Frick India Private Ltd Vs Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another - Citation 615740 - Court Judgment

Judgment:

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Frick India Private Ltd Vs Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another - Citation 615740 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '615740',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2, 2A, 25B and 25F',
			'appealno' => 'C.W.P. No. 137/1985',
			'appellant' => 'Frick India Private Ltd.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Frick India Private Ltd. Vs. Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
			'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another;',
			'citingcases' => ' June, 1982            18 days 
 July, 1982            31 days 
 August, 1982          31 days 
 September, 1982       30 days 
 October, 1982         31 days 
 November, 1982        30 days 
 December, 1982        31 days 
 January, 1983         31 days 
 February, 1983        28 days 
 March, 1983           12 days 
; 
 Regd. A.D. 
 FIL/PD/83/M-208                                                                                     Dt. 12.3.83 ',
			'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal and; Sudhir Mittal, Advs.',
			'counseldef' => ' J.B. Tacoria, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1999-07-07',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' K.K. Srivastava, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">K.K. Srivastava, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. As per reference </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed </p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days </p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">a) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> b) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (c) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Dear Sir,</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Sub : Termination </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> sd/- </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Personnel Manager </p><p style="text-align: justify;">CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). </p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '(1999)123PLR814',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
			'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'frick-india-private-ltd-vs-vijay-bahadur',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '615740',
		(int) 1 => 'frick-india-private-ltd-vs-vijay-bahadur'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Frick India Private Ltd Vs Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another - Citation 615740 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '615740',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2, 2A, 25B and 25F',
		'appealno' => 'C.W.P. No. 137/1985',
		'appellant' => 'Frick India Private Ltd.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Frick India Private Ltd. Vs. Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
		'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another;',
		'citingcases' => ' June, 1982            18 days 
 July, 1982            31 days 
 August, 1982          31 days 
 September, 1982       30 days 
 October, 1982         31 days 
 November, 1982        30 days 
 December, 1982        31 days 
 January, 1983         31 days 
 February, 1983        28 days 
 March, 1983           12 days 
; 
 Regd. A.D. 
 FIL/PD/83/M-208                                                                                     Dt. 12.3.83 ',
		'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal and; Sudhir Mittal, Advs.',
		'counseldef' => ' J.B. Tacoria, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1999-07-07',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' K.K. Srivastava, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>K.K. Srivastava, J.</p><p>1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p>2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : </p><p>'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' </p><p>3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : </p><p>'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. </p><p> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. </p><p> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. </p><p> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' </p><p>4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : </p><p>'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' </p><p>5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : </p><p>1. As per reference </p><p> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed </p><p>6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p>7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. </p><p>8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. </p><p>9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. </p><p>10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.</p><p>11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : </p><p>June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days </p><p>12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : </p><p>'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' </p><p>13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : </p><p>'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' </p><p>14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : </p><p>a) xxx xxx xxx </p><p> b) xxx xxx xxx </p><p> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] </p><p> (c) xxx xxx xxx </p><p>15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. </p><p>16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : </p><p>'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' </p><p>17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : </p><p>'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' </p><p>18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. </p><p>19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : </p><p>Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) </p><p> Dear Sir,</p><p> Sub : Termination </p><p> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. </p><p> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. </p><p> sd/- </p><p>Personnel Manager </p><p>CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, </p><p>Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' </p><p>20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. </p><p>21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : </p><p>25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - </p><p> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; </p><p> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and </p><p> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). </p><p>22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. </p><p>23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '(1999)123PLR814',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
		'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
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	(int) 0 => '<p>K.K. Srivastava, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : ',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' ',
	(int) 4 => '<p>3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. ',
	(int) 6 => '<p> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. ',
	(int) 7 => '<p> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. ',
	(int) 8 => '<p> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' ',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : ',
	(int) 10 => '<p>'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' ',
	(int) 11 => '<p>5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : ',
	(int) 12 => '<p>1. As per reference ',
	(int) 13 => '<p> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed ',
	(int) 14 => '<p>6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. ',
	(int) 15 => '<p>7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. ',
	(int) 16 => '<p>8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. ',
	(int) 17 => '<p>9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. ',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days ',
	(int) 21 => '<p>12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : ',
	(int) 22 => '<p>'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' ',
	(int) 23 => '<p>13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : ',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' ',
	(int) 25 => '<p>14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : ',
	(int) 26 => '<p>a) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 27 => '<p> b) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 28 => '<p> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] ',
	(int) 29 => '<p> (c) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 30 => '<p>15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. ',
	(int) 31 => '<p>16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : ',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' ',
	(int) 33 => '<p>17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : ',
	(int) 34 => '<p>'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' ',
	(int) 35 => '<p>18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. ',
	(int) 36 => '<p>19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : ',
	(int) 37 => '<p>Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) ',
	(int) 38 => '<p> Dear Sir,',
	(int) 39 => '<p> Sub : Termination ',
	(int) 40 => '<p> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. ',
	(int) 41 => '<p> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. ',
	(int) 42 => '<p> sd/- ',
	(int) 43 => '<p>Personnel Manager ',
	(int) 44 => '<p>CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, ',
	(int) 45 => '<p>Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' ',
	(int) 46 => '<p>20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. ',
	(int) 47 => '<p>21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : ',
	(int) 48 => '<p>25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - ',
	(int) 49 => '<p> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; ',
	(int) 50 => '<p> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and ',
	(int) 51 => '<p> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). ',
	(int) 52 => '<p>22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. ',
	(int) 53 => '<p>23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p>',
	(int) 54 => '<p>'
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K.K. Srivastava, J.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Frick India Private Ltd Vs Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another - Citation 615740 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'id' => '615740',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2, 2A, 25B and 25F',
			'appealno' => 'C.W.P. No. 137/1985',
			'appellant' => 'Frick India Private Ltd.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Frick India Private Ltd. Vs. Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
			'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another;',
			'citingcases' => ' June, 1982            18 days 
 July, 1982            31 days 
 August, 1982          31 days 
 September, 1982       30 days 
 October, 1982         31 days 
 November, 1982        30 days 
 December, 1982        31 days 
 January, 1983         31 days 
 February, 1983        28 days 
 March, 1983           12 days 
; 
 Regd. A.D. 
 FIL/PD/83/M-208                                                                                     Dt. 12.3.83 ',
			'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal and; Sudhir Mittal, Advs.',
			'counseldef' => ' J.B. Tacoria, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1999-07-07',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' K.K. Srivastava, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">K.K. Srivastava, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. As per reference </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed </p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days </p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">a) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> b) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (c) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Dear Sir,</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Sub : Termination </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> sd/- </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Personnel Manager </p><p style="text-align: justify;">CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). </p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '(1999)123PLR814',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
			'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'frick-india-private-ltd-vs-vijay-bahadur',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '615740',
		(int) 1 => 'frick-india-private-ltd-vs-vijay-bahadur'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Frick India Private Ltd Vs Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another - Citation 615740 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '615740',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2, 2A, 25B and 25F',
		'appealno' => 'C.W.P. No. 137/1985',
		'appellant' => 'Frick India Private Ltd.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Frick India Private Ltd. Vs. Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
		'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another;',
		'citingcases' => ' June, 1982            18 days 
 July, 1982            31 days 
 August, 1982          31 days 
 September, 1982       30 days 
 October, 1982         31 days 
 November, 1982        30 days 
 December, 1982        31 days 
 January, 1983         31 days 
 February, 1983        28 days 
 March, 1983           12 days 
; 
 Regd. A.D. 
 FIL/PD/83/M-208                                                                                     Dt. 12.3.83 ',
		'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal and; Sudhir Mittal, Advs.',
		'counseldef' => ' J.B. Tacoria, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1999-07-07',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' K.K. Srivastava, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>K.K. Srivastava, J.</p><p>1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p>2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : </p><p>'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' </p><p>3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : </p><p>'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. </p><p> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. </p><p> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. </p><p> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' </p><p>4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : </p><p>'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' </p><p>5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : </p><p>1. As per reference </p><p> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed </p><p>6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p>7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. </p><p>8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. </p><p>9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. </p><p>10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.</p><p>11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : </p><p>June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days </p><p>12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : </p><p>'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' </p><p>13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : </p><p>'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' </p><p>14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : </p><p>a) xxx xxx xxx </p><p> b) xxx xxx xxx </p><p> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] </p><p> (c) xxx xxx xxx </p><p>15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. </p><p>16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : </p><p>'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' </p><p>17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : </p><p>'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' </p><p>18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. </p><p>19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : </p><p>Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) </p><p> Dear Sir,</p><p> Sub : Termination </p><p> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. </p><p> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. </p><p> sd/- </p><p>Personnel Manager </p><p>CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, </p><p>Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' </p><p>20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. </p><p>21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : </p><p>25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - </p><p> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; </p><p> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and </p><p> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). </p><p>22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. </p><p>23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '(1999)123PLR814',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
		'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
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$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>K.K. Srivastava, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : ',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' ',
	(int) 4 => '<p>3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. ',
	(int) 6 => '<p> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. ',
	(int) 7 => '<p> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. ',
	(int) 8 => '<p> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' ',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : ',
	(int) 10 => '<p>'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' ',
	(int) 11 => '<p>5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : ',
	(int) 12 => '<p>1. As per reference ',
	(int) 13 => '<p> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed ',
	(int) 14 => '<p>6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. ',
	(int) 15 => '<p>7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. ',
	(int) 16 => '<p>8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. ',
	(int) 17 => '<p>9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. ',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days ',
	(int) 21 => '<p>12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : ',
	(int) 22 => '<p>'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' ',
	(int) 23 => '<p>13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : ',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' ',
	(int) 25 => '<p>14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : ',
	(int) 26 => '<p>a) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 27 => '<p> b) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 28 => '<p> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] ',
	(int) 29 => '<p> (c) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 30 => '<p>15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. ',
	(int) 31 => '<p>16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : ',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' ',
	(int) 33 => '<p>17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : ',
	(int) 34 => '<p>'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' ',
	(int) 35 => '<p>18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. ',
	(int) 36 => '<p>19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : ',
	(int) 37 => '<p>Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) ',
	(int) 38 => '<p> Dear Sir,',
	(int) 39 => '<p> Sub : Termination ',
	(int) 40 => '<p> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. ',
	(int) 41 => '<p> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. ',
	(int) 42 => '<p> sd/- ',
	(int) 43 => '<p>Personnel Manager ',
	(int) 44 => '<p>CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, ',
	(int) 45 => '<p>Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' ',
	(int) 46 => '<p>20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. ',
	(int) 47 => '<p>21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : ',
	(int) 48 => '<p>25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - ',
	(int) 49 => '<p> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; ',
	(int) 50 => '<p> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and ',
	(int) 51 => '<p> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). ',
	(int) 52 => '<p>22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. ',
	(int) 53 => '<p>23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p>',
	(int) 54 => '<p>'
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1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Frick India Private Ltd Vs Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another - Citation 615740 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '615740',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2, 2A, 25B and 25F',
			'appealno' => 'C.W.P. No. 137/1985',
			'appellant' => 'Frick India Private Ltd.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Frick India Private Ltd. Vs. Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
			'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another;',
			'citingcases' => ' June, 1982            18 days 
 July, 1982            31 days 
 August, 1982          31 days 
 September, 1982       30 days 
 October, 1982         31 days 
 November, 1982        30 days 
 December, 1982        31 days 
 January, 1983         31 days 
 February, 1983        28 days 
 March, 1983           12 days 
; 
 Regd. A.D. 
 FIL/PD/83/M-208                                                                                     Dt. 12.3.83 ',
			'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal and; Sudhir Mittal, Advs.',
			'counseldef' => ' J.B. Tacoria, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1999-07-07',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' K.K. Srivastava, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">K.K. Srivastava, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. As per reference </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed </p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days </p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">a) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> b) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (c) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Dear Sir,</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Sub : Termination </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> sd/- </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Personnel Manager </p><p style="text-align: justify;">CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). </p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '(1999)123PLR814',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
			'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'frick-india-private-ltd-vs-vijay-bahadur',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '615740',
		(int) 1 => 'frick-india-private-ltd-vs-vijay-bahadur'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Frick India Private Ltd Vs Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another - Citation 615740 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '615740',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2, 2A, 25B and 25F',
		'appealno' => 'C.W.P. No. 137/1985',
		'appellant' => 'Frick India Private Ltd.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Frick India Private Ltd. Vs. Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
		'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another;',
		'citingcases' => ' June, 1982            18 days 
 July, 1982            31 days 
 August, 1982          31 days 
 September, 1982       30 days 
 October, 1982         31 days 
 November, 1982        30 days 
 December, 1982        31 days 
 January, 1983         31 days 
 February, 1983        28 days 
 March, 1983           12 days 
; 
 Regd. A.D. 
 FIL/PD/83/M-208                                                                                     Dt. 12.3.83 ',
		'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal and; Sudhir Mittal, Advs.',
		'counseldef' => ' J.B. Tacoria, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1999-07-07',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' K.K. Srivastava, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>K.K. Srivastava, J.</p><p>1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p>2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : </p><p>'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' </p><p>3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : </p><p>'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. </p><p> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. </p><p> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. </p><p> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' </p><p>4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : </p><p>'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' </p><p>5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : </p><p>1. As per reference </p><p> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed </p><p>6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p>7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. </p><p>8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. </p><p>9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. </p><p>10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.</p><p>11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : </p><p>June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days </p><p>12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : </p><p>'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' </p><p>13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : </p><p>'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' </p><p>14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : </p><p>a) xxx xxx xxx </p><p> b) xxx xxx xxx </p><p> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] </p><p> (c) xxx xxx xxx </p><p>15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. </p><p>16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : </p><p>'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' </p><p>17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : </p><p>'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' </p><p>18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. </p><p>19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : </p><p>Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) </p><p> Dear Sir,</p><p> Sub : Termination </p><p> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. </p><p> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. </p><p> sd/- </p><p>Personnel Manager </p><p>CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, </p><p>Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' </p><p>20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. </p><p>21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : </p><p>25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - </p><p> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; </p><p> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and </p><p> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). </p><p>22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. </p><p>23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '(1999)123PLR814',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
		'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
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	(int) 0 => '<p>K.K. Srivastava, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : ',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' ',
	(int) 4 => '<p>3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. ',
	(int) 6 => '<p> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. ',
	(int) 7 => '<p> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. ',
	(int) 8 => '<p> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' ',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : ',
	(int) 10 => '<p>'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' ',
	(int) 11 => '<p>5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : ',
	(int) 12 => '<p>1. As per reference ',
	(int) 13 => '<p> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed ',
	(int) 14 => '<p>6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. ',
	(int) 15 => '<p>7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. ',
	(int) 16 => '<p>8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. ',
	(int) 17 => '<p>9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. ',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days ',
	(int) 21 => '<p>12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : ',
	(int) 22 => '<p>'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' ',
	(int) 23 => '<p>13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : ',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' ',
	(int) 25 => '<p>14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : ',
	(int) 26 => '<p>a) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 27 => '<p> b) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 28 => '<p> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] ',
	(int) 29 => '<p> (c) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 30 => '<p>15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. ',
	(int) 31 => '<p>16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : ',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' ',
	(int) 33 => '<p>17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : ',
	(int) 34 => '<p>'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' ',
	(int) 35 => '<p>18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. ',
	(int) 36 => '<p>19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : ',
	(int) 37 => '<p>Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) ',
	(int) 38 => '<p> Dear Sir,',
	(int) 39 => '<p> Sub : Termination ',
	(int) 40 => '<p> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. ',
	(int) 41 => '<p> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. ',
	(int) 42 => '<p> sd/- ',
	(int) 43 => '<p>Personnel Manager ',
	(int) 44 => '<p>CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, ',
	(int) 45 => '<p>Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' ',
	(int) 46 => '<p>20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. ',
	(int) 47 => '<p>21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : ',
	(int) 48 => '<p>25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - ',
	(int) 49 => '<p> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; ',
	(int) 50 => '<p> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and ',
	(int) 51 => '<p> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). ',
	(int) 52 => '<p>22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. ',
	(int) 53 => '<p>23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p>',
	(int) 54 => '<p>'
)
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2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under :

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Frick India Private Ltd Vs Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another - Citation 615740 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '615740',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2, 2A, 25B and 25F',
			'appealno' => 'C.W.P. No. 137/1985',
			'appellant' => 'Frick India Private Ltd.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Frick India Private Ltd. Vs. Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
			'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another;',
			'citingcases' => ' June, 1982            18 days 
 July, 1982            31 days 
 August, 1982          31 days 
 September, 1982       30 days 
 October, 1982         31 days 
 November, 1982        30 days 
 December, 1982        31 days 
 January, 1983         31 days 
 February, 1983        28 days 
 March, 1983           12 days 
; 
 Regd. A.D. 
 FIL/PD/83/M-208                                                                                     Dt. 12.3.83 ',
			'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal and; Sudhir Mittal, Advs.',
			'counseldef' => ' J.B. Tacoria, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1999-07-07',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' K.K. Srivastava, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">K.K. Srivastava, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. As per reference </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed </p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days </p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">a) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> b) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (c) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Dear Sir,</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Sub : Termination </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> sd/- </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Personnel Manager </p><p style="text-align: justify;">CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). </p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '(1999)123PLR814',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
			'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'frick-india-private-ltd-vs-vijay-bahadur',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '615740',
		(int) 1 => 'frick-india-private-ltd-vs-vijay-bahadur'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Frick India Private Ltd Vs Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another - Citation 615740 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '615740',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2, 2A, 25B and 25F',
		'appealno' => 'C.W.P. No. 137/1985',
		'appellant' => 'Frick India Private Ltd.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Frick India Private Ltd. Vs. Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
		'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another;',
		'citingcases' => ' June, 1982            18 days 
 July, 1982            31 days 
 August, 1982          31 days 
 September, 1982       30 days 
 October, 1982         31 days 
 November, 1982        30 days 
 December, 1982        31 days 
 January, 1983         31 days 
 February, 1983        28 days 
 March, 1983           12 days 
; 
 Regd. A.D. 
 FIL/PD/83/M-208                                                                                     Dt. 12.3.83 ',
		'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal and; Sudhir Mittal, Advs.',
		'counseldef' => ' J.B. Tacoria, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1999-07-07',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' K.K. Srivastava, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>K.K. Srivastava, J.</p><p>1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p>2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : </p><p>'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' </p><p>3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : </p><p>'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. </p><p> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. </p><p> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. </p><p> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' </p><p>4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : </p><p>'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' </p><p>5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : </p><p>1. As per reference </p><p> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed </p><p>6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p>7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. </p><p>8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. </p><p>9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. </p><p>10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.</p><p>11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : </p><p>June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days </p><p>12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : </p><p>'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' </p><p>13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : </p><p>'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' </p><p>14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : </p><p>a) xxx xxx xxx </p><p> b) xxx xxx xxx </p><p> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] </p><p> (c) xxx xxx xxx </p><p>15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. </p><p>16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : </p><p>'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' </p><p>17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : </p><p>'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' </p><p>18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. </p><p>19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : </p><p>Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) </p><p> Dear Sir,</p><p> Sub : Termination </p><p> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. </p><p> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. </p><p> sd/- </p><p>Personnel Manager </p><p>CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, </p><p>Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' </p><p>20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. </p><p>21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : </p><p>25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - </p><p> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; </p><p> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and </p><p> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). </p><p>22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. </p><p>23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '(1999)123PLR814',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
		'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
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$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>K.K. Srivastava, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : ',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' ',
	(int) 4 => '<p>3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. ',
	(int) 6 => '<p> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. ',
	(int) 7 => '<p> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. ',
	(int) 8 => '<p> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' ',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : ',
	(int) 10 => '<p>'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' ',
	(int) 11 => '<p>5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : ',
	(int) 12 => '<p>1. As per reference ',
	(int) 13 => '<p> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed ',
	(int) 14 => '<p>6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. ',
	(int) 15 => '<p>7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. ',
	(int) 16 => '<p>8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. ',
	(int) 17 => '<p>9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. ',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days ',
	(int) 21 => '<p>12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : ',
	(int) 22 => '<p>'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' ',
	(int) 23 => '<p>13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : ',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' ',
	(int) 25 => '<p>14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : ',
	(int) 26 => '<p>a) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 27 => '<p> b) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 28 => '<p> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] ',
	(int) 29 => '<p> (c) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 30 => '<p>15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. ',
	(int) 31 => '<p>16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : ',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' ',
	(int) 33 => '<p>17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : ',
	(int) 34 => '<p>'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' ',
	(int) 35 => '<p>18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. ',
	(int) 36 => '<p>19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : ',
	(int) 37 => '<p>Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) ',
	(int) 38 => '<p> Dear Sir,',
	(int) 39 => '<p> Sub : Termination ',
	(int) 40 => '<p> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. ',
	(int) 41 => '<p> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. ',
	(int) 42 => '<p> sd/- ',
	(int) 43 => '<p>Personnel Manager ',
	(int) 44 => '<p>CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, ',
	(int) 45 => '<p>Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' ',
	(int) 46 => '<p>20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. ',
	(int) 47 => '<p>21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : ',
	(int) 48 => '<p>25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - ',
	(int) 49 => '<p> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; ',
	(int) 50 => '<p> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and ',
	(int) 51 => '<p> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). ',
	(int) 52 => '<p>22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. ',
	(int) 53 => '<p>23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p>',
	(int) 54 => '<p>'
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'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.'

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Frick India Private Ltd Vs Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another - Citation 615740 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '615740',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2, 2A, 25B and 25F',
			'appealno' => 'C.W.P. No. 137/1985',
			'appellant' => 'Frick India Private Ltd.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Frick India Private Ltd. Vs. Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
			'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another;',
			'citingcases' => ' June, 1982            18 days 
 July, 1982            31 days 
 August, 1982          31 days 
 September, 1982       30 days 
 October, 1982         31 days 
 November, 1982        30 days 
 December, 1982        31 days 
 January, 1983         31 days 
 February, 1983        28 days 
 March, 1983           12 days 
; 
 Regd. A.D. 
 FIL/PD/83/M-208                                                                                     Dt. 12.3.83 ',
			'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal and; Sudhir Mittal, Advs.',
			'counseldef' => ' J.B. Tacoria, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1999-07-07',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' K.K. Srivastava, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">K.K. Srivastava, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. As per reference </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed </p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days </p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">a) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> b) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (c) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Dear Sir,</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Sub : Termination </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> sd/- </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Personnel Manager </p><p style="text-align: justify;">CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). </p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '(1999)123PLR814',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
			'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'frick-india-private-ltd-vs-vijay-bahadur',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '615740',
		(int) 1 => 'frick-india-private-ltd-vs-vijay-bahadur'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Frick India Private Ltd Vs Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another - Citation 615740 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '615740',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2, 2A, 25B and 25F',
		'appealno' => 'C.W.P. No. 137/1985',
		'appellant' => 'Frick India Private Ltd.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Frick India Private Ltd. Vs. Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
		'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another;',
		'citingcases' => ' June, 1982            18 days 
 July, 1982            31 days 
 August, 1982          31 days 
 September, 1982       30 days 
 October, 1982         31 days 
 November, 1982        30 days 
 December, 1982        31 days 
 January, 1983         31 days 
 February, 1983        28 days 
 March, 1983           12 days 
; 
 Regd. A.D. 
 FIL/PD/83/M-208                                                                                     Dt. 12.3.83 ',
		'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal and; Sudhir Mittal, Advs.',
		'counseldef' => ' J.B. Tacoria, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1999-07-07',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' K.K. Srivastava, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>K.K. Srivastava, J.</p><p>1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p>2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : </p><p>'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' </p><p>3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : </p><p>'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. </p><p> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. </p><p> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. </p><p> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' </p><p>4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : </p><p>'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' </p><p>5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : </p><p>1. As per reference </p><p> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed </p><p>6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p>7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. </p><p>8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. </p><p>9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. </p><p>10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.</p><p>11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : </p><p>June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days </p><p>12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : </p><p>'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' </p><p>13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : </p><p>'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' </p><p>14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : </p><p>a) xxx xxx xxx </p><p> b) xxx xxx xxx </p><p> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] </p><p> (c) xxx xxx xxx </p><p>15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. </p><p>16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : </p><p>'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' </p><p>17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : </p><p>'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' </p><p>18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. </p><p>19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : </p><p>Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) </p><p> Dear Sir,</p><p> Sub : Termination </p><p> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. </p><p> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. </p><p> sd/- </p><p>Personnel Manager </p><p>CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, </p><p>Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' </p><p>20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. </p><p>21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : </p><p>25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - </p><p> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; </p><p> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and </p><p> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). </p><p>22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. </p><p>23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '(1999)123PLR814',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
		'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
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	(int) 0 => '<p>K.K. Srivastava, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : ',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' ',
	(int) 4 => '<p>3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. ',
	(int) 6 => '<p> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. ',
	(int) 7 => '<p> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. ',
	(int) 8 => '<p> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' ',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : ',
	(int) 10 => '<p>'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' ',
	(int) 11 => '<p>5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : ',
	(int) 12 => '<p>1. As per reference ',
	(int) 13 => '<p> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed ',
	(int) 14 => '<p>6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. ',
	(int) 15 => '<p>7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. ',
	(int) 16 => '<p>8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. ',
	(int) 17 => '<p>9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. ',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days ',
	(int) 21 => '<p>12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : ',
	(int) 22 => '<p>'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' ',
	(int) 23 => '<p>13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : ',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' ',
	(int) 25 => '<p>14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : ',
	(int) 26 => '<p>a) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 27 => '<p> b) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 28 => '<p> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] ',
	(int) 29 => '<p> (c) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 30 => '<p>15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. ',
	(int) 31 => '<p>16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : ',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' ',
	(int) 33 => '<p>17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : ',
	(int) 34 => '<p>'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' ',
	(int) 35 => '<p>18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. ',
	(int) 36 => '<p>19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : ',
	(int) 37 => '<p>Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) ',
	(int) 38 => '<p> Dear Sir,',
	(int) 39 => '<p> Sub : Termination ',
	(int) 40 => '<p> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. ',
	(int) 41 => '<p> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. ',
	(int) 42 => '<p> sd/- ',
	(int) 43 => '<p>Personnel Manager ',
	(int) 44 => '<p>CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, ',
	(int) 45 => '<p>Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' ',
	(int) 46 => '<p>20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. ',
	(int) 47 => '<p>21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : ',
	(int) 48 => '<p>25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - ',
	(int) 49 => '<p> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; ',
	(int) 50 => '<p> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and ',
	(int) 51 => '<p> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). ',
	(int) 52 => '<p>22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. ',
	(int) 53 => '<p>23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p>',
	(int) 54 => '<p>'
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3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under :

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Frick India Private Ltd Vs Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another - Citation 615740 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '615740',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2, 2A, 25B and 25F',
			'appealno' => 'C.W.P. No. 137/1985',
			'appellant' => 'Frick India Private Ltd.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Frick India Private Ltd. Vs. Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
			'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another;',
			'citingcases' => ' June, 1982            18 days 
 July, 1982            31 days 
 August, 1982          31 days 
 September, 1982       30 days 
 October, 1982         31 days 
 November, 1982        30 days 
 December, 1982        31 days 
 January, 1983         31 days 
 February, 1983        28 days 
 March, 1983           12 days 
; 
 Regd. A.D. 
 FIL/PD/83/M-208                                                                                     Dt. 12.3.83 ',
			'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal and; Sudhir Mittal, Advs.',
			'counseldef' => ' J.B. Tacoria, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1999-07-07',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' K.K. Srivastava, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">K.K. Srivastava, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. As per reference </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed </p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days </p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">a) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> b) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (c) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Dear Sir,</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Sub : Termination </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> sd/- </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Personnel Manager </p><p style="text-align: justify;">CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). </p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '(1999)123PLR814',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
			'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'frick-india-private-ltd-vs-vijay-bahadur',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '615740',
		(int) 1 => 'frick-india-private-ltd-vs-vijay-bahadur'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Frick India Private Ltd Vs Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another - Citation 615740 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '615740',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2, 2A, 25B and 25F',
		'appealno' => 'C.W.P. No. 137/1985',
		'appellant' => 'Frick India Private Ltd.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Frick India Private Ltd. Vs. Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
		'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another;',
		'citingcases' => ' June, 1982            18 days 
 July, 1982            31 days 
 August, 1982          31 days 
 September, 1982       30 days 
 October, 1982         31 days 
 November, 1982        30 days 
 December, 1982        31 days 
 January, 1983         31 days 
 February, 1983        28 days 
 March, 1983           12 days 
; 
 Regd. A.D. 
 FIL/PD/83/M-208                                                                                     Dt. 12.3.83 ',
		'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal and; Sudhir Mittal, Advs.',
		'counseldef' => ' J.B. Tacoria, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1999-07-07',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' K.K. Srivastava, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>K.K. Srivastava, J.</p><p>1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p>2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : </p><p>'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' </p><p>3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : </p><p>'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. </p><p> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. </p><p> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. </p><p> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' </p><p>4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : </p><p>'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' </p><p>5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : </p><p>1. As per reference </p><p> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed </p><p>6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p>7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. </p><p>8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. </p><p>9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. </p><p>10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.</p><p>11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : </p><p>June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days </p><p>12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : </p><p>'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' </p><p>13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : </p><p>'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' </p><p>14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : </p><p>a) xxx xxx xxx </p><p> b) xxx xxx xxx </p><p> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] </p><p> (c) xxx xxx xxx </p><p>15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. </p><p>16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : </p><p>'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' </p><p>17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : </p><p>'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' </p><p>18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. </p><p>19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : </p><p>Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) </p><p> Dear Sir,</p><p> Sub : Termination </p><p> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. </p><p> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. </p><p> sd/- </p><p>Personnel Manager </p><p>CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, </p><p>Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' </p><p>20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. </p><p>21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : </p><p>25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - </p><p> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; </p><p> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and </p><p> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). </p><p>22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. </p><p>23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '(1999)123PLR814',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
		'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
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$caseref = 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another<br>'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>K.K. Srivastava, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : ',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' ',
	(int) 4 => '<p>3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. ',
	(int) 6 => '<p> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. ',
	(int) 7 => '<p> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. ',
	(int) 8 => '<p> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' ',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : ',
	(int) 10 => '<p>'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' ',
	(int) 11 => '<p>5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : ',
	(int) 12 => '<p>1. As per reference ',
	(int) 13 => '<p> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed ',
	(int) 14 => '<p>6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. ',
	(int) 15 => '<p>7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. ',
	(int) 16 => '<p>8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. ',
	(int) 17 => '<p>9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. ',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days ',
	(int) 21 => '<p>12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : ',
	(int) 22 => '<p>'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' ',
	(int) 23 => '<p>13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : ',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' ',
	(int) 25 => '<p>14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : ',
	(int) 26 => '<p>a) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 27 => '<p> b) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 28 => '<p> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] ',
	(int) 29 => '<p> (c) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 30 => '<p>15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. ',
	(int) 31 => '<p>16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : ',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' ',
	(int) 33 => '<p>17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : ',
	(int) 34 => '<p>'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' ',
	(int) 35 => '<p>18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. ',
	(int) 36 => '<p>19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : ',
	(int) 37 => '<p>Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) ',
	(int) 38 => '<p> Dear Sir,',
	(int) 39 => '<p> Sub : Termination ',
	(int) 40 => '<p> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. ',
	(int) 41 => '<p> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. ',
	(int) 42 => '<p> sd/- ',
	(int) 43 => '<p>Personnel Manager ',
	(int) 44 => '<p>CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, ',
	(int) 45 => '<p>Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' ',
	(int) 46 => '<p>20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. ',
	(int) 47 => '<p>21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : ',
	(int) 48 => '<p>25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - ',
	(int) 49 => '<p> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; ',
	(int) 50 => '<p> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and ',
	(int) 51 => '<p> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). ',
	(int) 52 => '<p>22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. ',
	(int) 53 => '<p>23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p>',
	(int) 54 => '<p>'
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'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Frick India Private Ltd Vs Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another - Citation 615740 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '615740',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2, 2A, 25B and 25F',
			'appealno' => 'C.W.P. No. 137/1985',
			'appellant' => 'Frick India Private Ltd.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Frick India Private Ltd. Vs. Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
			'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another;',
			'citingcases' => ' June, 1982            18 days 
 July, 1982            31 days 
 August, 1982          31 days 
 September, 1982       30 days 
 October, 1982         31 days 
 November, 1982        30 days 
 December, 1982        31 days 
 January, 1983         31 days 
 February, 1983        28 days 
 March, 1983           12 days 
; 
 Regd. A.D. 
 FIL/PD/83/M-208                                                                                     Dt. 12.3.83 ',
			'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal and; Sudhir Mittal, Advs.',
			'counseldef' => ' J.B. Tacoria, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1999-07-07',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' K.K. Srivastava, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">K.K. Srivastava, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. As per reference </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed </p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days </p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">a) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> b) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (c) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Dear Sir,</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Sub : Termination </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> sd/- </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Personnel Manager </p><p style="text-align: justify;">CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). </p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '(1999)123PLR814',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
			'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'frick-india-private-ltd-vs-vijay-bahadur',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '615740',
		(int) 1 => 'frick-india-private-ltd-vs-vijay-bahadur'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Frick India Private Ltd Vs Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another - Citation 615740 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '615740',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2, 2A, 25B and 25F',
		'appealno' => 'C.W.P. No. 137/1985',
		'appellant' => 'Frick India Private Ltd.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Frick India Private Ltd. Vs. Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
		'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another;',
		'citingcases' => ' June, 1982            18 days 
 July, 1982            31 days 
 August, 1982          31 days 
 September, 1982       30 days 
 October, 1982         31 days 
 November, 1982        30 days 
 December, 1982        31 days 
 January, 1983         31 days 
 February, 1983        28 days 
 March, 1983           12 days 
; 
 Regd. A.D. 
 FIL/PD/83/M-208                                                                                     Dt. 12.3.83 ',
		'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal and; Sudhir Mittal, Advs.',
		'counseldef' => ' J.B. Tacoria, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1999-07-07',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' K.K. Srivastava, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>K.K. Srivastava, J.</p><p>1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p>2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : </p><p>'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' </p><p>3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : </p><p>'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. </p><p> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. </p><p> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. </p><p> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' </p><p>4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : </p><p>'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' </p><p>5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : </p><p>1. As per reference </p><p> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed </p><p>6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p>7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. </p><p>8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. </p><p>9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. </p><p>10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.</p><p>11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : </p><p>June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days </p><p>12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : </p><p>'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' </p><p>13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : </p><p>'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' </p><p>14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : </p><p>a) xxx xxx xxx </p><p> b) xxx xxx xxx </p><p> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] </p><p> (c) xxx xxx xxx </p><p>15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. </p><p>16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : </p><p>'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' </p><p>17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : </p><p>'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' </p><p>18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. </p><p>19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : </p><p>Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) </p><p> Dear Sir,</p><p> Sub : Termination </p><p> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. </p><p> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. </p><p> sd/- </p><p>Personnel Manager </p><p>CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, </p><p>Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' </p><p>20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. </p><p>21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : </p><p>25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - </p><p> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; </p><p> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and </p><p> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). </p><p>22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. </p><p>23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '(1999)123PLR814',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
		'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
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	(int) 0 => '<p>K.K. Srivastava, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : ',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' ',
	(int) 4 => '<p>3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. ',
	(int) 6 => '<p> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. ',
	(int) 7 => '<p> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. ',
	(int) 8 => '<p> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' ',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : ',
	(int) 10 => '<p>'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' ',
	(int) 11 => '<p>5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : ',
	(int) 12 => '<p>1. As per reference ',
	(int) 13 => '<p> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed ',
	(int) 14 => '<p>6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. ',
	(int) 15 => '<p>7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. ',
	(int) 16 => '<p>8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. ',
	(int) 17 => '<p>9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. ',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days ',
	(int) 21 => '<p>12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : ',
	(int) 22 => '<p>'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' ',
	(int) 23 => '<p>13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : ',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' ',
	(int) 25 => '<p>14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : ',
	(int) 26 => '<p>a) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 27 => '<p> b) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 28 => '<p> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] ',
	(int) 29 => '<p> (c) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 30 => '<p>15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. ',
	(int) 31 => '<p>16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : ',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' ',
	(int) 33 => '<p>17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : ',
	(int) 34 => '<p>'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' ',
	(int) 35 => '<p>18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. ',
	(int) 36 => '<p>19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : ',
	(int) 37 => '<p>Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) ',
	(int) 38 => '<p> Dear Sir,',
	(int) 39 => '<p> Sub : Termination ',
	(int) 40 => '<p> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. ',
	(int) 41 => '<p> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. ',
	(int) 42 => '<p> sd/- ',
	(int) 43 => '<p>Personnel Manager ',
	(int) 44 => '<p>CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, ',
	(int) 45 => '<p>Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' ',
	(int) 46 => '<p>20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. ',
	(int) 47 => '<p>21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : ',
	(int) 48 => '<p>25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - ',
	(int) 49 => '<p> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; ',
	(int) 50 => '<p> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and ',
	(int) 51 => '<p> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). ',
	(int) 52 => '<p>22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. ',
	(int) 53 => '<p>23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p>',
	(int) 54 => '<p>'
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2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Frick India Private Ltd Vs Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another - Citation 615740 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '615740',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2, 2A, 25B and 25F',
			'appealno' => 'C.W.P. No. 137/1985',
			'appellant' => 'Frick India Private Ltd.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Frick India Private Ltd. Vs. Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
			'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another;',
			'citingcases' => ' June, 1982            18 days 
 July, 1982            31 days 
 August, 1982          31 days 
 September, 1982       30 days 
 October, 1982         31 days 
 November, 1982        30 days 
 December, 1982        31 days 
 January, 1983         31 days 
 February, 1983        28 days 
 March, 1983           12 days 
; 
 Regd. A.D. 
 FIL/PD/83/M-208                                                                                     Dt. 12.3.83 ',
			'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal and; Sudhir Mittal, Advs.',
			'counseldef' => ' J.B. Tacoria, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1999-07-07',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' K.K. Srivastava, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">K.K. Srivastava, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. As per reference </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed </p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days </p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">a) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> b) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (c) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Dear Sir,</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Sub : Termination </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> sd/- </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Personnel Manager </p><p style="text-align: justify;">CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). </p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '(1999)123PLR814',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
			'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'frick-india-private-ltd-vs-vijay-bahadur',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '615740',
		(int) 1 => 'frick-india-private-ltd-vs-vijay-bahadur'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Frick India Private Ltd Vs Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another - Citation 615740 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '615740',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2, 2A, 25B and 25F',
		'appealno' => 'C.W.P. No. 137/1985',
		'appellant' => 'Frick India Private Ltd.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Frick India Private Ltd. Vs. Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
		'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another;',
		'citingcases' => ' June, 1982            18 days 
 July, 1982            31 days 
 August, 1982          31 days 
 September, 1982       30 days 
 October, 1982         31 days 
 November, 1982        30 days 
 December, 1982        31 days 
 January, 1983         31 days 
 February, 1983        28 days 
 March, 1983           12 days 
; 
 Regd. A.D. 
 FIL/PD/83/M-208                                                                                     Dt. 12.3.83 ',
		'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal and; Sudhir Mittal, Advs.',
		'counseldef' => ' J.B. Tacoria, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1999-07-07',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' K.K. Srivastava, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>K.K. Srivastava, J.</p><p>1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p>2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : </p><p>'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' </p><p>3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : </p><p>'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. </p><p> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. </p><p> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. </p><p> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' </p><p>4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : </p><p>'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' </p><p>5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : </p><p>1. As per reference </p><p> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed </p><p>6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p>7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. </p><p>8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. </p><p>9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. </p><p>10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.</p><p>11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : </p><p>June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days </p><p>12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : </p><p>'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' </p><p>13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : </p><p>'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' </p><p>14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : </p><p>a) xxx xxx xxx </p><p> b) xxx xxx xxx </p><p> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] </p><p> (c) xxx xxx xxx </p><p>15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. </p><p>16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : </p><p>'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' </p><p>17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : </p><p>'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' </p><p>18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. </p><p>19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : </p><p>Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) </p><p> Dear Sir,</p><p> Sub : Termination </p><p> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. </p><p> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. </p><p> sd/- </p><p>Personnel Manager </p><p>CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, </p><p>Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' </p><p>20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. </p><p>21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : </p><p>25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - </p><p> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; </p><p> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and </p><p> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). </p><p>22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. </p><p>23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '(1999)123PLR814',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
		'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
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	(int) 0 => '<p>K.K. Srivastava, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : ',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' ',
	(int) 4 => '<p>3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. ',
	(int) 6 => '<p> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. ',
	(int) 7 => '<p> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. ',
	(int) 8 => '<p> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' ',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : ',
	(int) 10 => '<p>'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' ',
	(int) 11 => '<p>5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : ',
	(int) 12 => '<p>1. As per reference ',
	(int) 13 => '<p> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed ',
	(int) 14 => '<p>6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. ',
	(int) 15 => '<p>7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. ',
	(int) 16 => '<p>8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. ',
	(int) 17 => '<p>9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. ',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days ',
	(int) 21 => '<p>12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : ',
	(int) 22 => '<p>'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' ',
	(int) 23 => '<p>13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : ',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' ',
	(int) 25 => '<p>14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : ',
	(int) 26 => '<p>a) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 27 => '<p> b) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 28 => '<p> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] ',
	(int) 29 => '<p> (c) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 30 => '<p>15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. ',
	(int) 31 => '<p>16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : ',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' ',
	(int) 33 => '<p>17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : ',
	(int) 34 => '<p>'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' ',
	(int) 35 => '<p>18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. ',
	(int) 36 => '<p>19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : ',
	(int) 37 => '<p>Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) ',
	(int) 38 => '<p> Dear Sir,',
	(int) 39 => '<p> Sub : Termination ',
	(int) 40 => '<p> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. ',
	(int) 41 => '<p> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. ',
	(int) 42 => '<p> sd/- ',
	(int) 43 => '<p>Personnel Manager ',
	(int) 44 => '<p>CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, ',
	(int) 45 => '<p>Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' ',
	(int) 46 => '<p>20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. ',
	(int) 47 => '<p>21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : ',
	(int) 48 => '<p>25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - ',
	(int) 49 => '<p> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; ',
	(int) 50 => '<p> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and ',
	(int) 51 => '<p> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). ',
	(int) 52 => '<p>22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. ',
	(int) 53 => '<p>23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p>',
	(int) 54 => '<p>'
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3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Frick India Private Ltd Vs Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another - Citation 615740 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '615740',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2, 2A, 25B and 25F',
			'appealno' => 'C.W.P. No. 137/1985',
			'appellant' => 'Frick India Private Ltd.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Frick India Private Ltd. Vs. Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
			'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another;',
			'citingcases' => ' June, 1982            18 days 
 July, 1982            31 days 
 August, 1982          31 days 
 September, 1982       30 days 
 October, 1982         31 days 
 November, 1982        30 days 
 December, 1982        31 days 
 January, 1983         31 days 
 February, 1983        28 days 
 March, 1983           12 days 
; 
 Regd. A.D. 
 FIL/PD/83/M-208                                                                                     Dt. 12.3.83 ',
			'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal and; Sudhir Mittal, Advs.',
			'counseldef' => ' J.B. Tacoria, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1999-07-07',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' K.K. Srivastava, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">K.K. Srivastava, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. As per reference </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed </p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days </p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">a) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> b) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (c) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Dear Sir,</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Sub : Termination </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> sd/- </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Personnel Manager </p><p style="text-align: justify;">CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). </p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '(1999)123PLR814',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
			'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'frick-india-private-ltd-vs-vijay-bahadur',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '615740',
		(int) 1 => 'frick-india-private-ltd-vs-vijay-bahadur'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Frick India Private Ltd Vs Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another - Citation 615740 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '615740',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2, 2A, 25B and 25F',
		'appealno' => 'C.W.P. No. 137/1985',
		'appellant' => 'Frick India Private Ltd.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Frick India Private Ltd. Vs. Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
		'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another;',
		'citingcases' => ' June, 1982            18 days 
 July, 1982            31 days 
 August, 1982          31 days 
 September, 1982       30 days 
 October, 1982         31 days 
 November, 1982        30 days 
 December, 1982        31 days 
 January, 1983         31 days 
 February, 1983        28 days 
 March, 1983           12 days 
; 
 Regd. A.D. 
 FIL/PD/83/M-208                                                                                     Dt. 12.3.83 ',
		'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal and; Sudhir Mittal, Advs.',
		'counseldef' => ' J.B. Tacoria, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1999-07-07',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' K.K. Srivastava, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>K.K. Srivastava, J.</p><p>1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p>2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : </p><p>'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' </p><p>3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : </p><p>'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. </p><p> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. </p><p> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. </p><p> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' </p><p>4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : </p><p>'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' </p><p>5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : </p><p>1. As per reference </p><p> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed </p><p>6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p>7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. </p><p>8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. </p><p>9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. </p><p>10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.</p><p>11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : </p><p>June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days </p><p>12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : </p><p>'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' </p><p>13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : </p><p>'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' </p><p>14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : </p><p>a) xxx xxx xxx </p><p> b) xxx xxx xxx </p><p> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] </p><p> (c) xxx xxx xxx </p><p>15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. </p><p>16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : </p><p>'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' </p><p>17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : </p><p>'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' </p><p>18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. </p><p>19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : </p><p>Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) </p><p> Dear Sir,</p><p> Sub : Termination </p><p> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. </p><p> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. </p><p> sd/- </p><p>Personnel Manager </p><p>CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, </p><p>Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' </p><p>20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. </p><p>21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : </p><p>25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - </p><p> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; </p><p> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and </p><p> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). </p><p>22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. </p><p>23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '(1999)123PLR814',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
		'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
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	(int) 0 => '<p>K.K. Srivastava, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : ',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' ',
	(int) 4 => '<p>3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. ',
	(int) 6 => '<p> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. ',
	(int) 7 => '<p> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. ',
	(int) 8 => '<p> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' ',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : ',
	(int) 10 => '<p>'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' ',
	(int) 11 => '<p>5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : ',
	(int) 12 => '<p>1. As per reference ',
	(int) 13 => '<p> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed ',
	(int) 14 => '<p>6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. ',
	(int) 15 => '<p>7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. ',
	(int) 16 => '<p>8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. ',
	(int) 17 => '<p>9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. ',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days ',
	(int) 21 => '<p>12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : ',
	(int) 22 => '<p>'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' ',
	(int) 23 => '<p>13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : ',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' ',
	(int) 25 => '<p>14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : ',
	(int) 26 => '<p>a) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 27 => '<p> b) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 28 => '<p> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] ',
	(int) 29 => '<p> (c) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 30 => '<p>15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. ',
	(int) 31 => '<p>16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : ',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' ',
	(int) 33 => '<p>17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : ',
	(int) 34 => '<p>'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' ',
	(int) 35 => '<p>18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. ',
	(int) 36 => '<p>19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : ',
	(int) 37 => '<p>Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) ',
	(int) 38 => '<p> Dear Sir,',
	(int) 39 => '<p> Sub : Termination ',
	(int) 40 => '<p> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. ',
	(int) 41 => '<p> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. ',
	(int) 42 => '<p> sd/- ',
	(int) 43 => '<p>Personnel Manager ',
	(int) 44 => '<p>CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, ',
	(int) 45 => '<p>Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' ',
	(int) 46 => '<p>20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. ',
	(int) 47 => '<p>21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : ',
	(int) 48 => '<p>25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - ',
	(int) 49 => '<p> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; ',
	(int) 50 => '<p> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and ',
	(int) 51 => '<p> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). ',
	(int) 52 => '<p>22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. ',
	(int) 53 => '<p>23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p>',
	(int) 54 => '<p>'
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4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.'

