Chamkaur Singh and Another Vs. the State of Punjab and Another - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
- sections 100-a [as inserted by act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & letters patent, 1865, clause 10: [dr. b.s. chauhan, cj, l. mohapatra & a.s. naidu, jj] letters patent appeal order of single judge of high court passed while deciding matters filed under order 43, rule1 of c.p.c., - held, after introduction of section 110a in the c.p.c., by 2002 amendment act, no letters patent appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a single judge of a high court. a right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. it is pertinent to note that section 100-a introduced by 2002 amendment of the code starts with a non obstante clause. the purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. the legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. it is well settled that the definition of judgment in section 2(9) of c.p.c., is much wider and more liberal, intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to clause (a) to (w) of order 43, rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. amended section 100-a of the code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a single judge of a high court, no further appeal shall lie. even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under section 2(9) means a statement given by a judge on the grounds of a decree or order. thus the contention that against an order passed by a single judge in an appeal filed under section 104 c.p.c., a further appeal lies to a division bench cannot be accepted. the newly incorporated section 100a in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a single judge to a division bench notwithstanding anything contained in the letters patent. the letters patent which provides for further appeal to a division bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a single judge. it has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an appeal to the high court. it has not made any provision for filing appeal to a division bench against the judgment or decree or order of a single judge. no letters patent appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a single judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a special act. sections 100-a [as inserted by act 22 of 2002] & 104:[dr. b.s. chauhan, cj, l. mohapatra & a.s. naidu, jj] writ appeal held, a writ appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by single judge in a writ petition filed under article 226 of the constitution of india. in a writ application filed under articles 226 and 227 of constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under article 226, a writ appeal will lie. but, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a single judge in exercising powers of superintendence under article 227 of the constitution. - 47-a if he is quasi-judicially satisfied that the value of the property in a particular transaction is higher than the prescribed rate and has not been so rated etc. ' a combined reading of the above noted provisions makes it manifestly clear that the)registering officer as well as the collector have to perform, if not a judicial, at least a quasi-judicial function in determining or in estimating the price of the properties, subject-matter of a particular transaction as if the property is being sold in 'open market' on the date of the execution of the instrument relating to such transfer. if we may say so, these instructions clearly nullify and obliterate the explanation added to this section. ' the true intendment of these instructions or their binding nature is clearly brought out in some of these cases where the learned counsel for the petitioners referred to similar instructions issued by different collectors pertaining to their respective districts. ' we are, therefore, clearly of the opinion that these so-called guidelines could neither be issued under s. 3. it is hardly necessary to say in the light of the well established aspect of rule of law that every executive action, if it is to operate to the prejudice of any person, must be supported by some legislative authority.orderi.s. tiwana, j.1. learned counsel for the parties are agreed that the facts stated and contentions raised in this petition are fairly representative of the facts and contentions raised in the 40 connected civil writ petitions, nos. 7662, 8550, 9856, 9905, 10032, 11822 of 1988; 1506, 4733, 5131, 8021, 15841, 10327, 15081, 15090 to 15093, 15447 to 15449, 16047, 16206, 16208, 16802 of 1989; and 142 to 144, 262, 274, 1560, 1728, 1729, 2844, 4012, 4013, 4358, 4390, 4543, 4153 and 5996 of 1990, and these deserve to meet the same fate as of this petition. facts are as follows :--the petitioners agreed to purchase 2 1/2 acres of land, situated in village kahangarh bhutana, tehsil samana, district patiala, from rupinderjit singh son of inder singh, for a sum of rs. 