Punjab National Fertilizers and Vs. Collr. of C. Ex. - Court Judgment

SooperKanoon Citationsooperkanoon.com/6138
CourtCustoms Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal CESTAT Delhi
Decided OnDec-17-1990
JudgeAuthor: 4 E 200J.
Reported in(1991)LC166Tri(Delhi)
AppellantPunjab National Fertilizers and
RespondentCollr. of C. Ex.
Excerpt:
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1.1 the appellant is a public limited company having its factory at naya nan-gal in the district of ropar, punjab. the appellant was granted an industrial licence for the manufacture and marketing of 66,000 tonnes per annum of soda ash and 66,000 tonnes per annum of ammonium chloride fertilizer. the commercial production of the two products commenced on 26th january 1985. the appellant claims that he manufactures soda ash by employing a sophisticated chemical process, known as 'modified solvay' or 'dual process' which is a modification of conventional solvay process for soda ash manufacture. it is further claimed by the appellant he had been regularly filing classification list in respect of soda ash and ammonium chloride fertilizer and had been clearing the goods after following the.....
Judgment:
1.1 The appellant is a Public Limited Company having its factory at Naya Nan-gal in the District of Ropar, Punjab. The appellant was granted an Industrial Licence for the manufacture and marketing of 66,000 tonnes per annum of Soda Ash and 66,000 tonnes per annum of Ammonium Chloride Fertilizer. The commercial production of the two products commenced on 26th January 1985. The appellant claims that he manufactures Soda Ash by employing a sophisticated chemical process, known as 'modified solvay' or 'dual process' which is a modification of Conventional Solvay Process for Soda Ash manufacture. It is further claimed by the appellant he had been regularly filing classification list in respect of Soda Ash and Ammonium Chloride Fertilizer and had been clearing the goods after following the proper procedure and payment of applicable duty. His further claim is that he had furnished to the jurisdictional authorities the complete details of the process of manufacture, the reactions that take place in the process and all other details at the time of furnishing the classification list initially.

1.2 On 29th November 1984, the jurisdictional Inspector of Central Excise & Customs wrote a letter to the appellants contending that the appellant manufactures Sodium Bicarbonate at the intermediate stage which is liable to Central excise duty under erstwhile Tariff Item No. 14AA(1); it also contended that since there was no exemption notification in respect of its usage in the manufacture of Soda Ash, Sodium Bicarbonate was liable to duty. Accordingly, the Inspector called upon the appellant to file a classification list of the goods at the intermediate stage and the price list in respect of alleged Sodium Bicarbonate. The Inspector also called upon the appellants to furnish information with regard to the quantity of alleged Sodium Bicarbonate manufactured by them from July 1984 to 30th November 1984.

1.3 Since the commencement of the dispute started with the aforesaid letter dated 29-11-1984 it is appropriate at this stage to set out the relevant extracts therefrom :- "It is to inform you that sodium bicarbonate manufactured by you at the intermediary stage is liable for Central Excise duty under Tariff Item 14AA(1) as there is no exemption notification in respect of its usage in the manufacture of Soda Ash falling under TI 14A. 2. You are, therefore, requested to file the classification list of the goods at the intermediary stage and the price list in respect of sodium bicarbonate which is being used for captive consumption. The quantity of sodium bicarbonate manufactured by you from 7/84 to 30-11-1984 may please be supplied to this office immediately not later than a week on receipt of this letter." Beginning with the above letter there has been a protracted correspondence between the appellant and the department. The contention of the appellant has been that the alleged Sodium Bicarbonate arising at the intermediate stage is a mixture of various chemicals containing about 70 to 75% of Sodium Bicarbonate which is not marketable at all as Sodium Bicarbonate. This mixture of chemicals, according to the appellant, cannot be levied to duty as Sodium Bicarbonate in terms of tariff description 14AA(1) because in the absence of any definition of Sodium Bicarbonate in the Central Excise Tariff the goods 'Sodium Bicarbonate' mentioned in the Tariff must be known as such in the market before they are levied to duty whereas the mixture of chemicals allegedly containing Sodium Bicarbonate is not known as Sodium Bicarbonate in the market. In short, the appellant's contention is that the mixture containing Sodium Bicarbonate is not marketable and hence it is not Sodium Bicarbonate and as such cannot be levied to duty under erstwhile Tariff Item 14AA(1).

1.4 In the course of the correspondence, the appellant also submitted vide their letter dated 22-2-1985 (Annexure 'E' to the appeal) that as per chemical reaction, 168 tonnes of Sodium Bicarbonate is required to produce 106 tonnes of Soda Ash (Sodium Bicarbonate). The appellant also mentioned that the commercial form of Sodium Bicarbonate is produced in the country by a separate process which involves dissolving of Soda Ash in water and reacting it further with carbondioxide to produce Sodium Bicarbonate which is then used as chemical for domestic and pharmaceutical purposes etc. In the production of Sodium Bicarbonate, it was also stated that one has to control certain serious and dangerous chemicals like arsenic, lead, copper and iron. None of these operations are being performed in the process of manufacture undertaken by the appellant.

1.5 The concerned Superintendent of Central Excise vide his letter dated 29th March, 1985, referring to the letter of the jurisdictional Inspector directed the appellant to commence paying central excise duty at 15% ad valorem from 1-4-1985. The Superintendent of Central Excise also directed the appellant to furnish classification list and price list and also obtain a central excise Licence in addition to maintaining RG-1 Account and observing other Central Excise formalities before using the alleged Sodium Bicarbonate in the manufacture of Soda Ash. Since the Superintendent was insisting with regard to the figures of production of the alleged Sodium Bicarbonate the appellant informed vide its letter dated 29th July 1985 (Annexure 'K' to the appeal) that he had produced 16975.27 tonnes (upto 5 AM of 29-7-1985) of Soda Ash approximately for which the alleged Sodium Bicarbonate would be 24751.5 tonnes. The Supdt. however, by his letter dated 14th August, 1985 directed the appellant to furnish the value of alleged Sodium Bicarbonate said to have been produced by them. The appellant by his letter dated 23rd August 1985 (Annexure 'M') informed the Supdt. that since the appellant was not selling Sodium Bicarbonate and since no method has been devised to find out the cost of production of Sodium Bicarbonate, which is formed in the intermediate stage of the manufacture of Soda Ash, it was not possible for the appellant to correlate the consumption of utilities, raw materials and overheads and determine the cost of production or the value of sale realisation of the alleged Sodium Bicarbonate.