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Frick India Private Ltd Vs Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another - Citation 615740 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '615740',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2, 2A, 25B and 25F',
			'appealno' => 'C.W.P. No. 137/1985',
			'appellant' => 'Frick India Private Ltd.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Frick India Private Ltd. Vs. Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
			'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another;',
			'citingcases' => ' June, 1982            18 days 
 July, 1982            31 days 
 August, 1982          31 days 
 September, 1982       30 days 
 October, 1982         31 days 
 November, 1982        30 days 
 December, 1982        31 days 
 January, 1983         31 days 
 February, 1983        28 days 
 March, 1983           12 days 
; 
 Regd. A.D. 
 FIL/PD/83/M-208                                                                                     Dt. 12.3.83 ',
			'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal and; Sudhir Mittal, Advs.',
			'counseldef' => ' J.B. Tacoria, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1999-07-07',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' K.K. Srivastava, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">K.K. Srivastava, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. As per reference </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed </p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days </p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">a) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> b) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (c) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Dear Sir,</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Sub : Termination </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> sd/- </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Personnel Manager </p><p style="text-align: justify;">CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). </p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '(1999)123PLR814',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
			'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'frick-india-private-ltd-vs-vijay-bahadur',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '615740',
		(int) 1 => 'frick-india-private-ltd-vs-vijay-bahadur'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Frick India Private Ltd Vs Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another - Citation 615740 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '615740',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2, 2A, 25B and 25F',
		'appealno' => 'C.W.P. No. 137/1985',
		'appellant' => 'Frick India Private Ltd.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Frick India Private Ltd. Vs. Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
		'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another;',
		'citingcases' => ' June, 1982            18 days 
 July, 1982            31 days 
 August, 1982          31 days 
 September, 1982       30 days 
 October, 1982         31 days 
 November, 1982        30 days 
 December, 1982        31 days 
 January, 1983         31 days 
 February, 1983        28 days 
 March, 1983           12 days 
; 
 Regd. A.D. 
 FIL/PD/83/M-208                                                                                     Dt. 12.3.83 ',
		'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal and; Sudhir Mittal, Advs.',
		'counseldef' => ' J.B. Tacoria, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1999-07-07',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' K.K. Srivastava, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>K.K. Srivastava, J.</p><p>1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p>2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : </p><p>'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' </p><p>3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : </p><p>'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. </p><p> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. </p><p> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. </p><p> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' </p><p>4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : </p><p>'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' </p><p>5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : </p><p>1. As per reference </p><p> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed </p><p>6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p>7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. </p><p>8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. </p><p>9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. </p><p>10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.</p><p>11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : </p><p>June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days </p><p>12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : </p><p>'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' </p><p>13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : </p><p>'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' </p><p>14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : </p><p>a) xxx xxx xxx </p><p> b) xxx xxx xxx </p><p> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] </p><p> (c) xxx xxx xxx </p><p>15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. </p><p>16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : </p><p>'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' </p><p>17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : </p><p>'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' </p><p>18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. </p><p>19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : </p><p>Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) </p><p> Dear Sir,</p><p> Sub : Termination </p><p> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. </p><p> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. </p><p> sd/- </p><p>Personnel Manager </p><p>CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, </p><p>Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' </p><p>20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. </p><p>21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : </p><p>25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - </p><p> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; </p><p> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and </p><p> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). </p><p>22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. </p><p>23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '(1999)123PLR814',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
		'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
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	(int) 0 => '<p>K.K. Srivastava, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : ',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' ',
	(int) 4 => '<p>3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. ',
	(int) 6 => '<p> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. ',
	(int) 7 => '<p> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. ',
	(int) 8 => '<p> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' ',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : ',
	(int) 10 => '<p>'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' ',
	(int) 11 => '<p>5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : ',
	(int) 12 => '<p>1. As per reference ',
	(int) 13 => '<p> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed ',
	(int) 14 => '<p>6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. ',
	(int) 15 => '<p>7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. ',
	(int) 16 => '<p>8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. ',
	(int) 17 => '<p>9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. ',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days ',
	(int) 21 => '<p>12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : ',
	(int) 22 => '<p>'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' ',
	(int) 23 => '<p>13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : ',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' ',
	(int) 25 => '<p>14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : ',
	(int) 26 => '<p>a) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 27 => '<p> b) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 28 => '<p> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] ',
	(int) 29 => '<p> (c) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 30 => '<p>15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. ',
	(int) 31 => '<p>16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : ',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' ',
	(int) 33 => '<p>17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : ',
	(int) 34 => '<p>'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' ',
	(int) 35 => '<p>18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. ',
	(int) 36 => '<p>19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : ',
	(int) 37 => '<p>Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) ',
	(int) 38 => '<p> Dear Sir,',
	(int) 39 => '<p> Sub : Termination ',
	(int) 40 => '<p> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. ',
	(int) 41 => '<p> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. ',
	(int) 42 => '<p> sd/- ',
	(int) 43 => '<p>Personnel Manager ',
	(int) 44 => '<p>CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, ',
	(int) 45 => '<p>Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' ',
	(int) 46 => '<p>20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. ',
	(int) 47 => '<p>21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : ',
	(int) 48 => '<p>25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - ',
	(int) 49 => '<p> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; ',
	(int) 50 => '<p> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and ',
	(int) 51 => '<p> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). ',
	(int) 52 => '<p>22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. ',
	(int) 53 => '<p>23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p>',
	(int) 54 => '<p>'
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4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under :

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Frick India Private Ltd Vs Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another - Citation 615740 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '615740',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2, 2A, 25B and 25F',
			'appealno' => 'C.W.P. No. 137/1985',
			'appellant' => 'Frick India Private Ltd.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Frick India Private Ltd. Vs. Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
			'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another;',
			'citingcases' => ' June, 1982            18 days 
 July, 1982            31 days 
 August, 1982          31 days 
 September, 1982       30 days 
 October, 1982         31 days 
 November, 1982        30 days 
 December, 1982        31 days 
 January, 1983         31 days 
 February, 1983        28 days 
 March, 1983           12 days 
; 
 Regd. A.D. 
 FIL/PD/83/M-208                                                                                     Dt. 12.3.83 ',
			'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal and; Sudhir Mittal, Advs.',
			'counseldef' => ' J.B. Tacoria, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1999-07-07',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' K.K. Srivastava, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">K.K. Srivastava, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. As per reference </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed </p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days </p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">a) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> b) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (c) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Dear Sir,</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Sub : Termination </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> sd/- </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Personnel Manager </p><p style="text-align: justify;">CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). </p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '(1999)123PLR814',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
			'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'frick-india-private-ltd-vs-vijay-bahadur',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '615740',
		(int) 1 => 'frick-india-private-ltd-vs-vijay-bahadur'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Frick India Private Ltd Vs Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another - Citation 615740 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '615740',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2, 2A, 25B and 25F',
		'appealno' => 'C.W.P. No. 137/1985',
		'appellant' => 'Frick India Private Ltd.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Frick India Private Ltd. Vs. Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
		'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another;',
		'citingcases' => ' June, 1982            18 days 
 July, 1982            31 days 
 August, 1982          31 days 
 September, 1982       30 days 
 October, 1982         31 days 
 November, 1982        30 days 
 December, 1982        31 days 
 January, 1983         31 days 
 February, 1983        28 days 
 March, 1983           12 days 
; 
 Regd. A.D. 
 FIL/PD/83/M-208                                                                                     Dt. 12.3.83 ',
		'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal and; Sudhir Mittal, Advs.',
		'counseldef' => ' J.B. Tacoria, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1999-07-07',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' K.K. Srivastava, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>K.K. Srivastava, J.</p><p>1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p>2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : </p><p>'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' </p><p>3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : </p><p>'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. </p><p> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. </p><p> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. </p><p> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' </p><p>4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : </p><p>'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' </p><p>5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : </p><p>1. As per reference </p><p> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed </p><p>6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p>7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. </p><p>8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. </p><p>9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. </p><p>10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.</p><p>11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : </p><p>June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days </p><p>12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : </p><p>'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' </p><p>13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : </p><p>'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' </p><p>14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : </p><p>a) xxx xxx xxx </p><p> b) xxx xxx xxx </p><p> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] </p><p> (c) xxx xxx xxx </p><p>15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. </p><p>16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : </p><p>'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' </p><p>17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : </p><p>'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' </p><p>18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. </p><p>19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : </p><p>Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) </p><p> Dear Sir,</p><p> Sub : Termination </p><p> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. </p><p> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. </p><p> sd/- </p><p>Personnel Manager </p><p>CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, </p><p>Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' </p><p>20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. </p><p>21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : </p><p>25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - </p><p> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; </p><p> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and </p><p> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). </p><p>22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. </p><p>23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '(1999)123PLR814',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
		'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
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	(int) 0 => '<p>K.K. Srivastava, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : ',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' ',
	(int) 4 => '<p>3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. ',
	(int) 6 => '<p> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. ',
	(int) 7 => '<p> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. ',
	(int) 8 => '<p> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' ',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : ',
	(int) 10 => '<p>'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' ',
	(int) 11 => '<p>5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : ',
	(int) 12 => '<p>1. As per reference ',
	(int) 13 => '<p> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed ',
	(int) 14 => '<p>6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. ',
	(int) 15 => '<p>7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. ',
	(int) 16 => '<p>8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. ',
	(int) 17 => '<p>9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. ',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days ',
	(int) 21 => '<p>12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : ',
	(int) 22 => '<p>'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' ',
	(int) 23 => '<p>13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : ',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' ',
	(int) 25 => '<p>14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : ',
	(int) 26 => '<p>a) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 27 => '<p> b) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 28 => '<p> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] ',
	(int) 29 => '<p> (c) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 30 => '<p>15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. ',
	(int) 31 => '<p>16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : ',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' ',
	(int) 33 => '<p>17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : ',
	(int) 34 => '<p>'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' ',
	(int) 35 => '<p>18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. ',
	(int) 36 => '<p>19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : ',
	(int) 37 => '<p>Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) ',
	(int) 38 => '<p> Dear Sir,',
	(int) 39 => '<p> Sub : Termination ',
	(int) 40 => '<p> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. ',
	(int) 41 => '<p> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. ',
	(int) 42 => '<p> sd/- ',
	(int) 43 => '<p>Personnel Manager ',
	(int) 44 => '<p>CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, ',
	(int) 45 => '<p>Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' ',
	(int) 46 => '<p>20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. ',
	(int) 47 => '<p>21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : ',
	(int) 48 => '<p>25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - ',
	(int) 49 => '<p> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; ',
	(int) 50 => '<p> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and ',
	(int) 51 => '<p> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). ',
	(int) 52 => '<p>22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. ',
	(int) 53 => '<p>23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p>',
	(int) 54 => '<p>'
)
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'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.'

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Frick India Private Ltd Vs Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another - Citation 615740 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '615740',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2, 2A, 25B and 25F',
			'appealno' => 'C.W.P. No. 137/1985',
			'appellant' => 'Frick India Private Ltd.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Frick India Private Ltd. Vs. Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
			'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another;',
			'citingcases' => ' June, 1982            18 days 
 July, 1982            31 days 
 August, 1982          31 days 
 September, 1982       30 days 
 October, 1982         31 days 
 November, 1982        30 days 
 December, 1982        31 days 
 January, 1983         31 days 
 February, 1983        28 days 
 March, 1983           12 days 
; 
 Regd. A.D. 
 FIL/PD/83/M-208                                                                                     Dt. 12.3.83 ',
			'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal and; Sudhir Mittal, Advs.',
			'counseldef' => ' J.B. Tacoria, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1999-07-07',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' K.K. Srivastava, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">K.K. Srivastava, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. As per reference </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed </p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days </p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">a) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> b) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (c) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Dear Sir,</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Sub : Termination </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> sd/- </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Personnel Manager </p><p style="text-align: justify;">CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). </p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '(1999)123PLR814',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
			'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'frick-india-private-ltd-vs-vijay-bahadur',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '615740',
		(int) 1 => 'frick-india-private-ltd-vs-vijay-bahadur'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Frick India Private Ltd Vs Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another - Citation 615740 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '615740',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2, 2A, 25B and 25F',
		'appealno' => 'C.W.P. No. 137/1985',
		'appellant' => 'Frick India Private Ltd.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Frick India Private Ltd. Vs. Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
		'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another;',
		'citingcases' => ' June, 1982            18 days 
 July, 1982            31 days 
 August, 1982          31 days 
 September, 1982       30 days 
 October, 1982         31 days 
 November, 1982        30 days 
 December, 1982        31 days 
 January, 1983         31 days 
 February, 1983        28 days 
 March, 1983           12 days 
; 
 Regd. A.D. 
 FIL/PD/83/M-208                                                                                     Dt. 12.3.83 ',
		'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal and; Sudhir Mittal, Advs.',
		'counseldef' => ' J.B. Tacoria, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1999-07-07',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' K.K. Srivastava, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>K.K. Srivastava, J.</p><p>1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p>2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : </p><p>'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' </p><p>3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : </p><p>'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. </p><p> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. </p><p> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. </p><p> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' </p><p>4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : </p><p>'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' </p><p>5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : </p><p>1. As per reference </p><p> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed </p><p>6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p>7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. </p><p>8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. </p><p>9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. </p><p>10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.</p><p>11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : </p><p>June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days </p><p>12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : </p><p>'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' </p><p>13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : </p><p>'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' </p><p>14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : </p><p>a) xxx xxx xxx </p><p> b) xxx xxx xxx </p><p> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] </p><p> (c) xxx xxx xxx </p><p>15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. </p><p>16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : </p><p>'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' </p><p>17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : </p><p>'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' </p><p>18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. </p><p>19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : </p><p>Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) </p><p> Dear Sir,</p><p> Sub : Termination </p><p> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. </p><p> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. </p><p> sd/- </p><p>Personnel Manager </p><p>CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, </p><p>Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' </p><p>20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. </p><p>21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : </p><p>25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - </p><p> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; </p><p> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and </p><p> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). </p><p>22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. </p><p>23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '(1999)123PLR814',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
		'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
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	(int) 0 => '<p>K.K. Srivastava, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : ',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' ',
	(int) 4 => '<p>3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. ',
	(int) 6 => '<p> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. ',
	(int) 7 => '<p> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. ',
	(int) 8 => '<p> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' ',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : ',
	(int) 10 => '<p>'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' ',
	(int) 11 => '<p>5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : ',
	(int) 12 => '<p>1. As per reference ',
	(int) 13 => '<p> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed ',
	(int) 14 => '<p>6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. ',
	(int) 15 => '<p>7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. ',
	(int) 16 => '<p>8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. ',
	(int) 17 => '<p>9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. ',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days ',
	(int) 21 => '<p>12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : ',
	(int) 22 => '<p>'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' ',
	(int) 23 => '<p>13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : ',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' ',
	(int) 25 => '<p>14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : ',
	(int) 26 => '<p>a) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 27 => '<p> b) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 28 => '<p> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] ',
	(int) 29 => '<p> (c) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 30 => '<p>15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. ',
	(int) 31 => '<p>16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : ',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' ',
	(int) 33 => '<p>17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : ',
	(int) 34 => '<p>'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' ',
	(int) 35 => '<p>18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. ',
	(int) 36 => '<p>19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : ',
	(int) 37 => '<p>Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) ',
	(int) 38 => '<p> Dear Sir,',
	(int) 39 => '<p> Sub : Termination ',
	(int) 40 => '<p> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. ',
	(int) 41 => '<p> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. ',
	(int) 42 => '<p> sd/- ',
	(int) 43 => '<p>Personnel Manager ',
	(int) 44 => '<p>CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, ',
	(int) 45 => '<p>Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' ',
	(int) 46 => '<p>20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. ',
	(int) 47 => '<p>21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : ',
	(int) 48 => '<p>25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - ',
	(int) 49 => '<p> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; ',
	(int) 50 => '<p> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and ',
	(int) 51 => '<p> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). ',
	(int) 52 => '<p>22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. ',
	(int) 53 => '<p>23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p>',
	(int) 54 => '<p>'
)
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5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues :

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Frick India Private Ltd Vs Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another - Citation 615740 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '615740',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2, 2A, 25B and 25F',
			'appealno' => 'C.W.P. No. 137/1985',
			'appellant' => 'Frick India Private Ltd.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Frick India Private Ltd. Vs. Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
			'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another;',
			'citingcases' => ' June, 1982            18 days 
 July, 1982            31 days 
 August, 1982          31 days 
 September, 1982       30 days 
 October, 1982         31 days 
 November, 1982        30 days 
 December, 1982        31 days 
 January, 1983         31 days 
 February, 1983        28 days 
 March, 1983           12 days 
; 
 Regd. A.D. 
 FIL/PD/83/M-208                                                                                     Dt. 12.3.83 ',
			'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal and; Sudhir Mittal, Advs.',
			'counseldef' => ' J.B. Tacoria, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1999-07-07',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' K.K. Srivastava, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">K.K. Srivastava, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. As per reference </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed </p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days </p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">a) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> b) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (c) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Dear Sir,</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Sub : Termination </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> sd/- </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Personnel Manager </p><p style="text-align: justify;">CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). </p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '(1999)123PLR814',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
			'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'frick-india-private-ltd-vs-vijay-bahadur',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '615740',
		(int) 1 => 'frick-india-private-ltd-vs-vijay-bahadur'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Frick India Private Ltd Vs Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another - Citation 615740 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '615740',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2, 2A, 25B and 25F',
		'appealno' => 'C.W.P. No. 137/1985',
		'appellant' => 'Frick India Private Ltd.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Frick India Private Ltd. Vs. Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
		'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another;',
		'citingcases' => ' June, 1982            18 days 
 July, 1982            31 days 
 August, 1982          31 days 
 September, 1982       30 days 
 October, 1982         31 days 
 November, 1982        30 days 
 December, 1982        31 days 
 January, 1983         31 days 
 February, 1983        28 days 
 March, 1983           12 days 
; 
 Regd. A.D. 
 FIL/PD/83/M-208                                                                                     Dt. 12.3.83 ',
		'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal and; Sudhir Mittal, Advs.',
		'counseldef' => ' J.B. Tacoria, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1999-07-07',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' K.K. Srivastava, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>K.K. Srivastava, J.</p><p>1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p>2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : </p><p>'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' </p><p>3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : </p><p>'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. </p><p> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. </p><p> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. </p><p> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' </p><p>4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : </p><p>'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' </p><p>5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : </p><p>1. As per reference </p><p> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed </p><p>6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p>7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. </p><p>8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. </p><p>9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. </p><p>10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.</p><p>11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : </p><p>June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days </p><p>12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : </p><p>'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' </p><p>13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : </p><p>'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' </p><p>14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : </p><p>a) xxx xxx xxx </p><p> b) xxx xxx xxx </p><p> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] </p><p> (c) xxx xxx xxx </p><p>15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. </p><p>16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : </p><p>'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' </p><p>17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : </p><p>'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' </p><p>18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. </p><p>19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : </p><p>Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) </p><p> Dear Sir,</p><p> Sub : Termination </p><p> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. </p><p> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. </p><p> sd/- </p><p>Personnel Manager </p><p>CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, </p><p>Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' </p><p>20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. </p><p>21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : </p><p>25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - </p><p> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; </p><p> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and </p><p> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). </p><p>22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. </p><p>23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '(1999)123PLR814',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
		'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
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$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>K.K. Srivastava, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : ',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' ',
	(int) 4 => '<p>3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. ',
	(int) 6 => '<p> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. ',
	(int) 7 => '<p> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. ',
	(int) 8 => '<p> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' ',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : ',
	(int) 10 => '<p>'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' ',
	(int) 11 => '<p>5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : ',
	(int) 12 => '<p>1. As per reference ',
	(int) 13 => '<p> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed ',
	(int) 14 => '<p>6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. ',
	(int) 15 => '<p>7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. ',
	(int) 16 => '<p>8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. ',
	(int) 17 => '<p>9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. ',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days ',
	(int) 21 => '<p>12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : ',
	(int) 22 => '<p>'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' ',
	(int) 23 => '<p>13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : ',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' ',
	(int) 25 => '<p>14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : ',
	(int) 26 => '<p>a) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 27 => '<p> b) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 28 => '<p> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] ',
	(int) 29 => '<p> (c) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 30 => '<p>15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. ',
	(int) 31 => '<p>16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : ',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' ',
	(int) 33 => '<p>17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : ',
	(int) 34 => '<p>'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' ',
	(int) 35 => '<p>18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. ',
	(int) 36 => '<p>19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : ',
	(int) 37 => '<p>Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) ',
	(int) 38 => '<p> Dear Sir,',
	(int) 39 => '<p> Sub : Termination ',
	(int) 40 => '<p> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. ',
	(int) 41 => '<p> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. ',
	(int) 42 => '<p> sd/- ',
	(int) 43 => '<p>Personnel Manager ',
	(int) 44 => '<p>CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, ',
	(int) 45 => '<p>Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' ',
	(int) 46 => '<p>20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. ',
	(int) 47 => '<p>21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : ',
	(int) 48 => '<p>25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - ',
	(int) 49 => '<p> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; ',
	(int) 50 => '<p> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and ',
	(int) 51 => '<p> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). ',
	(int) 52 => '<p>22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. ',
	(int) 53 => '<p>23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p>',
	(int) 54 => '<p>'
)
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1. As per reference