50,000/- and for the said purpose the requisite non-judicial stamp papers were purchased by them on aug. 10, 1988. the sale deed, however, could not be executed and registered in view of the fact that on the same day instructions styled as 'guidelines' dt. aug. 4, 1988 were received by the sub-registrar (tehsildar), samana from the collector (deputy commissioner-cum-registrar), patiala, laying down the floor or the minimum prices of different kinds and qualities of land on the basis of their situation or location for purposes of registration of instruments relating to transferring of any property. copy of these guidelines is an-nexure p1. as per the same, rates vary from rs. 13,000/- per acre to rs. 20,000/- per square yard. since guidance (guidelines) with respect to different classes of land and properties falling within the jurisdiction of sub-registrar, samana, were inadvertently omitted in annexure p1, the collector issued fresh instructions dated aug. 8, 1988 (copy annexure p1/a) specifying therein that chahi and nehri types of land within the jurisdiction of sub-registrar, samana, would be rated at rs.35,000/- per acre. in the instant case we are not concerned with other types of land. these guidelines purport to have been issued under s. 47a of the stamp act as introduced vide punjab act no. 21 of 1982.stand of the petitioners is that these instructions or guidelines are neither covered by the above noted provision of law nor are referable to any other legal source of authority and thus are wholly arbitrary and without jurisdiction. as against this, the respondents plead that:-- 'the impugned circulars contain guidelines for the use of sub-registrar and indicate the minimum valuation of chahi and other lands to avoid evasion of stamp duty. it is denied that in view of the guidelines circulated by the collector, patiala, the petitioners were unable to execute the sale deed and get it registered. these circulars do not debar the parties from execution of the sale deed and getting the same registered in accordance with the procedure laid down under the law. the circulars are in consonance with the spirit and provisions of law. the relevant provisions of law on the point are contained in s. 47-a of the stamp act, 1982 (punjab act no. 21 of 1982). .... .... .... .... since stamp duty and registration fee are both chargeable on ad valorem basis, there is a tendency among parties to conveyance deeds to depress the value of property or consideration paid therefor as cited in the conveyance deed.' according to the respondents, it is to meet this situation that the present guidelines have been issued. in order to sustain this ptea, a pointed reference has been made to the following paragraphs of these guidelines by mr. m.l. sarin, learned additional advocate general:-- 'these floor prices will act only as guidelines to the sub-registrars and the sub-kegistrar is free to invoke s.47-a if he is quasi-judicially satisfied that the value of the property in a particular transaction is higher than the prescribed rate and has not been so rated etc. in the document. in other words, these prices are only the minimum prices prescribed. in case any party insists that the consideration money in respect of the property is lower than the prescribed rates owing to someincumbrances etc. then the only remedy available to the party would be to get the document impounded and place its case before the collector under s.47a of the stamp act, 1899, who would pass an order on merits.' it is thus evident from the above noted pleas that all that needs to be settled in this case is as to whether the above noted guidelines, which to our mind for all practical purposes are in the form of a command, are referable to any legal source of authority. as per the stand of the respondents, as already pointed out, these have been issued in accordance with the provisions of s. 47a of the stamp act. the relevant part of this section reads thus:-- 1. if the registering officer appointed under the registration act, 1908 (central act no. 16 of 1908), while registering any instrument relating to the transfer of any property, has reason to believe that the value of the property or consideration, as the case may be, has not been truly set forth in the instrument, he may, after registering such instrument, refer the same to the collector, for determination of the value of the property or the consideration, as the case may be, and the proper duty payable thereon. 