1.6 Some more correspondence ensued between the appellant and the department on the quantity of further production of alleged Sodium Bicarbonate.

1.7 The Collector for the first time issued a show cause notice dated 20-5-1987 calling upon the appellant to show cause as to why a sum of Rs. 1,32,27,323/- should not be recovered from the appellant under Rule 9(2) of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules) read with Section 11A of the Central Excises & Salt Act, 1944 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), being the amount of Central Excise duty on Sodium Bicarbonate consumed captively during the period July 1984 to November 1985 without payment of duty, by the appellant in the manufacture of Soda Ash and as to why penalty be not imposed on him.

1.8 On adjudication, the Collector has confirmed the aforesaid demand brushing aside the pleas of the appellants on merits as well as the plea of time bar in respect of demand of duty, in terms of Section 11-A of the Act. In coming to this conclusion on merits the Collector has observed that in another matter decided by the Tribunal in its order No. 351/88-C dated 20-4-1988 the Tribunal has considered at length the liability of duty on Sodium Bicarbonate manufactured by the appellant and held that this was leviable to central excise duty. The Collector has respectfully followed the reasoning and conclusion of the Tribunal in the said order which has since been reported in 1988 (37) ELT 155.

The period involved in the case was 1-12-1985 to 28-2-1986 and 1-3-1986 to 1-4-1986.

1.9 On the plea of limitation, the Collector has observed that "the department itself had written to the appellant to apply for a Central Excise. Licence and commence paying duty. The letters were written on 29-11-1984, 29-3-1985 and 17-4-1985. Despite this, however, the company did not do anything in the matter. It is evident that the Central Excise Officers did not resort to coercive measures like search of factory etc. only due to the consideration that the company is an undertaking of the Punjab Government. In fact, the company has taken the benefit of this indulgence by not furnishing promptly the information and it was only on 29-7-1985 that they furnished the information. One of the circumstances under which provisions of Section 11A can be invoked, is contravention of any provisions of Act or of the Rules made thereunder within an intent to evade payment of duty. In this case it is very clearly established that despite being asked repeatedly to do so the party did not take out a Central Excise Licence or pay duty and removed the goods without payment of duty in contravention of Rule 9(1). Hence, the extended period (of 5 years) has rightly been invoked in this case".

1.10 Having regard to the overall facts and circumstances, the Collector has imposed a penalty of Rs. 10,000/- on the appellant under Rule 173-Q of the Central Excise Rules, 1944.

2. On the basis of the pleadings in the appeal memorandum and the arguments urged during the course of hearing by both sides following issues arise in this matter :- (1) Whether earlier judgment of the Tribunal in the case of the appellants themselves reported in 1988 (37) ELT 155 is not binding and can be reopened.

(2) If the answer to (1) above is in the affirmative, should the matter be remanded to the Collector for de novo adjudication in the facts and circumstances of this case and the new material brought on record.

(3) If answer to issue No. (2) above is in the negative, whether classification of the product under consideration under Tariff Item 14AA(1) is correct.

(4) Whether the show cause notice dated 20-5-1987 for demand of duty is time barred in view of the provisions of Section 11-A of the Act.

Issue No. (1) - On this issue, learned advocate Shri Ravinder Narain for the appellant has urged that it is well settled proposition of law that there is no res judicata in fiscal matters. The earlier judgment of the Tribunal mentioned supra relates to a period 1-12-1985 to 28-2-1986 pertaining to the Old Tariff and 1-3-1986 to 1-4-1986 pertaining to the New Tariff, whereas in the present matter the period involved is entirely different i.e. July 1984 to November 1985. For the aforesaid proposition, the learned advocate has relied upon the following judgments :: (1) 1972 (84) ITR 273 (SC) - CIT v. Brij Lal Lohia [Head Note No. II] (3) 1971 (82) ITR 287-at page 291 (Bom.) - Seth Ram Nath Daga v. CIT.In the case of Brij Lal Lohia, supra, the Supreme Court has held that "the fact that in the earlier proceedings the Tribunal took a different view of these deeds was not a conclusive circumstances; the decision of the Tribunal reached in those proceedings did not operate as res judicata. As seen earlier there was a great deal more evidence before the Tribunal during the present proceedings relating to those gift deeds." Similarly in the instant case, the learned advocate has urged that additional evidence has been allowed to be taken on record by the Tribunal under its Misc. Order No. 108/1989-C dt. 1-6-1989 by which two affidavits of Experts namely (i) Sarat Kapilram Vakil and (ii) Sukh Chain Lal Jain have been admitted. The department has not furnished any counter affidavits. Apart from the aforesaid two affidavits, the learned advocate has also said that technical literature from various authoritative books have also been brought on record. He also submits that some further judgments of the Supreme Court namely (1) 1989 (40) ELT 280 (SC) - Bhore Inds. and (2) 1989 (43) ELT 214 (SC) -Ambalal Sarabhai Enterprises. They have also been pronounced making the law clearer than it had been hitherto. In view of these developments there are cogent reasons and grounds for this Bench not to feel bound by the earlier judgment of the Tribunal in the matter of the appellant himself, mentioned supra.

