report with the police. When Sube Singh and witnesses had gone to Daya Ram and other accused, then the accused had threatened that they shall be done to death.
Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144]Code Contextecho $this->Adsense->display('responsive_rect');
}
echo html_entity_decode($this->Wand->highlight($content[$i], $query));
$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp' $dataForView = array( 'title_for_layout' => 'Daya Ram and ors Vs Sube Singh - Citation 616448 - Court Judgment | ', 'desc' => array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '616448', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 120B, 406, 420 and 506', 'appealno' => 'Civil Revision No. 939 of 2003', 'appellant' => 'Daya Ram and ors.', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Daya Ram and ors. Vs. Sube Singh', 'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent Appeal Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., - Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act. Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. ', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => '', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => ' Ashit Malik, Adv.', 'counseldef' => ' Kulvir Narwal, Adv.', 'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana', 'court_type' => 'HC', 'decidedon' => '2005-02-08', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' M.M. Aggarwal, J.', 'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">M.M. Aggarwal, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This petition had been filed against order dated 24.3.2003 of Additional Sessions Judge, Rohtak whereby order of the Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class dated 26.11.2002 had been set aside and the Additional Sessions Judge had directed that the complaint shall proceed for offence under Sections 420/406/120-B and 506 I.P.C.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The facts of the case had been that Sube Singh filed a complaint alleging that Daya Ram and others had entered into an unlawful assembly and hatched a conspiracy. Daya Ram had entered into an agreement to sell his 1/6th share. The sale was to be for Rs. 2 lacs a killa. On 21.8.2000, he had received Rs. 1 lac and then remaining amount Rs. 58,750/- was to be received at the time of registration of sale-deed. However, before 21.12.2000 i.e. the date of performance, Daya Ram had in connivance with other accused cheated the complainant by transferring his 1/6th share to accused Nos. 2 to 10 and accused No. 1 surrendered possession on 4.9.2000 in favour of accused Nos. 2 to 10 and also executed release deed in favour of accused Nos. 2 to 10, that Daya Ram had then lodged a false report with the police. When Sube Singh and witnesses had gone to Daya Ram and other accused, then the accused had threatened that they shall be done to death.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The Additional Sessions Judge vide order dated 24.3.2003 directed that since there was a prima facie case for offence under Sections 406/420/120-B/506 I.P.C., against the petitioners, they should be proceeded against for the aforesaid offence by the Magistrate.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. It is a fact that Sube Singh had already filed a Civil Suit for specific performance on the basis of agreement as against Daya Ram and other accused. That suit is stated to be pending.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Counsel for the petitioner had argued that when the civil suit was pending, no criminal prosecution could be launched.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Counsel for the complainant Sube Singh had argued that Daya Ram in collusions with other accused had cheated the complainant. They had entered into a conspiracy and threatened the complainant; that, in fact, Daya Ram etc. had got complainant Sube Singh wrongfully implicated in a case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. It is a fact that civil Suit filed by Sube Singh against Daya Ram and others for specific performance of the agreement to sell dated 21.8.2000 is pending. However, it is difficult to say as to whether other accused had entered into conspiracy with Daya Ram when Daya Ram executed relinquishment deed in favour of other accused. The averment that all the accused had threatened the complainant appears to have been made to implicate as many as possible.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It is settled law that criminal prosecution and Civil Suit can go together. However, I am of the view that the case of cheating is made out only against Daya Ram petitioner who had entered into agreement of sale and received the amount and not the other petitioners. No other offence is made out.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Under these circumstances, the order dated 24.3.2004 of Additional Sessions Judge, Rohtak is set aside to the extent that only Daya Ram shall face trial for offence under Section 420 I.P.C. The complaint against other petitioners shall stand dismissed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => '(2005)140PLR501', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Sube Singh', 'sub' => 'Civil', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ), 'casename_url' => 'daya-ram-ors-vs-sube-singh', 'args' => array( (int) 0 => '616448', (int) 1 => 'daya-ram-ors-vs-sube-singh' ) ) $title_for_layout = 'Daya Ram and ors Vs Sube Singh - Citation 616448 - Court Judgment | ' $desc = array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '616448', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 120B, 406, 420 and 506', 'appealno' => 'Civil Revision No. 939 of 2003', 'appellant' => 'Daya Ram and ors.', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Daya Ram and ors. Vs. Sube Singh', 'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent Appeal Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., - Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act. Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. ', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => '', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => ' Ashit Malik, Adv.', 'counseldef' => ' Kulvir Narwal, Adv.', 'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana', 'court_type' => 'HC', 'decidedon' => '2005-02-08', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' M.M. Aggarwal, J.', 'judgement' => '<p>M.M. Aggarwal, J.</p><p>1. This petition had been filed against order dated 24.3.2003 of Additional Sessions Judge, Rohtak whereby order of the Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class dated 26.11.2002 had been set aside and the Additional Sessions Judge had directed that the complaint shall proceed for offence under Sections 420/406/120-B and 506 I.P.C.</p><p>2. The facts of the case had been that Sube Singh filed a complaint alleging that Daya Ram and others had entered into an unlawful assembly and hatched a conspiracy. Daya Ram had entered into an agreement to sell his 1/6th share. The sale was to be for Rs. 2 lacs a killa. On 21.8.2000, he had received Rs. 1 lac and then remaining amount Rs. 58,750/- was to be received at the time of registration of sale-deed. However, before 21.12.2000 i.e. the date of performance, Daya Ram had in connivance with other accused cheated the complainant by transferring his 1/6th share to accused Nos. 2 to 10 and accused No. 1 surrendered possession on 4.9.2000 in favour of accused Nos. 2 to 10 and also executed release deed in favour of accused Nos. 2 to 10, that Daya Ram had then lodged a false report with the police. When Sube Singh and witnesses had gone to Daya Ram and other accused, then the accused had threatened that they shall be done to death.</p><p>3. The Additional Sessions Judge vide order dated 24.3.2003 directed that since there was a prima facie case for offence under Sections 406/420/120-B/506 I.P.C., against the petitioners, they should be proceeded against for the aforesaid offence by the Magistrate.</p><p>4. It is a fact that Sube Singh had already filed a Civil Suit for specific performance on the basis of agreement as against Daya Ram and other accused. That suit is stated to be pending.</p><p>5. Counsel for the petitioner had argued that when the civil suit was pending, no criminal prosecution could be launched.</p><p>6. Counsel for the complainant Sube Singh had argued that Daya Ram in collusions with other accused had cheated the complainant. They had entered into a conspiracy and threatened the complainant; that, in fact, Daya Ram etc. had got complainant Sube Singh wrongfully implicated in a case.</p><p>7. It is a fact that civil Suit filed by Sube Singh against Daya Ram and others for specific performance of the agreement to sell dated 21.8.2000 is pending. However, it is difficult to say as to whether other accused had entered into conspiracy with Daya Ram when Daya Ram executed relinquishment deed in favour of other accused. The averment that all the accused had threatened the complainant appears to have been made to implicate as many as possible.</p><p>8. It is settled law that criminal prosecution and Civil Suit can go together. However, I am of the view that the case of cheating is made out only against Daya Ram petitioner who had entered into agreement of sale and received the amount and not the other petitioners. No other offence is made out.</p><p>Under these circumstances, the order dated 24.3.2004 of Additional Sessions Judge, Rohtak is set aside to the extent that only Daya Ram shall face trial for offence under Section 420 I.P.C. The complaint against other petitioners shall stand dismissed.<p></p><p>', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => '(2005)140PLR501', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Sube Singh', 'sub' => 'Civil', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ) $casename_url = 'daya-ram-ors-vs-sube-singh' $args = array( (int) 0 => '616448', (int) 1 => 'daya-ram-ors-vs-sube-singh' ) $url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/616448/daya-ram-ors-vs-sube-singh' $ctype = ' High Court' $content = array( (int) 0 => '<p>M.M. Aggarwal, J.', (int) 1 => '<p>1. This petition had been filed against order dated 24.3.2003 of Additional Sessions Judge, Rohtak whereby order of the Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class dated 26.11.2002 had been set aside and the Additional Sessions Judge had directed that the complaint shall proceed for offence under Sections 420/406/120-B and 506 I.P.C.', (int) 2 => '<p>2. The facts of the case had been that Sube Singh filed a complaint alleging that Daya Ram and others had entered into an unlawful assembly and hatched a conspiracy. Daya Ram had entered into an agreement to sell his 1/6th share. The sale was to be for Rs. 2 lacs a killa. On 21.8.2000, he had received Rs. 1 lac and then remaining amount Rs. 58,750/- was to be received at the time of registration of sale-deed. However, before 21.12.2000 i.e. the date of performance, Daya Ram had in connivance with other accused cheated the complainant by transferring his 1/6th share to accused Nos. 2 to 10 and accused No. 1 surrendered possession on 4.9.2000 in favour of accused Nos. 2 to 10 and also executed release deed in favour of accused Nos. 2 to 10, that Daya Ram had then lodged a false report with the police. When Sube Singh and witnesses had gone to Daya Ram and other accused, then the accused had threatened that they shall be done to death.', (int) 3 => '<p>3. The Additional Sessions Judge vide order dated 24.3.2003 directed that since there was a prima facie case for offence under Sections 406/420/120-B/506 I.P.C., against the petitioners, they should be proceeded against for the aforesaid offence by the Magistrate.', (int) 4 => '<p>4. It is a fact that Sube Singh had already filed a Civil Suit for specific performance on the basis of agreement as against Daya Ram and other accused. That suit is stated to be pending.', (int) 5 => '<p>5. Counsel for the petitioner had argued that when the civil suit was pending, no criminal prosecution could be launched.', (int) 6 => '<p>6. Counsel for the complainant Sube Singh had argued that Daya Ram in collusions with other accused had cheated the complainant. They had entered into a conspiracy and threatened the complainant; that, in fact, Daya Ram etc. had got complainant Sube Singh wrongfully implicated in a case.', (int) 7 => '<p>7. It is a fact that civil Suit filed by Sube Singh against Daya Ram and others for specific performance of the agreement to sell dated 21.8.2000 is pending. However, it is difficult to say as to whether other accused had entered into conspiracy with Daya Ram when Daya Ram executed relinquishment deed in favour of other accused. The averment that all the accused had threatened the complainant appears to have been made to implicate as many as possible.', (int) 8 => '<p>8. It is settled law that criminal prosecution and Civil Suit can go together. However, I am of the view that the case of cheating is made out only against Daya Ram petitioner who had entered into agreement of sale and received the amount and not the other petitioners. No other offence is made out.', (int) 9 => '<p>Under these circumstances, the order dated 24.3.2004 of Additional Sessions Judge, Rohtak is set aside to the extent that only Daya Ram shall face trial for offence under Section 420 I.P.C. The complaint against other petitioners shall stand dismissed.<p>', (int) 10 => '<p>' ) $paragraphAfter = (int) 1 $cnt = (int) 11 $i = (int) 3include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144 View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971 View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933 View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473 Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963 Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200 Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167 [main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109
3. The Additional Sessions Judge vide order dated 24.3.2003 directed that since there was a prima facie case for offence under Sections 406/420/120-B/506 I.P.C., against the petitioners, they should be proceeded against for the aforesaid offence by the Magistrate.
Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144]Code Contextecho $this->Adsense->display('responsive_rect');
}
echo html_entity_decode($this->Wand->highlight($content[$i], $query));
$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp' $dataForView = array( 'title_for_layout' => 'Daya Ram and ors Vs Sube Singh - Citation 616448 - Court Judgment | ', 'desc' => array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '616448', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 120B, 406, 420 and 506', 'appealno' => 'Civil Revision No. 939 of 2003', 'appellant' => 'Daya Ram and ors.', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Daya Ram and ors. Vs. Sube Singh', 'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent Appeal Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., - Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act. Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. ', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => '', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => ' Ashit Malik, Adv.', 'counseldef' => ' Kulvir Narwal, Adv.', 'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana', 'court_type' => 'HC', 'decidedon' => '2005-02-08', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' M.M. Aggarwal, J.', 'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">M.M. Aggarwal, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This petition had been filed against order dated 24.3.2003 of Additional Sessions Judge, Rohtak whereby order of the Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class dated 26.11.2002 had been set aside and the Additional Sessions Judge had directed that the complaint shall proceed for offence under Sections 420/406/120-B and 506 I.P.C.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The facts of the case had been that Sube Singh filed a complaint alleging that Daya Ram and others had entered into an unlawful assembly and hatched a conspiracy. Daya Ram had entered into an agreement to sell his 1/6th share. The sale was to be for Rs. 2 lacs a killa. On 21.8.2000, he had received Rs. 1 lac and then remaining amount Rs. 58,750/- was to be received at the time of registration of sale-deed. However, before 21.12.2000 i.e. the date of performance, Daya Ram had in connivance with other accused cheated the complainant by transferring his 1/6th share to accused Nos. 2 to 10 and accused No. 1 surrendered possession on 4.9.2000 in favour of accused Nos. 2 to 10 and also executed release deed in favour of accused Nos. 2 to 10, that Daya Ram had then lodged a false report with the police. When Sube Singh and witnesses had gone to Daya Ram and other accused, then the accused had threatened that they shall be done to death.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The Additional Sessions Judge vide order dated 24.3.2003 directed that since there was a prima facie case for offence under Sections 406/420/120-B/506 I.P.C., against the petitioners, they should be proceeded against for the aforesaid offence by the Magistrate.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. It is a fact that Sube Singh had already filed a Civil Suit for specific performance on the basis of agreement as against Daya Ram and other accused. That suit is stated to be pending.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Counsel for the petitioner had argued that when the civil suit was pending, no criminal prosecution could be launched.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Counsel for the complainant Sube Singh had argued that Daya Ram in collusions with other accused had cheated the complainant. They had entered into a conspiracy and threatened the complainant; that, in fact, Daya Ram etc. had got complainant Sube Singh wrongfully implicated in a case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. It is a fact that civil Suit filed by Sube Singh against Daya Ram and others for specific performance of the agreement to sell dated 21.8.2000 is pending. However, it is difficult to say as to whether other accused had entered into conspiracy with Daya Ram when Daya Ram executed relinquishment deed in favour of other accused. The averment that all the accused had threatened the complainant appears to have been made to implicate as many as possible.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It is settled law that criminal prosecution and Civil Suit can go together. However, I am of the view that the case of cheating is made out only against Daya Ram petitioner who had entered into agreement of sale and received the amount and not the other petitioners. No other offence is made out.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Under these circumstances, the order dated 24.3.2004 of Additional Sessions Judge, Rohtak is set aside to the extent that only Daya Ram shall face trial for offence under Section 420 I.P.C. The complaint against other petitioners shall stand dismissed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => '(2005)140PLR501', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Sube Singh', 'sub' => 'Civil', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ), 'casename_url' => 'daya-ram-ors-vs-sube-singh', 'args' => array( (int) 0 => '616448', (int) 1 => 'daya-ram-ors-vs-sube-singh' ) ) $title_for_layout = 'Daya Ram and ors Vs Sube Singh - Citation 616448 - Court Judgment | ' $desc = array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '616448', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 120B, 406, 420 and 506', 'appealno' => 'Civil Revision No. 939 of 2003', 'appellant' => 'Daya Ram and ors.', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Daya Ram and ors. Vs. Sube Singh', 'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent Appeal Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., - Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act. Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. ', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => '', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => ' Ashit Malik, Adv.', 'counseldef' => ' Kulvir Narwal, Adv.', 'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana', 'court_type' => 'HC', 'decidedon' => '2005-02-08', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' M.M. Aggarwal, J.', 'judgement' => '<p>M.M. Aggarwal, J.</p><p>1. This petition had been filed against order dated 24.3.2003 of Additional Sessions Judge, Rohtak whereby order of the Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class dated 26.11.2002 had been set aside and the Additional Sessions Judge had directed that the complaint shall proceed for offence under Sections 420/406/120-B and 506 I.P.C.</p><p>2. The facts of the case had been that Sube Singh filed a complaint alleging that Daya Ram and others had entered into an unlawful assembly and hatched a conspiracy. Daya Ram had entered into an agreement to sell his 1/6th share. The sale was to be for Rs. 2 lacs a killa. On 21.8.2000, he had received Rs. 1 lac and then remaining amount Rs. 58,750/- was to be received at the time of registration of sale-deed. However, before 21.12.2000 i.e. the date of performance, Daya Ram had in connivance with other accused cheated the complainant by transferring his 1/6th share to accused Nos. 2 to 10 and accused No. 1 surrendered possession on 4.9.2000 in favour of accused Nos. 2 to 10 and also executed release deed in favour of accused Nos. 2 to 10, that Daya Ram had then lodged a false report with the police. When Sube Singh and witnesses had gone to Daya Ram and other accused, then the accused had threatened that they shall be done to death.</p><p>3. The Additional Sessions Judge vide order dated 24.3.2003 directed that since there was a prima facie case for offence under Sections 406/420/120-B/506 I.P.C., against the petitioners, they should be proceeded against for the aforesaid offence by the Magistrate.</p><p>4. It is a fact that Sube Singh had already filed a Civil Suit for specific performance on the basis of agreement as against Daya Ram and other accused. That suit is stated to be pending.</p><p>5. Counsel for the petitioner had argued that when the civil suit was pending, no criminal prosecution could be launched.</p><p>6. Counsel for the complainant Sube Singh had argued that Daya Ram in collusions with other accused had cheated the complainant. They had entered into a conspiracy and threatened the complainant; that, in fact, Daya Ram etc. had got complainant Sube Singh wrongfully implicated in a case.</p><p>7. It is a fact that civil Suit filed by Sube Singh against Daya Ram and others for specific performance of the agreement to sell dated 21.8.2000 is pending. However, it is difficult to say as to whether other accused had entered into conspiracy with Daya Ram when Daya Ram executed relinquishment deed in favour of other accused. The averment that all the accused had threatened the complainant appears to have been made to implicate as many as possible.</p><p>8. It is settled law that criminal prosecution and Civil Suit can go together. However, I am of the view that the case of cheating is made out only against Daya Ram petitioner who had entered into agreement of sale and received the amount and not the other petitioners. No other offence is made out.</p><p>Under these circumstances, the order dated 24.3.2004 of Additional Sessions Judge, Rohtak is set aside to the extent that only Daya Ram shall face trial for offence under Section 420 I.P.C. The complaint against other petitioners shall stand dismissed.<p></p><p>', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => '(2005)140PLR501', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Sube Singh', 'sub' => 'Civil', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ) $casename_url = 'daya-ram-ors-vs-sube-singh' $args = array( (int) 0 => '616448', (int) 1 => 'daya-ram-ors-vs-sube-singh' ) $url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/616448/daya-ram-ors-vs-sube-singh' $ctype = ' High Court' $content = array( (int) 0 => '<p>M.M. Aggarwal, J.', (int) 1 => '<p>1. This petition had been filed against order dated 24.3.2003 of Additional Sessions Judge, Rohtak whereby order of the Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class dated 26.11.2002 had been set aside and the Additional Sessions Judge had directed that the complaint shall proceed for offence under Sections 420/406/120-B and 506 I.P.C.', (int) 2 => '<p>2. The facts of the case had been that Sube Singh filed a complaint alleging that Daya Ram and others had entered into an unlawful assembly and hatched a conspiracy. Daya Ram had entered into an agreement to sell his 1/6th share. The sale was to be for Rs. 2 lacs a killa. On 21.8.2000, he had received Rs. 1 lac and then remaining amount Rs. 58,750/- was to be received at the time of registration of sale-deed. However, before 21.12.2000 i.e. the date of performance, Daya Ram had in connivance with other accused cheated the complainant by transferring his 1/6th share to accused Nos. 2 to 10 and accused No. 1 surrendered possession on 4.9.2000 in favour of accused Nos. 2 to 10 and also executed release deed in favour of accused Nos. 2 to 10, that Daya Ram had then lodged a false report with the police. When Sube Singh and witnesses had gone to Daya Ram and other accused, then the accused had threatened that they shall be done to death.', (int) 3 => '<p>3. The Additional Sessions Judge vide order dated 24.3.2003 directed that since there was a prima facie case for offence under Sections 406/420/120-B/506 I.P.C., against the petitioners, they should be proceeded against for the aforesaid offence by the Magistrate.', (int) 4 => '<p>4. It is a fact that Sube Singh had already filed a Civil Suit for specific performance on the basis of agreement as against Daya Ram and other accused. That suit is stated to be pending.', (int) 5 => '<p>5. Counsel for the petitioner had argued that when the civil suit was pending, no criminal prosecution could be launched.', (int) 6 => '<p>6. Counsel for the complainant Sube Singh had argued that Daya Ram in collusions with other accused had cheated the complainant. They had entered into a conspiracy and threatened the complainant; that, in fact, Daya Ram etc. had got complainant Sube Singh wrongfully implicated in a case.', (int) 7 => '<p>7. It is a fact that civil Suit filed by Sube Singh against Daya Ram and others for specific performance of the agreement to sell dated 21.8.2000 is pending. However, it is difficult to say as to whether other accused had entered into conspiracy with Daya Ram when Daya Ram executed relinquishment deed in favour of other accused. The averment that all the accused had threatened the complainant appears to have been made to implicate as many as possible.', (int) 8 => '<p>8. It is settled law that criminal prosecution and Civil Suit can go together. However, I am of the view that the case of cheating is made out only against Daya Ram petitioner who had entered into agreement of sale and received the amount and not the other petitioners. No other offence is made out.', (int) 9 => '<p>Under these circumstances, the order dated 24.3.2004 of Additional Sessions Judge, Rohtak is set aside to the extent that only Daya Ram shall face trial for offence under Section 420 I.P.C. The complaint against other petitioners shall stand dismissed.<p>', (int) 10 => '<p>' ) $paragraphAfter = (int) 1 $cnt = (int) 11 $i = (int) 4include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144 View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971 View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933 View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473 Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963 Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200 Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167 [main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109
4. It is a fact that Sube Singh had already filed a Civil Suit for specific performance on the basis of agreement as against Daya Ram and other accused. That suit is stated to be pending.