2. on receipt of reference under section(1), collector shall, after giving the parties reasonable opportunity of being heard and after holding an enquiry in such manner as may be prescribed by rules under this act, determine the value of consideration and the duty as aforesaid and the deficient amount of duty, if any, shall be payable by the person liable to pay the duty. explanation:-- for the purpose of thissection, value of any property shall be estimated to be the price which in the opinion of the collector or the appellate authority, as the case may be such property would have fetched, if sold in the open market, on the date of execution of the instrument relating to the transfer of such property.' a combined reading of the above noted provisions makes it manifestly clear that the)registering officer as well as the collector have to perform, if not a judicial, at least a quasi-judicial function in determining or in estimating the price of the properties, subject-matter of a particular transaction as if the property is being sold in 'open market' on the date of the execution of the instrument relating to such transfer. as per sub-sec. (1), it is only while registering the instrument of transfer that the registering officer has to take his independent decision which essentially is a quasi-judicial decision as it is to be founded on 'reason to believe' that the property has been under-valued or the ostensible consideration is not the real or genuine consideration. it is only after reaching this conclusion that he may refer the matter to the collector for the determination of the value of the property or the genuineness of the consideration, as the case may be. as per the so called guidelines, the relevant part of which has already been reproduced above, what is left open to the registering officer (sub-registrar) is that he would refer the matter to the collector only if he finds that the value of the property in a particular transaction 'is higher than the prescribed rate'. it is thus implicit that he would not register the document if the value of the property in question is stated to be lower than the prescribed rate. in other words, he would not accept a rate lower than the one prescribed in the guidelines as the true or genuine consideration or value of the property as envisaged by sub-section(1) of section47a. according to the guidelines he would refer the matter to the collector only if he forms the opinion that the property should be rated at a rate still higher than the one mentioned in these guidelines. these guidelines, therefore, completely take away the jurisdiction of the sub-registrar to reach any quasi-judicial decision with regard to the valuation or the consideration for the transfer of a particular property falling within his jurisdiction. further vide these instructions the onus of proving that the real or genuine price of the property sold or transferred is less than the rate prescribed is shifted on to the parties to the transactions. in such a situation it is made incumbent on any party to the transaction toget the document impounded and to refer the matter to the collector for his decision. besides this being contrary to the language and content of s. 47-a of the stamp act, it is not clear as to how the party has 'to get the document impounded' or how is it enjoined upon the sub-registrar to impound the document. similarly, the jurisdiction of the collector under sub-sec. (2) of s. 47-a is jeopardised. as per the same, he, on a reference, has to hold an enquiry in such manner as may be prescribed by the rules under the act for determining the true value or consideration on which (he stamp duty has to be paid. this enquiry and determination of the value has essentially to be an independent, fair and quasi-judicial decision of the collector in the light of the facts established before him. he cannot possibly record any stereotyped or mechanical conclusions in this regard. the natural effect of the instructions which are sought to be mellowed down as guidelines is that the same would bind the collector even more than the sub-registrar or the registering officer appointed under the registration act, he being author of the same. it is, therefore, abundantly clear that these guidelines completely run contrary to the plain language and intendment of sub-sections (1) and (2) of s. 47-a. if we may say so, these instructions clearly nullify and obliterate the explanation added to this section. the instructions hardly leave anything open to the registering officer and the collector to determine the estimated value or price of the property, which is subject-matter of a particular transaction. further, these run counter to the mandate of law contained in the last lines of the explanation; 'if sold in the open market on the date of execution of the instrument relating to the transfer of such property.' the true intendment of these instructions or their binding nature is clearly brought out in some of these cases where the learned counsel for the petitioners referred to similar instructions issued by different collectors pertaining to their respective districts. in one such case, that is annexure r.2 to the written statement in c.w.p. no. 15090 of 1989 (bagga singh v. state of punjab and others) collector, kapurthala, while conveying the instructions to the sub-registrars in his district, has recorded that 'the chairman ordered that no registry should be done where