3.1 Elaborating his preposition on the basis of Brij Lal Lohia's judgment of the Supreme Court, learned advocate has submitted that in that case following were the facts :- The assessee, a dealer in jute had claimed that he had made a gift of Rs. X to his brother 'B' and another sum of Rs. Y to his nephew 'N'. Thereafter 'B' and 'N' started a new firm dealing in jute and at about the same time the assessee stopped his business. On the basis of the material then before it, the Income Tax Tribunal did not accept that the gifts were genuine for the assessment years 1945-46 and 1946-47 and ultimately the Supreme Court refused to interfere with that finding. In proceedings for the subsequent assessment years i.e. 1947-48 to 1951-52 considerable additional evidence was adduced and the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) after taking into consideration the decision rendered in the earlier proceedings, came to the conclusion that the gifts were genuine.

It is in the above facts that the matter went upto Supreme Court and the Hon'ble Apex Court ruled as above. The learned advocate submits that the' present matter is on a somewhat stronger footing inasmuch as the earlier decision does not have the seal of approval of the Supreme Court as it had in the case of Brij Lal Lohia and yet the Supreme Court agreed with the ITAT taking a different view of those very deeds on additional material being brought to their notice.

3.2 Similarly in the case oiSeth Ram Nath Daga, the Supreme Court has ruled that the Income Tax Officer is not bound by the rule of res judicata or estoppel and he can reopen an assessment if the assessee, in a subsequent year is able to satisfy the Income Tax authority that the previous finding was not correct either because it was not arrived after due enquiry or because it was arbitrary or if the assessee put forth before the Income Tax authority fresh facts from which different conclusion are arrived at.

3.3 Rebutting the aforesaid plea, the learned DR Shri S.- Chakraborti for the Revenue urges that the impugned order passed by the Collector on the basis of Tribunal's order relating to same goods of the same party cannot be faulted. Lower authority is bound by the decision of the Tribunal regarding the classification of the goods. For this proposition he relies on the following citations :- (1) 1978 (2) ELT J40 (Guj.) - J.D. Patel & Anr. v. UOI [Paras 9 & 10] [It is a salutary principle affirmed by various High Courts that in case there is only one interpretation enunciated by a High Court in respect of a provision of taxing statute another High Court must accept that view of the interpretation of a section or a provision of taxing statute which is an All India Statute for the sake of uniformity and consistency in the application of taxing statute and for avoiding the challenge of discrimination in application and administration of tax matters.] [Order passed in revision is quasi judicial order and is final and conclusive qua the parties. If department does not respect the said it is illegal on the part of the department].

[The Customs authorities are bound by their own decisions in administering taxing statutes and cannot modify their own decisions at their sweet will. The Customs are bound by their precedents in administering taxing statutes involving the very basis of taxation in respect of a particular article and not leave it to them to modify their own previous decisions but to leave it to them to apply to Courts or Parliament or Legislatures as the case may be to put the law beyond doubt].

(4) 1988 (33)ELT 684 - Para 10 Mahindra Re-Rolls Industries and Anr.

v. UOI and Ors.

[A judgment or a verdict given by the competent authority is binding, whether it be wrong, right or incomplete].

(5) 1984 (18) ELT 172-Para 15 (Bom.) - Godrej & Boyce Mfg. Co. Pvt.

Ltd. v. UOI [Once a finding is given by a superior authority on contentions raised before it, it is binding upon the subordinate authorities in subsequent proceedings unless some other material is brought to their notice, which compells them to take a contrary view].

3.4 We have carefully considered the pleas advanced from both sides on this issue and the citations made by them. Having regard to all the citations, it is clear that departmental authorities/quasi judicial authorities are not bound by their previous decisions and there is no principle of res judicata operating on subsequent matters, if, inter alia, there is a fresh material to be considered in a subsequent matters. It is no doubt true that the Collector was bound by the decision of the Tribunal in an earlier case but this Bench of the Tribunal is not bound by the earlier decision of the Tribunal provided there is change in law or fresh material to be considered. There is no doubt that in the instant matter fresh material has been on record by way of (i) technical literature (ii) affidavits of two experts and (iii) clarification regarding position of law as mentioned earlier.

Therefore, we are of the view that the earlier decision of the Tribunal in 1988 (37) ELT 155 does not operate as res judicata in the present matter and as binding on this Bench.

4. Issue No. 2 - Contention of the learned DR for the Revenue on this issue was that even if the earlier judgment is not treated as binding between the parties on the issue of classification, there are circumstances to remand the matter in this case because further enquiry and investigation is required to be caused at the adjudicating authority's stage in view of the fresh material brought on reord by the appellant. As against this submission, the learned advocate for the appellant, in his rejoinder to the DR for the Revenue has urged that fresh material is not of such a nature as to call for any further investigation or enquiry. Firstly affidavits of two experts have been filed. The affidavits are self-explanatory based on the experience and qualifications of the experts. No affidavit of another expert by way of rebuttal has been placed on record by the department despite the fact that the affidavits were produced alongwith the appeal and had been taken on record by virtue of the misc. order of the Bench as mentioned above. The other material on record is technical literature from authoritative books bringing out as to how the product under consideration is known in the market. Such technical literature is produced day in and day out by both sides before the Tribunal. There is hardly any scope for any investigation into the statements given in these authoritative texts. Further material by way of judgments of the Supreme Court also do not call for any further investigation. The judgments clarified only the legal position which has hitherto been prevailing. The learned advocate had also urged that there is an inconsistency in the plea of the learned DR on this issue with the plea on the first plea regarding the binding character of the Tribunal's earlier judgment, on the lower authorities. Since the lower authority is bound by the decision of the superior authority, he would hardly be in a position to undertake an enquiry with an open mind against the Tribunal's earlier judgment. The Collector, urges the learned advocate, would find himself in an embarrassing position to go against the earlier judgment of the Tribunal.