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Frick India Private Ltd Vs Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another - Citation 615740 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '615740',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2, 2A, 25B and 25F',
			'appealno' => 'C.W.P. No. 137/1985',
			'appellant' => 'Frick India Private Ltd.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Frick India Private Ltd. Vs. Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
			'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another;',
			'citingcases' => ' June, 1982            18 days 
 July, 1982            31 days 
 August, 1982          31 days 
 September, 1982       30 days 
 October, 1982         31 days 
 November, 1982        30 days 
 December, 1982        31 days 
 January, 1983         31 days 
 February, 1983        28 days 
 March, 1983           12 days 
; 
 Regd. A.D. 
 FIL/PD/83/M-208                                                                                     Dt. 12.3.83 ',
			'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal and; Sudhir Mittal, Advs.',
			'counseldef' => ' J.B. Tacoria, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1999-07-07',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' K.K. Srivastava, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">K.K. Srivastava, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. As per reference </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed </p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days </p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">a) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> b) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (c) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Dear Sir,</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Sub : Termination </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> sd/- </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Personnel Manager </p><p style="text-align: justify;">CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). </p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '(1999)123PLR814',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
			'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'frick-india-private-ltd-vs-vijay-bahadur',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '615740',
		(int) 1 => 'frick-india-private-ltd-vs-vijay-bahadur'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Frick India Private Ltd Vs Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another - Citation 615740 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '615740',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2, 2A, 25B and 25F',
		'appealno' => 'C.W.P. No. 137/1985',
		'appellant' => 'Frick India Private Ltd.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Frick India Private Ltd. Vs. Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
		'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another;',
		'citingcases' => ' June, 1982            18 days 
 July, 1982            31 days 
 August, 1982          31 days 
 September, 1982       30 days 
 October, 1982         31 days 
 November, 1982        30 days 
 December, 1982        31 days 
 January, 1983         31 days 
 February, 1983        28 days 
 March, 1983           12 days 
; 
 Regd. A.D. 
 FIL/PD/83/M-208                                                                                     Dt. 12.3.83 ',
		'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal and; Sudhir Mittal, Advs.',
		'counseldef' => ' J.B. Tacoria, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1999-07-07',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' K.K. Srivastava, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>K.K. Srivastava, J.</p><p>1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p>2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : </p><p>'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' </p><p>3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : </p><p>'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. </p><p> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. </p><p> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. </p><p> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' </p><p>4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : </p><p>'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' </p><p>5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : </p><p>1. As per reference </p><p> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed </p><p>6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p>7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. </p><p>8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. </p><p>9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. </p><p>10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.</p><p>11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : </p><p>June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days </p><p>12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : </p><p>'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' </p><p>13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : </p><p>'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' </p><p>14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : </p><p>a) xxx xxx xxx </p><p> b) xxx xxx xxx </p><p> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] </p><p> (c) xxx xxx xxx </p><p>15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. </p><p>16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : </p><p>'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' </p><p>17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : </p><p>'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' </p><p>18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. </p><p>19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : </p><p>Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) </p><p> Dear Sir,</p><p> Sub : Termination </p><p> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. </p><p> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. </p><p> sd/- </p><p>Personnel Manager </p><p>CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, </p><p>Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' </p><p>20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. </p><p>21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : </p><p>25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - </p><p> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; </p><p> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and </p><p> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). </p><p>22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. </p><p>23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '(1999)123PLR814',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
		'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
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	(int) 0 => '<p>K.K. Srivastava, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : ',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' ',
	(int) 4 => '<p>3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. ',
	(int) 6 => '<p> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. ',
	(int) 7 => '<p> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. ',
	(int) 8 => '<p> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' ',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : ',
	(int) 10 => '<p>'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' ',
	(int) 11 => '<p>5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : ',
	(int) 12 => '<p>1. As per reference ',
	(int) 13 => '<p> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed ',
	(int) 14 => '<p>6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. ',
	(int) 15 => '<p>7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. ',
	(int) 16 => '<p>8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. ',
	(int) 17 => '<p>9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. ',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days ',
	(int) 21 => '<p>12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : ',
	(int) 22 => '<p>'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' ',
	(int) 23 => '<p>13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : ',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' ',
	(int) 25 => '<p>14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : ',
	(int) 26 => '<p>a) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 27 => '<p> b) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 28 => '<p> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] ',
	(int) 29 => '<p> (c) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 30 => '<p>15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. ',
	(int) 31 => '<p>16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : ',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' ',
	(int) 33 => '<p>17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : ',
	(int) 34 => '<p>'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' ',
	(int) 35 => '<p>18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. ',
	(int) 36 => '<p>19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : ',
	(int) 37 => '<p>Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) ',
	(int) 38 => '<p> Dear Sir,',
	(int) 39 => '<p> Sub : Termination ',
	(int) 40 => '<p> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. ',
	(int) 41 => '<p> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. ',
	(int) 42 => '<p> sd/- ',
	(int) 43 => '<p>Personnel Manager ',
	(int) 44 => '<p>CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, ',
	(int) 45 => '<p>Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' ',
	(int) 46 => '<p>20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. ',
	(int) 47 => '<p>21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : ',
	(int) 48 => '<p>25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - ',
	(int) 49 => '<p> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; ',
	(int) 50 => '<p> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and ',
	(int) 51 => '<p> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). ',
	(int) 52 => '<p>22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. ',
	(int) 53 => '<p>23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p>',
	(int) 54 => '<p>'
)
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2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Frick India Private Ltd Vs Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another - Citation 615740 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '615740',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2, 2A, 25B and 25F',
			'appealno' => 'C.W.P. No. 137/1985',
			'appellant' => 'Frick India Private Ltd.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Frick India Private Ltd. Vs. Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
			'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another;',
			'citingcases' => ' June, 1982            18 days 
 July, 1982            31 days 
 August, 1982          31 days 
 September, 1982       30 days 
 October, 1982         31 days 
 November, 1982        30 days 
 December, 1982        31 days 
 January, 1983         31 days 
 February, 1983        28 days 
 March, 1983           12 days 
; 
 Regd. A.D. 
 FIL/PD/83/M-208                                                                                     Dt. 12.3.83 ',
			'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal and; Sudhir Mittal, Advs.',
			'counseldef' => ' J.B. Tacoria, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1999-07-07',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' K.K. Srivastava, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">K.K. Srivastava, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. As per reference </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed </p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days </p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">a) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> b) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (c) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Dear Sir,</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Sub : Termination </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> sd/- </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Personnel Manager </p><p style="text-align: justify;">CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). </p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '(1999)123PLR814',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
			'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'frick-india-private-ltd-vs-vijay-bahadur',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '615740',
		(int) 1 => 'frick-india-private-ltd-vs-vijay-bahadur'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Frick India Private Ltd Vs Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another - Citation 615740 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '615740',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2, 2A, 25B and 25F',
		'appealno' => 'C.W.P. No. 137/1985',
		'appellant' => 'Frick India Private Ltd.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Frick India Private Ltd. Vs. Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
		'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another;',
		'citingcases' => ' June, 1982            18 days 
 July, 1982            31 days 
 August, 1982          31 days 
 September, 1982       30 days 
 October, 1982         31 days 
 November, 1982        30 days 
 December, 1982        31 days 
 January, 1983         31 days 
 February, 1983        28 days 
 March, 1983           12 days 
; 
 Regd. A.D. 
 FIL/PD/83/M-208                                                                                     Dt. 12.3.83 ',
		'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal and; Sudhir Mittal, Advs.',
		'counseldef' => ' J.B. Tacoria, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1999-07-07',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' K.K. Srivastava, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>K.K. Srivastava, J.</p><p>1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p>2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : </p><p>'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' </p><p>3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : </p><p>'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. </p><p> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. </p><p> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. </p><p> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' </p><p>4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : </p><p>'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' </p><p>5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : </p><p>1. As per reference </p><p> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed </p><p>6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p>7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. </p><p>8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. </p><p>9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. </p><p>10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.</p><p>11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : </p><p>June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days </p><p>12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : </p><p>'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' </p><p>13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : </p><p>'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' </p><p>14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : </p><p>a) xxx xxx xxx </p><p> b) xxx xxx xxx </p><p> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] </p><p> (c) xxx xxx xxx </p><p>15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. </p><p>16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : </p><p>'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' </p><p>17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : </p><p>'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' </p><p>18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. </p><p>19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : </p><p>Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) </p><p> Dear Sir,</p><p> Sub : Termination </p><p> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. </p><p> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. </p><p> sd/- </p><p>Personnel Manager </p><p>CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, </p><p>Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' </p><p>20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. </p><p>21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : </p><p>25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - </p><p> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; </p><p> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and </p><p> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). </p><p>22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. </p><p>23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '(1999)123PLR814',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
		'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
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	(int) 0 => '<p>K.K. Srivastava, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : ',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' ',
	(int) 4 => '<p>3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. ',
	(int) 6 => '<p> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. ',
	(int) 7 => '<p> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. ',
	(int) 8 => '<p> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' ',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : ',
	(int) 10 => '<p>'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' ',
	(int) 11 => '<p>5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : ',
	(int) 12 => '<p>1. As per reference ',
	(int) 13 => '<p> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed ',
	(int) 14 => '<p>6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. ',
	(int) 15 => '<p>7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. ',
	(int) 16 => '<p>8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. ',
	(int) 17 => '<p>9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. ',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days ',
	(int) 21 => '<p>12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : ',
	(int) 22 => '<p>'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' ',
	(int) 23 => '<p>13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : ',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' ',
	(int) 25 => '<p>14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : ',
	(int) 26 => '<p>a) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 27 => '<p> b) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 28 => '<p> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] ',
	(int) 29 => '<p> (c) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 30 => '<p>15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. ',
	(int) 31 => '<p>16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : ',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' ',
	(int) 33 => '<p>17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : ',
	(int) 34 => '<p>'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' ',
	(int) 35 => '<p>18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. ',
	(int) 36 => '<p>19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : ',
	(int) 37 => '<p>Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) ',
	(int) 38 => '<p> Dear Sir,',
	(int) 39 => '<p> Sub : Termination ',
	(int) 40 => '<p> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. ',
	(int) 41 => '<p> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. ',
	(int) 42 => '<p> sd/- ',
	(int) 43 => '<p>Personnel Manager ',
	(int) 44 => '<p>CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, ',
	(int) 45 => '<p>Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' ',
	(int) 46 => '<p>20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. ',
	(int) 47 => '<p>21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : ',
	(int) 48 => '<p>25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - ',
	(int) 49 => '<p> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; ',
	(int) 50 => '<p> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and ',
	(int) 51 => '<p> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). ',
	(int) 52 => '<p>22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. ',
	(int) 53 => '<p>23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p>',
	(int) 54 => '<p>'
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6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Frick India Private Ltd Vs Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another - Citation 615740 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '615740',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2, 2A, 25B and 25F',
			'appealno' => 'C.W.P. No. 137/1985',
			'appellant' => 'Frick India Private Ltd.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Frick India Private Ltd. Vs. Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
			'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another;',
			'citingcases' => ' June, 1982            18 days 
 July, 1982            31 days 
 August, 1982          31 days 
 September, 1982       30 days 
 October, 1982         31 days 
 November, 1982        30 days 
 December, 1982        31 days 
 January, 1983         31 days 
 February, 1983        28 days 
 March, 1983           12 days 
; 
 Regd. A.D. 
 FIL/PD/83/M-208                                                                                     Dt. 12.3.83 ',
			'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal and; Sudhir Mittal, Advs.',
			'counseldef' => ' J.B. Tacoria, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1999-07-07',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' K.K. Srivastava, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">K.K. Srivastava, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. As per reference </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed </p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days </p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">a) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> b) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (c) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Dear Sir,</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Sub : Termination </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> sd/- </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Personnel Manager </p><p style="text-align: justify;">CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). </p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '(1999)123PLR814',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
			'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'frick-india-private-ltd-vs-vijay-bahadur',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '615740',
		(int) 1 => 'frick-india-private-ltd-vs-vijay-bahadur'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Frick India Private Ltd Vs Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another - Citation 615740 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '615740',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2, 2A, 25B and 25F',
		'appealno' => 'C.W.P. No. 137/1985',
		'appellant' => 'Frick India Private Ltd.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Frick India Private Ltd. Vs. Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
		'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another;',
		'citingcases' => ' June, 1982            18 days 
 July, 1982            31 days 
 August, 1982          31 days 
 September, 1982       30 days 
 October, 1982         31 days 
 November, 1982        30 days 
 December, 1982        31 days 
 January, 1983         31 days 
 February, 1983        28 days 
 March, 1983           12 days 
; 
 Regd. A.D. 
 FIL/PD/83/M-208                                                                                     Dt. 12.3.83 ',
		'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal and; Sudhir Mittal, Advs.',
		'counseldef' => ' J.B. Tacoria, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1999-07-07',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' K.K. Srivastava, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>K.K. Srivastava, J.</p><p>1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p>2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : </p><p>'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' </p><p>3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : </p><p>'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. </p><p> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. </p><p> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. </p><p> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' </p><p>4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : </p><p>'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' </p><p>5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : </p><p>1. As per reference </p><p> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed </p><p>6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p>7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. </p><p>8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. </p><p>9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. </p><p>10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.</p><p>11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : </p><p>June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days </p><p>12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : </p><p>'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' </p><p>13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : </p><p>'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' </p><p>14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : </p><p>a) xxx xxx xxx </p><p> b) xxx xxx xxx </p><p> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] </p><p> (c) xxx xxx xxx </p><p>15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. </p><p>16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : </p><p>'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' </p><p>17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : </p><p>'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' </p><p>18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. </p><p>19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : </p><p>Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) </p><p> Dear Sir,</p><p> Sub : Termination </p><p> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. </p><p> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. </p><p> sd/- </p><p>Personnel Manager </p><p>CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, </p><p>Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' </p><p>20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. </p><p>21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : </p><p>25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - </p><p> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; </p><p> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and </p><p> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). </p><p>22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. </p><p>23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '(1999)123PLR814',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
		'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
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	(int) 0 => '<p>K.K. Srivastava, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : ',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' ',
	(int) 4 => '<p>3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. ',
	(int) 6 => '<p> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. ',
	(int) 7 => '<p> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. ',
	(int) 8 => '<p> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' ',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : ',
	(int) 10 => '<p>'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' ',
	(int) 11 => '<p>5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : ',
	(int) 12 => '<p>1. As per reference ',
	(int) 13 => '<p> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed ',
	(int) 14 => '<p>6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. ',
	(int) 15 => '<p>7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. ',
	(int) 16 => '<p>8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. ',
	(int) 17 => '<p>9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. ',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days ',
	(int) 21 => '<p>12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : ',
	(int) 22 => '<p>'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' ',
	(int) 23 => '<p>13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : ',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' ',
	(int) 25 => '<p>14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : ',
	(int) 26 => '<p>a) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 27 => '<p> b) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 28 => '<p> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] ',
	(int) 29 => '<p> (c) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 30 => '<p>15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. ',
	(int) 31 => '<p>16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : ',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' ',
	(int) 33 => '<p>17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : ',
	(int) 34 => '<p>'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' ',
	(int) 35 => '<p>18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. ',
	(int) 36 => '<p>19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : ',
	(int) 37 => '<p>Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) ',
	(int) 38 => '<p> Dear Sir,',
	(int) 39 => '<p> Sub : Termination ',
	(int) 40 => '<p> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. ',
	(int) 41 => '<p> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. ',
	(int) 42 => '<p> sd/- ',
	(int) 43 => '<p>Personnel Manager ',
	(int) 44 => '<p>CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, ',
	(int) 45 => '<p>Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' ',
	(int) 46 => '<p>20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. ',
	(int) 47 => '<p>21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : ',
	(int) 48 => '<p>25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - ',
	(int) 49 => '<p> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; ',
	(int) 50 => '<p> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and ',
	(int) 51 => '<p> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). ',
	(int) 52 => '<p>22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. ',
	(int) 53 => '<p>23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p>',
	(int) 54 => '<p>'
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7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Frick India Private Ltd Vs Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another - Citation 615740 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '615740',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2, 2A, 25B and 25F',
			'appealno' => 'C.W.P. No. 137/1985',
			'appellant' => 'Frick India Private Ltd.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Frick India Private Ltd. Vs. Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
			'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another;',
			'citingcases' => ' June, 1982            18 days 
 July, 1982            31 days 
 August, 1982          31 days 
 September, 1982       30 days 
 October, 1982         31 days 
 November, 1982        30 days 
 December, 1982        31 days 
 January, 1983         31 days 
 February, 1983        28 days 
 March, 1983           12 days 
; 
 Regd. A.D. 
 FIL/PD/83/M-208                                                                                     Dt. 12.3.83 ',
			'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal and; Sudhir Mittal, Advs.',
			'counseldef' => ' J.B. Tacoria, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1999-07-07',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' K.K. Srivastava, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">K.K. Srivastava, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. As per reference </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed </p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days </p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">a) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> b) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (c) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Dear Sir,</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Sub : Termination </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> sd/- </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Personnel Manager </p><p style="text-align: justify;">CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). </p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '(1999)123PLR814',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
			'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'frick-india-private-ltd-vs-vijay-bahadur',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '615740',
		(int) 1 => 'frick-india-private-ltd-vs-vijay-bahadur'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Frick India Private Ltd Vs Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another - Citation 615740 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '615740',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2, 2A, 25B and 25F',
		'appealno' => 'C.W.P. No. 137/1985',
		'appellant' => 'Frick India Private Ltd.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Frick India Private Ltd. Vs. Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
		'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another;',
		'citingcases' => ' June, 1982            18 days 
 July, 1982            31 days 
 August, 1982          31 days 
 September, 1982       30 days 
 October, 1982         31 days 
 November, 1982        30 days 
 December, 1982        31 days 
 January, 1983         31 days 
 February, 1983        28 days 
 March, 1983           12 days 
; 
 Regd. A.D. 
 FIL/PD/83/M-208                                                                                     Dt. 12.3.83 ',
		'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal and; Sudhir Mittal, Advs.',
		'counseldef' => ' J.B. Tacoria, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1999-07-07',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' K.K. Srivastava, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>K.K. Srivastava, J.</p><p>1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p>2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : </p><p>'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' </p><p>3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : </p><p>'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. </p><p> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. </p><p> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. </p><p> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' </p><p>4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : </p><p>'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' </p><p>5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : </p><p>1. As per reference </p><p> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed </p><p>6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p>7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. </p><p>8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. </p><p>9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. </p><p>10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.</p><p>11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : </p><p>June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days </p><p>12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : </p><p>'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' </p><p>13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : </p><p>'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' </p><p>14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : </p><p>a) xxx xxx xxx </p><p> b) xxx xxx xxx </p><p> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] </p><p> (c) xxx xxx xxx </p><p>15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. </p><p>16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : </p><p>'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' </p><p>17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : </p><p>'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' </p><p>18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. </p><p>19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : </p><p>Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) </p><p> Dear Sir,</p><p> Sub : Termination </p><p> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. </p><p> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. </p><p> sd/- </p><p>Personnel Manager </p><p>CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, </p><p>Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' </p><p>20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. </p><p>21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : </p><p>25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - </p><p> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; </p><p> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and </p><p> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). </p><p>22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. </p><p>23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '(1999)123PLR814',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
		'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
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$caseref = 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another<br>'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>K.K. Srivastava, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : ',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' ',
	(int) 4 => '<p>3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. ',
	(int) 6 => '<p> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. ',
	(int) 7 => '<p> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. ',
	(int) 8 => '<p> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' ',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : ',
	(int) 10 => '<p>'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' ',
	(int) 11 => '<p>5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : ',
	(int) 12 => '<p>1. As per reference ',
	(int) 13 => '<p> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed ',
	(int) 14 => '<p>6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. ',
	(int) 15 => '<p>7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. ',
	(int) 16 => '<p>8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. ',
	(int) 17 => '<p>9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. ',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days ',
	(int) 21 => '<p>12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : ',
	(int) 22 => '<p>'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' ',
	(int) 23 => '<p>13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : ',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' ',
	(int) 25 => '<p>14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : ',
	(int) 26 => '<p>a) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 27 => '<p> b) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 28 => '<p> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] ',
	(int) 29 => '<p> (c) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 30 => '<p>15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. ',
	(int) 31 => '<p>16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : ',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' ',
	(int) 33 => '<p>17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : ',
	(int) 34 => '<p>'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' ',
	(int) 35 => '<p>18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. ',
	(int) 36 => '<p>19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : ',
	(int) 37 => '<p>Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) ',
	(int) 38 => '<p> Dear Sir,',
	(int) 39 => '<p> Sub : Termination ',
	(int) 40 => '<p> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. ',
	(int) 41 => '<p> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. ',
	(int) 42 => '<p> sd/- ',
	(int) 43 => '<p>Personnel Manager ',
	(int) 44 => '<p>CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, ',
	(int) 45 => '<p>Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' ',
	(int) 46 => '<p>20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. ',
	(int) 47 => '<p>21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : ',
	(int) 48 => '<p>25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - ',
	(int) 49 => '<p> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; ',
	(int) 50 => '<p> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and ',
	(int) 51 => '<p> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). ',
	(int) 52 => '<p>22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. ',
	(int) 53 => '<p>23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p>',
	(int) 54 => '<p>'
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8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Frick India Private Ltd Vs Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another - Citation 615740 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '615740',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2, 2A, 25B and 25F',
			'appealno' => 'C.W.P. No. 137/1985',
			'appellant' => 'Frick India Private Ltd.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Frick India Private Ltd. Vs. Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
			'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another;',
			'citingcases' => ' June, 1982            18 days 
 July, 1982            31 days 
 August, 1982          31 days 
 September, 1982       30 days 
 October, 1982         31 days 
 November, 1982        30 days 
 December, 1982        31 days 
 January, 1983         31 days 
 February, 1983        28 days 
 March, 1983           12 days 
; 
 Regd. A.D. 
 FIL/PD/83/M-208                                                                                     Dt. 12.3.83 ',
			'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal and; Sudhir Mittal, Advs.',
			'counseldef' => ' J.B. Tacoria, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1999-07-07',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' K.K. Srivastava, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">K.K. Srivastava, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. As per reference </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed </p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days </p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">a) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> b) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (c) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Dear Sir,</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Sub : Termination </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> sd/- </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Personnel Manager </p><p style="text-align: justify;">CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). </p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '(1999)123PLR814',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
			'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'frick-india-private-ltd-vs-vijay-bahadur',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '615740',
		(int) 1 => 'frick-india-private-ltd-vs-vijay-bahadur'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Frick India Private Ltd Vs Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another - Citation 615740 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '615740',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2, 2A, 25B and 25F',
		'appealno' => 'C.W.P. No. 137/1985',
		'appellant' => 'Frick India Private Ltd.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Frick India Private Ltd. Vs. Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
		'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another;',
		'citingcases' => ' June, 1982            18 days 
 July, 1982            31 days 
 August, 1982          31 days 
 September, 1982       30 days 
 October, 1982         31 days 
 November, 1982        30 days 
 December, 1982        31 days 
 January, 1983         31 days 
 February, 1983        28 days 
 March, 1983           12 days 
; 
 Regd. A.D. 
 FIL/PD/83/M-208                                                                                     Dt. 12.3.83 ',
		'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal and; Sudhir Mittal, Advs.',
		'counseldef' => ' J.B. Tacoria, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1999-07-07',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' K.K. Srivastava, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>K.K. Srivastava, J.</p><p>1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p>2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : </p><p>'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' </p><p>3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : </p><p>'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. </p><p> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. </p><p> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. </p><p> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' </p><p>4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : </p><p>'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' </p><p>5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : </p><p>1. As per reference </p><p> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed </p><p>6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p>7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. </p><p>8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. </p><p>9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. </p><p>10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.</p><p>11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : </p><p>June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days </p><p>12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : </p><p>'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' </p><p>13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : </p><p>'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' </p><p>14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : </p><p>a) xxx xxx xxx </p><p> b) xxx xxx xxx </p><p> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] </p><p> (c) xxx xxx xxx </p><p>15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. </p><p>16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : </p><p>'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' </p><p>17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : </p><p>'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' </p><p>18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. </p><p>19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : </p><p>Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) </p><p> Dear Sir,</p><p> Sub : Termination </p><p> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. </p><p> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. </p><p> sd/- </p><p>Personnel Manager </p><p>CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, </p><p>Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' </p><p>20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. </p><p>21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : </p><p>25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - </p><p> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; </p><p> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and </p><p> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). </p><p>22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. </p><p>23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '(1999)123PLR814',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
		'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
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$caseref = 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another<br>'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>K.K. Srivastava, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : ',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' ',
	(int) 4 => '<p>3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. ',
	(int) 6 => '<p> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. ',
	(int) 7 => '<p> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. ',
	(int) 8 => '<p> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' ',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : ',
	(int) 10 => '<p>'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' ',
	(int) 11 => '<p>5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : ',
	(int) 12 => '<p>1. As per reference ',
	(int) 13 => '<p> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed ',
	(int) 14 => '<p>6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. ',
	(int) 15 => '<p>7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. ',
	(int) 16 => '<p>8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. ',
	(int) 17 => '<p>9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. ',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days ',
	(int) 21 => '<p>12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : ',
	(int) 22 => '<p>'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' ',
	(int) 23 => '<p>13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : ',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' ',
	(int) 25 => '<p>14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : ',
	(int) 26 => '<p>a) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 27 => '<p> b) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 28 => '<p> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] ',
	(int) 29 => '<p> (c) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 30 => '<p>15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. ',
	(int) 31 => '<p>16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : ',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' ',
	(int) 33 => '<p>17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : ',
	(int) 34 => '<p>'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' ',
	(int) 35 => '<p>18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. ',
	(int) 36 => '<p>19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : ',
	(int) 37 => '<p>Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) ',
	(int) 38 => '<p> Dear Sir,',
	(int) 39 => '<p> Sub : Termination ',
	(int) 40 => '<p> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. ',
	(int) 41 => '<p> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. ',
	(int) 42 => '<p> sd/- ',
	(int) 43 => '<p>Personnel Manager ',
	(int) 44 => '<p>CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, ',
	(int) 45 => '<p>Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' ',
	(int) 46 => '<p>20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. ',
	(int) 47 => '<p>21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : ',
	(int) 48 => '<p>25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - ',
	(int) 49 => '<p> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; ',
	(int) 50 => '<p> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and ',
	(int) 51 => '<p> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). ',
	(int) 52 => '<p>22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. ',
	(int) 53 => '<p>23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p>',
	(int) 54 => '<p>'
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9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Frick India Private Ltd Vs Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another - Citation 615740 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '615740',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2, 2A, 25B and 25F',
			'appealno' => 'C.W.P. No. 137/1985',
			'appellant' => 'Frick India Private Ltd.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Frick India Private Ltd. Vs. Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
			'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another;',
			'citingcases' => ' June, 1982            18 days 
 July, 1982            31 days 
 August, 1982          31 days 
 September, 1982       30 days 
 October, 1982         31 days 
 November, 1982        30 days 
 December, 1982        31 days 
 January, 1983         31 days 
 February, 1983        28 days 
 March, 1983           12 days 
; 
 Regd. A.D. 
 FIL/PD/83/M-208                                                                                     Dt. 12.3.83 ',
			'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal and; Sudhir Mittal, Advs.',
			'counseldef' => ' J.B. Tacoria, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1999-07-07',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' K.K. Srivastava, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">K.K. Srivastava, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. As per reference </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed </p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days </p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">a) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> b) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (c) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Dear Sir,</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Sub : Termination </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> sd/- </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Personnel Manager </p><p style="text-align: justify;">CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). </p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '(1999)123PLR814',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
			'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'frick-india-private-ltd-vs-vijay-bahadur',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '615740',
		(int) 1 => 'frick-india-private-ltd-vs-vijay-bahadur'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Frick India Private Ltd Vs Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another - Citation 615740 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '615740',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2, 2A, 25B and 25F',
		'appealno' => 'C.W.P. No. 137/1985',
		'appellant' => 'Frick India Private Ltd.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Frick India Private Ltd. Vs. Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
		'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another;',
		'citingcases' => ' June, 1982            18 days 
 July, 1982            31 days 
 August, 1982          31 days 
 September, 1982       30 days 
 October, 1982         31 days 
 November, 1982        30 days 
 December, 1982        31 days 
 January, 1983         31 days 
 February, 1983        28 days 
 March, 1983           12 days 
; 
 Regd. A.D. 
 FIL/PD/83/M-208                                                                                     Dt. 12.3.83 ',
		'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal and; Sudhir Mittal, Advs.',
		'counseldef' => ' J.B. Tacoria, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1999-07-07',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' K.K. Srivastava, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>K.K. Srivastava, J.</p><p>1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p>2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : </p><p>'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' </p><p>3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : </p><p>'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. </p><p> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. </p><p> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. </p><p> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' </p><p>4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : </p><p>'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' </p><p>5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : </p><p>1. As per reference </p><p> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed </p><p>6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p>7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. </p><p>8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. </p><p>9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. </p><p>10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.</p><p>11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : </p><p>June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days </p><p>12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : </p><p>'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' </p><p>13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : </p><p>'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' </p><p>14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : </p><p>a) xxx xxx xxx </p><p> b) xxx xxx xxx </p><p> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] </p><p> (c) xxx xxx xxx </p><p>15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. </p><p>16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : </p><p>'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' </p><p>17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : </p><p>'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' </p><p>18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. </p><p>19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : </p><p>Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) </p><p> Dear Sir,</p><p> Sub : Termination </p><p> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. </p><p> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. </p><p> sd/- </p><p>Personnel Manager </p><p>CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, </p><p>Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' </p><p>20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. </p><p>21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : </p><p>25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - </p><p> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; </p><p> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and </p><p> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). </p><p>22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. </p><p>23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '(1999)123PLR814',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
		'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
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	(int) 0 => '<p>K.K. Srivastava, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : ',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' ',
	(int) 4 => '<p>3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. ',
	(int) 6 => '<p> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. ',
	(int) 7 => '<p> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. ',
	(int) 8 => '<p> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' ',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : ',
	(int) 10 => '<p>'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' ',
	(int) 11 => '<p>5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : ',
	(int) 12 => '<p>1. As per reference ',
	(int) 13 => '<p> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed ',
	(int) 14 => '<p>6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. ',
	(int) 15 => '<p>7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. ',
	(int) 16 => '<p>8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. ',
	(int) 17 => '<p>9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. ',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days ',
	(int) 21 => '<p>12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : ',
	(int) 22 => '<p>'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' ',
	(int) 23 => '<p>13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : ',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' ',
	(int) 25 => '<p>14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : ',
	(int) 26 => '<p>a) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 27 => '<p> b) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 28 => '<p> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] ',
	(int) 29 => '<p> (c) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 30 => '<p>15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. ',
	(int) 31 => '<p>16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : ',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' ',
	(int) 33 => '<p>17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : ',
	(int) 34 => '<p>'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' ',
	(int) 35 => '<p>18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. ',
	(int) 36 => '<p>19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : ',
	(int) 37 => '<p>Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) ',
	(int) 38 => '<p> Dear Sir,',
	(int) 39 => '<p> Sub : Termination ',
	(int) 40 => '<p> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. ',
	(int) 41 => '<p> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. ',
	(int) 42 => '<p> sd/- ',
	(int) 43 => '<p>Personnel Manager ',
	(int) 44 => '<p>CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, ',
	(int) 45 => '<p>Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' ',
	(int) 46 => '<p>20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. ',
	(int) 47 => '<p>21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : ',
	(int) 48 => '<p>25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - ',
	(int) 49 => '<p> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; ',
	(int) 50 => '<p> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and ',
	(int) 51 => '<p> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). ',
	(int) 52 => '<p>22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. ',
	(int) 53 => '<p>23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p>',
	(int) 54 => '<p>'
)
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10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Frick India Private Ltd Vs Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another - Citation 615740 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '615740',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2, 2A, 25B and 25F',
			'appealno' => 'C.W.P. No. 137/1985',
			'appellant' => 'Frick India Private Ltd.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Frick India Private Ltd. Vs. Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
			'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another;',
			'citingcases' => ' June, 1982            18 days 
 July, 1982            31 days 
 August, 1982          31 days 
 September, 1982       30 days 
 October, 1982         31 days 
 November, 1982        30 days 
 December, 1982        31 days 
 January, 1983         31 days 
 February, 1983        28 days 
 March, 1983           12 days 
; 
 Regd. A.D. 
 FIL/PD/83/M-208                                                                                     Dt. 12.3.83 ',
			'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal and; Sudhir Mittal, Advs.',
			'counseldef' => ' J.B. Tacoria, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1999-07-07',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' K.K. Srivastava, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">K.K. Srivastava, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. As per reference </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed </p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days </p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">a) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> b) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (c) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Dear Sir,</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Sub : Termination </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> sd/- </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Personnel Manager </p><p style="text-align: justify;">CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). </p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '(1999)123PLR814',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
			'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'frick-india-private-ltd-vs-vijay-bahadur',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '615740',
		(int) 1 => 'frick-india-private-ltd-vs-vijay-bahadur'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Frick India Private Ltd Vs Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another - Citation 615740 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '615740',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2, 2A, 25B and 25F',
		'appealno' => 'C.W.P. No. 137/1985',
		'appellant' => 'Frick India Private Ltd.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Frick India Private Ltd. Vs. Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
		'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another;',
		'citingcases' => ' June, 1982            18 days 
 July, 1982            31 days 
 August, 1982          31 days 
 September, 1982       30 days 
 October, 1982         31 days 
 November, 1982        30 days 
 December, 1982        31 days 
 January, 1983         31 days 
 February, 1983        28 days 
 March, 1983           12 days 
; 
 Regd. A.D. 
 FIL/PD/83/M-208                                                                                     Dt. 12.3.83 ',
		'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal and; Sudhir Mittal, Advs.',
		'counseldef' => ' J.B. Tacoria, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1999-07-07',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' K.K. Srivastava, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>K.K. Srivastava, J.</p><p>1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p>2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : </p><p>'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' </p><p>3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : </p><p>'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. </p><p> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. </p><p> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. </p><p> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' </p><p>4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : </p><p>'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' </p><p>5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : </p><p>1. As per reference </p><p> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed </p><p>6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p>7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. </p><p>8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. </p><p>9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. </p><p>10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.</p><p>11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : </p><p>June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days </p><p>12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : </p><p>'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' </p><p>13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : </p><p>'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' </p><p>14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : </p><p>a) xxx xxx xxx </p><p> b) xxx xxx xxx </p><p> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] </p><p> (c) xxx xxx xxx </p><p>15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. </p><p>16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : </p><p>'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' </p><p>17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : </p><p>'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' </p><p>18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. </p><p>19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : </p><p>Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) </p><p> Dear Sir,</p><p> Sub : Termination </p><p> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. </p><p> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. </p><p> sd/- </p><p>Personnel Manager </p><p>CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, </p><p>Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' </p><p>20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. </p><p>21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : </p><p>25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - </p><p> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; </p><p> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and </p><p> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). </p><p>22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. </p><p>23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '(1999)123PLR814',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
		'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
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$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>K.K. Srivastava, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : ',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' ',
	(int) 4 => '<p>3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. ',
	(int) 6 => '<p> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. ',
	(int) 7 => '<p> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. ',
	(int) 8 => '<p> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' ',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : ',
	(int) 10 => '<p>'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' ',
	(int) 11 => '<p>5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : ',
	(int) 12 => '<p>1. As per reference ',
	(int) 13 => '<p> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed ',
	(int) 14 => '<p>6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. ',
	(int) 15 => '<p>7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. ',
	(int) 16 => '<p>8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. ',
	(int) 17 => '<p>9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. ',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days ',
	(int) 21 => '<p>12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : ',
	(int) 22 => '<p>'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' ',
	(int) 23 => '<p>13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : ',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' ',
	(int) 25 => '<p>14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : ',
	(int) 26 => '<p>a) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 27 => '<p> b) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 28 => '<p> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] ',
	(int) 29 => '<p> (c) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 30 => '<p>15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. ',
	(int) 31 => '<p>16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : ',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' ',
	(int) 33 => '<p>17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : ',
	(int) 34 => '<p>'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' ',
	(int) 35 => '<p>18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. ',
	(int) 36 => '<p>19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : ',
	(int) 37 => '<p>Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) ',
	(int) 38 => '<p> Dear Sir,',
	(int) 39 => '<p> Sub : Termination ',
	(int) 40 => '<p> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. ',
	(int) 41 => '<p> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. ',
	(int) 42 => '<p> sd/- ',
	(int) 43 => '<p>Personnel Manager ',
	(int) 44 => '<p>CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, ',
	(int) 45 => '<p>Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' ',
	(int) 46 => '<p>20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. ',
	(int) 47 => '<p>21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : ',
	(int) 48 => '<p>25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - ',
	(int) 49 => '<p> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; ',
	(int) 50 => '<p> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and ',
	(int) 51 => '<p> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). ',
	(int) 52 => '<p>22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. ',
	(int) 53 => '<p>23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p>',
	(int) 54 => '<p>'
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11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under :

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Frick India Private Ltd Vs Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another - Citation 615740 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '615740',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2, 2A, 25B and 25F',
			'appealno' => 'C.W.P. No. 137/1985',
			'appellant' => 'Frick India Private Ltd.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Frick India Private Ltd. Vs. Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
			'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another;',
			'citingcases' => ' June, 1982            18 days 
 July, 1982            31 days 
 August, 1982          31 days 
 September, 1982       30 days 
 October, 1982         31 days 
 November, 1982        30 days 
 December, 1982        31 days 
 January, 1983         31 days 
 February, 1983        28 days 
 March, 1983           12 days 
; 
 Regd. A.D. 
 FIL/PD/83/M-208                                                                                     Dt. 12.3.83 ',
			'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal and; Sudhir Mittal, Advs.',
			'counseldef' => ' J.B. Tacoria, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1999-07-07',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' K.K. Srivastava, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">K.K. Srivastava, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. As per reference </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed </p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days </p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">a) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> b) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (c) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Dear Sir,</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Sub : Termination </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> sd/- </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Personnel Manager </p><p style="text-align: justify;">CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). </p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '(1999)123PLR814',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
			'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'frick-india-private-ltd-vs-vijay-bahadur',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '615740',
		(int) 1 => 'frick-india-private-ltd-vs-vijay-bahadur'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Frick India Private Ltd Vs Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another - Citation 615740 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '615740',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2, 2A, 25B and 25F',
		'appealno' => 'C.W.P. No. 137/1985',
		'appellant' => 'Frick India Private Ltd.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Frick India Private Ltd. Vs. Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
		'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another;',
		'citingcases' => ' June, 1982            18 days 
 July, 1982            31 days 
 August, 1982          31 days 
 September, 1982       30 days 
 October, 1982         31 days 
 November, 1982        30 days 
 December, 1982        31 days 
 January, 1983         31 days 
 February, 1983        28 days 
 March, 1983           12 days 
; 
 Regd. A.D. 
 FIL/PD/83/M-208                                                                                     Dt. 12.3.83 ',
		'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal and; Sudhir Mittal, Advs.',
		'counseldef' => ' J.B. Tacoria, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1999-07-07',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' K.K. Srivastava, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>K.K. Srivastava, J.</p><p>1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p>2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : </p><p>'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' </p><p>3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : </p><p>'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. </p><p> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. </p><p> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. </p><p> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' </p><p>4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : </p><p>'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' </p><p>5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : </p><p>1. As per reference </p><p> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed </p><p>6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p>7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. </p><p>8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. </p><p>9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. </p><p>10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.</p><p>11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : </p><p>June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days </p><p>12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : </p><p>'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' </p><p>13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : </p><p>'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' </p><p>14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : </p><p>a) xxx xxx xxx </p><p> b) xxx xxx xxx </p><p> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] </p><p> (c) xxx xxx xxx </p><p>15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. </p><p>16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : </p><p>'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' </p><p>17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : </p><p>'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' </p><p>18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. </p><p>19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : </p><p>Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) </p><p> Dear Sir,</p><p> Sub : Termination </p><p> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. </p><p> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. </p><p> sd/- </p><p>Personnel Manager </p><p>CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, </p><p>Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' </p><p>20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. </p><p>21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : </p><p>25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - </p><p> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; </p><p> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and </p><p> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). </p><p>22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. </p><p>23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '(1999)123PLR814',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
		'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
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	(int) 0 => '<p>K.K. Srivastava, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : ',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' ',
	(int) 4 => '<p>3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. ',
	(int) 6 => '<p> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. ',
	(int) 7 => '<p> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. ',
	(int) 8 => '<p> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' ',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : ',
	(int) 10 => '<p>'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' ',
	(int) 11 => '<p>5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : ',
	(int) 12 => '<p>1. As per reference ',
	(int) 13 => '<p> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed ',
	(int) 14 => '<p>6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. ',
	(int) 15 => '<p>7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. ',
	(int) 16 => '<p>8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. ',
	(int) 17 => '<p>9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. ',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days ',
	(int) 21 => '<p>12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : ',
	(int) 22 => '<p>'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' ',
	(int) 23 => '<p>13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : ',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' ',
	(int) 25 => '<p>14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : ',
	(int) 26 => '<p>a) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 27 => '<p> b) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 28 => '<p> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] ',
	(int) 29 => '<p> (c) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 30 => '<p>15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. ',
	(int) 31 => '<p>16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : ',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' ',
	(int) 33 => '<p>17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : ',
	(int) 34 => '<p>'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' ',
	(int) 35 => '<p>18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. ',
	(int) 36 => '<p>19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : ',
	(int) 37 => '<p>Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) ',
	(int) 38 => '<p> Dear Sir,',
	(int) 39 => '<p> Sub : Termination ',
	(int) 40 => '<p> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. ',
	(int) 41 => '<p> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. ',
	(int) 42 => '<p> sd/- ',
	(int) 43 => '<p>Personnel Manager ',
	(int) 44 => '<p>CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, ',
	(int) 45 => '<p>Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' ',
	(int) 46 => '<p>20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. ',
	(int) 47 => '<p>21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : ',
	(int) 48 => '<p>25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - ',
	(int) 49 => '<p> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; ',
	(int) 50 => '<p> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and ',
	(int) 51 => '<p> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). ',
	(int) 52 => '<p>22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. ',
	(int) 53 => '<p>23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p>',
	(int) 54 => '<p>'
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June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Frick India Private Ltd Vs Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another - Citation 615740 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '615740',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2, 2A, 25B and 25F',
			'appealno' => 'C.W.P. No. 137/1985',
			'appellant' => 'Frick India Private Ltd.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Frick India Private Ltd. Vs. Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
			'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another;',
			'citingcases' => ' June, 1982            18 days 
 July, 1982            31 days 
 August, 1982          31 days 
 September, 1982       30 days 
 October, 1982         31 days 
 November, 1982        30 days 
 December, 1982        31 days 
 January, 1983         31 days 
 February, 1983        28 days 
 March, 1983           12 days 
; 
 Regd. A.D. 
 FIL/PD/83/M-208                                                                                     Dt. 12.3.83 ',
			'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal and; Sudhir Mittal, Advs.',
			'counseldef' => ' J.B. Tacoria, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1999-07-07',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' K.K. Srivastava, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">K.K. Srivastava, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. As per reference </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed </p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days </p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">a) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> b) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (c) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Dear Sir,</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Sub : Termination </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> sd/- </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Personnel Manager </p><p style="text-align: justify;">CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). </p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '(1999)123PLR814',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
			'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'frick-india-private-ltd-vs-vijay-bahadur',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '615740',
		(int) 1 => 'frick-india-private-ltd-vs-vijay-bahadur'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Frick India Private Ltd Vs Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another - Citation 615740 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '615740',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2, 2A, 25B and 25F',
		'appealno' => 'C.W.P. No. 137/1985',
		'appellant' => 'Frick India Private Ltd.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Frick India Private Ltd. Vs. Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
		'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another;',
		'citingcases' => ' June, 1982            18 days 
 July, 1982            31 days 
 August, 1982          31 days 
 September, 1982       30 days 
 October, 1982         31 days 
 November, 1982        30 days 
 December, 1982        31 days 
 January, 1983         31 days 
 February, 1983        28 days 
 March, 1983           12 days 
; 
 Regd. A.D. 
 FIL/PD/83/M-208                                                                                     Dt. 12.3.83 ',
		'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal and; Sudhir Mittal, Advs.',
		'counseldef' => ' J.B. Tacoria, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1999-07-07',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' K.K. Srivastava, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>K.K. Srivastava, J.</p><p>1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p>2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : </p><p>'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' </p><p>3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : </p><p>'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. </p><p> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. </p><p> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. </p><p> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' </p><p>4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : </p><p>'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' </p><p>5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : </p><p>1. As per reference </p><p> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed </p><p>6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p>7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. </p><p>8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. </p><p>9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. </p><p>10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.</p><p>11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : </p><p>June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days </p><p>12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : </p><p>'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' </p><p>13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : </p><p>'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' </p><p>14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : </p><p>a) xxx xxx xxx </p><p> b) xxx xxx xxx </p><p> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] </p><p> (c) xxx xxx xxx </p><p>15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. </p><p>16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : </p><p>'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' </p><p>17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : </p><p>'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' </p><p>18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. </p><p>19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : </p><p>Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) </p><p> Dear Sir,</p><p> Sub : Termination </p><p> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. </p><p> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. </p><p> sd/- </p><p>Personnel Manager </p><p>CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, </p><p>Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' </p><p>20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. </p><p>21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : </p><p>25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - </p><p> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; </p><p> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and </p><p> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). </p><p>22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. </p><p>23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '(1999)123PLR814',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
		'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
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	(int) 0 => '<p>K.K. Srivastava, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : ',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' ',
	(int) 4 => '<p>3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. ',
	(int) 6 => '<p> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. ',
	(int) 7 => '<p> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. ',
	(int) 8 => '<p> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' ',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : ',
	(int) 10 => '<p>'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' ',
	(int) 11 => '<p>5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : ',
	(int) 12 => '<p>1. As per reference ',
	(int) 13 => '<p> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed ',
	(int) 14 => '<p>6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. ',
	(int) 15 => '<p>7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. ',
	(int) 16 => '<p>8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. ',
	(int) 17 => '<p>9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. ',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days ',
	(int) 21 => '<p>12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : ',
	(int) 22 => '<p>'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' ',
	(int) 23 => '<p>13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : ',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' ',
	(int) 25 => '<p>14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : ',
	(int) 26 => '<p>a) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 27 => '<p> b) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 28 => '<p> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] ',
	(int) 29 => '<p> (c) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 30 => '<p>15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. ',
	(int) 31 => '<p>16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : ',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' ',
	(int) 33 => '<p>17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : ',
	(int) 34 => '<p>'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' ',
	(int) 35 => '<p>18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. ',
	(int) 36 => '<p>19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : ',
	(int) 37 => '<p>Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) ',
	(int) 38 => '<p> Dear Sir,',
	(int) 39 => '<p> Sub : Termination ',
	(int) 40 => '<p> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. ',
	(int) 41 => '<p> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. ',
	(int) 42 => '<p> sd/- ',
	(int) 43 => '<p>Personnel Manager ',
	(int) 44 => '<p>CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, ',
	(int) 45 => '<p>Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' ',
	(int) 46 => '<p>20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. ',
	(int) 47 => '<p>21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : ',
	(int) 48 => '<p>25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - ',
	(int) 49 => '<p> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; ',
	(int) 50 => '<p> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and ',
	(int) 51 => '<p> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). ',
	(int) 52 => '<p>22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. ',
	(int) 53 => '<p>23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p>',
	(int) 54 => '<p>'
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12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under :