the amount of consideration is less than the approved prices of land.' we are, therefore, clearly of the opinion that these so-called guidelines could neither be issued under s. 47-a of the stamp act nor are these in consonance with the same, rather these just run counter to the' language and intendment of the said provision. we are further of the opinion that no guidelines can possibly be issued or laid down for controlling the quasi-judicial decision of a particular functionary or authority under a particular statute. we think it appropriate to make a reference to the following observations of their lordships of the supreme court in chief settlement commissioner, punjab v. om parkash, air 1969 sc 33, made in the context of para 17 of tarlok singh's land resettlement manual, which was equated to executive or administrative instructions (at p. 36 of air) :-- 'the notion of inherent or autonomous law-making power in the executive administration is a notion that must be emphatically rejected. with all its defects, delays and inconveniences men have discovered no technique for long preserving free government except that the executive be under the law, and that the law be made by parliamentary deliberations. in our constitutional system, the central and most characteristic feature is the concept of the rule of law which means, in the present context the authority of the law courts to test all administrative actions by the standard of legality. the administrative or executive action that does not meet the standard will be set aside if the aggrieved person brings the appropriate ac-tion in the competent court. the rule of law rejects the conception of the dual state in which governmental action is placed in a privileged position of immunity from control by law. such a notion is foreign to our basic constitutional concept.' these observations, to our mind, aptly apply to the case in hand.2. at one stage, while finding it difficultto sustain the above noted instructions orguidelines in the context of s.47-a of the stamp act, mr. sarin, learned additional advocate general, sought to urge that in view of sub-sec. (2) of s. 68 of the registration act, the registrar is competent to issue any or general order to the sub-registrar, commanding the latter to perform his duties in accordance with the same as the functioning of the latter is under the superintendence and control of the registrar in whose district the office of the sub-registrar is situated. mr. sarin, however, to our mind, while submitting so, omits to notice the language of sub-sec. (2) of the said section which lays down that the registrar can only issue an order which is 'consistent with this act' and that order has again to be with reference to a particular act or omission committed by the sub-registrar. mr. sarin, however, is not able to refer to any provisions of the registration act under which the collector can issue order or directions of the type as contained in annexures p. 1 and p. 1 / a. on the contrary, as has been ruled by this court in siri krishan jindal v. registrar (deputy commissioner), district patiala, air 1982 punjab & haryana 266 and the apex court in himalaya house co. ltd., bombay v. chief controlling revenue authority, air 1972 sc 899, the registrar has no power to determine the market value of the property sold in order to assess the chargeability of the stamp duty on the same. similarly, prior to the incorporation of s. 47-a in the stamp act, there was no provision in that act to empower the revenue, the collector or the registering officer to make an independent enquiry about the value of the property conveyed or sold for determining the stamp duty chargeable. we, therefore, find this stand of mr. sarin to be equally meritless.3. it is hardly necessary to say in the light of the well established aspect of rule of law that every executive action, if it is to operate to the prejudice of any person, must be supported by some legislative authority. (see rai sahib ram jawaya kapur v. the state of punjab, air 1955 sc 549, state of madhya pradesh v. thakur bharat singh, air 1967 sc 1170; satwant singh sawhney v. d. ramarathnam, assistant passport officer,new delhi, air 1967 sc 1836; bennet coleman and co. v. union of india, air 1973 sc 106, and naraindas indurkhya v. the state of madhya pradesh, air 1974 sc 1232).4. for the reasons recorded above, we conclude that the instructions annexures p. 1 and p. 1/a in the instant case, and similar instructions/guidelines impugned in the connected cases as issued by different collectors for their respective districts in the state of punjab are totally without jurisdiction and void. the authorities under the stamp act as also under the registration act are directed to perform their duties in accordance with those statutes by ignoring the guidelines/instructions referred to above. the petitioners are also held entitled to costs at the rate of rs. 1000/- in each case.5. petitions allowed.