4.1 We have carefully considered the pleas advanced on this issue from both sides and are inclined to agree with the various submissions made by the learned advocate. We agree with him that the additional material brought on record is not of such a nature which would warrant an enquiry at the original stage. As regards the affidavits, the learned DR has relied upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Smt.

Sudha Devi v. M.P. Narayanan and Ors. [Judgment Today 1988 (2) SC 217].

In this case the Supreme Court has held that "affidavits are not included in the definition of evidence under Section 3 of the Evidence Act. They can be used as evidence only if for sufficient reason Court passes an Order under Order XIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. From a reading of the case we notice that the affidavits were discarded in this case because the Court felt that the plaintiff was attempting to "fill up the lacuna in the evidence belatedly at the Supreme Court". Further, reliance placed by the learned DR on the aforesaid case is also misplaced. The burden of proving the marketability of the goods which consequently makes them excisable is essentially on the department, as will be adverted to latter in the next issue. The department has based its case entirely on ambiguous nomenclature of the product under consideration whereas the appellant's case has been right through that the said product is not Sodium Bicarbonate but a mixture of various chemicals including Sodium Bicarbonate. Further, as rightly pointed out by the learned advocate for the appellant, that the appellant was not given any opportunity to distinguish the Tribunal's earlier judgment in its Order No. 351/98-C dated 20-4-1988 after a personal hearing on 29th January, 1988. Had they been given an opportunity the appellant would have filed the affidavits of the experts at the original stage itself. Still further, as rightly pointed out by the learned advocate, Rule 23 of the CEGAT (Procedure) Rules permits production of the additional evidence if "the Tribunal is of the opinion that any documents should be produced or any witness should be examined or any affidavit should be filed to enable it to pass orders or for any sufficient cause or if the adjudicating authority or the appellant or Revisional authority has decided the case without giving sufficient opportunity to any party to adduce evidence on the point specified by them or not specified by them..." and does not say that in all such cases of production of additional evidence the matter must necessarily be remanded to the adjudicating authority. We observe that the department has been given sufficient opportunity to rebut the affidavits evidence by any other counter affidavit but the Revenue has not chosen to do so. In the overall facts and circumstances of the case we do not find any justification to remand the case in view of the additional material brought on record, as urged by the learned DR.5.0 Issue No. 3 - This is the main issue. Question is whether the impugned product can be treated as Sodium Bicarbonate liable to duty under erstwhile T.I.14AA(1). Learned advocate has urged that it is a well settled proposition of law that before any goods could be levied to excise duty they should be marketable. The following citations have been relied upon by him :-Bhor Industries Ltd. v. CCE The learned advocate has also stressed that the impugned product arises at an intermediate stage in the manufacture of Soda Ash as a result of chemical reactions. This product is not capable of being used anywhere else except for the purpose of manufacture of Soda Ash and as such those cannot be termed as goods and cannot be consequently be made liable to excise duty and intermediate product even if conforming to the Tariff description of an item must be capable of being removed and if marketed then only, he submits, it would be excisable. For this proposition, he relies on two judgments of Bombay High Court, namely (1) 1987 (13) ECR 912 [Gokal Chand Rattan Chand Woollen Mills Pvt. Ltd. v. U.O.I. and (2) 1988 (36) ELT 11 (Bom.) - Para 2A [Grentex & Co. and Anr. v. UOI], apart from the citations in respect of Bhor Industries and Ambalal Sarabhai, mentioned supra. Marketability of the product can either be proved, according to him, by an actual evidence of its marketing or the evidence that the product is capable of being marketed. He further submits that the onus to produce this evidence is on the Revenue which wants to levy duty. Regarding the onus to prove the marketable character, the learned advocate relies on Supreme Court's judgment in the case of Ambalal Sarabhai Enterprises [1990 (43) ELT 214]. He submits that no evidence whatsoever has been adduced by the department regarding the marketable character of the product. On the other hand, the affidavits produced by the appellants and going unrebutted by the department clearly indicate that the impugned product is not marketable as Sodium Bi- carbonate. In this connection, he drew attention to affidavit dated 23rd July, 1988 of one Shri Sarat Kapilram Vakil, who is highly qualified and experienced states as follows :- "That in the manufacture of Soda Ash crude wet sodium bicarbonate is an intermediate compound containing impurities like Sodium Chloride, Ammonium hydro-oxide, Ammonium bicarbonate, Ammonium chloride, Iron Oxide, traces and Magnesium Carbonate and free moisture. The compound is usable only for the manufacture of Soda Ash in the process plant where it is formed. It does not possess any commercial identity either by name, form or usage.

That during my 39 years experience in all aspects of Soda Ash manufacture and marketing I have not known that the above intermediate compound at-any time been bought or sold in the market.

That in commercial parlance the mixture of Chemicals containing Crude Sodium Bicarbonate in the above form is not known and cannot be known also as Sodium Bicarbonate or Sodium Bicarbonate with impurities as it only exists in the process of manufacturing of Soda Ash and cannot be used anything else." 5.1 Similarly, the affidavit of Shri Sukh Chain Lal Jain who also claims to have a very high qualifications and extensive experience, has the following to say on the impugned product :- "That a mixture of chemicals in wet form containing Sodium Bicarbonate in the intermediate stage of manufacture of Soda Ash is not known as Sodium Bicarbonate or as Sodium Bicarbonate with impurities.

That during my 48 years of experience I have not known that the aforesaid mixture of chemicals has at any point of time come to be bought or sold ordinarily in the market. Technically it is not workable due to recyling of Carbon-Dioxide upsetting balance.

That in commercial parlance the mixture of Chemicals containing Sodium Bicarbonate is not known or cannot be known as Sodium Bicarbonate or as Sodium Bicarbonate with impurities." 5.2 Learned advocate for the appellant has further pointed out, on the authority of Chemical Process Industries, a book by R. Norris Shreve and Joseph A. Brink, JR., that Sodium Bicarbonate or baking soda as it is popularly known in the market is not made by refining the crude Sodium Bicarbonate obtained from the filters in the Solvay process.