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Frick India Private Ltd Vs Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another - Citation 615740 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '615740',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2, 2A, 25B and 25F',
			'appealno' => 'C.W.P. No. 137/1985',
			'appellant' => 'Frick India Private Ltd.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Frick India Private Ltd. Vs. Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
			'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another;',
			'citingcases' => ' June, 1982            18 days 
 July, 1982            31 days 
 August, 1982          31 days 
 September, 1982       30 days 
 October, 1982         31 days 
 November, 1982        30 days 
 December, 1982        31 days 
 January, 1983         31 days 
 February, 1983        28 days 
 March, 1983           12 days 
; 
 Regd. A.D. 
 FIL/PD/83/M-208                                                                                     Dt. 12.3.83 ',
			'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal and; Sudhir Mittal, Advs.',
			'counseldef' => ' J.B. Tacoria, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1999-07-07',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' K.K. Srivastava, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">K.K. Srivastava, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. As per reference </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed </p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days </p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">a) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> b) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (c) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Dear Sir,</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Sub : Termination </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> sd/- </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Personnel Manager </p><p style="text-align: justify;">CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). </p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '(1999)123PLR814',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
			'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'frick-india-private-ltd-vs-vijay-bahadur',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '615740',
		(int) 1 => 'frick-india-private-ltd-vs-vijay-bahadur'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Frick India Private Ltd Vs Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another - Citation 615740 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '615740',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2, 2A, 25B and 25F',
		'appealno' => 'C.W.P. No. 137/1985',
		'appellant' => 'Frick India Private Ltd.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Frick India Private Ltd. Vs. Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
		'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another;',
		'citingcases' => ' June, 1982            18 days 
 July, 1982            31 days 
 August, 1982          31 days 
 September, 1982       30 days 
 October, 1982         31 days 
 November, 1982        30 days 
 December, 1982        31 days 
 January, 1983         31 days 
 February, 1983        28 days 
 March, 1983           12 days 
; 
 Regd. A.D. 
 FIL/PD/83/M-208                                                                                     Dt. 12.3.83 ',
		'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal and; Sudhir Mittal, Advs.',
		'counseldef' => ' J.B. Tacoria, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1999-07-07',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' K.K. Srivastava, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>K.K. Srivastava, J.</p><p>1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p>2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : </p><p>'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' </p><p>3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : </p><p>'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. </p><p> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. </p><p> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. </p><p> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' </p><p>4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : </p><p>'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' </p><p>5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : </p><p>1. As per reference </p><p> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed </p><p>6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p>7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. </p><p>8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. </p><p>9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. </p><p>10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.</p><p>11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : </p><p>June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days </p><p>12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : </p><p>'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' </p><p>13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : </p><p>'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' </p><p>14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : </p><p>a) xxx xxx xxx </p><p> b) xxx xxx xxx </p><p> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] </p><p> (c) xxx xxx xxx </p><p>15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. </p><p>16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : </p><p>'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' </p><p>17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : </p><p>'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' </p><p>18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. </p><p>19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : </p><p>Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) </p><p> Dear Sir,</p><p> Sub : Termination </p><p> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. </p><p> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. </p><p> sd/- </p><p>Personnel Manager </p><p>CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, </p><p>Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' </p><p>20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. </p><p>21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : </p><p>25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - </p><p> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; </p><p> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and </p><p> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). </p><p>22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. </p><p>23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '(1999)123PLR814',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
		'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
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$caseref = 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another<br>'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>K.K. Srivastava, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : ',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' ',
	(int) 4 => '<p>3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. ',
	(int) 6 => '<p> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. ',
	(int) 7 => '<p> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. ',
	(int) 8 => '<p> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' ',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : ',
	(int) 10 => '<p>'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' ',
	(int) 11 => '<p>5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : ',
	(int) 12 => '<p>1. As per reference ',
	(int) 13 => '<p> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed ',
	(int) 14 => '<p>6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. ',
	(int) 15 => '<p>7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. ',
	(int) 16 => '<p>8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. ',
	(int) 17 => '<p>9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. ',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days ',
	(int) 21 => '<p>12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : ',
	(int) 22 => '<p>'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' ',
	(int) 23 => '<p>13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : ',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' ',
	(int) 25 => '<p>14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : ',
	(int) 26 => '<p>a) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 27 => '<p> b) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 28 => '<p> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] ',
	(int) 29 => '<p> (c) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 30 => '<p>15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. ',
	(int) 31 => '<p>16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : ',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' ',
	(int) 33 => '<p>17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : ',
	(int) 34 => '<p>'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' ',
	(int) 35 => '<p>18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. ',
	(int) 36 => '<p>19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : ',
	(int) 37 => '<p>Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) ',
	(int) 38 => '<p> Dear Sir,',
	(int) 39 => '<p> Sub : Termination ',
	(int) 40 => '<p> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. ',
	(int) 41 => '<p> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. ',
	(int) 42 => '<p> sd/- ',
	(int) 43 => '<p>Personnel Manager ',
	(int) 44 => '<p>CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, ',
	(int) 45 => '<p>Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' ',
	(int) 46 => '<p>20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. ',
	(int) 47 => '<p>21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : ',
	(int) 48 => '<p>25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - ',
	(int) 49 => '<p> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; ',
	(int) 50 => '<p> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and ',
	(int) 51 => '<p> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). ',
	(int) 52 => '<p>22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. ',
	(int) 53 => '<p>23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p>',
	(int) 54 => '<p>'
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'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.'

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Frick India Private Ltd Vs Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another - Citation 615740 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '615740',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2, 2A, 25B and 25F',
			'appealno' => 'C.W.P. No. 137/1985',
			'appellant' => 'Frick India Private Ltd.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Frick India Private Ltd. Vs. Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
			'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another;',
			'citingcases' => ' June, 1982            18 days 
 July, 1982            31 days 
 August, 1982          31 days 
 September, 1982       30 days 
 October, 1982         31 days 
 November, 1982        30 days 
 December, 1982        31 days 
 January, 1983         31 days 
 February, 1983        28 days 
 March, 1983           12 days 
; 
 Regd. A.D. 
 FIL/PD/83/M-208                                                                                     Dt. 12.3.83 ',
			'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal and; Sudhir Mittal, Advs.',
			'counseldef' => ' J.B. Tacoria, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1999-07-07',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' K.K. Srivastava, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">K.K. Srivastava, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. As per reference </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed </p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days </p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">a) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> b) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (c) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Dear Sir,</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Sub : Termination </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> sd/- </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Personnel Manager </p><p style="text-align: justify;">CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). </p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '(1999)123PLR814',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
			'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'frick-india-private-ltd-vs-vijay-bahadur',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '615740',
		(int) 1 => 'frick-india-private-ltd-vs-vijay-bahadur'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Frick India Private Ltd Vs Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another - Citation 615740 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '615740',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2, 2A, 25B and 25F',
		'appealno' => 'C.W.P. No. 137/1985',
		'appellant' => 'Frick India Private Ltd.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Frick India Private Ltd. Vs. Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
		'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another;',
		'citingcases' => ' June, 1982            18 days 
 July, 1982            31 days 
 August, 1982          31 days 
 September, 1982       30 days 
 October, 1982         31 days 
 November, 1982        30 days 
 December, 1982        31 days 
 January, 1983         31 days 
 February, 1983        28 days 
 March, 1983           12 days 
; 
 Regd. A.D. 
 FIL/PD/83/M-208                                                                                     Dt. 12.3.83 ',
		'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal and; Sudhir Mittal, Advs.',
		'counseldef' => ' J.B. Tacoria, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1999-07-07',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' K.K. Srivastava, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>K.K. Srivastava, J.</p><p>1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p>2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : </p><p>'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' </p><p>3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : </p><p>'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. </p><p> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. </p><p> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. </p><p> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' </p><p>4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : </p><p>'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' </p><p>5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : </p><p>1. As per reference </p><p> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed </p><p>6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p>7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. </p><p>8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. </p><p>9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. </p><p>10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.</p><p>11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : </p><p>June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days </p><p>12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : </p><p>'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' </p><p>13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : </p><p>'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' </p><p>14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : </p><p>a) xxx xxx xxx </p><p> b) xxx xxx xxx </p><p> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] </p><p> (c) xxx xxx xxx </p><p>15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. </p><p>16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : </p><p>'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' </p><p>17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : </p><p>'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' </p><p>18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. </p><p>19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : </p><p>Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) </p><p> Dear Sir,</p><p> Sub : Termination </p><p> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. </p><p> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. </p><p> sd/- </p><p>Personnel Manager </p><p>CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, </p><p>Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' </p><p>20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. </p><p>21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : </p><p>25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - </p><p> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; </p><p> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and </p><p> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). </p><p>22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. </p><p>23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '(1999)123PLR814',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
		'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
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$caseref = 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another<br>'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>K.K. Srivastava, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : ',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' ',
	(int) 4 => '<p>3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. ',
	(int) 6 => '<p> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. ',
	(int) 7 => '<p> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. ',
	(int) 8 => '<p> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' ',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : ',
	(int) 10 => '<p>'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' ',
	(int) 11 => '<p>5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : ',
	(int) 12 => '<p>1. As per reference ',
	(int) 13 => '<p> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed ',
	(int) 14 => '<p>6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. ',
	(int) 15 => '<p>7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. ',
	(int) 16 => '<p>8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. ',
	(int) 17 => '<p>9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. ',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days ',
	(int) 21 => '<p>12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : ',
	(int) 22 => '<p>'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' ',
	(int) 23 => '<p>13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : ',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' ',
	(int) 25 => '<p>14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : ',
	(int) 26 => '<p>a) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 27 => '<p> b) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 28 => '<p> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] ',
	(int) 29 => '<p> (c) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 30 => '<p>15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. ',
	(int) 31 => '<p>16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : ',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' ',
	(int) 33 => '<p>17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : ',
	(int) 34 => '<p>'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' ',
	(int) 35 => '<p>18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. ',
	(int) 36 => '<p>19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : ',
	(int) 37 => '<p>Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) ',
	(int) 38 => '<p> Dear Sir,',
	(int) 39 => '<p> Sub : Termination ',
	(int) 40 => '<p> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. ',
	(int) 41 => '<p> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. ',
	(int) 42 => '<p> sd/- ',
	(int) 43 => '<p>Personnel Manager ',
	(int) 44 => '<p>CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, ',
	(int) 45 => '<p>Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' ',
	(int) 46 => '<p>20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. ',
	(int) 47 => '<p>21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : ',
	(int) 48 => '<p>25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - ',
	(int) 49 => '<p> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; ',
	(int) 50 => '<p> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and ',
	(int) 51 => '<p> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). ',
	(int) 52 => '<p>22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. ',
	(int) 53 => '<p>23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p>',
	(int) 54 => '<p>'
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13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under :

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Frick India Private Ltd Vs Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another - Citation 615740 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '615740',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2, 2A, 25B and 25F',
			'appealno' => 'C.W.P. No. 137/1985',
			'appellant' => 'Frick India Private Ltd.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Frick India Private Ltd. Vs. Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
			'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another;',
			'citingcases' => ' June, 1982            18 days 
 July, 1982            31 days 
 August, 1982          31 days 
 September, 1982       30 days 
 October, 1982         31 days 
 November, 1982        30 days 
 December, 1982        31 days 
 January, 1983         31 days 
 February, 1983        28 days 
 March, 1983           12 days 
; 
 Regd. A.D. 
 FIL/PD/83/M-208                                                                                     Dt. 12.3.83 ',
			'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal and; Sudhir Mittal, Advs.',
			'counseldef' => ' J.B. Tacoria, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1999-07-07',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' K.K. Srivastava, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">K.K. Srivastava, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. As per reference </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed </p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days </p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">a) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> b) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (c) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Dear Sir,</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Sub : Termination </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> sd/- </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Personnel Manager </p><p style="text-align: justify;">CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). </p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '(1999)123PLR814',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
			'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'frick-india-private-ltd-vs-vijay-bahadur',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '615740',
		(int) 1 => 'frick-india-private-ltd-vs-vijay-bahadur'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Frick India Private Ltd Vs Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another - Citation 615740 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '615740',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2, 2A, 25B and 25F',
		'appealno' => 'C.W.P. No. 137/1985',
		'appellant' => 'Frick India Private Ltd.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Frick India Private Ltd. Vs. Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
		'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another;',
		'citingcases' => ' June, 1982            18 days 
 July, 1982            31 days 
 August, 1982          31 days 
 September, 1982       30 days 
 October, 1982         31 days 
 November, 1982        30 days 
 December, 1982        31 days 
 January, 1983         31 days 
 February, 1983        28 days 
 March, 1983           12 days 
; 
 Regd. A.D. 
 FIL/PD/83/M-208                                                                                     Dt. 12.3.83 ',
		'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal and; Sudhir Mittal, Advs.',
		'counseldef' => ' J.B. Tacoria, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1999-07-07',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' K.K. Srivastava, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>K.K. Srivastava, J.</p><p>1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p>2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : </p><p>'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' </p><p>3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : </p><p>'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. </p><p> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. </p><p> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. </p><p> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' </p><p>4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : </p><p>'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' </p><p>5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : </p><p>1. As per reference </p><p> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed </p><p>6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p>7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. </p><p>8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. </p><p>9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. </p><p>10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.</p><p>11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : </p><p>June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days </p><p>12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : </p><p>'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' </p><p>13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : </p><p>'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' </p><p>14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : </p><p>a) xxx xxx xxx </p><p> b) xxx xxx xxx </p><p> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] </p><p> (c) xxx xxx xxx </p><p>15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. </p><p>16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : </p><p>'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' </p><p>17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : </p><p>'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' </p><p>18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. </p><p>19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : </p><p>Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) </p><p> Dear Sir,</p><p> Sub : Termination </p><p> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. </p><p> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. </p><p> sd/- </p><p>Personnel Manager </p><p>CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, </p><p>Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' </p><p>20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. </p><p>21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : </p><p>25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - </p><p> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; </p><p> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and </p><p> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). </p><p>22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. </p><p>23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '(1999)123PLR814',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
		'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
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	(int) 0 => '<p>K.K. Srivastava, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : ',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' ',
	(int) 4 => '<p>3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. ',
	(int) 6 => '<p> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. ',
	(int) 7 => '<p> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. ',
	(int) 8 => '<p> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' ',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : ',
	(int) 10 => '<p>'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' ',
	(int) 11 => '<p>5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : ',
	(int) 12 => '<p>1. As per reference ',
	(int) 13 => '<p> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed ',
	(int) 14 => '<p>6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. ',
	(int) 15 => '<p>7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. ',
	(int) 16 => '<p>8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. ',
	(int) 17 => '<p>9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. ',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days ',
	(int) 21 => '<p>12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : ',
	(int) 22 => '<p>'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' ',
	(int) 23 => '<p>13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : ',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' ',
	(int) 25 => '<p>14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : ',
	(int) 26 => '<p>a) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 27 => '<p> b) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 28 => '<p> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] ',
	(int) 29 => '<p> (c) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 30 => '<p>15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. ',
	(int) 31 => '<p>16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : ',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' ',
	(int) 33 => '<p>17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : ',
	(int) 34 => '<p>'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' ',
	(int) 35 => '<p>18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. ',
	(int) 36 => '<p>19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : ',
	(int) 37 => '<p>Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) ',
	(int) 38 => '<p> Dear Sir,',
	(int) 39 => '<p> Sub : Termination ',
	(int) 40 => '<p> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. ',
	(int) 41 => '<p> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. ',
	(int) 42 => '<p> sd/- ',
	(int) 43 => '<p>Personnel Manager ',
	(int) 44 => '<p>CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, ',
	(int) 45 => '<p>Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' ',
	(int) 46 => '<p>20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. ',
	(int) 47 => '<p>21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : ',
	(int) 48 => '<p>25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - ',
	(int) 49 => '<p> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; ',
	(int) 50 => '<p> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and ',
	(int) 51 => '<p> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). ',
	(int) 52 => '<p>22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. ',
	(int) 53 => '<p>23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p>',
	(int) 54 => '<p>'
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'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....'

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Frick India Private Ltd Vs Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another - Citation 615740 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '615740',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2, 2A, 25B and 25F',
			'appealno' => 'C.W.P. No. 137/1985',
			'appellant' => 'Frick India Private Ltd.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Frick India Private Ltd. Vs. Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
			'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another;',
			'citingcases' => ' June, 1982            18 days 
 July, 1982            31 days 
 August, 1982          31 days 
 September, 1982       30 days 
 October, 1982         31 days 
 November, 1982        30 days 
 December, 1982        31 days 
 January, 1983         31 days 
 February, 1983        28 days 
 March, 1983           12 days 
; 
 Regd. A.D. 
 FIL/PD/83/M-208                                                                                     Dt. 12.3.83 ',
			'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal and; Sudhir Mittal, Advs.',
			'counseldef' => ' J.B. Tacoria, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1999-07-07',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' K.K. Srivastava, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">K.K. Srivastava, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. As per reference </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed </p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days </p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">a) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> b) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (c) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Dear Sir,</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Sub : Termination </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> sd/- </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Personnel Manager </p><p style="text-align: justify;">CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). </p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '(1999)123PLR814',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
			'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'frick-india-private-ltd-vs-vijay-bahadur',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '615740',
		(int) 1 => 'frick-india-private-ltd-vs-vijay-bahadur'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Frick India Private Ltd Vs Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another - Citation 615740 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '615740',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2, 2A, 25B and 25F',
		'appealno' => 'C.W.P. No. 137/1985',
		'appellant' => 'Frick India Private Ltd.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Frick India Private Ltd. Vs. Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
		'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another;',
		'citingcases' => ' June, 1982            18 days 
 July, 1982            31 days 
 August, 1982          31 days 
 September, 1982       30 days 
 October, 1982         31 days 
 November, 1982        30 days 
 December, 1982        31 days 
 January, 1983         31 days 
 February, 1983        28 days 
 March, 1983           12 days 
; 
 Regd. A.D. 
 FIL/PD/83/M-208                                                                                     Dt. 12.3.83 ',
		'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal and; Sudhir Mittal, Advs.',
		'counseldef' => ' J.B. Tacoria, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1999-07-07',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' K.K. Srivastava, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>K.K. Srivastava, J.</p><p>1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p>2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : </p><p>'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' </p><p>3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : </p><p>'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. </p><p> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. </p><p> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. </p><p> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' </p><p>4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : </p><p>'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' </p><p>5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : </p><p>1. As per reference </p><p> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed </p><p>6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p>7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. </p><p>8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. </p><p>9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. </p><p>10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.</p><p>11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : </p><p>June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days </p><p>12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : </p><p>'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' </p><p>13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : </p><p>'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' </p><p>14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : </p><p>a) xxx xxx xxx </p><p> b) xxx xxx xxx </p><p> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] </p><p> (c) xxx xxx xxx </p><p>15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. </p><p>16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : </p><p>'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' </p><p>17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : </p><p>'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' </p><p>18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. </p><p>19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : </p><p>Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) </p><p> Dear Sir,</p><p> Sub : Termination </p><p> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. </p><p> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. </p><p> sd/- </p><p>Personnel Manager </p><p>CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, </p><p>Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' </p><p>20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. </p><p>21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : </p><p>25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - </p><p> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; </p><p> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and </p><p> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). </p><p>22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. </p><p>23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '(1999)123PLR814',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
		'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
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	(int) 0 => '<p>K.K. Srivastava, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : ',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' ',
	(int) 4 => '<p>3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. ',
	(int) 6 => '<p> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. ',
	(int) 7 => '<p> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. ',
	(int) 8 => '<p> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' ',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : ',
	(int) 10 => '<p>'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' ',
	(int) 11 => '<p>5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : ',
	(int) 12 => '<p>1. As per reference ',
	(int) 13 => '<p> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed ',
	(int) 14 => '<p>6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. ',
	(int) 15 => '<p>7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. ',
	(int) 16 => '<p>8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. ',
	(int) 17 => '<p>9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. ',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days ',
	(int) 21 => '<p>12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : ',
	(int) 22 => '<p>'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' ',
	(int) 23 => '<p>13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : ',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' ',
	(int) 25 => '<p>14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : ',
	(int) 26 => '<p>a) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 27 => '<p> b) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 28 => '<p> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] ',
	(int) 29 => '<p> (c) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 30 => '<p>15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. ',
	(int) 31 => '<p>16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : ',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' ',
	(int) 33 => '<p>17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : ',
	(int) 34 => '<p>'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' ',
	(int) 35 => '<p>18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. ',
	(int) 36 => '<p>19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : ',
	(int) 37 => '<p>Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) ',
	(int) 38 => '<p> Dear Sir,',
	(int) 39 => '<p> Sub : Termination ',
	(int) 40 => '<p> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. ',
	(int) 41 => '<p> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. ',
	(int) 42 => '<p> sd/- ',
	(int) 43 => '<p>Personnel Manager ',
	(int) 44 => '<p>CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, ',
	(int) 45 => '<p>Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' ',
	(int) 46 => '<p>20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. ',
	(int) 47 => '<p>21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : ',
	(int) 48 => '<p>25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - ',
	(int) 49 => '<p> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; ',
	(int) 50 => '<p> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and ',
	(int) 51 => '<p> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). ',
	(int) 52 => '<p>22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. ',
	(int) 53 => '<p>23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p>',
	(int) 54 => '<p>'
)
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14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include :

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Frick India Private Ltd Vs Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another - Citation 615740 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '615740',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2, 2A, 25B and 25F',
			'appealno' => 'C.W.P. No. 137/1985',
			'appellant' => 'Frick India Private Ltd.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Frick India Private Ltd. Vs. Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
			'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another;',
			'citingcases' => ' June, 1982            18 days 
 July, 1982            31 days 
 August, 1982          31 days 
 September, 1982       30 days 
 October, 1982         31 days 
 November, 1982        30 days 
 December, 1982        31 days 
 January, 1983         31 days 
 February, 1983        28 days 
 March, 1983           12 days 
; 
 Regd. A.D. 
 FIL/PD/83/M-208                                                                                     Dt. 12.3.83 ',
			'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal and; Sudhir Mittal, Advs.',
			'counseldef' => ' J.B. Tacoria, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1999-07-07',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' K.K. Srivastava, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">K.K. Srivastava, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. As per reference </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed </p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days </p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">a) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> b) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (c) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Dear Sir,</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Sub : Termination </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> sd/- </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Personnel Manager </p><p style="text-align: justify;">CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). </p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '(1999)123PLR814',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
			'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'frick-india-private-ltd-vs-vijay-bahadur',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '615740',
		(int) 1 => 'frick-india-private-ltd-vs-vijay-bahadur'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Frick India Private Ltd Vs Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another - Citation 615740 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '615740',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2, 2A, 25B and 25F',
		'appealno' => 'C.W.P. No. 137/1985',
		'appellant' => 'Frick India Private Ltd.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Frick India Private Ltd. Vs. Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
		'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another;',
		'citingcases' => ' June, 1982            18 days 
 July, 1982            31 days 
 August, 1982          31 days 
 September, 1982       30 days 
 October, 1982         31 days 
 November, 1982        30 days 
 December, 1982        31 days 
 January, 1983         31 days 
 February, 1983        28 days 
 March, 1983           12 days 
; 
 Regd. A.D. 
 FIL/PD/83/M-208                                                                                     Dt. 12.3.83 ',
		'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal and; Sudhir Mittal, Advs.',
		'counseldef' => ' J.B. Tacoria, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1999-07-07',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' K.K. Srivastava, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>K.K. Srivastava, J.</p><p>1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p>2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : </p><p>'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' </p><p>3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : </p><p>'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. </p><p> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. </p><p> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. </p><p> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' </p><p>4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : </p><p>'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' </p><p>5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : </p><p>1. As per reference </p><p> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed </p><p>6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p>7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. </p><p>8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. </p><p>9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. </p><p>10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.</p><p>11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : </p><p>June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days </p><p>12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : </p><p>'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' </p><p>13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : </p><p>'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' </p><p>14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : </p><p>a) xxx xxx xxx </p><p> b) xxx xxx xxx </p><p> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] </p><p> (c) xxx xxx xxx </p><p>15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. </p><p>16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : </p><p>'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' </p><p>17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : </p><p>'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' </p><p>18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. </p><p>19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : </p><p>Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) </p><p> Dear Sir,</p><p> Sub : Termination </p><p> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. </p><p> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. </p><p> sd/- </p><p>Personnel Manager </p><p>CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, </p><p>Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' </p><p>20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. </p><p>21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : </p><p>25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - </p><p> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; </p><p> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and </p><p> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). </p><p>22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. </p><p>23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '(1999)123PLR814',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
		'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
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$caseref = 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another<br>'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>K.K. Srivastava, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : ',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' ',
	(int) 4 => '<p>3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. ',
	(int) 6 => '<p> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. ',
	(int) 7 => '<p> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. ',
	(int) 8 => '<p> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' ',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : ',
	(int) 10 => '<p>'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' ',
	(int) 11 => '<p>5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : ',
	(int) 12 => '<p>1. As per reference ',
	(int) 13 => '<p> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed ',
	(int) 14 => '<p>6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. ',
	(int) 15 => '<p>7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. ',
	(int) 16 => '<p>8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. ',
	(int) 17 => '<p>9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. ',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days ',
	(int) 21 => '<p>12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : ',
	(int) 22 => '<p>'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' ',
	(int) 23 => '<p>13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : ',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' ',
	(int) 25 => '<p>14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : ',
	(int) 26 => '<p>a) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 27 => '<p> b) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 28 => '<p> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] ',
	(int) 29 => '<p> (c) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 30 => '<p>15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. ',
	(int) 31 => '<p>16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : ',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' ',
	(int) 33 => '<p>17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : ',
	(int) 34 => '<p>'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' ',
	(int) 35 => '<p>18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. ',
	(int) 36 => '<p>19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : ',
	(int) 37 => '<p>Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) ',
	(int) 38 => '<p> Dear Sir,',
	(int) 39 => '<p> Sub : Termination ',
	(int) 40 => '<p> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. ',
	(int) 41 => '<p> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. ',
	(int) 42 => '<p> sd/- ',
	(int) 43 => '<p>Personnel Manager ',
	(int) 44 => '<p>CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, ',
	(int) 45 => '<p>Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' ',
	(int) 46 => '<p>20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. ',
	(int) 47 => '<p>21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : ',
	(int) 48 => '<p>25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - ',
	(int) 49 => '<p> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; ',
	(int) 50 => '<p> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and ',
	(int) 51 => '<p> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). ',
	(int) 52 => '<p>22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. ',
	(int) 53 => '<p>23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p>',
	(int) 54 => '<p>'
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a) xxx xxx xxx

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Frick India Private Ltd Vs Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another - Citation 615740 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '615740',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2, 2A, 25B and 25F',
			'appealno' => 'C.W.P. No. 137/1985',
			'appellant' => 'Frick India Private Ltd.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Frick India Private Ltd. Vs. Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
			'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another;',
			'citingcases' => ' June, 1982            18 days 
 July, 1982            31 days 
 August, 1982          31 days 
 September, 1982       30 days 
 October, 1982         31 days 
 November, 1982        30 days 
 December, 1982        31 days 
 January, 1983         31 days 
 February, 1983        28 days 
 March, 1983           12 days 
; 
 Regd. A.D. 
 FIL/PD/83/M-208                                                                                     Dt. 12.3.83 ',
			'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal and; Sudhir Mittal, Advs.',
			'counseldef' => ' J.B. Tacoria, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1999-07-07',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' K.K. Srivastava, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">K.K. Srivastava, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. As per reference </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed </p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days </p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">a) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> b) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (c) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Dear Sir,</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Sub : Termination </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> sd/- </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Personnel Manager </p><p style="text-align: justify;">CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). </p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '(1999)123PLR814',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
			'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'frick-india-private-ltd-vs-vijay-bahadur',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '615740',
		(int) 1 => 'frick-india-private-ltd-vs-vijay-bahadur'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Frick India Private Ltd Vs Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another - Citation 615740 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '615740',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2, 2A, 25B and 25F',
		'appealno' => 'C.W.P. No. 137/1985',
		'appellant' => 'Frick India Private Ltd.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Frick India Private Ltd. Vs. Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
		'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another;',
		'citingcases' => ' June, 1982            18 days 
 July, 1982            31 days 
 August, 1982          31 days 
 September, 1982       30 days 
 October, 1982         31 days 
 November, 1982        30 days 
 December, 1982        31 days 
 January, 1983         31 days 
 February, 1983        28 days 
 March, 1983           12 days 
; 
 Regd. A.D. 
 FIL/PD/83/M-208                                                                                     Dt. 12.3.83 ',
		'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal and; Sudhir Mittal, Advs.',
		'counseldef' => ' J.B. Tacoria, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1999-07-07',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' K.K. Srivastava, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>K.K. Srivastava, J.</p><p>1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p>2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : </p><p>'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' </p><p>3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : </p><p>'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. </p><p> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. </p><p> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. </p><p> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' </p><p>4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : </p><p>'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' </p><p>5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : </p><p>1. As per reference </p><p> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed </p><p>6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p>7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. </p><p>8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. </p><p>9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. </p><p>10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.</p><p>11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : </p><p>June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days </p><p>12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : </p><p>'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' </p><p>13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : </p><p>'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' </p><p>14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : </p><p>a) xxx xxx xxx </p><p> b) xxx xxx xxx </p><p> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] </p><p> (c) xxx xxx xxx </p><p>15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. </p><p>16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : </p><p>'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' </p><p>17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : </p><p>'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' </p><p>18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. </p><p>19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : </p><p>Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) </p><p> Dear Sir,</p><p> Sub : Termination </p><p> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. </p><p> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. </p><p> sd/- </p><p>Personnel Manager </p><p>CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, </p><p>Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' </p><p>20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. </p><p>21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : </p><p>25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - </p><p> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; </p><p> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and </p><p> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). </p><p>22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. </p><p>23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '(1999)123PLR814',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
		'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
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	(int) 0 => '<p>K.K. Srivastava, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : ',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' ',
	(int) 4 => '<p>3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. ',
	(int) 6 => '<p> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. ',
	(int) 7 => '<p> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. ',
	(int) 8 => '<p> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' ',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : ',
	(int) 10 => '<p>'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' ',
	(int) 11 => '<p>5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : ',
	(int) 12 => '<p>1. As per reference ',
	(int) 13 => '<p> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed ',
	(int) 14 => '<p>6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. ',
	(int) 15 => '<p>7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. ',
	(int) 16 => '<p>8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. ',
	(int) 17 => '<p>9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. ',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days ',
	(int) 21 => '<p>12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : ',
	(int) 22 => '<p>'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' ',
	(int) 23 => '<p>13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : ',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' ',
	(int) 25 => '<p>14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : ',
	(int) 26 => '<p>a) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 27 => '<p> b) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 28 => '<p> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] ',
	(int) 29 => '<p> (c) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 30 => '<p>15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. ',
	(int) 31 => '<p>16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : ',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' ',
	(int) 33 => '<p>17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : ',
	(int) 34 => '<p>'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' ',
	(int) 35 => '<p>18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. ',
	(int) 36 => '<p>19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : ',
	(int) 37 => '<p>Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) ',
	(int) 38 => '<p> Dear Sir,',
	(int) 39 => '<p> Sub : Termination ',
	(int) 40 => '<p> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. ',
	(int) 41 => '<p> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. ',
	(int) 42 => '<p> sd/- ',
	(int) 43 => '<p>Personnel Manager ',
	(int) 44 => '<p>CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, ',
	(int) 45 => '<p>Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' ',
	(int) 46 => '<p>20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. ',
	(int) 47 => '<p>21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : ',
	(int) 48 => '<p>25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - ',
	(int) 49 => '<p> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; ',
	(int) 50 => '<p> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and ',
	(int) 51 => '<p> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). ',
	(int) 52 => '<p>22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. ',
	(int) 53 => '<p>23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p>',
	(int) 54 => '<p>'
)
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	'title_for_layout' => 'Frick India Private Ltd Vs Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another - Citation 615740 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '615740',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2, 2A, 25B and 25F',
			'appealno' => 'C.W.P. No. 137/1985',
			'appellant' => 'Frick India Private Ltd.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Frick India Private Ltd. Vs. Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
			'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another;',
			'citingcases' => ' June, 1982            18 days 
 July, 1982            31 days 
 August, 1982          31 days 
 September, 1982       30 days 
 October, 1982         31 days 
 November, 1982        30 days 
 December, 1982        31 days 
 January, 1983         31 days 
 February, 1983        28 days 
 March, 1983           12 days 
; 
 Regd. A.D. 
 FIL/PD/83/M-208                                                                                     Dt. 12.3.83 ',
			'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal and; Sudhir Mittal, Advs.',
			'counseldef' => ' J.B. Tacoria, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1999-07-07',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' K.K. Srivastava, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">K.K. Srivastava, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. As per reference </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed </p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days </p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">a) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> b) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (c) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Dear Sir,</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Sub : Termination </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> sd/- </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Personnel Manager </p><p style="text-align: justify;">CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). </p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '(1999)123PLR814',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
			'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'frick-india-private-ltd-vs-vijay-bahadur',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '615740',
		(int) 1 => 'frick-india-private-ltd-vs-vijay-bahadur'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Frick India Private Ltd Vs Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another - Citation 615740 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '615740',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2, 2A, 25B and 25F',
		'appealno' => 'C.W.P. No. 137/1985',
		'appellant' => 'Frick India Private Ltd.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Frick India Private Ltd. Vs. Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
		'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another;',
		'citingcases' => ' June, 1982            18 days 
 July, 1982            31 days 
 August, 1982          31 days 
 September, 1982       30 days 
 October, 1982         31 days 
 November, 1982        30 days 
 December, 1982        31 days 
 January, 1983         31 days 
 February, 1983        28 days 
 March, 1983           12 days 
; 
 Regd. A.D. 
 FIL/PD/83/M-208                                                                                     Dt. 12.3.83 ',
		'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal and; Sudhir Mittal, Advs.',
		'counseldef' => ' J.B. Tacoria, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1999-07-07',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' K.K. Srivastava, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>K.K. Srivastava, J.</p><p>1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p>2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : </p><p>'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' </p><p>3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : </p><p>'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. </p><p> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. </p><p> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. </p><p> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' </p><p>4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : </p><p>'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' </p><p>5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : </p><p>1. As per reference </p><p> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed </p><p>6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p>7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. </p><p>8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. </p><p>9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. </p><p>10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.</p><p>11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : </p><p>June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days </p><p>12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : </p><p>'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' </p><p>13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : </p><p>'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' </p><p>14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : </p><p>a) xxx xxx xxx </p><p> b) xxx xxx xxx </p><p> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] </p><p> (c) xxx xxx xxx </p><p>15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. </p><p>16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : </p><p>'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' </p><p>17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : </p><p>'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' </p><p>18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. </p><p>19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : </p><p>Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) </p><p> Dear Sir,</p><p> Sub : Termination </p><p> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. </p><p> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. </p><p> sd/- </p><p>Personnel Manager </p><p>CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, </p><p>Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' </p><p>20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. </p><p>21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : </p><p>25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - </p><p> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; </p><p> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and </p><p> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). </p><p>22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. </p><p>23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '(1999)123PLR814',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
		'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
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	(int) 0 => '<p>K.K. Srivastava, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : ',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' ',
	(int) 4 => '<p>3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. ',
	(int) 6 => '<p> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. ',
	(int) 7 => '<p> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. ',
	(int) 8 => '<p> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' ',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : ',
	(int) 10 => '<p>'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' ',
	(int) 11 => '<p>5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : ',
	(int) 12 => '<p>1. As per reference ',
	(int) 13 => '<p> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed ',
	(int) 14 => '<p>6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. ',
	(int) 15 => '<p>7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. ',
	(int) 16 => '<p>8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. ',
	(int) 17 => '<p>9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. ',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days ',
	(int) 21 => '<p>12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : ',
	(int) 22 => '<p>'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' ',
	(int) 23 => '<p>13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : ',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' ',
	(int) 25 => '<p>14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : ',
	(int) 26 => '<p>a) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 27 => '<p> b) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 28 => '<p> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] ',
	(int) 29 => '<p> (c) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 30 => '<p>15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. ',
	(int) 31 => '<p>16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : ',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' ',
	(int) 33 => '<p>17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : ',
	(int) 34 => '<p>'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' ',
	(int) 35 => '<p>18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. ',
	(int) 36 => '<p>19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : ',
	(int) 37 => '<p>Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) ',
	(int) 38 => '<p> Dear Sir,',
	(int) 39 => '<p> Sub : Termination ',
	(int) 40 => '<p> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. ',
	(int) 41 => '<p> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. ',
	(int) 42 => '<p> sd/- ',
	(int) 43 => '<p>Personnel Manager ',
	(int) 44 => '<p>CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, ',
	(int) 45 => '<p>Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' ',
	(int) 46 => '<p>20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. ',
	(int) 47 => '<p>21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : ',
	(int) 48 => '<p>25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - ',
	(int) 49 => '<p> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; ',
	(int) 50 => '<p> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and ',
	(int) 51 => '<p> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). ',
	(int) 52 => '<p>22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. ',
	(int) 53 => '<p>23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p>',
	(int) 54 => '<p>'
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[(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or]

