SooperKanoon Citation | sooperkanoon.com/611516 |
Subject | Tenancy;Property |
Court | Punjab and Haryana High Court |
Decided On | May-05-1964 |
Case Number | Letter Patent Appeal No. 215 of 1960 |
Judge | D. Falshaw, C.J.,; A.N. Grover and; P.D. Sharma, JJ. |
Reported in | AIR1966P& H32 |
Acts | East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948 - Sections 18; Tenancy Law |
Appellant | The State of Punjab and ors. |
Respondent | Banta Singh Arjan and ors. |
Appellant Advocate | C.D. Dewan, Deputy Adv. General |
Respondent Advocate | B.S. Bindra, Adv. |
Cases Referred | Jit Singh v. State of Punjab
|
Excerpt:
- sections 100-a [as inserted by act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & letters patent, 1865, clause 10: [dr. b.s. chauhan, cj, l. mohapatra & a.s. naidu, jj] letters patent appeal order of single judge of high court passed while deciding matters filed under order 43, rule1 of c.p.c., - held, after introduction of section 110a in the c.p.c., by 2002 amendment act, no letters patent appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a single judge of a high court. a right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. it is pertinent to note that section 100-a introduced by 2002 amendment of the code starts with a non obstante clause. the purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. the legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. it is well settled that the definition of judgment in section 2(9) of c.p.c., is much wider and more liberal, intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to clause (a) to (w) of order 43, rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. amended section 100-a of the code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a single judge of a high court, no further appeal shall lie. even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under section 2(9) means a statement given by a judge on the grounds of a decree or order. thus the contention that against an order passed by a single judge in an appeal filed under section 104 c.p.c., a further appeal lies to a division bench cannot be accepted. the newly incorporated section 100a in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a single judge to a division bench notwithstanding anything contained in the letters patent. the letters patent which provides for further appeal to a division bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a single judge. it has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an appeal to the high court. it has not made any provision for filing appeal to a division bench against the judgment or decree or order of a single judge. no letters patent appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a single judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a special act.
sections 100-a [as inserted by act 22 of 2002] & 104:[dr. b.s. chauhan, cj, l. mohapatra & a.s. naidu, jj] writ appeal held, a writ appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by single judge in a writ petition filed under article 226 of the constitution of india. in a writ application filed under articles 226 and 227 of constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under article 226, a writ appeal will lie. but, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a single judge in exercising powers of superintendence under article 227 of the constitution.
- so far as the lands reserved for other purposes are concerned, the scheme would be perfectly valid.grover, j.1. in the writ petition which has been allowed in part, land had been reserved in a consolidation scheme for a lorry stand, a government school, a play-ground, phirnis, paths leading to neighbouring villages and to railway station, widening of the noormahal jullundur road, extension of village abadi and for ponds, manure pits, community latrines, etc. before the learned single judge only three points were argued. the first objection which was raised was that the scheme contravened section 15 of the east punjab holdings (consolidation and prevention of fragmentation) act, 1948, by not providing for compensation to any owner who was allotted a holding of a lesser value than that of his original holding. the learned judge declined to go into the merits of this objection because the scheme had been confirmed in march 1958 and no petition was filed in this court till april 1959.2. the next objection taken before the learned single judge was that land had been allotted to the panchayat in excess of the area vested in it prior to the consolidation proceedings. following the decision in munsha singh v. state of punjab, 62 pun lr 1: (air 1960 punj 317) (fb), the learned judge held that the allotment of land to the panchayat in excess of its previous holding would invalidate the scheme to that extent.3. the last ground urged was that 75 kanals and 17 marlas of land had been reserved for widening of the noormahal jullundur road belonging to the district board and 1 kanal and 9 marlas had been reserved for the lorry stand. the learned judge held that no land could have been reserved for these purposes under the east punjab holdings (consolidation and prevention of fragmentation) act and that land could be acquired only under the land acquisition act. as regards 131 kanals and 1 marla which had been reserved for government school for boys and girls, it was held that it was obviously a common purpose. the scheme was accordingly quashed to the extent indicated before. the present appeal has been filed by the state under clause 10 of the letters patent.4. there can be no manner of doubt that in view of our decision in jit singh v. state of punjab (letters patent appeal no. 131 of 1960): (air 1964 punj 419 fb), the only reservation which could not have been validly and properly made relates to the area of 75 kanals and 17 marlas meant for widening of the noormahal jullundur road. even the learned counsel for the state does not dispute this position. so far as the lands reserved for other purposes are concerned, the scheme would be perfectly valid.5. in the result, the appeal is allowed to the extent that the scheme shall stand set aside only with regard to the reservation made for widening of the noormahal jullundur road. in all other respects the writ petition shall stand dismissed. there will be no order as to costs.p.d. sharma, j.6. i agree.d. falshaw, c.j.7. i agree.
Judgment:Grover, J.
1. In the writ petition which has been allowed in part, land had been reserved in a consolidation scheme for a lorry stand, a Government school, a play-ground, phirnis, paths leading to neighbouring villages and to railway station, widening of the Noormahal Jullundur Road, extension of village abadi and for ponds, manure pits, community latrines, etc. Before the learned Single Judge only three points were argued. The first objection which was raised was that the scheme contravened Section 15 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948, by not providing for compensation to any owner who was allotted a holding of a lesser value than that of his original holding. The learned Judge declined to go into the merits of this objection because the scheme had been confirmed in March 1958 and no petition was filed in this Court till April 1959.
2. The next objection taken before the learned Single Judge was that land had been allotted to the Panchayat in excess of the area vested in it prior to the consolidation proceedings. Following the decision in Munsha Singh v. State of Punjab, 62 Pun LR 1: (AIR 1960 Punj 317) (FB), the learned Judge held that the allotment of land to the Panchayat in excess of its previous holding would invalidate the scheme to that extent.
3. The last ground urged was that 75 kanals and 17 marlas of land had been reserved for widening of the Noormahal Jullundur Road belonging to the District Board and 1 kanal and 9 marlas had been reserved for the lorry stand. The learned Judge held that no land could have been reserved for these purposes under the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act and that land could be acquired only under the Land Acquisition Act. As regards 131 kanals and 1 marla which had been reserved for Government School for boys and girls, it was held that it was obviously a common purpose. The scheme was accordingly quashed to the extent indicated before. The present appeal has been filed by the State under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent.
4. There can be no manner of doubt that in view of our decision in Jit Singh v. State of Punjab (Letters Patent Appeal No. 131 of 1960): (AIR 1964 Punj 419 FB), the only reservation which could not have been validly and properly made relates to the area of 75 kanals and 17 marlas meant for widening of the Noormahal Jullundur Road. Even the learned counsel for the State does not dispute this position. So far as the lands reserved for other purposes are concerned, the scheme would be perfectly valid.
5. In the result, the appeal is allowed to the extent that the scheme shall stand set aside only with regard to the reservation made for widening of the Noormahal Jullundur Road. In all other respects the writ petition shall stand dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
P.D. Sharma, J.
6. I agree.
D. Falshaw, C.J.
7. I agree.