Extracts from the said Book are given below :- "Sodium bicarbonate, or baking soda, is not made by refining the crude sodium bicarbonate obtained from the filters in the Solvay process. There are several reasons for this, (1) There is a great difficulty in completely drying this carbonate, (2) The value of the ammonia in this crude bicarbonate would be lost, (3) Even a small amount of ammonia gives the bicarbonate an odor that renders it unfit for many uses (4) The bicarbonate made in this way contains a great many other impurities.

To make -sodium bicarbonate, a saturated solution of soda ash is first prepared and then run into the tope of a column similar to the carbonating tower used in soda ash manufacture. Carbon dioxide is sent in from compressors at the bottom of the tower, which is maintained at about 40C. The suspension of bicarbonate formed is removed from the bottom of the tower, filtered, and washed on a rotary-drum filter. After centrifugation, the material is dried on a continuous-belt conveyor at 70C. Bicarbonate from this process about 99.9% pure. Sodium bicarbonate finds large use in the manufacture of baking powder, carbonated water, and leather goods, and in fire extinguishers. Annually, about 120,000 tons is manufactured in the United States".

5.3 Both sides have also relied upon a book "Manufacture of, a Practical Treatise by Te-Pang Hou, Ph.D. Relevant extracts from the aforesaid Treatise are reproduced below :- "Sodium bicarbonate, commercially known as baking soda or bicarbonate of soda, is a product directly related to the ammonia soda industry. Sodium bicarbonate in the crude state is first made in the carbonating towers or columns and filtered, and hence is also called 'ammonia soda'. From it soda ash is obtained by calcining.

But this crude bicarbonate (NaHCO3) from the filters contains as impurities sodium chloride (0.3 to 0.4 per cent NaCl on dry basis), ammonium bicarbonate (3.5 per cent NH4HCO3 on dry basis), a small percentage of ammonium chloride, and sometimes also traces of magnesium carbonate. Ammonium bicarbonate is decomposed in the dryers.

and the sodium chloride formed, together with sodium chloride present as such, is left in the soda ash. Any precipitate of magnesium carbonate in the bicarbonate will find its way to the soda ash which, when dissolved, shows turbidity in the solution. When the wet bicarbonate is dried by long exposure at a low temperature to prevent decomposition of sodium bicarbonate, it is difficult to decompose the ammonium bicarbonate completely and to drive off all ammonia from the sodium bicarbonate obtained. For, in a bicarbonate layer as thin as 1/2 inch, dried at a temperature of 60 to 70C over steam coils for a period of 12 hours, enough ammonia remains in the dried bicarbonate to give a distinct odor, while about 10 per cent of the bicarbonate has been decomposed to normal carbonate. This is an unsatisfactory, situation, to say nothing of the impurities left in the product obtained. Therefore pure sodium bicarbonate cannot be made directly this way.

At first thought it would seem natural to start with this crude bicarbonate from the filters and refine it. There are, indeed, many patents dealing with the refining of this bicarbonate by redissolving, recrystalisation, etc. On account of the presence in it of 0.7 to 0.8 per cent total ammonia (as NH3) which must be recovered, such methods cannot be carried out simply, and a step involving distillation of the bicarbonate solution is necessary if ammonia is to be saved. The ammonia soda manufacturers generally prefer to make it from soda ash. This seems to be a roundabout way, but after all it is simple and convenient from the manufacturing standpoint, because :- (2) carbon dioxide gas is recovered in a rich form from the dryers while lean gas from lime kilns, which is ususally in excess, may be used for recarbonating the sodium monocarbonate to bicarbonate; (3) almost the same apparatus can be used in setting, carbonating, filtering, etc., as in soda ash manufacture. In fact, some of the aniquated apparatus from soda works is used in the manufacture On the other hand, there is a process employed by several alkali plants in this country, working from the crude bicarbonate by dissolving it hot, setting, distilling off ammonia, recarbonating the partially decomposed bicarbonate and filtering the precipitated bicarbonate. The process differs from the above only in the distillation operation, which would not be necessary when starting from soda ash." 5.4 Both sides have also relied on the Condensed Chemical Dictionary.

In order to appropriate their arguments relevant extracts therefrom are also reproduced :- Properties : White powder or crystalline lumps; cooling, slightly alkaline taste. Soluble in water; insoluble in alcohol. Stable in dry air, but slowly decomposes in moist air, Spg gr 2.159; m.p.

loses carbon dioxide at 270 C. Low toxicity. Non-combustible.

Derivation : Principally by treating a saturated solution of soda ash with carbon dioxide to precipitate the less soluble bicarbonate; also by purifying the grade product from the Solvay Process.

Containers : Bottles and cartons; bags; drums; bulk. Uses : Manufacture of effervescent salts and beverages, artificial mineral water, baking powder; other sodium salts; pharmaceuticals; sponge rubber; gold and platinum plating; treating wool and silk; fire extinguishers, prevention of timber mold; cleaning preparations; laboratory reagent; antacid; mouthwash." 5.5 Apart from the foregoing additional technical literature brought on record by both sides, there are specifications prescribed in the Indian Standard No. IS : 2124-1974 which has been the subject of examination in the Tribunal's Order reported in 1988 (37) ELT 155. Both sides have also relied on ISI specification, relevant extracts from which are reproduced below :- "0.3 Sodium bicarbonate is used as baking powder, reagent in analytical chemistry; in the manufacture of effervescent salts and beverages. It also finds use in artificial mineral waters, gold and platinum plating, tanning industry, treating wool and silk, fire extinguishers and ceramics.