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Frick India Private Ltd Vs Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another - Citation 615740 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '615740',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2, 2A, 25B and 25F',
			'appealno' => 'C.W.P. No. 137/1985',
			'appellant' => 'Frick India Private Ltd.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Frick India Private Ltd. Vs. Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
			'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another;',
			'citingcases' => ' June, 1982            18 days 
 July, 1982            31 days 
 August, 1982          31 days 
 September, 1982       30 days 
 October, 1982         31 days 
 November, 1982        30 days 
 December, 1982        31 days 
 January, 1983         31 days 
 February, 1983        28 days 
 March, 1983           12 days 
; 
 Regd. A.D. 
 FIL/PD/83/M-208                                                                                     Dt. 12.3.83 ',
			'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal and; Sudhir Mittal, Advs.',
			'counseldef' => ' J.B. Tacoria, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1999-07-07',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' K.K. Srivastava, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">K.K. Srivastava, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. As per reference </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed </p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days </p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">a) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> b) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (c) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Dear Sir,</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Sub : Termination </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> sd/- </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Personnel Manager </p><p style="text-align: justify;">CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). </p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '(1999)123PLR814',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
			'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'frick-india-private-ltd-vs-vijay-bahadur',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '615740',
		(int) 1 => 'frick-india-private-ltd-vs-vijay-bahadur'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Frick India Private Ltd Vs Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another - Citation 615740 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '615740',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2, 2A, 25B and 25F',
		'appealno' => 'C.W.P. No. 137/1985',
		'appellant' => 'Frick India Private Ltd.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Frick India Private Ltd. Vs. Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
		'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another;',
		'citingcases' => ' June, 1982            18 days 
 July, 1982            31 days 
 August, 1982          31 days 
 September, 1982       30 days 
 October, 1982         31 days 
 November, 1982        30 days 
 December, 1982        31 days 
 January, 1983         31 days 
 February, 1983        28 days 
 March, 1983           12 days 
; 
 Regd. A.D. 
 FIL/PD/83/M-208                                                                                     Dt. 12.3.83 ',
		'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal and; Sudhir Mittal, Advs.',
		'counseldef' => ' J.B. Tacoria, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1999-07-07',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' K.K. Srivastava, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>K.K. Srivastava, J.</p><p>1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p>2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : </p><p>'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' </p><p>3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : </p><p>'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. </p><p> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. </p><p> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. </p><p> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' </p><p>4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : </p><p>'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' </p><p>5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : </p><p>1. As per reference </p><p> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed </p><p>6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p>7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. </p><p>8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. </p><p>9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. </p><p>10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.</p><p>11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : </p><p>June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days </p><p>12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : </p><p>'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' </p><p>13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : </p><p>'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' </p><p>14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : </p><p>a) xxx xxx xxx </p><p> b) xxx xxx xxx </p><p> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] </p><p> (c) xxx xxx xxx </p><p>15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. </p><p>16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : </p><p>'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' </p><p>17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : </p><p>'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' </p><p>18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. </p><p>19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : </p><p>Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) </p><p> Dear Sir,</p><p> Sub : Termination </p><p> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. </p><p> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. </p><p> sd/- </p><p>Personnel Manager </p><p>CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, </p><p>Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' </p><p>20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. </p><p>21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : </p><p>25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - </p><p> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; </p><p> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and </p><p> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). </p><p>22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. </p><p>23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '(1999)123PLR814',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
		'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
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	(int) 0 => '<p>K.K. Srivastava, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : ',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' ',
	(int) 4 => '<p>3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. ',
	(int) 6 => '<p> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. ',
	(int) 7 => '<p> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. ',
	(int) 8 => '<p> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' ',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : ',
	(int) 10 => '<p>'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' ',
	(int) 11 => '<p>5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : ',
	(int) 12 => '<p>1. As per reference ',
	(int) 13 => '<p> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed ',
	(int) 14 => '<p>6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. ',
	(int) 15 => '<p>7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. ',
	(int) 16 => '<p>8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. ',
	(int) 17 => '<p>9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. ',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days ',
	(int) 21 => '<p>12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : ',
	(int) 22 => '<p>'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' ',
	(int) 23 => '<p>13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : ',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' ',
	(int) 25 => '<p>14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : ',
	(int) 26 => '<p>a) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 27 => '<p> b) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 28 => '<p> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] ',
	(int) 29 => '<p> (c) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 30 => '<p>15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. ',
	(int) 31 => '<p>16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : ',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' ',
	(int) 33 => '<p>17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : ',
	(int) 34 => '<p>'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' ',
	(int) 35 => '<p>18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. ',
	(int) 36 => '<p>19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : ',
	(int) 37 => '<p>Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) ',
	(int) 38 => '<p> Dear Sir,',
	(int) 39 => '<p> Sub : Termination ',
	(int) 40 => '<p> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. ',
	(int) 41 => '<p> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. ',
	(int) 42 => '<p> sd/- ',
	(int) 43 => '<p>Personnel Manager ',
	(int) 44 => '<p>CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, ',
	(int) 45 => '<p>Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' ',
	(int) 46 => '<p>20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. ',
	(int) 47 => '<p>21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : ',
	(int) 48 => '<p>25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - ',
	(int) 49 => '<p> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; ',
	(int) 50 => '<p> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and ',
	(int) 51 => '<p> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). ',
	(int) 52 => '<p>22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. ',
	(int) 53 => '<p>23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p>',
	(int) 54 => '<p>'
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	'title_for_layout' => 'Frick India Private Ltd Vs Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another - Citation 615740 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '615740',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2, 2A, 25B and 25F',
			'appealno' => 'C.W.P. No. 137/1985',
			'appellant' => 'Frick India Private Ltd.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Frick India Private Ltd. Vs. Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
			'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another;',
			'citingcases' => ' June, 1982            18 days 
 July, 1982            31 days 
 August, 1982          31 days 
 September, 1982       30 days 
 October, 1982         31 days 
 November, 1982        30 days 
 December, 1982        31 days 
 January, 1983         31 days 
 February, 1983        28 days 
 March, 1983           12 days 
; 
 Regd. A.D. 
 FIL/PD/83/M-208                                                                                     Dt. 12.3.83 ',
			'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal and; Sudhir Mittal, Advs.',
			'counseldef' => ' J.B. Tacoria, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1999-07-07',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' K.K. Srivastava, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">K.K. Srivastava, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. As per reference </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed </p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days </p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">a) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> b) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (c) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Dear Sir,</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Sub : Termination </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> sd/- </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Personnel Manager </p><p style="text-align: justify;">CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). </p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '(1999)123PLR814',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
			'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'frick-india-private-ltd-vs-vijay-bahadur',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '615740',
		(int) 1 => 'frick-india-private-ltd-vs-vijay-bahadur'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Frick India Private Ltd Vs Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another - Citation 615740 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '615740',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2, 2A, 25B and 25F',
		'appealno' => 'C.W.P. No. 137/1985',
		'appellant' => 'Frick India Private Ltd.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Frick India Private Ltd. Vs. Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
		'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another;',
		'citingcases' => ' June, 1982            18 days 
 July, 1982            31 days 
 August, 1982          31 days 
 September, 1982       30 days 
 October, 1982         31 days 
 November, 1982        30 days 
 December, 1982        31 days 
 January, 1983         31 days 
 February, 1983        28 days 
 March, 1983           12 days 
; 
 Regd. A.D. 
 FIL/PD/83/M-208                                                                                     Dt. 12.3.83 ',
		'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal and; Sudhir Mittal, Advs.',
		'counseldef' => ' J.B. Tacoria, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1999-07-07',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' K.K. Srivastava, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>K.K. Srivastava, J.</p><p>1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p>2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : </p><p>'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' </p><p>3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : </p><p>'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. </p><p> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. </p><p> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. </p><p> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' </p><p>4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : </p><p>'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' </p><p>5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : </p><p>1. As per reference </p><p> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed </p><p>6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p>7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. </p><p>8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. </p><p>9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. </p><p>10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.</p><p>11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : </p><p>June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days </p><p>12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : </p><p>'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' </p><p>13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : </p><p>'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' </p><p>14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : </p><p>a) xxx xxx xxx </p><p> b) xxx xxx xxx </p><p> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] </p><p> (c) xxx xxx xxx </p><p>15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. </p><p>16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : </p><p>'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' </p><p>17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : </p><p>'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' </p><p>18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. </p><p>19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : </p><p>Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) </p><p> Dear Sir,</p><p> Sub : Termination </p><p> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. </p><p> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. </p><p> sd/- </p><p>Personnel Manager </p><p>CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, </p><p>Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' </p><p>20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. </p><p>21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : </p><p>25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - </p><p> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; </p><p> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and </p><p> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). </p><p>22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. </p><p>23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '(1999)123PLR814',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
		'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
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	(int) 0 => '<p>K.K. Srivastava, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : ',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' ',
	(int) 4 => '<p>3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. ',
	(int) 6 => '<p> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. ',
	(int) 7 => '<p> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. ',
	(int) 8 => '<p> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' ',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : ',
	(int) 10 => '<p>'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' ',
	(int) 11 => '<p>5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : ',
	(int) 12 => '<p>1. As per reference ',
	(int) 13 => '<p> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed ',
	(int) 14 => '<p>6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. ',
	(int) 15 => '<p>7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. ',
	(int) 16 => '<p>8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. ',
	(int) 17 => '<p>9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. ',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days ',
	(int) 21 => '<p>12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : ',
	(int) 22 => '<p>'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' ',
	(int) 23 => '<p>13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : ',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' ',
	(int) 25 => '<p>14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : ',
	(int) 26 => '<p>a) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 27 => '<p> b) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 28 => '<p> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] ',
	(int) 29 => '<p> (c) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 30 => '<p>15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. ',
	(int) 31 => '<p>16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : ',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' ',
	(int) 33 => '<p>17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : ',
	(int) 34 => '<p>'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' ',
	(int) 35 => '<p>18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. ',
	(int) 36 => '<p>19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : ',
	(int) 37 => '<p>Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) ',
	(int) 38 => '<p> Dear Sir,',
	(int) 39 => '<p> Sub : Termination ',
	(int) 40 => '<p> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. ',
	(int) 41 => '<p> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. ',
	(int) 42 => '<p> sd/- ',
	(int) 43 => '<p>Personnel Manager ',
	(int) 44 => '<p>CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, ',
	(int) 45 => '<p>Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' ',
	(int) 46 => '<p>20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. ',
	(int) 47 => '<p>21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : ',
	(int) 48 => '<p>25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - ',
	(int) 49 => '<p> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; ',
	(int) 50 => '<p> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and ',
	(int) 51 => '<p> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). ',
	(int) 52 => '<p>22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. ',
	(int) 53 => '<p>23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p>',
	(int) 54 => '<p>'
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15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Frick India Private Ltd Vs Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another - Citation 615740 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '615740',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2, 2A, 25B and 25F',
			'appealno' => 'C.W.P. No. 137/1985',
			'appellant' => 'Frick India Private Ltd.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Frick India Private Ltd. Vs. Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
			'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another;',
			'citingcases' => ' June, 1982            18 days 
 July, 1982            31 days 
 August, 1982          31 days 
 September, 1982       30 days 
 October, 1982         31 days 
 November, 1982        30 days 
 December, 1982        31 days 
 January, 1983         31 days 
 February, 1983        28 days 
 March, 1983           12 days 
; 
 Regd. A.D. 
 FIL/PD/83/M-208                                                                                     Dt. 12.3.83 ',
			'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal and; Sudhir Mittal, Advs.',
			'counseldef' => ' J.B. Tacoria, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1999-07-07',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' K.K. Srivastava, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">K.K. Srivastava, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. As per reference </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed </p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days </p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">a) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> b) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (c) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Dear Sir,</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Sub : Termination </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> sd/- </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Personnel Manager </p><p style="text-align: justify;">CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). </p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '(1999)123PLR814',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
			'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'frick-india-private-ltd-vs-vijay-bahadur',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '615740',
		(int) 1 => 'frick-india-private-ltd-vs-vijay-bahadur'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Frick India Private Ltd Vs Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another - Citation 615740 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '615740',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2, 2A, 25B and 25F',
		'appealno' => 'C.W.P. No. 137/1985',
		'appellant' => 'Frick India Private Ltd.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Frick India Private Ltd. Vs. Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
		'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another;',
		'citingcases' => ' June, 1982            18 days 
 July, 1982            31 days 
 August, 1982          31 days 
 September, 1982       30 days 
 October, 1982         31 days 
 November, 1982        30 days 
 December, 1982        31 days 
 January, 1983         31 days 
 February, 1983        28 days 
 March, 1983           12 days 
; 
 Regd. A.D. 
 FIL/PD/83/M-208                                                                                     Dt. 12.3.83 ',
		'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal and; Sudhir Mittal, Advs.',
		'counseldef' => ' J.B. Tacoria, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1999-07-07',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' K.K. Srivastava, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>K.K. Srivastava, J.</p><p>1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p>2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : </p><p>'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' </p><p>3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : </p><p>'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. </p><p> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. </p><p> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. </p><p> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' </p><p>4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : </p><p>'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' </p><p>5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : </p><p>1. As per reference </p><p> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed </p><p>6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p>7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. </p><p>8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. </p><p>9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. </p><p>10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.</p><p>11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : </p><p>June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days </p><p>12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : </p><p>'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' </p><p>13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : </p><p>'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' </p><p>14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : </p><p>a) xxx xxx xxx </p><p> b) xxx xxx xxx </p><p> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] </p><p> (c) xxx xxx xxx </p><p>15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. </p><p>16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : </p><p>'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' </p><p>17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : </p><p>'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' </p><p>18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. </p><p>19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : </p><p>Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) </p><p> Dear Sir,</p><p> Sub : Termination </p><p> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. </p><p> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. </p><p> sd/- </p><p>Personnel Manager </p><p>CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, </p><p>Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' </p><p>20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. </p><p>21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : </p><p>25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - </p><p> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; </p><p> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and </p><p> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). </p><p>22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. </p><p>23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '(1999)123PLR814',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
		'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
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$caseref = 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another<br>'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>K.K. Srivastava, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : ',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' ',
	(int) 4 => '<p>3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. ',
	(int) 6 => '<p> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. ',
	(int) 7 => '<p> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. ',
	(int) 8 => '<p> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' ',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : ',
	(int) 10 => '<p>'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' ',
	(int) 11 => '<p>5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : ',
	(int) 12 => '<p>1. As per reference ',
	(int) 13 => '<p> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed ',
	(int) 14 => '<p>6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. ',
	(int) 15 => '<p>7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. ',
	(int) 16 => '<p>8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. ',
	(int) 17 => '<p>9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. ',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days ',
	(int) 21 => '<p>12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : ',
	(int) 22 => '<p>'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' ',
	(int) 23 => '<p>13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : ',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' ',
	(int) 25 => '<p>14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : ',
	(int) 26 => '<p>a) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 27 => '<p> b) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 28 => '<p> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] ',
	(int) 29 => '<p> (c) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 30 => '<p>15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. ',
	(int) 31 => '<p>16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : ',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' ',
	(int) 33 => '<p>17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : ',
	(int) 34 => '<p>'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' ',
	(int) 35 => '<p>18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. ',
	(int) 36 => '<p>19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : ',
	(int) 37 => '<p>Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) ',
	(int) 38 => '<p> Dear Sir,',
	(int) 39 => '<p> Sub : Termination ',
	(int) 40 => '<p> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. ',
	(int) 41 => '<p> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. ',
	(int) 42 => '<p> sd/- ',
	(int) 43 => '<p>Personnel Manager ',
	(int) 44 => '<p>CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, ',
	(int) 45 => '<p>Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' ',
	(int) 46 => '<p>20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. ',
	(int) 47 => '<p>21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : ',
	(int) 48 => '<p>25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - ',
	(int) 49 => '<p> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; ',
	(int) 50 => '<p> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and ',
	(int) 51 => '<p> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). ',
	(int) 52 => '<p>22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. ',
	(int) 53 => '<p>23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p>',
	(int) 54 => '<p>'
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16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under :

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Frick India Private Ltd Vs Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another - Citation 615740 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '615740',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2, 2A, 25B and 25F',
			'appealno' => 'C.W.P. No. 137/1985',
			'appellant' => 'Frick India Private Ltd.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Frick India Private Ltd. Vs. Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
			'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another;',
			'citingcases' => ' June, 1982            18 days 
 July, 1982            31 days 
 August, 1982          31 days 
 September, 1982       30 days 
 October, 1982         31 days 
 November, 1982        30 days 
 December, 1982        31 days 
 January, 1983         31 days 
 February, 1983        28 days 
 March, 1983           12 days 
; 
 Regd. A.D. 
 FIL/PD/83/M-208                                                                                     Dt. 12.3.83 ',
			'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal and; Sudhir Mittal, Advs.',
			'counseldef' => ' J.B. Tacoria, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1999-07-07',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' K.K. Srivastava, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">K.K. Srivastava, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. As per reference </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed </p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days </p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">a) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> b) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (c) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Dear Sir,</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Sub : Termination </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> sd/- </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Personnel Manager </p><p style="text-align: justify;">CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). </p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '(1999)123PLR814',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
			'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'frick-india-private-ltd-vs-vijay-bahadur',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '615740',
		(int) 1 => 'frick-india-private-ltd-vs-vijay-bahadur'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Frick India Private Ltd Vs Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another - Citation 615740 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '615740',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2, 2A, 25B and 25F',
		'appealno' => 'C.W.P. No. 137/1985',
		'appellant' => 'Frick India Private Ltd.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Frick India Private Ltd. Vs. Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
		'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another;',
		'citingcases' => ' June, 1982            18 days 
 July, 1982            31 days 
 August, 1982          31 days 
 September, 1982       30 days 
 October, 1982         31 days 
 November, 1982        30 days 
 December, 1982        31 days 
 January, 1983         31 days 
 February, 1983        28 days 
 March, 1983           12 days 
; 
 Regd. A.D. 
 FIL/PD/83/M-208                                                                                     Dt. 12.3.83 ',
		'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal and; Sudhir Mittal, Advs.',
		'counseldef' => ' J.B. Tacoria, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1999-07-07',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' K.K. Srivastava, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>K.K. Srivastava, J.</p><p>1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p>2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : </p><p>'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' </p><p>3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : </p><p>'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. </p><p> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. </p><p> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. </p><p> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' </p><p>4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : </p><p>'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' </p><p>5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : </p><p>1. As per reference </p><p> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed </p><p>6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p>7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. </p><p>8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. </p><p>9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. </p><p>10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.</p><p>11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : </p><p>June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days </p><p>12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : </p><p>'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' </p><p>13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : </p><p>'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' </p><p>14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : </p><p>a) xxx xxx xxx </p><p> b) xxx xxx xxx </p><p> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] </p><p> (c) xxx xxx xxx </p><p>15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. </p><p>16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : </p><p>'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' </p><p>17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : </p><p>'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' </p><p>18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. </p><p>19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : </p><p>Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) </p><p> Dear Sir,</p><p> Sub : Termination </p><p> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. </p><p> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. </p><p> sd/- </p><p>Personnel Manager </p><p>CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, </p><p>Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' </p><p>20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. </p><p>21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : </p><p>25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - </p><p> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; </p><p> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and </p><p> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). </p><p>22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. </p><p>23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '(1999)123PLR814',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
		'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
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$caseref = 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another<br>'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>K.K. Srivastava, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : ',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' ',
	(int) 4 => '<p>3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. ',
	(int) 6 => '<p> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. ',
	(int) 7 => '<p> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. ',
	(int) 8 => '<p> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' ',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : ',
	(int) 10 => '<p>'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' ',
	(int) 11 => '<p>5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : ',
	(int) 12 => '<p>1. As per reference ',
	(int) 13 => '<p> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed ',
	(int) 14 => '<p>6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. ',
	(int) 15 => '<p>7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. ',
	(int) 16 => '<p>8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. ',
	(int) 17 => '<p>9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. ',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days ',
	(int) 21 => '<p>12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : ',
	(int) 22 => '<p>'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' ',
	(int) 23 => '<p>13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : ',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' ',
	(int) 25 => '<p>14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : ',
	(int) 26 => '<p>a) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 27 => '<p> b) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 28 => '<p> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] ',
	(int) 29 => '<p> (c) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 30 => '<p>15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. ',
	(int) 31 => '<p>16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : ',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' ',
	(int) 33 => '<p>17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : ',
	(int) 34 => '<p>'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' ',
	(int) 35 => '<p>18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. ',
	(int) 36 => '<p>19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : ',
	(int) 37 => '<p>Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) ',
	(int) 38 => '<p> Dear Sir,',
	(int) 39 => '<p> Sub : Termination ',
	(int) 40 => '<p> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. ',
	(int) 41 => '<p> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. ',
	(int) 42 => '<p> sd/- ',
	(int) 43 => '<p>Personnel Manager ',
	(int) 44 => '<p>CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, ',
	(int) 45 => '<p>Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' ',
	(int) 46 => '<p>20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. ',
	(int) 47 => '<p>21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : ',
	(int) 48 => '<p>25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - ',
	(int) 49 => '<p> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; ',
	(int) 50 => '<p> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and ',
	(int) 51 => '<p> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). ',
	(int) 52 => '<p>22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. ',
	(int) 53 => '<p>23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p>',
	(int) 54 => '<p>'
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'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.'

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Frick India Private Ltd Vs Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another - Citation 615740 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '615740',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2, 2A, 25B and 25F',
			'appealno' => 'C.W.P. No. 137/1985',
			'appellant' => 'Frick India Private Ltd.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Frick India Private Ltd. Vs. Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
			'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another;',
			'citingcases' => ' June, 1982            18 days 
 July, 1982            31 days 
 August, 1982          31 days 
 September, 1982       30 days 
 October, 1982         31 days 
 November, 1982        30 days 
 December, 1982        31 days 
 January, 1983         31 days 
 February, 1983        28 days 
 March, 1983           12 days 
; 
 Regd. A.D. 
 FIL/PD/83/M-208                                                                                     Dt. 12.3.83 ',
			'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal and; Sudhir Mittal, Advs.',
			'counseldef' => ' J.B. Tacoria, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1999-07-07',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' K.K. Srivastava, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">K.K. Srivastava, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. As per reference </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed </p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days </p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">a) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> b) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (c) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Dear Sir,</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Sub : Termination </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> sd/- </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Personnel Manager </p><p style="text-align: justify;">CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). </p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '(1999)123PLR814',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
			'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'frick-india-private-ltd-vs-vijay-bahadur',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '615740',
		(int) 1 => 'frick-india-private-ltd-vs-vijay-bahadur'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Frick India Private Ltd Vs Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another - Citation 615740 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '615740',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2, 2A, 25B and 25F',
		'appealno' => 'C.W.P. No. 137/1985',
		'appellant' => 'Frick India Private Ltd.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Frick India Private Ltd. Vs. Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
		'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another;',
		'citingcases' => ' June, 1982            18 days 
 July, 1982            31 days 
 August, 1982          31 days 
 September, 1982       30 days 
 October, 1982         31 days 
 November, 1982        30 days 
 December, 1982        31 days 
 January, 1983         31 days 
 February, 1983        28 days 
 March, 1983           12 days 
; 
 Regd. A.D. 
 FIL/PD/83/M-208                                                                                     Dt. 12.3.83 ',
		'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal and; Sudhir Mittal, Advs.',
		'counseldef' => ' J.B. Tacoria, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1999-07-07',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' K.K. Srivastava, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>K.K. Srivastava, J.</p><p>1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p>2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : </p><p>'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' </p><p>3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : </p><p>'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. </p><p> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. </p><p> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. </p><p> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' </p><p>4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : </p><p>'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' </p><p>5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : </p><p>1. As per reference </p><p> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed </p><p>6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p>7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. </p><p>8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. </p><p>9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. </p><p>10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.</p><p>11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : </p><p>June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days </p><p>12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : </p><p>'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' </p><p>13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : </p><p>'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' </p><p>14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : </p><p>a) xxx xxx xxx </p><p> b) xxx xxx xxx </p><p> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] </p><p> (c) xxx xxx xxx </p><p>15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. </p><p>16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : </p><p>'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' </p><p>17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : </p><p>'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' </p><p>18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. </p><p>19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : </p><p>Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) </p><p> Dear Sir,</p><p> Sub : Termination </p><p> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. </p><p> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. </p><p> sd/- </p><p>Personnel Manager </p><p>CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, </p><p>Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' </p><p>20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. </p><p>21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : </p><p>25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - </p><p> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; </p><p> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and </p><p> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). </p><p>22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. </p><p>23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '(1999)123PLR814',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
		'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
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$caseref = 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another<br>'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>K.K. Srivastava, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : ',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' ',
	(int) 4 => '<p>3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. ',
	(int) 6 => '<p> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. ',
	(int) 7 => '<p> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. ',
	(int) 8 => '<p> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' ',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : ',
	(int) 10 => '<p>'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' ',
	(int) 11 => '<p>5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : ',
	(int) 12 => '<p>1. As per reference ',
	(int) 13 => '<p> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed ',
	(int) 14 => '<p>6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. ',
	(int) 15 => '<p>7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. ',
	(int) 16 => '<p>8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. ',
	(int) 17 => '<p>9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. ',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days ',
	(int) 21 => '<p>12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : ',
	(int) 22 => '<p>'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' ',
	(int) 23 => '<p>13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : ',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' ',
	(int) 25 => '<p>14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : ',
	(int) 26 => '<p>a) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 27 => '<p> b) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 28 => '<p> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] ',
	(int) 29 => '<p> (c) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 30 => '<p>15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. ',
	(int) 31 => '<p>16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : ',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' ',
	(int) 33 => '<p>17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : ',
	(int) 34 => '<p>'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' ',
	(int) 35 => '<p>18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. ',
	(int) 36 => '<p>19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : ',
	(int) 37 => '<p>Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) ',
	(int) 38 => '<p> Dear Sir,',
	(int) 39 => '<p> Sub : Termination ',
	(int) 40 => '<p> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. ',
	(int) 41 => '<p> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. ',
	(int) 42 => '<p> sd/- ',
	(int) 43 => '<p>Personnel Manager ',
	(int) 44 => '<p>CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, ',
	(int) 45 => '<p>Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' ',
	(int) 46 => '<p>20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. ',
	(int) 47 => '<p>21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : ',
	(int) 48 => '<p>25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - ',
	(int) 49 => '<p> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; ',
	(int) 50 => '<p> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and ',
	(int) 51 => '<p> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). ',
	(int) 52 => '<p>22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. ',
	(int) 53 => '<p>23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p>',
	(int) 54 => '<p>'
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17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under :

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Frick India Private Ltd Vs Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another - Citation 615740 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '615740',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2, 2A, 25B and 25F',
			'appealno' => 'C.W.P. No. 137/1985',
			'appellant' => 'Frick India Private Ltd.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Frick India Private Ltd. Vs. Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
			'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another;',
			'citingcases' => ' June, 1982            18 days 
 July, 1982            31 days 
 August, 1982          31 days 
 September, 1982       30 days 
 October, 1982         31 days 
 November, 1982        30 days 
 December, 1982        31 days 
 January, 1983         31 days 
 February, 1983        28 days 
 March, 1983           12 days 
; 
 Regd. A.D. 
 FIL/PD/83/M-208                                                                                     Dt. 12.3.83 ',
			'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal and; Sudhir Mittal, Advs.',
			'counseldef' => ' J.B. Tacoria, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1999-07-07',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' K.K. Srivastava, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">K.K. Srivastava, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. As per reference </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed </p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days </p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">a) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> b) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (c) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Dear Sir,</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Sub : Termination </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> sd/- </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Personnel Manager </p><p style="text-align: justify;">CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). </p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '(1999)123PLR814',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
			'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'frick-india-private-ltd-vs-vijay-bahadur',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '615740',
		(int) 1 => 'frick-india-private-ltd-vs-vijay-bahadur'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Frick India Private Ltd Vs Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another - Citation 615740 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '615740',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2, 2A, 25B and 25F',
		'appealno' => 'C.W.P. No. 137/1985',
		'appellant' => 'Frick India Private Ltd.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Frick India Private Ltd. Vs. Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
		'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another;',
		'citingcases' => ' June, 1982            18 days 
 July, 1982            31 days 
 August, 1982          31 days 
 September, 1982       30 days 
 October, 1982         31 days 
 November, 1982        30 days 
 December, 1982        31 days 
 January, 1983         31 days 
 February, 1983        28 days 
 March, 1983           12 days 
; 
 Regd. A.D. 
 FIL/PD/83/M-208                                                                                     Dt. 12.3.83 ',
		'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal and; Sudhir Mittal, Advs.',
		'counseldef' => ' J.B. Tacoria, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1999-07-07',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' K.K. Srivastava, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>K.K. Srivastava, J.</p><p>1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p>2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : </p><p>'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' </p><p>3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : </p><p>'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. </p><p> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. </p><p> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. </p><p> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' </p><p>4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : </p><p>'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' </p><p>5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : </p><p>1. As per reference </p><p> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed </p><p>6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p>7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. </p><p>8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. </p><p>9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. </p><p>10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.</p><p>11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : </p><p>June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days </p><p>12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : </p><p>'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' </p><p>13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : </p><p>'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' </p><p>14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : </p><p>a) xxx xxx xxx </p><p> b) xxx xxx xxx </p><p> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] </p><p> (c) xxx xxx xxx </p><p>15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. </p><p>16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : </p><p>'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' </p><p>17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : </p><p>'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' </p><p>18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. </p><p>19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : </p><p>Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) </p><p> Dear Sir,</p><p> Sub : Termination </p><p> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. </p><p> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. </p><p> sd/- </p><p>Personnel Manager </p><p>CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, </p><p>Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' </p><p>20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. </p><p>21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : </p><p>25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - </p><p> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; </p><p> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and </p><p> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). </p><p>22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. </p><p>23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '(1999)123PLR814',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
		'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
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$caseref = 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another<br>'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>K.K. Srivastava, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : ',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' ',
	(int) 4 => '<p>3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. ',
	(int) 6 => '<p> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. ',
	(int) 7 => '<p> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. ',
	(int) 8 => '<p> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' ',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : ',
	(int) 10 => '<p>'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' ',
	(int) 11 => '<p>5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : ',
	(int) 12 => '<p>1. As per reference ',
	(int) 13 => '<p> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed ',
	(int) 14 => '<p>6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. ',
	(int) 15 => '<p>7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. ',
	(int) 16 => '<p>8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. ',
	(int) 17 => '<p>9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. ',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days ',
	(int) 21 => '<p>12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : ',
	(int) 22 => '<p>'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' ',
	(int) 23 => '<p>13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : ',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' ',
	(int) 25 => '<p>14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : ',
	(int) 26 => '<p>a) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 27 => '<p> b) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 28 => '<p> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] ',
	(int) 29 => '<p> (c) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 30 => '<p>15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. ',
	(int) 31 => '<p>16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : ',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' ',
	(int) 33 => '<p>17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : ',
	(int) 34 => '<p>'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' ',
	(int) 35 => '<p>18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. ',
	(int) 36 => '<p>19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : ',
	(int) 37 => '<p>Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) ',
	(int) 38 => '<p> Dear Sir,',
	(int) 39 => '<p> Sub : Termination ',
	(int) 40 => '<p> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. ',
	(int) 41 => '<p> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. ',
	(int) 42 => '<p> sd/- ',
	(int) 43 => '<p>Personnel Manager ',
	(int) 44 => '<p>CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, ',
	(int) 45 => '<p>Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' ',
	(int) 46 => '<p>20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. ',
	(int) 47 => '<p>21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : ',
	(int) 48 => '<p>25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - ',
	(int) 49 => '<p> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; ',
	(int) 50 => '<p> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and ',
	(int) 51 => '<p> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). ',
	(int) 52 => '<p>22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. ',
	(int) 53 => '<p>23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p>',
	(int) 54 => '<p>'
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'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.'

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Frick India Private Ltd Vs Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another - Citation 615740 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '615740',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2, 2A, 25B and 25F',
			'appealno' => 'C.W.P. No. 137/1985',
			'appellant' => 'Frick India Private Ltd.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Frick India Private Ltd. Vs. Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
			'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another;',
			'citingcases' => ' June, 1982            18 days 
 July, 1982            31 days 
 August, 1982          31 days 
 September, 1982       30 days 
 October, 1982         31 days 
 November, 1982        30 days 
 December, 1982        31 days 
 January, 1983         31 days 
 February, 1983        28 days 
 March, 1983           12 days 
; 
 Regd. A.D. 
 FIL/PD/83/M-208                                                                                     Dt. 12.3.83 ',
			'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal and; Sudhir Mittal, Advs.',
			'counseldef' => ' J.B. Tacoria, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1999-07-07',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' K.K. Srivastava, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">K.K. Srivastava, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. As per reference </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed </p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days </p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">a) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> b) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (c) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Dear Sir,</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Sub : Termination </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> sd/- </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Personnel Manager </p><p style="text-align: justify;">CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). </p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '(1999)123PLR814',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
			'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'frick-india-private-ltd-vs-vijay-bahadur',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '615740',
		(int) 1 => 'frick-india-private-ltd-vs-vijay-bahadur'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Frick India Private Ltd Vs Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another - Citation 615740 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '615740',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2, 2A, 25B and 25F',
		'appealno' => 'C.W.P. No. 137/1985',
		'appellant' => 'Frick India Private Ltd.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Frick India Private Ltd. Vs. Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
		'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another;',
		'citingcases' => ' June, 1982            18 days 
 July, 1982            31 days 
 August, 1982          31 days 
 September, 1982       30 days 
 October, 1982         31 days 
 November, 1982        30 days 
 December, 1982        31 days 
 January, 1983         31 days 
 February, 1983        28 days 
 March, 1983           12 days 
; 
 Regd. A.D. 
 FIL/PD/83/M-208                                                                                     Dt. 12.3.83 ',
		'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal and; Sudhir Mittal, Advs.',
		'counseldef' => ' J.B. Tacoria, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1999-07-07',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' K.K. Srivastava, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>K.K. Srivastava, J.</p><p>1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p>2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : </p><p>'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' </p><p>3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : </p><p>'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. </p><p> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. </p><p> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. </p><p> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' </p><p>4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : </p><p>'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' </p><p>5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : </p><p>1. As per reference </p><p> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed </p><p>6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p>7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. </p><p>8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. </p><p>9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. </p><p>10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.</p><p>11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : </p><p>June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days </p><p>12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : </p><p>'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' </p><p>13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : </p><p>'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' </p><p>14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : </p><p>a) xxx xxx xxx </p><p> b) xxx xxx xxx </p><p> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] </p><p> (c) xxx xxx xxx </p><p>15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. </p><p>16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : </p><p>'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' </p><p>17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : </p><p>'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' </p><p>18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. </p><p>19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : </p><p>Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) </p><p> Dear Sir,</p><p> Sub : Termination </p><p> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. </p><p> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. </p><p> sd/- </p><p>Personnel Manager </p><p>CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, </p><p>Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' </p><p>20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. </p><p>21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : </p><p>25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - </p><p> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; </p><p> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and </p><p> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). </p><p>22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. </p><p>23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '(1999)123PLR814',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
		'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
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	(int) 0 => '<p>K.K. Srivastava, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : ',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' ',
	(int) 4 => '<p>3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. ',
	(int) 6 => '<p> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. ',
	(int) 7 => '<p> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. ',
	(int) 8 => '<p> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' ',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : ',
	(int) 10 => '<p>'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' ',
	(int) 11 => '<p>5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : ',
	(int) 12 => '<p>1. As per reference ',
	(int) 13 => '<p> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed ',
	(int) 14 => '<p>6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. ',
	(int) 15 => '<p>7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. ',
	(int) 16 => '<p>8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. ',
	(int) 17 => '<p>9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. ',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days ',
	(int) 21 => '<p>12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : ',
	(int) 22 => '<p>'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' ',
	(int) 23 => '<p>13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : ',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' ',
	(int) 25 => '<p>14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : ',
	(int) 26 => '<p>a) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 27 => '<p> b) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 28 => '<p> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] ',
	(int) 29 => '<p> (c) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 30 => '<p>15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. ',
	(int) 31 => '<p>16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : ',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' ',
	(int) 33 => '<p>17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : ',
	(int) 34 => '<p>'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' ',
	(int) 35 => '<p>18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. ',
	(int) 36 => '<p>19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : ',
	(int) 37 => '<p>Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) ',
	(int) 38 => '<p> Dear Sir,',
	(int) 39 => '<p> Sub : Termination ',
	(int) 40 => '<p> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. ',
	(int) 41 => '<p> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. ',
	(int) 42 => '<p> sd/- ',
	(int) 43 => '<p>Personnel Manager ',
	(int) 44 => '<p>CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, ',
	(int) 45 => '<p>Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' ',
	(int) 46 => '<p>20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. ',
	(int) 47 => '<p>21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : ',
	(int) 48 => '<p>25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - ',
	(int) 49 => '<p> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; ',
	(int) 50 => '<p> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and ',
	(int) 51 => '<p> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). ',
	(int) 52 => '<p>22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. ',
	(int) 53 => '<p>23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p>',
	(int) 54 => '<p>'
)
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18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Frick India Private Ltd Vs Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another - Citation 615740 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '615740',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2, 2A, 25B and 25F',
			'appealno' => 'C.W.P. No. 137/1985',
			'appellant' => 'Frick India Private Ltd.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Frick India Private Ltd. Vs. Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
			'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another;',
			'citingcases' => ' June, 1982            18 days 
 July, 1982            31 days 
 August, 1982          31 days 
 September, 1982       30 days 
 October, 1982         31 days 
 November, 1982        30 days 
 December, 1982        31 days 
 January, 1983         31 days 
 February, 1983        28 days 
 March, 1983           12 days 
; 
 Regd. A.D. 
 FIL/PD/83/M-208                                                                                     Dt. 12.3.83 ',
			'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal and; Sudhir Mittal, Advs.',
			'counseldef' => ' J.B. Tacoria, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1999-07-07',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' K.K. Srivastava, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">K.K. Srivastava, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. As per reference </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed </p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days </p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">a) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> b) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (c) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Dear Sir,</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Sub : Termination </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> sd/- </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Personnel Manager </p><p style="text-align: justify;">CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). </p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '(1999)123PLR814',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
			'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'frick-india-private-ltd-vs-vijay-bahadur',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '615740',
		(int) 1 => 'frick-india-private-ltd-vs-vijay-bahadur'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Frick India Private Ltd Vs Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another - Citation 615740 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '615740',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2, 2A, 25B and 25F',
		'appealno' => 'C.W.P. No. 137/1985',
		'appellant' => 'Frick India Private Ltd.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Frick India Private Ltd. Vs. Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
		'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another;',
		'citingcases' => ' June, 1982            18 days 
 July, 1982            31 days 
 August, 1982          31 days 
 September, 1982       30 days 
 October, 1982         31 days 
 November, 1982        30 days 
 December, 1982        31 days 
 January, 1983         31 days 
 February, 1983        28 days 
 March, 1983           12 days 
; 
 Regd. A.D. 
 FIL/PD/83/M-208                                                                                     Dt. 12.3.83 ',
		'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal and; Sudhir Mittal, Advs.',
		'counseldef' => ' J.B. Tacoria, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1999-07-07',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' K.K. Srivastava, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>K.K. Srivastava, J.</p><p>1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p>2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : </p><p>'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' </p><p>3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : </p><p>'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. </p><p> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. </p><p> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. </p><p> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' </p><p>4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : </p><p>'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' </p><p>5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : </p><p>1. As per reference </p><p> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed </p><p>6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p>7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. </p><p>8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. </p><p>9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. </p><p>10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.</p><p>11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : </p><p>June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days </p><p>12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : </p><p>'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' </p><p>13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : </p><p>'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' </p><p>14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : </p><p>a) xxx xxx xxx </p><p> b) xxx xxx xxx </p><p> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] </p><p> (c) xxx xxx xxx </p><p>15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. </p><p>16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : </p><p>'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' </p><p>17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : </p><p>'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' </p><p>18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. </p><p>19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : </p><p>Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) </p><p> Dear Sir,</p><p> Sub : Termination </p><p> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. </p><p> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. </p><p> sd/- </p><p>Personnel Manager </p><p>CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, </p><p>Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' </p><p>20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. </p><p>21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : </p><p>25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - </p><p> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; </p><p> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and </p><p> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). </p><p>22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. </p><p>23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '(1999)123PLR814',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
		'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
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	(int) 0 => '<p>K.K. Srivastava, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : ',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' ',
	(int) 4 => '<p>3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. ',
	(int) 6 => '<p> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. ',
	(int) 7 => '<p> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. ',
	(int) 8 => '<p> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' ',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : ',
	(int) 10 => '<p>'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' ',
	(int) 11 => '<p>5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : ',
	(int) 12 => '<p>1. As per reference ',
	(int) 13 => '<p> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed ',
	(int) 14 => '<p>6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. ',
	(int) 15 => '<p>7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. ',
	(int) 16 => '<p>8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. ',
	(int) 17 => '<p>9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. ',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days ',
	(int) 21 => '<p>12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : ',
	(int) 22 => '<p>'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' ',
	(int) 23 => '<p>13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : ',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' ',
	(int) 25 => '<p>14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : ',
	(int) 26 => '<p>a) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 27 => '<p> b) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 28 => '<p> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] ',
	(int) 29 => '<p> (c) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 30 => '<p>15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. ',
	(int) 31 => '<p>16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : ',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' ',
	(int) 33 => '<p>17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : ',
	(int) 34 => '<p>'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' ',
	(int) 35 => '<p>18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. ',
	(int) 36 => '<p>19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : ',
	(int) 37 => '<p>Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) ',
	(int) 38 => '<p> Dear Sir,',
	(int) 39 => '<p> Sub : Termination ',
	(int) 40 => '<p> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. ',
	(int) 41 => '<p> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. ',
	(int) 42 => '<p> sd/- ',
	(int) 43 => '<p>Personnel Manager ',
	(int) 44 => '<p>CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, ',
	(int) 45 => '<p>Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' ',
	(int) 46 => '<p>20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. ',
	(int) 47 => '<p>21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : ',
	(int) 48 => '<p>25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - ',
	(int) 49 => '<p> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; ',
	(int) 50 => '<p> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and ',
	(int) 51 => '<p> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). ',
	(int) 52 => '<p>22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. ',
	(int) 53 => '<p>23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p>',
	(int) 54 => '<p>'
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19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under :