Judgment:
ORDER

I.S. Tiwana, J.

1. Learned counsel for the parties are agreed that the facts stated and contentions raised in this petition are fairly representative of the facts and contentions raised in the 40 connected civil writ petitions, Nos. 7662, 8550, 9856, 9905, 10032, 11822 of 1988; 1506, 4733, 5131, 8021, 15841, 10327, 15081, 15090 to 15093, 15447 to 15449, 16047, 16206, 16208, 16802 of 1989; and 142 to 144, 262, 274, 1560, 1728, 1729, 2844, 4012, 4013, 4358, 4390, 4543, 4153 and 5996 of 1990, and these deserve to meet the same fate as of this petition. Facts are as follows :--

The petitioners agreed to purchase 2 1/2 acres of land, situated in village Kahangarh Bhutana, Tehsil Samana, District Patiala, from Rupinderjit Singh son of Inder Singh, for a sum of Rs. 50,000/- and for the said purpose the requisite non-judicial stamp papers were purchased by them on Aug. 10, 1988. The sale deed, however, could not be executed and registered in view of the fact that on the same day instructions styled as 'guidelines' dt. Aug. 4, 1988 were received by the Sub-Registrar (Tehsildar), Samana from the Collector (Deputy Commissioner-cum-Registrar), Patiala, laying down the floor or the minimum prices of different kinds and qualities of land on the basis of their situation or location for purposes of registration of instruments relating to transferring of any property. Copy of these guidelines is An-nexure P1. As per the same, rates vary from Rs. 13,000/- per acre to Rs. 20,000/- per square yard. Since guidance (guidelines) with respect to different classes of land and properties falling within the jurisdiction of Sub-Registrar, Samana, were inadvertently omitted in Annexure P1, the Collector issued fresh instructions dated Aug. 8, 1988 (copy Annexure P1/A) specifying therein that Chahi and Nehri types of land within the jurisdiction of Sub-Registrar, Samana, would be rated at Rs.35,000/- per acre. In the instant case we are not concerned with other types of land. These guidelines purport to have been issued under S. 47A of the Stamp Act as introduced vide Punjab Act No. 21 of 1982.Stand of the petitioners is that these instructions or guidelines are neither covered by the above noted provision of law nor are referable to any other legal source of authority and thus are wholly arbitrary and without jurisdiction. As against this, the respondents plead that:--

'The impugned circulars contain guidelines for the use of Sub-Registrar and indicate the minimum valuation of Chahi and other lands to avoid evasion of stamp duty. It is denied that in view of the guidelines circulated by the Collector, Patiala, the petitioners were unable to execute the sale deed and get it registered. These circulars do not debar the parties from execution of the sale deed and getting the same registered in accordance with the procedure laid down under the law. The circulars are in consonance with the spirit and provisions of law. The relevant provisions of law on the point are contained in S. 47-A of the Stamp Act, 1982 (Punjab Act No. 21 of 1982).

.... .... .... .... Since stamp duty and registration fee are both chargeable on ad valorem basis, there is a tendency among parties to conveyance deeds to depress the value of property or consideration paid therefor as cited in the conveyance deed.'

According to the respondents, it is to meet this situation that the present guidelines have been issued. In order to sustain this ptea, a pointed reference has been made to the following paragraphs of these guidelines by Mr. M.L. Sarin, learned Additional Advocate General:--

'These floor prices will act only as guidelines to the Sub-Registrars and the Sub-kegistrar is free to invoke S.47-A if he is quasi-judicially satisfied that the value of the property in a particular transaction is higher than the prescribed rate and has not been so rated etc. in the document. In other words, these prices are only the minimum prices prescribed.

In case any party insists that the consideration money in respect of the property is lower than the prescribed rates owing to someincumbrances etc. then the only remedy available to the party would be to get the document impounded and place its case before the Collector under S.47A of the Stamp Act, 1899, who would pass an order on merits.'

It is thus evident from the above noted pleas that all that needs to be settled in this case is as to whether the above noted guidelines, which to our mind for all practical purposes are in the form of a command, are referable to any legal source of authority. As per the stand of the respondents, as already pointed out, these have been issued in accordance with the provisions of S. 47A of the Stamp Act. The relevant part of this section reads thus:--

1. If the Registering Officer appointed under the Registration Act, 1908 (Central Act NO. 16 of 1908), while registering any instrument relating to the transfer of any property, has reason to believe that the value of the property or consideration, as the case may be, has not been truly set forth in the instrument, he may, after registering such instrument, refer the same to the Collector, for determination of the value of the property or the consideration, as the case may be, and the proper duty payable thereon.

2. On receipt of reference under section(1), Collector shall, after giving the parties reasonable opportunity of being heard and after holding an enquiry in such manner as may be prescribed by rules under this Act, determine the value of consideration and the duty as aforesaid and the deficient amount of duty, if any, shall be payable by the person liable to pay the duty.