2.1 There shall be three grades of the material, namely, Pure Grade, Analytical Reagent Grade and Refined Grade." 5.6 Learned advocate has submitted that it is apparent from the aforesaid technical literature that the impugned product is variously known as crude Sodium Bicarbonate and wet Sodium Bicarbonate ammonia soda but nowhere it is specified as Sodium Bicarbonate. He submits that although there are some patents as referred to in the Book 'Manufacture of Soda' which indicates production of Sodium Bicarbonate by refining the impugned product, most popular and normal method of producing Sodium Bicarbonate is from Soda Ash which is in fact the final product of the appellant. As referred to in those Books there are technical difficulties in manufacturing Sodium Bicarbonate by the process of refining of the impugned product and it is not commercially viable.

Therefore, the impugned product cannot be considered even an unrefined Sodium Bicarbonate or crude Sodium Bicarbonate because this is not marketable as Sodium Bicarbonate. It will, therefore, be fallacy, according to the learned advocate, on the basis of available material to call the impugned product as Sodium Bicarbonate liable to excise duty. For want of a proper nomenclature and becuase of predominance of Sodium Bicarbonate in the mixture of chemicals that the impugned product is the expression, is tagged alongwith crude or raw.

5.7 Dealing with ISI specifications, he submits that the said specifications clearly spell out the extensive uses of the Sodium Bicarbonate in para 0.3. Having regard to all those uses, the marketable Sodium Bicarbonate has been classified into 3 grades -different grades being suitable for different uses namely pure grade is considered to be suitable for the chemical and pharmaceutical industry, Analytical Reagent grade is suitable as a reagent for analysis in laboratories and refined grade is suitable for aerated water and baking powder industry. The lowest percentage of alkalinity is in the pure grade and the refined grade i.e. 99% whereas it is undisputed that the alkalinity in the impugned product is about 75% on the average. Therefore, by no stretch of imagination he submits that the impugned product could be considered as Sodium Bicarbonate for commercial uses. He submits* that the ISI specifications have been relied by the Courts in India including the Supreme Court for the purpose of classification under the Central Excise Tariff. In this connection, he invites attention to the following citations :- If there is a market meaning or trade meaning...that should be adhered to. In this case there is no direct evidence how these peculiar goods are dealt with in the particular market dealing with those goods but there is evidence how these are to be understood in the light of the specifications of the Indian Standard Institute....[Para 8 of the Report].

[In para 12 of the said Report the Court relied on view of Indian Standards Institution as regards what is refined oil as known to the trade in India rather than on some work of a foreign author in respect of Trade and Practice abroad.] 5.8 Controverting the arguments of the learned advocate Shri S.Chakraborti, learned DR for the Revenue has stated in the first instance that marketability of goods for the purpose of levy of excise duty is not relevant so long as the goods produced are covered by the definition or description of goods in a Tariff Item. This has been held so, according to him, by the Supreme Court in 1978 (2) ELT J 389 - Para 7 [H.U.F. Business known as Ramlal Mansukhrai Rewari and Anr.] and 1985 (20) ELT 202 [Oriental Timber]. He also relies upon some judgments of Tribunal reported in 1985 (21) ELT 532 [Ilac Ltd. v. CCE]. He submits that the decision of the Tribuanl in Ilac's case mentioned supra is in all fours with the product under consideration here. In Ilac's case, learned DR submits that Calcium Carbide of low purity was produced at an intermediate stage and used in the acetylene gas. It was held that the impure Calcium Carbide arising at the intermediate stage is liable to duty as Calcium Carbide under the same Tariff Item 14AA because it is specifically mentioned and there is no percentage of purity prescribed in the Tariff Item. Same is the case in the present matter according to the learned DR. The impugned product Sodium Bicarbonate, which is called by the appellant as a mixture of chemicals is nothing but a crude Sodium Bicarbonate as described in the literature. Since the Tariff Entry is a Sodium Bicarbonate, all forms of Sodium Bicarbonate whether pure or impure would be covered by the Tariff Entry and would, therefore, be liable to duty. Purification of a product by itself does not bring into existence any new commodity. Duty is leviable at the first instance when an excisable commodity comes into existence. Similar is the decision of the Tribunal in the case of Panyam Cements and Mineral Industries Ltd. [1989 (40) ELT 454 (Tribunal)]. In fact this latter decision relies on Ilac decision, mentioned supra. It has also been urged that ISI specifications are not helpful in determining the classification of a product under the Central Excise Tariff. ISI specifications merely referred to quality of goods and is not an indication of the Commercial parlance of the goods.

For this proposition, the learned DR relies upon Supreme Court's decision in the case of Indian Aluminium Cables [1985 (21) ELT 3 Paras 8 and 9]. It has been so held in 5 Member Bench decision of the Tribunal in the case of PIBCO v. CCE, Calcutta [1988 (35) ELT 130]. He further states that ISI specifications in the instant case merely referred to 3 grades :------------------------------------------------------------------------ TABLE : REQUIREMENTS FOR SODIUM BICARBONATE "SI. CHARACTERISTIC REQUIREMENT Method ofNo. Pure Analytical Refined test (Ref to Grade Reagent Grade Cl. No. in(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)(i)Total alkalinity (as NaHCO3) present by mass, Min. 99.0 99.8 99.0 A-2----------------------------------------------------------------------- It does not pertain to all grades of commercial Sodium Bicarbonate.

From this angle he submits that ISI specifications do not advance the case of the appellant.