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Frick India Private Ltd Vs Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another - Citation 615740 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '615740',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2, 2A, 25B and 25F',
			'appealno' => 'C.W.P. No. 137/1985',
			'appellant' => 'Frick India Private Ltd.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Frick India Private Ltd. Vs. Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
			'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another;',
			'citingcases' => ' June, 1982            18 days 
 July, 1982            31 days 
 August, 1982          31 days 
 September, 1982       30 days 
 October, 1982         31 days 
 November, 1982        30 days 
 December, 1982        31 days 
 January, 1983         31 days 
 February, 1983        28 days 
 March, 1983           12 days 
; 
 Regd. A.D. 
 FIL/PD/83/M-208                                                                                     Dt. 12.3.83 ',
			'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal and; Sudhir Mittal, Advs.',
			'counseldef' => ' J.B. Tacoria, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1999-07-07',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' K.K. Srivastava, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">K.K. Srivastava, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. As per reference </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed </p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days </p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">a) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> b) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (c) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Dear Sir,</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Sub : Termination </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> sd/- </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Personnel Manager </p><p style="text-align: justify;">CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). </p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '(1999)123PLR814',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
			'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'frick-india-private-ltd-vs-vijay-bahadur',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '615740',
		(int) 1 => 'frick-india-private-ltd-vs-vijay-bahadur'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Frick India Private Ltd Vs Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another - Citation 615740 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '615740',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2, 2A, 25B and 25F',
		'appealno' => 'C.W.P. No. 137/1985',
		'appellant' => 'Frick India Private Ltd.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Frick India Private Ltd. Vs. Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
		'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another;',
		'citingcases' => ' June, 1982            18 days 
 July, 1982            31 days 
 August, 1982          31 days 
 September, 1982       30 days 
 October, 1982         31 days 
 November, 1982        30 days 
 December, 1982        31 days 
 January, 1983         31 days 
 February, 1983        28 days 
 March, 1983           12 days 
; 
 Regd. A.D. 
 FIL/PD/83/M-208                                                                                     Dt. 12.3.83 ',
		'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal and; Sudhir Mittal, Advs.',
		'counseldef' => ' J.B. Tacoria, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1999-07-07',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' K.K. Srivastava, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>K.K. Srivastava, J.</p><p>1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p>2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : </p><p>'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' </p><p>3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : </p><p>'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. </p><p> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. </p><p> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. </p><p> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' </p><p>4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : </p><p>'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' </p><p>5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : </p><p>1. As per reference </p><p> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed </p><p>6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p>7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. </p><p>8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. </p><p>9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. </p><p>10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.</p><p>11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : </p><p>June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days </p><p>12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : </p><p>'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' </p><p>13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : </p><p>'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' </p><p>14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : </p><p>a) xxx xxx xxx </p><p> b) xxx xxx xxx </p><p> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] </p><p> (c) xxx xxx xxx </p><p>15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. </p><p>16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : </p><p>'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' </p><p>17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : </p><p>'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' </p><p>18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. </p><p>19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : </p><p>Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) </p><p> Dear Sir,</p><p> Sub : Termination </p><p> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. </p><p> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. </p><p> sd/- </p><p>Personnel Manager </p><p>CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, </p><p>Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' </p><p>20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. </p><p>21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : </p><p>25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - </p><p> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; </p><p> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and </p><p> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). </p><p>22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. </p><p>23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '(1999)123PLR814',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
		'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
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	(int) 0 => '<p>K.K. Srivastava, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : ',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' ',
	(int) 4 => '<p>3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. ',
	(int) 6 => '<p> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. ',
	(int) 7 => '<p> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. ',
	(int) 8 => '<p> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' ',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : ',
	(int) 10 => '<p>'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' ',
	(int) 11 => '<p>5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : ',
	(int) 12 => '<p>1. As per reference ',
	(int) 13 => '<p> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed ',
	(int) 14 => '<p>6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. ',
	(int) 15 => '<p>7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. ',
	(int) 16 => '<p>8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. ',
	(int) 17 => '<p>9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. ',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days ',
	(int) 21 => '<p>12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : ',
	(int) 22 => '<p>'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' ',
	(int) 23 => '<p>13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : ',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' ',
	(int) 25 => '<p>14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : ',
	(int) 26 => '<p>a) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 27 => '<p> b) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 28 => '<p> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] ',
	(int) 29 => '<p> (c) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 30 => '<p>15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. ',
	(int) 31 => '<p>16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : ',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' ',
	(int) 33 => '<p>17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : ',
	(int) 34 => '<p>'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' ',
	(int) 35 => '<p>18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. ',
	(int) 36 => '<p>19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : ',
	(int) 37 => '<p>Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) ',
	(int) 38 => '<p> Dear Sir,',
	(int) 39 => '<p> Sub : Termination ',
	(int) 40 => '<p> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. ',
	(int) 41 => '<p> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. ',
	(int) 42 => '<p> sd/- ',
	(int) 43 => '<p>Personnel Manager ',
	(int) 44 => '<p>CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, ',
	(int) 45 => '<p>Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' ',
	(int) 46 => '<p>20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. ',
	(int) 47 => '<p>21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : ',
	(int) 48 => '<p>25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - ',
	(int) 49 => '<p> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; ',
	(int) 50 => '<p> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and ',
	(int) 51 => '<p> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). ',
	(int) 52 => '<p>22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. ',
	(int) 53 => '<p>23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p>',
	(int) 54 => '<p>'
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Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana)

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Frick India Private Ltd Vs Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another - Citation 615740 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '615740',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2, 2A, 25B and 25F',
			'appealno' => 'C.W.P. No. 137/1985',
			'appellant' => 'Frick India Private Ltd.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Frick India Private Ltd. Vs. Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
			'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another;',
			'citingcases' => ' June, 1982            18 days 
 July, 1982            31 days 
 August, 1982          31 days 
 September, 1982       30 days 
 October, 1982         31 days 
 November, 1982        30 days 
 December, 1982        31 days 
 January, 1983         31 days 
 February, 1983        28 days 
 March, 1983           12 days 
; 
 Regd. A.D. 
 FIL/PD/83/M-208                                                                                     Dt. 12.3.83 ',
			'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal and; Sudhir Mittal, Advs.',
			'counseldef' => ' J.B. Tacoria, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1999-07-07',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' K.K. Srivastava, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">K.K. Srivastava, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. As per reference </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed </p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days </p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">a) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> b) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (c) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Dear Sir,</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Sub : Termination </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> sd/- </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Personnel Manager </p><p style="text-align: justify;">CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). </p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '(1999)123PLR814',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
			'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'frick-india-private-ltd-vs-vijay-bahadur',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '615740',
		(int) 1 => 'frick-india-private-ltd-vs-vijay-bahadur'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Frick India Private Ltd Vs Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another - Citation 615740 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '615740',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2, 2A, 25B and 25F',
		'appealno' => 'C.W.P. No. 137/1985',
		'appellant' => 'Frick India Private Ltd.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Frick India Private Ltd. Vs. Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
		'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another;',
		'citingcases' => ' June, 1982            18 days 
 July, 1982            31 days 
 August, 1982          31 days 
 September, 1982       30 days 
 October, 1982         31 days 
 November, 1982        30 days 
 December, 1982        31 days 
 January, 1983         31 days 
 February, 1983        28 days 
 March, 1983           12 days 
; 
 Regd. A.D. 
 FIL/PD/83/M-208                                                                                     Dt. 12.3.83 ',
		'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal and; Sudhir Mittal, Advs.',
		'counseldef' => ' J.B. Tacoria, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1999-07-07',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' K.K. Srivastava, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>K.K. Srivastava, J.</p><p>1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p>2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : </p><p>'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' </p><p>3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : </p><p>'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. </p><p> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. </p><p> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. </p><p> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' </p><p>4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : </p><p>'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' </p><p>5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : </p><p>1. As per reference </p><p> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed </p><p>6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p>7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. </p><p>8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. </p><p>9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. </p><p>10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.</p><p>11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : </p><p>June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days </p><p>12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : </p><p>'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' </p><p>13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : </p><p>'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' </p><p>14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : </p><p>a) xxx xxx xxx </p><p> b) xxx xxx xxx </p><p> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] </p><p> (c) xxx xxx xxx </p><p>15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. </p><p>16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : </p><p>'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' </p><p>17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : </p><p>'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' </p><p>18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. </p><p>19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : </p><p>Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) </p><p> Dear Sir,</p><p> Sub : Termination </p><p> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. </p><p> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. </p><p> sd/- </p><p>Personnel Manager </p><p>CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, </p><p>Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' </p><p>20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. </p><p>21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : </p><p>25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - </p><p> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; </p><p> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and </p><p> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). </p><p>22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. </p><p>23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '(1999)123PLR814',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
		'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
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	(int) 0 => '<p>K.K. Srivastava, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : ',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' ',
	(int) 4 => '<p>3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. ',
	(int) 6 => '<p> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. ',
	(int) 7 => '<p> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. ',
	(int) 8 => '<p> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' ',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : ',
	(int) 10 => '<p>'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' ',
	(int) 11 => '<p>5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : ',
	(int) 12 => '<p>1. As per reference ',
	(int) 13 => '<p> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed ',
	(int) 14 => '<p>6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. ',
	(int) 15 => '<p>7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. ',
	(int) 16 => '<p>8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. ',
	(int) 17 => '<p>9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. ',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days ',
	(int) 21 => '<p>12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : ',
	(int) 22 => '<p>'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' ',
	(int) 23 => '<p>13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : ',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' ',
	(int) 25 => '<p>14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : ',
	(int) 26 => '<p>a) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 27 => '<p> b) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 28 => '<p> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] ',
	(int) 29 => '<p> (c) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 30 => '<p>15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. ',
	(int) 31 => '<p>16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : ',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' ',
	(int) 33 => '<p>17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : ',
	(int) 34 => '<p>'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' ',
	(int) 35 => '<p>18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. ',
	(int) 36 => '<p>19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : ',
	(int) 37 => '<p>Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) ',
	(int) 38 => '<p> Dear Sir,',
	(int) 39 => '<p> Sub : Termination ',
	(int) 40 => '<p> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. ',
	(int) 41 => '<p> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. ',
	(int) 42 => '<p> sd/- ',
	(int) 43 => '<p>Personnel Manager ',
	(int) 44 => '<p>CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, ',
	(int) 45 => '<p>Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' ',
	(int) 46 => '<p>20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. ',
	(int) 47 => '<p>21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : ',
	(int) 48 => '<p>25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - ',
	(int) 49 => '<p> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; ',
	(int) 50 => '<p> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and ',
	(int) 51 => '<p> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). ',
	(int) 52 => '<p>22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. ',
	(int) 53 => '<p>23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p>',
	(int) 54 => '<p>'
)
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	'title_for_layout' => 'Frick India Private Ltd Vs Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another - Citation 615740 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '615740',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2, 2A, 25B and 25F',
			'appealno' => 'C.W.P. No. 137/1985',
			'appellant' => 'Frick India Private Ltd.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Frick India Private Ltd. Vs. Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
			'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another;',
			'citingcases' => ' June, 1982            18 days 
 July, 1982            31 days 
 August, 1982          31 days 
 September, 1982       30 days 
 October, 1982         31 days 
 November, 1982        30 days 
 December, 1982        31 days 
 January, 1983         31 days 
 February, 1983        28 days 
 March, 1983           12 days 
; 
 Regd. A.D. 
 FIL/PD/83/M-208                                                                                     Dt. 12.3.83 ',
			'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal and; Sudhir Mittal, Advs.',
			'counseldef' => ' J.B. Tacoria, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1999-07-07',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' K.K. Srivastava, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">K.K. Srivastava, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. As per reference </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed </p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days </p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">a) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> b) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (c) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Dear Sir,</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Sub : Termination </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> sd/- </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Personnel Manager </p><p style="text-align: justify;">CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). </p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '(1999)123PLR814',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
			'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'frick-india-private-ltd-vs-vijay-bahadur',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '615740',
		(int) 1 => 'frick-india-private-ltd-vs-vijay-bahadur'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Frick India Private Ltd Vs Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another - Citation 615740 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '615740',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2, 2A, 25B and 25F',
		'appealno' => 'C.W.P. No. 137/1985',
		'appellant' => 'Frick India Private Ltd.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Frick India Private Ltd. Vs. Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
		'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another;',
		'citingcases' => ' June, 1982            18 days 
 July, 1982            31 days 
 August, 1982          31 days 
 September, 1982       30 days 
 October, 1982         31 days 
 November, 1982        30 days 
 December, 1982        31 days 
 January, 1983         31 days 
 February, 1983        28 days 
 March, 1983           12 days 
; 
 Regd. A.D. 
 FIL/PD/83/M-208                                                                                     Dt. 12.3.83 ',
		'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal and; Sudhir Mittal, Advs.',
		'counseldef' => ' J.B. Tacoria, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1999-07-07',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' K.K. Srivastava, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>K.K. Srivastava, J.</p><p>1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p>2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : </p><p>'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' </p><p>3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : </p><p>'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. </p><p> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. </p><p> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. </p><p> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' </p><p>4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : </p><p>'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' </p><p>5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : </p><p>1. As per reference </p><p> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed </p><p>6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p>7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. </p><p>8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. </p><p>9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. </p><p>10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.</p><p>11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : </p><p>June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days </p><p>12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : </p><p>'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' </p><p>13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : </p><p>'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' </p><p>14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : </p><p>a) xxx xxx xxx </p><p> b) xxx xxx xxx </p><p> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] </p><p> (c) xxx xxx xxx </p><p>15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. </p><p>16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : </p><p>'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' </p><p>17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : </p><p>'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' </p><p>18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. </p><p>19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : </p><p>Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) </p><p> Dear Sir,</p><p> Sub : Termination </p><p> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. </p><p> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. </p><p> sd/- </p><p>Personnel Manager </p><p>CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, </p><p>Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' </p><p>20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. </p><p>21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : </p><p>25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - </p><p> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; </p><p> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and </p><p> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). </p><p>22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. </p><p>23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '(1999)123PLR814',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
		'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
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	(int) 0 => '<p>K.K. Srivastava, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : ',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' ',
	(int) 4 => '<p>3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. ',
	(int) 6 => '<p> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. ',
	(int) 7 => '<p> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. ',
	(int) 8 => '<p> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' ',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : ',
	(int) 10 => '<p>'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' ',
	(int) 11 => '<p>5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : ',
	(int) 12 => '<p>1. As per reference ',
	(int) 13 => '<p> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed ',
	(int) 14 => '<p>6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. ',
	(int) 15 => '<p>7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. ',
	(int) 16 => '<p>8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. ',
	(int) 17 => '<p>9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. ',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days ',
	(int) 21 => '<p>12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : ',
	(int) 22 => '<p>'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' ',
	(int) 23 => '<p>13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : ',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' ',
	(int) 25 => '<p>14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : ',
	(int) 26 => '<p>a) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 27 => '<p> b) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 28 => '<p> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] ',
	(int) 29 => '<p> (c) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 30 => '<p>15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. ',
	(int) 31 => '<p>16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : ',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' ',
	(int) 33 => '<p>17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : ',
	(int) 34 => '<p>'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' ',
	(int) 35 => '<p>18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. ',
	(int) 36 => '<p>19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : ',
	(int) 37 => '<p>Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) ',
	(int) 38 => '<p> Dear Sir,',
	(int) 39 => '<p> Sub : Termination ',
	(int) 40 => '<p> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. ',
	(int) 41 => '<p> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. ',
	(int) 42 => '<p> sd/- ',
	(int) 43 => '<p>Personnel Manager ',
	(int) 44 => '<p>CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, ',
	(int) 45 => '<p>Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' ',
	(int) 46 => '<p>20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. ',
	(int) 47 => '<p>21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : ',
	(int) 48 => '<p>25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - ',
	(int) 49 => '<p> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; ',
	(int) 50 => '<p> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and ',
	(int) 51 => '<p> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). ',
	(int) 52 => '<p>22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. ',
	(int) 53 => '<p>23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p>',
	(int) 54 => '<p>'
)
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Sub : Termination

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Frick India Private Ltd Vs Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another - Citation 615740 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '615740',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2, 2A, 25B and 25F',
			'appealno' => 'C.W.P. No. 137/1985',
			'appellant' => 'Frick India Private Ltd.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Frick India Private Ltd. Vs. Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
			'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another;',
			'citingcases' => ' June, 1982            18 days 
 July, 1982            31 days 
 August, 1982          31 days 
 September, 1982       30 days 
 October, 1982         31 days 
 November, 1982        30 days 
 December, 1982        31 days 
 January, 1983         31 days 
 February, 1983        28 days 
 March, 1983           12 days 
; 
 Regd. A.D. 
 FIL/PD/83/M-208                                                                                     Dt. 12.3.83 ',
			'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal and; Sudhir Mittal, Advs.',
			'counseldef' => ' J.B. Tacoria, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1999-07-07',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' K.K. Srivastava, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">K.K. Srivastava, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. As per reference </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed </p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days </p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">a) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> b) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (c) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Dear Sir,</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Sub : Termination </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> sd/- </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Personnel Manager </p><p style="text-align: justify;">CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). </p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '(1999)123PLR814',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
			'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'frick-india-private-ltd-vs-vijay-bahadur',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '615740',
		(int) 1 => 'frick-india-private-ltd-vs-vijay-bahadur'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Frick India Private Ltd Vs Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another - Citation 615740 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '615740',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2, 2A, 25B and 25F',
		'appealno' => 'C.W.P. No. 137/1985',
		'appellant' => 'Frick India Private Ltd.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Frick India Private Ltd. Vs. Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
		'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another;',
		'citingcases' => ' June, 1982            18 days 
 July, 1982            31 days 
 August, 1982          31 days 
 September, 1982       30 days 
 October, 1982         31 days 
 November, 1982        30 days 
 December, 1982        31 days 
 January, 1983         31 days 
 February, 1983        28 days 
 March, 1983           12 days 
; 
 Regd. A.D. 
 FIL/PD/83/M-208                                                                                     Dt. 12.3.83 ',
		'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal and; Sudhir Mittal, Advs.',
		'counseldef' => ' J.B. Tacoria, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1999-07-07',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' K.K. Srivastava, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>K.K. Srivastava, J.</p><p>1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p>2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : </p><p>'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' </p><p>3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : </p><p>'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. </p><p> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. </p><p> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. </p><p> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' </p><p>4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : </p><p>'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' </p><p>5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : </p><p>1. As per reference </p><p> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed </p><p>6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p>7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. </p><p>8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. </p><p>9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. </p><p>10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.</p><p>11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : </p><p>June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days </p><p>12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : </p><p>'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' </p><p>13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : </p><p>'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' </p><p>14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : </p><p>a) xxx xxx xxx </p><p> b) xxx xxx xxx </p><p> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] </p><p> (c) xxx xxx xxx </p><p>15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. </p><p>16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : </p><p>'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' </p><p>17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : </p><p>'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' </p><p>18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. </p><p>19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : </p><p>Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) </p><p> Dear Sir,</p><p> Sub : Termination </p><p> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. </p><p> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. </p><p> sd/- </p><p>Personnel Manager </p><p>CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, </p><p>Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' </p><p>20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. </p><p>21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : </p><p>25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - </p><p> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; </p><p> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and </p><p> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). </p><p>22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. </p><p>23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '(1999)123PLR814',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
		'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
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	(int) 0 => '<p>K.K. Srivastava, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : ',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' ',
	(int) 4 => '<p>3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. ',
	(int) 6 => '<p> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. ',
	(int) 7 => '<p> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. ',
	(int) 8 => '<p> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' ',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : ',
	(int) 10 => '<p>'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' ',
	(int) 11 => '<p>5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : ',
	(int) 12 => '<p>1. As per reference ',
	(int) 13 => '<p> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed ',
	(int) 14 => '<p>6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. ',
	(int) 15 => '<p>7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. ',
	(int) 16 => '<p>8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. ',
	(int) 17 => '<p>9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. ',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days ',
	(int) 21 => '<p>12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : ',
	(int) 22 => '<p>'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' ',
	(int) 23 => '<p>13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : ',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' ',
	(int) 25 => '<p>14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : ',
	(int) 26 => '<p>a) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 27 => '<p> b) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 28 => '<p> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] ',
	(int) 29 => '<p> (c) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 30 => '<p>15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. ',
	(int) 31 => '<p>16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : ',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' ',
	(int) 33 => '<p>17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : ',
	(int) 34 => '<p>'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' ',
	(int) 35 => '<p>18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. ',
	(int) 36 => '<p>19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : ',
	(int) 37 => '<p>Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) ',
	(int) 38 => '<p> Dear Sir,',
	(int) 39 => '<p> Sub : Termination ',
	(int) 40 => '<p> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. ',
	(int) 41 => '<p> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. ',
	(int) 42 => '<p> sd/- ',
	(int) 43 => '<p>Personnel Manager ',
	(int) 44 => '<p>CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, ',
	(int) 45 => '<p>Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' ',
	(int) 46 => '<p>20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. ',
	(int) 47 => '<p>21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : ',
	(int) 48 => '<p>25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - ',
	(int) 49 => '<p> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; ',
	(int) 50 => '<p> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and ',
	(int) 51 => '<p> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). ',
	(int) 52 => '<p>22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. ',
	(int) 53 => '<p>23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p>',
	(int) 54 => '<p>'
)
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With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Frick India Private Ltd Vs Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another - Citation 615740 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '615740',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2, 2A, 25B and 25F',
			'appealno' => 'C.W.P. No. 137/1985',
			'appellant' => 'Frick India Private Ltd.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Frick India Private Ltd. Vs. Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
			'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another;',
			'citingcases' => ' June, 1982            18 days 
 July, 1982            31 days 
 August, 1982          31 days 
 September, 1982       30 days 
 October, 1982         31 days 
 November, 1982        30 days 
 December, 1982        31 days 
 January, 1983         31 days 
 February, 1983        28 days 
 March, 1983           12 days 
; 
 Regd. A.D. 
 FIL/PD/83/M-208                                                                                     Dt. 12.3.83 ',
			'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal and; Sudhir Mittal, Advs.',
			'counseldef' => ' J.B. Tacoria, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1999-07-07',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' K.K. Srivastava, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">K.K. Srivastava, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. As per reference </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed </p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days </p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">a) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> b) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (c) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Dear Sir,</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Sub : Termination </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> sd/- </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Personnel Manager </p><p style="text-align: justify;">CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). </p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '(1999)123PLR814',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
			'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'frick-india-private-ltd-vs-vijay-bahadur',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '615740',
		(int) 1 => 'frick-india-private-ltd-vs-vijay-bahadur'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Frick India Private Ltd Vs Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another - Citation 615740 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '615740',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2, 2A, 25B and 25F',
		'appealno' => 'C.W.P. No. 137/1985',
		'appellant' => 'Frick India Private Ltd.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Frick India Private Ltd. Vs. Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
		'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another;',
		'citingcases' => ' June, 1982            18 days 
 July, 1982            31 days 
 August, 1982          31 days 
 September, 1982       30 days 
 October, 1982         31 days 
 November, 1982        30 days 
 December, 1982        31 days 
 January, 1983         31 days 
 February, 1983        28 days 
 March, 1983           12 days 
; 
 Regd. A.D. 
 FIL/PD/83/M-208                                                                                     Dt. 12.3.83 ',
		'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal and; Sudhir Mittal, Advs.',
		'counseldef' => ' J.B. Tacoria, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1999-07-07',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' K.K. Srivastava, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>K.K. Srivastava, J.</p><p>1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p>2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : </p><p>'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' </p><p>3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : </p><p>'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. </p><p> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. </p><p> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. </p><p> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' </p><p>4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : </p><p>'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' </p><p>5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : </p><p>1. As per reference </p><p> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed </p><p>6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p>7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. </p><p>8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. </p><p>9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. </p><p>10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.</p><p>11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : </p><p>June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days </p><p>12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : </p><p>'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' </p><p>13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : </p><p>'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' </p><p>14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : </p><p>a) xxx xxx xxx </p><p> b) xxx xxx xxx </p><p> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] </p><p> (c) xxx xxx xxx </p><p>15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. </p><p>16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : </p><p>'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' </p><p>17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : </p><p>'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' </p><p>18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. </p><p>19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : </p><p>Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) </p><p> Dear Sir,</p><p> Sub : Termination </p><p> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. </p><p> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. </p><p> sd/- </p><p>Personnel Manager </p><p>CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, </p><p>Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' </p><p>20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. </p><p>21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : </p><p>25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - </p><p> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; </p><p> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and </p><p> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). </p><p>22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. </p><p>23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '(1999)123PLR814',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
		'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
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	(int) 0 => '<p>K.K. Srivastava, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : ',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' ',
	(int) 4 => '<p>3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. ',
	(int) 6 => '<p> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. ',
	(int) 7 => '<p> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. ',
	(int) 8 => '<p> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' ',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : ',
	(int) 10 => '<p>'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' ',
	(int) 11 => '<p>5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : ',
	(int) 12 => '<p>1. As per reference ',
	(int) 13 => '<p> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed ',
	(int) 14 => '<p>6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. ',
	(int) 15 => '<p>7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. ',
	(int) 16 => '<p>8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. ',
	(int) 17 => '<p>9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. ',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days ',
	(int) 21 => '<p>12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : ',
	(int) 22 => '<p>'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' ',
	(int) 23 => '<p>13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : ',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' ',
	(int) 25 => '<p>14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : ',
	(int) 26 => '<p>a) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 27 => '<p> b) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 28 => '<p> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] ',
	(int) 29 => '<p> (c) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 30 => '<p>15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. ',
	(int) 31 => '<p>16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : ',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' ',
	(int) 33 => '<p>17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : ',
	(int) 34 => '<p>'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' ',
	(int) 35 => '<p>18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. ',
	(int) 36 => '<p>19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : ',
	(int) 37 => '<p>Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) ',
	(int) 38 => '<p> Dear Sir,',
	(int) 39 => '<p> Sub : Termination ',
	(int) 40 => '<p> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. ',
	(int) 41 => '<p> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. ',
	(int) 42 => '<p> sd/- ',
	(int) 43 => '<p>Personnel Manager ',
	(int) 44 => '<p>CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, ',
	(int) 45 => '<p>Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' ',
	(int) 46 => '<p>20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. ',
	(int) 47 => '<p>21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : ',
	(int) 48 => '<p>25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - ',
	(int) 49 => '<p> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; ',
	(int) 50 => '<p> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and ',
	(int) 51 => '<p> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). ',
	(int) 52 => '<p>22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. ',
	(int) 53 => '<p>23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p>',
	(int) 54 => '<p>'
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Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Frick India Private Ltd Vs Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another - Citation 615740 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '615740',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2, 2A, 25B and 25F',
			'appealno' => 'C.W.P. No. 137/1985',
			'appellant' => 'Frick India Private Ltd.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Frick India Private Ltd. Vs. Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
			'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another;',
			'citingcases' => ' June, 1982            18 days 
 July, 1982            31 days 
 August, 1982          31 days 
 September, 1982       30 days 
 October, 1982         31 days 
 November, 1982        30 days 
 December, 1982        31 days 
 January, 1983         31 days 
 February, 1983        28 days 
 March, 1983           12 days 
; 
 Regd. A.D. 
 FIL/PD/83/M-208                                                                                     Dt. 12.3.83 ',
			'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal and; Sudhir Mittal, Advs.',
			'counseldef' => ' J.B. Tacoria, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1999-07-07',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' K.K. Srivastava, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">K.K. Srivastava, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. As per reference </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed </p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days </p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">a) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> b) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (c) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Dear Sir,</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Sub : Termination </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> sd/- </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Personnel Manager </p><p style="text-align: justify;">CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). </p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '(1999)123PLR814',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
			'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'frick-india-private-ltd-vs-vijay-bahadur',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '615740',
		(int) 1 => 'frick-india-private-ltd-vs-vijay-bahadur'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Frick India Private Ltd Vs Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another - Citation 615740 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '615740',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2, 2A, 25B and 25F',
		'appealno' => 'C.W.P. No. 137/1985',
		'appellant' => 'Frick India Private Ltd.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Frick India Private Ltd. Vs. Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
		'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another;',
		'citingcases' => ' June, 1982            18 days 
 July, 1982            31 days 
 August, 1982          31 days 
 September, 1982       30 days 
 October, 1982         31 days 
 November, 1982        30 days 
 December, 1982        31 days 
 January, 1983         31 days 
 February, 1983        28 days 
 March, 1983           12 days 
; 
 Regd. A.D. 
 FIL/PD/83/M-208                                                                                     Dt. 12.3.83 ',
		'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal and; Sudhir Mittal, Advs.',
		'counseldef' => ' J.B. Tacoria, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1999-07-07',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' K.K. Srivastava, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>K.K. Srivastava, J.</p><p>1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p>2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : </p><p>'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' </p><p>3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : </p><p>'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. </p><p> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. </p><p> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. </p><p> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' </p><p>4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : </p><p>'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' </p><p>5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : </p><p>1. As per reference </p><p> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed </p><p>6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p>7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. </p><p>8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. </p><p>9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. </p><p>10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.</p><p>11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : </p><p>June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days </p><p>12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : </p><p>'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' </p><p>13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : </p><p>'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' </p><p>14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : </p><p>a) xxx xxx xxx </p><p> b) xxx xxx xxx </p><p> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] </p><p> (c) xxx xxx xxx </p><p>15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. </p><p>16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : </p><p>'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' </p><p>17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : </p><p>'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' </p><p>18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. </p><p>19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : </p><p>Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) </p><p> Dear Sir,</p><p> Sub : Termination </p><p> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. </p><p> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. </p><p> sd/- </p><p>Personnel Manager </p><p>CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, </p><p>Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' </p><p>20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. </p><p>21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : </p><p>25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - </p><p> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; </p><p> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and </p><p> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). </p><p>22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. </p><p>23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '(1999)123PLR814',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
		'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
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	(int) 0 => '<p>K.K. Srivastava, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : ',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' ',
	(int) 4 => '<p>3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. ',
	(int) 6 => '<p> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. ',
	(int) 7 => '<p> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. ',
	(int) 8 => '<p> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' ',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : ',
	(int) 10 => '<p>'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' ',
	(int) 11 => '<p>5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : ',
	(int) 12 => '<p>1. As per reference ',
	(int) 13 => '<p> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed ',
	(int) 14 => '<p>6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. ',
	(int) 15 => '<p>7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. ',
	(int) 16 => '<p>8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. ',
	(int) 17 => '<p>9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. ',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days ',
	(int) 21 => '<p>12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : ',
	(int) 22 => '<p>'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' ',
	(int) 23 => '<p>13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : ',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' ',
	(int) 25 => '<p>14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : ',
	(int) 26 => '<p>a) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 27 => '<p> b) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 28 => '<p> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] ',
	(int) 29 => '<p> (c) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 30 => '<p>15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. ',
	(int) 31 => '<p>16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : ',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' ',
	(int) 33 => '<p>17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : ',
	(int) 34 => '<p>'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' ',
	(int) 35 => '<p>18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. ',
	(int) 36 => '<p>19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : ',
	(int) 37 => '<p>Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) ',
	(int) 38 => '<p> Dear Sir,',
	(int) 39 => '<p> Sub : Termination ',
	(int) 40 => '<p> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. ',
	(int) 41 => '<p> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. ',
	(int) 42 => '<p> sd/- ',
	(int) 43 => '<p>Personnel Manager ',
	(int) 44 => '<p>CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, ',
	(int) 45 => '<p>Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' ',
	(int) 46 => '<p>20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. ',
	(int) 47 => '<p>21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : ',
	(int) 48 => '<p>25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - ',
	(int) 49 => '<p> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; ',
	(int) 50 => '<p> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and ',
	(int) 51 => '<p> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). ',
	(int) 52 => '<p>22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. ',
	(int) 53 => '<p>23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p>',
	(int) 54 => '<p>'
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	'title_for_layout' => 'Frick India Private Ltd Vs Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another - Citation 615740 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '615740',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2, 2A, 25B and 25F',
			'appealno' => 'C.W.P. No. 137/1985',
			'appellant' => 'Frick India Private Ltd.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Frick India Private Ltd. Vs. Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
			'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another;',
			'citingcases' => ' June, 1982            18 days 
 July, 1982            31 days 
 August, 1982          31 days 
 September, 1982       30 days 
 October, 1982         31 days 
 November, 1982        30 days 
 December, 1982        31 days 
 January, 1983         31 days 
 February, 1983        28 days 
 March, 1983           12 days 
; 
 Regd. A.D. 
 FIL/PD/83/M-208                                                                                     Dt. 12.3.83 ',
			'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal and; Sudhir Mittal, Advs.',
			'counseldef' => ' J.B. Tacoria, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1999-07-07',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' K.K. Srivastava, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">K.K. Srivastava, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. As per reference </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed </p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days </p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">a) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> b) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (c) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Dear Sir,</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Sub : Termination </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> sd/- </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Personnel Manager </p><p style="text-align: justify;">CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). </p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '(1999)123PLR814',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
			'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'frick-india-private-ltd-vs-vijay-bahadur',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '615740',
		(int) 1 => 'frick-india-private-ltd-vs-vijay-bahadur'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Frick India Private Ltd Vs Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another - Citation 615740 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '615740',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2, 2A, 25B and 25F',
		'appealno' => 'C.W.P. No. 137/1985',
		'appellant' => 'Frick India Private Ltd.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Frick India Private Ltd. Vs. Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
		'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another;',
		'citingcases' => ' June, 1982            18 days 
 July, 1982            31 days 
 August, 1982          31 days 
 September, 1982       30 days 
 October, 1982         31 days 
 November, 1982        30 days 
 December, 1982        31 days 
 January, 1983         31 days 
 February, 1983        28 days 
 March, 1983           12 days 
; 
 Regd. A.D. 
 FIL/PD/83/M-208                                                                                     Dt. 12.3.83 ',
		'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal and; Sudhir Mittal, Advs.',
		'counseldef' => ' J.B. Tacoria, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1999-07-07',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' K.K. Srivastava, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>K.K. Srivastava, J.</p><p>1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p>2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : </p><p>'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' </p><p>3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : </p><p>'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. </p><p> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. </p><p> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. </p><p> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' </p><p>4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : </p><p>'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' </p><p>5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : </p><p>1. As per reference </p><p> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed </p><p>6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p>7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. </p><p>8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. </p><p>9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. </p><p>10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.</p><p>11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : </p><p>June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days </p><p>12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : </p><p>'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' </p><p>13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : </p><p>'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' </p><p>14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : </p><p>a) xxx xxx xxx </p><p> b) xxx xxx xxx </p><p> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] </p><p> (c) xxx xxx xxx </p><p>15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. </p><p>16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : </p><p>'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' </p><p>17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : </p><p>'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' </p><p>18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. </p><p>19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : </p><p>Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) </p><p> Dear Sir,</p><p> Sub : Termination </p><p> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. </p><p> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. </p><p> sd/- </p><p>Personnel Manager </p><p>CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, </p><p>Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' </p><p>20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. </p><p>21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : </p><p>25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - </p><p> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; </p><p> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and </p><p> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). </p><p>22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. </p><p>23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '(1999)123PLR814',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
		'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
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	(int) 0 => '<p>K.K. Srivastava, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : ',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' ',
	(int) 4 => '<p>3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. ',
	(int) 6 => '<p> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. ',
	(int) 7 => '<p> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. ',
	(int) 8 => '<p> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' ',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : ',
	(int) 10 => '<p>'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' ',
	(int) 11 => '<p>5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : ',
	(int) 12 => '<p>1. As per reference ',
	(int) 13 => '<p> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed ',
	(int) 14 => '<p>6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. ',
	(int) 15 => '<p>7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. ',
	(int) 16 => '<p>8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. ',
	(int) 17 => '<p>9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. ',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days ',
	(int) 21 => '<p>12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : ',
	(int) 22 => '<p>'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' ',
	(int) 23 => '<p>13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : ',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' ',
	(int) 25 => '<p>14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : ',
	(int) 26 => '<p>a) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 27 => '<p> b) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 28 => '<p> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] ',
	(int) 29 => '<p> (c) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 30 => '<p>15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. ',
	(int) 31 => '<p>16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : ',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' ',
	(int) 33 => '<p>17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : ',
	(int) 34 => '<p>'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' ',
	(int) 35 => '<p>18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. ',
	(int) 36 => '<p>19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : ',
	(int) 37 => '<p>Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) ',
	(int) 38 => '<p> Dear Sir,',
	(int) 39 => '<p> Sub : Termination ',
	(int) 40 => '<p> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. ',
	(int) 41 => '<p> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. ',
	(int) 42 => '<p> sd/- ',
	(int) 43 => '<p>Personnel Manager ',
	(int) 44 => '<p>CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, ',
	(int) 45 => '<p>Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' ',
	(int) 46 => '<p>20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. ',
	(int) 47 => '<p>21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : ',
	(int) 48 => '<p>25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - ',
	(int) 49 => '<p> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; ',
	(int) 50 => '<p> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and ',
	(int) 51 => '<p> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). ',
	(int) 52 => '<p>22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. ',
	(int) 53 => '<p>23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p>',
	(int) 54 => '<p>'
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Personnel Manager