Explanation:-- For the purpose of thissection, value of any property shall be estimated to be the price which in the opinion of the Collector or the appellate authority, as the case may be such property would have fetched, if sold in the open market, on the date of execution of the instrument relating to the transfer of such property.'

A combined reading of the above noted provisions makes it manifestly clear that the)Registering Officer as well as the Collector have to perform, if not a judicial, at least a quasi-judicial function in determining or in estimating the price of the properties, subject-matter of a particular transaction as if the property is being sold in 'open market' on the date of the execution of the instrument relating to such transfer. As per sub-sec. (1), it is only while registering the instrument of transfer that the Registering Officer has to take his independent decision which essentially is a quasi-judicial decision as it is to be founded on 'reason to believe' that the property has been under-valued or the ostensible consideration is not the real or genuine consideration. It is only after reaching this conclusion that he may refer the matter to the Collector for the determination of the value of the property or the genuineness of the consideration, as the case may be. As per the so called guidelines, the relevant part of which has already been reproduced above, what is left open to the Registering Officer (Sub-Registrar) is that he would refer the matter to the Collector only if he finds that the value of the property in a particular transaction 'is higher than the prescribed rate'. It is thus implicit that he would not register the document if the value of the property in question is stated to be lower than the prescribed rate. In other words, he would not accept a rate lower than the one prescribed in the guidelines as the true or genuine consideration or value of the property as envisaged by sub-section(1) of Section47A. According to the guidelines he would refer the matter to the Collector only if he forms the opinion that the property should be rated at a rate still higher than the one mentioned in these guidelines. These guidelines, therefore, completely take away the jurisdiction of the Sub-Registrar to reach any quasi-judicial decision with regard to the valuation or the consideration for the transfer of a particular property falling within his jurisdiction. Further vide these instructions the onus of proving that the real or genuine price of the property sold or transferred is less than the rate prescribed is shifted on to the parties to the transactions. In such a situation it is made incumbent on any party to the transaction toget the document impounded and to refer the matter to the Collector for his decision. Besides this being contrary to the language and content of S. 47-A of the Stamp Act, it is not clear as to how the party has 'to get the document impounded' or how is it enjoined upon the Sub-Registrar to impound the document. Similarly, the jurisdiction of the Collector under sub-sec. (2) of S. 47-A is jeopardised. As per the same, he, on a reference, has to hold an enquiry in such manner as may be prescribed by the rules under the Act for determining the true value or consideration on which (he stamp duty has to be paid. This enquiry and determination of the value has essentially to be an independent, fair and quasi-judicial decision of the Collector in the light of the facts established before him. He cannot possibly record any stereotyped or mechanical conclusions in this regard. The natural effect of the instructions which are sought to be mellowed down as guidelines is that the same would bind the Collector even more than the Sub-Registrar or the Registering Officer appointed under the Registration Act, he being author of the same. It is, therefore, abundantly clear that these guidelines completely run contrary to the plain language and intendment of sub-sections (1) and (2) of S. 47-A. If we may say so, these instructions clearly nullify and obliterate the explanation added to this section. The instructions hardly leave anything open to the Registering Officer and the Collector to determine the estimated value or price of the property, which is subject-matter of a particular transaction. Further, these run counter to the mandate of law contained in the last lines of the explanation; 'If sold in the open market on the date of execution of the instrument relating to the transfer of such property.' The true intendment of these instructions or their binding nature is clearly brought out in some of these cases where the learned counsel for the petitioners referred to similar instructions issued by different Collectors pertaining to their respective districts. In one such case, that is Annexure R.2 to the written statement in C.W.P. No. 15090 of 1989 (Bagga Singh v. State of Punjab and others) Collector, Kapurthala, while conveying the instructions to the Sub-Registrars in his district, has recorded that 'The Chairman ordered that no registry should be done where the amount of consideration is less than the approved prices of land.' We are, therefore, clearly of the opinion that these so-called guidelines could neither be issued under S. 47-A of the Stamp Act nor are these in consonance with the same, rather these just run counter to the' language and intendment of the said provision. We are further of the opinion that no guidelines can possibly be issued or laid down for controlling the quasi-judicial decision of a particular functionary or authority under a particular statute. We think it appropriate to make a reference to the following observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Chief Settlement Commissioner, Punjab v. Om Parkash, AIR 1969 SC 33, made in the context of para 17 of Tarlok Singh's Land Resettlement Manual, which was equated to executive or administrative instructions (at p. 36 of AIR) :--