5.9. With reference to Condensed Chemical Dictionary, learned DR submits that the impugned product merely needs to be purified since it is stated therein that Sodium Bicarbonate can be produced also by purifying the crude product from the Sol-vay process. He, therefore, submits that nothing more than purification of the impugned product is called for to produce Sodium Bicarbonate of greater purity. This means that the impugned product is also Sodium Bicarbonate. Relying on the Book 'Manufacture of Soda', the learned DR submits that there are many patents dealing with the refining of Bicarbonate arising in the manufacture of Soda Ash. This book also reinforced his earlier arguments that the impugned product is a merely an impure form of sodium Bicarbonate. He further relies for the same argument on another Technical Book, namely 'Industrial Chemicals by Faith, Keys & Clarks wherein it has been mentioned that "some Sodium Bicarbonate" is made, however, by purifying impure Sodium Bicarbonate". In order to appreciate this argument, full para from which the aforesaid sentence has been quoted by the learned DR is reproduced below :- The manufacture of sodium bicarbonate (baking soda) is a typical example of a process in which it is economically advantageous to purify the raw material in order to obtain a pure product, rather than to purify an impure end product. Accordingly, most sodium bicarbonate is made by converting soda ash rather than by purifying the intermediate sodium bicarbonate formed in the ammonia soda process. Besides the advantage of a higher purity product, two other reasons are given for following the first mentioned process. One is higher recovery of ammonia, and the other is that rich parbon dioxide gas may be recovered on calcining sodium bicarbonate, whereas only lean gas is needed to recarbonate soda ash. Some sodium bicarbonate is made, however, by purifying impure sodium bicarbonate." 5.10 On a query from the Bench, learned DR, however, admitted that no evidence had been produced by the department in support of marketability of the impugned product.

5.11 In the rejoinder the learned advocate for the appellant submits that Tribunal's judgments in the cases of Ilac Ltd. andPanyam Cements and Mineral Industries Ltd. relied upon strongly by the learned DR fly in the face of Supreme Court's judgments in the cases ofBhor Industries andAmbalal Sarabhai. In view of the categorical law laid down by the Supreme Court those judgments of the Tribunal relied upon by the learned DR should be discarded and ignored.

5.12 He further submits that a close reading of paras 39 and 41 of the Tribunal's decision in Ilac Ltd. indicates that the product arising at the intermediate stage was admitted by the assessee therein to be clacium carbide and on the basis of this admission the judgment of the Tribunal proceeded. In the instant case the position is different. The appellant has submitted that the product is merely a mixture of chemicals and not sodium bicarbonate as known in the market. He, therefore, submits alternatively that the decision of 1 lac is also distinguishable on facts.

5.13 As regards the Supreme Court's judgments in the case of HUF Ramlal Mansukhrai Rewari and Another and Oriental Timber, mentioned supra, learned advocate has submitted that these judgments are on the peculiar description of the excisable goods in the concerned Tariff Items namely 26AA (iron and steel products) and 16B (plywood) respectively. There the tariff descriptions were in such a manner that the excisability arose on the physical shape of the product. The moment the commodity acquired the said physical shape, as described in the Tariff Item, the Supreme Court held the goods to be excisable irrespective Of their marketability but the instant case is different. He submits that the present case is more analogous to Bhor Industries andAmbalal Sarabhai.

5.14 Discarding of the ISI specifications by the Supreme Court in the case of Indian Aluminium Cables, the learned advocate has submitted that it was in the context of the specific description of the Tariff Item from which the Supreme Court's comments arose. The Tariff Item in that case was aluminium wire rods. The question was whether aluminium properzi rods were wire rods or not and in that context the assessee therein relied upon the ISI specifications. The Supreme Court held that the Tariff description being wire rods and there being no dispute that properzi rods are also known as wire rods the mere fact that the concerned rods did not conform to the ISI specifications, did not mean that the goods wire rods have not been produced. The distinction in that case was sought to be made on the basis of the process of manufacture which was held to be irrelevant by the Supreme Court.

5.15 We have carefully considered the pleas advanced on both sides. We are of the view that it is settled beyond doubt that in order to be excisable the goods must be marketable unless a specific definition of goods is given in the Tariff Item. The Supreme Court after discussing its earlier judgments in the cases of (1) UOI v. Delhi Cloth & General Mills - [1977 (1) ELT J 199], (2) 1978 (2) ELT J336 South Bihar Sugar Mills Ltd. v. UOI, (3) 1986 (24) ELT J 169 (SC) Union Carbide India Ltd. v. UOI and (4) regarding the Bill to amend Section 20 of the Sea Customs Act, 1878 and Section 53 of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 in Bhor Industries (supra), held as follows :- "7...taxable event in the case of duties of excises is the manufacture of goods and the duty is not directly on the goods but on the manufacture thereof. Therefore, the essential ingredient is that there should be manufacture of goods. The goods being articles which are known to those who are dealing in the market having their identity as such. Section 3 of the Act enjoins that there shall be levied and collected in such manner as may be prescribed duties of excise, on all excisable goods other than salt which are produced or 'manufactured' in India. 'Excisable goods' under Section 2(d) of the Act means goods specified in the Schedule to the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985 as being subject to a duty of excise and includes salt. Therefore, it is necessary, in a case like this, to find out whether there are goods, that is to say, articles as known in the market as separate distinct identifiable commodities and whether the tariff duty levied would be as specified in the Schedule. Simply because a certain article falls within the Schedule it would not be dutiable under excise law if the said article is not 'goods' known to the market. Marketability, therefore, is an essential ingredient in order to be dutiable under the Schedule to Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985".

Earlier in para 5 of the Report regarding Bhor Industries the Supreme Court has observed as follows :- "It appears to us that under the Central Excise Act, as it stood at the relevant time, in order to be goods as specified in the entry the first condition was that as a result of manufacture goods must come into existence. For articles to be goods these must be known in the market as such or these must be capable of being sold in the market as goods. Actual sale in the market is not necessary, user in the captive consumption is not determinative but the articles must be capable of being sold in the market or known in the market as goods. That was necessary".

The extracts of the affidavits of the two experts brought on record by the appellant have already been set out above. No evidence to the contrary had been adduced by the department. Even the technical literature relied upon by both sides and in particular, Industrial Chemicals relied upon by the department (relevant extracts from which have already been set out above), clearly indicates that the impugned product cannot be termed as "Sodium Bicarbonate". In fact, the product has been given various names in various books such as crude product, impure product, ammonia soda etc. These various names bringing out the impure and crude character of the impugned product itself is indicative of the fact that it is not known in the market as Sodium Bicarbonate.