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Frick India Private Ltd Vs Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another - Citation 615740 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '615740',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2, 2A, 25B and 25F',
			'appealno' => 'C.W.P. No. 137/1985',
			'appellant' => 'Frick India Private Ltd.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Frick India Private Ltd. Vs. Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
			'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another;',
			'citingcases' => ' June, 1982            18 days 
 July, 1982            31 days 
 August, 1982          31 days 
 September, 1982       30 days 
 October, 1982         31 days 
 November, 1982        30 days 
 December, 1982        31 days 
 January, 1983         31 days 
 February, 1983        28 days 
 March, 1983           12 days 
; 
 Regd. A.D. 
 FIL/PD/83/M-208                                                                                     Dt. 12.3.83 ',
			'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal and; Sudhir Mittal, Advs.',
			'counseldef' => ' J.B. Tacoria, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1999-07-07',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' K.K. Srivastava, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">K.K. Srivastava, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. As per reference </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed </p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days </p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">a) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> b) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (c) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Dear Sir,</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Sub : Termination </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> sd/- </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Personnel Manager </p><p style="text-align: justify;">CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). </p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '(1999)123PLR814',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
			'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'frick-india-private-ltd-vs-vijay-bahadur',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '615740',
		(int) 1 => 'frick-india-private-ltd-vs-vijay-bahadur'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Frick India Private Ltd Vs Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another - Citation 615740 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '615740',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2, 2A, 25B and 25F',
		'appealno' => 'C.W.P. No. 137/1985',
		'appellant' => 'Frick India Private Ltd.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Frick India Private Ltd. Vs. Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
		'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another;',
		'citingcases' => ' June, 1982            18 days 
 July, 1982            31 days 
 August, 1982          31 days 
 September, 1982       30 days 
 October, 1982         31 days 
 November, 1982        30 days 
 December, 1982        31 days 
 January, 1983         31 days 
 February, 1983        28 days 
 March, 1983           12 days 
; 
 Regd. A.D. 
 FIL/PD/83/M-208                                                                                     Dt. 12.3.83 ',
		'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal and; Sudhir Mittal, Advs.',
		'counseldef' => ' J.B. Tacoria, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1999-07-07',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' K.K. Srivastava, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>K.K. Srivastava, J.</p><p>1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p>2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : </p><p>'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' </p><p>3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : </p><p>'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. </p><p> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. </p><p> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. </p><p> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' </p><p>4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : </p><p>'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' </p><p>5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : </p><p>1. As per reference </p><p> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed </p><p>6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p>7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. </p><p>8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. </p><p>9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. </p><p>10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.</p><p>11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : </p><p>June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days </p><p>12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : </p><p>'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' </p><p>13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : </p><p>'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' </p><p>14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : </p><p>a) xxx xxx xxx </p><p> b) xxx xxx xxx </p><p> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] </p><p> (c) xxx xxx xxx </p><p>15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. </p><p>16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : </p><p>'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' </p><p>17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : </p><p>'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' </p><p>18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. </p><p>19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : </p><p>Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) </p><p> Dear Sir,</p><p> Sub : Termination </p><p> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. </p><p> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. </p><p> sd/- </p><p>Personnel Manager </p><p>CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, </p><p>Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' </p><p>20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. </p><p>21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : </p><p>25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - </p><p> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; </p><p> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and </p><p> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). </p><p>22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. </p><p>23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '(1999)123PLR814',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
		'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
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	(int) 0 => '<p>K.K. Srivastava, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : ',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' ',
	(int) 4 => '<p>3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. ',
	(int) 6 => '<p> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. ',
	(int) 7 => '<p> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. ',
	(int) 8 => '<p> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' ',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : ',
	(int) 10 => '<p>'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' ',
	(int) 11 => '<p>5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : ',
	(int) 12 => '<p>1. As per reference ',
	(int) 13 => '<p> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed ',
	(int) 14 => '<p>6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. ',
	(int) 15 => '<p>7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. ',
	(int) 16 => '<p>8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. ',
	(int) 17 => '<p>9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. ',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days ',
	(int) 21 => '<p>12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : ',
	(int) 22 => '<p>'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' ',
	(int) 23 => '<p>13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : ',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' ',
	(int) 25 => '<p>14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : ',
	(int) 26 => '<p>a) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 27 => '<p> b) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 28 => '<p> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] ',
	(int) 29 => '<p> (c) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 30 => '<p>15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. ',
	(int) 31 => '<p>16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : ',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' ',
	(int) 33 => '<p>17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : ',
	(int) 34 => '<p>'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' ',
	(int) 35 => '<p>18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. ',
	(int) 36 => '<p>19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : ',
	(int) 37 => '<p>Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) ',
	(int) 38 => '<p> Dear Sir,',
	(int) 39 => '<p> Sub : Termination ',
	(int) 40 => '<p> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. ',
	(int) 41 => '<p> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. ',
	(int) 42 => '<p> sd/- ',
	(int) 43 => '<p>Personnel Manager ',
	(int) 44 => '<p>CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, ',
	(int) 45 => '<p>Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' ',
	(int) 46 => '<p>20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. ',
	(int) 47 => '<p>21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : ',
	(int) 48 => '<p>25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - ',
	(int) 49 => '<p> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; ',
	(int) 50 => '<p> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and ',
	(int) 51 => '<p> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). ',
	(int) 52 => '<p>22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. ',
	(int) 53 => '<p>23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p>',
	(int) 54 => '<p>'
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CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh,

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Frick India Private Ltd Vs Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another - Citation 615740 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '615740',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2, 2A, 25B and 25F',
			'appealno' => 'C.W.P. No. 137/1985',
			'appellant' => 'Frick India Private Ltd.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Frick India Private Ltd. Vs. Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
			'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another;',
			'citingcases' => ' June, 1982            18 days 
 July, 1982            31 days 
 August, 1982          31 days 
 September, 1982       30 days 
 October, 1982         31 days 
 November, 1982        30 days 
 December, 1982        31 days 
 January, 1983         31 days 
 February, 1983        28 days 
 March, 1983           12 days 
; 
 Regd. A.D. 
 FIL/PD/83/M-208                                                                                     Dt. 12.3.83 ',
			'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal and; Sudhir Mittal, Advs.',
			'counseldef' => ' J.B. Tacoria, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1999-07-07',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' K.K. Srivastava, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">K.K. Srivastava, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. As per reference </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed </p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days </p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">a) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> b) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (c) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Dear Sir,</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Sub : Termination </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> sd/- </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Personnel Manager </p><p style="text-align: justify;">CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). </p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '(1999)123PLR814',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
			'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'frick-india-private-ltd-vs-vijay-bahadur',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '615740',
		(int) 1 => 'frick-india-private-ltd-vs-vijay-bahadur'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Frick India Private Ltd Vs Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another - Citation 615740 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '615740',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2, 2A, 25B and 25F',
		'appealno' => 'C.W.P. No. 137/1985',
		'appellant' => 'Frick India Private Ltd.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Frick India Private Ltd. Vs. Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
		'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another;',
		'citingcases' => ' June, 1982            18 days 
 July, 1982            31 days 
 August, 1982          31 days 
 September, 1982       30 days 
 October, 1982         31 days 
 November, 1982        30 days 
 December, 1982        31 days 
 January, 1983         31 days 
 February, 1983        28 days 
 March, 1983           12 days 
; 
 Regd. A.D. 
 FIL/PD/83/M-208                                                                                     Dt. 12.3.83 ',
		'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal and; Sudhir Mittal, Advs.',
		'counseldef' => ' J.B. Tacoria, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1999-07-07',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' K.K. Srivastava, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>K.K. Srivastava, J.</p><p>1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p>2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : </p><p>'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' </p><p>3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : </p><p>'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. </p><p> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. </p><p> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. </p><p> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' </p><p>4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : </p><p>'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' </p><p>5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : </p><p>1. As per reference </p><p> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed </p><p>6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p>7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. </p><p>8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. </p><p>9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. </p><p>10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.</p><p>11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : </p><p>June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days </p><p>12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : </p><p>'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' </p><p>13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : </p><p>'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' </p><p>14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : </p><p>a) xxx xxx xxx </p><p> b) xxx xxx xxx </p><p> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] </p><p> (c) xxx xxx xxx </p><p>15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. </p><p>16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : </p><p>'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' </p><p>17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : </p><p>'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' </p><p>18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. </p><p>19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : </p><p>Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) </p><p> Dear Sir,</p><p> Sub : Termination </p><p> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. </p><p> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. </p><p> sd/- </p><p>Personnel Manager </p><p>CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, </p><p>Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' </p><p>20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. </p><p>21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : </p><p>25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - </p><p> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; </p><p> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and </p><p> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). </p><p>22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. </p><p>23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '(1999)123PLR814',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
		'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
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	(int) 0 => '<p>K.K. Srivastava, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : ',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' ',
	(int) 4 => '<p>3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. ',
	(int) 6 => '<p> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. ',
	(int) 7 => '<p> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. ',
	(int) 8 => '<p> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' ',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : ',
	(int) 10 => '<p>'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' ',
	(int) 11 => '<p>5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : ',
	(int) 12 => '<p>1. As per reference ',
	(int) 13 => '<p> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed ',
	(int) 14 => '<p>6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. ',
	(int) 15 => '<p>7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. ',
	(int) 16 => '<p>8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. ',
	(int) 17 => '<p>9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. ',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days ',
	(int) 21 => '<p>12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : ',
	(int) 22 => '<p>'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' ',
	(int) 23 => '<p>13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : ',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' ',
	(int) 25 => '<p>14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : ',
	(int) 26 => '<p>a) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 27 => '<p> b) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 28 => '<p> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] ',
	(int) 29 => '<p> (c) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 30 => '<p>15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. ',
	(int) 31 => '<p>16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : ',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' ',
	(int) 33 => '<p>17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : ',
	(int) 34 => '<p>'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' ',
	(int) 35 => '<p>18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. ',
	(int) 36 => '<p>19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : ',
	(int) 37 => '<p>Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) ',
	(int) 38 => '<p> Dear Sir,',
	(int) 39 => '<p> Sub : Termination ',
	(int) 40 => '<p> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. ',
	(int) 41 => '<p> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. ',
	(int) 42 => '<p> sd/- ',
	(int) 43 => '<p>Personnel Manager ',
	(int) 44 => '<p>CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, ',
	(int) 45 => '<p>Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' ',
	(int) 46 => '<p>20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. ',
	(int) 47 => '<p>21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : ',
	(int) 48 => '<p>25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - ',
	(int) 49 => '<p> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; ',
	(int) 50 => '<p> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and ',
	(int) 51 => '<p> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). ',
	(int) 52 => '<p>22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. ',
	(int) 53 => '<p>23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p>',
	(int) 54 => '<p>'
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Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)'

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Frick India Private Ltd Vs Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another - Citation 615740 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '615740',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2, 2A, 25B and 25F',
			'appealno' => 'C.W.P. No. 137/1985',
			'appellant' => 'Frick India Private Ltd.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Frick India Private Ltd. Vs. Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
			'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another;',
			'citingcases' => ' June, 1982            18 days 
 July, 1982            31 days 
 August, 1982          31 days 
 September, 1982       30 days 
 October, 1982         31 days 
 November, 1982        30 days 
 December, 1982        31 days 
 January, 1983         31 days 
 February, 1983        28 days 
 March, 1983           12 days 
; 
 Regd. A.D. 
 FIL/PD/83/M-208                                                                                     Dt. 12.3.83 ',
			'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal and; Sudhir Mittal, Advs.',
			'counseldef' => ' J.B. Tacoria, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1999-07-07',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' K.K. Srivastava, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">K.K. Srivastava, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. As per reference </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed </p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days </p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">a) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> b) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (c) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Dear Sir,</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Sub : Termination </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> sd/- </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Personnel Manager </p><p style="text-align: justify;">CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). </p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '(1999)123PLR814',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
			'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'frick-india-private-ltd-vs-vijay-bahadur',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '615740',
		(int) 1 => 'frick-india-private-ltd-vs-vijay-bahadur'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Frick India Private Ltd Vs Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another - Citation 615740 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '615740',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2, 2A, 25B and 25F',
		'appealno' => 'C.W.P. No. 137/1985',
		'appellant' => 'Frick India Private Ltd.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Frick India Private Ltd. Vs. Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
		'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another;',
		'citingcases' => ' June, 1982            18 days 
 July, 1982            31 days 
 August, 1982          31 days 
 September, 1982       30 days 
 October, 1982         31 days 
 November, 1982        30 days 
 December, 1982        31 days 
 January, 1983         31 days 
 February, 1983        28 days 
 March, 1983           12 days 
; 
 Regd. A.D. 
 FIL/PD/83/M-208                                                                                     Dt. 12.3.83 ',
		'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal and; Sudhir Mittal, Advs.',
		'counseldef' => ' J.B. Tacoria, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1999-07-07',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' K.K. Srivastava, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>K.K. Srivastava, J.</p><p>1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p>2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : </p><p>'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' </p><p>3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : </p><p>'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. </p><p> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. </p><p> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. </p><p> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' </p><p>4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : </p><p>'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' </p><p>5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : </p><p>1. As per reference </p><p> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed </p><p>6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p>7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. </p><p>8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. </p><p>9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. </p><p>10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.</p><p>11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : </p><p>June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days </p><p>12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : </p><p>'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' </p><p>13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : </p><p>'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' </p><p>14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : </p><p>a) xxx xxx xxx </p><p> b) xxx xxx xxx </p><p> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] </p><p> (c) xxx xxx xxx </p><p>15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. </p><p>16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : </p><p>'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' </p><p>17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : </p><p>'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' </p><p>18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. </p><p>19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : </p><p>Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) </p><p> Dear Sir,</p><p> Sub : Termination </p><p> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. </p><p> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. </p><p> sd/- </p><p>Personnel Manager </p><p>CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, </p><p>Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' </p><p>20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. </p><p>21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : </p><p>25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - </p><p> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; </p><p> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and </p><p> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). </p><p>22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. </p><p>23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '(1999)123PLR814',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
		'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
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	(int) 0 => '<p>K.K. Srivastava, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : ',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' ',
	(int) 4 => '<p>3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. ',
	(int) 6 => '<p> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. ',
	(int) 7 => '<p> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. ',
	(int) 8 => '<p> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' ',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : ',
	(int) 10 => '<p>'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' ',
	(int) 11 => '<p>5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : ',
	(int) 12 => '<p>1. As per reference ',
	(int) 13 => '<p> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed ',
	(int) 14 => '<p>6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. ',
	(int) 15 => '<p>7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. ',
	(int) 16 => '<p>8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. ',
	(int) 17 => '<p>9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. ',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days ',
	(int) 21 => '<p>12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : ',
	(int) 22 => '<p>'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' ',
	(int) 23 => '<p>13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : ',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' ',
	(int) 25 => '<p>14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : ',
	(int) 26 => '<p>a) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 27 => '<p> b) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 28 => '<p> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] ',
	(int) 29 => '<p> (c) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 30 => '<p>15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. ',
	(int) 31 => '<p>16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : ',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' ',
	(int) 33 => '<p>17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : ',
	(int) 34 => '<p>'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' ',
	(int) 35 => '<p>18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. ',
	(int) 36 => '<p>19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : ',
	(int) 37 => '<p>Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) ',
	(int) 38 => '<p> Dear Sir,',
	(int) 39 => '<p> Sub : Termination ',
	(int) 40 => '<p> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. ',
	(int) 41 => '<p> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. ',
	(int) 42 => '<p> sd/- ',
	(int) 43 => '<p>Personnel Manager ',
	(int) 44 => '<p>CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, ',
	(int) 45 => '<p>Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' ',
	(int) 46 => '<p>20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. ',
	(int) 47 => '<p>21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : ',
	(int) 48 => '<p>25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - ',
	(int) 49 => '<p> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; ',
	(int) 50 => '<p> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and ',
	(int) 51 => '<p> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). ',
	(int) 52 => '<p>22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. ',
	(int) 53 => '<p>23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p>',
	(int) 54 => '<p>'
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20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Frick India Private Ltd Vs Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another - Citation 615740 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '615740',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2, 2A, 25B and 25F',
			'appealno' => 'C.W.P. No. 137/1985',
			'appellant' => 'Frick India Private Ltd.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Frick India Private Ltd. Vs. Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
			'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another;',
			'citingcases' => ' June, 1982            18 days 
 July, 1982            31 days 
 August, 1982          31 days 
 September, 1982       30 days 
 October, 1982         31 days 
 November, 1982        30 days 
 December, 1982        31 days 
 January, 1983         31 days 
 February, 1983        28 days 
 March, 1983           12 days 
; 
 Regd. A.D. 
 FIL/PD/83/M-208                                                                                     Dt. 12.3.83 ',
			'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal and; Sudhir Mittal, Advs.',
			'counseldef' => ' J.B. Tacoria, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1999-07-07',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' K.K. Srivastava, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">K.K. Srivastava, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. As per reference </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed </p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days </p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">a) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> b) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (c) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Dear Sir,</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Sub : Termination </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> sd/- </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Personnel Manager </p><p style="text-align: justify;">CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). </p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '(1999)123PLR814',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
			'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'frick-india-private-ltd-vs-vijay-bahadur',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '615740',
		(int) 1 => 'frick-india-private-ltd-vs-vijay-bahadur'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Frick India Private Ltd Vs Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another - Citation 615740 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '615740',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2, 2A, 25B and 25F',
		'appealno' => 'C.W.P. No. 137/1985',
		'appellant' => 'Frick India Private Ltd.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Frick India Private Ltd. Vs. Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
		'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another;',
		'citingcases' => ' June, 1982            18 days 
 July, 1982            31 days 
 August, 1982          31 days 
 September, 1982       30 days 
 October, 1982         31 days 
 November, 1982        30 days 
 December, 1982        31 days 
 January, 1983         31 days 
 February, 1983        28 days 
 March, 1983           12 days 
; 
 Regd. A.D. 
 FIL/PD/83/M-208                                                                                     Dt. 12.3.83 ',
		'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal and; Sudhir Mittal, Advs.',
		'counseldef' => ' J.B. Tacoria, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1999-07-07',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' K.K. Srivastava, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>K.K. Srivastava, J.</p><p>1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p>2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : </p><p>'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' </p><p>3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : </p><p>'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. </p><p> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. </p><p> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. </p><p> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' </p><p>4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : </p><p>'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' </p><p>5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : </p><p>1. As per reference </p><p> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed </p><p>6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p>7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. </p><p>8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. </p><p>9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. </p><p>10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.</p><p>11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : </p><p>June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days </p><p>12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : </p><p>'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' </p><p>13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : </p><p>'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' </p><p>14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : </p><p>a) xxx xxx xxx </p><p> b) xxx xxx xxx </p><p> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] </p><p> (c) xxx xxx xxx </p><p>15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. </p><p>16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : </p><p>'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' </p><p>17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : </p><p>'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' </p><p>18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. </p><p>19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : </p><p>Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) </p><p> Dear Sir,</p><p> Sub : Termination </p><p> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. </p><p> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. </p><p> sd/- </p><p>Personnel Manager </p><p>CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, </p><p>Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' </p><p>20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. </p><p>21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : </p><p>25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - </p><p> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; </p><p> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and </p><p> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). </p><p>22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. </p><p>23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '(1999)123PLR814',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
		'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
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$caseref = 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another<br>'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>K.K. Srivastava, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : ',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' ',
	(int) 4 => '<p>3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. ',
	(int) 6 => '<p> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. ',
	(int) 7 => '<p> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. ',
	(int) 8 => '<p> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' ',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : ',
	(int) 10 => '<p>'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' ',
	(int) 11 => '<p>5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : ',
	(int) 12 => '<p>1. As per reference ',
	(int) 13 => '<p> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed ',
	(int) 14 => '<p>6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. ',
	(int) 15 => '<p>7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. ',
	(int) 16 => '<p>8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. ',
	(int) 17 => '<p>9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. ',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days ',
	(int) 21 => '<p>12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : ',
	(int) 22 => '<p>'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' ',
	(int) 23 => '<p>13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : ',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' ',
	(int) 25 => '<p>14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : ',
	(int) 26 => '<p>a) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 27 => '<p> b) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 28 => '<p> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] ',
	(int) 29 => '<p> (c) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 30 => '<p>15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. ',
	(int) 31 => '<p>16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : ',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' ',
	(int) 33 => '<p>17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : ',
	(int) 34 => '<p>'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' ',
	(int) 35 => '<p>18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. ',
	(int) 36 => '<p>19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : ',
	(int) 37 => '<p>Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) ',
	(int) 38 => '<p> Dear Sir,',
	(int) 39 => '<p> Sub : Termination ',
	(int) 40 => '<p> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. ',
	(int) 41 => '<p> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. ',
	(int) 42 => '<p> sd/- ',
	(int) 43 => '<p>Personnel Manager ',
	(int) 44 => '<p>CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, ',
	(int) 45 => '<p>Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' ',
	(int) 46 => '<p>20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. ',
	(int) 47 => '<p>21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : ',
	(int) 48 => '<p>25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - ',
	(int) 49 => '<p> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; ',
	(int) 50 => '<p> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and ',
	(int) 51 => '<p> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). ',
	(int) 52 => '<p>22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. ',
	(int) 53 => '<p>23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p>',
	(int) 54 => '<p>'
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21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under :

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Frick India Private Ltd Vs Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another - Citation 615740 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '615740',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2, 2A, 25B and 25F',
			'appealno' => 'C.W.P. No. 137/1985',
			'appellant' => 'Frick India Private Ltd.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Frick India Private Ltd. Vs. Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
			'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another;',
			'citingcases' => ' June, 1982            18 days 
 July, 1982            31 days 
 August, 1982          31 days 
 September, 1982       30 days 
 October, 1982         31 days 
 November, 1982        30 days 
 December, 1982        31 days 
 January, 1983         31 days 
 February, 1983        28 days 
 March, 1983           12 days 
; 
 Regd. A.D. 
 FIL/PD/83/M-208                                                                                     Dt. 12.3.83 ',
			'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal and; Sudhir Mittal, Advs.',
			'counseldef' => ' J.B. Tacoria, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1999-07-07',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' K.K. Srivastava, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">K.K. Srivastava, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. As per reference </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed </p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days </p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">a) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> b) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (c) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Dear Sir,</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Sub : Termination </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> sd/- </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Personnel Manager </p><p style="text-align: justify;">CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). </p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '(1999)123PLR814',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
			'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'frick-india-private-ltd-vs-vijay-bahadur',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '615740',
		(int) 1 => 'frick-india-private-ltd-vs-vijay-bahadur'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Frick India Private Ltd Vs Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another - Citation 615740 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '615740',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2, 2A, 25B and 25F',
		'appealno' => 'C.W.P. No. 137/1985',
		'appellant' => 'Frick India Private Ltd.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Frick India Private Ltd. Vs. Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
		'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another;',
		'citingcases' => ' June, 1982            18 days 
 July, 1982            31 days 
 August, 1982          31 days 
 September, 1982       30 days 
 October, 1982         31 days 
 November, 1982        30 days 
 December, 1982        31 days 
 January, 1983         31 days 
 February, 1983        28 days 
 March, 1983           12 days 
; 
 Regd. A.D. 
 FIL/PD/83/M-208                                                                                     Dt. 12.3.83 ',
		'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal and; Sudhir Mittal, Advs.',
		'counseldef' => ' J.B. Tacoria, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1999-07-07',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' K.K. Srivastava, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>K.K. Srivastava, J.</p><p>1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p>2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : </p><p>'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' </p><p>3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : </p><p>'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. </p><p> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. </p><p> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. </p><p> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' </p><p>4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : </p><p>'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' </p><p>5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : </p><p>1. As per reference </p><p> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed </p><p>6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p>7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. </p><p>8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. </p><p>9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. </p><p>10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.</p><p>11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : </p><p>June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days </p><p>12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : </p><p>'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' </p><p>13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : </p><p>'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' </p><p>14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : </p><p>a) xxx xxx xxx </p><p> b) xxx xxx xxx </p><p> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] </p><p> (c) xxx xxx xxx </p><p>15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. </p><p>16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : </p><p>'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' </p><p>17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : </p><p>'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' </p><p>18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. </p><p>19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : </p><p>Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) </p><p> Dear Sir,</p><p> Sub : Termination </p><p> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. </p><p> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. </p><p> sd/- </p><p>Personnel Manager </p><p>CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, </p><p>Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' </p><p>20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. </p><p>21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : </p><p>25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - </p><p> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; </p><p> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and </p><p> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). </p><p>22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. </p><p>23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '(1999)123PLR814',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
		'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
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$caseref = 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another<br>'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>K.K. Srivastava, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : ',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' ',
	(int) 4 => '<p>3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. ',
	(int) 6 => '<p> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. ',
	(int) 7 => '<p> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. ',
	(int) 8 => '<p> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' ',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : ',
	(int) 10 => '<p>'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' ',
	(int) 11 => '<p>5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : ',
	(int) 12 => '<p>1. As per reference ',
	(int) 13 => '<p> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed ',
	(int) 14 => '<p>6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. ',
	(int) 15 => '<p>7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. ',
	(int) 16 => '<p>8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. ',
	(int) 17 => '<p>9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. ',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days ',
	(int) 21 => '<p>12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : ',
	(int) 22 => '<p>'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' ',
	(int) 23 => '<p>13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : ',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' ',
	(int) 25 => '<p>14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : ',
	(int) 26 => '<p>a) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 27 => '<p> b) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 28 => '<p> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] ',
	(int) 29 => '<p> (c) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 30 => '<p>15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. ',
	(int) 31 => '<p>16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : ',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' ',
	(int) 33 => '<p>17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : ',
	(int) 34 => '<p>'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' ',
	(int) 35 => '<p>18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. ',
	(int) 36 => '<p>19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : ',
	(int) 37 => '<p>Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) ',
	(int) 38 => '<p> Dear Sir,',
	(int) 39 => '<p> Sub : Termination ',
	(int) 40 => '<p> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. ',
	(int) 41 => '<p> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. ',
	(int) 42 => '<p> sd/- ',
	(int) 43 => '<p>Personnel Manager ',
	(int) 44 => '<p>CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, ',
	(int) 45 => '<p>Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' ',
	(int) 46 => '<p>20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. ',
	(int) 47 => '<p>21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : ',
	(int) 48 => '<p>25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - ',
	(int) 49 => '<p> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; ',
	(int) 50 => '<p> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and ',
	(int) 51 => '<p> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). ',
	(int) 52 => '<p>22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. ',
	(int) 53 => '<p>23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p>',
	(int) 54 => '<p>'
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25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until -

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Frick India Private Ltd Vs Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another - Citation 615740 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '615740',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2, 2A, 25B and 25F',
			'appealno' => 'C.W.P. No. 137/1985',
			'appellant' => 'Frick India Private Ltd.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Frick India Private Ltd. Vs. Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
			'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another;',
			'citingcases' => ' June, 1982            18 days 
 July, 1982            31 days 
 August, 1982          31 days 
 September, 1982       30 days 
 October, 1982         31 days 
 November, 1982        30 days 
 December, 1982        31 days 
 January, 1983         31 days 
 February, 1983        28 days 
 March, 1983           12 days 
; 
 Regd. A.D. 
 FIL/PD/83/M-208                                                                                     Dt. 12.3.83 ',
			'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal and; Sudhir Mittal, Advs.',
			'counseldef' => ' J.B. Tacoria, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1999-07-07',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' K.K. Srivastava, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">K.K. Srivastava, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. As per reference </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed </p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days </p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">a) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> b) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (c) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Dear Sir,</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Sub : Termination </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> sd/- </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Personnel Manager </p><p style="text-align: justify;">CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). </p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '(1999)123PLR814',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
			'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'frick-india-private-ltd-vs-vijay-bahadur',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '615740',
		(int) 1 => 'frick-india-private-ltd-vs-vijay-bahadur'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Frick India Private Ltd Vs Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another - Citation 615740 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '615740',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2, 2A, 25B and 25F',
		'appealno' => 'C.W.P. No. 137/1985',
		'appellant' => 'Frick India Private Ltd.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Frick India Private Ltd. Vs. Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
		'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another;',
		'citingcases' => ' June, 1982            18 days 
 July, 1982            31 days 
 August, 1982          31 days 
 September, 1982       30 days 
 October, 1982         31 days 
 November, 1982        30 days 
 December, 1982        31 days 
 January, 1983         31 days 
 February, 1983        28 days 
 March, 1983           12 days 
; 
 Regd. A.D. 
 FIL/PD/83/M-208                                                                                     Dt. 12.3.83 ',
		'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal and; Sudhir Mittal, Advs.',
		'counseldef' => ' J.B. Tacoria, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1999-07-07',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' K.K. Srivastava, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>K.K. Srivastava, J.</p><p>1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p>2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : </p><p>'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' </p><p>3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : </p><p>'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. </p><p> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. </p><p> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. </p><p> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' </p><p>4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : </p><p>'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' </p><p>5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : </p><p>1. As per reference </p><p> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed </p><p>6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p>7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. </p><p>8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. </p><p>9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. </p><p>10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.</p><p>11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : </p><p>June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days </p><p>12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : </p><p>'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' </p><p>13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : </p><p>'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' </p><p>14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : </p><p>a) xxx xxx xxx </p><p> b) xxx xxx xxx </p><p> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] </p><p> (c) xxx xxx xxx </p><p>15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. </p><p>16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : </p><p>'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' </p><p>17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : </p><p>'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' </p><p>18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. </p><p>19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : </p><p>Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) </p><p> Dear Sir,</p><p> Sub : Termination </p><p> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. </p><p> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. </p><p> sd/- </p><p>Personnel Manager </p><p>CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, </p><p>Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' </p><p>20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. </p><p>21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : </p><p>25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - </p><p> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; </p><p> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and </p><p> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). </p><p>22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. </p><p>23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '(1999)123PLR814',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
		'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
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	(int) 0 => '<p>K.K. Srivastava, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : ',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' ',
	(int) 4 => '<p>3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. ',
	(int) 6 => '<p> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. ',
	(int) 7 => '<p> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. ',
	(int) 8 => '<p> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' ',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : ',
	(int) 10 => '<p>'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' ',
	(int) 11 => '<p>5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : ',
	(int) 12 => '<p>1. As per reference ',
	(int) 13 => '<p> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed ',
	(int) 14 => '<p>6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. ',
	(int) 15 => '<p>7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. ',
	(int) 16 => '<p>8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. ',
	(int) 17 => '<p>9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. ',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days ',
	(int) 21 => '<p>12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : ',
	(int) 22 => '<p>'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' ',
	(int) 23 => '<p>13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : ',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' ',
	(int) 25 => '<p>14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : ',
	(int) 26 => '<p>a) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 27 => '<p> b) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 28 => '<p> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] ',
	(int) 29 => '<p> (c) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 30 => '<p>15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. ',
	(int) 31 => '<p>16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : ',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' ',
	(int) 33 => '<p>17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : ',
	(int) 34 => '<p>'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' ',
	(int) 35 => '<p>18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. ',
	(int) 36 => '<p>19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : ',
	(int) 37 => '<p>Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) ',
	(int) 38 => '<p> Dear Sir,',
	(int) 39 => '<p> Sub : Termination ',
	(int) 40 => '<p> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. ',
	(int) 41 => '<p> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. ',
	(int) 42 => '<p> sd/- ',
	(int) 43 => '<p>Personnel Manager ',
	(int) 44 => '<p>CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, ',
	(int) 45 => '<p>Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' ',
	(int) 46 => '<p>20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. ',
	(int) 47 => '<p>21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : ',
	(int) 48 => '<p>25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - ',
	(int) 49 => '<p> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; ',
	(int) 50 => '<p> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and ',
	(int) 51 => '<p> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). ',
	(int) 52 => '<p>22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. ',
	(int) 53 => '<p>23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p>',
	(int) 54 => '<p>'
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(a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice;