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$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp' $dataForView = array( 'title_for_layout' => 'Daya Ram and ors Vs Sube Singh - Citation 616448 - Court Judgment | ', 'desc' => array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '616448', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 120B, 406, 420 and 506', 'appealno' => 'Civil Revision No. 939 of 2003', 'appellant' => 'Daya Ram and ors.', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Daya Ram and ors. Vs. Sube Singh', 'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent Appeal Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., - Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act. Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. ', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => '', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => ' Ashit Malik, Adv.', 'counseldef' => ' Kulvir Narwal, Adv.', 'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana', 'court_type' => 'HC', 'decidedon' => '2005-02-08', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' M.M. Aggarwal, J.', 'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">M.M. Aggarwal, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This petition had been filed against order dated 24.3.2003 of Additional Sessions Judge, Rohtak whereby order of the Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class dated 26.11.2002 had been set aside and the Additional Sessions Judge had directed that the complaint shall proceed for offence under Sections 420/406/120-B and 506 I.P.C.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The facts of the case had been that Sube Singh filed a complaint alleging that Daya Ram and others had entered into an unlawful assembly and hatched a conspiracy. Daya Ram had entered into an agreement to sell his 1/6th share. The sale was to be for Rs. 2 lacs a killa. On 21.8.2000, he had received Rs. 1 lac and then remaining amount Rs. 58,750/- was to be received at the time of registration of sale-deed. However, before 21.12.2000 i.e. the date of performance, Daya Ram had in connivance with other accused cheated the complainant by transferring his 1/6th share to accused Nos. 2 to 10 and accused No. 1 surrendered possession on 4.9.2000 in favour of accused Nos. 2 to 10 and also executed release deed in favour of accused Nos. 2 to 10, that Daya Ram had then lodged a false report with the police. When Sube Singh and witnesses had gone to Daya Ram and other accused, then the accused had threatened that they shall be done to death.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The Additional Sessions Judge vide order dated 24.3.2003 directed that since there was a prima facie case for offence under Sections 406/420/120-B/506 I.P.C., against the petitioners, they should be proceeded against for the aforesaid offence by the Magistrate.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. It is a fact that Sube Singh had already filed a Civil Suit for specific performance on the basis of agreement as against Daya Ram and other accused. That suit is stated to be pending.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Counsel for the petitioner had argued that when the civil suit was pending, no criminal prosecution could be launched.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Counsel for the complainant Sube Singh had argued that Daya Ram in collusions with other accused had cheated the complainant. They had entered into a conspiracy and threatened the complainant; that, in fact, Daya Ram etc. had got complainant Sube Singh wrongfully implicated in a case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. It is a fact that civil Suit filed by Sube Singh against Daya Ram and others for specific performance of the agreement to sell dated 21.8.2000 is pending. However, it is difficult to say as to whether other accused had entered into conspiracy with Daya Ram when Daya Ram executed relinquishment deed in favour of other accused. The averment that all the accused had threatened the complainant appears to have been made to implicate as many as possible.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It is settled law that criminal prosecution and Civil Suit can go together. However, I am of the view that the case of cheating is made out only against Daya Ram petitioner who had entered into agreement of sale and received the amount and not the other petitioners. No other offence is made out.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Under these circumstances, the order dated 24.3.2004 of Additional Sessions Judge, Rohtak is set aside to the extent that only Daya Ram shall face trial for offence under Section 420 I.P.C. The complaint against other petitioners shall stand dismissed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => '(2005)140PLR501', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Sube Singh', 'sub' => 'Civil', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ), 'casename_url' => 'daya-ram-ors-vs-sube-singh', 'args' => array( (int) 0 => '616448', (int) 1 => 'daya-ram-ors-vs-sube-singh' ) ) $title_for_layout = 'Daya Ram and ors Vs Sube Singh - Citation 616448 - Court Judgment | ' $desc = array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '616448', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 120B, 406, 420 and 506', 'appealno' => 'Civil Revision No. 939 of 2003', 'appellant' => 'Daya Ram and ors.', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Daya Ram and ors. Vs. Sube Singh', 'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent Appeal Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., - Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act. Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. ', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => '', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => ' Ashit Malik, Adv.', 'counseldef' => ' Kulvir Narwal, Adv.', 'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana', 'court_type' => 'HC', 'decidedon' => '2005-02-08', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' M.M. Aggarwal, J.', 'judgement' => '<p>M.M. Aggarwal, J.</p><p>1. This petition had been filed against order dated 24.3.2003 of Additional Sessions Judge, Rohtak whereby order of the Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class dated 26.11.2002 had been set aside and the Additional Sessions Judge had directed that the complaint shall proceed for offence under Sections 420/406/120-B and 506 I.P.C.</p><p>2. The facts of the case had been that Sube Singh filed a complaint alleging that Daya Ram and others had entered into an unlawful assembly and hatched a conspiracy. Daya Ram had entered into an agreement to sell his 1/6th share. The sale was to be for Rs. 2 lacs a killa. On 21.8.2000, he had received Rs. 1 lac and then remaining amount Rs. 58,750/- was to be received at the time of registration of sale-deed. However, before 21.12.2000 i.e. the date of performance, Daya Ram had in connivance with other accused cheated the complainant by transferring his 1/6th share to accused Nos. 2 to 10 and accused No. 1 surrendered possession on 4.9.2000 in favour of accused Nos. 2 to 10 and also executed release deed in favour of accused Nos. 2 to 10, that Daya Ram had then lodged a false report with the police. When Sube Singh and witnesses had gone to Daya Ram and other accused, then the accused had threatened that they shall be done to death.</p><p>3. The Additional Sessions Judge vide order dated 24.3.2003 directed that since there was a prima facie case for offence under Sections 406/420/120-B/506 I.P.C., against the petitioners, they should be proceeded against for the aforesaid offence by the Magistrate.</p><p>4. It is a fact that Sube Singh had already filed a Civil Suit for specific performance on the basis of agreement as against Daya Ram and other accused. That suit is stated to be pending.</p><p>5. Counsel for the petitioner had argued that when the civil suit was pending, no criminal prosecution could be launched.</p><p>6. Counsel for the complainant Sube Singh had argued that Daya Ram in collusions with other accused had cheated the complainant. They had entered into a conspiracy and threatened the complainant; that, in fact, Daya Ram etc. had got complainant Sube Singh wrongfully implicated in a case.</p><p>7. It is a fact that civil Suit filed by Sube Singh against Daya Ram and others for specific performance of the agreement to sell dated 21.8.2000 is pending. However, it is difficult to say as to whether other accused had entered into conspiracy with Daya Ram when Daya Ram executed relinquishment deed in favour of other accused. The averment that all the accused had threatened the complainant appears to have been made to implicate as many as possible.</p><p>8. It is settled law that criminal prosecution and Civil Suit can go together. However, I am of the view that the case of cheating is made out only against Daya Ram petitioner who had entered into agreement of sale and received the amount and not the other petitioners. No other offence is made out.</p><p>Under these circumstances, the order dated 24.3.2004 of Additional Sessions Judge, Rohtak is set aside to the extent that only Daya Ram shall face trial for offence under Section 420 I.P.C. The complaint against other petitioners shall stand dismissed.<p></p><p>', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => '(2005)140PLR501', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Sube Singh', 'sub' => 'Civil', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ) $casename_url = 'daya-ram-ors-vs-sube-singh' $args = array( (int) 0 => '616448', (int) 1 => 'daya-ram-ors-vs-sube-singh' ) $url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/616448/daya-ram-ors-vs-sube-singh' $ctype = ' High Court' $content = array( (int) 0 => '<p>M.M. Aggarwal, J.', (int) 1 => '<p>1. This petition had been filed against order dated 24.3.2003 of Additional Sessions Judge, Rohtak whereby order of the Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class dated 26.11.2002 had been set aside and the Additional Sessions Judge had directed that the complaint shall proceed for offence under Sections 420/406/120-B and 506 I.P.C.', (int) 2 => '<p>2. The facts of the case had been that Sube Singh filed a complaint alleging that Daya Ram and others had entered into an unlawful assembly and hatched a conspiracy. Daya Ram had entered into an agreement to sell his 1/6th share. The sale was to be for Rs. 2 lacs a killa. On 21.8.2000, he had received Rs. 1 lac and then remaining amount Rs. 58,750/- was to be received at the time of registration of sale-deed. However, before 21.12.2000 i.e. the date of performance, Daya Ram had in connivance with other accused cheated the complainant by transferring his 1/6th share to accused Nos. 2 to 10 and accused No. 1 surrendered possession on 4.9.2000 in favour of accused Nos. 2 to 10 and also executed release deed in favour of accused Nos. 2 to 10, that Daya Ram had then lodged a false report with the police. When Sube Singh and witnesses had gone to Daya Ram and other accused, then the accused had threatened that they shall be done to death.', (int) 3 => '<p>3. The Additional Sessions Judge vide order dated 24.3.2003 directed that since there was a prima facie case for offence under Sections 406/420/120-B/506 I.P.C., against the petitioners, they should be proceeded against for the aforesaid offence by the Magistrate.', (int) 4 => '<p>4. It is a fact that Sube Singh had already filed a Civil Suit for specific performance on the basis of agreement as against Daya Ram and other accused. That suit is stated to be pending.', (int) 5 => '<p>5. Counsel for the petitioner had argued that when the civil suit was pending, no criminal prosecution could be launched.', (int) 6 => '<p>6. Counsel for the complainant Sube Singh had argued that Daya Ram in collusions with other accused had cheated the complainant. They had entered into a conspiracy and threatened the complainant; that, in fact, Daya Ram etc. had got complainant Sube Singh wrongfully implicated in a case.', (int) 7 => '<p>7. It is a fact that civil Suit filed by Sube Singh against Daya Ram and others for specific performance of the agreement to sell dated 21.8.2000 is pending. However, it is difficult to say as to whether other accused had entered into conspiracy with Daya Ram when Daya Ram executed relinquishment deed in favour of other accused. The averment that all the accused had threatened the complainant appears to have been made to implicate as many as possible.', (int) 8 => '<p>8. It is settled law that criminal prosecution and Civil Suit can go together. However, I am of the view that the case of cheating is made out only against Daya Ram petitioner who had entered into agreement of sale and received the amount and not the other petitioners. No other offence is made out.', (int) 9 => '<p>Under these circumstances, the order dated 24.3.2004 of Additional Sessions Judge, Rohtak is set aside to the extent that only Daya Ram shall face trial for offence under Section 420 I.P.C. The complaint against other petitioners shall stand dismissed.<p>', (int) 10 => '<p>' ) $paragraphAfter = (int) 1 $cnt = (int) 11 $i = (int) 5include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144 View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971 View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933 View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473 Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963 Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200 Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167 [main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109
5. Counsel for the petitioner had argued that when the civil suit was pending, no criminal prosecution could be launched.
Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144]Code Contextecho $this->Adsense->display('responsive_rect');
}
echo html_entity_decode($this->Wand->highlight($content[$i], $query));
$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp' $dataForView = array( 'title_for_layout' => 'Daya Ram and ors Vs Sube Singh - Citation 616448 - Court Judgment | ', 'desc' => array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '616448', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 120B, 406, 420 and 506', 'appealno' => 'Civil Revision No. 939 of 2003', 'appellant' => 'Daya Ram and ors.', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Daya Ram and ors. Vs. Sube Singh', 'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent Appeal Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., - Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act. Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. ', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => '', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => ' Ashit Malik, Adv.', 'counseldef' => ' Kulvir Narwal, Adv.', 'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana', 'court_type' => 'HC', 'decidedon' => '2005-02-08', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' M.M. Aggarwal, J.', 'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">M.M. Aggarwal, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This petition had been filed against order dated 24.3.2003 of Additional Sessions Judge, Rohtak whereby order of the Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class dated 26.11.2002 had been set aside and the Additional Sessions Judge had directed that the complaint shall proceed for offence under Sections 420/406/120-B and 506 I.P.C.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The facts of the case had been that Sube Singh filed a complaint alleging that Daya Ram and others had entered into an unlawful assembly and hatched a conspiracy. Daya Ram had entered into an agreement to sell his 1/6th share. The sale was to be for Rs. 2 lacs a killa. On 21.8.2000, he had received Rs. 1 lac and then remaining amount Rs. 58,750/- was to be received at the time of registration of sale-deed. However, before 21.12.2000 i.e. the date of performance, Daya Ram had in connivance with other accused cheated the complainant by transferring his 1/6th share to accused Nos. 2 to 10 and accused No. 1 surrendered possession on 4.9.2000 in favour of accused Nos. 2 to 10 and also executed release deed in favour of accused Nos. 2 to 10, that Daya Ram had then lodged a false report with the police. When Sube Singh and witnesses had gone to Daya Ram and other accused, then the accused had threatened that they shall be done to death.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The Additional Sessions Judge vide order dated 24.3.2003 directed that since there was a prima facie case for offence under Sections 406/420/120-B/506 I.P.C., against the petitioners, they should be proceeded against for the aforesaid offence by the Magistrate.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. It is a fact that Sube Singh had already filed a Civil Suit for specific performance on the basis of agreement as against Daya Ram and other accused. That suit is stated to be pending.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Counsel for the petitioner had argued that when the civil suit was pending, no criminal prosecution could be launched.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Counsel for the complainant Sube Singh had argued that Daya Ram in collusions with other accused had cheated the complainant. They had entered into a conspiracy and threatened the complainant; that, in fact, Daya Ram etc. had got complainant Sube Singh wrongfully implicated in a case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. It is a fact that civil Suit filed by Sube Singh against Daya Ram and others for specific performance of the agreement to sell dated 21.8.2000 is pending. However, it is difficult to say as to whether other accused had entered into conspiracy with Daya Ram when Daya Ram executed relinquishment deed in favour of other accused. The averment that all the accused had threatened the complainant appears to have been made to implicate as many as possible.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It is settled law that criminal prosecution and Civil Suit can go together. However, I am of the view that the case of cheating is made out only against Daya Ram petitioner who had entered into agreement of sale and received the amount and not the other petitioners. No other offence is made out.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Under these circumstances, the order dated 24.3.2004 of Additional Sessions Judge, Rohtak is set aside to the extent that only Daya Ram shall face trial for offence under Section 420 I.P.C. The complaint against other petitioners shall stand dismissed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => '(2005)140PLR501', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Sube Singh', 'sub' => 'Civil', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ), 'casename_url' => 'daya-ram-ors-vs-sube-singh', 'args' => array( (int) 0 => '616448', (int) 1 => 'daya-ram-ors-vs-sube-singh' ) ) $title_for_layout = 'Daya Ram and ors Vs Sube Singh - Citation 616448 - Court Judgment | ' $desc = array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '616448', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 120B, 406, 420 and 506', 'appealno' => 'Civil Revision No. 939 of 2003', 'appellant' => 'Daya Ram and ors.', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Daya Ram and ors. Vs. Sube Singh', 'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent Appeal Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., - Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act. Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. ', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => '', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => ' Ashit Malik, Adv.', 'counseldef' => ' Kulvir Narwal, Adv.', 'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana', 'court_type' => 'HC', 'decidedon' => '2005-02-08', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' M.M. Aggarwal, J.', 'judgement' => '<p>M.M. Aggarwal, J.</p><p>1. This petition had been filed against order dated 24.3.2003 of Additional Sessions Judge, Rohtak whereby order of the Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class dated 26.11.2002 had been set aside and the Additional Sessions Judge had directed that the complaint shall proceed for offence under Sections 420/406/120-B and 506 I.P.C.</p><p>2. The facts of the case had been that Sube Singh filed a complaint alleging that Daya Ram and others had entered into an unlawful assembly and hatched a conspiracy. Daya Ram had entered into an agreement to sell his 1/6th share. The sale was to be for Rs. 2 lacs a killa. On 21.8.2000, he had received Rs. 1 lac and then remaining amount Rs. 58,750/- was to be received at the time of registration of sale-deed. However, before 21.12.2000 i.e. the date of performance, Daya Ram had in connivance with other accused cheated the complainant by transferring his 1/6th share to accused Nos. 2 to 10 and accused No. 1 surrendered possession on 4.9.2000 in favour of accused Nos. 2 to 10 and also executed release deed in favour of accused Nos. 2 to 10, that Daya Ram had then lodged a false report with the police. When Sube Singh and witnesses had gone to Daya Ram and other accused, then the accused had threatened that they shall be done to death.</p><p>3. The Additional Sessions Judge vide order dated 24.3.2003 directed that since there was a prima facie case for offence under Sections 406/420/120-B/506 I.P.C., against the petitioners, they should be proceeded against for the aforesaid offence by the Magistrate.</p><p>4. It is a fact that Sube Singh had already filed a Civil Suit for specific performance on the basis of agreement as against Daya Ram and other accused. That suit is stated to be pending.</p><p>5. Counsel for the petitioner had argued that when the civil suit was pending, no criminal prosecution could be launched.</p><p>6. Counsel for the complainant Sube Singh had argued that Daya Ram in collusions with other accused had cheated the complainant. They had entered into a conspiracy and threatened the complainant; that, in fact, Daya Ram etc. had got complainant Sube Singh wrongfully implicated in a case.</p><p>7. It is a fact that civil Suit filed by Sube Singh against Daya Ram and others for specific performance of the agreement to sell dated 21.8.2000 is pending. However, it is difficult to say as to whether other accused had entered into conspiracy with Daya Ram when Daya Ram executed relinquishment deed in favour of other accused. The averment that all the accused had threatened the complainant appears to have been made to implicate as many as possible.</p><p>8. It is settled law that criminal prosecution and Civil Suit can go together. However, I am of the view that the case of cheating is made out only against Daya Ram petitioner who had entered into agreement of sale and received the amount and not the other petitioners. No other offence is made out.</p><p>Under these circumstances, the order dated 24.3.2004 of Additional Sessions Judge, Rohtak is set aside to the extent that only Daya Ram shall face trial for offence under Section 420 I.P.C. The complaint against other petitioners shall stand dismissed.<p></p><p>', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => '(2005)140PLR501', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Sube Singh', 'sub' => 'Civil', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ) $casename_url = 'daya-ram-ors-vs-sube-singh' $args = array( (int) 0 => '616448', (int) 1 => 'daya-ram-ors-vs-sube-singh' ) $url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/616448/daya-ram-ors-vs-sube-singh' $ctype = ' High Court' $content = array( (int) 0 => '<p>M.M. Aggarwal, J.', (int) 1 => '<p>1. This petition had been filed against order dated 24.3.2003 of Additional Sessions Judge, Rohtak whereby order of the Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class dated 26.11.2002 had been set aside and the Additional Sessions Judge had directed that the complaint shall proceed for offence under Sections 420/406/120-B and 506 I.P.C.', (int) 2 => '<p>2. The facts of the case had been that Sube Singh filed a complaint alleging that Daya Ram and others had entered into an unlawful assembly and hatched a conspiracy. Daya Ram had entered into an agreement to sell his 1/6th share. The sale was to be for Rs. 2 lacs a killa. On 21.8.2000, he had received Rs. 1 lac and then remaining amount Rs. 58,750/- was to be received at the time of registration of sale-deed. However, before 21.12.2000 i.e. the date of performance, Daya Ram had in connivance with other accused cheated the complainant by transferring his 1/6th share to accused Nos. 2 to 10 and accused No. 1 surrendered possession on 4.9.2000 in favour of accused Nos. 2 to 10 and also executed release deed in favour of accused Nos. 2 to 10, that Daya Ram had then lodged a false report with the police. When Sube Singh and witnesses had gone to Daya Ram and other accused, then the accused had threatened that they shall be done to death.', (int) 3 => '<p>3. The Additional Sessions Judge vide order dated 24.3.2003 directed that since there was a prima facie case for offence under Sections 406/420/120-B/506 I.P.C., against the petitioners, they should be proceeded against for the aforesaid offence by the Magistrate.', (int) 4 => '<p>4. It is a fact that Sube Singh had already filed a Civil Suit for specific performance on the basis of agreement as against Daya Ram and other accused. That suit is stated to be pending.', (int) 5 => '<p>5. Counsel for the petitioner had argued that when the civil suit was pending, no criminal prosecution could be launched.', (int) 6 => '<p>6. Counsel for the complainant Sube Singh had argued that Daya Ram in collusions with other accused had cheated the complainant. They had entered into a conspiracy and threatened the complainant; that, in fact, Daya Ram etc. had got complainant Sube Singh wrongfully implicated in a case.', (int) 7 => '<p>7. It is a fact that civil Suit filed by Sube Singh against Daya Ram and others for specific performance of the agreement to sell dated 21.8.2000 is pending. However, it is difficult to say as to whether other accused had entered into conspiracy with Daya Ram when Daya Ram executed relinquishment deed in favour of other accused. The averment that all the accused had threatened the complainant appears to have been made to implicate as many as possible.', (int) 8 => '<p>8. It is settled law that criminal prosecution and Civil Suit can go together. However, I am of the view that the case of cheating is made out only against Daya Ram petitioner who had entered into agreement of sale and received the amount and not the other petitioners. No other offence is made out.', (int) 9 => '<p>Under these circumstances, the order dated 24.3.2004 of Additional Sessions Judge, Rohtak is set aside to the extent that only Daya Ram shall face trial for offence under Section 420 I.P.C. The complaint against other petitioners shall stand dismissed.<p>', (int) 10 => '<p>' ) $paragraphAfter = (int) 1 $cnt = (int) 11 $i = (int) 6include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144 View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971 View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933 View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473 Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963 Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200 Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167 [main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109
6. Counsel for the complainant Sube Singh had argued that Daya Ram in collusions with other accused had cheated the complainant. They had entered into a conspiracy and threatened the complainant; that, in fact, Daya Ram etc. had got complainant Sube Singh wrongfully implicated in a case.
Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144]Code Contextecho $this->Adsense->display('responsive_rect');
}
echo html_entity_decode($this->Wand->highlight($content[$i], $query));
$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp' $dataForView = array( 'title_for_layout' => 'Daya Ram and ors Vs Sube Singh - Citation 616448 - Court Judgment | ', 'desc' => array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '616448', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 120B, 406, 420 and 506', 'appealno' => 'Civil Revision No. 939 of 2003', 'appellant' => 'Daya Ram and ors.', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Daya Ram and ors. Vs. Sube Singh', 'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent Appeal Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., - Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act. Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. ', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => '', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => ' Ashit Malik, Adv.', 'counseldef' => ' Kulvir Narwal, Adv.', 'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana', 'court_type' => 'HC', 'decidedon' => '2005-02-08', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' M.M. Aggarwal, J.', 'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">M.M. Aggarwal, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This petition had been filed against order dated 24.3.2003 of Additional Sessions Judge, Rohtak whereby order of the Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class dated 26.11.2002 had been set aside and the Additional Sessions Judge had directed that the complaint shall proceed for offence under Sections 420/406/120-B and 506 I.P.C.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The facts of the case had been that Sube Singh filed a complaint alleging that Daya Ram and others had entered into an unlawful assembly and hatched a conspiracy. Daya Ram had entered into an agreement to sell his 1/6th share. The sale was to be for Rs. 2 lacs a killa. On 21.8.2000, he had received Rs. 1 lac and then remaining amount Rs. 58,750/- was to be received at the time of registration of sale-deed. However, before 21.12.2000 i.e. the date of performance, Daya Ram had in connivance with other accused cheated the complainant by transferring his 1/6th share to accused Nos. 2 to 10 and accused No. 1 surrendered possession on 4.9.2000 in favour of accused Nos. 2 to 10 and also executed release deed in favour of accused Nos. 2 to 10, that Daya Ram had then lodged a false report with the police. When Sube Singh and witnesses had gone to Daya Ram and other accused, then the accused had threatened that they shall be done to death.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The Additional Sessions Judge vide order dated 24.3.2003 directed that since there was a prima facie case for offence under Sections 406/420/120-B/506 I.P.C., against the petitioners, they should be proceeded against for the aforesaid offence by the Magistrate.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. It is a fact that Sube Singh had already filed a Civil Suit for specific performance on the basis of agreement as against Daya Ram and other accused. That suit is stated to be pending.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Counsel for the petitioner had argued that when the civil suit was pending, no criminal prosecution could be launched.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Counsel for the complainant Sube Singh had argued that Daya Ram in collusions with other accused had cheated the complainant. They had entered into a conspiracy and threatened the complainant; that, in fact, Daya Ram etc. had got complainant Sube Singh wrongfully implicated in a case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. It is a fact that civil Suit filed by Sube Singh against Daya Ram and others for specific performance of the agreement to sell dated 21.8.2000 is pending. However, it is difficult to say as to whether other accused had entered into conspiracy with Daya Ram when Daya Ram executed relinquishment deed in favour of other accused. The averment that all the accused had threatened the complainant appears to have been made to implicate as many as possible.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It is settled law that criminal prosecution and Civil Suit can go together. However, I am of the view that the case of cheating is made out only against Daya Ram petitioner who had entered into agreement of sale and received the amount and not the other petitioners. No other offence is made out.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Under these circumstances, the order dated 24.3.2004 of Additional Sessions Judge, Rohtak is set aside to the extent that only Daya Ram shall face trial for offence under Section 420 I.P.C. The complaint against other petitioners shall stand dismissed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => '(2005)140PLR501', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Sube Singh', 'sub' => 'Civil', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ), 'casename_url' => 'daya-ram-ors-vs-sube-singh', 'args' => array( (int) 0 => '616448', (int) 1 => 'daya-ram-ors-vs-sube-singh' ) ) $title_for_layout = 'Daya Ram and ors Vs Sube Singh - Citation 616448 - Court Judgment | ' $desc = array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '616448', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 120B, 406, 420 and 506', 'appealno' => 'Civil Revision No. 939 of 2003', 'appellant' => 'Daya Ram and ors.', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Daya Ram and ors. Vs. Sube Singh', 'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent Appeal Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., - Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act. Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. ', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => '', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => ' Ashit Malik, Adv.', 'counseldef' => ' Kulvir Narwal, Adv.', 'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana', 'court_type' => 'HC', 'decidedon' => '2005-02-08', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' M.M. Aggarwal, J.', 'judgement' => '<p>M.M. Aggarwal, J.</p><p>1. This petition had been filed against order dated 24.3.2003 of Additional Sessions Judge, Rohtak whereby order of the Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class dated 26.11.2002 had been set aside and the Additional Sessions Judge had directed that the complaint shall proceed for offence under Sections 420/406/120-B and 506 I.P.C.</p><p>2. The facts of the case had been that Sube Singh filed a complaint alleging that Daya Ram and others had entered into an unlawful assembly and hatched a conspiracy. Daya Ram had entered into an agreement to sell his 1/6th share. The sale was to be for Rs. 2 lacs a killa. On 21.8.2000, he had received Rs. 1 lac and then remaining amount Rs. 58,750/- was to be received at the time of registration of sale-deed. However, before 21.12.2000 i.e. the date of performance, Daya Ram had in connivance with other accused cheated the complainant by transferring his 1/6th share to accused Nos. 2 to 10 and accused No. 1 surrendered possession on 4.9.2000 in favour of accused Nos. 2 to 10 and also executed release deed in favour of accused Nos. 2 to 10, that Daya Ram had then lodged a false report with the police. When Sube Singh and witnesses had gone to Daya Ram and other accused, then the accused had threatened that they shall be done to death.</p><p>3. The Additional Sessions Judge vide order dated 24.3.2003 directed that since there was a prima facie case for offence under Sections 406/420/120-B/506 I.P.C., against the petitioners, they should be proceeded against for the aforesaid offence by the Magistrate.</p><p>4. It is a fact that Sube Singh had already filed a Civil Suit for specific performance on the basis of agreement as against Daya Ram and other accused. That suit is stated to be pending.</p><p>5. Counsel for the petitioner had argued that when the civil suit was pending, no criminal prosecution could be launched.</p><p>6. Counsel for the complainant Sube Singh had argued that Daya Ram in collusions with other accused had cheated the complainant. They had entered into a conspiracy and threatened the complainant; that, in fact, Daya Ram etc. had got complainant Sube Singh wrongfully implicated in a case.</p><p>7. It is a fact that civil Suit filed by Sube Singh against Daya Ram and others for specific performance of the agreement to sell dated 21.8.2000 is pending. However, it is difficult to say as to whether other accused had entered into conspiracy with Daya Ram when Daya Ram executed relinquishment deed in favour of other accused. The averment that all the accused had threatened the complainant appears to have been made to implicate as many as possible.</p><p>8. It is settled law that criminal prosecution and Civil Suit can go together. However, I am of the view that the case of cheating is made out only against Daya Ram petitioner who had entered into agreement of sale and received the amount and not the other petitioners. No other offence is made out.</p><p>Under these circumstances, the order dated 24.3.2004 of Additional Sessions Judge, Rohtak is set aside to the extent that only Daya Ram shall face trial for offence under Section 420 I.P.C. The complaint against other petitioners shall stand dismissed.<p></p><p>', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => '(2005)140PLR501', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Sube Singh', 'sub' => 'Civil', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ) $casename_url = 'daya-ram-ors-vs-sube-singh' $args = array( (int) 0 => '616448', (int) 1 => 'daya-ram-ors-vs-sube-singh' ) $url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/616448/daya-ram-ors-vs-sube-singh' $ctype = ' High Court' $content = array( (int) 0 => '<p>M.M. Aggarwal, J.', (int) 1 => '<p>1. This petition had been filed against order dated 24.3.2003 of Additional Sessions Judge, Rohtak whereby order of the Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class dated 26.11.2002 had been set aside and the Additional Sessions Judge had directed that the complaint shall proceed for offence under Sections 420/406/120-B and 506 I.P.C.', (int) 2 => '<p>2. The facts of the case had been that Sube Singh filed a complaint alleging that Daya Ram and others had entered into an unlawful assembly and hatched a conspiracy. Daya Ram had entered into an agreement to sell his 1/6th share. The sale was to be for Rs. 2 lacs a killa. On 21.8.2000, he had received Rs. 1 lac and then remaining amount Rs. 58,750/- was to be received at the time of registration of sale-deed. However, before 21.12.2000 i.e. the date of performance, Daya Ram had in connivance with other accused cheated the complainant by transferring his 1/6th share to accused Nos. 2 to 10 and accused No. 1 surrendered possession on 4.9.2000 in favour of accused Nos. 2 to 10 and also executed release deed in favour of accused Nos. 2 to 10, that Daya Ram had then lodged a false report with the police. When Sube Singh and witnesses had gone to Daya Ram and other accused, then the accused had threatened that they shall be done to death.', (int) 3 => '<p>3. The Additional Sessions Judge vide order dated 24.3.2003 directed that since there was a prima facie case for offence under Sections 406/420/120-B/506 I.P.C., against the petitioners, they should be proceeded against for the aforesaid offence by the Magistrate.', (int) 4 => '<p>4. It is a fact that Sube Singh had already filed a Civil Suit for specific performance on the basis of agreement as against Daya Ram and other accused. That suit is stated to be pending.', (int) 5 => '<p>5. Counsel for the petitioner had argued that when the civil suit was pending, no criminal prosecution could be launched.', (int) 6 => '<p>6. Counsel for the complainant Sube Singh had argued that Daya Ram in collusions with other accused had cheated the complainant. They had entered into a conspiracy and threatened the complainant; that, in fact, Daya Ram etc. had got complainant Sube Singh wrongfully implicated in a case.', (int) 7 => '<p>7. It is a fact that civil Suit filed by Sube Singh against Daya Ram and others for specific performance of the agreement to sell dated 21.8.2000 is pending. However, it is difficult to say as to whether other accused had entered into conspiracy with Daya Ram when Daya Ram executed relinquishment deed in favour of other accused. The averment that all the accused had threatened the complainant appears to have been made to implicate as many as possible.', (int) 8 => '<p>8. It is settled law that criminal prosecution and Civil Suit can go together. However, I am of the view that the case of cheating is made out only against Daya Ram petitioner who had entered into agreement of sale and received the amount and not the other petitioners. No other offence is made out.', (int) 9 => '<p>Under these circumstances, the order dated 24.3.2004 of Additional Sessions Judge, Rohtak is set aside to the extent that only Daya Ram shall face trial for offence under Section 420 I.P.C. The complaint against other petitioners shall stand dismissed.<p>', (int) 10 => '<p>' ) $paragraphAfter = (int) 1 $cnt = (int) 11 $i = (int) 7include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144 View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971 View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933 View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473 Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963 Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200 Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167 [main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109
7. It is a fact that civil Suit filed by Sube Singh against Daya Ram and others for specific performance of the agreement to sell dated 21.8.2000 is pending. However, it is difficult to say as to whether other accused had entered into conspiracy with Daya Ram when Daya Ram executed relinquishment deed in favour of other accused. The averment that all the accused had threatened the complainant appears to have been made to implicate as many as possible.