In fact all the technical literature brought on record clearly envisages that the normal method of production of Sodium Bicarbonate is from Soda Ash which is the finished product of the appellant. Another important fact has also been mentioned in the appeal memorandum that while Soda Ash has a market price of Rs. 3000/- per tonne the Sodium Bicarbonate has a market price of Rs. 6000/- per M.T. It would be absurd to think that intermediate product would be costlier than the finished product which emerges out of the intermediate product.

5.16 Learned DR has placed a strong reliance on Tribunal's earlier judgments in the matter of the appellant himself reported in 1988 (37) ELT 155. A finding of the Bench of this Tribunal in the said case to the effect: "the contention of the appellant that his product Sodium Bicarbonate is an intermediate product and is not marketable, does not help his case in the matter of classification and charging Central Excise duty" in apparently against the law laid down by the Supreme Court and reiterated inBhor Industries andAmbalal Sarabhai's cases.

Accordingly, the Tribunal's earlier judgment in the case of appellant reported in 1988 (37) ELT 155 in so far as it relates to the old Tariff i.e. Tariff Entry before 1-3-1986 will not help the Revenue in view of (i) the additional material brought on record by the two sides (ii) affidavits of the Experts taken on record under the orders of the Tribunal (iii) the judgments of the Supreme Court in the cases of Ambalal Sarabhai and Bhor Industries. Accordingly, we hold that the impugned product i.e. a mixture of chemicals containing Sodium Bicarbonate arising at the intermediate stage in the process of manufacture of Soda Ash is not liable to duty as Sodium Bicarbonate under Tariff Item 14AA of the erstwhile Tariff Item.

6. Issue No. 4 - This issue reduces to one of academic nature after our finding on Issue No. 3. Nevertheless we shall record our finding on this issue. A show cause notice was issued in this case on 20-5-1987 demanding duty for the period July 1984 to November 1985. The learned advocate has submitted that there was a protracted correspondence on the issue whether the impugned product was liable to excise duty beginning from July 1984. Despite the protests of the appellant, the appellant gave whatever information was available with him in July 1985. This is despite the fact that the classification lists, the process of manufacture containing details of chemical reactions etc.

were filed before the department and all other information which was required was given by him as promptly as possible. Despite this the department has issued the notice long after the stipulated normal period of six months and therefore, the demand of duty is time-barred.

It cannot be held, submits the learned advocate, that there was any wilful mis-statement or suppression of facts or there was any contravention of rules with an intent to evade payment of duty warranting invocation of larger period of 5 years for demand of duty.

There was no allegation, he submits, in the show cause notice regarding wilful mis-statement or suppression of facts or contravention of rules with an intent to evade payment of duty. Accordingly, the larger period for demand of duty cannot be invoked. He relies for this proposition on Jay Engineering Works v. CCE [1985 (21) ELT 299-Para 9]. He also states that in order to attract larger period of 5 years for recovery of duty some positive action or withholding of information by the assessee is called for as has been held by the Supreme Court in the case of CCE v.Chemphar Drugs Liniments [1989 (40) ELT 276 Para 8]. Similar were the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Padmini Products [1989 (43) ELT 195 at Page 200J.6.1 Learned DR, on the other hand, reiterates the findings of the adjudicating authority which has held that larger period is invoked because the appellant has contravened the rule with an intent to evade payment of duty. The appellant had taken, according to the said authority, advantage of the indulgent attitude of the departmental authorities. He has also been found guilty of not furnishing the information promptly and it was only on 29-7-1985 that he furnished the information.

6.2 We have carefully considered the pleas advanced on both sides. We find that this controversy had been picked up by the department almost from the commencement of the 'manufacture' by the appellant and yet the department allowed the controversy to be dragged on. The Revenue cannot blame for not taking a decision either way without making the assessments provisional, as is enjoined in the Central Excise Law. If the departmental authorities have been indulgent, as found by the adjudicating authority, they must bear the consequences of this indulgence; the statutory procedure laid down in the Central Excise Act under Section 11-A cannot be circumvented. It is a mandatory procedure which has to be fulfilled before demanding duty for the past period.

Since all the facts were known to the department and only some information regarding quantity and value was not available with them, they should not have allowed the controversy to drag on. Nothing prevented the department to issue the show casue notice in the first instance itself if they were sure of its stand. In the overall facts and circumstances, as already set out in the facts earlier, there is no doubt that the show cause notice is barred by time having been issued for beyond six months of the period involved for demand of duty in this case. There is no reason in the facts and circumstances of this case to invoke a larger period of 5 years as has been done in the impugned order. The demand of duty is, therefore, barred by limitation too.

6.3 Issue No. 5 - In the facts and circumstances of the case no penalty is imposable. Therefore, the penalty is also set aside.

7. As a last attempt the departmental representative submitted that in case the Bench is inclined to differ from the earlier decision of the Tribunal reported in 1988 (37) ELT 155 in the matter of the appellant himself, it would be advisable to set up a Larger Bench so that finality can be given on this issue. Opposing this request, the learned advocate for the appellant has urged that there is no need for a Larger Bench inasmuch as fresh facts and clearer enunciation of law has since been made. In view of these new developments, setting up of a Larger Bench is not called for. This Bench itself is competent to take a decision. He relies on Tribunal's Order No. 344-345/89-A in the case of CCE, Meerut v. Modi Zerox Ltd. apart from citing Supreme Court's judgment in the case of Brij Lal Lohia mentioned in connection with the Issue No. 1. We are inclined to agree with the learned advocate for the appellant. In view of the fresh material having been brought on record there are cogent reasons for differing with the earlier judgment of the Tribunal. Normally a Larger Bench is set up when conflicting judgments of different Benches of the Tribunal are there or likely to be there on the same material.