Niranjan Singh Vs. Om Suta and ors. - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
- sections 100-a [as inserted by act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & letters patent, 1865, clause 10: [dr. b.s. chauhan, cj, l. mohapatra & a.s. naidu, jj] letters patent appeal order of single judge of high court passed while deciding matters filed under order 43, rule1 of c.p.c., - held, after introduction of section 110a in the c.p.c., by 2002 amendment act, no letters patent appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a single judge of a high court. a right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. it is pertinent to note that section 100-a introduced by 2002 amendment of the code starts with a non obstante clause. the purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. the legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. it is well settled that the definition of judgment in section 2(9) of c.p.c., is much wider and more liberal, intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to clause (a) to (w) of order 43, rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. amended section 100-a of the code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a single judge of a high court, no further appeal shall lie. even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under section 2(9) means a statement given by a judge on the grounds of a decree or order. thus the contention that against an order passed by a single judge in an appeal filed under section 104 c.p.c., a further appeal lies to a division bench cannot be accepted. the newly incorporated section 100a in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a single judge to a division bench notwithstanding anything contained in the letters patent. the letters patent which provides for further appeal to a division bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a single judge. it has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an appeal to the high court. it has not made any provision for filing appeal to a division bench against the judgment or decree or order of a single judge. no letters patent appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a single judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a special act. sections 100-a [as inserted by act 22 of 2002] & 104:[dr. b.s. chauhan, cj, l. mohapatra & a.s. naidu, jj] writ appeal held, a writ appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by single judge in a writ petition filed under article 226 of the constitution of india. in a writ application filed under articles 226 and 227 of constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under article 226, a writ appeal will lie. but, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a single judge in exercising powers of superintendence under article 227 of the constitution. orderv.k. bali, j.1. this appeal under clause x of the letters patent has been filed against judgment dated december 17, 1998 passed by the learned single judge in f.a.o. no. 269 of 1994, whereby order passed by the motor accidents claims tribunal was upheld, according to which it was the appellant owner of the vehicle involved in the accident, who was to pay compensation on account of death of two persons as the victims were held to be non-fare passengers and were also unauthorised to travel as per terms of the insurance policy.2. at the time when matter came up for hearing before a motion bench of this court on january 9, 2000, the learned counsel for the appellant had cited a judgment of the hon'ble supreme court in new india assurance company v. satpal singh and ors., (2000-1)124 p.l.r. 464 (s.c.), to contend that the new motor vehicles act came into force on october 14, 1988 and the accident had taken place on september 25, 1989 and in the situation as mentioned above appellant-owner was not liable to pay compensation even with regard to death of the passengers who were travelling in the vehicle that met with an accident. the matter was admitted only on the basis of judgment in satpal singh's case (supra).3. shri amit jain, advocate, learned counsel for the appellants very fairly states that the judgment in satpal singh's case (supra) has since been over-ruled by a larger bench of the supreme court in new india assurance company ltd. v. asha rani, (2003-1)133 p.l.r. 1 (s.c.). he, however, contends that the appellant was paying rs. 240/- in addition to the premium, by virtue of which, non-fare (non-paying) passengers could also travel in the vehicle and, therefore, premium paid by the appellant owner had covered death or bodily injuries even with regard to the person who was travelling in the vehicle but was non-fare passenger. we have perused original insurance policy shown by learned counsel for the appellant. in our view, rs. 240/- were paid by the appellant on account of 'liability to public risk'. immediately underneath the column to liability to public risk, the mentioning of the word 'add: for l.l. to authorised non-fare paying passengers as per end imt 14(b) limit any one passenger rs. .... limit any one accdt. rs.....' the net amount payable on account of heads as mentioned above is blank, what really transpires is that no additional premium was paid by the appellant for so-called authorised non-fare passengers and as mentioned above, rs. 240/- were towards liability to public risk.4. even though the learned courts below have examined the aforesaid contention of the learned counsel on the basis as if the appellant had paid amount of rs. 240/- as premium towards authorised non-fare travelling passengers and yet repelled the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant, but it appears that while dealing with the issue aforesaid the policy as such was not seen. it has been mentioned above that the insurance policy does not show the appellant having paid any additional amount for vehicle's authorised non-fare passengers.finding no merit in the appeal, the same is dismissed, however, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.

Judgment:
ORDER

V.K. Bali, J.

1. This appeal under Clause X of the Letters Patent has been filed against judgment dated December 17, 1998 passed by the learned Single Judge in F.A.O. No. 269 of 1994, whereby order passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal was upheld, according to which it was the appellant owner of the vehicle involved in the accident, who was to pay compensation on account of death of two persons as the victims were held to be non-fare passengers and were also unauthorised to travel as per terms of the insurance policy.

2. At the time when matter came up for hearing before a Motion Bench of this Court on January 9, 2000, the learned counsel for the appellant had cited a judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in New India Assurance Company v. Satpal Singh and Ors., (2000-1)124 P.L.R. 464 (S.C.), to contend that the new Motor Vehicles Act came into force on October 14, 1988 and the accident had taken place on September 25, 1989 and in the situation as mentioned above appellant-owner was not liable to pay compensation even with regard to death of the passengers who were travelling in the vehicle that met with an accident. The matter was admitted only on the basis of judgment in Satpal Singh's case (supra).

3. Shri Amit Jain, Advocate, learned counsel for the appellants very fairly states that the judgment in Satpal Singh's case (supra) has since been over-ruled by a larger Bench of the Supreme Court in New India Assurance Company Ltd. v. Asha Rani, (2003-1)133 P.L.R. 1 (S.C.). He, however, contends that the appellant was paying Rs. 240/- in addition to the premium, by virtue of which, non-fare (non-paying) passengers could also travel in the vehicle and, therefore, premium paid by the appellant owner had covered death or bodily injuries even with regard to the person who was travelling in the vehicle but was non-fare passenger. We have perused original insurance policy shown by learned counsel for the appellant. In our view, Rs. 240/- were paid by the appellant on account of 'Liability to public risk'. Immediately underneath the column to liability to public risk, the mentioning of the word 'Add: for L.L. to authorised non-fare paying passengers as per END IMT 14(b) Limit any one passenger Rs. .... Limit any one Accdt. Rs.....' the net amount payable on account of heads as mentioned above is blank, what really transpires is that no additional premium was paid by the appellant for so-called authorised non-fare passengers and as mentioned above, Rs. 240/- were towards liability to public risk.

4. Even though the learned Courts below have examined the aforesaid contention of the learned counsel on the basis as if the appellant had paid amount of Rs. 240/- as premium towards authorised non-fare travelling passengers and yet repelled the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant, but it appears that while dealing with the issue aforesaid the policy as such was not seen. It has been mentioned above that the insurance policy does not show the appellant having paid any additional amount for vehicle's authorised non-fare passengers.

Finding no merit in the appeal, the same is dismissed, however, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.