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$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp' $dataForView = array( 'title_for_layout' => 'Daya Ram and ors Vs Sube Singh - Citation 616448 - Court Judgment | ', 'desc' => array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '616448', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 120B, 406, 420 and 506', 'appealno' => 'Civil Revision No. 939 of 2003', 'appellant' => 'Daya Ram and ors.', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Daya Ram and ors. Vs. Sube Singh', 'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent Appeal Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., - Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act. Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. ', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => '', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => ' Ashit Malik, Adv.', 'counseldef' => ' Kulvir Narwal, Adv.', 'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana', 'court_type' => 'HC', 'decidedon' => '2005-02-08', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' M.M. Aggarwal, J.', 'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">M.M. Aggarwal, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This petition had been filed against order dated 24.3.2003 of Additional Sessions Judge, Rohtak whereby order of the Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class dated 26.11.2002 had been set aside and the Additional Sessions Judge had directed that the complaint shall proceed for offence under Sections 420/406/120-B and 506 I.P.C.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The facts of the case had been that Sube Singh filed a complaint alleging that Daya Ram and others had entered into an unlawful assembly and hatched a conspiracy. Daya Ram had entered into an agreement to sell his 1/6th share. The sale was to be for Rs. 2 lacs a killa. On 21.8.2000, he had received Rs. 1 lac and then remaining amount Rs. 58,750/- was to be received at the time of registration of sale-deed. However, before 21.12.2000 i.e. the date of performance, Daya Ram had in connivance with other accused cheated the complainant by transferring his 1/6th share to accused Nos. 2 to 10 and accused No. 1 surrendered possession on 4.9.2000 in favour of accused Nos. 2 to 10 and also executed release deed in favour of accused Nos. 2 to 10, that Daya Ram had then lodged a false report with the police. When Sube Singh and witnesses had gone to Daya Ram and other accused, then the accused had threatened that they shall be done to death.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The Additional Sessions Judge vide order dated 24.3.2003 directed that since there was a prima facie case for offence under Sections 406/420/120-B/506 I.P.C., against the petitioners, they should be proceeded against for the aforesaid offence by the Magistrate.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. It is a fact that Sube Singh had already filed a Civil Suit for specific performance on the basis of agreement as against Daya Ram and other accused. That suit is stated to be pending.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Counsel for the petitioner had argued that when the civil suit was pending, no criminal prosecution could be launched.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Counsel for the complainant Sube Singh had argued that Daya Ram in collusions with other accused had cheated the complainant. They had entered into a conspiracy and threatened the complainant; that, in fact, Daya Ram etc. had got complainant Sube Singh wrongfully implicated in a case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. It is a fact that civil Suit filed by Sube Singh against Daya Ram and others for specific performance of the agreement to sell dated 21.8.2000 is pending. However, it is difficult to say as to whether other accused had entered into conspiracy with Daya Ram when Daya Ram executed relinquishment deed in favour of other accused. The averment that all the accused had threatened the complainant appears to have been made to implicate as many as possible.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It is settled law that criminal prosecution and Civil Suit can go together. However, I am of the view that the case of cheating is made out only against Daya Ram petitioner who had entered into agreement of sale and received the amount and not the other petitioners. No other offence is made out.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Under these circumstances, the order dated 24.3.2004 of Additional Sessions Judge, Rohtak is set aside to the extent that only Daya Ram shall face trial for offence under Section 420 I.P.C. The complaint against other petitioners shall stand dismissed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => '(2005)140PLR501', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Sube Singh', 'sub' => 'Civil', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ), 'casename_url' => 'daya-ram-ors-vs-sube-singh', 'args' => array( (int) 0 => '616448', (int) 1 => 'daya-ram-ors-vs-sube-singh' ) ) $title_for_layout = 'Daya Ram and ors Vs Sube Singh - Citation 616448 - Court Judgment | ' $desc = array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '616448', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 120B, 406, 420 and 506', 'appealno' => 'Civil Revision No. 939 of 2003', 'appellant' => 'Daya Ram and ors.', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Daya Ram and ors. Vs. Sube Singh', 'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent Appeal Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., - Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act. Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. ', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => '', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => ' Ashit Malik, Adv.', 'counseldef' => ' Kulvir Narwal, Adv.', 'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana', 'court_type' => 'HC', 'decidedon' => '2005-02-08', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' M.M. Aggarwal, J.', 'judgement' => '<p>M.M. Aggarwal, J.</p><p>1. This petition had been filed against order dated 24.3.2003 of Additional Sessions Judge, Rohtak whereby order of the Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class dated 26.11.2002 had been set aside and the Additional Sessions Judge had directed that the complaint shall proceed for offence under Sections 420/406/120-B and 506 I.P.C.</p><p>2. The facts of the case had been that Sube Singh filed a complaint alleging that Daya Ram and others had entered into an unlawful assembly and hatched a conspiracy. Daya Ram had entered into an agreement to sell his 1/6th share. The sale was to be for Rs. 2 lacs a killa. On 21.8.2000, he had received Rs. 1 lac and then remaining amount Rs. 58,750/- was to be received at the time of registration of sale-deed. However, before 21.12.2000 i.e. the date of performance, Daya Ram had in connivance with other accused cheated the complainant by transferring his 1/6th share to accused Nos. 2 to 10 and accused No. 1 surrendered possession on 4.9.2000 in favour of accused Nos. 2 to 10 and also executed release deed in favour of accused Nos. 2 to 10, that Daya Ram had then lodged a false report with the police. When Sube Singh and witnesses had gone to Daya Ram and other accused, then the accused had threatened that they shall be done to death.</p><p>3. The Additional Sessions Judge vide order dated 24.3.2003 directed that since there was a prima facie case for offence under Sections 406/420/120-B/506 I.P.C., against the petitioners, they should be proceeded against for the aforesaid offence by the Magistrate.</p><p>4. It is a fact that Sube Singh had already filed a Civil Suit for specific performance on the basis of agreement as against Daya Ram and other accused. That suit is stated to be pending.</p><p>5. Counsel for the petitioner had argued that when the civil suit was pending, no criminal prosecution could be launched.</p><p>6. Counsel for the complainant Sube Singh had argued that Daya Ram in collusions with other accused had cheated the complainant. They had entered into a conspiracy and threatened the complainant; that, in fact, Daya Ram etc. had got complainant Sube Singh wrongfully implicated in a case.</p><p>7. It is a fact that civil Suit filed by Sube Singh against Daya Ram and others for specific performance of the agreement to sell dated 21.8.2000 is pending. However, it is difficult to say as to whether other accused had entered into conspiracy with Daya Ram when Daya Ram executed relinquishment deed in favour of other accused. The averment that all the accused had threatened the complainant appears to have been made to implicate as many as possible.</p><p>8. It is settled law that criminal prosecution and Civil Suit can go together. However, I am of the view that the case of cheating is made out only against Daya Ram petitioner who had entered into agreement of sale and received the amount and not the other petitioners. No other offence is made out.</p><p>Under these circumstances, the order dated 24.3.2004 of Additional Sessions Judge, Rohtak is set aside to the extent that only Daya Ram shall face trial for offence under Section 420 I.P.C. The complaint against other petitioners shall stand dismissed.<p></p><p>', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => '(2005)140PLR501', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Sube Singh', 'sub' => 'Civil', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ) $casename_url = 'daya-ram-ors-vs-sube-singh' $args = array( (int) 0 => '616448', (int) 1 => 'daya-ram-ors-vs-sube-singh' ) $url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/616448/daya-ram-ors-vs-sube-singh' $ctype = ' High Court' $content = array( (int) 0 => '<p>M.M. Aggarwal, J.', (int) 1 => '<p>1. This petition had been filed against order dated 24.3.2003 of Additional Sessions Judge, Rohtak whereby order of the Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class dated 26.11.2002 had been set aside and the Additional Sessions Judge had directed that the complaint shall proceed for offence under Sections 420/406/120-B and 506 I.P.C.', (int) 2 => '<p>2. The facts of the case had been that Sube Singh filed a complaint alleging that Daya Ram and others had entered into an unlawful assembly and hatched a conspiracy. Daya Ram had entered into an agreement to sell his 1/6th share. The sale was to be for Rs. 2 lacs a killa. On 21.8.2000, he had received Rs. 1 lac and then remaining amount Rs. 58,750/- was to be received at the time of registration of sale-deed. However, before 21.12.2000 i.e. the date of performance, Daya Ram had in connivance with other accused cheated the complainant by transferring his 1/6th share to accused Nos. 2 to 10 and accused No. 1 surrendered possession on 4.9.2000 in favour of accused Nos. 2 to 10 and also executed release deed in favour of accused Nos. 2 to 10, that Daya Ram had then lodged a false report with the police. When Sube Singh and witnesses had gone to Daya Ram and other accused, then the accused had threatened that they shall be done to death.', (int) 3 => '<p>3. The Additional Sessions Judge vide order dated 24.3.2003 directed that since there was a prima facie case for offence under Sections 406/420/120-B/506 I.P.C., against the petitioners, they should be proceeded against for the aforesaid offence by the Magistrate.', (int) 4 => '<p>4. It is a fact that Sube Singh had already filed a Civil Suit for specific performance on the basis of agreement as against Daya Ram and other accused. That suit is stated to be pending.', (int) 5 => '<p>5. Counsel for the petitioner had argued that when the civil suit was pending, no criminal prosecution could be launched.', (int) 6 => '<p>6. Counsel for the complainant Sube Singh had argued that Daya Ram in collusions with other accused had cheated the complainant. They had entered into a conspiracy and threatened the complainant; that, in fact, Daya Ram etc. had got complainant Sube Singh wrongfully implicated in a case.', (int) 7 => '<p>7. It is a fact that civil Suit filed by Sube Singh against Daya Ram and others for specific performance of the agreement to sell dated 21.8.2000 is pending. However, it is difficult to say as to whether other accused had entered into conspiracy with Daya Ram when Daya Ram executed relinquishment deed in favour of other accused. The averment that all the accused had threatened the complainant appears to have been made to implicate as many as possible.', (int) 8 => '<p>8. It is settled law that criminal prosecution and Civil Suit can go together. However, I am of the view that the case of cheating is made out only against Daya Ram petitioner who had entered into agreement of sale and received the amount and not the other petitioners. No other offence is made out.', (int) 9 => '<p>Under these circumstances, the order dated 24.3.2004 of Additional Sessions Judge, Rohtak is set aside to the extent that only Daya Ram shall face trial for offence under Section 420 I.P.C. The complaint against other petitioners shall stand dismissed.<p>', (int) 10 => '<p>' ) $paragraphAfter = (int) 1 $cnt = (int) 11 $i = (int) 8include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144 View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971 View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933 View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473 Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963 Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200 Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167 [main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109
8. It is settled law that criminal prosecution and Civil Suit can go together. However, I am of the view that the case of cheating is made out only against Daya Ram petitioner who had entered into agreement of sale and received the amount and not the other petitioners. No other offence is made out.
Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144]Code Contextecho $this->Adsense->display('responsive_rect');
}
echo html_entity_decode($this->Wand->highlight($content[$i], $query));
$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp' $dataForView = array( 'title_for_layout' => 'Daya Ram and ors Vs Sube Singh - Citation 616448 - Court Judgment | ', 'desc' => array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '616448', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 120B, 406, 420 and 506', 'appealno' => 'Civil Revision No. 939 of 2003', 'appellant' => 'Daya Ram and ors.', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Daya Ram and ors. Vs. Sube Singh', 'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent Appeal Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., - Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act. Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. ', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => '', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => ' Ashit Malik, Adv.', 'counseldef' => ' Kulvir Narwal, Adv.', 'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana', 'court_type' => 'HC', 'decidedon' => '2005-02-08', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' M.M. Aggarwal, J.', 'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">M.M. Aggarwal, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This petition had been filed against order dated 24.3.2003 of Additional Sessions Judge, Rohtak whereby order of the Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class dated 26.11.2002 had been set aside and the Additional Sessions Judge had directed that the complaint shall proceed for offence under Sections 420/406/120-B and 506 I.P.C.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The facts of the case had been that Sube Singh filed a complaint alleging that Daya Ram and others had entered into an unlawful assembly and hatched a conspiracy. Daya Ram had entered into an agreement to sell his 1/6th share. The sale was to be for Rs. 2 lacs a killa. On 21.8.2000, he had received Rs. 1 lac and then remaining amount Rs. 58,750/- was to be received at the time of registration of sale-deed. However, before 21.12.2000 i.e. the date of performance, Daya Ram had in connivance with other accused cheated the complainant by transferring his 1/6th share to accused Nos. 2 to 10 and accused No. 1 surrendered possession on 4.9.2000 in favour of accused Nos. 2 to 10 and also executed release deed in favour of accused Nos. 2 to 10, that Daya Ram had then lodged a false report with the police. When Sube Singh and witnesses had gone to Daya Ram and other accused, then the accused had threatened that they shall be done to death.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The Additional Sessions Judge vide order dated 24.3.2003 directed that since there was a prima facie case for offence under Sections 406/420/120-B/506 I.P.C., against the petitioners, they should be proceeded against for the aforesaid offence by the Magistrate.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. It is a fact that Sube Singh had already filed a Civil Suit for specific performance on the basis of agreement as against Daya Ram and other accused. That suit is stated to be pending.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Counsel for the petitioner had argued that when the civil suit was pending, no criminal prosecution could be launched.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Counsel for the complainant Sube Singh had argued that Daya Ram in collusions with other accused had cheated the complainant. They had entered into a conspiracy and threatened the complainant; that, in fact, Daya Ram etc. had got complainant Sube Singh wrongfully implicated in a case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. It is a fact that civil Suit filed by Sube Singh against Daya Ram and others for specific performance of the agreement to sell dated 21.8.2000 is pending. However, it is difficult to say as to whether other accused had entered into conspiracy with Daya Ram when Daya Ram executed relinquishment deed in favour of other accused. The averment that all the accused had threatened the complainant appears to have been made to implicate as many as possible.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It is settled law that criminal prosecution and Civil Suit can go together. However, I am of the view that the case of cheating is made out only against Daya Ram petitioner who had entered into agreement of sale and received the amount and not the other petitioners. No other offence is made out.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Under these circumstances, the order dated 24.3.2004 of Additional Sessions Judge, Rohtak is set aside to the extent that only Daya Ram shall face trial for offence under Section 420 I.P.C. The complaint against other petitioners shall stand dismissed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => '(2005)140PLR501', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Sube Singh', 'sub' => 'Civil', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ), 'casename_url' => 'daya-ram-ors-vs-sube-singh', 'args' => array( (int) 0 => '616448', (int) 1 => 'daya-ram-ors-vs-sube-singh' ) ) $title_for_layout = 'Daya Ram and ors Vs Sube Singh - Citation 616448 - Court Judgment | ' $desc = array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '616448', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 120B, 406, 420 and 506', 'appealno' => 'Civil Revision No. 939 of 2003', 'appellant' => 'Daya Ram and ors.', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Daya Ram and ors. Vs. Sube Singh', 'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent Appeal Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., - Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act. Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. ', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => '', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => ' Ashit Malik, Adv.', 'counseldef' => ' Kulvir Narwal, Adv.', 'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana', 'court_type' => 'HC', 'decidedon' => '2005-02-08', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' M.M. Aggarwal, J.', 'judgement' => '<p>M.M. Aggarwal, J.</p><p>1. This petition had been filed against order dated 24.3.2003 of Additional Sessions Judge, Rohtak whereby order of the Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class dated 26.11.2002 had been set aside and the Additional Sessions Judge had directed that the complaint shall proceed for offence under Sections 420/406/120-B and 506 I.P.C.</p><p>2. The facts of the case had been that Sube Singh filed a complaint alleging that Daya Ram and others had entered into an unlawful assembly and hatched a conspiracy. Daya Ram had entered into an agreement to sell his 1/6th share. The sale was to be for Rs. 2 lacs a killa. On 21.8.2000, he had received Rs. 1 lac and then remaining amount Rs. 58,750/- was to be received at the time of registration of sale-deed. However, before 21.12.2000 i.e. the date of performance, Daya Ram had in connivance with other accused cheated the complainant by transferring his 1/6th share to accused Nos. 2 to 10 and accused No. 1 surrendered possession on 4.9.2000 in favour of accused Nos. 2 to 10 and also executed release deed in favour of accused Nos. 2 to 10, that Daya Ram had then lodged a false report with the police. When Sube Singh and witnesses had gone to Daya Ram and other accused, then the accused had threatened that they shall be done to death.</p><p>3. The Additional Sessions Judge vide order dated 24.3.2003 directed that since there was a prima facie case for offence under Sections 406/420/120-B/506 I.P.C., against the petitioners, they should be proceeded against for the aforesaid offence by the Magistrate.</p><p>4. It is a fact that Sube Singh had already filed a Civil Suit for specific performance on the basis of agreement as against Daya Ram and other accused. That suit is stated to be pending.</p><p>5. Counsel for the petitioner had argued that when the civil suit was pending, no criminal prosecution could be launched.</p><p>6. Counsel for the complainant Sube Singh had argued that Daya Ram in collusions with other accused had cheated the complainant. They had entered into a conspiracy and threatened the complainant; that, in fact, Daya Ram etc. had got complainant Sube Singh wrongfully implicated in a case.</p><p>7. It is a fact that civil Suit filed by Sube Singh against Daya Ram and others for specific performance of the agreement to sell dated 21.8.2000 is pending. However, it is difficult to say as to whether other accused had entered into conspiracy with Daya Ram when Daya Ram executed relinquishment deed in favour of other accused. The averment that all the accused had threatened the complainant appears to have been made to implicate as many as possible.</p><p>8. It is settled law that criminal prosecution and Civil Suit can go together. However, I am of the view that the case of cheating is made out only against Daya Ram petitioner who had entered into agreement of sale and received the amount and not the other petitioners. No other offence is made out.</p><p>Under these circumstances, the order dated 24.3.2004 of Additional Sessions Judge, Rohtak is set aside to the extent that only Daya Ram shall face trial for offence under Section 420 I.P.C. The complaint against other petitioners shall stand dismissed.<p></p><p>', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => '(2005)140PLR501', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Sube Singh', 'sub' => 'Civil', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ) $casename_url = 'daya-ram-ors-vs-sube-singh' $args = array( (int) 0 => '616448', (int) 1 => 'daya-ram-ors-vs-sube-singh' ) $url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/616448/daya-ram-ors-vs-sube-singh' $ctype = ' High Court' $content = array( (int) 0 => '<p>M.M. Aggarwal, J.', (int) 1 => '<p>1. This petition had been filed against order dated 24.3.2003 of Additional Sessions Judge, Rohtak whereby order of the Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class dated 26.11.2002 had been set aside and the Additional Sessions Judge had directed that the complaint shall proceed for offence under Sections 420/406/120-B and 506 I.P.C.', (int) 2 => '<p>2. The facts of the case had been that Sube Singh filed a complaint alleging that Daya Ram and others had entered into an unlawful assembly and hatched a conspiracy. Daya Ram had entered into an agreement to sell his 1/6th share. The sale was to be for Rs. 2 lacs a killa. On 21.8.2000, he had received Rs. 1 lac and then remaining amount Rs. 58,750/- was to be received at the time of registration of sale-deed. However, before 21.12.2000 i.e. the date of performance, Daya Ram had in connivance with other accused cheated the complainant by transferring his 1/6th share to accused Nos. 2 to 10 and accused No. 1 surrendered possession on 4.9.2000 in favour of accused Nos. 2 to 10 and also executed release deed in favour of accused Nos. 2 to 10, that Daya Ram had then lodged a false report with the police. When Sube Singh and witnesses had gone to Daya Ram and other accused, then the accused had threatened that they shall be done to death.', (int) 3 => '<p>3. The Additional Sessions Judge vide order dated 24.3.2003 directed that since there was a prima facie case for offence under Sections 406/420/120-B/506 I.P.C., against the petitioners, they should be proceeded against for the aforesaid offence by the Magistrate.', (int) 4 => '<p>4. It is a fact that Sube Singh had already filed a Civil Suit for specific performance on the basis of agreement as against Daya Ram and other accused. That suit is stated to be pending.', (int) 5 => '<p>5. Counsel for the petitioner had argued that when the civil suit was pending, no criminal prosecution could be launched.', (int) 6 => '<p>6. Counsel for the complainant Sube Singh had argued that Daya Ram in collusions with other accused had cheated the complainant. They had entered into a conspiracy and threatened the complainant; that, in fact, Daya Ram etc. had got complainant Sube Singh wrongfully implicated in a case.', (int) 7 => '<p>7. It is a fact that civil Suit filed by Sube Singh against Daya Ram and others for specific performance of the agreement to sell dated 21.8.2000 is pending. However, it is difficult to say as to whether other accused had entered into conspiracy with Daya Ram when Daya Ram executed relinquishment deed in favour of other accused. The averment that all the accused had threatened the complainant appears to have been made to implicate as many as possible.', (int) 8 => '<p>8. It is settled law that criminal prosecution and Civil Suit can go together. However, I am of the view that the case of cheating is made out only against Daya Ram petitioner who had entered into agreement of sale and received the amount and not the other petitioners. No other offence is made out.', (int) 9 => '<p>Under these circumstances, the order dated 24.3.2004 of Additional Sessions Judge, Rohtak is set aside to the extent that only Daya Ram shall face trial for offence under Section 420 I.P.C. The complaint against other petitioners shall stand dismissed.<p>', (int) 10 => '<p>' ) $paragraphAfter = (int) 1 $cnt = (int) 11 $i = (int) 9include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144 View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971 View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933 View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473 Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963 Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200 Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167 [main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109
Under these circumstances, the order dated 24.3.2004 of Additional Sessions Judge, Rohtak is set aside to the extent that only Daya Ram shall face trial for offence under Section 420 I.P.C. The complaint against other petitioners shall stand dismissed.
Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144]Code Contextecho $this->Adsense->display('responsive_rect');
}
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$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp' $dataForView = array( 'title_for_layout' => 'Daya Ram and ors Vs Sube Singh - Citation 616448 - Court Judgment | ', 'desc' => array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '616448', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 120B, 406, 420 and 506', 'appealno' => 'Civil Revision No. 939 of 2003', 'appellant' => 'Daya Ram and ors.', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Daya Ram and ors. Vs. Sube Singh', 'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent Appeal Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., - Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act. Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. ', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => '', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => ' Ashit Malik, Adv.', 'counseldef' => ' Kulvir Narwal, Adv.', 'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana', 'court_type' => 'HC', 'decidedon' => '2005-02-08', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' M.M. Aggarwal, J.', 'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">M.M. Aggarwal, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This petition had been filed against order dated 24.3.2003 of Additional Sessions Judge, Rohtak whereby order of the Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class dated 26.11.2002 had been set aside and the Additional Sessions Judge had directed that the complaint shall proceed for offence under Sections 420/406/120-B and 506 I.P.C.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The facts of the case had been that Sube Singh filed a complaint alleging that Daya Ram and others had entered into an unlawful assembly and hatched a conspiracy. Daya Ram had entered into an agreement to sell his 1/6th share. The sale was to be for Rs. 2 lacs a killa. On 21.8.2000, he had received Rs. 1 lac and then remaining amount Rs. 58,750/- was to be received at the time of registration of sale-deed. However, before 21.12.2000 i.e. the date of performance, Daya Ram had in connivance with other accused cheated the complainant by transferring his 1/6th share to accused Nos. 2 to 10 and accused No. 1 surrendered possession on 4.9.2000 in favour of accused Nos. 2 to 10 and also executed release deed in favour of accused Nos. 2 to 10, that Daya Ram had then lodged a false report with the police. When Sube Singh and witnesses had gone to Daya Ram and other accused, then the accused had threatened that they shall be done to death.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The Additional Sessions Judge vide order dated 24.3.2003 directed that since there was a prima facie case for offence under Sections 406/420/120-B/506 I.P.C., against the petitioners, they should be proceeded against for the aforesaid offence by the Magistrate.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. It is a fact that Sube Singh had already filed a Civil Suit for specific performance on the basis of agreement as against Daya Ram and other accused. That suit is stated to be pending.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Counsel for the petitioner had argued that when the civil suit was pending, no criminal prosecution could be launched.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Counsel for the complainant Sube Singh had argued that Daya Ram in collusions with other accused had cheated the complainant. They had entered into a conspiracy and threatened the complainant; that, in fact, Daya Ram etc. had got complainant Sube Singh wrongfully implicated in a case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. It is a fact that civil Suit filed by Sube Singh against Daya Ram and others for specific performance of the agreement to sell dated 21.8.2000 is pending. However, it is difficult to say as to whether other accused had entered into conspiracy with Daya Ram when Daya Ram executed relinquishment deed in favour of other accused. The averment that all the accused had threatened the complainant appears to have been made to implicate as many as possible.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. It is settled law that criminal prosecution and Civil Suit can go together. However, I am of the view that the case of cheating is made out only against Daya Ram petitioner who had entered into agreement of sale and received the amount and not the other petitioners. No other offence is made out.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Under these circumstances, the order dated 24.3.2004 of Additional Sessions Judge, Rohtak is set aside to the extent that only Daya Ram shall face trial for offence under Section 420 I.P.C. The complaint against other petitioners shall stand dismissed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => '(2005)140PLR501', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Sube Singh', 'sub' => 'Civil', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ), 'casename_url' => 'daya-ram-ors-vs-sube-singh', 'args' => array( (int) 0 => '616448', (int) 1 => 'daya-ram-ors-vs-sube-singh' ) ) $title_for_layout = 'Daya Ram and ors Vs Sube Singh - Citation 616448 - Court Judgment | ' $desc = array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '616448', 'acts' => '<a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 120B, 406, 420 and 506', 'appealno' => 'Civil Revision No. 939 of 2003', 'appellant' => 'Daya Ram and ors.', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Daya Ram and ors. Vs. Sube Singh', 'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent Appeal Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., - Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act. Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. ', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => '', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => ' Ashit Malik, Adv.', 'counseldef' => ' Kulvir Narwal, Adv.', 'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana', 'court_type' => 'HC', 'decidedon' => '2005-02-08', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' M.M. Aggarwal, J.', 'judgement' => '<p>M.M. Aggarwal, J.</p><p>1. This petition had been filed against order dated 24.3.2003 of Additional Sessions Judge, Rohtak whereby order of the Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class dated 26.11.2002 had been set aside and the Additional Sessions Judge had directed that the complaint shall proceed for offence under Sections 420/406/120-B and 506 I.P.C.</p><p>2. The facts of the case had been that Sube Singh filed a complaint alleging that Daya Ram and others had entered into an unlawful assembly and hatched a conspiracy. Daya Ram had entered into an agreement to sell his 1/6th share. The sale was to be for Rs. 2 lacs a killa. On 21.8.2000, he had received Rs. 1 lac and then remaining amount Rs. 58,750/- was to be received at the time of registration of sale-deed. However, before 21.12.2000 i.e. the date of performance, Daya Ram had in connivance with other accused cheated the complainant by transferring his 1/6th share to accused Nos. 2 to 10 and accused No. 1 surrendered possession on 4.9.2000 in favour of accused Nos. 2 to 10 and also executed release deed in favour of accused Nos. 2 to 10, that Daya Ram had then lodged a false report with the police. When Sube Singh and witnesses had gone to Daya Ram and other accused, then the accused had threatened that they shall be done to death.</p><p>3. The Additional Sessions Judge vide order dated 24.3.2003 directed that since there was a prima facie case for offence under Sections 406/420/120-B/506 I.P.C., against the petitioners, they should be proceeded against for the aforesaid offence by the Magistrate.</p><p>4. It is a fact that Sube Singh had already filed a Civil Suit for specific performance on the basis of agreement as against Daya Ram and other accused. That suit is stated to be pending.</p><p>5. Counsel for the petitioner had argued that when the civil suit was pending, no criminal prosecution could be launched.</p><p>6. Counsel for the complainant Sube Singh had argued that Daya Ram in collusions with other accused had cheated the complainant. They had entered into a conspiracy and threatened the complainant; that, in fact, Daya Ram etc. had got complainant Sube Singh wrongfully implicated in a case.</p><p>7. It is a fact that civil Suit filed by Sube Singh against Daya Ram and others for specific performance of the agreement to sell dated 21.8.2000 is pending. However, it is difficult to say as to whether other accused had entered into conspiracy with Daya Ram when Daya Ram executed relinquishment deed in favour of other accused. The averment that all the accused had threatened the complainant appears to have been made to implicate as many as possible.</p><p>8. It is settled law that criminal prosecution and Civil Suit can go together. However, I am of the view that the case of cheating is made out only against Daya Ram petitioner who had entered into agreement of sale and received the amount and not the other petitioners. No other offence is made out.</p><p>Under these circumstances, the order dated 24.3.2004 of Additional Sessions Judge, Rohtak is set aside to the extent that only Daya Ram shall face trial for offence under Section 420 I.P.C. The complaint against other petitioners shall stand dismissed.<p></p><p>', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => '(2005)140PLR501', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Sube Singh', 'sub' => 'Civil', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ) $casename_url = 'daya-ram-ors-vs-sube-singh' $args = array( (int) 0 => '616448', (int) 1 => 'daya-ram-ors-vs-sube-singh' ) $url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/616448/daya-ram-ors-vs-sube-singh' $ctype = ' High Court' $content = array( (int) 0 => '<p>M.M. Aggarwal, J.', (int) 1 => '<p>1. This petition had been filed against order dated 24.3.2003 of Additional Sessions Judge, Rohtak whereby order of the Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class dated 26.11.2002 had been set aside and the Additional Sessions Judge had directed that the complaint shall proceed for offence under Sections 420/406/120-B and 506 I.P.C.', (int) 2 => '<p>2. The facts of the case had been that Sube Singh filed a complaint alleging that Daya Ram and others had entered into an unlawful assembly and hatched a conspiracy. Daya Ram had entered into an agreement to sell his 1/6th share. The sale was to be for Rs. 2 lacs a killa. On 21.8.2000, he had received Rs. 1 lac and then remaining amount Rs. 58,750/- was to be received at the time of registration of sale-deed. However, before 21.12.2000 i.e. the date of performance, Daya Ram had in connivance with other accused cheated the complainant by transferring his 1/6th share to accused Nos. 2 to 10 and accused No. 1 surrendered possession on 4.9.2000 in favour of accused Nos. 2 to 10 and also executed release deed in favour of accused Nos. 2 to 10, that Daya Ram had then lodged a false report with the police. When Sube Singh and witnesses had gone to Daya Ram and other accused, then the accused had threatened that they shall be done to death.', (int) 3 => '<p>3. The Additional Sessions Judge vide order dated 24.3.2003 directed that since there was a prima facie case for offence under Sections 406/420/120-B/506 I.P.C., against the petitioners, they should be proceeded against for the aforesaid offence by the Magistrate.', (int) 4 => '<p>4. It is a fact that Sube Singh had already filed a Civil Suit for specific performance on the basis of agreement as against Daya Ram and other accused. That suit is stated to be pending.', (int) 5 => '<p>5. Counsel for the petitioner had argued that when the civil suit was pending, no criminal prosecution could be launched.', (int) 6 => '<p>6. Counsel for the complainant Sube Singh had argued that Daya Ram in collusions with other accused had cheated the complainant. They had entered into a conspiracy and threatened the complainant; that, in fact, Daya Ram etc. had got complainant Sube Singh wrongfully implicated in a case.', (int) 7 => '<p>7. It is a fact that civil Suit filed by Sube Singh against Daya Ram and others for specific performance of the agreement to sell dated 21.8.2000 is pending. However, it is difficult to say as to whether other accused had entered into conspiracy with Daya Ram when Daya Ram executed relinquishment deed in favour of other accused. The averment that all the accused had threatened the complainant appears to have been made to implicate as many as possible.', (int) 8 => '<p>8. It is settled law that criminal prosecution and Civil Suit can go together. However, I am of the view that the case of cheating is made out only against Daya Ram petitioner who had entered into agreement of sale and received the amount and not the other petitioners. No other offence is made out.', (int) 9 => '<p>Under these circumstances, the order dated 24.3.2004 of Additional Sessions Judge, Rohtak is set aside to the extent that only Daya Ram shall face trial for offence under Section 420 I.P.C. The complaint against other petitioners shall stand dismissed.<p>', (int) 10 => '<p>' ) $paragraphAfter = (int) 1 $cnt = (int) 11 $i = (int) 10include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144 View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971 View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933 View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473 Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963 Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200 Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167 [main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109