'The notion of inherent or autonomous Law-making power in the executive administration is a notion that must be emphatically rejected. With all its defects, delays and inconveniences men have discovered no technique for long preserving free government except that the Executive be under the law, and that the law be made by parliamentary deliberations. In our constitutional system, the central and most characteristic feature is the concept of the rule of law which means, in the present context the authority of the law courts to test all administrative actions by the standard of legality. The administrative or executive action that does not meet the standard will be set aside if the aggrieved person brings the appropriate ac-tion in the competent court. The rule of law rejects the conception of the Dual State in which governmental action is placed in a privileged position of immunity from control by law. Such a notion is foreign to our basic constitutional concept.' These observations, to our mind, aptly apply to the case in hand.

2. At one stage, while finding it difficultto sustain the above noted instructions orguidelines in the context of S.47-A of the Stamp Act, Mr. Sarin, learned Additional Advocate General, sought to urge that in view of sub-sec. (2) of S. 68 of the Registration Act, the Registrar is competent to issue any or general order to the Sub-Registrar, commanding the latter to perform his duties in accordance with the same as the functioning of the latter is under the superintendence and control of the Registrar in whose district the office of the Sub-Registrar is situated. Mr. Sarin, however, to our mind, while submitting so, omits to notice the language of sub-sec. (2) of the said section which lays down that the Registrar can only issue an order which is 'consistent with this Act' and that order has again to be with reference to a particular act or omission committed by the Sub-Registrar. Mr. Sarin, however, is not able to refer to any provisions of the Registration Act under which the Collector can issue order or directions of the type as contained in Annexures P. 1 and P. 1 / A. On the contrary, as has been ruled by this Court in Siri Krishan Jindal v. Registrar (Deputy Commissioner), District Patiala, AIR 1982 Punjab & Haryana 266 and the apex Court in Himalaya House Co. Ltd., Bombay v. Chief Controlling Revenue Authority, AIR 1972 SC 899, the Registrar has no power to determine the market value of the property sold in order to assess the chargeability of the stamp duty on the same. Similarly, prior to the incorporation of S. 47-A in the Stamp Act, there was no provision in that Act to empower the revenue, the Collector or the Registering Officer to make an independent enquiry about the value of the property conveyed or sold for determining the stamp duty chargeable. We, therefore, find this stand of Mr. Sarin to be equally meritless.

3. It is hardly necessary to say in the light of the well established aspect of rule of law that every executive action, if it is to operate to the prejudice of any person, must be supported by some legislative authority. (See Rai Sahib Ram Jawaya Kapur v. The State of Punjab, AIR 1955 SC 549, State of Madhya Pradesh v. Thakur Bharat Singh, AIR 1967 SC 1170; Satwant Singh Sawhney v. D. Ramarathnam, Assistant Passport Officer,New Delhi, AIR 1967 SC 1836; Bennet Coleman and Co. v. Union of India, AIR 1973 SC 106, and Naraindas Indurkhya v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1974 SC 1232).

4. For the reasons recorded above, we conclude that the instructions Annexures P. 1 and P. 1/A in the instant case, and similar instructions/guidelines impugned in the connected cases as issued by different Collectors for their respective districts in the State of Punjab are totally without jurisdiction and void. The authorities under the Stamp Act as also under the Registration Act are directed to perform their duties in accordance with those statutes by ignoring the guidelines/instructions referred to above. The petitioners are also held entitled to costs at the rate of Rs. 1000/- in each case.

5. Petitions allowed.