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Frick India Private Ltd Vs Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another - Citation 615740 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '615740',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2, 2A, 25B and 25F',
			'appealno' => 'C.W.P. No. 137/1985',
			'appellant' => 'Frick India Private Ltd.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Frick India Private Ltd. Vs. Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
			'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another;',
			'citingcases' => ' June, 1982            18 days 
 July, 1982            31 days 
 August, 1982          31 days 
 September, 1982       30 days 
 October, 1982         31 days 
 November, 1982        30 days 
 December, 1982        31 days 
 January, 1983         31 days 
 February, 1983        28 days 
 March, 1983           12 days 
; 
 Regd. A.D. 
 FIL/PD/83/M-208                                                                                     Dt. 12.3.83 ',
			'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal and; Sudhir Mittal, Advs.',
			'counseldef' => ' J.B. Tacoria, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1999-07-07',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' K.K. Srivastava, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">K.K. Srivastava, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. As per reference </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed </p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days </p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">a) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> b) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (c) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Dear Sir,</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Sub : Termination </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> sd/- </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Personnel Manager </p><p style="text-align: justify;">CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). </p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '(1999)123PLR814',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
			'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'frick-india-private-ltd-vs-vijay-bahadur',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '615740',
		(int) 1 => 'frick-india-private-ltd-vs-vijay-bahadur'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Frick India Private Ltd Vs Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another - Citation 615740 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '615740',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2, 2A, 25B and 25F',
		'appealno' => 'C.W.P. No. 137/1985',
		'appellant' => 'Frick India Private Ltd.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Frick India Private Ltd. Vs. Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
		'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another;',
		'citingcases' => ' June, 1982            18 days 
 July, 1982            31 days 
 August, 1982          31 days 
 September, 1982       30 days 
 October, 1982         31 days 
 November, 1982        30 days 
 December, 1982        31 days 
 January, 1983         31 days 
 February, 1983        28 days 
 March, 1983           12 days 
; 
 Regd. A.D. 
 FIL/PD/83/M-208                                                                                     Dt. 12.3.83 ',
		'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal and; Sudhir Mittal, Advs.',
		'counseldef' => ' J.B. Tacoria, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1999-07-07',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' K.K. Srivastava, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>K.K. Srivastava, J.</p><p>1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p>2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : </p><p>'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' </p><p>3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : </p><p>'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. </p><p> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. </p><p> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. </p><p> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' </p><p>4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : </p><p>'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' </p><p>5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : </p><p>1. As per reference </p><p> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed </p><p>6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p>7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. </p><p>8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. </p><p>9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. </p><p>10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.</p><p>11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : </p><p>June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days </p><p>12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : </p><p>'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' </p><p>13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : </p><p>'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' </p><p>14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : </p><p>a) xxx xxx xxx </p><p> b) xxx xxx xxx </p><p> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] </p><p> (c) xxx xxx xxx </p><p>15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. </p><p>16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : </p><p>'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' </p><p>17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : </p><p>'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' </p><p>18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. </p><p>19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : </p><p>Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) </p><p> Dear Sir,</p><p> Sub : Termination </p><p> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. </p><p> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. </p><p> sd/- </p><p>Personnel Manager </p><p>CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, </p><p>Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' </p><p>20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. </p><p>21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : </p><p>25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - </p><p> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; </p><p> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and </p><p> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). </p><p>22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. </p><p>23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '(1999)123PLR814',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
		'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
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	(int) 0 => '<p>K.K. Srivastava, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : ',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' ',
	(int) 4 => '<p>3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. ',
	(int) 6 => '<p> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. ',
	(int) 7 => '<p> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. ',
	(int) 8 => '<p> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' ',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : ',
	(int) 10 => '<p>'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' ',
	(int) 11 => '<p>5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : ',
	(int) 12 => '<p>1. As per reference ',
	(int) 13 => '<p> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed ',
	(int) 14 => '<p>6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. ',
	(int) 15 => '<p>7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. ',
	(int) 16 => '<p>8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. ',
	(int) 17 => '<p>9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. ',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days ',
	(int) 21 => '<p>12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : ',
	(int) 22 => '<p>'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' ',
	(int) 23 => '<p>13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : ',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' ',
	(int) 25 => '<p>14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : ',
	(int) 26 => '<p>a) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 27 => '<p> b) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 28 => '<p> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] ',
	(int) 29 => '<p> (c) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 30 => '<p>15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. ',
	(int) 31 => '<p>16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : ',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' ',
	(int) 33 => '<p>17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : ',
	(int) 34 => '<p>'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' ',
	(int) 35 => '<p>18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. ',
	(int) 36 => '<p>19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : ',
	(int) 37 => '<p>Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) ',
	(int) 38 => '<p> Dear Sir,',
	(int) 39 => '<p> Sub : Termination ',
	(int) 40 => '<p> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. ',
	(int) 41 => '<p> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. ',
	(int) 42 => '<p> sd/- ',
	(int) 43 => '<p>Personnel Manager ',
	(int) 44 => '<p>CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, ',
	(int) 45 => '<p>Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' ',
	(int) 46 => '<p>20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. ',
	(int) 47 => '<p>21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : ',
	(int) 48 => '<p>25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - ',
	(int) 49 => '<p> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; ',
	(int) 50 => '<p> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and ',
	(int) 51 => '<p> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). ',
	(int) 52 => '<p>22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. ',
	(int) 53 => '<p>23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p>',
	(int) 54 => '<p>'
)
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(b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Frick India Private Ltd Vs Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another - Citation 615740 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '615740',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2, 2A, 25B and 25F',
			'appealno' => 'C.W.P. No. 137/1985',
			'appellant' => 'Frick India Private Ltd.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Frick India Private Ltd. Vs. Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
			'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another;',
			'citingcases' => ' June, 1982            18 days 
 July, 1982            31 days 
 August, 1982          31 days 
 September, 1982       30 days 
 October, 1982         31 days 
 November, 1982        30 days 
 December, 1982        31 days 
 January, 1983         31 days 
 February, 1983        28 days 
 March, 1983           12 days 
; 
 Regd. A.D. 
 FIL/PD/83/M-208                                                                                     Dt. 12.3.83 ',
			'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal and; Sudhir Mittal, Advs.',
			'counseldef' => ' J.B. Tacoria, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1999-07-07',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' K.K. Srivastava, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">K.K. Srivastava, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. As per reference </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed </p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days </p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">a) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> b) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (c) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Dear Sir,</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Sub : Termination </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> sd/- </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Personnel Manager </p><p style="text-align: justify;">CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). </p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '(1999)123PLR814',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
			'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'frick-india-private-ltd-vs-vijay-bahadur',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '615740',
		(int) 1 => 'frick-india-private-ltd-vs-vijay-bahadur'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Frick India Private Ltd Vs Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another - Citation 615740 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '615740',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2, 2A, 25B and 25F',
		'appealno' => 'C.W.P. No. 137/1985',
		'appellant' => 'Frick India Private Ltd.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Frick India Private Ltd. Vs. Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
		'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another;',
		'citingcases' => ' June, 1982            18 days 
 July, 1982            31 days 
 August, 1982          31 days 
 September, 1982       30 days 
 October, 1982         31 days 
 November, 1982        30 days 
 December, 1982        31 days 
 January, 1983         31 days 
 February, 1983        28 days 
 March, 1983           12 days 
; 
 Regd. A.D. 
 FIL/PD/83/M-208                                                                                     Dt. 12.3.83 ',
		'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal and; Sudhir Mittal, Advs.',
		'counseldef' => ' J.B. Tacoria, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1999-07-07',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' K.K. Srivastava, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>K.K. Srivastava, J.</p><p>1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p>2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : </p><p>'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' </p><p>3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : </p><p>'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. </p><p> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. </p><p> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. </p><p> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' </p><p>4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : </p><p>'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' </p><p>5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : </p><p>1. As per reference </p><p> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed </p><p>6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p>7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. </p><p>8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. </p><p>9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. </p><p>10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.</p><p>11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : </p><p>June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days </p><p>12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : </p><p>'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' </p><p>13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : </p><p>'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' </p><p>14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : </p><p>a) xxx xxx xxx </p><p> b) xxx xxx xxx </p><p> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] </p><p> (c) xxx xxx xxx </p><p>15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. </p><p>16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : </p><p>'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' </p><p>17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : </p><p>'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' </p><p>18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. </p><p>19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : </p><p>Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) </p><p> Dear Sir,</p><p> Sub : Termination </p><p> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. </p><p> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. </p><p> sd/- </p><p>Personnel Manager </p><p>CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, </p><p>Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' </p><p>20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. </p><p>21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : </p><p>25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - </p><p> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; </p><p> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and </p><p> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). </p><p>22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. </p><p>23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '(1999)123PLR814',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
		'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
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	(int) 0 => '<p>K.K. Srivastava, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : ',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' ',
	(int) 4 => '<p>3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. ',
	(int) 6 => '<p> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. ',
	(int) 7 => '<p> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. ',
	(int) 8 => '<p> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' ',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : ',
	(int) 10 => '<p>'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' ',
	(int) 11 => '<p>5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : ',
	(int) 12 => '<p>1. As per reference ',
	(int) 13 => '<p> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed ',
	(int) 14 => '<p>6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. ',
	(int) 15 => '<p>7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. ',
	(int) 16 => '<p>8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. ',
	(int) 17 => '<p>9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. ',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days ',
	(int) 21 => '<p>12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : ',
	(int) 22 => '<p>'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' ',
	(int) 23 => '<p>13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : ',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' ',
	(int) 25 => '<p>14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : ',
	(int) 26 => '<p>a) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 27 => '<p> b) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 28 => '<p> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] ',
	(int) 29 => '<p> (c) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 30 => '<p>15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. ',
	(int) 31 => '<p>16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : ',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' ',
	(int) 33 => '<p>17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : ',
	(int) 34 => '<p>'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' ',
	(int) 35 => '<p>18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. ',
	(int) 36 => '<p>19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : ',
	(int) 37 => '<p>Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) ',
	(int) 38 => '<p> Dear Sir,',
	(int) 39 => '<p> Sub : Termination ',
	(int) 40 => '<p> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. ',
	(int) 41 => '<p> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. ',
	(int) 42 => '<p> sd/- ',
	(int) 43 => '<p>Personnel Manager ',
	(int) 44 => '<p>CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, ',
	(int) 45 => '<p>Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' ',
	(int) 46 => '<p>20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. ',
	(int) 47 => '<p>21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : ',
	(int) 48 => '<p>25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - ',
	(int) 49 => '<p> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; ',
	(int) 50 => '<p> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and ',
	(int) 51 => '<p> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). ',
	(int) 52 => '<p>22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. ',
	(int) 53 => '<p>23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p>',
	(int) 54 => '<p>'
)
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(c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette).

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Frick India Private Ltd Vs Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another - Citation 615740 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '615740',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2, 2A, 25B and 25F',
			'appealno' => 'C.W.P. No. 137/1985',
			'appellant' => 'Frick India Private Ltd.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Frick India Private Ltd. Vs. Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
			'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another;',
			'citingcases' => ' June, 1982            18 days 
 July, 1982            31 days 
 August, 1982          31 days 
 September, 1982       30 days 
 October, 1982         31 days 
 November, 1982        30 days 
 December, 1982        31 days 
 January, 1983         31 days 
 February, 1983        28 days 
 March, 1983           12 days 
; 
 Regd. A.D. 
 FIL/PD/83/M-208                                                                                     Dt. 12.3.83 ',
			'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal and; Sudhir Mittal, Advs.',
			'counseldef' => ' J.B. Tacoria, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1999-07-07',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' K.K. Srivastava, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">K.K. Srivastava, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. As per reference </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed </p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days </p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">a) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> b) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (c) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Dear Sir,</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Sub : Termination </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> sd/- </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Personnel Manager </p><p style="text-align: justify;">CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). </p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '(1999)123PLR814',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
			'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'frick-india-private-ltd-vs-vijay-bahadur',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '615740',
		(int) 1 => 'frick-india-private-ltd-vs-vijay-bahadur'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Frick India Private Ltd Vs Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another - Citation 615740 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '615740',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2, 2A, 25B and 25F',
		'appealno' => 'C.W.P. No. 137/1985',
		'appellant' => 'Frick India Private Ltd.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Frick India Private Ltd. Vs. Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
		'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another;',
		'citingcases' => ' June, 1982            18 days 
 July, 1982            31 days 
 August, 1982          31 days 
 September, 1982       30 days 
 October, 1982         31 days 
 November, 1982        30 days 
 December, 1982        31 days 
 January, 1983         31 days 
 February, 1983        28 days 
 March, 1983           12 days 
; 
 Regd. A.D. 
 FIL/PD/83/M-208                                                                                     Dt. 12.3.83 ',
		'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal and; Sudhir Mittal, Advs.',
		'counseldef' => ' J.B. Tacoria, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1999-07-07',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' K.K. Srivastava, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>K.K. Srivastava, J.</p><p>1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p>2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : </p><p>'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' </p><p>3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : </p><p>'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. </p><p> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. </p><p> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. </p><p> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' </p><p>4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : </p><p>'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' </p><p>5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : </p><p>1. As per reference </p><p> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed </p><p>6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p>7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. </p><p>8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. </p><p>9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. </p><p>10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.</p><p>11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : </p><p>June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days </p><p>12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : </p><p>'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' </p><p>13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : </p><p>'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' </p><p>14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : </p><p>a) xxx xxx xxx </p><p> b) xxx xxx xxx </p><p> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] </p><p> (c) xxx xxx xxx </p><p>15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. </p><p>16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : </p><p>'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' </p><p>17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : </p><p>'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' </p><p>18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. </p><p>19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : </p><p>Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) </p><p> Dear Sir,</p><p> Sub : Termination </p><p> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. </p><p> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. </p><p> sd/- </p><p>Personnel Manager </p><p>CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, </p><p>Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' </p><p>20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. </p><p>21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : </p><p>25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - </p><p> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; </p><p> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and </p><p> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). </p><p>22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. </p><p>23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '(1999)123PLR814',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
		'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
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	(int) 0 => '<p>K.K. Srivastava, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : ',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' ',
	(int) 4 => '<p>3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. ',
	(int) 6 => '<p> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. ',
	(int) 7 => '<p> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. ',
	(int) 8 => '<p> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' ',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : ',
	(int) 10 => '<p>'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' ',
	(int) 11 => '<p>5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : ',
	(int) 12 => '<p>1. As per reference ',
	(int) 13 => '<p> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed ',
	(int) 14 => '<p>6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. ',
	(int) 15 => '<p>7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. ',
	(int) 16 => '<p>8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. ',
	(int) 17 => '<p>9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. ',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days ',
	(int) 21 => '<p>12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : ',
	(int) 22 => '<p>'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' ',
	(int) 23 => '<p>13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : ',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' ',
	(int) 25 => '<p>14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : ',
	(int) 26 => '<p>a) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 27 => '<p> b) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 28 => '<p> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] ',
	(int) 29 => '<p> (c) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 30 => '<p>15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. ',
	(int) 31 => '<p>16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : ',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' ',
	(int) 33 => '<p>17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : ',
	(int) 34 => '<p>'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' ',
	(int) 35 => '<p>18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. ',
	(int) 36 => '<p>19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : ',
	(int) 37 => '<p>Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) ',
	(int) 38 => '<p> Dear Sir,',
	(int) 39 => '<p> Sub : Termination ',
	(int) 40 => '<p> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. ',
	(int) 41 => '<p> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. ',
	(int) 42 => '<p> sd/- ',
	(int) 43 => '<p>Personnel Manager ',
	(int) 44 => '<p>CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, ',
	(int) 45 => '<p>Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' ',
	(int) 46 => '<p>20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. ',
	(int) 47 => '<p>21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : ',
	(int) 48 => '<p>25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - ',
	(int) 49 => '<p> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; ',
	(int) 50 => '<p> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and ',
	(int) 51 => '<p> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). ',
	(int) 52 => '<p>22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. ',
	(int) 53 => '<p>23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p>',
	(int) 54 => '<p>'
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22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Frick India Private Ltd Vs Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another - Citation 615740 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '615740',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2, 2A, 25B and 25F',
			'appealno' => 'C.W.P. No. 137/1985',
			'appellant' => 'Frick India Private Ltd.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Frick India Private Ltd. Vs. Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
			'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another;',
			'citingcases' => ' June, 1982            18 days 
 July, 1982            31 days 
 August, 1982          31 days 
 September, 1982       30 days 
 October, 1982         31 days 
 November, 1982        30 days 
 December, 1982        31 days 
 January, 1983         31 days 
 February, 1983        28 days 
 March, 1983           12 days 
; 
 Regd. A.D. 
 FIL/PD/83/M-208                                                                                     Dt. 12.3.83 ',
			'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal and; Sudhir Mittal, Advs.',
			'counseldef' => ' J.B. Tacoria, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1999-07-07',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' K.K. Srivastava, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">K.K. Srivastava, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. As per reference </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed </p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days </p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">a) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> b) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (c) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Dear Sir,</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Sub : Termination </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> sd/- </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Personnel Manager </p><p style="text-align: justify;">CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). </p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '(1999)123PLR814',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
			'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'frick-india-private-ltd-vs-vijay-bahadur',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '615740',
		(int) 1 => 'frick-india-private-ltd-vs-vijay-bahadur'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Frick India Private Ltd Vs Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another - Citation 615740 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '615740',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2, 2A, 25B and 25F',
		'appealno' => 'C.W.P. No. 137/1985',
		'appellant' => 'Frick India Private Ltd.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Frick India Private Ltd. Vs. Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
		'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another;',
		'citingcases' => ' June, 1982            18 days 
 July, 1982            31 days 
 August, 1982          31 days 
 September, 1982       30 days 
 October, 1982         31 days 
 November, 1982        30 days 
 December, 1982        31 days 
 January, 1983         31 days 
 February, 1983        28 days 
 March, 1983           12 days 
; 
 Regd. A.D. 
 FIL/PD/83/M-208                                                                                     Dt. 12.3.83 ',
		'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal and; Sudhir Mittal, Advs.',
		'counseldef' => ' J.B. Tacoria, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1999-07-07',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' K.K. Srivastava, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>K.K. Srivastava, J.</p><p>1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p>2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : </p><p>'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' </p><p>3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : </p><p>'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. </p><p> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. </p><p> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. </p><p> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' </p><p>4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : </p><p>'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' </p><p>5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : </p><p>1. As per reference </p><p> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed </p><p>6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p>7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. </p><p>8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. </p><p>9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. </p><p>10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.</p><p>11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : </p><p>June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days </p><p>12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : </p><p>'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' </p><p>13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : </p><p>'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' </p><p>14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : </p><p>a) xxx xxx xxx </p><p> b) xxx xxx xxx </p><p> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] </p><p> (c) xxx xxx xxx </p><p>15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. </p><p>16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : </p><p>'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' </p><p>17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : </p><p>'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' </p><p>18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. </p><p>19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : </p><p>Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) </p><p> Dear Sir,</p><p> Sub : Termination </p><p> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. </p><p> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. </p><p> sd/- </p><p>Personnel Manager </p><p>CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, </p><p>Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' </p><p>20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. </p><p>21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : </p><p>25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - </p><p> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; </p><p> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and </p><p> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). </p><p>22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. </p><p>23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '(1999)123PLR814',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
		'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
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	(int) 0 => '<p>K.K. Srivastava, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : ',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' ',
	(int) 4 => '<p>3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. ',
	(int) 6 => '<p> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. ',
	(int) 7 => '<p> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. ',
	(int) 8 => '<p> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' ',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : ',
	(int) 10 => '<p>'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' ',
	(int) 11 => '<p>5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : ',
	(int) 12 => '<p>1. As per reference ',
	(int) 13 => '<p> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed ',
	(int) 14 => '<p>6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. ',
	(int) 15 => '<p>7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. ',
	(int) 16 => '<p>8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. ',
	(int) 17 => '<p>9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. ',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days ',
	(int) 21 => '<p>12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : ',
	(int) 22 => '<p>'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' ',
	(int) 23 => '<p>13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : ',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' ',
	(int) 25 => '<p>14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : ',
	(int) 26 => '<p>a) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 27 => '<p> b) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 28 => '<p> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] ',
	(int) 29 => '<p> (c) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 30 => '<p>15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. ',
	(int) 31 => '<p>16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : ',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' ',
	(int) 33 => '<p>17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : ',
	(int) 34 => '<p>'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' ',
	(int) 35 => '<p>18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. ',
	(int) 36 => '<p>19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : ',
	(int) 37 => '<p>Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) ',
	(int) 38 => '<p> Dear Sir,',
	(int) 39 => '<p> Sub : Termination ',
	(int) 40 => '<p> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. ',
	(int) 41 => '<p> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. ',
	(int) 42 => '<p> sd/- ',
	(int) 43 => '<p>Personnel Manager ',
	(int) 44 => '<p>CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, ',
	(int) 45 => '<p>Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' ',
	(int) 46 => '<p>20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. ',
	(int) 47 => '<p>21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : ',
	(int) 48 => '<p>25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - ',
	(int) 49 => '<p> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; ',
	(int) 50 => '<p> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and ',
	(int) 51 => '<p> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). ',
	(int) 52 => '<p>22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. ',
	(int) 53 => '<p>23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p>',
	(int) 54 => '<p>'
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23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Frick India Private Ltd Vs Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another - Citation 615740 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '615740',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2, 2A, 25B and 25F',
			'appealno' => 'C.W.P. No. 137/1985',
			'appellant' => 'Frick India Private Ltd.',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Frick India Private Ltd. Vs. Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
			'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another;',
			'citingcases' => ' June, 1982            18 days 
 July, 1982            31 days 
 August, 1982          31 days 
 September, 1982       30 days 
 October, 1982         31 days 
 November, 1982        30 days 
 December, 1982        31 days 
 January, 1983         31 days 
 February, 1983        28 days 
 March, 1983           12 days 
; 
 Regd. A.D. 
 FIL/PD/83/M-208                                                                                     Dt. 12.3.83 ',
			'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal and; Sudhir Mittal, Advs.',
			'counseldef' => ' J.B. Tacoria, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1999-07-07',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' K.K. Srivastava, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">K.K. Srivastava, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. As per reference </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed </p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days </p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">a) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> b) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (c) xxx xxx xxx </p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Dear Sir,</p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Sub : Termination </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> sd/- </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Personnel Manager </p><p style="text-align: justify;">CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and </p><p style="text-align: justify;"> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). </p><p style="text-align: justify;">22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '(1999)123PLR814',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
			'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'frick-india-private-ltd-vs-vijay-bahadur',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '615740',
		(int) 1 => 'frick-india-private-ltd-vs-vijay-bahadur'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Frick India Private Ltd Vs Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another - Citation 615740 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '615740',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51293/industrial-disputes-act-1947-complete-act">Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a> - Sections 2, 2A, 25B and 25F',
		'appealno' => 'C.W.P. No. 137/1985',
		'appellant' => 'Frick India Private Ltd.',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Frick India Private Ltd. Vs. Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
		'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another;',
		'citingcases' => ' June, 1982            18 days 
 July, 1982            31 days 
 August, 1982          31 days 
 September, 1982       30 days 
 October, 1982         31 days 
 November, 1982        30 days 
 December, 1982        31 days 
 January, 1983         31 days 
 February, 1983        28 days 
 March, 1983           12 days 
; 
 Regd. A.D. 
 FIL/PD/83/M-208                                                                                     Dt. 12.3.83 ',
		'counselplain' => ' R.S. Mittal and; Sudhir Mittal, Advs.',
		'counseldef' => ' J.B. Tacoria, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1999-07-07',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' K.K. Srivastava, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>K.K. Srivastava, J.</p><p>1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p>2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : </p><p>'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' </p><p>3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : </p><p>'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. </p><p> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. </p><p> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. </p><p> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' </p><p>4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : </p><p>'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' </p><p>5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : </p><p>1. As per reference </p><p> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed </p><p>6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. </p><p>7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. </p><p>8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. </p><p>9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. </p><p>10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.</p><p>11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : </p><p>June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days </p><p>12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : </p><p>'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' </p><p>13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : </p><p>'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' </p><p>14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : </p><p>a) xxx xxx xxx </p><p> b) xxx xxx xxx </p><p> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] </p><p> (c) xxx xxx xxx </p><p>15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. </p><p>16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : </p><p>'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' </p><p>17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : </p><p>'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' </p><p>18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. </p><p>19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : </p><p>Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) </p><p> Dear Sir,</p><p> Sub : Termination </p><p> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. </p><p> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. </p><p> sd/- </p><p>Personnel Manager </p><p>CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, </p><p>Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' </p><p>20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. </p><p>21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : </p><p>25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - </p><p> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; </p><p> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and </p><p> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). </p><p>22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. </p><p>23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '(1999)123PLR814',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another',
		'sub' => 'Labour and Industrial',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
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	(int) 0 => '<p>K.K. Srivastava, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The petitioner seeks quashing of the award made by respondent No. 2 Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad on September 1, 1984 published in the Haryana Gazette dated November 13, 1984, copy Annexure P-13, vide which the order of termination of the workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh respondent No. 1 passed by the petitioner was declared illegal and void and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Respondent No. 1 Vijay Bahadur Singh was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner Frick India Pvt. Limited, Faridabad initially on November 27, 1981 on a probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve his work. Respondent No. 1 was, however, not interested in the service with the petitioner and left the job in search of a better employment on June 2, 1982. The full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and paid to him vide voucher produced in the proceedings before the Labour Court as Ex. M-14. Respondent No. 1-workman, Vijay Bahadur Singh, however, again applied to the petitioner for fresh appointment on June 10, 1982 vide his application Ex. M-3 and a copy of which was placed with the writ petition as Annexure P-1. vide letter of appointment dated June 29, 1982, the petitioner offered appointment to respondent No. 1 as Fitter (semi skilled) w.e.f. June 13, 1982 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, copy of Annexure P-2. vide condition No. 3 mentioned in the appointment letter, respondent No. 1 was offered job for a period of six months which could be extended at the discretion of the Management. Respondent No. 1 was specifically informed that during the period of probation his services could be terminated without assigning any reason and without any notice of payment of compensation in lieu thereof. He was told that on satisfactory completion of probationary period he could be considered for confirmation on the said post in the petitioner-Company and a separate letter to that effect would be issued to him by the petitioner. In case no such letter was issued by the petitioner, respondent No. 1-workman would continue to be on probation. After confirmation the service of respondent No. 1 could be terminated by the Management with one month notice or salary in lieu thereof. A proviso was added that in case the service of respondent No. 1 was terminated for misconduct entailing dismissal, he will not be entitled to any notice of payment in lieu of such notice. Respondent No. 1-workman was at liberty to leave the service of the Company after giving one month notice or one month salary in lieu thereof. Respondent No. 1-joined the services of the petitioner on the post of the Fitter (semi skilled) aforesaid w.e.f. June 13, 1982. During the period of probation of six months, the petitioner found that respondent No. 1 was not taking any interest in his work. The Initiating Officer, however, recommended that respondent No. 1 be given three months extension vide endorsement made on the confidential Memo Annexure P-3. Accordingly, the period of probation of respondent No. 1-Vijay Bahadur Singh was extended by three months vide letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P-4, issued by the Personnel Department, Respondent No. 1 was asked to improve his services and was advised that if he failed to improve his working and the same continued to be unsatisfactory, the said letter will be treated as a notice and service will come to an end after the expiry of the notice. However, if his work was found to be satisfactory he was deemed to have been confirmed if a letter of confirmation is issued to him. Towards the end of extended period of probation the report of the Initiating Officer appended in the remarks column of confidential memo, Annexure P-5, was as under : ',
	(int) 3 => '<p>'Remarks : He is not suitable. His services may be terminated.' ',
	(int) 4 => '<p>3. Resultantly, vide letter dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-3 the Personnel Manager communicated to respondent No. 1 about the termination of his services w.e.f. March 12, 1983. A.N. A copy of termination letter was sent to respondent No. 1 at his home address in Village Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur, (U.P.) vide Annexure P-7. The Personnel Manager sent a memo to the Accounts Department of the petitioner directing to pay to respondent No. 1 his full and final payment as per details given in the letter which are as under : ',
	(int) 5 => '<p>'1. Pay salary for the month of February, 1983, if lying unpaid. ',
	(int) 6 => '<p> 2. Pay 2 (Two days) E/leave encashment. 2 (Two) days 1983. ',
	(int) 7 => '<p> 3. Pay one month salary in lieu of notice period. ',
	(int) 8 => '<p> 4. Pay him 15 (fifteen days) retrenchment compensation.' ',
	(int) 9 => '<p>4. The payment was offered to respondent No. 1, vide Annexure P-8, on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. This endorsement has been made at the bottom of Annexure P-8 which reads as under : ',
	(int) 10 => '<p>'Offered him on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same.' ',
	(int) 11 => '<p>5. Respondent No. 1-workman served a demand notice dated April 13, 1983, copy Annexure P-9, under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act for reinstatement of the workman with full backwages and continuity of service. Upon a reference having been made, respondent No. 1 filed a claim statement before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad, copy Annexure P-10, alleging, inter alia, that the simpliciter termination w.e.f. April 1, 1983 was bad in law and void ab initio in absence of compliance of the provisions of statutory law. He also alleged that he was condemned without being given an opportunity of hearing. He also alleged that he had proceeded on sanctioned leave from February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983 and requested for extension of leave on the ground of his illness for which medical certificate was sent to the petitioner-Management. On his return, respondent No. 1 was not allowed to join his duty and his services were terminated unjustified. The petitioner-Management filed written statement, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the work of respondent No. 1-workman was found unsatisfactory and as such his services were terminated w.e.f. March 13, 1983. It was denied that the services were terminated on April 1, 1983. The claimant, it was averred, was appointed on June 13, 1982 for a period of probation of six months. The letter of appointment was duly acknowledged by respondent No. 1-Workman. During the period of probation the work of the claimant was not satisfactory and the period of probation was extended for three months but he did not improve his work and his services were terminated. Regarding the leave it was mentioned that the claimant had gone on leave for eleven days w.e.f. February 15, 1983 to February 25, 1983. It was also admitted that an application for extension of leave was received but since there was no medical certificate attached with the leave application, hence it was not considered. According to the petitioner-Management, it a case of termination of services of a probationary employee in terms of employment and certified Standing Orders of the Company. The petitioner also contended that claimant was gainfully employed. The claimant examined himself and on behalf of the Management, Mr. R. N. Yadav, Personal Officer was produced as Management witness No. 1. Respondent No. 2-Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faridabad framed the following issues : ',
	(int) 12 => '<p>1. As per reference ',
	(int) 13 => '<p> 2. Whether the workman is gainfully employed ',
	(int) 14 => '<p>6. He took up issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and decided them in favour of respondent No. 1-workman and declared the impugned order of termination of service as illegal and void and held the workman entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full backwages. ',
	(int) 15 => '<p>7. The petitioner-Management has challenged the impugned award dated September 1, 1984 passed by respondent No. 2 on the grounds, inter alia, that the impugned award was not a speaking one and no reference was made to the oral and documentary evidence led before the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1, admittedly appeared at the factory gate on April 1, 1983 and on that day he was offered his full and final dues including the retrenchment compensation and notice pay as required by Section 25-F of the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The workman-respondent No. 1 had also admitted about the fact that he had refused to accept the payment offered to him by means of Ex. M-11. The finding of the Labour Court regarding the non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was alleged to be contrary to the record. It was also contended that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service as contained in the letter of appointment and it was not a case of unfair labour practice. ',
	(int) 16 => '<p>8. Upon issuance of a notice of motion respondent No. 1 filed his written statement in which he admitted that he was employed as a Fitter by the petitioner on November 27, 1981. It was contended that his services were terminated w.e.f. April 1, 1983. Respondent No. 1 alleged that there was non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act as he had actually worked for not less than 240 days as required by Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination order was rightly held illegal and void by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. In nutshell respondent No. 1 defended the impugned award but the same was opposed by respondent No. 2 after taking into consideration the various aspects of the case. ',
	(int) 17 => '<p>9. I have heard the learned Counsel for petitioner No. 1 and perused the impugned award and the record of the case. ',
	(int) 18 => '<p>10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No. 1-workman was appointed initially on November 27, 1981 on probation of six months. The work of respondent No. 1 was, however, not found satisfactory and he was asked to improve upon his work. Respondent No. 1, it was contended by the petitioner's counsel, was not interested in the service and he left the job on June 2, 1982. At that time full and final account of respondent No. 1 was settled and a sum of Rs. 417.40 was paid with the voucher which was produced before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 as Ex. M-14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the claim of respondent No. 1-workman to the contrary was not factually correct. He categorically denied the averment of respondent No. 1 that he was victim of unfair labour practice and that the break in service of respondent No. 1-workman was deliberately done and he was then given an appointment on June 13, 1982 vide a separate letter of appointment. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, on the other hand, contended that respondent No. 1-workman had not left the job on his own and it was a break shown in his service and he was shown as given fresh appointment subsequently w.e.f. June 13, 1982. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that this controversy may not be gone into inasmuch as respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days of working with the petitioner even after June 13, 1982. Mr. Tacoria argued that since the respondent No. 1-workman had worked with the petitioner w.e.f. June 13, 1982 for a period of 240 days in calendar year preceding the order of termination of his services, the same would amount to retrenchment under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short to be referred as Act). It was contended by Mr. Tacoria that in the instant case the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and this non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25-F of the Act would render the order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman as illegal and he was rightly held entitled for reinstatement with full back wages by the award passed by respondent No. 2-Labour Court. Elaborating his arguments regarding the completion of 240 days of working with the petitioner, Mr. Tacoria said that respondent No. 1-workman worked continuously from June 13, 1982 upto March 12, 1983 and the total number of days which would work out would be 273 days which would appear from the following days of the months intervening between June 13, 1982 and March 12, 1983.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>11. The days on which respondent No. 1-workman worked with the petitioner on his job are as under : ',
	(int) 20 => '<p>June, 1982 18 days July, 1982 31 days August, 1982 31 days September, 1982 30 days October, 1982 31 days November, 1982 30 days December, 1982 31 days January, 1983 31 days February, 1983 28 days March, 1983 12 days ',
	(int) 21 => '<p>12. Controverting the argument of Mr. Tacoria learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman, Mr. R. S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner argued that in this case the compliance of the provisions of Section 25F are required inasmuch as the services of respondent No. 1-workman had been terminated as per the provisions contained in the letter of appointment containing the terms and conditions regulating his services. He also placed reliance on the authority reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, 1997 8 Supreme Court Cases 461 wherein in para 15 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : ',
	(int) 22 => '<p>'In the instant case, the respondent was discharged from service during probation in terms of Regulation 14(4) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Such termination has already been upheld by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Venugoapl v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India. This decision also meets the ground raised by the Counsel for the respondent that the termination of the respondent's services would amount to 'Retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act and since the requirements of Section 25-F of that Act were not complied with, the termination would be bad. It may be pointed out that the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 which came into force on January 31, 1981 provided that under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the Regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The validity of the Amendment Act was upheld by this Court in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India. For this reason also, the ground that termination would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be entertained.' ',
	(int) 23 => '<p>13. The main emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the services of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation and he referred to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the nature of service during the period of probation. The Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 6, inter alia, as under : ',
	(int) 24 => '<p>'The period of probation is a period of test during which the work and conduct of an employee is under scrutiny. If on an assessment of his work and conduct during this period it is found that he was not suitable for the post it would be open to the employer to terminate his services. His services cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause .....' ',
	(int) 25 => '<p>14. Mr. J. B. Tacoria, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, at this stage pointed out that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarani's case (supra) will not be relevant in the instant case because in the said case there were statutory provisions contained in the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981, which came up into force on January 31, 1981 under sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The regulations which were already in force immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act, it was held, shall be deemed to be Rules made by the Central Government and they shall be deemed to have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the <a>Industrial Disputes Act, 1947</a>. The case of respondent No. 1-workman, in this case falls within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the instant case are, thus, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni's case (supra). So far as the provisions contained under Section 2 sub-section (oo) sub-section (bb) of the Act are concerned, to which reference was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it may be noticed that sub-section (bb) of Section 2(oo) was inserted in the Act by the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. August 8, 1984. In the instant case the impugned order terminating the service of respondent No. 1-workman was passed on March 12, 1983 i.e. prior to the incorporation of the amendment in Section 2(oo) by adding (bb) to the said Section. Section 2(oo)(bb) provides that retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : ',
	(int) 26 => '<p>a) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 27 => '<p> b) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 28 => '<p> [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, or] ',
	(int) 29 => '<p> (c) xxx xxx xxx ',
	(int) 30 => '<p>15. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman has substance. The interpretation which is being put to the condition contained in the appointment letter of respondent No. 1-workman, containing specifically a provision of termination of his services during the period of probation has no adverse effect on the claim of the respondent-workman because at the time when his service was terminated by the Management the provision of Section (bb) added to Section 2(oo) had not come into force. The case of the respondent-workman is to be decided under the law as it stood on the date when his service was terminated by the management. For similar reasons the other authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1996 Lab I.C. 420 (Bombay High Court) will not be applicable as that case was considered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. ',
	(int) 31 => '<p>16. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-workman placed reliance in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another, 1991(3) Recent Services Judgments 486, which is the decision of a single Bench of this Court regarding the compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A perusal of the facts of the said case, which are extracted in para 2, will go to show that the workman was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979 and on the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. The learned single Judge summarised the facts in para 2 as under : ',
	(int) 32 => '<p>'The petitioner is a Co-operative Society and Jasminder Singh respondent was appointed as a Store-keeper by an office order dated June 19, 1978. According to the terms and conditions of his appointment, he was placed on probation for a period of one year which was further extended by another six months on July 13, 1979. On the expiry of the extended period of probation, the Board of Directors of the petitioner-Society decided to terminate the services of the respondent as his work and conduct had not been found satisfactory. It appears that there were some serious allegations of misconduct against the workman but he was discharged the expiry of the probationary period without being formally charge sheeted or an enquiry being held. This termination gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication by the State Government to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar.' ',
	(int) 33 => '<p>17. Considering the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act, the learned single Judge held that workman had put in 18 months of service and even if it was to be assumed that the workman was a probationer, it was necessary for the Management to comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act and the same not having been done, the order of termination could not be upheld. Now coming to the facts of the instant case it is evident from perusal of the letter dated December 13, 1982, copy Annexure P4, issued by the Personnel Department of the petitioner that the work of respondent No. 1-workman had been kept under observation of the management for the last six months but his work was not found satisfactory. This letter further informed the respondent-workman that he had been granted extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve his services. Para 2 of this letter reads as under : ',
	(int) 34 => '<p>'We grant you an extension of three months more i.e. upto March 12, 1983 to improve your services. Please be advised if you fail to improve your working and the same continues to be unsatisfactory, this letter will be treated as Notice and your services will come to an end after the expiry of this Notice period.' ',
	(int) 35 => '<p>18. It would appear from perusal of the remarks of the Initiating Officer made in the confidential Memo, copy Annexure P-5, that respondent No. 1-workman was not found suitable and the recommendation was made that his services may be terminated. ',
	(int) 36 => '<p>19. The order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1-workman dated March 12, 1983, copy Annexure P-6, which reads as under : ',
	(int) 37 => '<p>Regd. A.D. FIL/PD/83/M-208 Dt. 12.3.83 Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, S/o. Shri Bhagwat Singh, Mamraj Colony, Sarai Khawaja, P.O. - Amarnagar, Distt. Faridabad (Haryana) ',
	(int) 38 => '<p> Dear Sir,',
	(int) 39 => '<p> Sub : Termination ',
	(int) 40 => '<p> With reference to clause (3) of our appointment letter dated June 29, 1982, your services are terminated w.e.f. March 12, 1983 A.N., as your services are no longer required. ',
	(int) 41 => '<p> Your full and final payment will be settled after you hand over the tools and any papers held with you. ',
	(int) 42 => '<p> sd/- ',
	(int) 43 => '<p>Personnel Manager ',
	(int) 44 => '<p>CC : Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh S/o Sh. Bhagwat Singh, ',
	(int) 45 => '<p>Vill. Patar, P.O. Tajpur Dehma, Distt. Ghazipur (U.P.)' ',
	(int) 46 => '<p>20. Annexure P-7 shows the giving of full and final settlement of the claim of respondent No. 1-workman. These documents undoubtedly show that the service of respondent No. 1-workman was terminated during the period of probation on the ground that his work was not found satisfactory. It is, however, relevant to note that there is no allegation of any misconduct on the part of respondent No. 1-workman as was in the case of The Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited's case (supra). In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is shown from the documents on record and which position is not in dispute that respondent No. 1-workman had completed 240 days and more in a calendar year preceding the date of the impugned order of termination of the services and as such he is to be held to be in service period of one year under Section 25-F(b) and therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted in the case of respondent No. 1 and the same were required to be complied with. ',
	(int) 47 => '<p>21. In the instant case a perusal of Annexure P-7, shows that it contains full and final settlement of accounts of respondent No. 1-workman including one month salary in lieu of notice period (item No. 3) and 15 days retrenchment compensation (item No. 4). A perusal of Annexure P-8, which is the copy of the voucher for the payment, shows that the amount aforesaid including one month salary in lieu of notice period of 15 days retrenchment compensation was offered to respondent No. 1-workman on April 1, 1983 but he refused to accept the same. Respondent No. 1-workman in his statement recorded before the Labour Court-respondent No. 2, admitted in cross-examination that he had received letter for collecting his full and final payment but he did not collect. Section 25-F provides as under : ',
	(int) 48 => '<p>25-F Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - ',
	(int) 49 => '<p> (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; ',
	(int) 50 => '<p> (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay (for every completed year of continuous service) or any part thereof in excess of six months; and ',
	(int) 51 => '<p> (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government (for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette). ',
	(int) 52 => '<p>22. A perusal of the full and final accounts prepared by the petitioner-Management will go to show that the Management had complied with the provisions of Section 25-F by offering one month salary in lieu of the notice of 15 days salary as retrenchment compensation and the same had been offered to respondent No. 1-workman but he did not accept the same. In this view of the matter the writ petition has considerable merit and the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 fell in error in taking a contrary view. ',
	(int) 53 => '<p>23. Resultantly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned award passed by the Labour Court-respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside. Consequently, writ is allowed and the impugned award Annexures P-13 passed by respondent No. 2 Labour Court is quashed.<p>',
	(int) 54 => '<p>'
)
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Subject	Labour and Industrial
Court	Punjab and Haryana High Court
Decided On	Jul-07-1999
Case Number	C.W.P. No. 137/1985
Judge	K.K. Srivastava, J.
Reported in	(1999)123PLR814
Acts	Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 - Sections 2, 2A, 25B and 25F
Appellant	Frick India Private Ltd.
Respondent	Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another
Appellant Advocate	R.S. Mittal and; Sudhir Mittal, Advs.
Respondent Advocate	J.B. Tacoria, Adv.
Cases Referred	Sugar Mills Limited v. Jasminder Singh and Another

Frick India Private Ltd. Vs. Vijay Bahadur Singh and Another - Court Judgment